CHURCHILL vs.

RAFFERTY,

G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580)

FACTS:

The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove
any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard,
or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of
police power in this case?

HELD:

Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles
which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is
obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the
ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably
within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed
by the courts.

"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same."

"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said,
however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace,
health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the
provisions of the organic law."

"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the
community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest
number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the
exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand
correction."

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put
forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."

"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its
boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."
Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

32 Phil. 580 (1915)

In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case
involves a dual question one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the
collection of the tax in question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the
same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter aspect as correlated to the police
power of the State.

Facts

Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising
business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands
in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the
defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of
section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector
of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that
the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the
billboards in question in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the
health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons. Defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the
complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant decided that the billboard
complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.

Issue

1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a

legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?

Held

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or
billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general
welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well-
recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if
the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power.
Judgmentreversed.
Barangay Sindalan v. CA, G.R. No. G.R. No. 150640, 22 March 2007

Facts

Barangay Sindalan, pursuant to its resolution, filed a complaint for eminent domain against the Sindayan
spouses who were the registered owners of the parcel of land subject of the expropriation. The
barangay sought to convert a portion of spouses Sindayans land into Barangay Sindalans feeder road.
The spouses argued that the expropriation of their property was improper because it was sought for a
private use. They alleged that the expropriation of their property, which was adjacent to Davsan II
Subdivision, would benefit only the homeowners of said subdivision. The RTC ruled that the barangay
had the lawful right to take the property of the Sindayan spouses. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Issue

Whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose No,
the contemplated road to be constructed by the barangay would benefit only the residents of a
subdivision.

Held

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be
for a public purpose. In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for
the community." The intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has
not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, will be
benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed. While the number of people who use or can use
the property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual
milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents lot is confined solely to the Davsan II
Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. Considering that the residents who need a
feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to
acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the
subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent
domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an
unlawful purpose.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr
1987]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for
brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be
P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that
under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the
fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the
case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining

just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible

encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a
matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle
or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not
substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the
Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Valid Classification
Eminent Domain Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or
R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall,
by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners
of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and
229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform
program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated
due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
 Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY
the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking
HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative
fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs)
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications
of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May
10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on
May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified
FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the
application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they
received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution
thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution
that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should
not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting
to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not
transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears
too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that
are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease
of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to
give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of
actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands
of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of
the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be
awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of
Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by
intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-
hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands
became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the
approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno)
that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2,
2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority
noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme.
Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears
stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a
special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality
the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after
10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly,
the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands
under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to
land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
[over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that
the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this
33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in
the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the
common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number
of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares
divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by
PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]
APO Fruits Corp. et al vs Court of
Appeals, Land Bank of the
Philippines
514 SCRA 537 Civil Law Property Eminent Domain Determination of Just
Compensation
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5 parcels
of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two
voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFCs
land and P164.40 million for HPIs land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR
cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was
filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render
a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government,
through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFCs account and P45M
into HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996. Later, titles were given to
farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of
just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and
HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase
price should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at
P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to
the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was just compensation.
HELD: No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB,
an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat
on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before
the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was
given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount
but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and
to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly
oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences
of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is
not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved
from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of
the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court
shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this
Act
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the
guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as
well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and
HPIs lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network,
airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount
of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the residential
and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value
of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined
by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and
location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just compensation (Php 1.38
billion) as computed with 12% interest per annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of
the just compensation or P138 million.

Read full text (February 6, 2007)

xx
541 SCRA 117 Civil Law Damages Attorneys Fees Interest
Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration averring, among others, that the award of
attorneys fees and interest is not proper because (1) it did not delay payment as proven by
the fact that they already deposited payment into the accounts of AFC and HPI (see facts
above), and (2) theres no substantial factual basis for the award of the 10% attorneys fees
(P138 million in total for attorneys fees!).
Land Bank, in the same motion, also prayed that the case be referred to the Supreme
Court en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Land Bank is correct as far as the interest and attorneys fees are
concerned.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed that indeed there was no delay in payment. It was
just that there was no proper computation of the amount of just compensation. Anent the
issue of attorneys fees, Land Bank is also correct. Attorneys fees as a rule is not
recoverable except if so alleged in the complaint and properly justified. In this case, AFCs
and HPIs allegation that they were constrained to go to court because of the delay of
payment entitled them to receive attorneys fees is not tenable. The SC determined that the
delay in payment was not the fault of Land Bank but rather it was the fault of AFC and HPI
for failing to follow the proper procedure in filing cases. What AFC/HPI should have done
was when they did not agree with Land Banks valuation they should not have filed two
complaints with DAR and waited for three years they should have filed the complaint
directly with the RTC which will sit as a Special Agrarian Court and should not have waited
for three years. Hence, the delay and the expenses AFC/HPI incurred were a result of their
own actions.
Land Banks prayer to refer the case to the SC en banc was denied by the SC 3rd Division.

Read full text (December 19, 2007)

xx
April 30, 2008 Remedial Law Prohibited Pleading (Second Motion for Reconsideration in
the SC level)
Political Law Constitutional Law Division Cases vs En Banc Cases
Not satisfied with the decision (above), Land Bank filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration. It avers that that this case should be referred to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc because the decision on just compensation which was promulgated by the
Third Division of the Supreme Court will practically reverse a doctrine handed down by
another division and that as a rule no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in
a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
On the other hand, AFC and HPI also filed their (first) MFR contesting the deletion of the
award of interest and attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Land Bank is correct.
HELD: No. In the first place, the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration should be denied
because it is already a second motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading and
against the Internal Rules of the SC. Second, this decision of the third division is different to
the other cases cited by Land Bank as these other cases have different factual background,
hence, the rule that only the SC en banc may reverse a doctrine or principle is not violated.
The MFR by AFC and HPI was denied.
NOTE: This ruling became final on May 16, 2008 (Read digest below)

Read full text (April 30, 2008)

xx
607 SCRA 200 Remedial Law Second Motion for Reconsideration Immutability of
Judgment
Not satisfied, on May 28, 2008, AFC and HPI filed a Motion for Leave to file and admit a
Second Motion for Reconsideration (unlike Land Bank which filed a 2nd MFR without asking
for leave of court first). This is notwithstanding the fact that the decision of the Thrid Division
already became final on May 16, 2008. AFC and HPI readily attached their MFR.
AFC and HPI are assailing the deletion of the award of interest and attorneys fees.
This time also, the Third Division of the Supreme Court referred this case to the Supreme
Court en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for leave should be granted.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court, via majority decision, reiterated the ruling of the Third
Division of the Supreme Court that AFC/HPI are not entitled to the award of interest and
attorneys fees.
It also emphasized that the parties cannot be allowed to file a second motion for
reconsideration because of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. A judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. In
this case, the judgment already became final on May 16, 2008. Sure there are exceptions to
this rule, to wit:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.
But none of these exceptions are applicable in this case. In fact, the private claim by AFC
and HPI does not even qualify either as a substantial or transcendental matter, or as an
issue of paramount public interest, for no special or compelling circumstance has been
presented to warrant the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability in their favor.

Read full text (December 4, 2009)

xx
 632 SCRA 727 Civil Law Award of Interest
Political Law Constitutional Law Eminent Domain Just Compensation Doctrine of
Transcendental Importance
Still not satisfied with the December 4, 2009 Resolution, AFC and HPI filed a motion for
reconsideration on the said Resolution. (Note: This is the third MFR but is technically
the first MFR filed by AFC/HPI concerning the December 4, 2009 Resolution). In their
Motion, AFC and HPI pointed out that the principle of immutability of judgment cannot be
applied because in the first place, the entry of judgment of the April 30, 2008 Resolution
was made on May 16, 2008 which was still within the prescriptive period for them to file their
MFR (though it was not indicated what date AFC and HPI received the April 30, 08
Resolution); and second, this case involves a paramount public concern hence it should be
taken as an exception to the rule (Doctrine of Transcendental Importance).
AFC and HPI invoked their right for their claim of interest and did not invoke anymore their
claim for attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not AFCs and HPIs motion for reconsideration should be granted.
HELD: Yes. AFC and HPI is correct in asserting their right to interest. They rightfully
argued that the interest is part of just compensation. Hence, the earlier Decision by the SC
which states that there was no delay on the part of Land Bank because it actually made a
downpayment, albeit for the wrongfully computed amount of just compensation, is wrong.
In fact, there is actually delay in payment.
It is to be noted that the government immediately took over the property of AFC and HPI
without the full payment. In fact, AFC and HPI were immediately deprived of their property.
And for 12 years, they were deprived of the payment of the correct amount of just
compensation. It is therefore proper to award interest in this case. The rate of interest
should be 12% per annum (legal rate, but note that we now have a new legal rate,
see Nacar vs Gallery Frames) to be computed from the day the downpayment was made in
1996 until full payment of the just compensation. This is justified because when the land
was taken away from AFC and HPI without being paid the proper amount, they were not
only deprived of the land but were also deprived of the rightful profit and gains they would
have had from their property and were made to wait for a long time just so to be paid the
proper amount of just compensation.
So as a rule, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually
paid or deposited with the court (in this case since downpayment was made, reckoning
point shall be the day when downpayment was made; interest to be computed against
unpaid balance).

Read full text (October 12, 2010)

Note: Land Bank filed another Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Supreme Court on November 23, 2010 (see the full text of the Resolution here).
xx
647 SCRA 207 Political Law Doctrine of Transcendental Importance Eminent Domain
Still not satisfied, Land Bank filed a second motion for reconsideration with request for oral
arguments. The Solicitor General also sought to intervene (rightly so because of the amount
involved). Land Bank assails the applicability of the Doctrine of Transcendental Importance
as applied by the SC in awarding interest in favor of AFC and HPI. Land Bank argues that
the said doctrine cannot be applied because neither life nor liberty is involved in this case.
Land Bank insisted that the real issue in this case is the mere payment of money, a private
claim, which in no way affects public interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Land Bank is correct.
HELD: No. This case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of
public interest the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely,
the right of a landowner to receive just compensation when the government exercises the
power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform program. A proper computation of just
compensation will encourage more people to participate in the land reform program of the
government.
Note: Motion for oral arguments was denied. Sol-Gens motion to intervene was likewise
denied because SC said the government was already well represented by Land Bank.
Finally, SC ruled no further pleading on this case shall be entertained and parties may be
subjected to disciplinary actions if further pleadings are filed.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5 parcels
of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily
offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFCs land and P164.40
million for HPIs land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price
hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication
Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for
three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited
P26M into AFCs account and P45M into HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also
caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996.
Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of
just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The
RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should be
higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that
DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was just compensation.

FACTS:
No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency
of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for
three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The RTCs
finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was given chance to support its
ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such
evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while
government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch
as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the
interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
 SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the
guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and HPIs
lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier,
irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital funding
have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the residential
and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of the
property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such
factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location.
Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as
computed with 12% interest per annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just
compensation or P138 million.
Felipe Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

F:
Soon after the change in government in 1986, Petitioner a letter to the Office of the President, and to
Minister ErnestoMaceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of
its timber license agreement whichwas cancelled during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation
of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin PeaksDevelopment and Realty Corporation without public
bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and,(3) the issuance of an order allowing
petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area.
P alleged:
it entered into a timber license agreement with the DENR, wherein it was issuedan exclusive license to
cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within aspecified portion of public forest land
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30,
1990;That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafterreferred to
as "Bureau"], issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations inNueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitionerand nine other forest concessionaires,
pursuant to presidential instructions and amemorandum order of the Minister of Natural ResourcesThat
on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, requesting him tostop all logging
operations and to pull out logging machineries and equipment in order toconserve remaining
forests.That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letteraddressed
to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of theBureau's directive, citing in
support thereof its contributions to forest conservation andalleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of itslogging operation, but no favorable action was
taken on this letter;That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the
areaformerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and RealtyCorporation
under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the otherhalf was allowed to be
logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formalaward or license; and,That the latter
entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposedPresident Ferdinand Marcos.The
MNR issued an
order denying
petitioner's request.

It ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but
only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare sodemands,
and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaireswhose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of
logging operations in theprovinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao reasoning that the
Ministry imposed the ban because itrealizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forests. It
considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case,it has to ensure the availability of forest
resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.
Ps MR denied.
Meanwhile, MNR issued an administrative order lifting the logging ban in the province of Quirino. P
then appealed tothe Office of the President which however denied it on the ground of lack of merit.
It ruled that the appeal of petitionerwas prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in
the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration wasdenied.Hence, this petition for certiorari.
I:
WON public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and WON TLAare contracts.
H:

NO.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have upontheir finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of
res judicata.
Thesedecisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same
had been rendered by a

court of general jurisdiction. The rule of

res judicata
thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competentauthority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction.As gleaned from the record,
petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law
, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 asamended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions
until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letterdated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister
of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions,these were already settled matters
as far as petitioner was concerned.Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve thecountry's natural resources, have indicated an
ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements enteredinto, and permits or licenses
issued, under the previous dispensation.The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in
response to the renewed and growing global concern over thedespoliation of forest lands and the utter
disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. Thelegitimacy of such concern
can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of theprofligate
waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and
faunapeculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social
effects. The delicatebalance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been
triggered and the supply of food andenergy resources required by the people seriously depleted.While
there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate
financialrequirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival
in a viable environmentdemands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further
denudation of whatever remains of theforest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view
of the clear constitutional command to maintain abalanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution. A long line of cases establish the basic rulethat the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies
Petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because
he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari
with the Courtattacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that
petitioner, throughout the periodof its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from
the courts which were normally operating at thetime, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorarirequiring the reversal of
these orders will not lie.A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister
Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed bythe Office of the President, will disclose public policy
considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in thecase at bar.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilizationand disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that theymerely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
orirrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified,replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus,
they are not deemed contractswithin the purview of the due process of law clause
Dismissed
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. v. HONORABLE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA et al.

536 SCRA 193 (2007), EN BANC

Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone
(SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of
the law provides that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic
Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to the law, Indigo Distribution Corporation, et al.,
which are all domestic corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were
granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.

Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes,
duties, charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and
cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly
chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that, all
importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the
SBF, shall be treated as ordinary importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and
charges, including excise taxes.

Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on
the imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs
and the SBMA Administrator. Their request was subsequently denied prompting them
to file with the RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief to have
certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was subsequently granted by Judge
Ramon Caguioa. The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).

ISSUES:

Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ
in favor of private respondents despite the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance

HELD:

One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his Order
of May 4, 2005 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 2005 despite the
absence of a clear and unquestioned legal right of private respondents. In holding that
the presumption of constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by
private respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in his May 4, 2005 Order,
he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, private respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that
ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right would not
justify an injunctive relief.

Indeed, Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or
illegally collected taxes which would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private
respondents should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334 be declared unconstitutional or invalid.

The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which
courts are cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. Having ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of
R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in effect the proposition that private respondents in their
petition for declaratory relief were duty bound to prove, thereby shifting to petitioners
the burden of proving that R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.

In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have overstepped his discretion
when he arbitrarily fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million.
Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to
answer for all damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction. The purpose of
the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and
the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that being
possessed of the power to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public respondent
can proceed to determine the merits of the main case. Moreover, lacking the requisite
proof of public respondents alleged partiality, this Court has no ground to prohibit him
from proceeding with the case for declaratory relief. For these reasons, prohibition does
not lie.
GANZON VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:50 PM

G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:

Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local Government,
filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was
faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend
and remove local officials.

RULING:

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary
of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the
President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in
those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in
sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to
say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 9:14 AM

G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under
the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.
the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.
 PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R.
No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed
and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork
barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions,
as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance
of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs
Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP
of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the
Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994:
(a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on
Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision
in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is
constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The
burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As
held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government
agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving
fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A.
No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission;
E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health
is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without
also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not
the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by
the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation
of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of
said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative
of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the
right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once
in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations
to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to
complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate.
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper
steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
EUGENIO VS DRILON
Edit 0 1

Case Digest [Topic/Content, Brief Title of Case

Eugenio v. Drilon

G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)

FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment b
asis from Petitioner, two lots.Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of
non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spousesRelevo and the title
was registered under their name. Respondent prayed forannulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to
him. Applying P.D. 957 TheSubdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human
SettlementsRegulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstatePrivate
Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him ofthe payment (including
interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitionerclaims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying
P.D. 957 saying it should have not beengiven retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify
the non-paymentof the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse ofdiscretion and P.D. 957 is to given
retroactive effect so as to cover even thosecontracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did
not expressly providefor retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakableintent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law.
GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION VS EQUITABLE PCI BANK

Nature:
Redemption of Mortgage

Ponente:
Villarama
Date:
March 13, 2013
DOCTRINE: Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties butonly modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period
originally provided inAct No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of
foreclosure sale, and expires uponregistration of the certificate of sale or three months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewiseno retroactive application of the new redemption
period because Section 47 exempts from its operation thoseproperties foreclosed prior to its
effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under ActNo. 3135.

FACTS:
On November 29, 1985, petitioner Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favorof Equitable PCI Bank over three parcels of land as security for a Php2,000,000 loan
granted to the petitioner.Petitioner eventually failed to settles its loan obligation, leading respondent to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgageon December 13, 2000. Subsequently, a Certificate of Sale was
issued to respondent on January 26, 2001.In a letter dated March 7, 2001, petitioner offered to redeem
the foreclosed properties by tendering a check.Petitioner and respondent met on March 12, 2001.
However, petitioner was told that redemption was no
longer possible since the certificate of sale had already been registered; the title to the foreclosed prope
rties wereconsolidated in favor of the respondent on March 9, 2001.Petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages contending that the 1-year period of redemptionunder Act 3135
should apply, and not the shorter redemption period under RA 8791 as applying RA 8791 wouldresult in
the impairment of obligations of contracts and would violate the equal protection clause under
theconstitution.The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling that redemption was made
belatedly and that there was noredemption made at all.The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act 3135, and not the
shorter period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that foreclosure would be in accordance
with Act 3135
RULING:

The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply.

The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale.
In this case,
the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioners default and the latters
entire loan
obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance
with theRules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.But under Sec 47
of RA 8791, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons which are allowed toexercise the
right of redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale" and
inno case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.Section 47 did not divest
juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified thetime for the
exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The
newredemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of
the certificate ofsale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no
retroactive application of the newredemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivityand whose owners shall retain their redemption rights
under Act No. 3135.We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of
redemption for juridical personswhose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 3135.The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was
based on the nature of the propertiesforeclosed

whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is
retained,or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period

of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these
acquired assets.It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath
of the 1997 Southeast Asianfinancial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by
fashioning a legal framework for maintaininga safe and sound banking system. In this context, the
amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of suchsafe and sound practices aimed at ensuring
the solvency and liquidity of our banks.

It cannot therefore be disputedthat the said provision amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was
based on a reasonable classification andgermane to the purpose of the law.The right of redemption
being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the prescribed
time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to contract and to property,
ithas to give way to police power exercised for public welfare.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response toconditions and circumstances thus
assuming the greatest benefits.The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State andnot only may regulations which affect them be established
by the State, but all such regulations must be subject tochange from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the circumstances maychange, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of theConstitution must
yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. The right granted by this provision must
submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of regula
tion.
Such authority to regulate businessesextends to the banking industry which, as this Court has time and
again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public interest.Having ruled that the assailed Section 47 of
R.A. No. 8791 is constitutional, we find no reversible error
committed by the CA in holding that petitioner can no longer exercise the right of redemption over its fo
reclosed propertiesafter the certificate of sale in favor of respondent had been registered.
 Facts of the case
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal
to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such
marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also
brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the
plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans
on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not
violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Question
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people
of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Conclusion
Sort:

by seniority
by ideology

54 DECISION FOR OBERGEFELL

MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY

The Fourteenth Amendment requires both marriage licensing and recognition for same-sex couples.
Kennedy

Ginsburg

Breyer
Sotomayor

Kagan

Roberts
Scalia

Thomas

Alito

Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as
one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the
same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to
marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it
protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by
according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been
recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex
union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex
couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under
the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force
to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to
marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious
organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples
the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex
marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is
beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such
unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of
their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and
require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds
and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike
down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and
government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its
definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an
overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and
while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote
that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Courts authority both by exercising the
legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves
for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be
recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected
judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change
should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role,
the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a
right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas
also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine
of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so
distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands
of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical
restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government
entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on
religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to
determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in
the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does
not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the
states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a
majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the
democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the
Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of
Mindoro
39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native
habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of
Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes
had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be
of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later
caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board
of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this
section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a
better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It
is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is
necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or
a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term
non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area,
and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this
case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and
to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can
adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back
to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
 Facts of the case
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered
John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a
private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate
sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the
statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Question
Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual
Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical
behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the
home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Conclusion
Sort:

by seniority
by ideology

63 DECISION FOR LAWRENCE

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that
the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful
and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence
and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty
under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice
Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the
Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

LAWRENCE VS TEXAS

Brief Fact Summary. Police found two men engaged in sexual conduct, in their home,
and they were arrested under a Texas statute that prohibited such conduct between two
men.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right,

intimate sexual relationships between consenting adults are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Facts. In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private
home in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered (the right to enter
does seem to have been questioned) the home where John Geddes resided, and
observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The men
were arrested, held over night and charged with violating a Texas statute making it a
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
Specifically the statute provided A person commits and offense if he engaged in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex and goes on to
define deviate sexual intercourse as follows: any contact between any part of the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person or the penetration of
the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. The two men were then
convicted before a Justice of the Pease.

Issue. The issue is whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held. Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between consenting adults, is a liberty protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dissent. Justice Scalia: He believes that since the court does not find homosexual
sodomy to be a fundamental right, and merely describes it as an exercise in liberty, a
rational basis scrutiny should be applied, and in doing so, the law would be upheld. In
addition, the courts willingness to overturn Bowers rather than use stare decicis, is
inconsistent with other case law such as Planned Parenthood, and thus, feels the court
should be consistent and stable rather than being manipulative in invoking the
doctrine. Since all laws, by definition (as example, prostitution, using heroin, etc) affect
liberty, they would all be unconstitutional under this courts ruling.

Concurrence.

Justice OConnor: She does not join the court in overturning Bowers, but rather,
reaches her conclusion based on equal protection, rather than any due process
clause. She states that even using a rational basis review we have consistently held
that some objectives, such as a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group, are
not legitimate state interests. She comes to this conclusion based on the fact that
sodomy is not prohibited between opposite sex partners, thus unfairly targets same sex
partners and makes them unequal in the eyes of the law. Since this law brands
homosexuals as criminals, it makes it more difficult for them to be treated like everyone
else, thus violating equal protection and legally sanctioning discrimination.

Discussion. (Written by Justice Kennedy) The court does not focus on protecting
sodomy specifically, but rather, personal relationships. It explains that despite the fact
that the statutes in questions purport to only prohibit sex, Their penalties and purposes,
though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The court found
it alarming that the statute in question sought to control a personal relationship, stating
that forming personal relationships is one of the liberties we have, and should be able to
choose such relationships without fear of being punished or classified as criminals.

The court focuses on the fact that the laws should not target relations between
consenting adults in private, as this is what liberty hinges on. The court states that
adults are entitled to respect for their private lives, and Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. The court ultimately applies a rational basis review,
stating that the Texas statute in question furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify an intrusion into a personal and private life of an individual.

This case overrules Bowers v Hardwick, which had held that there is no fundamental
right to engage in sodomy, or homosexual activities. Bowers was based on the fact that
historically sodomy has been outlawed, but this court finds that historically it was only
outlawed to protect individuals from sexual predators, and that rationale should not be
used when consenting adults are involved, specifically stating "The present case does
not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."
 Constitutionality of RA 9262 "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004"

JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondent
(wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously
boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded
private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also
unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.

All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on
December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the
house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-
in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with
his paramour and has not sired a child with her.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would
take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued
legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair,
he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO)
ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for

1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to
husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies
are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, theequal
protection guarantee is violated.

Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:

1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women

International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and
fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties
such as the
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the
4. Convention Against Torture, and the
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.

UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in mind the
standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the UDHR are the following:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation
of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Declaration of Policy in RA 9262

enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments obligation to
safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies
against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by
the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender
equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262
can be viewed therefore as the Philippines compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed
to condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay,
all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice.

CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its
preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human
dignity.

2. Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW

The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for the
improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men. The
CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and norms,
focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis that women have suffered and are
continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological sex.

The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which
includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by
our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international sphere, are
undeniably important and essential.

RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of
violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a
husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship.

3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the Achievement

of Governmental Objectives

Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of
women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code: all
"assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male
superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological assumption that:
husband and wife were one body before God; thus "they were one person under the law, and
 that one person was the husband," a concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil
Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are expected to take
on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to
men gaining more power over women power, which must necessarily be controlled and
maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to retain such
power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened
the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit
the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence
committed against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases
involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories of
violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing trend
from 2004 to 2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children are
the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the other
hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal
protection from violence perpetuated by women.

4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural differences

The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men
prescribe that they be treated differently under particular conditions in order to achieve
substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a
man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following recommendations
of the CEDAW Committee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an
enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women
treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address
such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy
 aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power
between men and women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results may
be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in various fields
in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same income levels, equality in decision-making
and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from violence.

The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her life are
parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative measures,
such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her
private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is committed to uplift her to her
rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be
empowered.

5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake
ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by
women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The equal protection clause when
juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such
discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."

RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action

In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would address the evil
effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in the societys
subconscious, on Filipino women and children and elevate their status as human beings on
the same level as the father or the husband.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination against women.
It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination" against. Ameliorative
action "is not an exception to equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto equality, the
genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino people themselves enshrined as a goal of the
1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are necessary as a redistributive mechanism in
an unequal society to achieve substantive equality.

Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality

In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which
requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is
identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed
differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address
such differences.

Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
 1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But this model
does not take into account biological and socially constructed differences between women and
men. By failing to take into account these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact
perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model this recognizes differences between women and men but
considerswomens weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This approach reinforces the
inferior status of women and does not address the issue of discrimination of women on account
of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by nature, but
suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages were eliminated,
there was no further need for protection." Thus, the substantive equality model gives prime
importance to womens contexts, realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts
and measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the disadvantages they
experience as women.

6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is
justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to
ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women
and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.

Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection simply
requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not connote identity of
rights among individuals, nor does it require that every person is treated identically in all
circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions among persons are
based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a proper governmental purpose. In
short, statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and made
pursuant to a legitimate government objective.

R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that domestic
and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to unify and
strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the States mandate to actively promote the familys
total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and children are more
susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others, the pervasive bias
and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within the family environment that
traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary to recognize
the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one hand, and women and
children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws
as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of the family.

Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not
be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.

By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional
requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive reality. The
socially constructed distinctions between women and men that have afflicted us and spawned
discrimination and violence should be eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-
exist.

The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the helter
skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special other who we
hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for such time as will be
sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity.

I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.

Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be freed from a
long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit their wives or partners
and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt community response to this violent behavior
through barangay officials who can command the man to immediately desist from harming his
home partner and their children. It also establishes domestic violence as a crime, not only against
its victims but against society as well. No longer is domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case
of marital dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.

Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It ought to be
construed in consonance with social justice as the heart particularly of the 1987 Constitution
a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical
equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy." This
means that the weak, including women in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of bias
that they may cease to be weak.

Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human
rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in
the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful
position as a person with equal moral status."