Benin vs Tuason
in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel
G.R. No. L-26127
June 28, 1974
Facts:
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints
containing substantially the same allegations. In Civil Case No. 3621, the
plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint,
located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality
(now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal and that they inherited said
parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin; In Civil Case No. 3622 the
plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels
of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, and that
these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father
Bonoso Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and
possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma
(now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area
of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was
inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited
the same from his parents; and they and their predecessors in interest had
been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same; had said
lands declared for taxation purposes. The plaintiffs in these three civil
cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the
year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands,
the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc.,
through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by
force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements. They made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands,
as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or
erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as
Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No.
735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original
applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz,
Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la
Paz. The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the
registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land
(known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate; that the
registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of
Land Registration; They allege that the application for registration in LRC
No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of
parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was
published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down
No. 1 were altered and amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as
mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1
appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the
publication of the original application, were never published; that on March
7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended
plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration
was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the
registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa
Mesa Estate and
Diliman Estate). They contend that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No.
17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is
likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant
to a void decision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to
parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning
because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration. The lower
court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial
was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965.
However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said
defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and
an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.
The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered
and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965
Issue:
Whether or not the LRC had jurisdiction to render the decision for the
reason that the amendment to the original plan was not published.
Held:
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in
1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land
Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels
of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as
Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an
area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application and the notice of
hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land
applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October
25, 1911. On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the
amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681. November 11, 1913 the applicants
and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government
agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title
over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the
roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain. On December 29,
1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision which, among
others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans
accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude
certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general
default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court
of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not
the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original
plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had
already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. In compliance with
the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration submitted
a stating that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any
land that had not been previously included in the original plan. The decree
contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance
with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an
area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10
square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in
the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were
published in the Official Gazette.
The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the
essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an
application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of
registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act). We believe that
the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was
without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section
23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of
the application for registration when it appears to the court that the
amendment is necessary and proper. If the amendment consists in the
inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application, as published, a new
publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the
new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the
amended application. Without a new publication the registration court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to
the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the
registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the
newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with
respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and
third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might
be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area
covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published, a new publication is not necessary. In the case at bar, we find
that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to
exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the
subject of another registration case. , when the lower court said that the
area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of
Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact that the
difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this
difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive
consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735. We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square
meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the
amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally
included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being
undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters
(or 879.86 hectares), we believe that this difference of 27.10 square
meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was
made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared, cannot be considered substantial as would affect the identity of
Parcel 1. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the
original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by
the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan
should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to
order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of
the original plan.
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired
jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration
proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction
attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the
application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included
land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the
registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared
null and void in so far but only in so far as the land not included in the
publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication
being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the
decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the
publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been
issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the
certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands
over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction
The court sited the Santiago case which states that,
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the
registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in
favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud
that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as
proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the
decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the
lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such
proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication
but did not appear. The registration by the appellees predecessors in
interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that
existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title,
except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Sivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In
addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners
procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration
proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the
issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such
decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE
tHE HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR. NAMELY, OSCAR M. LOPEZ,
MANUEL M. LOPEZ AND PRESENTACION L.
PSINAKIS, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE FRANCISCO QUERUBIN,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO, BRANCH 74, THE HEIRS OF ALFONSO
SANDOVAL AND HIS WIFE ROSA RUIZ, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MRS. IMELDA RIVERA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 164092]
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, Petitioners, v. ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND
ROMAN OZAETA, JR.,Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The two consolidated cases before this Court involve a protracted dispute
over the registration of two parcels of land that was initiated decades ago
by the forbears of the parties herein.
G.R. No. 155405 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, which was filed by the heirs of Eugenio Lopez 2 (Lopez
heirs) to challenge the Decision3 dated January 22, 2002 and the
Resolution4 dated September 24, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58162. The Decision of the appellate court dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari5 filed by the Lopez heirs, which prayed for the setting aside of
the Order6 dated March 24, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 74, in LRC No. 98-2225; while the Resolution of the
appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Lopez heirs on
the Court of Appeals Decision.
G.R. No. 164092 is likewise a Petition for Review on Certiorari7 filed by
the Lopez heirs,8 which seeks the reversal of the Decision9 dated
September 9, 2003 and the Resolution10 dated June 18, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67515. The Decision of the appellate court
denied the appeal of the Lopez heirs from the three Orders of the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 152, sitting as a land registration court, in LRC No. N-
2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887. Two of the RTC Orders were dated June
24, 1999,11 while the other one was dated March 3, 2000.12 The Resolution
of the appellate court, on the other hand, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration13 and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration14 filed
by the Lopez heirs on the Court of Appeals Decision.
From the records of the above cases, the following facts emerge:
Application for Registration of Title
(LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887)
On April 6, 1960, Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (applicants
Sandoval and Ozaeta) filed an Application for Registration of Title 15 for two
parcels of land designated as Lots 1 and 2 of plan Psu-177091, which were
situated in Barrio Mambugan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal
(subject properties). The application was docketed as LRC No. N-2858,
LRC Rec. No. N-18887 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal,
Branch II. The Director of Lands filed an Opposition 16 to the application, but
this was eventually withdrawn.17
On May 31, 1966, the CFI of Rizal rendered a Decision,18 the dispositive
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicant ALFONSO SANDOVAL
and his wife, ROSA RUIZ; applicant ROMAN OZAETA, JR. and his wife, MA.
SALOME LAO, all of legal age, Filipinos, and residents of Rizal Province, the
true and absolute owners in equal pro-indiviso shares of Lots 1 and 2 of
plan Psu-177091 (Exhibit D), and orders the registration thereof in their
names.
xxxx
Once this decision becomes final, let an order for the issuance of decree
issue.19
On September 23, 1970, prior to the issuance of the decrees of
registration, the spouses Sandoval and spouses Ozaeta sold the subject
properties to Eugenio Lopez. In the Deed of Absolute Sale20executed by
the spouses, they warranted that they would file the corresponding motion
or manifestation in LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 in order that
the original certificates of title over the subject properties will be issued in
the name of Eugenio Lopez, his heirs, administrators, or assigns. Eugenio
Lopez then entered into possession of the subject properties.
Subsequently, the decrees of registration remained unissued.
Years later, on May 12, 1993, a certain Atty. Juanito R. Dimaano filed in
LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 an Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Finality 21 for and on behalf of the
applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta. The land registration case was then
pending at the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 152. Atty. Dimaano averred that
the trial court's Decision dated May 31, 1966 had since become final, as no
appeal was filed thereon, and he prayed for the issuance of a Certificate of
Finality of the aforesaid Decision. On July 14, 1993, Atty. Dimaano filed a
Motion for Issuance of a Decree22 in the said case.
In an Order23dated August 24, 1993, the RTC of Pasig City granted the
motion for the issuance of the decrees of registration. On even date, the
RTC of Pasig City ordered24 the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to comply
with the provisions of Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,25 as the
Decision dated May 31, 1966 had already attained finality. Apparently, the
LRA was unable to immediately act in accordance with the Order of the trial
court, citing discrepancies in the technical description and area of the
subject properties.26 Subsequently, after the discrepancies were clarified,
the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order27dated October 20, 1994,
instructing the LRA to proceed with the issuance of the decrees of
registration over the subject properties.
In January 1997, the Lopez heirs were notified of the filing of a case
docketed as LRC No. 96-1907 before the RTC of Antipolo City, Branch 74.
The case was a petition for cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 288133 and 288134 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City,
which was filed by Evelyn T. Sandoval in her capacity as administratrix of
the estate of applicant Alfonso Sandoval. Registered in the name of Lopez,
Inc., TCT Nos. 288133 and 288134 covered the same properties subject of
the instant petitions. According to the Lopez heirs, Eugenio Lopez already
purchased the subject properties from Hacienda Benito, Inc. even before
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Eugenio Lopez and the
spouses Sandoval and the spouses Ozaeta.28
On July 16, 1997, the Lopez heirs29 filed a Motion dated April 28,
199730 where they manifested to the trial court that Eugenio Lopez passed
away on July 6, 1975. Pursuant to Section 22 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,31 they moved for the RTC to consider the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in favor of Eugenio Lopez in relation to the application for
registration of title. They also prayed that the decrees of registration over
the subject properties be issued in their names as the successors-in-
interest of Eugenio Lopez. Attached to the motion were the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the receipts32 evidencing the full payment of the
purchase price for the subject properties.
In a Motion dated July 21, 1998,33 the Lopez heirs entreated the trial
court to issue an order holding in abeyance the issuance of the decrees of
registration until the final disposition of their Motion dated April 28, 1997.
Thereafter, on December 4, 1998, the Lopez heirs filed a Motion dated
November 25, 1998.34They manifested therein that while their Motion
dated April 28, 1997 was still being heard by the trial court, Decree Nos. N-
217643 and N-217644 covering the subject properties were issued in the
name of the spouses Sandoval and spouses Ozaeta. As stated in Original
Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. O-160335 and O-160436 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal, the relevant entries in the decrees read:
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May,
1966 of the Hon. Pedro C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygafta, this 3rd
day of July, 1998.
Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
Quezon City, this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen
hundred and ninety-sevenat 8:02 a.m.
(Signed) ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION
Entered in the "Registration Book"
for the Marikina, pursuant to the provisions
of section 39 of P.D. No. 1529, on the 18th
day of August nineteen hundred and ninety-
eight, at 1:16 p.m.
(Signed)
EDGAR D.SANTOS
Register of Deeds37 (Emphases ours.)
In their motion, the Lopez heirs prayed for the declaration of nullity of
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
They alleged that the issuance of the decrees and the certificates of title
preempted the trial court in resolving their Motion dated April 28, 1997
where they were asking for the recognition of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Eugenio Lopez as authorized under Section 22 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Also, the decrees were supposedly issued onOctober 20,
1997 but their issuance was made pursuant to the Order dated July 3,
1998 of Judge Briccio C. Ygaa. In other words, the Lopez heirs questioned
the anomalous issuance of the decrees supposedly prior to the court order
authorizing the same. Moreover, the Lopez heirs pointed out that the
decrees were issued under the signature of LRA Administrator Alfredo R.
Enriquez before he assumed office.
The Lopez heirs attached to the above motion a photocopy of the registry
return receipt,38 which proved that the LRA received a copy of the Lopez
heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997. Subsequently, the Lopez heirs
submitted to the trial court the following letter39 of LRA Administrator
Enriquez that was addressed to the counsel of the Lopez heirs:
1 December 1998
xxxx
Sir:
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643
and N-217644 issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record
No. N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his wife, Rosa
Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were
prepared on October 20, 1977 [sic] pursuant to the decision of the court
dated May 31, 1966 and the order for issuance of decree dated August 24,
1993. Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the Administrator on
August 8, 1998 and was [sic] released therefrom on August 13,
1998. Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime between
August 8 and 13, 1998 and definitely not on October 20, 1997 as
what is reflected thereon because the undersigned Administrator
assumed office only on July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the
decrees were signed it was not noticed, through oversight, that they were
dated October 20, 1977 [sic]. It is therefore hereby clarified that
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued
sometime between August 8 and 13, 1998 and not on October 20,
1997.
Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the
motion for the issuance of the decrees in favor of the [Lopez heirs], the
properties involved having been sold to him by the applicants, is still
pending with the court, it is informed that no copy of said motion nor
of the order directing this Office to comment thereon appears on
file in the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not have
been taken into consideration in the issuance of the decrees. Had the
Administration been apprised of these incidents, perhaps the issuance of
the decrees could have been held in abeyance until the court has resolved
the same.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that
since the certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees have
already been issued and released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is
now beyond our authority to recall them unless duly authorized by the
court.
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in your
letter.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
Administrator (Emphases ours.)
The Lopez heirs further submitted in court a copy of the appointment
letter40 of LRA Administrator Enriquez dated July 3, 1998 and two
certifications41 from the Quezon City Central Post Office both dated
December 22, 1998, which stated that copies of the Lopez heirs' Motions
dated April 28, 1997 and July 21, 1998 were duly received by the LRA
before said office issued the decrees.
In an Order42 dated February 19, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City denied the
Lopez heirs' Motion dated July 21, 1998 for being moot.
On June 24, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City denied the Lopez heirs' Motion
dated April 28, 1997.43Given the issuance of the decrees of registration, the
trial court ruled that said motion had also been rendered moot. Thus, the
Deed of Absolute Sale could no longer be considered.
On the same date, the RTC of Pasig City issued another Order,44 this time
denying the Motion of the Lopez heirs dated November 25, 1998. The trial
court relied on the clarification of the LRA Administrator that the decrees
were issued sometime between August 8 and 13, 1998, not on October 20,
1997. The RTC also held that the Lopez heirs were barred by laches in
presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 23, 1970. The trial
court ruled that the Lopez heirs should have exerted effort in ensuring that
the vendors complied with their obligation to file the necessary motion or
manifestation for the original certificates of title to issue in the name of
Eugenio Lopez or his successors-in-interest.
The Lopez heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration45 of the two Orders of
the RTC dated June 24, 1999.
Meanwhile, on August 27, 1999, applicant Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed
a Manifestation46 before the RTC of Pasig City, stating that he recently
learned that their former counsel never filed the motion or manifestation
required in the Deed of Absolute Sale in order that the titles to the subject
properties would be issued in the name of Eugenio Lopez. Ozaeta joined
the Lopez heirs in their Motions dated April 28, 1997 and November 25,
1998, as well as their Motion for Reconsideration of the two RTC Orders
dated June 24, 1999. Ozaeta affirmed the due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Eugenio Lopez and confirmed that the purchase
price thereon was already paid to the applicants. Lastly, Ozaeta asserted
that he did not engage Atty. Dimaano's legal services.
In an Order47 dated March 3, 2000, the RTC of Pasig City denied the Lopez
heirs' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Lopez heirs lodged an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 67515. They sought the reversal of the two
Orders of the RTC of Pasig City dated June 24, 1999 and prayed that the
trial court be directed to resume hearing their Motion dated April 28, 1997.
In the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003, the Court of Appeals
denied the appeal of the Lopez heirs in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the [Lopez heirs] filing the appropriate case in order to
enforce their rights over the titled property in question under the Deed of
Sale in their favor.48
The Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of laches was inapplicable
against the Lopez heirs. The appellate court found that after the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed, Eugenio Lopez entered into continuous
possession of the subject properties. The Court of Appeals added that the
Lopez heirs should not be faulted for the failure of the vendors' counsel to
discharge the obligation they warranted in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The
appellate court ruled, however, that the RTC of Pasig City properly denied
the remedy sought by the Lopez heirs. Although Section 22 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 mandates that a person purchasing property from an
applicant may move for the decree to be issued in his name directly, he
may not ask for any other positive relief such as the voiding of a decree
already registered in another person's name. The Motion dated November
25, 1998 was also a collateral attack on the titles to the subject properties,
which was prohibited by Section 4849 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Still,
the Court of Appeals clarified that its ruling was without prejudice to the
right of the Lopez heirs to file the proper action and litigate their case in a
trial initiated for that purpose.
The Lopez heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration50 and a Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration51 of the above decision, but the same were
denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated June 18, 2004.
The Lopez heirs challenged the above rulings of the Court of Appeals on
August 17, 2004 via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 164092.
Petition for Ex Parte Issuance of Writ of Possession (LRC No. 98-
2225)
Meanwhile, on September 28, 1998, while the Motion dated April 28, 1997
of the Lopez heirs was still pending before the RTC of Pasig City in LRC No.
N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887, a petition52 for theex parte issuance of a
writ of possession over the subject properties was filed in the name of the
heirs of Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval heirs). The petition was docketed
as LRC No. 98-2225 in the RTC of Antipolo City, Branch 74. Representing
the Sandoval heirs in the suit was Imelda Rivera, who claimed to be their
attorney-in-fact in accordance with a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
dated May 14, 1996 executed in her favor. The SPA reads:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, EVELYN T. SANDOVAL, ADMINISTRATRIX OF ALFONSO SANDOVAL,
of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and presently residing at Brgy.
Langgam, San Pedro, Laguna, have named, constituted and appointed by
these presents, do name, constitute and appoint IMELDA V. RIVERA, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married and presently residing at No. 490 Dr.
Sixto Antonio Ave., Maybunga, Pasig City, to be my true and lawful
Attorney-In-Fact, for me and in my name, place and stead and for my own
use and benefits, to do and perform any and all of the following acts and
things:
1. TO authorize my Attorney-In-Fact to sell a parcel of land situated
in Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal covered by TAX DECLARATION NO.
05-0795, containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
SIXTY[-]THREE (5,863) SQ. METERS, more or less; and TAX
DECLARATION NO. 05-0859, containing an area of TWO
THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less;
2. TO receive payment in cash or in check and to negotiate, endorse
and encash the same.
; and to witness in Court.
3. TO perform other related matters which are necessary for the
fulfillment of the said authority so granted.
GIVING AND GRANTING UNTO my said Attorney-in-Fact full power and
authority to do and perform every act and thing whatsoever, requisite and
necessary to [be] done in and about [the] premises, as fully to all intents
and purpose as I might or could do if personally present hereby ratifying
and confirming all that my said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue of the presents.53
Implying that the spouses Sandoval were the only registered owners of the
subject properties covered by OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604, Rivera prayed
for the trial court to issue the necessary writ of possession in order for the
Sandoval heirs to take physical possession of the subject properties. Atty.
Dimaano likewise appeared in this case as counsel for Rivera.
In an Order54dated October 21, 1998, the RTC of Antipolo City granted
the above petition. On November 13, 1998, the trial court issued the writ
of possession,55 directing the sheriff to place the Sandoval heirs in
possession of the subject properties.
The Lopez heirs filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Lift Writ of Possession,56pointing out that the subject properties were sold
to the late Eugenio Lopez on September 23, 1970 prior to the issuance of
the decrees of registration. The Lopez heirs added that they subsequently
filed a Motion dated April 28, 1997 in LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-
18887, which prayed that the Deed of Absolute Sale be considered in the
application for the registration of titles of the subject properties. As the
motion was still unresolved, OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 were allegedly
issued under dubious circumstances. Since the questioned titles were the
bases for the issuance of the writ of possession, the Lopez heirs argued
that the writ must be recalled. The Lopez heirs also impugned the SPA
granted to Rivera, saying that it was unclear whether the properties stated
therein were the same as the subject properties and that Rivera's authority
did not include the authority to file a case in court. Finally, the Lopez heirs
argued that the filing of LRC No. 98-2225 violated the rule against forum
shopping as LRC No. 2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 was still pending before
the RTC of Pasig City.
The Lopez heirs subsequently filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration (Re: Notice to Leave and Vacate Premises upon Writ of
Possession),57 reiterating the pendency of LRC No. 2858, LRC Rec. No. N-
18887 and the "need to maintain the status quo if only to preserve the
rights of the parties."
In an Order58dated February 2, 1999, the RTC of Antipolo City recalled
the writ of possession and deferred the resolution thereof until the RTC of
Pasig City settled in LRC No. 2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 the issue of the
validity of Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604, including the ownership thereof.
More than a year later, on March 10, 2000, Rivera filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Recall dated February 2, 1999.59 She stated that on June 24,
1999, the RTC of Pasig City denied the motion filed by the Lopez heirs that
sought the declaration of nullity of Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644
and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604. The RTC of Pasig City also denied the
motion for reconsideration of the Lopez heirs in an Order dated March 3,
2000. In view thereof, Rivera averred that the issue of ownership of the
subject properties had already been settled and she prayed for the
reinstatement of the writ of possession previously recalled.
In an Order60dated March 24, 2000, the RTC of Antipolo City granted the
above motion of Rivera. The trial court directed the Sheriff to issue and
implement the writ of possession upon finality of its order.
On April 4, 2000, Evelyn Sandoval filed a Manifestation,61 stating that she
was the appointed administrator of the estate of the late Alfonso Sandoval.
She informed the trial court, however, that she did not engage the services
of Atty. Dimaano as her counsel, nor had she authorized any person to file
the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession on her behalf.
On April 7, 2000, the Lopez heirs filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction,62 which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 58162. The petition sought the reversal of the Order dated March 24,
2000 by the RTC of Antipolo City.
In a Resolution63 dated April 12, 2000, the Court of Appeals temporarily
restrained the RTC of Antipolo City and the Sandoval heirs from
implementing the RTC Order dated March 24, 2000. On June 15, 2000, the
Court of Appeals ordered64 the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
enjoining the enforcement of the said RTC Order pending the termination
of the proceedings before the appellate court. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction65 was issued on June 28, 2000.
On January 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
Decision, dismissing the Lopez heirs' petition and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction. The appellate court ruled that the issuance of the
writ of possession was not barred by the pendency of the appeal from the
Orders dated June 24, 1999 and March 3, 2000 of the RTC of Pasig City in
the land registration case. On the other hand, the RTC of Antipolo City had
the duty to issue the writ of possession since the Decision dated May 31,
1966 in LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 already became final and
was in fact executed with the issuance of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
Moreover, the sufficiency of the SPA in favor of Rivera was held to be within
the province of the RTC of Antipolo City to exclusively determine. The Court
of Appeals noted that the existence and authenticity of the SPA was not
renounced by Evelyn Sandoval as she merely asserted in her Manifestation
that she did not authorize the filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession. Also, the appellate court said that the authority of Rivera to
sell the subject properties carried with it the concomitant duty to file the
said petition.
The Court of Appeals declared that the filing of the petition for the issuance
of the writ of possession in the RTC of Antipolo City, instead of the land
registration court, did not constitute forum shopping as the two actions
therein may proceed independently of each other. Furthermore, the rule
that the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession must be filed in the
land registration case was merely established in order to prevent a
successful litigant from being compelled to commence other actions in
other courts to secure the fruits of his victory. The Court of Appeals
reckoned that the Sandoval heirs merely waived the privilege granted to
them by the rules. The appellate court stated, lastly, that the enforcement
of the Deed of Absolute Sale came more than a decade too late.
The Lopez heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration66 of the above Decision,
but the same was denied in the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated September 24, 2002.
Undaunted, the Lopez heirs filed before this Court on November 15, 2002
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 155405.
Proceedings before the Court
In a Resolution67 dated December 9, 2002, the Court granted the prayer of
the Lopez heirs in G.R. No. 155405 for the issuance of a TRO upon their
filing of a bond in the amount of P1 million. On January 15, 2003, the
TRO68 was issued, enjoining (1) the implementation of the RTC Order dated
March 24, 2000 in LRC No. 98-2225, which directed the issuance of the
writ of possession; and (2) the conduct of proceedings in LRC No. 98-2225
until further orders from the Court.
On February 11, 2003, Atty. Dimaano filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appearance69 as counsel for Imelda Rivera in G.R. No. 155405 in view of
Rivera's Motion to Withdraw70 dated October 1, 2002 filed before the RTC of
Antipolo City. Rivera requested therein the withdrawal of the appearance of
Atty. Dimaano as her counsel of record.
On March 14, 2003, Rivera filed a Motion for Substitution,71 praying that
she be allowed to substitute the Sandoval heirs as the private respondent
in G.R. No. 155405. Rivera reasoned that the subject properties were
already registered in her name under TCT Nos. 360470 and 360471 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which titles were issued on December 4,
1998. The Lopez heirs opposed72the above motion of Rivera, manifesting
that TCT Nos. 360470 and 360471 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City
were being challenged by the spouses Ozaeta in Civil Case No. 99-5565 in
the RTC of Antipolo City. In said case, the spouses Ozaeta claimed that the
titles were registered in Rivera's name through a forged Waiver of Rights in
favor of the Sandoval heirs and a forged Extrajudicial Settlement with Deed
of Sale in favor of Rivera.
In a Resolution73 dated April 21, 2003 in G.R. No. 155405, the Court denied
Rivera's Motion for Substitution but ordered her inclusion as a respondent
in the case.
On March 2, 2006, the Lopez heirs filed a Motion for Consolidation 74 of G.R.
No. 155405 and G.R. No. 164092, which the Court granted in a
Resolution75 dated June 21, 2006.
Issues
In G.R. No. 164092, the Lopez heirs set forth the following issues for our
consideration:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS (MOVANTS-APPELLANTS) ARE
PROPERLY PARTIES-LITIGANTS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION DATED NOVEMBER 25, 1998 IS
PROPER FOR PURPOSES OF IMPUGNING THE QUESTIONED
 DECREES AND THE CORRESPONDING ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE.76
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 155405, the Lopez heirs submit the
following arguments:
1. WHETHER THE PENDENCY OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE APPEAL
FROM THE ORDERS OF THE REGISTRATION COURT (Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 [5]2 in Pasig City), DATED June 24, 1999 AND
March 3, 2000, BOTH DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO
DECLARE DECREES NOS. N-217643 AND N- 217644 AND THE
CORRESPONDING OCT NOS. O-1603 AND O-1604 NULL AND
VOID BARS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION.
2. WHETHER THE PETITION (for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession) IS DISMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 16, PARAGRAPH (D) OF
THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ON THE GROUND THAT
RESPONDENT IMELDA RIVERA HAD NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE.
3. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING WHEN SHE FILED THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
POSSESSION BEFORE THE RTC BRANCH 74, IN ANTIPOLO CITY,
ALTHOUGH THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE INVOLVING THE
QUESTIONED PROPERTIES IS STILL PENDING BEFORE RTC
BRANCH 152, IN PASIG CITY.
4. WHETHER THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND
ROSA RUIZ, REPRESENTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT, ARE
BOUND NOT ONLY BY THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED
BY SAID DECEDENTS BUT ALSO BY THE UNDERTAKING
CONTAINED THEREIN.
5. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AND THERE IS NO APPEAL, OR ANY PLAIN,
SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
LAW.
6. WHETHER THE INSTANT PETITION INVOLVES LEGAL ISSUES AS
WELL.
7. WHETHER ESTOPPEL OR LACHES HAS SET IN[.]77
G.R. No. 164092
Anent the first issue in G.R. No. 164092, the Lopez heirs insist that they
were parties-litigants in LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 since they
merely stepped into the shoes of applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta as
successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez. They claim that they have
complied with the requirements of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 in that: (1) they presented in the land registration court the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Eugenio Lopez together with their Motion dated
April 28, 1997, which prayed that the deed be considered in the application
for registration; and (2) the applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta, including the
LRA, were furnished with copies of said motion. When the RTC of Pasig City
gave due course to their motion, the Lopez heirs argued that they had
thereby acquired legal standing in the registration proceedings. As parties-
litigants, the Lopez heirs could then file the Motion dated November 25,
1998 to annul Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604.
As regards the second issue, the Lopez heirs contend that the Motion dated
November 25, 1998 was a direct attack on Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-
217644. Should the remedy availed of by the Lopez heirs be declared
improper, they argue that the same be considered as an innocuous error of
procedure that should not foreclose their right to demand immediate relief.
They maintain that the filing of a separate action to pursue their claim
would only lead to multiplicity of suits.
The Court grants the Lopez heirs' petition in G.R. No. 164092 albeit for
different reasons.
To recapitulate, after the CFI of Rizal, Branch II adjudicated the subject
properties in favor of the applicants in a Decision dated May 31, 1966 in
LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 and before the decrees of
registration were actually issued, said applicants sold the subject properties
to Eugenio Lopez on September 23, 1970. In the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the vendors-applicants obligated themselves to file in the land registration
case the necessary motion or manifestation in order that the certificates of
title will be issued in the name of Eugenio Lopez or his successors-in-
interest. Unfortunately, this obligation was not complied with for so many
years. Upon learning of this fact, the Lopez heirs filed their Motion dated
April 28, 1997 in the land registration case. Said motion contained the
Deed of Absolute Sale and prayed that the decrees of registration over the
subject properties be issued in the names of the Lopez heirs. At that time,
LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887 was still pending before the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 152 as the decrees of registration were yet to be issued
despite the Order dated October 20, 1994 of the trial court that directed
the LRA to proceed with the issuance of the decrees.
While the Motion dated April 28, 1997 was pending before the trial court,
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604
were issued in the name of the applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta and their
respective spouses. The Lopez heirs then filed a Motion dated November
25, 1998, which prayed for the annulment of Decree Nos. N-217643 and
N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604. The issuance of said decrees
of registration and certificates of title allegedly preempted the RTC of Pasig
City in resolving the Motion dated April 28, 1997 and that the same were
issued by the LRA under dubious circumstances.
On the preliminary issue of standing, the Court upholds the judgment of
the Court of Appeals that the Lopez heirs did not acquire legal standing as
parties-litigants in the land registration proceedings. However, petitioners
undeniably have a stake in the outcome of the pending litigation over the
subject properties.
Verily, the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 is sanctioned by
Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states that:
SEC. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.After the tiling
of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the
land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in
part, in which case the interested party shall present to the court the
pertinent instruments together with the subdivision plan approved by the
Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the court,
after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the
conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the
decree of registration be issued in the name of the person to whom the
property has been conveyed by said instruments.
In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,78 the Court had occasion to explain Section
29 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act),79 which is substantially
incorporated in Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, such that:
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows
the land, subject matter of an application for registration, to be "dealt
with", i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during the interval of time
between the filing of the application and the issuance of the decree of title,
and to have the instruments embodying such disposition or encumbrance
presented to the registration court by the "interested party" for the court to
either "order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by
said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of
the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by
said instruments. The law does not require that the application for
registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the "person to
whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it
require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been
conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the
land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1)
that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party
together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case, x
x x. (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 expressly allows the
disposition of lands subject matter of a registration proceeding and the
subsequent registration thereof in the name of the person to whom the
land was conveyed. As required by the law, the pertinent instruments of
conveyance must be presented to the court and that prior notice is given to
the parties in the land registration case. After said requisites are complied
with, the court shall either order the land registered subject to the
conveyance or encumbrance, or order that the decree of registration be
issued in the name of the person to whom the property was conveyed. The
buyer of the property may be a total stranger to the land registration case
and it is not even required for him to substitute the original applicant in
order that the decree of registration may be issued in his name. Such is
the import of our ruling inMendoza. Contrary to the Lopez heirs' position,
nowhere can it be inferred in Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or
in our discussion in Mendoza that the buyer of the
propertyautomatically becomes a party to the land registration case after
complying with the requirements of the aforesaid provision of law.
Nonetheless, the same provision of law authorizes the land registration
court to accord certain reliefs in favor of the person to whom the property
has been conveyed.
With respect to the second issue invoked by the Lopez heirs, the Court
finds that the Court of Appeals was not entirely incorrect in ruling that the
Lopez heirs availed themselves of the wrong remedy in impugning Decree
Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the Lopez heirs' Motion dated
November 25, 1998 was a collateral attack on the certificates of title
covering the subject properties, which is proscribed by Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.80 In Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,81 we
differentiated a direct attack from a collateral attack on the title as follows:
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant
to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of
the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral
when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. (Emphasis
ours, citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals, however, overlooked the fact that the Lopez heirs
never attacked the Decision dated May 31, 1966 of the then CFI of Rizal in
LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887, i.e., the judgment pursuant to
which the decrees of registration were issued. Far from it, the Lopez heirs
actually recognized the validity of said judgment. In filing their first motion
to have the Deed of Absolute Sale recognized prior to the issuance of the
decrees, the Lopez heirs do not question the final judgment of the land
registration court that the subject properties were owned by the spouses
Sandoval and the spouses Ozaeta for they derived their own right to the
properties from said applicants. When the decrees of registration were still
issued in the names of said original applicants, due to peculiar
circumstances that occurred outside the proceedings in the land
registration court, petitioners were unjustly deprived of the opportunity to
enforce the remedy accorded to them under Section 22 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
Be that as it may, the Court neither agrees with the theory of the trial court
that supervening events have mooted the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April
28, 1997, nor with the Court of Appeals' position that it was necessary for
the Lopez heirs to institute a separate action to enforce the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Under the highly exceptional circumstances of this case, we
hold that the land registration court did not necessarily lose jurisdiction
over the case notwithstanding the improvident issuance of the decrees of
registration by the LRA. To rectify their situation, the Lopez heirs could
have resorted to Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 in order to
correct the palpable mistakes in the certificates of title in this case. Said
provision reads:
SEC. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. - No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after
the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the
attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the
proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person
having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground
that the registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interests not appearing upon the
certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error
was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or,
on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or,
if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any
other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine
the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation
of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon
such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary,
as it may consider proper; Provided, however, that this section shall not
be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree
of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court
which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or
their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not
presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding
section.
All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as under
any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall
be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or
registration was entered. (Emphasis ours.)
Plainly, Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 authorizes a person
having interest in a registered property to ask for the amendment and
alteration of a certificate of title or the entry of a new certificate if "new
interests not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created,"
"an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon," or "upon any other reasonable ground."
As previously stated, the Lopez heirs recognized that the spouses Sandoval
and the spouses Ozaeta were adjudged the owners of the subject
properties in a Decision dated May 31, 1966 rendered by the then CFI of
Rizal in LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887. What the Lopez heirs
contend is that this ownership was thereafter transferred to Eugenio Lopez
on September 23, 1970, long before the actual issuance of the decrees of
registration. Nonetheless, the certificates of title covering the subject
properties were still issued in the names of the spouses Sandoval and the
spouses Ozaeta, not to Eugenio Lopez or his successors-in-interest. Thus,
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is available to the Lopez heirs
as a remedy in order to correct the erroneous issuance of the certificates of
title in the name of the vendor-applicants and they should file such a
petition or motion in the original land registration case.
We distinguish this case from jurisprudence which require the filing of a
separate civil action to cause the cancellation or correction of certificates of
title where the relief prayed for is not germane to the land registration
proceedings and require litigation in an ordinary civil case. 82 Here, the
present controversy is clearly a continuation of the original land
registration proceedings as it involved a mere incident therein. To recall,
the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997 (which sought the
consideration of the sale of the subject properties to their predecessor-in-
interest in the issuance of the decrees of registration) was allowed under
Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and was timely filed before the
decrees of registration were issued. Indeed, the land registration court was
still hearing said motion when the LRA improvidently and irregularly issued
the decrees of registration and corresponding certificates of title containing
patent errors on their face.
The Court is aware of jurisprudential rulings requiring unanimity among the
parties or the lack of serious objection on the part of any party in interest
under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 in light of the limited
jurisdiction of land registration courts.83 However, we also ruled in Vda. de
Arceo v. Court ofAppeals84 that:
We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court,
is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law. We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely
as a cadastral court." The amendment was "[a]imed at avoiding multiplicity
of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring
upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications
for 'original registration' but also 'over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
from such applications or petitions.'" At any rate, we have also stated
that the limited-jurisdiction-rule governing land registration courts
is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties
mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting controversial
issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full
opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has
considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the
same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial
issues. By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality,
one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may be waived. It
is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of
ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of
registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming
jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties
rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over
the parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would
not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided
it. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
In the land registration case involved herein, the parties already
acquiesced in submitting the said controversial issues to the land
registration court and were in the process of presenting their respective
evidence but the ruling of the trial court on the merits was preempted by
the untimely issuance of the decrees of registration. To be sure, whether
there is any serious opposition to the Lopez heirs' prayer to have the
property registered in their name is precisely still to be determined by the
land registration court.
Notably, applicant Roman Ozaeta, Jr. himself affirmed before the trial court
the due execution of the deed of absolute sate and confirmed that Eugenio
Lopez already paid the agreed purchase price. The Sandoval heirs merely
stated in their Comment to the Lopez heirs' Motion dated April 28, 1997
that the Deed of Absolute Sale had a "dubious and questionable nature as
to its authenticity" since it was presented only after 27 years from its
execution and some of the persons who executed the same were already
dead.85 The Sandoval heirs have yet to present evidence to support their
claim. Should the Deed of Absolute Sale be found authentic and duly
executed, the Sandoval heirs cannot escape its effects. Under the general
rule stated in Article 1311 of the Civil Code,86 the heirs are bound by the
contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest. This is evident
from Santos v. Lumbac87where the Court held that:
It is clear from [Article 1311 of the Civil Code] that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the
heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of
the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have
inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their
deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and
what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against
them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of
the party when the other party has a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract. (Emphasis ours, citations omitted.)
As for respondent Imelda Rivera, whose former counsel Atty. Dimaano
participated in both the land registration case (LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec.
No. N-18887) and the writ of possession case (LRC No. 98-2225), she
should be impleaded in the proceedings below to accord her the
opportunity to prove that she is a purchaser for value in good faith entitled
to protection under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
At the very least, proceedings under Section 108 are proper to rectify
glaring errors on OCT Nos. 0-1603 and O-1604, which bore incorrect or
inaccurate dates of issuance by the LRA and of entry in the Registration
Book. The land registration court should not have simply accepted the
letter-explanation of then LRA Administrator Enriquez that the correct
dates of issuance of the decrees were "sometime between August 8 and
13, 1998." Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 directs, among
others, that "[e]very decree of registration issued by the Commissioner
shall bear the date, hour and minute of its entry" while Section 40 in turn
provides that the original certificate of title "shall be entered in [the
Register of Deeds'] record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and
sealed by the Register of Deeds with the seal of his office" for "[s]aid
certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof." Put
alternatively, these dates are material information required by law and
cannot remain uncertain or ambiguous. Even for this reason alone, OCT
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 should be recalled and submitted to the land
registration court for cancellation or correction.
Truly, instead of declaring the pending incidents moot, the land registration
court could have continued hearing them and resolved them on the merits.
It becomes obvious at this point that a remand to the trial court of the
matters heretofore discussed is unavoidable. It must be noted,
nevertheless, that in the analogous case of Dawson v. Register of Deeds of
Quezon City,88 which involved a certificate of title issued in the name of the
wrong party, we held that:
Accordingly, petitioners may avail of the remedy provided under Section
108 of PD 1529. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they
are automatically entitled to the relief prayed for ~ the cancellation
of the title issued in the name of Louis P. Dawson and the issuance
of new titles. It is incumbent upon them to satisfy the
requirements and conditions prescribed under the statutory
provision. (Emphasis ours.)
In the interest of fairness, the Lopez heirs should be allowed to amend
their motion to conform to the requirements and conditions under Section
108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Thus, this case is remanded to the
land registration court for further proceedings, subject to the Lopez heirs'
compliance with the requisites of Section 108 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
G.R. No. 155405
In G.R. No. 155405, the Lopez heirs plead for this Court to reverse the
assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58162 and to
annul the Order dated March 24, 2000 of the RTC of Antipolo City, Branch
74, which granted the Sandoval heirs' motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
The Lopez heirs argue, among others, that the issuance of the writ of
possession was barred by the pendency of the appeal from the orders
dated June 24, 1999 and March 3, 2000 of the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
152, in LRC No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887, which orders denied the
Lopez heirs' motion to declare null and void the decrees of registration and
the certificates of title covering the subject properties. The Lopez heirs
further allege that the petition for the ex parte issuance of the writ of
possession should have been dismissed by the RTC of Antipolo City as
Imelda Rivera had no legal capacity to sue. The SPA in favor of Rivera
simply authorized her to sell the parcels of land described in the SPA and to
receive payment therefor. The Lopez heirs also point out that there is no
showing whether the subject properties were the same parcels of land
specifically mentioned in the SPA given the dissimilarity in their
descriptions. Even as the Sandoval heirs impliedly admitted the
insufficiency of the SPA, they, however, argued that the same was no
longer relevant as the subject properties were now registered in the name
of Rivera who was an innocent purchaser for value. The Lopez heirs aver
that Imelda Rivera cannot be considered an innocent purchaser for value
as she was fully aware of the pending litigation involving the subject
properties. Moreover, Evelyn Sandoval manifested that she neither
authorized anyone to file the motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, nor did she engage the services of Atty. Dimaano.
In view of our ruling in G.R. No. 164092, the Court likewise grants the
instant petition.
We declared in Factor v. Martel, Jr.89 that a writ of possession is employed
to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the
sheriff to enter the land and give possession thereof to the person entitled
under the judgment. In land registration proceedings, a writ of possession
is an order issued by the trial court, directing the sheriff to place the
applicants or oppositors, or whoever is the successful litigant, in possession
of the property.
Demorar v. Ibanez90 instructs that a writ of possession may be issued not
only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case, but
also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the land registration proceedings. The issuance of the decree of
registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to
end the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and
adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final
decree may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of
possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ
when prayed for by the successful claimant.
In Mendoza v. Salinas,91 however, the Court ruled that the ministerial duty
of the land registration court to issue a writ of possession ceases with
respect to actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership.
This is in accordance with the provisions of Article 433 of the Civil Code,
which states:
ART. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property.
Thus, one who claims to be the owner of a property that is possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery.
The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or
reinvindicatory action in which the ownership claims of the contending
parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.92
In this case, the Lopez heirs are precisely claiming ownership of the subject
properties as successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez. They have since
manifested before the trial court that Eugenio Lopez previously bought the
subject properties from Hacienda Benito, Inc. and Eugenio Lopez had been
in possession thereof even before the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale between him and the applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta. Apparently, the
subject properties are also covered by TCT Nos. 288133 and 288134 of the
Registry of Deeds of Marikina City, which are registered in the name of
Lopez, Inc.
Even without considering the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eugenio
Lopez, the Sandoval heirs are not entitled to a writ of possession to the
subject properties disputed in this case on the strength of OCT Nos. O-
1603 and O-1604 since said titles are also registered in the names of the
spouses Ozaeta. It must be emphasized as well that the Ozaeta spouses
affirmed that the subject properties had been sold to Eugenio Lopez.
Incidentally, the Court agrees with the Lopez heirs' contention that the SPA
in favor of Rivera was insufficient to cloth her with authority to file the
petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession in the instant
case. Under Article 1881 of the Civil Code, an agent is mandated to act
within the scope of his authority.93 The scope of an agent's authority, in
turn, is what appears in the written terms of the power of attorney granted
upon him.94
In the case at bar, the specific wordings of the SPA in favor of Rivera
authorized her to: (1) "sell a parcel of land situated in Mambugan,
Antipolo, Rizal covered by TAX DECLARATION NO. 05-0795, containing an
area of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY[-]THREE (5,863) SQ.
METERS, more or less; and TAX DECLARATION NO. 05-0859, containing an
area of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less;" (2) "receive
payment in cash or in check and to negotiate, endorse and encash the
same;" (3) "witness in Court;" and (4) "perform other related matters
which are necessary for the fulfillment of the said authority so granted."
We disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the authority of
Rivera to sell the properties described in the SPA carried with it the
concomitant duty to file the petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of
possession. We note as well that there is uncertainty whether the SPA
covered the same properties involved in these consolidated cases. As
consistently argued by the Lopez heirs, the area descriptions of the
properties involved in the SPA indeed do not match the following
descriptions of the subject properties:
OCT No. O-1603
"A parcel of land (Lot 1 Plan Psu-177091, LR Case No. N-2858, LRC Record
No. N-18887), situated in the Barrio of Mambugan, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon x x x containing an area of TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]NINE (2,479) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, x x x."
OCT No. O-1604
"A parcel of land (Lot 2 Plan Psu-177091, LR Case No. N-2858, LRC Record
No. N-18887), situated in the Barrio of Mambugan, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon x x x containing an area of SIX
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY[-]ONE (6,341) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, x x x."95
Notably, Rivera failed to explain the disparity in the above descriptions and
the descriptions of the properties subject of the SPA, while the RTC of
Antipolo City and the Court of Appeals largely ignored the same. This was
error on the part of the lower courts. Angeles v. Philippine National
Railways96dictates that "[a] power of attorney must be strictly construed
and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which
are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate
from the power of attorney." Thus, the varying descriptions of the
properties mentioned in the SPA and that of the subject properties
seriously put into question the authority of Rivera to file the petition for
the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession over the subject properties.
More importantly, the fact that Evelyn Sandoval - the principal who
executed the SPA in favor of Rivera - categorically manifested that she did
not authorize any person to file the said petition should have raised doubts
as to the authority of Rivera to file the same. All the same, the Court has
already previously settled the impropriety of the issuance of the writ of
possession in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:
In G.R. No. 164092, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
The Decision dated September 9, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 18,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67515 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 is ORDERED to
proceed with hearing petitioners' Motion dated April 28, 1997 and Motion
dated November 25, 1998, subject to petitioners' compliance with Section
108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Original Certificates of Title (OCT)
Nos. O-l 603 and O-1604 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
and all of the transfer certificates of title derived therefrom
are RECALLED and shall be surrendered to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 152 for appropriate action.
In G.R. No. 155405, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
The Decision dated January 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated September
24, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58162 are REVERSED.
The Order dated March 24, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 74, in LRC No. 98-2225, which directed the issuance
of a writ of possession isNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. LRC No. 98-2225 is
hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the respondents.
 GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE
LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA,petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES
MENDOZA, respondents.

Demetrio B. Encarnacion & Carlos J. Antiporda for petitioner.

Norberto S. Gonzalez for private respondents.

SANTOS, J.:

This petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals * dated February 27, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 46581-R entitled Generoso
Mendoza, applicants, applicant-appellee vs. Daniel Gole Cruz, et al., movant, which
upheld the registration in the names of herein private respondents, purchasers of the
landholdings subject matter of an application for registration, notwithstanding that they
were not parties in the original registration proceedings.

Relevant antecedent facts follow. On May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza, herein
petitioner, 1 filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the
registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house thereon, situated in the
Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan. A notice was issued on December 3, 1964 setting
the date of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly published, posted
and served but nobody appeared nor filed an answer or opposition within the period
allowed for that purpose. Consequently, the registration court entered on July 6, 1965,
an order of general default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-
parte. 2

G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978 From the evidence presented by applicant Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, it
was proven that he and his wife, Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels of
land subject of the application but the same were sold by them, during the pendency
of the case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, herein private
respondents, subject to the vendors usufructuary rights. The instrument embodying
such sale was presented as Exhibit 1. On the basis of such evidence, the registration
court rendered a decision on July 21, 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels
of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject
to the usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon. On
the same day, a copy of said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza. 3
On November 5, 1965. after the decision had become final, the applicant-vendor,
Generoso Mendoza, filed a motion for the issuance of the decree. On May 16, 1967,
Decree No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the land of vendees Daniel Gole
Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and ordering the registration of the same in their names,
subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors. Consequently, Original Certificate of
4
Title No. 0-3787 was issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza.
On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration
praying that the decision dated July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto
dated May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original Certificate of Title No. 03787 be
cancelled, on the ground that the vendees, the registered owners, had failed to pay
5
the purchase price of the lands.
The registration court considered said urgent petition for reconsideration as a petition
for review of the decree and issued an order dated September 3, 1968 setting aside
its decision, its order for the issuance of the decree, and the decree of registration, on
the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the
names of the vendees, who were not parties to the application for registration.
Moreover, said court ordered the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 03787 and directed the
registration of the lands in the names of spouses, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de
Leon, subject to the rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, stated
in the deed of sale. 6 THE APPLICANT, THE REGISTRATION COURT COULD LEGALLY ORDER THE
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza moved to reconsider the order,
but their motion was denied on October 17, 1968. On December 19, 1968, said
spouses appealed from the order dated September 3, 1968. On March 11, 1969,
Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and on April 10, 1969, the registration
court dismissed the appeal. 7
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
43250-R. The Court of Appeals on January 5, 1970, ordered the registration court to
give due course to the appeal. The registration court approved the Record on Appeal
and forwarded the same to the Court of Appeals together with all the evidence
adduced during the trial.8
Acting on said appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46581- R, the Court of
Appeals rendered on February 27, 1973, the decision, subject matter of the present
petition for review. It set aside the order of the land registration court of September 3,
1968 which set aside its decision of July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant
thereto. It also denied applicant Mendozas petition for reconsideration dated April 15
(filed April 16), 1968, which was considered as a petition for review of the decree.
Hence, this Petition for Review which alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred
1. IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HIMSELF CAUSED THE REGISTRATION
OF THE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE NAME OF THE APPELLANTS.
2. IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO FORMAL AMENDMENT OF
THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR
TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF VENDEES BECAUSE THE APPLICANT HIMSELF
PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR ADJUDICATION; AND THAT THE APPLICATION
COULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ALREADY
ADVANCED BY SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE SAID APPLICANT.
3. IN HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT
BASED ON FRAUD PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLEE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.9
The foregoing assigned errors question the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals ordering the registration of the landholdings subject matter of the application
for registration in the names of herein private respondents who are the purchasers of
the landholdings, notwithstanding that they were not parties in the original registration
proceedings before the lower court.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner assails the Court of Appeals holding that
he himself caused the registration of the land in question in the name of the vendees,
the herein private respondents. But whether or not the petitioner did in fact cause the
registration of the land in favor of private respondents is a question of fact which
cannot properly be raised in the present petition for review inasmuch as Section 2,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that in an appeal from the Court of
Appeals to this Court, only questions of law may be raised. 10
Thus, the finding of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner caused the registration of the land in favor of the
private respondents cannot now be raised in this Appeal much less disturbed by this
Court.
However, by petitioners insistence that he could not be deemed to have caused the
registration of the land in the names of private respondents as he never testified in
court having sold the same to said Private respondents 11he, in effect, invokes the
exception to the above-stated rule of conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals findings
of fact, namely: that the Court of Appeals finding is grounded entirely on surmises or
12
conjectures and has no basis in the evidence on record. Consequently, We are
tasked with the e petition of the records of the case to determine the veracity of
petitioners claim that he never testified in court as having sold the property to the
herein private respondents. And it must here be emphasized that should the records
confirm such claim of the petitioner, the Court of Appeals holding that he caused the
registration of the land in the names of private respondents would have no basis in the
evidence and should, thus, be reversed.
A careful study and consideration of the records of the case, however, belie
petitioners claim that he did not testify relative to the aforementioned deed of sale.
The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on the application for
registration held on July 6, 1965 all too clearly show that petitioner and his wife
testified before the deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold the
property sought to be registered to the private respondents. Thus, the records show
that petitioner testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Valentin:
Q. You said that you are the owners of these two parcels of land subject matter of this
litigation, after you have caused the filing of this application, was there any transaction
that took place with respect to the same?
A. Yes sir, we have sold these two parcels of land to Daniel Gole Cruz and his wife
Dolores Mendoza.
Q. Showing to you this document which is an original carbon copy of a deed of sale
written in Tagalog and executed and ratified on October 15, 1964, would you kindly
tell this Honorable Court which is Exhibit I, will you tell this Honorable Court if you
know this Exhibit I?(sic)
A. Yes, sir, that is the carbon copy of the deed of sale I have just Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the private respondent Daniel Gole
13
mentioned. (Emphasis supplied) Cruz to confirm the aforesaid sale of the subject property. Thus, Cruz testified as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, applicant-petitioners wife, Diega de Leon, testified as follows:
ATTY. VALENTIN:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
Q. Do you know the property covered by this registration proceedings?
Q. Do you know the two parcels of land subject matter of this registration
proceedings? A. Yes sir.

A. Yes, sir. Q. Why do you know the same?

xxx xxx xxx A. Because we have been living in said place since I got married and besides, on
October 15, 1964, the said two parcels of land were sold to us by the herein applicant
Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these properties. and his wife.

A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and and his wife, Dolores Mendoza are in Q. Showing to you this Exhibit 1, would you Identify and tell this Honorable Court if
actual possession of the same. you know the same?

Q. Why are Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza co-possessing with you these A. Yes sir, Exhibit I is the carbon original of the deed of sale executed in our
two parcels of land? favor.15 (Emphasis supplied).

A. Because on October 15, 1964, we sold this property to them with one of the
conditions that until my husband and myself or anyone of us die, we will live with
them.14(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, even the registration court itself did not believe applicant-petitioners claim that
he did not previously cause the registration of the subject property in the names of
private respondents. For, while it granted applicant-petitioners petition for review of
the decree and ordered the re-registration of the land in his name, the Court,
nevertheless, expressly declared in the very same order that:
Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case. At the hearing, he himself
produced evidence that on October 15,1964 he and his wife sold the Land in favor of
the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza for the amount of P6,000.00
payable in installments (Exh. 1). 16 (Emphasis supplied).
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the respondent Court of Appeals did not
incur any error when it held that applicant. Petitioner himself caused the registration of
the land in the names of private respondents.
Petitioner, however, insists in his second assignment of error, that the registration
court could not legally order the registration of the land in the names of the vendees-
respondents, who were neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration
case below. Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which
expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration
proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been
conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of
the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title, thus
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may
be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the
register of said at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner
as if no application had been made. The interested Party may, however, present such
instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of
the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation
with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land
registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the
decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the
property has been conveyed by said instruments. (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land
subject matter of an application for registration to be dealt with, i.e., to be disposed
of or encumbered during the interval of time between the filing of the application and
the issuance of the decree of title, and to have the instruments embodying such
disposition or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the ,interested
party for the court to either order such land registered subject to the encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of
the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said
instruments. 17 The law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the buyer or the person to whom the property has been
conveyed for the applicant. Neither does it require that the buyer or the person to
whom the property has been conveyed be a party to the case. He may thus be a total
stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1)
that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior
notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.
As heretofore stated, the instrument embodying the sale of the subject property by the
petitioner to the private respondents was duly presented to the registration court for
consideration. That the purpose was to have the land registered in the names of
private respondents subject to the usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife is
explicit in the following facts and circumstances. Firstly, it was the petitioner himself,
the applicant in the registration proceedings, who presented the deed of sale (Exh. I)
to the court and testified before the same that he did sell the land to the private
respondents. This was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have the land
registered in his name as an order of general default had been issued and the
hearing on the application for registration had been conducted EX-PARTE. Secondly,
as if to fully convince the court of the fact of sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega
de Leon, and private respondent, Daniel Gole Cruz, to confirm the said sale of the
land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the petitioner even filed the motion
for the issuance of the decree of confirmation of title after having received the decision
of the court ordering the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees-
respondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary rights thereby signifying his full
assent to the same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the consideration of the deed of sale
in relation with the application for registration. But the law does not require that the
motion accompanying the presentation of the instrument be in writing. And the above-
enumerated acts of the applicant-petitioner and the circumstances surrounding the
same accept of no interpretation than that the applicant-petitioner did in fact move the
court to order the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees-
respondents, subject only to the stipulated usufructuary rights of the petitioner and his
wife. There was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first requirement of the law.
Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the parties, the relevant fact to be
considered is that an order of general default had been issued prior to the
presentation of the deed of sale by the applicant-petitioner, since nobody filed an
opposition to the application for registration. Thus, the only person who should have
been entitled to a notice from the court was the applicant-petitioner himself, as the
only party with a legal standing in the proceedings. In view thereof, no legal objection
to the courts jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of
vendees-respondents may be interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the
requirement of prior notice to the parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law,
respondent Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in holding that the lower court had
jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents.
The petitioner, finally, contends in a desperate effort to justify the validity of the
appealed order of September 3, 1968 that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that he was not the victim of fraud perpetrated by the vendees, private
respondents, herein, who allegedly failed to pay the purchase price of the
landholdings. This is also without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act
provides as follows
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title
as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall be entered. Such decree shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor
by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree: subject, however,
to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the only ground upon which a decree of
registration may be set aside is fraud in obtaining the same. In the instant case,
applicant-petitioner cannot complain of fraud in obtaining the decree of registration for
as heretofore stated, it was solely upon his testimony and proof that the lots were

ordered registered in the names of the vendees-respondents and it was also upon his
motion that the decree of registration was issued by the lower court. What the
applicant-petitioner actually invokes in this case is not fraud in obtaining the decree of
registration but the alleged failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase
price of the landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent Court of Appeals:
(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a review. And the registration
court has no jurisdiction to decide the contentious issue of whether or not the deed of
sale, Exh. 1, should be rescinded for the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the
purchase price. The issue on the breach of contract has to be letigated in the ordinary
court. 18
In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the Honorable Court of Appeals did not
commit any error in setting aside the order of the lower court dated September 13,
1968, and thus allowing the registration of the lots of the names of the vendees,
herein private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 1973 is
hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioner.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Guererro, ** JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I concur in the judgment and the main opinion in this case. After all, as I view the
whole controversy here, whether the title of the land in qustion be in the name of the
Mendoza or Cruz spouses is of secondary importance, since the title issued to the
latter would anyway carry the appropriate annotations protective of the rights of the
former under the deed of sale and vice-versa. Inasmuch as the factuality of the sale to
the Cruz spouses is beyond dispute and it is evidenced by a public instrument, it is
unquestionable that the title to the property, which is real property, passed to them
upon the execution of the deed of sale and delivery thereof to them. In fact, in
recognition of such transfer of title it is expressly stipulated in the deed that the
vendors would retain possession and usufruct of the properties sold, as long as the
total price has not been paid. Thus, the only right that has remained with the
Mendozas is to exact complieance with such conditions of the sale.
The alleged failure of the vendees to pay a single centavo of the price does not, to my
mind, constitute fraud in securing the registration of the property in their names.
Worse, the Cruz spouses were not even parties to the registration proceeding they
were not represented therein by anybody; it was the court that caused such
registration at the instance, according to the evidence, of the petitioner himself. And
on this score, I am not ready to assume that Generoso Mendoza did not actually
testify, even as I feel that anyway his recorded testimony denied by him to have
been actually given is hardly indispensable, considering it merely confirmed what is
alleged in the application, qualified by the deed of sale in favor of the Cruz spouses,
the authenticity and due execution of which are, as I have already stated, beyond
dispute. The reopening of the decree of registration by Judge de Borja had no legal
basis.
As aptly held in the main opinion, the mere presentation to the court of that deed of
sale, in one way or another, justified the issuance of the title to the respondent, subject
to the annotated rights of the petitioner, in connection with which, if it be true that the
stipulated price has not been paid even partially, I might suggest that all that petitioner
or his successor or heirs should do is to file a sworn manifestation with the register of
deeds to such effect, so that together with the provisions of the deed of sale, the fact
of such alleged non-payment may be known to the whole world, so to speak, for his
protection. That protection is as good as if the title were in his name.
In short, I believe there is not much real substance in the controversy before Us. It
should be disposed of in the simplest manner possible. For may part, I am more
inclined to leave things as they are, rather than unnecessarily reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals, since for all practical purposes, it would not make any difference
in whose name the title in question is issued. The respective rights of the parties
would remain the same either way.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered in the names
of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. The registration in their
names is not proper because they did not intervene in the land registration
proceeding; they did not defray the expenses thereof, and they have not paid to
Generoso Mendoza, or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6.000 as the price of
the two lots. The antecedents of Generoso Mendoza's appeal are as follows:
On May 15, 1964 Generoso Mendoza filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
an application for the registration of two residential lots, with a total area of 258 square
meters, located in the poblacion of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He prayed that his title thereto
be confirmed and registered.
On October 15, 1964, or during the pendency of the proceeding, Generoso Mendoza
and his wife Diega de Leon, both seventy-five years old, conditionally sold to the Cruz
spouses, 25 and 26 years old, the said residential lots for P6,000 as follows: P1,000
upon the signing of the deed and P1,000 annually until the balance of P5,000 is paid.
Among the conditions of the sale is that as long as the total price had not been paid,
the vendors, or the survivor in case one of them died, would retain the possession and
usufruct of the two lots and the house thereon. Upon full payment of the price, the
vendees or either one of them, would take care of the vendors, or the survivor, as if
the latter were the parents of the vendees.
At the hearing, the deed of sale was presented in evidence. Judge Juan de Borja in a
decision dated July 21, 1965, ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of
the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza "subject to the usufructuary
rights of the spouses Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon". Lorenzo C. Valentin,
who notarized the deed of sale, represented the Mendoza spouses in the land
registration proceeding.
On May 16, 1967, a decree of registration was issued. Original Certificate of Title No.
0-3787 was issued to the Cruz spouses. On April 16, 1968, or within one year from the
issuance of the decree, Generoso Mendoza, through another lawyer, filed a motion to
set aside the decree and title on the ground that the Cruz spouses had not paid a
single centavo of the price and, "hence, they have dirty hands". A copy of that motion
was personally served upon the Cruz spouses.
Without denying that they had not paid the price, they opposed the motion on the
ground that the decision, which had long become final, could no longer be set aside.
Generoso Mendoza, in his reply, argued that the review of the decree was sought on
the ground of fraud and that the deed of sale had become void for non-payment of the
price.
At the hearing of the said motion on May 15, 1968, the old man, Generoso Mendoza,
was placed on the witness stand. He declared that during the hearing of his
application for registration he was in the courtroom but that he did not testify; that only
his lawyer, Atty. Valentin and the stenographer were present at the hearing, and that
he did not give his consent to the issuance of the title in the name of Daniel Gole
Cruz.
Judge De Borja, in his order of September 3, 1968, treated the motion as a petition for
review under section 38 of Act No. 496. Realizing that he might have perpetrated an
injustice in his decision, when he ordered the registration of the two lots in the names
of the Cruz spouses, Judge De Borja set aside that decision and the decree of
registration and ordered that the two lots be registered in the name of Generoso
Mendoza, "subject to the rights of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza" under the aforementioned deed of sale.
The Cruz spouses filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they alleged that they
had already paid P3,000 out of the price of P6,000 (p, 42, Record on Appeal). Judge
De Borja denied the motion. The Cruz spouses appealed. Judge De Borja did not give
due course to their appeal. He issued a writ of execution requiring the register of
deeds to cancel the title issued to the Cruz spouses.
However, the Court of Appeals in the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
filed by the Cruz spouses, ordered the lower court to give due course to their appeal
(Cruz vs. De Borja, CA-G. R. No. 43250-R, January 5, 1970).
Later, the Court of Appeals in adjudicating the appeal upheld the registration of the
lots in the names of the Cruz spouses and reversed Judge De Borja's order for the
registration of the lots in the name of Generoso Mendoza (De Leon vs. Gole Cruz,
CA-G. R. No. 46581-R, February 27, 1973, per Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. and
Gancayco, JJ., concurring). Diega de Leon, in substitution for her deceased husband,
Generoso Mendoza, appealed to this Court.
The Court of Appeals assumed that at the hearing of Generoso Miss. Mendoza's
application on July 6, 1965, the Mendoza spouses testified that they sold the two lots
to Daniel Gole Cruz. According to the Cruz spouses, Daniel Gole Cruz supposedly
testified also at the hearing on July 17, 1965 (pp. 83-84, Record on Appeal).
However, as already noted, Generoso Mendoza at the hearing on May 15, 1968 of his
motion to set aside the decree and the title testified that he was never interrogated,
meaning that he did not take the witness stand at the hearing of his application for
registration, and that only his counsel, Atty. Valentin, and the court stenographer were
present at the hearing.
We have, therefore, the conflicting versions of the parties as to what transpired at the
hearing before the commissioner of Generoso Mendoza's application for registration
and as to whether there has been any payment of the price for the sale. Generoso
Mendoza himself, by testifying that he never took the witness stand at the hearing of
his application, destroyed the basis for the confirmation of his alleged title to the land
or for its registration in the names of the Cruz spouses.
In my opinion the ends of justice would be served by setting aside all the proceedings
in the lower court and holding a rehearing. The Cruz spouses should file a counter-
petition in the trial court for the registration of the two lots in their names on the basis
of the deed of sale. The trial court should ascertain whether the price of the sale had
been paid by the this time. (See Vda. de Catindig vs. Roque, L-25777, November 26,
1976, 74 SCRA 83).
At this juncture, it may be stressed that in the deed of sale (which was executed after
the land registration proceeding had been commenced), it was stipulated that, since
the two lots were unregistered, the parties agreed that the deed would be registered in
the registry for unregistered land as provided for in Act No. 3344.
Had the parties intended that the vendees, the Cruz spouses, would be substituted as
applicants in the land registration proceeding, it could easily have been so stipulated
in the deed of sale. But no such stipulation was made. And no move was made by the
vendees to have themselves substituted as applicants maybe because the sale was
conditional and they had allegedly not paid any part of the price. Neither did the
vendor, Generoso Mendoza, the applicant in the land registration proceeding, amend
his application after the deed had been signed, by praying that the two lots be
registered in the names of the Cruz spouses. He did not do so because, as already
noted, the stipulation in the deed of sale was that the deed would be registered in the
registry for unregistered land.
Evidently, the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses was the
Idea of the notary Valentin who acted as counsel of Generoso Mendoza in the land
registration proceeding. He did not bother to get the written consent of the
septuagenarian Generoso Mendoza, to the registration of the two lots in the names of
the Cruz spouses.
The Cruz spouses never contradicted nor refuted the declaration in court of Generoso
Mendoza at the hearing of his motion to set aside the decree and the title that he
never testified during the hearing of his application and that it was only Atty. Valentin
who appeared before the stenographer during that hearing.
Any practising lawyer who has appeared in hearings before a commissioner deputed
by the land registration court to hear uncontested applications for registration knows
that in some instances the hearings are not conducted in a formal manner; that only
the applicant's lawyer and the stenographer are usually present; that the deputy clerk
of court, as commissioner, or the hearing officer does not even bother to hear the
applicant's testimony, and that the stenographer and the applicant's lawyer may
fabricate the testimonies that appear in the transcript, which usually indicates that the
applicant and his witnesses testified when in truth they did not testify at all. Such
reprehensible practice should be condemned. Trial courts should exercise close
supervision over the hearings of uncontested land registration cases so as not to
make a farce or mockery of the hearing.
I vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the nullification of all
the proceedings in the lower court and for the holding of a new hearing on the
application for registration of Generoso Mendoza and the counter-petition of the, Cruz
spouses as above-indicated.