2016 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)
ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran
(petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party);
Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper party).
- A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the
assertion of JKG-Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the expenditure of public funds.
While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates, the bid documents and
contract for MVPSP indicate, that the government shall bear the burden of paying for the
project. Every portion of the national treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be
properly allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in the amount
of P3.851 billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper
procurement process cannot be easily brushed of by the Court. (Reynaldo M. Jacomille,
vs. Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), et.al., G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)
- Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power
of judicial review and the great responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the allocation
of powers among the three great branches of the government.
- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April 24, 2009- Although the
courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not
empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the
President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment
has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under the constitutional
principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.
- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the DIRECT INJURY test. In
People vs. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.
- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi
may be waived by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when
the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of transcendental importance; of overreaching significance to society
or of paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA
152; BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, December 7, 2010.
- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be accorded standing
to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen to have standing,
he must establish that he has sufered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party
1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his right of sufrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the third party; the third party
cannot assert his constitutional right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claim.
- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is not concerned with
whether the petitioners are real parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing.
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.
- Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department of Energy, GR 180771
April 21 2015- The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens
suit. A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to
institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to
adjudicate the substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the constitution; to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable of
repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736,
May 27, 2004.
- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;
SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA
577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013.
- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will
not preclude the SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of judicial review to determine
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under its EXPANDED JURISDICTION-
BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.
- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - Petitioners have standing to
file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an
issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification nay,
the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. xxxx This case is a
matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As
the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even
as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore, that from
the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The

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 alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court
stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.
- Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative or Executive Act- The
doctrine operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it
nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its efects. xxx It applies only to cases
where extraordinary circumstances exist and only when the extraordinary circumstances
have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. Xxx Its application to the
DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)
- As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it afords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides. Laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary (Yap v. Thenamaris Ships
Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011). The doctrine of operative fact
serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. The doctrine of
operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the efects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration (Ibid). The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would
put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it (Ibid).
The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule
otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act
may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law (Ibid).
- While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules
and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental
to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for
vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However,
the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall
follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC
has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by
the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long
held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most
fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties. (FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015)
- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBCs principal function is to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President
a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in
the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days
from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the
membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task
of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named ex-
officio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.

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 The Court held that considering that the complete membership in the JBC is preferable and
pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation.
It ruled that the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant for the
position of Chief Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the selection of
nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the
constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary
Act of 1948, which reads: In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall
devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is
removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply
to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.
- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held that the use of the
singular letter a preceding representative of Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The word
Congress is used in its generic sense. Considering the language of the subject
constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic
aids such as the records of the Constitutional Commission.
- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create a JBC as an
innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a
holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary. To allow the Legislature to have more quantitive influence in the
JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half a vote
each, would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution, declared the Court.
- The Court also held that the JBCs seven-member composition serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It further held that
under the doctrine of operative facts where actions prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized as a matter of equity and fair play, all JBCs prior
official acts are valid.
- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as sole
representative of Congress in the JBC and that such is best left to the determination of
Congress.
- Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In cases where an objection
to an applicants qualification is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor
renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend. The unanimity rule of
the JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his right to due process.
- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice must be given a free hand
on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
- AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court en banc
determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits
they may extend to the justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the courts granted power.
- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
members.
- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the problem being one of legality
or validity, not its wisdom.
- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are not the concern of the
Supreme Court- government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government.

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- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to change the venue of
(and authority to conduct) preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the
courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the
Executive department and not of the judiciary.
- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of
change of venue.
- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In view of the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24,
2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A.
No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all court, the admission
to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
- GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010- The Supreme Court has
now the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, pactice and procedure in
all courts, Viewed from this perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption from
the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a persons rights guaranteed and
recognized by the bill of rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge
may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party
and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall
state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or

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 testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national
security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must
show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or
persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making
the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended
for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security
or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice
or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the
parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court,
justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition for a writ of amparo is
improper remedy to regain parental authority and custody ove a minor child who was
legally put up for adoption.
- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To start of with the
basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and efective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary
and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil
process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life,
liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing.
We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper
case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
- WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it afects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

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 (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person
in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
- Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule requires that the petition
must sufficiently allege the manner in which the right to privacy is violated or threatened
with violation and how such violation, or threats afects the right to life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party.
- Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zenarosa Commission was not unlawful act as that violates or
threatens to violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security as to entitle the petitioner
to the writ of habeas data.
- Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September 29, 2014- petitioners
have no reasonable expectation of privacy that would warrant the issuance of a writ of
habeas data when their daughters shared the incriminating pictures with their Facebook
Friends. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network
activity, it is necessary that the user in this case, the sanctioned students, should manifest
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or limit its visibility.
- Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme
Court.
- Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005- Congress has the plenary
legislative power. The silence of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as
meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which requires full
payment before the State may exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which
requires only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.
- PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental law requires mandatory
review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The
Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the
Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule
making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law making power of
Congress. The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a
subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for
automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not violate Section 14.
Resolutions are not decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that
the petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review decision of the
CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no need to fully
explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
in the CA decision.
- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The mandate under
Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating
the legal basis thereof.
- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The constitutional mandate that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the validity of memorandum

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 decisions, which adopt by reference the finding of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals.
- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The Supreme Court
stressed that it has the discretion to decide whether a minute resolution should be used
in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court explained
that the grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA, there is no
need to fully explain the Courts denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees with or
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. There is no point in reproducing or restating
in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of facts
and laws applies to decisions, where the petition is given due course, but not
where the petition is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.
- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not preclude the
validity of Memorandum Decision which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to avoid
cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions thereof) of the lower court.

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 ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13, 2008-
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they
stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or
[local government unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right
to property, the former should prevail,.
- Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs NLRC, 323
SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution is a limitation on government powers. It
does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment
under the Labor Code.
- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, et al., GR
No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichays right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. IN administrative
proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process, which simply means having thte opportunity to explain ones side.
- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is neither a property nor
a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of
ones residence maybe revoked at anytime.
- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to operate a motor vehicle
is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or
revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.
- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.
INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:
1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers);
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10.Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of
liquidity problems in such bank.

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11.Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs. Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz,
2000);
12.Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13.TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013)
- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23, 2014- Prior notice
and hearing, as elements of due pocess of law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial
proceedings, not when the government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi
legislative or administrative functions.
- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they were denied due
process during the NBI Investigation. The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of
granting any relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable cause.
- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41, January 21, 2015- there
is no law or rule that requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Equal Protection of the Law
- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the strict scrutiny standard,
an American constituted construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that
tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess
the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier application to equal protection. In the
cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of
the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially condemnable act- accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is universally condemned act.
- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010-
the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating diferentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a Congressman is not
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
- Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003, Substantive
distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.

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- PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal
protection clause of the constitution. It was granted a franchise , subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures
- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No.
180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.
- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs.
Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC.
- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The confiscated items
having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be
considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to
warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence since a
barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code.
- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is justified only
when:
1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be there
where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted.
5. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless searches and seizures:
6. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395
SCRA 553);
7. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
8. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the seals and
stamps was not apparent and established until after they have been turned over to the
Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as
evidence in plain view);
9. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
10. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has
knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to
relinquish the right.) Silahis Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538
SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given;
11. stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968;
Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon
reasonable suspicion that a person may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas
an arrest requires probable cause that a suspect committed a criminal ofense;
12. Armed conflict (war time);
13. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No. 129756-58, January 28,
2000);

11
14. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a
warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder
because of an ongoing coup;
15. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the exercise of military
powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
16. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson,
GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).
WARRANTLESS ARREST
- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the Rules, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an ofense penalized by
a fine only. As a corollary, neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an ofense. xxx
In this case, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

The pursuit of the ofender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time of the
commission of the ofense to the time of the arrest.

There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest proceedings are proper
only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be availed, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime. (2)
such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officer.
- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of immediacy
between the time of the ofense was committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If
there was an appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the
crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the
presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the commission of the
crime. The requirement of the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an
earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the
crime.
- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State. The
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. Right applies only against the government and agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.
- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative authorities (CID; BOC)
only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of law.
- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration can
issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be deported.
- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one ofense.
- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR
PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no room for doubt
on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is
only necessary that there be reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the

1
 discretion of the officer executing the warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14,
2004.
- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be arrested but only if it is
absolutely necessary to do so. You will be freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat
to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

- Disini Jr., et al. vs. Secretary of Justice- Two constitutional guarantees create these
zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the
basis of the right to be left alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the state has impermissibly intruded into
these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay,
G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The
petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not
read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens
privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons
who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to
Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from attaching on account of his
letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of
these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The
making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the
courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence
therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession
to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio, October 17, 2006- In evaluating
a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

1
- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008- Supreme
Court declared as unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes. However, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random drug testing
for secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials and employees of public
and private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug
use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises.
- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right to be let alone is not
an absolute right where the person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.
- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if
there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the freedom of expression.
- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited commercial
ads; and the State cannot rob him of his right without violating his constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.
- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the COMELEC drastically
reduced the airtime within which national candidates and political parties may air political
advertisements on television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
- RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which
prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a) the
possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the
replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate the contents thereof either
verbally or in writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if
convicted, ranges from six months to six years.
- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code
- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a
written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any
mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose,
any communication, message, conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group
of persons or any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.

Section 4- Freedom of expression-

- 1 Utak vs COMELEC, GR 206020 April 14 2015- The COMELEC may only regulate the
franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport
or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of
ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
- A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here,
the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted
on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the

1
 messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert
their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
- It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to
the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign
material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
- he prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral regulations
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted, but
the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the
requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
- The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not necessary to
a stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on posting of
election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein.
Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would
ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the
requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.
- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the
ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569. By
way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

B.P. No. 880

SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--
A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly
shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law
are not covered by this Act.

SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(b) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(c) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8
hereof.

1
(d) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly.
(e) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of
the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse
to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four
hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court,
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
- In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights
of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty
of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases involving liberty, the
scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that
restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their
validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.
- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally

1
 permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present
danger standard.
- IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform the IBP which should have been heard first on the
matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant
the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It found that Atienza
failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as
the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereto,
- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election surveys are covered by
the protection to freedom of expression as they refer to the measurement of opinions and
perception of voters as regards to a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the voters preference for
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period.The prohibition
imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior
restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period; and 3) the
government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech may either be
content-based (the subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated) and
content-neutral (it regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the time,
place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must show
that the government has a compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A
content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show an important government
interest, as long as it leaves open alternative channels of communication.
- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008- The acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning television stations against playing the Garci
tapes under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and
should be subjected to the clear and present and danger test.
- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No. 170270/GR
No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate implication of the application of the strict
scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to
prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.
- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech
cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of
strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law.
- A statute or act sufers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
difer as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

1
- A facial challenge is likewise diferent from an as-applied challenge.
- Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts afecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
chilling efect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an in terrorem efect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.
- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in
the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would efectively go against the grain of
the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power
may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties
who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge
to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States
power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited
to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation
in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not
before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if
the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigant.
- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment,and that claims of facial overbreadth
have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech
or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.
- American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with
regard to the statute's facial validity.
- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause
has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three
cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the
non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the

1
 two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal
statute, unlike in the present case.
- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
following elements may be culled: (1) the ofender commits an act punishable under any of
the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the ofender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful
demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
- Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-vis Section 4(3)
of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection
as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless is
entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of his right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitmate forms of expression.
- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of publication of exit
poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably restrictive because it efectively prevents
the use of exit poll data not only for election day projections, but also for long term
research.
- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner the power to
screen, review and examine all television programs, emphasizing the phrase all
television programs. Thus, when the law says all television programs, the word all
covers all television programs, whether religious, public afairs, news documentary, etc.
The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general
word or expression. It then follows that since The Inside Story is a television program, it is
within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.
- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009-The
Supreme Court said that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a G rating for general viewership. The
Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan,
not Soriano, as the MTRCB may not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction.
- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim is
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It must also be shown that a
third party could identify him as the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following:
1. private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceeding which are not confidential in nature including any statement made
therein or act performed by public officer.
- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those which are not
actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of Congress therein
or any committee thereof) or qualified privileged (those containing defamatory imputations
which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or

1
 justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and true reports without any
comments/remarks).
- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man
is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 - members of
Jehovahs witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag ceremonies (singing the
national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs.
- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated
when it will bring about clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has
a duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does not
constitute clear and present danger.
- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of religion does not prohibit
imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a
religious organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of registration.
- Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405 SCRA 497-
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards are drawn
from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Afairs exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom
of Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The
State has in efect forced Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah
on halal food.
- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus, it
found a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that moral disapproval is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party list system. Upholding equal protection, the Court ruled that from the
standpoint of the political process, LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. As such,
laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a transgression of
AngLadlads fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by reason of the COMELEC
action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other party-list candidates. (GR
No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared that the COMELEC order
to remove the tarpaulin did not violate freedom of religion, It does not convey any religious
doctrine of the catholic church.
- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed
by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once
the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

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 Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-
- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA- Relate to suspension of
deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA;
Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.
- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The persons right to travel is
subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system
of justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian
reasons is a matter addressed to the courts discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6,
2001).
- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that everyone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country.
- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO. MTJ-10-1770-July
18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court [personnel, before they can go on leave to
travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
regulate is to govern or direct according to rule.

Section 7- Right to Information

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is
consummated. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters afecting national security and public
order.
- Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section 17, Art. XI has
classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest.
In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of constitutional
origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on
the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law. xxx While public officers in the custody or control of public records have
the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit
access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public
trust.
- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC
- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records may not be
prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15- Congress, via Art. 125 of
the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike
does form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation
- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which
eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at

2
 present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property.
For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And
then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for
national government infrastructure projects.
- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the
property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303- There are at
least two crucial diferences between the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule
67. Under the statute, the government is required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974
which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the BIR,
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.
- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29, 2012- When the
State exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian
program, the constitutional provision which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the
constitution which provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. Notably, the provision also imposes upon the State
the obligation of paying landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
governments agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair and full price if the taken
property.
- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust account to provisionally
pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation,45 we struck down as void the DAR administrative circular46 that provided for
the opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in
Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.47 We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section
16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of
satisfying the governments payment of just compensation.
- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the Court determined that
the legal interest should be 12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was
efectively a forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment
been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the
RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed
from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took the
property.
- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the Court has allowed the
grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the
just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an efective forbearance on
the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from
the time of taking.
- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As often ruled by this
Court, the award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment
which, in efect, makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to
ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner.
However, when there is no delay in the payment of just compensation, the Supreme
Courthas not hesitated in deleting the imposition of interest thereon for the same is
justified only in cases where delay has been sufficiently established.

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- Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21 2015- The governments failure
to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
invalidate the States exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject
of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said
expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of
the States inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater
good.nThus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
- While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the
long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not
at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of just
compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for
the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses,
and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is taken.
- The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application
of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such
literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just
compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying
interpretation of economic policies a matter which this Court has no competence to take
cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in
the law and jurisprudence.
- For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined from
the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part.
To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing
with constitutional requirements in taking private property.
- Villanueva vs JBC, GR 211833 April 7, 2015- Discretionary execution of judgments
pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties, they are
exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
- It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit the claimants action only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered
by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, 1970).
- The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof
and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural,
matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to
acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974,
which specifically prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of
just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government
infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession, is a substantive law. Further,
there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974
or in any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to
this case.

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- RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard to
the expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for national government
infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of
right-of-way sites or locations for national government infrastructure projects, the
provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall still govern.
- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin elements of just
compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The simple fee
does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case
of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived
of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be
strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an
exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or
least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept,
has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public
necessity the very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance,
the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more
cogent point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another
public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared
purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the
state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another
citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is ofensive to our
laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of
expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play
- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who were able to prove the
commitment of the government to allow them to repurchase their land.
- Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State, through
expropriation proceedings may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this
property again to another private party as long as there is public purpose to the taking.
- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property subject to
expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional, just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.
- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 - For MCWD to exercise
its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of
directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.
- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a
limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted
against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
- While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle
that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure,
the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation

2
 punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate
the payment of just compensation.
- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent domain, subject to
judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community).
- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity (patrimonial), in any
expropriation proceeding, must be paid just compensation. If the property owned is public
or otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).
- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).
- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land Incorporated,
September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that the
State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since
said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just
compensation.
- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs.
Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 The tax credit given to commercial
establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form of
just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use, since the privilege
enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from private
establishments concerned.
- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then power of eminent domain comes into play. It is inconsequential that private entities
may benefit as long as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).
- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property for socialized
housing is for public use.
- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1) government lands;
2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4)
lands within the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites,
slum improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS sites
which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs.
Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions entered
or perfected even prior to its imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on the
exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been
granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)
- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that impair contract.
(Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)
- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR No. 195540, March
13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem
their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by
reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the
certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise
no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from
its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its efectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

2
 Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights
- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.
- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay based organizatios in
the nature of watch groups, as in the case of bantay bayan, are recognized by local
government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Banting and the
specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on
the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The
Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of Lauga which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial investigation, nor it can
be considered a formal arrest, by the very nature of the questioning, the expectations of
the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624
- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an efective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
invited for questioning.
- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is admission in
evidence.
- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.
- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel (Ampong vs.
CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court sustained the
admissibility of the sworn statements of the other accused, explaining that the
investigations performed by the PNP were administrative and not custodial in nature.
- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not
be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital ofense but later convicted of non-
capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266
SCRA 281).
- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The right is not
available in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any
provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting
bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
- Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases, bail may be
applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and

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 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons (Govt. of USA vs.
Purganan, September 24, 2002).
- Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007
Potential extraditee may be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence
that the person is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.
2. The right to be heard
- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty for the law to be
upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto,
November 19, 2001).
- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant may not be
sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the information to allege
relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348
SCRA 476).
- A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will call into
operations all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditees
right to notice and hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court-
it is only then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).
- Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11, 2014- the burden of
demonstrating political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence.
3. Right to public trial
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves
with decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).
- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The
impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all
the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough.
What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be
allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends
to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY
GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines outlined
therein.
- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to speedy trial maybe
waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition
of his case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert his
right, he is considered to have waived it.

2. Right to face to face confrontation

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- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening death of
plaintif/witness does not necessarily render the deceaseds testimony inadmissible. Where
no fault can be attributed to plaintif/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all
that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for preliminary investigation
with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that the case is of simple
nature and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was violation of the
accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends to
preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

- The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative hearings when the nature
of the penalty is penal in nature (like forfeiture of property or dismissal from employment)
and the hearing partakes the nature of criminal proceeding (Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA
1059).
- Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice
medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners).
- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456- The right
against self incrimination is extended in an administrative investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held
to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in which punishment is sought
to be visited upon a witness, whether a party of not.
- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of documents sought to
be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).
- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, the Supreme Court
affirmed the admissibility and probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the
first ever Supreme Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v.
Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar, held that in
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests
- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contended that the
blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of
Art. III of the Constitution.
- The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23
June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against self- incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt and that
it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.
- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383, the Court held
that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.

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- Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It
cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without
the presence of counsel. In that case, the Court ruled that there was no violation of the
right against self-incrimination. It further stated that the accused may be compelled to
submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an ofense of which he is
accused.

Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Penal Code)
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse comitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patriapotestas

Section 19- Death penalty

- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition of the death
penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for Congress to determine its reimposition
because of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

- The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for non payment of debt
- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to a civil debt
or one not arising from a criminal ofense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by
the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused
under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).
- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not concluded as a series of
events prompted the Senate to declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was
neither acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express
consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double jeopardy
must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).
- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of a case becomes
permanent after the lapse of one year for ofenses punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for ofenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years.
- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the accused, the following
must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2)

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 the provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the ofended party; 3) the
1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a subsequent
case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).
- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment of conviction. It
merely approved the agreement between the parties on the plea to a lesser ofense by the
accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)
- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the ofender under both
section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of RPC is unconstitutional because it constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. Same with charging the ofender
under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography constitute double
jeopardy.
- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double jeopardy if the
subsequent information charges the accused with diferent ofense, even if it arises from
the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is
forbidden is prosecution for the same ofense.

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not penal
law but a substantive law on jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional
(Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).
- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered ex-post facto law as
long as it operates prospectively since its stricture would cover only ofenses committed
after and not before its enactment.
- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court doctrines pursuant
to the maxim legisinterpretatiolegis vim obtinet- the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).
- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying circumstance in murder
cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398 SCRA 62).
- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being unconstitutional on the
ground that resort thereto was tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law-
Describing the argument as specious, the Supreme Court held no ex-post facto law was
involved in the case at bar. It added that the science of DNA typing involved the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas, an ex-post facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented. (PP vs.
Yatar, May 19, 2004)