GP 44-80 Design Guidelines For Relief Disposal Systems

Document No.
GP 44-80
Applicability Group
Date 31 March 2006
Guidance on Practice for

Relief Disposal Systems
GP 44-80
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Guidance on Practice for Relief Disposal Systems
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 44-80. This Guidance on
Practice (GP) is based on parts of heritage documents from the merged BP companies as follows:
BP RPSE
RP 44-3 Design Guidelines for Relief Disposal Systems.
Amoco
A PC-PRD-00-E Process Control-Pressure-Relief Devices-Device Selection and Systems
Design Specification.
A PC-PRD-00-G Process Control-Pressure-Relief Devices Guide.
ARCO Engineering Standards

Std 350 Spring Opposed Pressure Relief Valves.
Std 356 Low Pressure Tank Protective Devices.
Copyright
Copyright 2002,
2006, BP Group.
BPAll rights reserved.
Group. The information
All rights reserved.contained
The in this
document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which
information
the document wascontained inrecipients
supplied to the this document is subject
organization. toinformation
None of the the terms and
contained in this
conditions ofdocument shall be disclosed
the agreement outside the
or contract recipients
under which ownthe
organization
document was supplied to the recipients organization. None of
without the prior written permission of Director of Engineering, BP Group, unless the
terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.
the information contained in this document shall be disclosed
outside the recipients own organization without the prior written
permission of Manager, Standards, BP Group, unless the terms of
such agreement or contract expressly allow. Page 2 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Table of Contents
Page
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 2
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Normative references............................................................................................................. 6
3. Terms and definitions............................................................................................................. 7
3.1. General ....................................................................................................................... 7
3.2. Terms ......................................................................................................................... 7
3.3. Definitions ................................................................................................................... 8
4. Symbols and abbreviations .................................................................................................... 9
5. Choice of disposal systems.................................................................................................... 9
6. Atmospheric discharge ........................................................................................................ 10
6.1. Scope ....................................................................................................................... 10
6.2. General ..................................................................................................................... 11
6.3. Non-hazardous discharge ......................................................................................... 12
6.4. Flammable and toxic discharge in atmospheric vents ............................................... 12
6.5. Blowdown drums discharging to atmosphere ............................................................ 18
7. Closed systems ................................................................................................................... 18
7.1. General ..................................................................................................................... 18
7.2. Pipe & header sizing and layout ................................................................................ 19
7.3. Special relief arrangements ...................................................................................... 21
7.4. Winterisation ............................................................................................................. 22
8. Flare system design ............................................................................................................. 22
8.1. General ..................................................................................................................... 22
8.2. Component parts of the systems............................................................................... 22
8.3. Design considerations ............................................................................................... 23
8.4. Engineering diagrams ............................................................................................... 25
8.5. Flare types ................................................................................................................ 25
8.6. Smokeless flaring...................................................................................................... 26
8.7. Sizing of relief and flare systems............................................................................... 27
8.8. Siting......................................................................................................................... 28
8.9. Elevated flares .......................................................................................................... 33
8.10. Enclosed ground flares ............................................................................................. 33
8.11. Minimum heat content of flare gas ............................................................................ 33
8.12. Ignition systems ........................................................................................................ 33
8.13. Flashback prevention ................................................................................................ 34
8.14. Noise levels .............................................................................................................. 36
8.15. Flare sparing philosophy ........................................................................................... 36
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
9. Liquid removal ..................................................................................................................... 36

9.1. Unit knockout drum (Onshore) .................................................................................. 36
9.2. Primary knockout drum (Onshore) ............................................................................ 37
9.3. Cold service .............................................................................................................. 39
9.4. Liquid removal (Offshore).......................................................................................... 39
10. Flare purging and sealing .................................................................................................... 39
10.1. Gas purge ................................................................................................................. 39
10.2. Liquid seals ............................................................................................................... 42
10.3. Buoyancy seals (molecular seals) ............................................................................. 43
10.4. Flame arresters ......................................................................................................... 44
10.5. Efflux velocity accelerators (Velocity seals) ............................................................... 44
11. Flare and relief line headers and piping ............................................................................... 45
11.1. Routing ..................................................................................................................... 45
11.2. Design and construction............................................................................................ 45
12. Control and instrumentation ................................................................................................. 46
12.1. Flare smoke control .................................................................................................. 46
12.2. Burn-back ................................................................................................................. 47
12.3. Purge control ............................................................................................................ 47
12.4. Oxygen monitoring .................................................................................................... 48
12.5. Flow measurement ................................................................................................... 48
12.6. Requirements for instrumentation ............................................................................. 49
13. Testing ................................................................................................................................. 50
14. Spares ................................................................................................................................. 50
15. Blowdown system ................................................................................................................ 51
15.1. Design criteria ........................................................................................................... 51
15.2. Blowdown system liquid handling .............................................................................. 52
16. Vent systems ....................................................................................................................... 53
16.1. General ..................................................................................................................... 53
16.2. Closed vent system................................................................................................... 53
17. Flare gas recovery systems ................................................................................................. 54
Annex A (Normative) H.W. Husas correction formulae ................................................................. 56
Annex B (Informative) Flare system training information ............................................................... 58
Annex C-1 (Normative) Atmospheric relief chart ........................................................................... 59
Annex C-2 (Normative) Blowdown system assessment ................................................................ 60
Annex C-3 (Normative) Relief system studies and documentation ................................................ 61
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 62
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Introduction
This Guidance on Practice (GP) provides guidance on relief disposal systems that are within its stated
scope and is for use in determining the need for, and design of, specific relief disposal systems.
This GP refers to national and international standards that are widely accepted. Codes and standards of
the country in which the equipment is manufactured and/or operated should be considered and may be
accepted if they can be used to achieve an equivalent safe technical result. In any case, statutory and
local regulations must be complied with.
The value of this GP to its users is significantly enhanced by their regular participation in its
improvement and updating. For this reason, users are urged to inform BP of their experiences in all
aspects of its application.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
1. Scope
This GP specifies general requirements for designing relief disposal systems based on the engineering
principles set out in ISO 23251 or API RP 521 (Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring
Systems) and ISO 4126 or API RP 520 (Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving
Devices in Refineries). This GP should also be used in conjunction with sound engineering judgement
and with full consideration of country, state, and local rules and regulations. In addition, relief disposal
system shall be designed in compliance with the requirements of the insurance covering the plant or
installation.
In principle a relief disposal system includes individual pressure relief devices, a piping system with
associated control valves or manual valves and a discharge system. This system terminates in one or
more disposal systems such as a flare, in which the fluids are combusted, a scrubber or absorber in
which a component(s) of the relief stream is removed before venting, no treatment (i.e., vented directly
to the atmosphere), or blowdown systems in which non-volatile liquids are removed. Blowdown
drums are prohibited in services which handle heavier-than-air hydrocarbon vapour or light
hydrocarbon liquids (gasoline and lighter). The mechanical design of flare tips and stacks is covered in
GP 22-20.
This GP provides a level of safety acceptable to BP in the design and operation of the following
installations:
a. Refineries
b. Chemical plants
c. Terminals
d. Offshore installations
e. Crude oil and gas gathering centres
f. Pipelines: buried, above ground, or sub-sea
g. Storage installations
h. Floating production systems
i. Well Pads and Production Facilities
j. Steam generating plant and ancillary equipment
It shall be used in conjunction with GP 44-70, which specifies relief device requirements and the
calculation of relief loads.
2. Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text,
constitute requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or
revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this
technical practice are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of
the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative
document referred to applies.
BP
gHSSEr BP Getting Health, Safety, Security and Environment Right.
GP 14-01 Guidance on Practice for Noise Control.
GP 22-20 Guidance on Practices for Design of Flares (API 537).
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
GIS 22-201 Guidance on Industry Standard for Procurement of Flares to API 537.
GP 24-03 Guidance on Practice for Inherently Safer Design Concept Selection.
GP 30-76 Guidance on Practice for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
Development of the Process Requirements Specification.
GP 30-80 Guidance on Practice for SIS Implementation of Process Requirements.
GP 30-81 Guidance on Practice for SIS Operations and Maintenance.
GP 31-01 Guidance on Practice for Analyser Systems.
GP 44-10 Guidance on Practice for Plant Layout.
GP 44-30 Guidance on Practice for Event Modelling and Risk Based Evaluation.
GP 44-60 Guidance on Practice for API RP 500 Area Classification.
GP 44-65 Guidance on Practice for IP 15 Area Classification.
GP 44-70 Guidance on Practice for Overpressure Protection Systems.
GP 48-02 Guidance on Practice for HAZOP - Hazard & Operability Studies-
Training.
GP 76-01 Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention.
American Petroleum Institute (API)

API RP 520 Recommended Practice for Sizing, Selection, and Installation of
Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries.
API RP 521 Recommended Practice for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring
Systems.
API Std 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves.
API Std 537 Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Service.
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

ISO 4126 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure
Part 1: Safety valves.
Part 2: Bursting disc safety devices.
Part 4: Pilot operated safety devices.
Part 5: Controlled safety pressure relief systems.
Part 6: Application, selection and installation of bursting disc safety
devices.
Part 7: Common data.
ISO 23251 Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries Pressure-
Relieving and Depressuring Systems.
3. Terms and definitions
3.1. General
a. In this GP the term approve, as applied to BP, is used if BP does not wish a design to
proceed unless certain features have been agreed in writing with a contractor or supplier.
This does not imply that all details of a document have been considered by BP and does
not affect the design responsibilities of the contractor or supplier.
b. Throughout this document, the words will, may, should, shall and must, when used
in the context of actions by BP or others, have specific meanings. For the purposes of this
GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
3.2. Terms
Will - used normally in connection with an action by BP, rather than by a contractor or supplier.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
May - used if alternatives are equally acceptable.
Should - is used if a provision is preferred.
Shall - is used if a provision is mandatory.
Must - is used only when a provision is a statutory requirement.
3.3. Definitions
The technical terms used in this GP have the meanings as defined in ISO 23251 or API RP 521. The
following additional technical definitions also apply:
Coanda flare
A flare burner designed to employ the aerodynamic effect in which moving fluids follow a curved or
inclined surface over which they flow. Flares of this type generally use steam or pressure to achieve
smokeless operation.
Combustion support
The addition of fuel gas to the effluent to be flared for any of the following reasons:
a. To increase fuel concentration in order to make the effluent flammable.

b. To increase the volume of the effluent in order to increase flare tip velocity.
c. To avoid burn-back in the flare tip or flame lick outside the flare tip or a lazy flame
situation which could damage an adjacent flare tip.
d. To maintain an adequate slot velocity in a flare tip using the Coanda effect.
e. To prevent air infiltration.
f. To increase air turbulence and allow the flare to burn smokeless during periods of flare
relief, also known as assist gas.
Elevated flare
An elevated stack, (self-supported, guyed, or structure-supported), containing a flare tip, pilot burners,
igniters, smoke-suppressing devices, service pipes, and miscellaneous auxiliaries.
Flare
A general term used to designate a device or system used to safely dispose of relief gas in an
environmentally compliant manner through the use of combustion.
Flare system
The whole closed disposal system for fluids discharged from pressure relief valves, other pressure
relief devices, control valves, or manually operated valves, terminating in one or more flares.
Flare tip
The part of flare in which fuel and air are mixed at velocities, turbulence, and concentration required
to establish and maintain proper ignition and stable combustion. It is also referred as flare burner.
Flare vendor
A company that undertakes the design, supply, and sometimes the erection of a flare.
Ground flare
Any non-elevated flare. It is normally an enclosed flare, but may also refer to a ground multi-burner
flare or a burn pit.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Maximum flaring rate

The maximum rate of flow to the flare calculated in accordance with the specified blowdown and
relief philosophy for the plant.
Molecular seals
A gravity seal using the difference in molecular weight between air and the purge gas being used.
Flare tips using molecular seals are susceptible to burn back inside the flare tip.
Operational flaring load

Flare load results from process venting, normal safety valve leakage, and main process activities.
Emergency flaring load

Load results from emergency flare, pressure relief devices (relief from upset and/or emergency
blowdown system is activated).
Emergency depressuring load

Load resulting from blowdown of the facility to zero pressure inside the piping and process vessels.
Depending on the design philosophy, this can be either higher or lower than the emergency flare load.
Purge rate
The rate of flow of an inert or combustible gas required to prevent the oxygen concentration exceeding
a specified level at a specified location in the flare stack or supply ducting, when oxygen ingress is
undesirable.
Safe location
A safe location is one that would not cause significant deleterious impact or harm to personnel,
environment or property. Dispersion analyses and/or consequence analyses may be required to validate
the suitability of the discharge location.
Self-erecting flare
Flare that is dismountable and can be erected without the use of cranes (may need cranes, but only for
initial installation).
Smokeless
Without emitting dark smoke as defined in the UK Clean Air Act 1956 Section 34(2) or as defined in
EPA CFR 60.18 (c)(1) which basically does not allow the emission of visible smoke during flaring.
4. Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
CONCAWE Conservation of Clean Air and Water - Europe
LNG Liquefied natural gas
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
5. Choice of disposal systems
The selection of a disposal method is subject to many factors that may be specific to
a particular location or an individual unit. ISO 23251 or API RP 521 outline the
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
general principles and design approach for determining the most suitable type of
disposal system.
a. The system design approach shall include provisions for the disposal of warm or cold
fluids to a closed collection system with associated vapours or directly vented gases
passing to a vapour disposal system (such as a flare) or being directly vented to
atmosphere, depending on the fluid properties, molecular weight, and temperature, without
compromising personnel safety or equipment/ plant integrity.
b. If permitted by local statutory regulations, for relief of other than non-hazardous fluids, the
choice of pressure relief discharge location shall generally be in the following order of
preference, subject to the detailed limitations of this GP:
1. Other parts of the process plant or system.
2. Closed system, subject to the requirements of clause 7.
3. Atmosphere, subject to the requirements of clauses.
In general, the magnitude and frequency of relief discharge should be reduced by
using pressure-limiting instrumentation, in accordance with clause 7.3 of GP 44-70.
Constraints on atmospheric relief may be imposed by compact installations, e.g.
offshore.
c. Normal venting of flammable and toxic materials arising from controlled process
variations and sustained discharges for plant operability shall usually be taken to a closed
system.
In remote or offshore locations where there can be fewer potential sources of
ignition, such flammable and toxic discharges may be to atmosphere provided
dispersion analysis and consequence analyses do not indicate significant impact to
personnel safety or equipment / plant integrity and subject to BP approval.
d. Environmental considerations of releases need to be discussed thoroughly with the
appropriate Regulatory Authorities, at the earliest stage of process design in order to
implement the most cost effective solutions and to minimise effects on the environment.
6. Atmospheric discharge
6.1. Scope
Atmospheric discharge is the release of vapours and gases from pressure-relieving
and depressuring devices to the atmosphere. Atmospheric discharge, if feasible,
offers advantages over alternative methods of disposal because of its inherent
simplicity, dependability and generally lower capital cost.
a. Direct atmospheric releases shall be made within the limitations of environmental
regulations and corporate gHSSEr guidelines. See GP 76-01. Atmospheric venting for
flammable and/or toxic gases in BP shall be eliminated or severely curtailed when
practicable. Any deviation from the atmospheric venting requirements of this GP or any
new atmospheric blowdown stack installation requires approval from the BP Group
Director of Engineering.
b. The safe disposal approach requires an analysis for possible consequences including
thermal radiation levels from atmospheric vents which could ignite, an analysis of vapour
cloud dispersion, including any toxic products either present or formed from ignition of the
vent discharge, and an analysis of other possible consequences that may occur, depending
upon the release, including but not limited to vapour cloud explosions and flash fires.
These analyses determine the suitability for atmospheric relief and, if permitted, the
location and elevation at the point of discharge to assure that allowable thresholds for
thermal radiation, blast overpressure, and toxicity/flammability are not exceeded. When
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
performing these analyses, prevailing meteorological conditions shall be considered to

ensure personnel safety.
c. Noise levels from operational vent systems and relief devices that discharge directly to
atmosphere shall be analyzed to assure compliance with allowable levels. (See GP 14-01).
In the past, emergency pressure relief to atmosphere was accepted by BP, provided
it was below 1-2% H2S content, below a molecular weight of 72, and permitted by
statutory regulations. Other relief streams were taken to flare, the flare system being
sized on total discharge from the 'largest relieving unit'.
With development of the 'integrated facility design approach, the increased use of
air-cooling and much larger process units; BP philosophy was modified
accordingly. To adopt a conservative interpretation of API recommended practices
involves limited cost where safety relief devices discharge to atmosphere, but
considerable cost (both capital and operating) where relief streams discharge to
flare. This led to development of the principle that emergency hydrocarbon relief
streams could be taken to atmosphere wherever this could be regarded as 'safe'. The
general criteria for this were 1-2% H2S content, condensability (associated with a
generally-accepted increased molecular weight of 100) and restrictions on location
and velocity of discharge. These general criteria have since been replaced by the
requirement for a rigorous dispersion analysis and consequence analysis using BP
approved methods.
6.2. General
a. Under normal operation there shall be no continuous venting of raw (unburned)
hydrocarbons or toxic vapours to the atmosphere. This restriction does not apply to
analyser sample streams (GP 31-01) with very small venting rates and purge gas systems
required to prevent air ingress and designed to keep atmospheric vent systems safe.
Proposed venting of anything other than steam, air, or nitrogen shall be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis with due consideration of regulatory and BP corporate guidelines.
b. Dispersion analyses and consequence analyses shall be performed for all flammable, toxic,
corrosive and/or otherwise hazardous relief streams venting directly to atmosphere.
c. Atmospheric relief shall present no unacceptable secondary hazard such as increased risk
of fire, toxic exposure, or an explosive hazard. The definitions and calculation methods
used to justify this general criterion, where not covered by this GP, shall be specified or
approved by BP for each project.
d. If required by a regulating authority, an integrity assessment analysis study shall be made
or approved by BP to assess the estimated frequency and duration of atmospheric
emergency relief streams covered by clause 7.6 of GP 44-70. Credit for the use of
automatic pressure-limiting instrumentation should be taken, as justified by the study.
e. General discussion of atmospheric discharge from pressure relief devices in processing
installations is given in GP 44-10. However, flammable and toxic discharges shall comply
with the requirements of clause 6.4, which may dictate modified distances.
f. Noise limits shall be maintained in normally manned areas to meet the Special Limits
given in GP 14-01.
g. If atmospheric relief discharge is permitted within this GP, allowed per applicable national
codes or standards, meets BP corporate guidelines, and is acceptable to the local
authorities, no additional closed system need be provided for such discharges.
h. If pressure relief devices discharge to atmosphere, each individual discharge line should
have at least the same bore as the outlet from the pressure relief device. If acceptable
dispersion cannot be attained with this tail pipe bore, the outlet end of the tail pipe may be
reduced in diameter to improve dispersion, provided such a reduction does not increase the
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
relief device back pressure to where the pressure relief device does not operate stably or
where the relief rate is reduced below that calculated or required by the process.
6.3. Non-hazardous discharge

a. Safety relief devices venting steam, instrument/plant air, nitrogen vapours, or other non-
flammable and non-toxic gases shall be discharged to the atmosphere through a tail pipe
terminating at a suitable and safe location, as approved by BP. Note that analyses may be
required to validate the suitability of the discharge location for gases that may pose
asphyxiation or thermal burn hazards.
b. Air or steam used during start-up operations, maintenance, or decoking and regeneration
purposes may be discharged to the atmosphere and not to a closed disposal system.
c. When the discharge is not flammable or toxic, the discharge line to atmosphere shall have
a 10 mm (3/8 in) diameter drain hole at its lowest point.
6.4. Flammable and toxic discharge in atmospheric vents

If atmospheric discharge from relief devices has been permitted and approved by BP, any
flammable or toxic atmospheric discharges from pressure relief devices shall comply with
GP 44-70 and guidelines in this clause.
6.4.1. General
a. The decision to intermittently discharge flammable and toxic materials to the atmosphere
requires careful attention to ensure that disposal can be accomplished without creating a
potential hazard or causing other problems, such as the formation of flammable mixtures at
grade level or at elevated structures, buildings, process and breathing air intakes; exposure
of personnel to toxic materials; ignition of relief streams at the point of emission; excessive
noise levels; and air pollution. ISO 23251 or API RP 521 covers in greater detail these
associated potential hazards or problems.
b. The duration of atmospheric relief discharge should be limited by the use of pressure-
limiting instrumentation, reseating relief valves, or operator intervention. However, in
addition, the following criteria shall be met for flammable and/or toxic relief streams as
defined by BP:
1. The discharge velocity shall be sufficient to reduce the concentration of flammable
material at a suitable distance downstream of the point of discharge to below the
lower flammable limit, but not such a high outlet velocity that a build-up of static
electricity could occur.
a) The additional effect of wind-assisted dispersion between the jet and any source
of ignition may be taken into consideration subject to BP approval.
b) The use of pilot-assisted relief valves may be necessary (in services in which
these types of valves can be used) to achieve adequate jet velocities.
c) The distance downstream is set by plant layout and environmental
considerations.
See clause 6.4.1.d below.
2. To maximise dilution in atmospheric discharge, every pressure relief device should
have its own discharge line where practical. The discharge pipe shall be adequately
supported and sized for rated capacity of the relief device per clause 6.2.h above.
3. Dispersion analysis and consequence analyses shall be performed to confirm that the
discharge does not represent a significant impact to personnel safety, environment or
to equipment/ plant integrity per clause 6.4.5.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
4. There shall be no significant condensation of flammable or toxic material released

from the discharge pipe at the minimum expected ambient temperature.
a) Criteria for assessing condensability require specific calculations for each case.
b) As a preliminary guide, a hydrocarbon vapour of average molecular weight 100
or less should not generally condense under typical discharge conditions unless
the minimum expected ambient temperature allows condensation to occur.
c) For higher molecular weights a more detailed analysis is required; involving the
examination of vapour cooling rates and dew point conditions at the specified
minimum ambient temperature for the site.
5. The calculation methods used to justify these general criteria shall be subject to
approval by BP.
c. If multiple pressure relief devices are fitted on a system, the set pressures should be
staggered to assist in maintaining a high discharge velocity and to minimise chatter in the
case of relief valves.
If equipment is protected by multiple, parallel relief devices, most pressure vessel
design codes require the maximum set pressure to be not more than 5% above
design pressure for the second and later devices. However the European Pressure
Equipment Directive (PED) does not allow any pressure relief valve to have a set
pressure above the vessel design pressure unless the pressure relief valve is tested at
that condition. Therefore, it may be necessary to provide an additional margin
between operating and design pressures to permit adequate staggering of set
pressures.
d. The following are minimum spacing requirements for atmospheric venting and may need
to be increased for adequate dispersion.
1. In process installations, pressure relief devices on flammable services shall discharge
at a point not less than 3 m (10 ft) above any platform, equipment or structure within
a horizontal radius of 30 m (100 ft) measured from the point of discharge. Relief
devices in toxic service are subject to these same minimum distances, but may need to
have their distance increased pending national codes and standards or HSSE
guidelines for exposure limits.
2. In process installation, flammable vapours should discharge at a point not less than
30 m (100 ft) measured in a straight line from any permanent source of ignition.
3. Vapour from LPG or other low boiling point material storage vessels remote from a
process area shall discharge to atmosphere not less than 3 m (10 ft) above the pressure
relief devices and not less than 3 m (10 ft) above any platform within a 15 m (50 ft)
radius. There shall also be no permanent source of ignition within the radii specified
in GP 44-60 or GP 44-65, as appropriate, as measured from the discharge of a low
boiling point pressure relief device.
4. Flammable and toxic vapours shall discharge at a level not less than 25 m (82 ft)
above grade or any main operating floor.
e. The possibility of relief discharge ignition coincident with the presence of an operator in
the vicinity shall be considered and, if necessary, specific means for operator protection or
escape shall be provided as approved by BP. See clause 8.8.4 for thermal exposure limits.
f. There shall be no direct flame impingement or unacceptable radiation levels at operating
positions (i.e. in the event a flammable, atmospheric release would ignite). While not
normally required, if ignition would create a higher risk level, consideration should be
given to performing a quantified risk analysis to assess the likelihood of relief discharge
ignition. (Typical assumption is that flammable releases can ignite).
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The combination of (a) a process upset causing a flammable discharge, (b) the
possible ignition of this discharge, and (c) the possible presence of an operator at a
point close enough to be significantly affected, may well be considered to be remote,
but should also consider the potential size of the release and radius of impact.
g. If the discharge is flammable or toxic, the discharge line to atmosphere shall have a 10 mm
(3/8 in) drain at its lowest point. As required, the drain shall be piped to a safe location and
may contain a locked-open isolation valve in an easily accessible location.
If the relief system is capable of creating significant system backpressure, higher
discharge rates than normally expected may flow through this drain.
h. Selection of the pressure relief device shall consider the potential effects (if possible) for
vacuum formation in the protected equipment.
1. For some pressure relief devices, failure or opening can occur if the outlet pressure
exceeds the inlet pressure thereby allowing air to enter the equipment.
2. If air entry is possible, the potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere inside
the equipment shall be evaluated and, as required, effective prevention/mitigation
measures shall be provided.
Some pilot operated pressure relief valves may open if the outlet pressure exceeds
the inlet pressure. Backflow preventers can be installed to minimize the potential for
opening, but may be ineffective at high pressure differentials.
Some rupture disks require vacuum supports to prevent disk damage or failure when
the outlet pressure exceeds the inlet pressure.
i. When specified by BP, steam or inert gas connections may be provided for atmospheric
relief streams at ambient temperatures or above, only for use in extinguishing any residual
burning.
1. This shall be by hand control from grade level using double block-and-bleed valves,
connected to the vent after the relief device.
Double block and bleed valves are used to prevent undetected steam or inert gas
leakage to atmosphere.
2. A drain hole, left permanently open, shall be provided in the vent line. The vent line
drain hole shall be fitted with a short line to a safe location, or be located to discharge
away from any operating platform.
3. Such locations shall be subject to approval by BP.
j. Extra attention is required when relief gas may contain vapours that are dangerous at
extremely low concentrations; for example, hydrogen sulphide vapours can cause
unconsciousness and fatality within seconds following exposure to a concentration above
1 000 ppm. This is approximately one-tenth the lowest flammable limit concentration for
many hydrocarbons.
k. When installed for discharge temperatures below 0C (32F), extinguishing connections
shall be inert gas instead of steam. The use of Halons (bromo- or chlorofluorocarbons) and
other vaporising liquids shall be avoided if possible, and shall be considered only if there is
no practical alternative and if approved by BP. In this eventuality, reasonable steps shall be
taken to minimise the release of the vaporising liquid to atmosphere.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons are now generally accepted as being
significant man-made contributors to the depletion of the ozone layer.
The implications of this philosophy for the BP Group are contained in Safety
Guidance Note No. 90/2. This document outlines the approach that should be taken
when selecting an extinguishant for various applications, and should be consulted if
a new use for a Halon is being considered.
Page 14 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
In many applications, the use of an inert gas or steam is a practical, if more

expensive, alternative that should be thoroughly evaluated.
6.4.2. Vapour emission

Guidance in this clause should only be used for preliminary estimates and does not replace the
mandatory requirement for dispersion and consequence analyses in clause 6.4.5.
a. Released vapours or gases can be diluted below the lower flammable limit by entraining
air if the Reynolds number at the vent outlet meets or exceeds the following criterion:
g

Re 1.54 10 4 (from ISO 23251 or API RP 521)
a
Where Re = Reynolds number calculated at the vent outlet
g = Density of the gas at vent outlet
a = Density of the air
b. If the vent gas exit velocity is too low, air entrainment is limited and the released vapours
will be wind dominated, potentially forming flammable or explosive mixtures some
distance from the emission source. See ISO 23251 or API RP 521 for additional guidance.
c. Relief valves do not always relieve at full capacity and reduced flow rates with lower
dispersion factors shall be considered in the required dispersion studies.
6.4.3. Mist emission

Guidance in this clause should only be used for preliminary estimates and does not replace the
requirement for a dispersion analysis and consequence analysis discussed in clause 6.4.5.
a. Mists can result from condensation occurring after a vapour only release. See ISO 23251
or API RP 521, for further details and proposed methods of dealing with potential mists.
b. In general, provided the Reynolds number in clause 6.4.2 above is met or exceeded, the
flammability envelope for potential mists that may be formed can be taken as the same as
the stack vapour emission envelope.
6.4.4. Liquid overfill potential for vessels with pressure relief devices discharging directly to
atmosphere
a. Many process vessels have a liquid level present during normal, start-up, or shutdown
operations.
1. If these vessels are provided with pressure relief devices that discharge directly to
atmosphere, then overfilling of the vessel with liquid shall be considered to be a
credible event.
2. Unlike vapour or mist discharges, a discharge of liquid can settle out to grade creating
a hazardous environment. Appropriate design interventions shall be implemented to
ensure liquid is not released from the vessel.
3. The following minimum safeguards listed in this clause against overfilling the vessel
and potentially relieving liquid to the atmosphere are required and shall apply to
services in which a flammable, hazardous, and/or toxic liquid may be discharged.
Other criteria for atmospheric relief specified elsewhere in this GP must also be met.
b. Relief valves designed to relieve vessel vapours shall have the valve inlet connected to the
vessel vapour space. Note that in cases in which fire is the only credible scenario involving
vapour relief and if the equipment is normally liquid-full, the relief device should be
Page 15 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
installed at the high-point of the equipment or at a location that would promote vapour-
liquid disengagement.
c. If the time between when a critical high level alarm occurs and when the vessel becomes
liquid full is 30 minutes or more, based upon normal liquid inflow or production rates with
no liquid removal, the minimum level safeguards are:
1. At least two independent and diverse liquid level measurements shall be provided.
2. An additional independent critical high level alarm shall be provided.
3. Operations actions to prevent further accumulation of liquid level in response to the
critical high level alarm shall be clearly defined in operating manuals and training
materials and shall be reviewed with operating crews at regular intervals. The
operator actions shall be simple and effective in reducing levels.
4. A Hazard Evaluation shall be done using the techniques described in GP 30-76 to
determine if additional protective measures should be implemented.
d. If the time between when a critical high level alarm occurs and when the vessel becomes
liquid full is between 15 and 30 minutes, the minimum level safeguards are:
1. All safeguards listed in (c) above for over 30 minute reaction times.
2. Addition of a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) rated Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
that will activate on High-High level to prevent further accumulation of liquid or shut
down the equipment. The required integrity level shall be determined from a Hazard
Evaluation using the techniques described in GP 30-76.
e. If the time between when a critical high level alarm occurs and when the vessel becomes
liquid full is less than 15 minutes the minimum required safeguards are either:
1. The pressure relief valve shall not discharge to atmosphere, but shall discharge to a
safe closed system or back to a safe location within the process, or
2. All safeguards listed above (c) for over 30 minute reaction times and the addition of a
Safety Integrity Level rated Safety Instrumented System that activates on High-High
level to prevent further accumulation of liquid or shut down the equipment. The
required integrity level shall be determined from a Hazard Evaluation using the
techniques described in GP 30-76. No credit for Operator response to alarms shall be
taken in this evaluation. It should be noted that this system may have to be SIL 3.
f. Measured level ranges for systems with atmospheric relief shall be sufficient to indicate
actual level during all operations including start-up and shutdown. Equipment shall not
continue to be operated if the level indications and alarms are not functional or if the
indicated level measurements are above the high range of the measurements. (e.g.,
indicated level is 100% or higher).
g. In cases where a closed relief disposal system is not considered adequate for a liquid
overfill case, the instrumentation criteria above (clauses c-e) covering overfill protection
shall be applied.
h. The following criteria shall be met when installing the level measurements and alarms
mentioned above:
1. Level instruments used for safeguards against overfilling shall use separate process
taps.
2. Level instruments used for safeguards against overfilling shall use diverse
technologies (e.g. differential pressure and radar, displacer and differential pressure,
displacer and float, etc.) and shall be proven in use for the specific process
applications. Tower differential pressure devices may be acceptable, but criteria for
their use as surrogate level indicating devices need to be developed.
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3. Float type level switches may be used for high critical alarms, but an additional
transmitter is preferred.
4. The range of at least one of the two primary level measurements shall be such that it
indicates a valid level reading at the high critical alarm point and any shutdown or
interlock points. Also, the lowest density material expected to be in the vessel shall by
used for instrument calibration of overfill protective devices.
5. Operating characteristics of the level measurement during off-design, start-up, and
shutdown operations shall be considered in setting alarms and trip points. This
behaviour shall also be included in operator training and operating procedures. For
example a differential pressure or displacer level measurement reads low compared to
actual level if the fluid specific gravity is less than the design gravity. This can mean
that the indicated level cannot reach 100% even if the actual level is well above the
measured range.
6.4.5. Dispersion and consequence modelling

Other than for thermal relief (intended to intermittently relieve a very small volume of fluid (not
sustained relief)), dispersion modelling and hazard consequence analysis shall be conducted for
atmospheric relief devices and blowdown systems in flammable and/or toxic venting services.
The following criteria shall be followed:
a. The model should be based on a matrix of all relief cases, and model a range of cases,
depending on which are the most sensitive. As a minimum, modelling shall cover the rated
relief capacity of device and a representative low-flow case, such as 25% of rated capacity
or failure of the device at normal operating pressure.
b. For vents and blowdown systems to which more than one device discharges, note that
lower venting rates than the design basis (design basis is usually the highest rate) shall be
considered. Lower velocities from the stack tend to reduce the dispersion and can increase
the potential for the cloud to reach grade or other potentially vulnerable locations
(buildings, elevated platforms, process and breathing air intakes, etc.) while still flammable
or toxic. This means that the lowest expected relief rate into the system from any single
device should be considered.
c. A range of atmospheric conditions should be considered (such as using the U.S. EPA
SCREEN grid or local equivalent).
d. A model appropriate to the situation shall be chosen. In most cases PHAST or CIRRUS
should be satisfactory, unless special fluid properties or conditions apply.
e. For determining consequences, acceptable concentrations shall be 50% of the lower
flammability limit (LFL) at ground level, working platforms, buildings, process and
building air intakes, and at potential sources of ignition.
1. Acceptable concentrations shall also be below the short term exposure limit (STEL,
ERPG2 or other threshold as required by local regulation) at ground level and
working platforms.
2. Industrial Hygiene specialists should review potential exposures to benzene and other
carcinogens.
3. Toxic impacts outside the plant and process boundary may also need to be
considered, dependent on plant location and circumstances.
f. Potential ignition radiation impacts on personnel and equipment shall be considered.
g. If dispersion and consequence analyses indicate that flammable or toxic thresholds may be
exceeded, either connecting relief devices to closed systems or risk reduction measures
such as installation of high-integrity protective systems (HIPS) per GP 30-76 shall be
considered.
Page 17 of 62
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6.4.6. Venting from tanks and spheres

a. Venting for storage and low pressure spheres or tanks generally shall be in accordance
with API 2000 requirements.
b. Inlet and outlet piping on pressure relief and vacuum relief devices for atmospheric or low
pressure equipment should be kept to a minimum. Inlet and outlet piping and pipe fittings
shall be included in the relief device capacity calculations.
c. Pressure vacuum vents should be installed on hydrocarbon storage tanks in lieu of open
vents; however note the exclusion of viscous oil tanks in API 2000. Spheres and other LPG
vessels should be (in order of preference) designed for:
1. The minimum expected vacuum
2. Partial vacuum and equipped with a vacuum relief device along with a gas
repressuring line, or
3. Partial vacuum and equipped with a vacuum relief device but without a gas
repressuring line.
d. If practical, the use of either an inert or fuel gas pressurization line with a vapour recovery
system is preferred to allowing air ingress into or venting from a tank in hydrocarbon
service. However, a gas repressuring line does not circumvent the requirement for vacuum
relief protection due to reliability considerations.
e. New construction tanks and low-pressure spheres shall have a minimum of two means of
protection from overpressure and/or vacuum conditions when this is a potential process
risk. Existing tanks installation should strive to achieve this level of protection. A
combination breather vacuum vent satisfies both the pressure and vacuum relief
requirement for one level of pressure and vacuum protection in a single device.
f. Horizontal vent or exhaust pipes (often cut at a 45 degree angle) may be used on BP tank
and sphere installations. Consideration shall be given to nests, debris, or other foreign
material that could potentially plug these vents.
6.5. Blowdown drums discharging to atmosphere

See clause 15.
7. Closed systems
7.1. General
a. Closed relief systems are most frequently flare systems incorporating knockout drums if
necessary, but may in some cases be absorbers, scrubbers, quench towers, dump tanks, etc.
Closed systems shall be subject to design and installation approvals by BP.
b. Fluids returned to other parts of the process shall be compatible in composition and
temperature, to avoid any violent vaporisation or the possible formation of solids.
c. The following relief streams shall be taken to a closed system:
1. Relief streams that do not satisfy the requirements for atmospheric relief as given in
clause 6.4.
2. Relief streams that satisfy atmospheric relief requirements but where regulating
authorities prohibit atmospheric venting.
d. Normal venting of flammable and toxic materials arising from controlled process
variations and sustained discharges for plant operability shall be taken to a closed system;
however, in remote or offshore locations where there are fewer potential sources of
ignition, such flammable discharges might be to atmosphere, subject to BP approval.
Page 18 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
e. Attention is drawn to the possibility of condensation in a closed relief system immediately

following pressure relief device operation, leading to the ingress of air into the system. It
may be necessary to provide either a liquid seal drum or an emergency supply of non-
condensable purge gas to avoid this condition (clause 10.1.k). This effect can also occur
during normal operation from rapid cooling of an uninsulated, solar heated header by a
rainstorm.
f. When any addition or modification is being made to an existing closed relief system
protective instrumentation, utility rearrangement or closed system modifications, shall use
the principles of reliability analysis as outlined in GP 44-70 clause 7.4. The resulting
design measures may not necessarily be identical to those for new designs, but they shall
meet the requirements of this GP unless otherwise approved by BP.
Any such modifications need to be phased in with operating requirements, but
acceptable closed system capacity shall be maintained during all phases of the
modification.
If a small proportion of low-pressure vessels share a common closed relief system
with higher-pressure vessels, it may be economical to up-rate the lower-pressure
vessels rather than size the collecting system for the lowest back-pressure or use two
separate systems.
g. Knockout drums shall be provided if necessary to prevent liquid being carried over to the
disposal system (see clause 9).
h. If specified by BP, the feasibility of installing a flare gas recovery system shall be
investigated. This may be for economic or environmental reasons. If a flare gas recovery
system is installed, a free path to flare (e.g., liquid seal drum or rupture disk), independent
of instrumentation, shall be provided to allow for failure of the recovery system. (See
clause 10.2 for liquid seal requirements).
7.2. Pipe & header sizing and layout

a. Closed relief systems shall be sized on the basis of the normal venting (i.e., PSV leaking
seals, analyser vents), plus the emergency load arising from the most severe single event,
taking account of interaction. The following are some relief event examples:
1. A failure affecting a single equipment item together with its related effects.
2. A failure of a utility section (e.g., loss of electric power to single motor control
centre), or other limited condition, affecting a number of relieving points
simultaneously.
3. Temporary flaring during equipment start-up and ramp up. (i.e. turbine start-up,
compressor venting at start-up, or shutdown or gas venting from a drying unit.)
4. An overall utility failure or event affecting a number of relieving points
simultaneously (e.g., plant-wide or unit-wide loss of: electric power, instrument air,
cooling water, fuel gas, steam, etc.).
5. A fire affecting the whole of the largest single section of plant that can be readily
isolated by fire-fighting personnel and their equipment.
6. A failure of any flare gas recovery plant associated with the closed system.
7. A failure of the whole or part of any instrument system.
8. The emergency depressuring load shall be added to the worst relief load which could
be the cause of the need for depressuring, e.g., a fire. Vessels protected by both
depressuring valves and pressure relief valves should use the larger of the
depressuring load or the pressure relief load from the fire, but not both unless both are
required to prevent overpressure.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
For Exploration and Production flares the depressuring load can be very large,
approaching or exceeding the other individual or group loads. Unless certain
measures are undertaken, it is possible that either as a transient or even longer,
relief and blowdown loads could be superimposed if necessary to prevent
overpressure.
b. In determining the above, good engineering judgement shall be used in accordance with
ISO 23251 or API RP 521 generally, and GP 44-70 in particular. In all cases, design of the
closed pressure relief system shall meet requirements for air quality and for the release of
combustion products to a safe location.
c. If practical, the discharge pipe size should be as large as, or larger than, the size of the
pressure relief device outlet flange.
d. The hydraulic profile of closed disposal systems shall be verified and calculations shall be
updated as required to reflect the current piping arrangements, knockout drums, seal drum,
and flare installation. Laterals from the relief device outlet flange to the main header shall
use the rated capacity flow from the pressure relief valve except for modulating pilot
operated relief valves where the required relief load can be used. Main headers, flare
headers, and flare stacks should be sized for the required relief load.
e. Relief system piping shall be sized using the following pipe roughness, which reflects BP
experience of increased roughness in relief system piping:
1. 0,46 mm (0,018 in or 0,001 5 ft) for heavily corroded piping.
2. 0,15 mm (0,006 in or 0,000 5 ft) for carbon steel piping in normal service.
3. 0,046 mm (0,001 8 in or 0,000 15 ft) for stainless steel and other alloy piping in
normal service.
f. The use of an equivalent roughness of 0,046 mm (0,000 15 ft (0,001 8 in)) is generally not
considered to be sufficiently conservative basis for the sizing of relief headers and relief
valve discharge lines. The effect of using a higher pipe roughness varies with the system
concerned, however it is possible for pressure losses to be increased by as much as 50-
80%.The evaluation of pressure drops in piping handling compressible fluids (gases,
vapours, multiphase fluids, and/or fluids above the thermodynamic critical point) shall
evaluate the potential to reach sonic velocity (i.e., choking conditions) in the piping. The
isothermal flow model should be used to determine the hydraulic profile for gas/vapour
flow (See ISO 23251 or API RP 521). For multiphase compressible flow, the
homogeneous equilibrium model or equivalent that considers potential for choking (i.e.,
reaching sonic velocity) should be used to determine the hydraulic profile (See ISO 23251
or API RP 521).
g. Outlet relief device piping shall be sized to limit the maximum velocity to 0,8 Mach
Number if practical. Higher Mach numbers are allowed if an analysis is performed to
ensure acoustically induced vibration fatigue failures will not occur and that the piping and
pressure relief devices are adequately supported/ braced for the reaction forces caused by
venting.
h. Discharge piping shall be self-draining from the pressure relief device to the relief header.
Relief headers shall be self-draining toward their respective knockout drums or receivers
and all relief sub-headers shall be self-draining toward the main headers. The header
upstream of the flare shall similarly drain back to the drum.
i. Locating a pressure relief device below a header in closed systems should be avoided.
Laterals from a device that absolutely must be located below the header shall rise
continuously to the top of the header entry point and means shall be provided to both
prevent and confirm no condensate or liquid accumulation in the device discharge piping.
j. Discharge piping from operational vents should be insulated for a certain length if external
ice formation is to be prevented in a specified plot area to avoid falling ice hazards for
Page 20 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
personnel. Similarly, discharge piping from operational vents in hot service (above 65C or
150F) shall be insulated or barricaded if personnel could be exposed.
k. A closed system receiving multiple relief streams, in which vessels may be fitted with
pressure-limiting instrumentation, shall be sized on the general basis of ISO 23251 or API
RP 521 which states the maximum load as the sum of the loads of the individual devices
connected to it which are assumed to be relieving under the governing emergency
condition. The number assumed to be relieving simultaneously may be reduced if credit
for the operation of pressure-limiting instrumentation is taken.
l. Credit taken in this way for the operation of pressure-limiting instrumentation is subject to
approval by BP for each project, in accordance with the general principles of this GP and
the GP 30 series covering SIS systems as listed in clause 2.
m. If credit is taken for the operation of pressure-limiting instrumentation in the sizing of
closed relief systems, this instrumentation shall be evaluated and designed in accordance
with GP 30-76 and GP 30-80, appropriately SIS rated, and regarded as an integral part of
the pressure-relieving system.
n. In general, estimates shall be made of the possible incidence of pressure relief devices
lifting simultaneously due to the failure of pressure-limiting instrumentation or devices in
response to estimated demand rates. The criteria for sizing a closed relief system can be
refined using Quantified Risk Assessment principles as detailed in GP 50-01 and GP 50-02
such that the design flow rate is not likely to be exceeded within a period to be determined
for each case.
7.3. Special relief arrangements
7.3.1. Hydrogen sulphide relief

Since hydrogen sulphide is a highly toxic material that is frequently encountered, general
practice rules for selection of disposal means have been established and should be applied as
follows. Note that all discharges shall comply with clause 6.4.
% by Volume H2S Disposal means
less than 1 Atmosphere (Clause 6.4 governs)
12 BP to approve
greater than 2 Flare (separate line should be considered
for concentrations exceeding 10%)
7.3.2. Corrosive relief

Specific arrangements shall be made for corrosive relief streams, and these shall be subject to
approval by BP. Discharge of corrosive substances normally involve special materials of
construction, and the economics of segregating such discharges shall be evaluated. Materials
shall be subject to BP approval.
7.3.3. Low-temperature relief

Pressure relief header systems for refrigerated storage should be designed to:
Provide a high-toughness material in the flare header. Failures have occurred
where steels appropriate for the temperature of gas entering the header was not
used (auto-refrigeration effect).
Not have low points in which liquid could accumulate to prevent adequate relief
flow.
Provide a very low pressure drop to flare, so that the probability of opening any
atmospheric vent is greatly reduced.
Page 21 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
a. Low-temperature relief of fluids shall be segregated from other streams that are wet, to
avoid freezing of lines. For other than atmospheric discharge, a separate knockout drum
and closed vent system shall be provided using materials of construction specifically
selected for low-temperature service.
b. If appropriate, consideration shall be given to the provision of methanol injection facilities
to prevent hydrate formation.
7.4. Winterisation
a. If the danger of freezing of vent lines or pressure relief devices exists, heat tracing or other
positive precautions shall be taken.
b. If any overpressure protection is by pressure-limiting instrumentation that relies on heat
tracing, the heat tracing shall be included in reliability considerations if necessary.
c. If liquid seals are being considered, winterization or freeze protection of these seals shall
be carefully considered during the closed system design phase.
8. Flare system design
8.1. General
Flare systems are used to convert flammable, toxic, or corrosive vapours to less
objectionable compounds by combustion. The type of flare as well as any design
features required will be based on many factors such as the characteristic of the
flare gas, namely, composition, quantity, pressure level; economics, including both
initial investment and operating costs; availability of space; and public relations.
a. Flare systems and all associated components (headers, knockout drums, etc.) that are
described in ISO 23251 or API RP 521 shall be designed to meet the minimum
requirements of this document and shall comply with this GP as well as other referenced
documents.
b. Refer to GP 22-20 for further details on flare: mechanical design, operation, maintenance
issues and use of the flare as a disposal device.
8.2. Component parts of the systems

The flare system may comprise some or all of the following:
a. Lateral discharge lines from individual fluid discharge devices.
b. Relief headers connecting the lateral discharge lines together.
c. Flare header, to which relief headers from different units are connected, and which leads
to:
1. Knockout drum(s).
2. Quench drum(s).
3. Liquid seal drum(s).
4. Flare, consisting of: flare tip or flare burners, flare stack (if elevated) or enclosure (if
ground flare), stack support system, continuous pilots, pilot igniters and piping.
d. Ignition system.
e. Flame supervision (i.e. monitoring and pilot ignition).
f. Flashback prevention.
g. Purge system.
Page 22 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
h. Isolation system.
i. Smoke suppression control system.
j. Gas sampling system.
k. Oxygen analyzer.
l. Flow, temperature and level measurements and alarms.
m. Pump out facilities for drums.
n. Fire protection.
o. Insulation.
p. Heating and heat tracing.
q. Cold liquid/vapour vaporization and heating system.
r. Flare gas recovery system.
8.3. Design considerations

a. In normal operation, continuous hydrocarbon flaring shall be minimized as much as
practical.
b. The following points shall be given specific attention in the overall design of the flare
system:
1. The safety and well being of all personnel in the vicinity (both on-site and off-site)
under all conditions of flare operation. This includes start-up, purging, operational
and emergency flaring, shutdown, inspection, and maintenance of all or parts of the
system.
2. The protection of plant and equipment in the vicinity of the flare system under all
conditions including surface protection of the flare system itself per GP 22-20.
3. The protection of the flare system from damage by external events, e.g. fires.
4. The inherent safety of the flare system itself especially in respect of the following:
a) Flammable or explosive mixtures Blockages or flow restrictions
b) Chemical reactions Toxic components
c) Corrosion, erosion & hydrogen embrittlement Mechanical damage
d) Flare flame stability Security of ignition
e) Security of pilots Change over to another flare
5. The flow rate, composition, molecular weight, temperature, frequency and duration of
process streams discharging into the flare system at any one time, and any inherent
restrictions imposed, e.g. allowable back pressure, solids deposition. Particular
attention should be paid to depressuring flow rates especially if depressuring is
activated because of a fire or due to utilities failure that might cause all depressuring
valves to open simultaneously (if all depressuring valves are designed to fail open).
6. BP will approve or provide design data such as flare gas composition, molecular
weight, flow rates and utility services (e.g., steam, electric power, instrument air, fuel
gas, etc.) available.
7. Materials of construction for flare systems should be selected to be suitable for
operation at the minimum temperature of the system, allowing for any auto-
refrigeration from depressuring. For more information on material selection for the
flare refer to GP 22-20.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
8. Required life of flare system components.

9. The philosophy adopted for inspection and maintenance of the flare system and the
impact of these requirements on plant operation (flare system sparing requirements).
See GP Group 32 practices.
10. Meteorological and any other relevant environmental conditions pertaining to the site.
11. Any national and local regulations, particularly concerning smokeless burning, flare
visibility, pollution, and noise restrictions.
12. The need for segregation or isolation of relief headers for reasons of temperature (See
clause 9.3), toxicity, corrosive materials, etc.
a) Segregation is particularly required to prevent freezing of water wet streams,
solidification of viscous materials, or reactions which could lead to plugging of
lines.
b) If it can be proven that no wet (non-dehydrated) relief streams are present or
feasible (such as in an LNG import terminal), then no cold or wet
collection/flare system is necessary although a dry collection/flare would still be
needed.
13. Handling systems for the safe disposal of condensed hydrocarbons and sour water
from both knockout and seal drums.
14. A secure supply of seal fluid to the seal drum with provision to prevent overfill to the
flare header and knockout drum(s).
15. Plot space/layout considerations.
16. The requirement for a highly reliable cold liquid/vapour vaporisation and heating
system in situations where a cold flare cannot be justified.
17. Two or more elevated flares are allowed to be open to a common flare header only if
each flare is equipped with a liquid seal drum or other system to prevent the chimney
effect whereby gas flows out one flare causes a down draft in the other flare allowing
air to be drawn in.
c. The following is a checklist of possible hazards that should be considered in the design of
flare systems.
1. Flammable/Explosive mixtures in the flare system which could result from air
entering the system by any of the following mechanisms:
a) Down draft due to buoyancy effects, loss of purge gas flow, failure of the purge
reduction (molecular seal).
b) Condensation or cooling of vapours in the flare system (i.e. plant shutdown) can
cause air to be sucked in at the flare tip or through open vents or drains. This can
be a very serious problem since the capacity of the flare pipework to absorb heat
can lead to a very large and rapid contraction in volume.
c) A rain shower suddenly cooling off flare system pipework and drums that had
been exposed to the sun can cause air to be sucked into the system.
d) Buoyancy of light gases can create sub-atmospheric pressure in the low level
flare pipework. The resultant pressure differential may induce air to enter the
system through any openings, vents, drains, flanges, etc.
e) Vacuum systems connected to the flare can cause air to be sucked in. Special
high integrity segregation mechanisms are required to prevent this.
f) Process air may enter the flare due to loss of control in oxidation plants or
uncontrolled air purging.
Page 24 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
2. Blockages/flow restrictions
a) Freezing of liquid seals, condensate in flare lines or molecular seals, steam
condensing, freezing in the flare tip during low steam flow under winter
conditions, low ambient temperatures, low temperature discharges or auto-
refrigeration are all potential sources of vapour line blockage or restriction. See
clause 9.3.
b) Polymerisation products, hydrates, waxes, corrosion products.
c) Solids carried forward from the plants, catalyst, polymers etc.
d) Liquids trapped through faulty drains, bad design, and level control failure.
e) Valves incorrectly closed or failing closed.
3. Toxic components: Streams containing more than 10% volume H2S or other highly
toxic material should be run in a separate line to the flare, and should preferably be
coupled to the main flare gas stream near the flare tip to minimise exposure of the
main flare pipe work to the corrosive effects of H2S. Careful consideration should be
given to the disposal of foul liquid effluents from flare seals, drains, etc.
4. Chemical reactions within the flare system, pyrophoric scale, acetylides, peroxides,
etc.
5. Mechanical damages, hydraulic surge of liquid slugs, propulsion of solid ice-slugs,
hydrates, impact, low temperature embrittlement through auto-refrigeration, external
fire damage, burn-back at the flare tip, flame lick, venting of high temperature gases
into the flare system.
6. Liquid accumulations in relief and flare systems: Liquid relief to the flare collection
system should be avoided. If this cannot be prevented, careful consideration shall be
given to potential problems associated with liquid disposal from pressure relief
devices and liquid de-inventorying into the flare systems. Appreciable quantities of
liquid discharged to the flare during an emergency vapour release could cause slug
flow in the horizontal lines and the entrance to the knockout receivers causing
possible mechanical damage. See clause 9 for additional design considerations.
8.4. Engineering diagrams

a. Engineering diagrams shall separately show the whole flare system from the downstream
flange of the pressure relief valve or liquid drain valve, including knockout drums, liquids
disposal, purging arrangements, seals and flares.
b. Engineering line diagrams (e.g. isometric diagram), process line diagrams (PFDs, P&IDs),
line sizing calculations and material specifications shall be subject to BP approval before
mechanical design is finalized.
Sizing of the system is probably carried out by a main contractor or BP using BP
(GN 44-001) as reference. The main contractor must obtain BP approval before
information is passed to the flare vendors for mechanical design.
8.5. Flare types

The type of combustion device or flare to be used will be specified by BP or shall be proposed
by the flare vendor for approval by BP. Use GP 22-20 for additional details on flare type
descriptions, basing the final flare selection on:
1. Nature, frequency, and quantity of relief.
2. Space available.
3. Effect on surrounding plants and neighbourhood.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
4. Environmental requirements regarding smoke, pollution, noise, radiation, and

emission of light.
8.6. Smokeless flaring

Refer to GP 22-20 for mechanical details on design, operation, and maintenance of a smoke
suppression system when utilized on flaring devices.
a. Smokeless operation is normally the overriding requirement when designing a burner for a
flare system. Provision for smokeless flaring shall be made to comply with any national or
local regulations applicable to the site. BP will specify, or the flare vendor shall propose
and submit to BP for approval, the flow rates for both smokeless and non-smokeless
flaring. The design shall provide smokeless flaring for:
1. All cases of operational flaring, i.e. a controlled release of fluid to the flare system for
a continuous period exceeding 30 minutes.
2. The most credible flaring scenario or 10-20% of the maximum flaring capacity.
To achieve smokeless combustion:
(a) a minimum critical combustion temperature must be maintained, and
(b) an adequate supply of air mixed sufficiently with the fuel.
If the calorific value of the vented gases is not adequate to fulfil condition (a) above,
an incinerator should be used.
Requirement (b) may be achieved by any of the following methods:
Premixing Air with Fuel
In this method, gas jets are used in Bunsen type burners to inspirate air and mix
it with the fuel. This type of tip may be used in ground flares, but requires
adequate gas pressure and has a poor turndown ratio. To improve the latter,
burners should be used in groups operated in sequence, either by liquid seals of
increasing head, or by automatic valves backed by liquid seals.
Inspirating Additional Air into the Combustion Zone
- This method can utilizes the aero-dynamic skin-adhesion effect known as the
Coanda effect, in which steam, high pressure gas or air flowing from a
narrow slot follows the profile of a curved surface, entraining air up to
twenty times its own volume and introducing oxygen and turbulence
required for complete combustion.
- The Coanda slot may be facing inwards for internal mixing; outward for
external mixing, or may be linear. Slots may be fixed or variable. Slots
should be wide enough not to get blocked by impurities in the smoke
suppressing media. With variable slots, the mechanism should be robust and
well protected against ambient conditions.
- Steam may be used in Coanda or other flare tips to draw in air for mixing
with gas in single large units with steam flowing outwardly, i.e. with external
injector, or with multiple units in a single tip, with steam flowing inwardly in
each unit, i.e. with internal injectors.
- ISO 23251 or API RP 521 provides preliminary steam injection design rates
for flared gas to promote smokeless burning. Ultimately, vendors should be
consulted for steam rate requirements for their specific tip design.
Providing a Highly Turbulent Condition within the Flame
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
- Highly turbulent conditions within the flame required for smokeless

combustion may be achieved as a by-product of inspiration of air as in
Coanda effect flares, or by causing the turbulence by steam or air jets.
- The latter may be achieved either by the discharge of multiple steam jets into
the combustion zone which also inspirates air thereto, or by a high velocity
steam jet centrally placed in the tip which entrains air and creates enough
turbulence to attain efficient mixing of fuel and air. Both these methods may
be combined in one tip.
b. Depending upon local regulatory requirements, the requirements for smokeless flaring may
be relaxed by agreement with BP for periods of non-normal operation e.g. initial
commissioning, start-up, shut-down.
c. Steam, high-pressure gas, air, or water may be used for smoke suppression in flaring.
d. If using steam for smoke suppression, the following points shall be observed:
1. The system shall be designed to provide dry steam at the flare tip with the steam
pipework suitably insulated.
2. The system shall be provided to avoid steam condensation introduced to the flare tip
resulting in extinguishing the pilots or mechanical damage.
3. Drainage, with steam traps, shall be provided at the low points and the steam lines
shall be frost protected.
4. Steam flow may be either automatically or manually controlled in relation to the gas
flow or by the visible characteristics of the flame.
5. Steam lines should be suitably filtered as close to the flare base as practicable, but
upstream of the flow control valve.
6. In order to cool the pipework at the tip, a minimum flow of steam as specified by the
vendor shall be maintained by a bypass round the steam control valve.
7. Expansion loops shall be installed in the steam riser as required.
8.7. Sizing of relief and flare systems

a. The capacity and conditions for which the flare system is designed shall be based on
GP 44-70. As well as overpressure situations, the vapour loads to which the flare system
can be subjected as a result of maintenance operations (i.e., opening equipment-
depressuring valves) and other operations in which fluids are discharged into the flare
system shall be taken into account in the design.
Maintenance and other operations in which inert gas is discharged into the flare
system can cause the flare pilots to be extinguished unless supplemental fuel gas is
added to ensure the heat value of the flare gas is a minimum of 11 200 kJ/Nm3
(300 Btu/SCF). Note that supplemental gas is not required for low flow rates
corresponding to flare header continuous purges involving inert gas.
b. Absolute back pressure limits as specified by the vendor for the specific type of pressure
relief valve shall not be exceeded. Many pilot operated relief valves have backpressure
limits equivalent to the flange rating. However, most conventional and balanced bellows
spring-loaded pressure relief valves have backpressure limits considerably less than the
flange rating. API Std 526 provides typical limits for various valve types, sizes, materials
of construction and temperature ranges.
The back pressure limitation on relief valves should be noted. Except for special
low-pressure valves, the back pressure on a balanced relief valve cannot be more
than 50-60% of the set pressure in gauge unit. This requires special attention for
relief valves set in the 2-5 bar (ga) (30-75 psig) range. At an early stage it is
Page 27 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
worthwhile checking the size of relief lines required and the cost of increasing vessel
design pressure to reduce the flare main size required.
c. Pressure drop limitations may dictate the flare stack diameter.
d. The flare vendor shall submit the calculated flare tip velocity to BP for approval. The
velocity shall be chosen to satisfy requirements for flame stability, noise, and dispersion.
The latest designs of pipe flare tips permit smokeless flaring at velocities above
0,2 Mach No., but if this velocity is exceeded then experience of satisfactory
operation of the design should be examined. For emergency flaring 0,5 Mach No. is
generally accepted as a maximum for pipe flares. Above that figure, the flame could
become unstable and lifts off, resulting in the risk of flame extinction of pipe flares.
High pressure flares are available where the flame is stable even at 1,0 Mach No.
e. The total allowable pressure loss through the flare system including stack, liquid seal (if
any), knockout drums, and piping is normally dictated by the back pressure limitation on
critical relief valves, and shall be subject to approval by BP. Evaluation of flare system
back pressure shall consider:
1. All potential relief, depressuring and process venting conditions.
2. A pipe roughness consistent with the pipe material and operating conditions.
3. The final piping configuration including fittings, entrance losses, etc.
f. Identification of equipment and systems tied into the flare system and their pressure
limitations. This includes, but is not limited to analyzer vents, pump seal vents, centrifuge
seal vents, agitator seal vent, other seal vents, dryers, vessels and tanks that float on the
header through an open pipe, etc. Very low pressure equipment such as atmospheric
storage tanks should not normally be connected to a flare system because of the back
pressure effects or potential for reverse flow.
g. It is prohibited to tie-in bleeds from double-block-and-bleed assemblies into flare systems.
h. The basis and methods to be used for determining system pressure losses shall be
submitted to BP for approval.
In general, piping losses may be calculated using data from any recognised source,
e.g. Flow of Fluids Though Valves, Fittings and Pipe; Crane Technical Paper
No. 410. However, in many cases the published data is thought to significantly
underestimate losses through tees. For these calculations, the data of Internal Flow
Systems edited by D.S. Miller - BHRA Fluid Engineering, published by Gulf
Publishing or VDI Waermeatlas can be used.
i. See clause 7.2 for relief and flare header sizing requirements.
j. Dynamic analysis of events occurring during a plant wide failure scenario may indicate
reduced overall loads based upon the sequence of the relief loadings considered. This type
of analysis is considered to be valid for a plant wide upset event providing it is reviewed
and approved by BP. In many cases, following ISO 23251 or API RP 521 guidance would
be sufficient which allows credit for some favourable instrumentation response during
plant wide failure scenarios depending upon their reliability.
8.8. Siting
8.8.1. General principles

No detailed rules can be given regarding the location of flares, as each installation has its own
specific characteristics. See GP 44-10 for additional information and spacing requirements.
However, the following general principles should be applied:
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
a. A flare should be as close as possible to the unit or units it serves. However, consideration
should be given to possible future expansion requirements into what will become the
sterile area.
b. The siting should take account of the likely route for the flare line (see clause 11.1).
c. Unless a shutdown of all flares is an operational requirement, the position of one flare in
relation to another should be selected so that either can be maintained during the others
operation.
d. Prevailing wind direction should be taken into account in siting the flare to minimise
environmental effects if possible. Consideration shall also be given to a potential flame
out event and the impact on plant/flare siting, combustion device locations, control
system response, etc.
e. Potential gas release from a plant and the possibility of the flare as an ignition source
should also be considered in flare siting.
f. The possibility of burning droplets being emitted from the flare tip should be taken into
account in the siting.
In very exceptional circumstances burning droplets of liquid could be discharged
from the tip of a flare. The area which could be affected by the burning droplets
would depend upon the size of the droplets and the wind conditions. If the least
favourable extremes of droplet size and wind speed are combined to calculate the
extent of the possible area which could be affected by the burning droplets, an
improbably large area would result. It is recommended, therefore, that the estimated
average droplet size and average wind speed should be used in such calculations
due to the improbability of the worst conditions occurring in combination.
8.8.2. Height of flares

The height of a flare shall be determined by the following considerations:
a. The maximum allowable thermal radiation levels as specified in 8.8.4.
b. An adequate dispersion of flammable and/or toxic gases, even with the flare extinguished,
such that their concentration does not cause any significant impact to personnel or property
and are in accordance with any local regulations.
1. When performing the dispersion analysis, not only should the flare design flow rate
be considered but also other scenarios representing other conditions that may increase
the potential severity of impact (e.g., a higher molecular weight vapour at a lower
velocity may reach grade level, buildings, process and breathing air intakes or
platforms while flammable).
2. CIRRUS, PHAST or another BP approved dispersion model shall be used to
determine concentration versus distance and possible consequences if the flare is
extinguished.
3. Calculations of ground level concentrations shall be submitted for BPs approval.
4. Acceptable concentrations shall be based on the period over which the conditions
leading to the release can be sustained and the health hazard which they represent.
c. Any local or national height restrictions, e.g. for aircraft movements.
8.8.3. Calculation methods for flare thermal radiation

a. ISO 23251 or API RP 521 or another similar, BP approved method may be used to
estimate preliminary thermal radiation levels at grade level, elevated platforms, and
buildings. Most flare vendors have developed proprietary programs that are empirically
based for their specific flare tips and the fraction of heat radiated in these models may not
Page 29 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
be interchangeable with that used in ISO and API. If possible, vendor thermal radiation
calculations, results, assumptions, and any other relevant documentation shall be provided
to verify compliance to the following flame radiation limits. The flare vendor/contractor
shall indicate the basis for the calculations including flame emissivity and shall supply
calculated results for flame length, flame shape and emission. BP will specify the locations
or positions where flare radiation calculations are required and the applicable
environmental and operating conditions.
ISO 23251 or API RP 521 methods can be used for initial rough calculations, but it
is significantly inaccurate at fewer than 2 flame lengths. The flare vendor thermal
radiation model is generally preferred.
Positions critical to Flare Radiation Calculations, particularly offshore, are:
Base of flare boom Nearest edge of platform Helideck
Crane cabs Monkey board (drilling derrick) Drillers pipe rack
Radio mast (includes fittings)
Environmental conditions that should be used in the thermal radiation calculations
are:
No wind
32 to 50 km/h (20 to 30 mph) wind
Water curtains or thermal radiation shield may be considered for reducing thermal
radiation from flaring. Higher wind speed can be evaluated as required but the user
should recognize that there is a better cooling at higher wind speed that would
mitigate the heat radiation.
b. Plant or process areas containing high thermal radiation levels (fired heaters, exothermic
reactors, etc.) shall be considered in relation to, and shall be additive to, the expected
thermal radiation rates from both operational and emergency flaring events.
c. The duration of and additive effect from radiation of any other elevated flare(s) located on
the site which would flare simultaneously with the flare under design shall also be
considered.
8.8.4. Thermal radiation levels

a. The maximum permissible design level of radiation for exposure of personnel at maximum
emergency flaring shall be based on the following:
1. Continuous full shift exposure - 1,6 kW/m2
(offsite public location, outside (500 Btu/ft2h)
plant boundary where public
can be present)
2. Operational blowdown - 3,2 kW/m2
(max. 30 minutes) (1 000 Btu/ft2h)
3. 60-second peak exposure - 4,7 kW/m2
(escape time to safe haven) (1 500 Btu/ft2h)
4. 20-second peak exposure - 6,3 kW/m2
(escape time to safe haven) (2 000 Btu/ft2h)
b. In general, a 3,2 kW/m2 (1 000 Btu/ft2h) threshold should be used where personnel can be
normally working and 4,7 kW/m2 (1 500 Btu/ft2h) should be used where personnel are not
normally working.
NOTES
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
1. The figures given assume at least single-layer whole-body

working clothing and hard hat.
2. For flaring where the peak radiation load is intermittent,

solar radiation can be excluded. For flaring where the peak
radiation load is continuous, solar radiation should be
included. An appropriate allowance, dependent on latitude,
should be made when determining permissible flare
radiation.
The following values should be used for the solar radiation allowance unless
specific measured values are available for the site. The average value should be
used in conjunction with the 1,6 kW/m2 (500 Btu/ft2h) (continuous full shift) value
and the peak value with all others. Linear interpolation between latitudes can be
used.
Solar Radiation Table
Latitude Peak radiation Average radiation
degrees kW/m2 (Btu/ft2h) kW/m2 (Btu/ft2h)
0 0,98 (311) 0,73 (231)
10 0,99 (314) 0,74 (235)
20 1,00 (317) 0,73 (231)
30 1,01 (320) 0,69 (219)
40 1,00 (317) 0,63 (200)
50 0,96 (304) 0,54 (171)
60 0,88 (279) 0,44 (139)
These figures are taken from data supplied by the Meteorological Office, Bracknell,
England, ref D/Met 01/21/1/2/L. The data refer to the global irradiance received on
a horizontal surface, for an air mass appropriate to a suburban environment.
The peak radiation is the maximum of the monthly peak irradiance received at 1200
(Local Apparent Time, LAT) solar time. The average radiation is the arithmetic
mean of the monthly average irradiance, for the period 0800-1600 LAT, except
when the day length is less than 8 hours (only Nov-Jan, latitude 60), the mean is for
the daylight period only.
Each monthly value used for the particular latitude refers to the 15th day in each
month. The data are derived from latitude averages of the correlation of sunshine
and irradiation (i.e. the Angstrom relation) and should be considered to be only
rough approximations to the actual values at specific sites.
The main problem with exceeding the full shift or blowdown exposure levels can be
both heat exhaustion and overt burns.
1. Metal surfaces irradiated at any of the time/level ratios given may produce burns on
contact with bare skin.
2. For offshore flares it may not be possible to satisfy some of the requirements. Access
to some areas may therefore have to be restricted, e.g. the flare structure, the bridge
for a linked flare and the drilling tower. It should be possible for any vital work in
these areas to be carried out under specified and controlled conditions.
3. If necessary, these design levels may be achieved by the use of displacement or
shielding. The requirements for any shielding system and the type of system to be
employed shall be agreed with BP at an early stage.
Page 31 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
4. On towers or other elevated structures where rapid escape is not possible, ladders
shall be provided on the side away from the flare, so that the tower or structure can
provide some degree of shielding if necessary.
5. In tower-supported multiple flare systems, all access requirements shall be
considered. Shielding shall be provided if specified by BP.
6. A maximum ground level radiation will be specified by BP, either where access
across a restricted access zone without shielding is required or where the ground
covering may be ignited, e.g. grass or peat.
7. The effect of flaring on equipment in the vicinity shall be considered, using the same
design level above, from the following aspects:
a) High temperature from radiation.
b) Large temperature gradients, between exposed and non-exposed surfaces.
c) Corrosive action of pollutants.
d) Possibility of burning of un-ignited droplets.
e) Effect of hot gases.
8.8.5. Restricted access zone (Sterilisation zone)

a. To minimise the risk of injury to personnel through thermal radiation or related heat
exhaustion, the volumetric zone around the flare flame within which the radiation may
exceed the levels specified in 8.8.4 shall be designated a Restricted Access Zone. At places
where it may be possible for personnel to enter this zone, (usually at ground level, but also
possibly via elevated structures), access shall be restricted by warning notices located in
prominent positions.
b. Equipment may be located within a restricted access zone provided that:
1. It is designed such that it will not be damaged by the highest levels of thermal
radiation to which it could be exposed.
2. The equipment requires no regular operator attention or maintenance whilst the flare
is in operation.
3. It is possible to carry out emergency maintenance without risk of injury from thermal
radiation to personnel (wearing protective clothing or using radiation shields if
necessary).
c. A Restricted Access Zone shall be specified around the flare tip unless otherwise approved
by BP. The radius of this zone shall be defined by the larger of the distances calculated as
follows:
1. Operational (for periods of one shift or more)
The distance from the flare tip beyond which the thermal radiation level does not
exceed 1,6 kW/m2 (500 Btu/ft2h) at maximum operational flaring rate and a wind
speed determined by local environmental conditions.
2. Emergency (for periods up to 60 seconds)
The distance from the flare tip beyond which the thermal radiation level does not
exceed 4,7 kW/m2 (1 500 Btu/ft2h) at maximum flaring rate and a wind speed
determined by local environmental conditions.
3. Blowdown (for periods up to 30 minutes)
The distance from the flare tip beyond which the thermal radiation level will not
exceed 3,2 kW/m2 (1 000 Btu/ft2h) for more than 30 minutes.
d. The contribution from solar radiation shall be taken into account unless otherwise specified
by BP.
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31 March 2006 GP 44-80
8.9. Elevated flares

The simplest type of elevated flare is commonly referred to as a utility or pipe flare
consisting of a pipe fitted with a flame retention device for flame stability and a pilot
for gas ignition.
a. Elevated flares that use steam to control smoking are the most common form of smokeless
flare tip although air can also be used to minimize smoke formation. These flares typically
have velocity limits of about 0,5 Mach No. High pressure flares do not require steam or
utility air to promote smokeless combustion, but use energy of the flare gas itself. High
pressure flares can operate at a velocity of 1,0 Mach No. but require equipment connected
to the flare system to be able to withstand potentially high back pressure.
b. Refer to GP 22-20 for further details on design, operation, and maintenance of elevated
flares.
8.10. Enclosed ground flares

An enclosed ground flare represents any non-elevated flare that is normally
enclosed in a shell or fenced (solid wall to block thermal radiation) area. It may
also be termed as a multipoint flare. These flares can offer the advantages of hiding
flames, monitoring combustion emissions and lowering noise. If plot space is
available, a fenced ground flare can be designed to have a very large capacity.
a. Multipoint ground flares can be staged to allow a wide range in flare loads (i.e., high
turndown rates). Care must be taken when specifying the minimum turndown for each
stage to avoid possible burn back inside the flare piping that may occur if the flare load
drops below the minimum.
With their small nozzles, multipoint flares typically burn smokeless in most
services having the ability to readily entrain air into the gas being burned without
the use of steam, assist gas or other fluids to enhance air entrainment.
b. A significant disadvantage of ground flares is the flare gas is released near grade-level in
the event of a flare ignition system failure. Dispersion and consequence analyses shall be
performed to evaluate possible impacts due to release of unburned flare gases in the event
of ground flare ignition system failure.
c. Refer to GP 22-20 for further details on design, operation, and maintenance of enclosed
ground flares.
d. The exit area of enclosed ground flares should be such as to provide adequate dispersion of
all combustion products exiting the ground flare.
8.11. Minimum heat content of flare gas

Per the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) document AP 42, Volume 1 and
Chapter 13.5; the minimum heat content of flare gas should be 11 250 kJ/m3 (300 Btu/ft3) to
ensure a high combustion efficiency for the flare. Concentrations below 9 300 kJ/m3
(250 Btu/ft3) require the addition of fuel gas for complete combustion.
8.12. Ignition systems

Refer to GP 22-20 for details on flare ignition system design, selection, operation, and
maintenance issues.
8.12.1. General
a. The flare tip or burners shall be provided with pilot burners capable of igniting flare gas
under all relevant flow conditions and ambient conditions.
Page 33 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
b. The pilot burners shall be ignited by a reliable ignition system capable of operating under
all relevant ambient conditions.
c. As automatic ignition system is the primary means of ignition, an independent manual
back up is recommended. A flare gun is not an independent manual back up.
8.12.2. Pilot gas supply

a. The pilot gas supply shall be from a high-reliability source approved by BP. Automatic
back-up gas supplies should be used if necessary to achieve an acceptable overall
reliability.
b. The vendor shall confirm the pilot gas molecular weight and calorific value range their
flare pilots and pilot gas ignition system will work satisfactorily without adjustment to the
air and gas flows.
c. The pilot gas supply should be taken directly from the plant fuel gas main if available. The
pilot gas main is preferably supplied by a natural gas pipeline, a LPG vaporizer, or some
other reliable sources. This shall be by a top mounted branch, with two filters in parallel or
a dual filter with adequate valve arrangement to allow cleaning/replacing filters.
d. To check the pressure drop through the filter a differential pressure gauge shall be fitted
across it or possible a bypass across filter should be installed to allow maintenance while
the flare is in operation.
e. The filter elements shall have a mesh size of approximately 0,5 mm (0,020 in). The filter
and piping and fittings downstream from filters shall be in type 321 or 347 stainless steel
to avoid blockages by products of corrosion.
f. The pressure-reducing valve shall be of a self-operating type, placed downstream of the
filters.
g. A check valve shall be installed on the air line and pilot gas line if a flame front generator
pilot ignition system is being used.
This prevents reverse flow of pilot gas into the pilot gas or air into the pilot gas
when the flame front generator is blocked.
8.13. Flashback prevention

a. A reliable method of flashback prevention shall be incorporated into the flare system
design. The following methods may be used, either singly or in combination:
1. Gas purge (clause 10.1).
2. Liquid seals (clause 10.2).
3. Efflux velocity accelerators (clause 10.5).
b. The above methods are primarily intended to prevent diffusion of air into the flare stack.
Note that gas seals (i.e. molecular seals see clause 10.3) are not sufficient by themselves
to prevent flashback. If condensable materials are being flared, there is a significant
probability of large amounts of air being sucked back. This can also occur if the flare
header is suddenly cooled by a passing rainstorm. Typical purge rates to prevent air in
filtration on the cases can be more than an order of magnitude greater than the gas purge
used for air infiltration due to wind effect. If flare gas recovery is used, both gas purge and
liquid seals should be installed.
c. The use of a flame arrester shall be considered only in cases in which none of the above
methods are suitable and subject to the restrictions of clause 10.4.
d. The choice of method shall be subject to approval by BP.
Page 34 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
If air (or oxygen) enters a flare system and forms a flammable mixture of gases
within the system, the mixture will be ignited by the pilot burners at the flare tip. If
the flash back velocity of the mixture exceeds the efflux velocity, the flame will burn
back into the flare stack and an explosion is likely to result. Flare stacks have been
ruptured by such explosions.
If the efflux velocity is very close to the flash back velocity, fairly steady combustion
may occur within the flare stack, which may lead to overheating and loss of
mechanical integrity. (To achieve such internal combustion for long enough to
overheat the flare stack in this way would require the in-leakage of sufficient air.
This can occur if insufficient purge gas is used to mitigate air in filtration due to
wind effect).
Some of the conditions conducive to the formation of flammable mixtures within the
flare system are if:
Vacuum systems are linked to the flare.
Lighter-than-air gases particularly hydrogen are being flared.
Condensation or rapid cooling can occur within the flare system. (It may be
possible to reduce or even prevent condensation by heating and insulating the
flare line; however, such measures may be expensive to install and difficult to
maintain in a reliable condition).
Relief valves are removed for servicing.
Two or more flares are open to a common header without liquid seals in
between.
Air or oxygen is used in processes connected to the flare system.
The flare flame does not travel back into the flare stack if the efflux velocity of
the flare gas exceeds the flash back velocity. (This still applies even if the flare
gases have been premixed with air upstream of the flare tip).
To achieve this essential condition, the efflux velocity may be increased by the
addition of purge gas, by use of a velocity accelerator or the flash back velocity
may be reduced by the addition of inert gases to the flammable mixture. The best
location for the addition of inert gas is as close to the flare tip as possible
compatible with good mixing of gases before burning at the tip.
Ensure the flare gas heat value is above the minimum allowed (clause 8.11) at
all phases of operation. Otherwise, the pilot and main flames can be
extinguished.
The practicability of using inert gas to reduce the flash back velocity would
further depend upon the availability of a very high integrity source of inert gas
at the site, in sufficient quantity at an economic price.
Velocity accelerators and inert gas addition may be used in combination.
The main advantages of using inert gas is that a properly designed system gives
protection against flash back through air ingress from any source. The major
disadvantage is that at low flare gas flow rates, the gas mixture may become
non-combustible due to the excess inert gas present. Unburned toxic and/or
strong smelling components may escape to atmosphere and possibly cause a
nuisance.
Method of Calculating the Flash Back Velocity:
A method of calculating the flash back velocities for some gases commonly
occurring in flare systems when mixed with nitrogen, carbon dioxide, or both,
has been developed by Van Krevelin and Chermin and reported in the
transactions of the Seventh International Symposium on Combustion, 1959,
pages 358-368.
Page 35 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
This method may be used to calculate the inert gas flow corresponding to the
peak flash back velocity of the gas mixture. An excess inert gas flow of twenty
five percent above the calculated value should provide an ample margin of
safety to compensate for measuring errors and minor flow disturbances.
8.14. Noise levels

a. The flare shall be sited such that at the maximum emergency flow rate, the noise level at
positions normally accessible to personnel should not exceed 80 dB(A), unless otherwise
approved in writing by BP. A lower noise limit may be specified by BP to be applied in a
particular case, e.g. offshore platform, ground flare, proximity to local residents, etc.
The main contributor to noise in a smokeless flare is the steam jet noise. Therefore,
in general, the lower the ratio of steam to flared gas, the quieter the flare.
b. Flare vendors, in their quotations, shall provide information on the noise emission from the
flare at maximum emergency flow and at the maximum smokeless flaring rate. The noise
emission data shall be provided as a test report containing the sound-power levels in octave
bands from 31 Hz to 8 kHz. Measurements shall be made according to CONCAWE
report 2/79.
8.15. Flare sparing philosophy

a. Sparing of flares shall be considered to allow for maintenance, inspection, and breakdown.
If a flare system serves more than one unit that can function independently, then some
form of sparing may be specified by BP.
b. The time between overhauls will be specified by BP. Adequate provision shall be made to
enable the full specified range of continuous and intermittent flaring operations to be
sustained during this period.
If a flare serves one unit only, maintenance and inspection can be performed during
normal shutdown periods. Breakdown may be considered unlikely to occur, and if
this would in any case involve shutdown of one unit only, may be considered an
acceptable risk.
If two or more flares are available, the flare lines may be configured to allow one of
the flares to be taken out of service. In this instance back-up shall be provided in the
form of atmospheric discharge; such discharge should meet GP 44-70 for
atmospheric discharge.
If actual sparing is required, i.e. having an additional spare flare that can replace
the primary plant/process flare during maintenance, inspection or breakdown; the
most economical way of providing this may be the use of a common structure
supporting multiple risers with flare tips that can be individually lowered and
serviced while the remaining tips continue to operate. This type of flare can be
designed to allow for the maintenance, inspection and replacement of risers, tips
and flare auxiliaries. Special arrangements for inspection and maintenance of the
supporting structure are required.
9. Liquid removal
9.1. Unit knockout drum (Onshore)

a. If flares serve multiple units or plants, a knockout drum should normally be provided
within the battery limit of each unit or plant.
1. A unit knockout drum or receiver shall be provided in all cases in which significant
quantities of liquid can be relieved from the facility or process and where the flare is
located.
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2. The unit knockout drum shall comply with primary knockout drum requirements
detailed in clause 9.2.
b. If liquid carry-over from the unit knockout drum to the primary knockout drum is possible,
the flare header design should consider the potential for and mitigation of slug flow.
1. Piping that can be in liquid or multiphase service should be tied into the flare header
using 45 degree tees pointed towards the direction of flow as opposed to 90 degree
tees if practical.
2. Use of 90 degree elbows should be minimized or, if required, should use long radius
elbows that are braced and supported for slug impacts.
3. The weight of liquid that can be in the piping when relieving shall be considered
when specifying the pipe supports.
9.2. Primary knockout drum (Onshore)

a. A primary knockout drum shall be provided for each flare system. The drum shall be
located as close as practical to the flare taking account of access requirements and the
possible use of a liquid seal drum which shall be located downstream of the knockout
drum.
b. The knockout drum shall meet the minimum design requirements of ISO 23251 or API
RP 521 and shall also comply with GP 46-01.
1. Drums shall be designed for full vacuum and a maximum allowable working pressure
of at least 3,5 barg, (50 psig).
2. A minimum corrosion allowance of 3 mm (1/8 in) shall be provided on knockout
drums.
c. A knockout receiver or drum shall be sized to separate and collect all disengaged liquid
particles per the following criteria:
1. Knockout drum sizing calculation methods in ISO 23251, API RP 521, or equivalent
shall be used.
2. Liquid storage capacity of the knockout drum shall allow for a minimum of 20 to
30 minutes hold-up at maximum liquid in-flow to the drum or free space greater than
the maximum possible quantity of liquid that can be discharged into the drum. This
capacity shall be provided between the maximum normal liquid level (i.e. the pump
trip-in level) and the maximum level allowable in the drum taking into account any :
a) Simultaneous requirements for vapour/liquid separation.
b) Flashing of the relieved liquid at the knockout drum pressure.
3. The knockout drum shall be sized to remove liquid droplets above 600 m (0,024 in)
at the maximum emergency gas flow to the flare, and above 150 m (0,006 in) from
the gas flow equivalent to the maximum smokeless capacity of the flare. In
exceptional cases, for flares that are capable of burning larger sized droplets, a waiver
of these requirements may be accepted, subject to BP approval.
The essential purpose of this drum is the removal of the bulk of the liquids in the gas
stream and to prevent liquid carry-over to the flare.
The choice between a horizontal and a vertical drum should be made on economic
considerations, taking into account the vapour flow rate, the liquid storage required,
and the necessary slope of the flare header.
d. Attention is drawn to clause 9.3, which may require separate knockout drums to maintain
segregation between cold and wet streams. Vaporisation facilities shall be provided for
liquid disposal, if necessary. If vaporisation facilities are relied upon to prevent metal
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temperatures falling below their minimum design temperature, long-term reliability of the
vaporisation facility shall be assured. Otherwise, materials suitable for the low temperature
service shall be used.
e. The design of the knockout drum or receiver shall also meet all of the following criteria:
1. Condensed liquids in the relief or flare header systems shall drain to and collect in the
knockout drum or receiver; therefore relief piping and headers shall always be free
draining towards their associated knockout drum.
2. The split entry configuration of inlet piping to the knockout drum should be avoided
unless uniform flow distribution can be assured. The knockout drum inlet should be
equipped with a diverter plate, internal elbow or baffle to direct liquid away from the
knockout drum outlet. See ISO 23251 or API RP 521 for additional details.
3. If closed drain liquids are sent to a knockout drum, the drum shall be sized to
accommodate both the maximum expected fluid levels from its sloped piping as well
as the maximum liquid possible from the closed drain vessel(s). Due to the potential
knockout drum size increase in this circumstance, routing liquids to a suitably
instrumented and protected alternative, low-pressure vessel should be considered.
4. Because of the potential for blockage from scale or waxy deposits, the use of a
demister pad to limit the size of the drum shall be avoided.
5. The knockout drum shall be provided with automatic hydrocarbon liquid removal
unless otherwise specified by BP. Knockout drum pump(s) designed and installed
shall be capable of emptying the drum from its highest level shutdown to the drum
normal operating level or low level shutdown in a maximum of 2 hours.
Since the liquid in the KO drum may be toxic or flammable, or have toxic or
flammable material dissolved in it, particular care should be taken in the design and
operation of any drain points.
If there is any risk of toxic materials being released, the drain should be routed
to a closed system.
If there is any risk of the materials freezing, a second valve in series is required
as a minimum.
6. If appropriate, separate facilities for water or heavy hydrocarbon removal shall also
be provided; these may be automatic or manual.
a) The disposal route and facilities for these liquids shall be approved by BP.
b) Particular attention should be paid to prevent creation of a hazard due to the
release to atmosphere of flammable or toxic materials from drain points.
7. Instrumentation and control systems for the drum shall be in accordance with
clause 12.6.
8. Adequate winterisation shall be provided for the drum as approved by BP if
necessary.
9. Personnel protection shall be provided if metal temperatures can exceed 65C (150F)
while relieving.
10. Facilities shall be provided for isolation, venting and purging, inspection,
maintenance, and cleaning of the drum. Specific attention shall be given to the
requirements of inspection, maintenance, and cleaning if the associated plants cannot
be shut down and proposed methods shall be submitted for BP approval.
11. Introduction of liquids with a temperature in excess of 93C (200F) into knockout
drums containing water or light liquids shall be avoided to prevent the potential for
steam or vapour explosions.
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9.3. Cold service

a. Specific attention shall be given to liquid removal facilities in flare systems that dispose of
both cold and wet streams. In this context, a cold stream is defined as a stream at a
temperature below 0C (32F) which could cause freezing of water in a knockout drum, or
on mixing with a stream containing free or dissolved water. The situation is most likely to
occur in plants handling liquefied gases or gas streams at high pressure.
b. If practical, separate systems shall be provided for cold streams with segregation
maintained until the streams become compatible. The flare vendors proposals shall be
submitted for BP approval. Cold-liquid collection drums may require vaporisation
facilities.
The relief of liquid propane and butane frequently results in a cold two phase
discharge. Unless the disposal system is specifically designed to handle low
temperature fluids, it is necessary to provide a heating system to vaporise any liquid
and then superheat the cold vapour before it enters the main flare system.
The system should make use of indirect heating to avoid the possible contact of cold
fluid with steam condensate in the event of tube rupture in the heat exchanger.
Suggested heating media are methanol or glycol, but others may be considered.
c. Attention shall also be given to the presence of other materials that freeze or are highly
viscous at temperatures above 0C (32F). Vapours, gases, and vapour/liquid mixtures
which contain components likely to condense, form hydrates, or freeze at 0C (32F) or
above should be considered for routing to a separate relief/flare header system.
d. Attention is drawn to the special sealing provisions for cold service in clause 7.3.3.
e. Similar to the wet gas system, the dry gas collection system terminates in a dry gas
knockout receiver. Vapours, gases, and vapour/liquid mixtures which expand
isenthalpically through the relieving devices to a downstream temperature of less than 0C
(32F) not containing any components likely to freeze, should be routed to the dry gas
header system.
9.4. Liquid removal (Offshore)

a. The liquid removal facilities should be designed to remove entrained droplets (which may
carryover as burning hydrocarbons) from the gas flow and provide sufficient liquid hold-
up capacity to collect any surges of liquid. The hold-up capacity should be based on the
longest estimated time required to isolate the incoming flow.
b. Maximum use should be made of surge capacity within the process area to accommodate
liquid relief.
c. Devices which provide warning (and if necessary execute shutdown action) shall be fitted
to relief valves which can discharge liquids to flare.
d. The minimising of possible liquid relief to the flare system should be a normal feature of
any design. Appropriately rated SIL instrumentation should be installed on equipment trip
systems taking into account the undesirability of discharging liquids into the flare system.
See GP 30-76 and GP 44-70, clauses 7.3 and 7.4.
10. Flare purging and sealing
10.1. Gas purge

Unless otherwise specified by BP, a continuous purge system shall be used.
a. An inert gas (e.g. nitrogen), fuel gas or natural gas from a reliable source shall be
continuously introduced as a purge into vapour disposal systems.
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1. The choice should primarily be evaluated on cost; however BP preference is to use

inert gas if economically viable. Lower molecular weight gases require larger
quantities of purge gas to achieve similar safe conditions within the stack. (See
clause 10.1.c).
2. When deciding to use an inert purge, specific attention shall be given to any potential
consequences of releasing unburned toxic materials to the atmosphere.
3. The use of site generated nitrogen in this application could require evaluating the
potential for oxygen entry into the inert gas stream from the package generator.
b. The purge gas supply shall be from a high-reliability source approved by BP.
1. Automatic back-up supplies should be used if necessary to achieve an acceptable
overall reliability.
2. The purge system shall be designed so that loss of a single purge gas source or
injection point does not allow hazardous conditions to occur.
In choosing between a fuel gas and an inert gas purge, it should be noted that one
volume of fuel gas produces about ten volumes of inert gas in an inert gas
generator. However, the inert gas generator must be purchased and a back-up
supply must be provided, since it must be inherently less reliable than its feed gas
supply.
The methods given for calculating the required quantity of purge gas are based on a
sufficiently high efflux velocity to prevent the oxygen concentration 8 m (26 ft) from
the top of the stack becoming more than half the lower flammable limit. This is
intended to prevent flash-back down the stack. If an inert gas is used the flash-back
velocity (the speed with which a flame travels through the mixture) is significantly
reduced. This has the advantage of significantly reducing the risk of a damaging
explosion in the event of an unforeseen occurrence such as a suck-back.
With an inert gas purge, the object is to ensure that the efflux velocity is always
greater than the flash-back velocity. For a given relief composition there is a
maximum required purge rate which can be significantly smaller than the purge
rates required by the Husa formulae. This maximum purge rate is calculated by
establishing the required purge rate to balance flash-back and efflux velocities for a
variety of relief flow rates.
c. A minimum purge gas velocity or flow rate shall be maintained at the flare tip to:
1. Minimize air ingress due to wind effects, and
2. Prevent burn-back inside the flare tip.
The larger of the two flow rates shall be used.
d. The minimum purge rate to minimize air ingress due to wind effects shall be calculated
using Husas correlation formulae in Annex A.
1. The purge rate shall be such that the oxygen content in the flare gases 8 m (25 ft)
down from the top of the flare shall be less than 6%. Note the Husa correlation
applies where typical wind speeds do not exceed about 13,4 m/s (30 MPH).
2. Locations where prevailing winds often exceed this wind speed may need somewhat
higher purge rates.
e. For purge gas mixtures that are heavier than air, see 10.1.j. If either the purge gas or flare
gas is low molecular weight (e.g., containing high concentrations of hydrogen), the
maximum oxygen content shall not exceed the following:
a) Maximum oxygen of 5 volume percent for flare gases with a MW greater than 6
but not exceeding 8.
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b) Maximum oxygen of 4 volume percent for flare gases with a MW greater than 4
but not exceeding 6.
c) Maximum oxygen of 3 volume percent for flare gases with a MW 4.
f. The flare vendor shall specify the minimum purge required to prevent burn-back inside
non-refractory lined flare tips. This flow velocity shall be verified based on the selected
proprietary flare tip or molecular seal design. If the tip is refractory lined, then the purge
rate need be based only on that required to prevent air ingress due to wind effects.
g. When recommissioning an air-filled flare header network, knockout drum, and stack; a
supplemental, high initial purge flow may be required to air-free the entire flare system.
h. BP will specify if it is necessary to maintain the flare alight, even though in such cases the
minimum purge referred to in 10.1.b is very small.
i. For minimum purging, to check if the safe oxygen levels specified in 10.1.c are
maintained, the stack may be equipped with an oxygen monitoring system as described in
12.4; however the reliability of these systems should be considered before installation.
1. For flammable purge gases heavier than air, the minimum purge rate could
theoretically be achieved with very low flow rates. This may result in burning inside
the tip, resulting in higher tip temperatures and shorter tip life, or flame
extinguishment. The required purge rate using a gas mixture heavier than air shall be
calculated using nitrogen parameters in the Husa equation in Annex A.
2. Vendors shall specifically identify their minimum purge rate to avoid internal tip
combustion on the flare data sheet and confirm the Husa calculation using nitrogen
eliminates burning inside the tip or flame extinguishment. If not, alternatives such as
additional tip cooling or upgraded flare tip metallurgy should be considered.
The use of increased purge gas versus alternative tip cooling or metallurgy must be
evaluated against local and national regulations as well as total life cycle costs
considering the increased purge gas rates.
j. Emergency purge gas shall be provided to the flare system, if appropriate, to prevent the
formation of a vacuum in the flare header or stack due to vapour condensing or gas
contraction as the system cools following a release or due to cooling of uninsulated metal
pipework during a rainstorm.
1. This purge gas supply does not need to be continuous, but rather should be
automatically initiated and controlled by pressure, temperature, or a combination of
both. A calculation methodology is described in GN 44-002.
2. Alternatively, a liquid seal drum may be used (see clause 10.2).
With a liquid seal, the relief disposal piping system upstream of the seal is subject to
vacuum conditions when a hot relief flow stops and cools. This is not necessarily a
dangerous condition, provided that:
The equipment is designed for the maximum vacuum conditions that can occur.
No unintended flows are initiated because of increased pressure differential.
k. Purge gas connections shall be provided in every disposal system at the header extremities,
depending on final facility layout. These connections are required to ensure the system is
air-free before introduction of hydrocarbon.
l. The continuous purge gas used during normal operation can be tied into either near the
knockout drum and/or at the flare header extremities. Generally, continuous purge gas is
introduced near the knockout drum as it is the closest to the primary source of air ingress
(i.e., the flare tip).
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10.2. Liquid seals
10.2.1. Uses of seals

a. Liquid seals may be employed for prevention of air ingress into the flare header network
due to most thermal contraction events and for diversion of vapour flows (e.g., for flare gas
recovery systems). (See ISO 23251 or API RP 521). Liquid seals should be incorporated in
relief disposal systems as close as practical to elevated flares.
A liquid seal is only one of a number of methods of preventing the ingress of air into
a flare system via the flare tip due to thermal contraction. It is normally utilised in
conjunction with continuous gas purging.
Liquid seals may not prevent flashback in cases in which a large volume of gas is
relieved. Incidents have shown the flame can propagate back through a continuous
flow of bubbles. Hence, a continuous purge or other method should be used to
ensure the flare header is air-free.
b. If more than one flare is connected to a relief header and automatic pressure-actuated
valves are used, a full capacity back-up route to the flare shall be provided via a liquid seal
or another BP approved alternative which ensures an open relief route.
These valves are used to accommodate increasing flow rates, and either to
differentiate between smokeless and non-smokeless flaring, or to increase turndown
and burning efficiency. If liquid seals are impractical, another system is required
which provides both a guaranteed emergency relief route and a guaranteed
protection against air ingress to the flare and header systems.
10.2.2. Types of liquid seals

a. Water seals are normally used if either the ambient temperature or the temperature of the
relief streams cannot fall below 0C (32F). To guard against freezing in cold weather the
seals shall be part of the winterisation program and shall be fitted with automatic heating,
either electrical or steam coil, as specified by BP.
Some chemicals can raise the freezing point of water above 0C (32F). If such
chemicals could be relieved, then suitable adjustments should be made to the water
seal or the seal liquid.
b. For cold service, glycol or other suitable material shall be used, either pure or with water,
depending on the anticipated temperature of vapours.
c. The fluid shall be compatible with all the fluids that can enter the flare header.
10.2.3. Liquid seal design

a. The vertical leg of the flare header inlet shall form a vacuum leg of adequate length above
the liquid level in the drum for the maximum vacuum expected in the header due to
cooling and/or condensing of hot vapours.
1. It shall be at least 3 m (10 ft) high which corresponds to about 0,3 barg (4 psig) of
vacuum protection.
2. The minimum submergence depth of the inlet downcomer shall be 10 cm (4 in) per
ISO 23251 or API RP 521; however, the volume of liquid in the seal drum above the
level of the top of the submerged weir shall be sufficient to fill the 3 m (10 ft) vacuum
leg. See Liquid Seal Drums in ISO 23251 or API RP 521 for further details.
The traditional style of a single dip-leg with a serrated end was satisfactory when
there was always an appreciable flow of gas to the flare tip. The reduction of
leakage and the addition of flare gas recovery systems have significantly changed
this. One large, non-serrated dip-leg invariably leads to flow pulsations which are
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seen at the flare as flame pulses and can cause noise complaints of a rumbling type
noise. These make the flare more noticeable and defeat any attempt at maintaining a
controlled steam flow to keep the flare smokeless. A more effective system is based
on separate dip-legs of different sizes, sometimes with side slots (see ISO 23251 or
API RP 521), so that each release route allows a progressively larger flow without
any noticeable pulsation. To provide enough circumference for placement of
serrations and reduce the gas velocity the dip pipe diameter may have to be
increased. The diameter of the baffle sheath should be 1,8 to 2,0 times the diameter
of the dip leg, with 13 mm (0,5 in) diameter holes on 75 mm (3 in) diagonal centres.
The dip-leg should be surrounded by an anti-splashing perforated baffle sheath.
b. The maximum depth to which the inlet pipe may be submerged shall be based on the
maximum exit back pressure allowable in the relief or flare header.
c. To prevent surges of gas flow to the flare, the free area for the gas flow above the liquid
should equal at least 3 times the inlet pipe cross-section area.
d. Details of the dip leg design shall be submitted for BP approval. The design shall be
capable of flowing all quantities from maximum emergency flow down to 1/3 000th of that
flow without causing flow pulsations that cause nuisance.
The flow range of maximum to 1/3 000th may be too small a range. Recent designs
have shown a need to provide pulse free flaring from about 300 000 kg/hr
(660 000 lb/hr) (for the maximum emergency case) to about 100 kg/hr (220 lb/hr)
(for the normal leakage case).
e. A minimum pressure of 3,5 barg (50 psig) shall be used for the design of the seal drum.
f. Equipment shall be provided to maintain the design seal level. Make-up lines shall be sized
to replace the seal within 10 minutes. The design of the seal system shall provide for:
1. Prevention of hydrocarbon build up,
2. Prevention of displacement of seal liquid,
3. Maintaining the correct seal liquid level, over the operating pressure range.
4. Continuous purging of seal water shall be considered to prevent build up of H2S and
CO2.
g. The flare header shall slope from the top of the vacuum leg back to the off-site knockout
drum.
h. If water is used for the seal, the design of the disposal system for excess water shall take
into account the likely contamination with relieved materials, e.g. H2S. Alternatively, a
recirculation system may be provided with capacity to allow for make-up and for checking
the liquid inventory. This latter option should be provided for seal systems containing anti-
freeze.
i. If make-up requirements are not significant (i.e. static liquid seals), antifreeze systems may
be used. In this case, the requirements of 10.2.3.h may be under manual control.
10.3. Buoyancy seals (molecular seals)

a. Neither gas seals of the labyrinth type; nor seals of the flow restriction type are
recommended, but may be used subject to BP approval.
b. If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to use either type of seal, it is impossible to
quantify the benefit and hence no reduction in purge flow should be used.
There are two main types of gas seals: the labyrinth type and the flow restriction
type.
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The labyrinth type, also referred to as an inverted gas seal is known under the trade
name of John Zink Molecular seal, or Flaregas 'Flarex', etc. The flow restriction
type, exemplified by National Airoil's Fluidic Seal, consists of a flow restriction in
the form of a series of stepped cone sections of changing diameter, the purpose of
which is to reflect back the atmospheric ingress turbulence. Though called seals,
neither stop the reverse flow completely, only reduce it. They are both installed
immediately below the flare tip. However, when the volumetric condensation or
cooling rate of vapour in the relief system exceeds the purge rate plus the incoming
gas volume, air entry can no longer be precluded and a risk of an explosion exists.
In the labyrinth type of seal when using purge gas lighter-than air, the buoyancy of
the purge gas creates a zone of greater-than- atmospheric pressure at the top of the
seal, which prevents air from entering the flare stack. Purge gas heavier-than-air
'floods' the seal, and the labyrinth prevents atmospheric ingress.
Due to the ingress of rain water and the possibility of condensation, labyrinth gas
seals require drains. These can block with ice or carbon, or with refractory, if any,
dislodged from the flare tip, and therefore such seals are not recommended.
10.4. Flame arresters

Flame arresters shall be used only in clean systems in which plugging, scale build-up, dust, or
other accumulation cannot occur during any phase of operation (start-up, normal, shutdown,
emergency, etc.) and if there are no practical alternatives.
a. Provision shall be made for periodically checking and maintaining their condition.
b. It shall be possible to maintain or replace a flame arrester without shutting the plant down.
c. Their use shall be subject to BP approval.
Flame arresters are another way of preventing flashback. These are not very
commonly used, but could be effective against flash back. Their disadvantage comes
from the fact that they can easily become blocked by dust, carry-over, corrosion
products, materials liable to polymerisation, etc. A flame arrester should be
considered only when there is no other viable or economic alternative.
10.5. Efflux velocity accelerators (Velocity seals)

Flashback from the flare flame into a flare stack does not occur if the efflux velocity
of the flare gases always exceeds the flashback velocity (i.e. flame speed). The efflux
velocity may be increased by the use of an orifice plate with a single or multiple
orifices.
If an efflux velocity accelerator is used, the following points shall be considered:
a. Possible back mixing and deceleration effects due to wind.
b. Deceleration or reverse flow due to condensation of vapour or gas cooling and contraction
within the flare system.
c. The possibility of ignition occurring below the velocity accelerator from any conceivable
cause.
d. The increased back pressure imposed by the orifice plate, especially at high discharge
rates.
e. The possibility of the orifice plate becoming blocked or corroded in service.
f. There are no credible cases during any phase of operation (start-up, normal, shutdown,
emergency, etc.) in which flow could be reduced by human error, mechanical failure, or
other failure so that flashback becomes possible.
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11. Flare and relief line headers and piping
11.1. Routing
a. A flare line should be routed to avoid areas of high fire risk or otherwise hazardous areas,
e.g. other process plants. If this is not practicable, the routing and fire protection of the line
supports shall be proposed for BP approval.
b. The route should avoid areas of high fire risk, whether in the unit of origin or in another
unit.
An incident is known in which, during a process unit fire, a neighbouring unit had to
be shutdown for safety reasons. This involved dumping to the flare through a flare
line passing through the unit on fire. The line was damaged by the fire and fed it
with additional material.
11.2. Design and construction

a. Each individual unit flare header shall be designed to handle the worst single relief rate or
the largest combined rate from the pressure relief devices within that unit as a result of any
common event. Vent valves, dump valves, depressurisation valves, and other devices that
open to flare in the event of instrument air failure, electric failure, or other common cause
failure shall be included in the main flare header lateral and header design along with
pressure relief devices that open at the same time.
b. The main flare header shall be sized for the worst case originating from a fire or a common
mode failure (i.e., power failure, loss of cooling media, loss of instrument air, etc). Vent
valves, dump valves, depressurisation valves, and other devices that open to flare in the
event of instrument air or electric failure shall be included in the main flare header design.
c. Flare headers should not normally be insulated due to corrosion under insulation concern.
d. Thermal movement of flare lines shall preferably be accommodated by providing
flexibility in the piping layout or alternatively by expansion loops. Sliding expansion joints
shall not be used. Any use of piping bellows shall be subject to approval by BP.
When flaring streams likely to contain H2S or water vapours, bellows should only be
used when essential.
e. Both relief headers and flare lines should slope all the way towards their respective
knockout drums at a minimum 1 in 400 slope.
1. If this is not possible, drainage pots shall be provided at low points. The pots shall be
fitted with a level gauge, automatic pump-out facilities and frost protection if
required. These pots shall also be routinely checked for and drained of any
accumulated liquid.
2. Any relief or flare system liquid carryover or condensed liquids shall drain to and be
collected in its associated knockout drum which shall be sized per clause 9.1.
3. Horizontal sections of line to accommodate possible flow in either direction are not
acceptable.
Liquid accumulation in flare header low points can result in slug flow and liquid
hammer effects causing possible header or elbow failure and shall be avoided.
f. Individual relieving devices in closed systems shall be located above the header if
practical. If relief devices are located where liquid can accumulate in their discharge lines,
provisions shall be installed and maintained to prevent liquid accumulation (e.g., drip pan
elbows draining to a safe location).
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g. If several units are connected to one flare system, isolating block valves with flushing
connections, unless otherwise specified by BP, shall be provided in sub-headers at the unit
battery limits.
1. Rising stem gate valves are preferred.
2. Butterfly valves shall not be used because of uncertainty in failure position (i.e., may
stick closed or fail in a closed position).
3. Isolating block valves shall be provided with: position indicators, locking devices (car
seals or chain locks for example) which can be locked open and spectacle blinds
upstream.
Large spade or spacer blinds can be difficult to identify externally in a congested
process plant and may require additional operational controls.
4. Gate valves shall be installed in a horizontal position so that the gates cannot fall into
the closed position should they become detached from the stem.
h. A valved, blanked, drain branch shall be provided upstream of the block valve to facilitate
the draining and purging of the isolated branch.
i. Purge gas connections, including vents and drains, shall be provided to enable all parts of
the relief system to be purged and steamed out. These shall be connected to the fuel gas
system or nitrogen supply as specified by BP. See GP 44-70.
j. If headers of different materials of construction are connected together, in view of possible
backflow, the higher quality material shall be used for at least 10 m (33 ft) upstream of the
change in the process conditions.
k. Pipe stressing and anchor and support design shall allow for thermal expansion or
contraction, two-phase flow, slugs of liquid, acoustic fatigue due to high velocity flow, ice
formation or auto refrigeration cooling in cold service, and fire protection, if any. In order
to avoid expensive over design, the flare header mechanical design should be based on a
realistic evaluation of the maximum temperatures and durations of each relief situation,
and not simply the maximum specified relief temperatures.
l. Consideration shall be given to the need for hydrotesting after construction. If it is
required, all components, particularly foundations and supports, shall be designed for this
condition.
m. Relief devices and header material of construction selection shall consider potential
corrosive materials and other materials that can cause degradation (e.g., H2S) that may be
vented into the flare network and migrate back into interconnected piping.
12. Control and instrumentation
Refer to GP 22-20 for details on flare controls, pilot flame detection and instrumentation design,
selection, operation, and maintenance issues.
12.1. Flare smoke control

a. If specified by BP, smokeless flares using steam or other pressurized fluids for smoke
suppression should be equipped with either manual or automatic control systems which
will apportion the suppressant to the flare gas to produce clean burning without excess
flow.
In many cases, manual actuation of the steam system upon visual detection of smoke
is adequate to minimize smoking.
Excessive steam flow is not only costly but also increases flare noise.
b. If using automatic controls, three main types of control systems that may be used are:
Page 46 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
1. Ground mounted optical flare infrared radiation sensor.

2. High level flare radiation sensor.
3. Based on measurement of the flow rate of the flare gas through an ultrasonic mass
flow meter.
c. As the flare operates over a very wide range of flow rates, the flow-measuring device shall
not obstruct the line or reduce its capacity. The preferred method of control is by flare gas
flow.
Density measurement and compensation need only be considered if flared gas
accounting is necessary.
d. Smoke control using system 12.1.b.1 above depends on the fact that radiation from a
smoking flame is greater than that from a smokeless one. Measuring the radiant-heat
energy from a portion of the flame may be achieved either by an optical monitor located at
ground level a moderate distance from the flare stack base and trained on the base region
of the flame, or by paralleled high level radiation sensors spaced around the stack just
below the tip.
e. The optical monitor shall be a rugged telescope with a restricted field of view, equipped
with a photocell sensitive to near infra-red radiation. The telescope shall be of waterproof
design and allow regular cleaning of the lenses.
The advantage of an optical monitor is that it is located at ground level and
therefore can be checked and maintained at any time; it also has a fast response.
The disadvantages are that it requires a very precise aiming that can easily be
disturbed, and is not sufficiently selective to permit its use for multi-burner
installations.
f. For both types of radiant heat measurement, compensation for ambient variations
(night/day, sun/cloud) may be required. Signals from the monitor shall operate an actuated
control valve via appropriate converters which shall be adjustable up to the required flow
range and down to zero flow under normal conditions.
g. Appropriate control algorithms shall be developed to automatically position valves and
controls for smoke suppression.
1. Controls shall be matched to flaring conditions in the process to conserve smoke
suppression fluids while preventing smoke from being formed during a flare event.
2. Manual control to allow direct operator intervention shall be provided.
h. If system 12.1.b.3 is proposed, it shall contain facilities for on-stream inspection and
maintenance of all the important parts of the system and where specified by BP, the system
shall include a density-measuring device to provide correction using more suppressant for
heavier hydrocarbon gases.
12.2. Burn-back
Burn-back detection is not normally required. Either refractory lining or burn-back prevention
methods (i.e. adequate purging) should be used. If burn-back in the tip can occur, burn-back
detection shall be provided by one or more thermocouples in thermopockets whose location
inside the flare tip shall be subject to approval by BP. The thermocouples shall be wired to
control room alarms through a temperature switch adjustable for a temperature range
appropriate for the tip.
12.3. Purge control

Continuous purge flow rates for the flare system shall be monitored and alarmed.
Page 47 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
12.4. Oxygen monitoring

a. Oxygen monitoring is not generally required if there are alternate means of assuring the
system is air-free; such as a reliable, continuous purge. If installed, the typical alarm point
for the oxygen monitor should be about 1% oxygen in flare gas.
The primary purpose of oxygen monitoring equipment is to ensure that if a minimum
purge rate is used an explosive atmosphere does not result. It may also highlight the
spurious ingress of oxygen due to operating deviations, such as contraction of flare
stack gas during rapid cooling or a process shutdown, etc.
Particular care should be taken when using light purge gas coupled with taller
stacks. Under these conditions it must be assured that no air ingress occurs in the
vent/relief system potentially forming an explosive mixture.
b. The oxygen sampling probe shall be located 8 m (25 ft) or 15 diameters, whichever is the
smaller, below the tip exit. The probe piping shall be in accordance with vendor
requirements and shall be resistant to fouling or contamination by CO2 or other waste gases
in the flare stream.
c. The oxygen analysing installation should be suitable for mounting in an outdoor, exposed
location at the base of the stack or on the flare K.O. drum.
1. If located in an area where radiation level may exceed 4,73 kW/m2 (1 500 Btu/ft2h) it
shall be provided with suitable shielding.
2. The oxygen sensor and its electronic support package shall be capable of operating in
the expected temperature ambient range, particularly considering potential flare
radiation impacts.
d. The sample gas shall be withdrawn by a diaphragm type vacuum pump, fitted upstream
with liquid knockout pot, and returned to the stack above the sample point. This is required
to avoid a fluctuating pressure in the sampling line, due to changes in the pressure drop
through the stack induced by changes in the flow rates.
e. A portion of the sample gas shall be taken through a regulating needle valve to an oxygen
analyser and exhausted to atmosphere. Local and control room indications and alarms shall
be provided as specified by BP.
12.5. Flow measurement

a. Flow measurement of the flare gas may be required for three reasons:
1. Control of the flow rate of the smoke suppressant.
2. Regulatory reporting purposes (i.e., flaring rates).
3. Information (e.g. loss management, accounting).
The very wide range of the flow rates between a purge and a full emergency release
presents a difficult problem for the instrumentation. An additional problem is
contaminants that are often present in the gas.
b. Flow measurement should be by use of an ultrasonic mass flow meter unless an alternative
is approved by BP. See GP 30-10 and the GP 64 series on flow measurement.
c. If ultrasonic mass flow meters are used, they shall be mounted in the flare line downstream
of the off-site knockout drum, and installed per manufacturers recommendations.
d. If an alternative type of flare meter is used which is installed in the flare gas stream, the
measurement device should be inserted via a seal housing and isolating valve, providing
the capability of withdrawing the instrument during flare operation.
Page 48 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
12.6. Requirements for instrumentation

a. Normal requirements for flare system instrumentation are as follows:
1. For steam to flare stack (if installed):
a) Flow control: automatic and/or manual.
b) Flow indication and recording.
2. For flare stack internal atmosphere:
a) Oxygen contents indication (if oxygen monitor installed).
b) High oxygen contents alarm (if oxygen monitor installed).
3. For each knockout drum:
a) Level indication.
b) High level alarm (This alarm shall be a critical alarm).
c) Level switches or transmitters (if automatic operation of pumps is used).
d) Level gauge.
e) Upstream pressure gauge.
f) Temperature indicators/alarms for liquid phase (as appropriate)
4. For each liquid seal:
a) Level indication.
b) Low level alarm.
c) High level alarm.
d) Liquid temperature indication.
e) Temperature control (by steam or electricity).
f) Adequate instrumentation for liquid sump tank and liquid overhead drum if
fitted.
5. For pilot gas:
a) Flow indication.
b) Pressure control valve.
c) Low flow alarm.
d) Indication of back-up supply in operation.
e) Pilot flame failure (alarm).
6. For purge gas:
a) Flow indication.
b) Flow control.
c) Low flow alarm.
7. For air to pilots (if a separate source):
a) Flow indication.
b) Low flow alarm.
c) Pressure control valve.
d) Pressure indicator.
Page 49 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
b. Supplementary (optional) requirements are as follows:

1. For flare gas from knockout drum to flare stack:
a) Flow indication and recording.
b) Temperature indication.
c) High/low temperature alarm (either or both as appropriate).
2. For steam to flare stack: closed circuit television monitoring of flare tip.
13. Testing
The decision on the acceptability of pneumatic testing should be taken at an early

stage in the design and cannot be left until the line is constructed. On many
construction sites there is a great reluctance to carry out such testing. Apart from
procurement difficulties, consideration must be given to selecting welding
consumables with good fracture toughness to guard against brittle fracture and give
additional confidence in the safety of the line during test.
a. Maximum use of computer simulation and modelling should be performed to minimize
actual flare testing.
b. Unless otherwise specified by BP, full or maximum flow testing using air and measuring
the associated pressure drop shall be carried out by the flare vendor in their fabrication
facility. If reduced flow testing is proposed by the flare supplier, they shall clearly
demonstrate scale-up factors to validate the full flow flare capacity.
c. Other flare rates such as smokeless flare capacity or steam/assist gas flow rates shall be
demonstrated by the vendor either in their facility or on site, using testing methods
proposed by the vendor and approved by BP.
d. The flare vendor shall carry out the flushing, cold testing and static testing of the flare
system in accordance with GP 32-10 and GP 32-20; providing any special equipment
required for this testing.
e. The flare vendor shall produce documentation for BP approval, listing the
precommissioning and commissioning activities based on GP 32-20.
f. Any further requirements of the flare vendor for the attendance of specialist operators and
service staff during the precommissioning, commissioning and on-site performance testing
of the flare system will be specified by BP.
14. Spares
a. Spares lists shall be compiled by the flare vendor and submitted for BP approval. They
should consider the following as a minimum:
1. Replacement for all the gaskets for the joints that have to be broken during
construction or after testing.
2. One set of spares to cover the first overhaul.
3. One complete pilot burner.
4. One complete set of spare thermocouples.
5. One of each type of the equipment forming part of the ignition panel.
6. One set of spares for the smoke-suppressant apportioning instrumentation.
If purge is at the minimum rate and only sufficient to prevent air ingress at the tip,
burning in the tip and higher metal temperature may result. This shortens the tip
Page 50 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
life, but may produce significant energy saving, usually greater than the cost of
replacing a tip.
b. The above spare components should be evaluated on economic grounds, including an
allowance for change-out time.
15. Blowdown system
15.1. Design criteria

Hydrocarbon blowdown systems discharging directly to atmosphere shall be in compliance with
HSSE design and loss prevention requirements per GP 76-01. Atmospheric blowdown systems
(i.e., stacks and blowdown drums or receivers open or otherwise vented to atmosphere) in
hydrocarbon and/or toxic service are not allowed unless all of the following criteria are met:
a. Because of the high potential for generating a heavy vapour cloud, flammable liquids with
a flash point < 37C (100F) are prohibited from atmospheric blowdown systems.
Discharging flammable liquids into the sewer system or venting from the stack in the
event of an overfill could lead to a vapour cloud explosion or other significant
hazards.
b. Dispersion modelling with subsequent hazard consequence analysis shall be performed to
ensure that residual vapours vented from the blowdown stack do not pose flammable,
toxic, or other hazardous conditions (see clause 6.4.5). This shall include consideration of
all relief scenarios and modelling a range of cases, depending on which are the most
sensitive.
1. Lower venting rates than the design basis (design basis is usually the highest rate)
must be considered. Lower stack velocities tend to reduce dispersion and can increase
the potential for the cloud to reach grade, buildings, process and breathing air intakes,
platforms, etc. while still flammable.
2. Flammable gas concentrations shall be below 50% of the Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL) or below the Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL) at grade, platforms,
buildings, process and breathing air intakes, or sources of ignition.
3. Benzene, H2S, and other toxic gases or carcinogens shall be controlled at levels below
those specified in the BP gHSSEr guidelines and/or applicable local and national
standards for hazardous or toxic materials.
4. If dispersion and consequence analyses indicate that flammable or toxic levels may be
exceeded, options such as elimination of relevant relief cases (HIPS, redesign of
equipment, etc.), removal of relevant relief devices from the blowdown system, or
elimination of the blowdown system shall be considered.
c. The design review of hydrocarbon blowdown stacks to atmosphere shall be consistent with
GP 48-02 and shall consider personnel health and safety, noise, potential odour, potential
ground level emissions, potential liquid carryover, ignition sources, and thermal radiation.
d. The design of the atmospheric blowdown drum shall, as a minimum, meet current API
RP 521 or ISO 23251 design criteria for flare knockout drums with the additional measures
noted as follows. The blowdown drum shall:
1. Have a liquid residence time of at least 30 minutes or free space greater than the
maximum possible quantity of liquid that can be discharged into the drum after high
level alarm (based on highest anticipated liquid relief load), and shall be able to
empty out within 2 hours of high level alarm (unless the free space is greater than the
maximum possible quantity of liquid that can be discharged into the drum).
a) The residence time shall consider the maximum level of slop liquid in the vessel
that can be expected.
Page 51 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
b) No credit shall be allowed for pump out systems in determining the residence
time.
2. Have a continuous level indication and high level alarm with an independent high
level trip. The reliability (SIL level) of the high level trip function shall be determined
per GP 30-76.
a) There shall be a procedure in place for operator response to prevent overfilling
under all foreseeable conditions, including start-up, shutdown and other non-
routine operations.
b) Design of level instrumentation should include functionality for ease of on-line
maintenance and may therefore require redundancy.
3. Be designed to knock out liquid droplets such that any remaining droplets act as
vapour (i.e., maximum of 20 micron (0,000 8 in) liquid particle size).
4. Not be used for temporary storage of liquids generated from maintenance or other
activities.
e. Inlet and outlet piping shall be designed to provide adequate vapour-liquid disengagement.
In most piping configurations this would require installation of internal diverter plates,
elbows, or other deflecting devices which shall be properly maintained.
f. An appropriate and reliable continuous inert purge gas shall be in place at a rate
determined by the Husa correlation to prevent air intrusion. Steam is not an effective purge
for prevention of air infiltration because it can condense.
g. Consideration shall be given to potential ignition of vapours from the vent stack.
1. Methods to extinguish the flame shall be determined.
2. Thermal radiation and possible impacts on nearby areas where personnel and
equipment can be located shall be evaluated.
h. Liquid in the blowdown system shall be cooled to less than its flash point, but in no case
greater than 65C (150F) before discharge to any open system such as an oily water
sewer.
1. If water is used as the quench medium, it should not directly contact liquid that is
> 93C (200F) to prevent steam explosion events that can lead to overpressure of
the vessel and/or entrainment/discharge of hydrocarbon liquid to the environment.
2. Quench designs should take into account the need for good contact between the
quench stream and the hot vapours being cooled/condensed (internals, such as baffles,
may accomplish this).
i. If quench systems are used, possible consequences from failure of the quench medium,
resulting in release of excessive vapours to atmosphere and/or hot liquids to the sewer,
shall be considered.
j. Flame arresters in vent stacks (not a clean service) are prohibited because of plugging
potential.
In general, process systems connected to a vent stack are susceptible to
overpressure of only a few pounds and may be very susceptible to vacuum
conditions. Normal design is to provide an adequate purge rate to prevent
flashback into the vent system. Whenever flame arresters are used, they must
comply with clause 10.4.
15.2. Blowdown system liquid handling

The preferred disposal method for liquids is via pump to a closed slops system. An overflow via
a gooseneck to a suitably designed closed oily water sewer can be installed as a backup,
Page 52 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
provided it can be demonstrated that the closed sewer system can adequately handle the
materials (and the above restrictions on temperature and flash point are met). Systems should
have provisions to automatically start/stop the pumps via level control. Gooseneck seal depth
should take into account the maximum stack back-pressure at blowdown conditions.
Winterisation protection should be provided if the gooseneck contents can freeze at minimum
ambient temperatures.
16. Vent systems
16.1. General
a. Vents shall be provided to safely dispose of hydrocarbon vapours from equipment into one
of the following closed systems:
1. Process gas line (either fuel gas or wet gas).
2. Vapour recovery system.
3. Flare system. Tie-in of a vent to the flare system shall consider the impact of higher
flare header pressures under upset conditions on upstream vent process vessel
pressures.
4. Incinerator/thermo oxidizer.
5. Sump vent stack.
6. Combustion chambers.
b. Vents from process systems handling streams containing greater than 10 ppmw benzene on
an annual average may need to be controlled by a device such as carbon canister or an
incinerator.
c. Emergency vent to atmosphere may be used if it meets applicable country, state, and local
regulations.
d. If venting directly to atmosphere, all criteria in clause 6.4 shall be met.
16.2. Closed vent system

a. Flow indicator shall be installed on the vent system.
b. Piping components for vent lines shall be designed and installed as process piping.
c. If vent is to an incinerator, the incinerator shall be designed to reduce VOC emissions by
99%, minimum, and to provide the necessary residence time and minimum temperature as
required by regulations.
d. Incinerator shall be equipped with continuous recording temperature monitoring devices,
including start-up and normal operation, which shall:
1. Monitor temperature in combustion zone.
2. Measure temperature immediately before and after catalyst bed (if there is a catalyst
bed in the incinerator).
3. Verify performance during start-up.
4. Have an accuracy of +/1/2C (+/1F), or +/1% of temperature being measured,
whichever is greater.
e. If vent is to a vapour recovery system then system shall be designed to recover 95%,
minimum, of VOC emission vented.
Page 53 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
17. Flare gas recovery systems
a. Flare gas recovery should be evaluated on a project specific basis. These systems collect
and recover low pressure gases from the flare header system, maximising product recovery
and minimising flaring environmental impact. Further process design aspects when using
flare gas recovery can be found in ISO 23251 or API RP 521.
Flare gas recovery issues are closely related to BPs HSSE policy that specifies No
accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to the environment. The eventual use
of flare gas recovery may have effects on all three principles of this policy.
b. Basic issues associated with decisions to use or not use a flare gas recovery system should
include:
1. Technical Feasibility: On a case by case basis, is the goal to recover part or all vent
gases technically feasible? If not, alternative technical solutions should be considered,
such as reduced leakage in pressure reducing valves, balancing fuel gas systems, and
use of inert gas blanketing instead of fuel gas.
2. Impact on Safety: Would implementation of flare gas recovery potentially have a
significant negative impact on safety? If yes, the recovery system shall not be used.
3. Good Engineering Practice: Some topics in a good engineering practice review should
include:
a) Can process design improvements, operational practices, and/or process controls
reduce the volumes of flare/vent gases?
b) Can users be found for recovered low pressure gas?
c) Can recovered low pressure gas be transferred to another facility for
consumption or recovery?
d) Can eductor compression technology be provided using high pressure gas to
compress low pressure gas (may be applicable in oil/gas production facilities)?
e) Can compressor(s) be used for compression regarding utilities, space, and
weight limitations?
f) Variability of flow and value of available volumes for recovery versus cost of
system?
g) Purity of gas and is a gas cleanup system required?
4. Environmental Cost Factors: What effects would eventual use of the flare gas
recovery system have on capital, operational, and maintenance costs? Justification for
use of the recovery system shall include costs for each category.
5. Reputation Issues: Even though reputation issues cannot readily be quantified, they
should be considered in the evaluation process. Reputation issues include: public and
government interest, along with any third party impact. The effects of flare visual
impacts, noise impacts at sensitive times (evenings, nights), odour nuisance of flare
plume, etc. are some issues that need to be considered in this group.
c. The following are some examples related to flaring reduction/elimination:
1. Eliminate routine flaring/venting (e.g., eliminate source as first option) or use flare
gas/vent gas recovery system and use recovered gas for internal use, export, or re-
injection.
2. Consider options to prevent the occurrence of non routine and emergency
flaring/venting (e.g., use of high integrity blowdown compressors). The safety
implications for any project utilizing this option shall be evaluated.
3. Recapture fugitive gases associated with loading/unloading facilities.
Page 54 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
4. Recover low pressure vent gases produced by gas blanketing operations.

d. Flare gas recovery equipment capacity is typically selected to handle normal or routine gas
flows to flare with spare capacity to manage smaller releases from blowdown
valves/pressure relief valves.
1. During larger releases, the recovery system is isolated from the flare system and full
flow is diverted to flare where it needs to be ignited and burned (see clause 8.11).
2. If flare gas recovery is implemented, the flare stack will be left without flow.
Therefore, the flare stack still needs to have the continuous purge gas flow specified
in clause 10.1.
e. During flare gas recovery operation, many regulations require flare pilots to be left in
service (i.e., continuous ignition source). If not required from a regulatory standpoint, the
decision to shut down the pilots shall be evaluated by performing a risk analysis and
evaluation of pilot ignition system availability and reliability.
Some vendors have developed and are offering a flare ignition system without use of
conventional combustion based pilot design or conversely have a need to
continuously operate these pilots when they are provided.
f. The flare gas recovery system is typically installed downstream of the flare knockout
drum. An isolation valve closes the gas flow to flare and diverts flow to the flare gas
recovery system. For safety reasons, a rupture disk shall be installed in parallel with the
isolation valve.
Two basic types of flare gas recovery systems are currently being used in flare gas
recovery and compression: the ejector system and compressor based system. The
compressor based system is superior from an energy efficiency viewpoint and
provides larger system capacity. The ejector based system offers very high
availability and is virtually maintenance free; however, it requires a high rate (due
to a low overall efficiency) of high pressure motive gas that in many cases limits its
application. The choice of equipment is dependent on the process design and
installation specifics and needs to be assessed individually in each case.
Another important economic and safety benefit from having flare gas recovered and
not continuously flared is the expected life of the flare tips and pilots is increased.
Most flares are designed for the anticipated maximum flow rates; however, typical
or routine flaring rates are substantially lower. Low flaring rates, in most
applications, may be below minimum rates for flare tip design, resulting in tip
mechanical damage and short tip life.
Various vendors are currently offering flare gas recovery system/equipment as a
complete system (kit or skid based). The system includes all required components. In
some cases, the system is a proprietary design and patented.
Page 55 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Annex A
(Normative)
H.W. Husas correction formulae
The Husa correlation shall be used to calculate minimum purge gas flow rates for gases lighter than
air. If the purge gas mixture is heavier than air, a purge rate based on nitrogen shall be used. The Husa
correlation may be expressed either as:
1 20,9 n 0,65
Q 0,07068D 3, 46 ln Ci K i
y O2 i
where:
Q = purge gas rate, SCFH
D = flare stack diameter, in
y = column depth at which the oxygen concentration (O2) is to be predicted, ft
O2 = oxygen concentration, volume percent
Ci = Volume fraction of component i
Ki = Constant for component i. Typical values for Ki are:
Hydrogen: K = +5,783
Helium: K = +5,078
Methane: K = +2,328
Nitrogen: K = +1,067 (No wind)
Nitrogen: K = +1,707 (Wind 15 to 20 MPH or 6,7 to 8,9 m/s)
Ethane: K = 1,067
Propane: K = 2,651
CO2: K = 2,651
C4+: K = 6,586
Note that steam or other condensable is not a suitable purge gas.
In metric units:
1 20,9 n 0,65
Q 201,66 D 3.46
ln Ci K i
y O2 i
where:

Q = purge gas rate, m3/hr
D = flare stack diameter, m
y = column depth at which the oxygen concentration (O2) is to be predicted, m
O2 = oxygen concentration, volume percent
Ci = Volume fraction of component i
Ki = Constant for component i (see above)
These equations can be simplified using the standard criteria of limiting the oxygen concentration to 6
volume % 25 ft (7,62 m) down the flare stack (note that lower oxygen concentrations should be used
for certain compounds such as hydrogen see clause 10.1.c):
Page 56 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Q = 0,0004044 D3,46 K
where: Q = purge gas rate, SCFH
D = flare stack diameter, in
K = constant (see above)
In metric: Q = 0,0004044 D3,46 K

where: Q = purge gas rate, m3/hr
D = flare stack diameter, m
K = constant (see above)
Values of Ki for gases lighter than air are determined from
Ki = exp (0,065 (29MW i))

Values of Ki for gases heavier than air are determined from an amended Husa correlation
where (MWi29)) is substituted for MWi as follows:
Ki = exp (0,065 (MW i29))

where MWi = molecular weight of the ith component of n components.
Note: It should be recognised that the Husa correlation was

derived under calm or no wind conditions and is generally
applicable for wind speeds up to about 13 m/s (30 MPH).
Locations where prevailing winds can often exceed this wind
speed may need somewhat higher purge rates.
Page 57 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Annex B
(Informative)
Flare system training information
BP has a website containing general process background, photos, training material and an assessment
tool on a variety of process areas including Flare Systems. Simply select Module 7 (Flare) in the
following website: http://amposs408/cmas/process_operations/. A pop-up screen will ask for login
information, but no login is required; merely click the topic of interest in the table of contents (left
hand side) to proceed. Note, though some screens will indicate End of Page, click on the Next
button as some material may still continue on that topic.
Page 58 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Annex C-1
(Normative)
Atmospheric relief chart
Page 59 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Annex C-2
(Normative)
Blowdown system assessment
Page 60 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Annex C-3
(Normative)
Relief system studies and documentation
Page 61 of 62
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Bibliography
[1] Van Krevelin and Chermin and reported in the transactions of the Seventh International Symposium
on Combustion, 1959
[2] Meteorological Office, Bracknell, England, ref D/Met 01/21/1/2/L
[3] Flow of Fluids Though Valves, Fittings and Pipe; Crane Technical Paper No. 410
[4] Internal Flow Systems edited by D.S. Miller - BHRA Fluid Engineering, published by Gulf Publishing
or VDI Waermeatlas
[5] GN 44-001 Relief System Design Guidelines
[6] Safety Guidance Note No. 90/2: The use of Halons in Firefighting (Feb 1990), published by Group
Safety Centre (now Corporate Safety Services)
Page 62 of 62

GP 44-80 Design Guidelines For Relief Disposal Systems

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GP 44-80 Design Guidelines For Relief Disposal Systems

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Guidance on Practice for

ARCO Engineering Standards

9. Liquid removal ..................................................................................................................... 36

American Petroleum Institute (API)

International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

3. Terms and definitions

May - used if alternatives are equally acceptable.

Should - is used if a provision is preferred.

Shall - is used if a provision is mandatory.

Must - is used only when a provision is a statutory requirement.

a. To increase fuel concentration in order to make the effluent flammable.

Maximum flaring rate

Operational flaring load

Emergency flaring load

Emergency depressuring load

4. Symbols and abbreviations

CONCAWE Conservation of Clean Air and Water - Europe

LNG Liquefied natural gas

LPG Liquefied petroleum gas

5. Choice of disposal systems

performing these analyses, prevailing meteorological conditions shall be considered to

6.3. Non-hazardous discharge

6.4. Flammable and toxic discharge in atmospheric vents

4. There shall be no significant condensation of flammable or toxic material released

In many applications, the use of an inert gas or steam is a practical, if more

6.4.2. Vapour emission

6.4.3. Mist emission

6.4.5. Dispersion and consequence modelling

6.4.6. Venting from tanks and spheres

6.5. Blowdown drums discharging to atmosphere

e. Attention is drawn to the possibility of condensation in a closed relief system immediately

7.2. Pipe & header sizing and layout

7.3. Special relief arrangements

7.3.1. Hydrogen sulphide relief

7.3.2. Corrosive relief

7.3.3. Low-temperature relief

8. Flare system design

8.2. Component parts of the systems

8.3. Design considerations

8. Required life of flare system components.

8.4. Engineering diagrams

8.5. Flare types

4. Environmental requirements regarding smoke, pollution, noise, radiation, and

8.6. Smokeless flaring

- Highly turbulent conditions within the flame required for smokeless

8.7. Sizing of relief and flare systems

8.8.1. General principles

8.8.2. Height of flares

8.8.3. Calculation methods for flare thermal radiation

8.8.4. Thermal radiation levels

1. The figures given assume at least single-layer whole-body

2. For flaring where the peak radiation load is intermittent,

8.8.5. Restricted access zone (Sterilisation zone)

8.9. Elevated flares

8.10. Enclosed ground flares

8.11. Minimum heat content of flare gas

8.12. Ignition systems

8.12.2. Pilot gas supply

8.13. Flashback prevention

8.14. Noise levels

8.15. Flare sparing philosophy

9.1. Unit knockout drum (Onshore)