League of Provinces of the Philippines v.
DENR our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed
G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this
Court order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)
(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076,
otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2)
prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and
(3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy
and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the
Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A.
No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and
infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling
the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely
supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.
HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as
the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of
the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the
DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the
enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to
the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local
Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned
local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization
of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign
within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as
its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the
DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying
out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in
to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court,
however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a
petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.
(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered
in accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in
the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No.
707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for
Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and
canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor,
emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under
R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR
Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the
issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as
recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on
the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function
under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the
extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be
equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in
issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the
Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over
conflicting claims based on the law.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. BAYAN
TELECOMMUNICATION
FACTS
Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise
holder under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3259 (1961) to establish and operate radio
stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting.
Section 14 (a) of R.A. No. 3259 states: The grantee shall be liable to pay the same
taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise,
xxx. In 1992, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC) took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within
the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties. Barely few months
after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7633, amending Bayantels
original franchise. The Section 11 of the amendatory contained the following
tax provision: The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same
taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise,
xxx. In 1993, the government of Quezon City enacted an ordinance otherwise known
as the Quezon City Revenue Code withdrawing tax exemption privileges.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bayantels real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real
property taxes under its franchise.
RULING
YES. A clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily
includes the power to exempt, and the local governments delegated power to tax
under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution must be ruled in favor of the former. The
grant of taxing powers to LGUs under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect
the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared
national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments
simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing
powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase exclusive of this franchise cannot be
construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or
personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively
used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are
not so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy
are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category.
Since R. A. No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC, perfectly aware that the
LGC has already withdrawn Bayantels former exemption from realty taxes, the
Congress using, Section 11 thereof with exactly the same defining phrase exclusive
of this franchise is the basis for Bayantels exemption from realty taxes prior to the
LGC. In plain language, the Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an
express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the
LGCs delegated taxing power, all of the franchisees (Bayantels) properties that are
actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise
ACORD V ZAMORA
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to
Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of
every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY
2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA
8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It
provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
that the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it
is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which
amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted
by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly
assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA
specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed
Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the
classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only
upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay
officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against
respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then
National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit,
challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII
(A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA
(the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by
unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release
by placing the same under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity
of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public
interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate
of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not
automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD: they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. LTO vs. City of Butuan
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it
made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could Facts:
meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than
making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above Relying on the provisions of the LGC regarding the power to create sources
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the of revenue as well as
executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing
conditions upon the release of the IRA. the allowed powers of taxation (Sec. 129 and 133, Local Government Code)
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely vested in Local
prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally
withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive Government Units, The Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Butuan passed SP
branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially Ordinance No. 916-92
means that the President or any member of the Executive Department
cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release entitled An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire,
of the IRA. providing mechanism for
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically
release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties
enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive for Violations thereof
from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard
constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing and for other Purposes. The ordinance provided for, among other things,
of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a the payment of
proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to
allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would registration of the
have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.
local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and Petitioner LTO explains that
not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not
authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been
the IRA. transferred to local
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to
mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas: government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is Land Transportation
less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in
which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the
amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may authority of LTO to
even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of
national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress drive such vehicles.
was motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget deficit in line
with prudent fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, Issue:
however, must be echoed: [T]he rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution Is there a valid application of the LGC provisions on taxation powers of
and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal LGUs?
methods.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 Ruling:
and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as
No. The reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local
government units,
specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.
Police power and
taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty
which the State might
share with local government units by delegation given under a
constitutional or a statutory fiat.
All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature
but the similarities
just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and
welfare. Taxation, in its
case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order to
support its existence and
carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in
many respects, the grant
of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two
powers are, by tradition
and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective
concepts, character,
scopes and limitations. To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1)
indistinctively would
result in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently
has not been
intended.
CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Bantangas CATV vs. C.A.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810.
September 29, 2004]
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210
granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in
Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to
charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that
any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening
to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction
alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate
the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
xxx
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436,
the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other
bodies.
xxx
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach
subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions
allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
xxx
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well
recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the
CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROP.CORP.
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped
the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit
and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and
providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both
violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.
Held:
No.CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC.
However,ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils
exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869
authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere
ordinance.
Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue
Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary
to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of
Manila, the RTC declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the
power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision
therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of
supervision over local governments. In this case, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao
declared Section 187 unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances. He cited the familiar
distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is
"the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional
and whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than
supervision, over the local government
HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke
it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets
aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As the court sees it, that
was an act not of control but of mere supervision. Secretary Drilon set aside
the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein
of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully
examined every one of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
hearings were sent to interested parties. The minutes of the hearings are
found in the exhibits and such show that the proposed ordinances were
published.
MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended
RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite
of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question
over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed
by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was
the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,
together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It
is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them
proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
LCP vs COMELEC
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law
Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress,
the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills
contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in
RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of
Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of
Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood
bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The
Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare
the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce
the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause.
Held:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of
the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills.
The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is
not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not
affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In
short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related
to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.
NAVARRO v ERMITA
Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands,
formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for
constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the
land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec.
461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of
the province as unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province
constitutional?
Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the
creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the
creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception
to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided
for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it
must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception
to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent
under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to creation of
provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus
correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting
the true legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority.
It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given
to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the
two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the
other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

restrictive construction which could trench on the equal protection

clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land
area requirement should be read together with territorial
contiguity.
GANZON V. CA
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against
him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the
suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does
not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local
officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter
ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of