Autobus vs. Bautista G.R. No.

156367
Facts:
Respondent Antonio Bautista has been employed by the petitioner Auto Bus
Transport Systems Inc. as driver conductor. He was paid on commission basis,
seven percent (7%) of the total gross income per travel, on a twice a month basis.
On 03 January 2000, while respondent was driving Autobus No. 114 along Sta. Fe,
Nueva Vizcaya, and the bus he was driving accidentally bumped the rear portion of
another bus that owned also by the company, as the latter vehicle suddenly
stopped at a sharp curve without giving any warning. He claimed that he bumped
the he accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not slept for
more than 24 hours because Auto Bus required him to return to Isabela immediately
after arriving at Manila. Sad to say as result of the accident, respondent further
alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount of
P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost of repair of the damaged
buses and that despite respondents pleas for reconsideration, the same was
ignored by management. After a month, management sent him a letter of
termination.
Because of his illegal dismissal made by the management, the petitioner instituted
a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for non-payment of 13th month
pay and service incentive leave pay against Autobus.
On 29 September 2000, based on the pleadings and supporting evidence presented
by the parties, Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan promulgated a Decision, he ruled
Bautista is entitled to P78, 117.87 13th month pay payments and P13, 788.05 for
his unpaid service incentive leave pay.
The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC
modified the Labor Arbiters ruling. It deleted the award for 13 th Month pay. The
court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC.
The petitioner Auto Bus averred that Bautista is a commissioned employee and if
that is not reason enough that Bautista is also a field personnel hence he is not
entitled to a service incentive leave. They invoke:
Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled
to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. Coverage.this rule shall apply to all employees except:
...
(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work
irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof.

Issue(s):
1. Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave;
2. Whether or not the three (3)-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291
of the Labor Code, as amended, is applicable to respondents claim of service
incentive leave pay.

Held:
1. Yes Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court
emphasized that it does not mean that the respondent was paid on purely
commission basis, and that he will not be entitled to Service Incentive Leave.
The first issue shall be resolved is that, in order to resolve the issue of propriety of
the grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or not he is a field
personnel.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to non-
agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal
place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work
in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Furthermore, as a general rule, [field personnel] are those whose performance of
their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the
workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific
amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be
at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be
field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the
principal office of the employee. Auto Bus Transport Systems.
Moreover, as observed by the Labor Arbiter and concurred in by the Court of
Appeals:
It is of judicial notice that along the routes that are plied by these bus
companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who board
the bus and inspect the passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductors
reports. There is also the mandatory once-a-week car barn or shop day,
where the bus is regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical, and
hydraulic aspects, whether or not there are problems thereon as reported by
the driver and/or conductor. They too, must be at specific place as [sic]
specified time, as they generally observe prompt departure and arrival from
 their point of origin to their point of destination. In each and every depot,
there is always the Dispatcher whose function is precisely to see to it that the
bus and its crew leave the premises at specific times and arrive at the
estimated proper time.
In the case at bar, respondent Antonio Bautista is not a field employee but a regular
employee who performs tasks usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade of
petitioners business. He has a specific route to traverse as a bus driver and that is
a specific place that he needs to be at work. Also through the inspector, the
respondent Antonio Bautista constantly checking upon him.
Therefore, respondent is entitled to the grant of service incentive leave.
2. Yes - Article 291 of the Labor Code states that all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationship shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
In the application of this section of the Labor Code, the pivotal question to be
answered is when the cause of action for money claims accrues in order to
determine the reckoning date of the three-year prescriptive period.
Correspondingly, it can be conscientiously deduced that the cause of action of an
entitled employee to claim his service incentive leave pay accrues from the moment
the employer refuses to remunerate its monetary equivalent if the employee did not
make use of said leave credits but instead chose to avail of its commutation.
Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his leave credits and opts for its
commutation upon his resignation or separation from employment, his cause of
action to claim the whole amount of his accumulated service incentive leave shall
arise when the employer fails to pay such amount at the time of his
resignation or separation from employment.
Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code in light of this peculiarity of the service
incentive leave, we can conclude that the three (3)-year prescriptive period
commences, not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled
to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time when
the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of
commutation or upon termination of the employees services, as the case
may be.
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Benares vs. Pancho G.R. No. 151827
Facts:
The complainants alleged to have working as sugar farm workers in Hacienda
Maasin II, a sugar cane plantation located in Murcia, Negros Occidental with an area
of 12-24 has planted, owned and managed by the respondent Josefina Benares.
On July 24, 1991, complainants thru counsel wrote the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City for intercession particularly in
the matter of wages and other benefits mandated by law.
On September 24, 1991, the Bacolod District Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment conducted a routine inspection. Accordingly, a report and
recommendation was made, hence, they endorsed the instant case to the Regional
Arbitration Branch, NLRC, Bacolod City for proper hearing and disposition.
On October 15, 1991, complainants alleged to have been terminated without being
paid termination benefits by respondent.
On July 14, 1992, notification and summons were served to the parties wherein
complainants were directed to file a formal complaint.
On July 28, 1992, a formal complaint was filed for illegal dismissal with money
claims.
From the records, summons and notices of hearing were served to the parties and
apparently no amicable settlement was arrived, hence, the parties were directed to
file their respective position papers.
On January 22, 1993, complainant submitted their position paper, while respondent
filed its position paper on June 21, 1993.
On March 17, 1994, complainants filed their reply position paper and affidavit.
Correspondingly, a rejoinder was filed by respondent on May 16, 1994.
On August 17, 1994, from the Minutes of the scheduled hearing, respondent failed
to appear, and that the Office will evaluate the records of the case whether to
conduct a formal trial on the merits or not, and that the corresponding order will be
issued.
On January 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an order to the effect that the case is
now deemed submitted for resolution.
On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter a quo issued the assailed decision dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit.
On June 26, 1998, complainants not satisfied with the aforecited ruling interposed
the instant appeal before the NLRC. The NLRC held that respondents attained the
status of regular seasonal workers of Hda. Maasin II having worked therein from
1964-1985. It found that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that
the termination of respondents was for a just or authorized cause. Hence,
respondents were illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRCs ruling, with the modification that the
backwages and other monetary benefits shall be computed from the time
compensation was withheld in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715.
In this case, petitioner argues that respondents were not her regular employees as
they were merely pakiao workers who did not work continuously in the sugar
plantation. They performed such tasks as weeding, cutting and loading canes,
planting cane points, fertilizing, cleaning the drainage, etc. These functions
allegedly do not require respondents daily presence in the sugarcane field as it is
not everyday that one weeds, cuts canes or applies fertilizer. In support of her
allegations, petitioner submitted cultivo and milling payrolls.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are regular employees of Hacienda Maasin and thus
entitled to their monetary claims.
Held:
Yes Under Art. 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT.The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed
to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists.
Meaning to say that the above-mentioned article provides three kinds of employees,
(1) Regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer;
(2) Project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where
the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season; and
(3) Casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees.
In addition, In Hacienda Fatima vs. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food
and General Trade, the Supreme Court condensed the rule that the primary
standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee vis--vis the usual trade or
business of the employer. This connection can be determined by considering
the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety. If the employee has been
performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and
merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that
activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with
respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
In this case, the issue, therefore, of whether respondents were regular employees of
petitioner has been adequately dealt with. The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals have similarly held that respondents were regular employees of
petitioner. Since it is a settled rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are
accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality, we shall no longer disturb
this finding.
Also, we also find no reason to disturb the finding that respondents were illegally
terminated. When there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal
and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a just or
authorized cause. In this case, as found both by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,
petitioner failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents.
Therefore, the instant petition is denied, and the respondents are to be considered
as regular employees, thus, they are entitled to monetary claims.

SIP Food House vs. Batolina G.R. No. 192473

Facts:
GSIS Multi-Purpose Cooperative (GMPC) wanted to operate a canteen in a new GSIS
Building, but had no capability and expertise in that area. Thus, it engaged the
services of the petitioner S.I.P. Food House (SIP), owned by the spouses Alejandro
and Esther Pablo, as concessionaire. The respondents Restituto Batolina and nine
(9) others (the respondents) worked as waiters and waitresses in the canteen.
Unfortunately, GMPC terminated SIPs contract as GMPC concessionaire, because
of GMPCs decision to take direct investment in and management of the GMPC
canteen; SIPs continued refusal to heed GMPCs directives for service
improvement; and the alleged interference of the Pablos two sons with the
operation of the canteen. The termination of the concession contract caused the
termination of the respondents employment, prompting them to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal, with money claims, against SIP and the spouses Pablo.
The respondents alleged before the labor arbiter that they were SIP employees, who
were illegally dismissed sometime in February and March 2004. S.I.P. SIP did not
implement Wage Order Nos. 5 to 11 for the years 1997 to 2004. They did not
receive overtime pay although they worked from 6:30 in the morning until 5:30 in
the afternoon, or other employee benefits such as service incentive leave, and
maternity benefit (for their co-employee Flordeliza Matias). Their employee
contributions were also not remitted to the Social Security System.
The Labor Arbiter Francisco Robles rendered a decision as he found out that the
respondents were GMPCs employees, and not SIPs, as there existed only a labor-
only contracting relationship between the two parties. He emphasized that even if
respondents were considered as SIPs employees, their dismissal would still not be
illegal because the termination of its contract to operate the canteen came as a
surprise and against its will, rendering the canteens closure involuntary. He ruled
also that SIP is not liable for unpaid salaries of the respondent because it had
complied with the minimum statutory requirement.
The respondents brought their case, on appeal, to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC rendered decision as they found out that SIP was the respondents
employer, but it sustained the labor arbiters ruling that the employees were not
illegally dismissed as the termination of SIPs concession to operate the canteen
constituted an authorized cause for the severance of employer-employee relations.
Also, NLRC awarded the respondents a total of P952, 865.53 in salary and 13th
month pay differentials and service incentive leave pay.
SIP elevated the case to the CA through petition for certiorari. They argued that the
NLRC erred in declaring that it was the respondents employer who is liable for their
money claims despite its being a labor-only contractor of GMPC.
The CA rendered decision affirming the decision of the NLRC, but as per the awards,
remanded the case for a re-computation.
SIP elevated the case to the Supreme Court seeking for a reversal decision of the
appellate courts ruling that it was the employer of the respondents, claiming that it
was merely a labor only contractor of the GMPC.
Issue:
WON an employer-employee relationship exists bet. SIP and to the respondents.

Held:

Yes The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the NLRC and CA. Clearly, no less
than respondents, thru their counsel, admitted that respondents herein were their
employees, as stated in their protest letter to GMPC, xxx Last March 12, 2004,
without any court writ or order, and with the aid of your armed agents, you
physically barred our clients & their employees/helpers from entering the said
premises and from performing their usual duties of serving the food requirements of
GSIS personnel and others.
Furthermore, The CA ruled out SIPs claim that it was a labor-only contractor or a
mere agent of GMPC. We agree with the CA; SIP and its proprietors could not be
considered as mere agents of GMPC because they exercised the essential
elements of an employment relationship with the respondents such as
hiring, payment of wages and the power of control, not to mention that SIP
operated the canteen on its own account as it paid a fee for the use of the building
and for the privilege of running the canteen. The fact that the respondents applied
with GMPC in February 2004 when it terminated its contract with SIP, is another
clear indication that the two entities were separate and distinct from each other. We
thus see no reason to disturb the CAs findings.

For the monetary claims, we affirm the CAs ruling with regard to the monetary
claims of the respondents. However, on the collateral issue of the proper
computation of the monetary award, we also find the CA ruling to be in order.
Indeed, in the absence of evidence that the employees worked for 26 days a month,
no need exists to re-compute the award for the respondents who were explicitly
claiming for their salaries and benefits for the services rendered from Monday to
Friday or 5 days a week or a total of 20 days a month

David v Macasio G.R. No. 195466

Facts:

Respondent Macasio, employed as butcher in Yiels Hog Dealer which owned and
managed by the petitioner Ariel L. David, filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint
against to the petitioner for nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, and 13 th
month pay. He also claimed payment for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees as well as the service incentive leave (SIL).
Macasio also claimed that David exercised effective control and supervision over his
work, pointing out that David: (1) set the work day, reporting time and hogs to be
chopped, as well as the manner by which he was to perform his work; (2) daily paid
his salary of P700.00, which was increased from P600.00 in 2007, P500.00 in 2006
and P400.00 in 2005; and (3) approved and disapproved his leaves.
On the other hand, David claimed that he started his hog dealer business in 2005
and that he only has ten employees. He alleged that he hired Macasio as a butcher
or chopper on pakyaw or task basis who is, therefore, not entitled to overtime
pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant to the provisions of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Labor Code. David pointed out that
Macasio: (1) usually starts his work at 10:00 p.m. and ends at 2:00 a.m. of the
following day or earlier, depending on the volume of the delivered hogs; (2)
received the fixed amount of P700.00 per engagement, regardless of the actual
number of hours that he spent chopping the delivered hogs; and (3) was not
engaged to report for work and, accordingly, did not receive any fee when no hogs
were delivered.
Later on, the Labor Arbiter rendered decision which gave credence the claim of the
petitioner that he engaged Macasio on pakyaw or task basis. He also concluded
that since Macasio was engaged on pakyaw or task basis, thus, Macasio is not
entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL, and 13th month pay.
Upon the decision of the Labor Arbiter, Macasio raised his complaint to the NLRC.
Subsequently, NLRC rendered decision affirming the Labor Arbiters decision. The
NLRC observed that David did not require Macasio to observe an eight-hour work
schedule to earn the fixed P700.00 wage; and that Macasio had been performing a
non-time work, pointing out that Macasio was paid a fixed amount for the
completion of the assigned task, irrespective of the time consumed in its
performance. Since Macasio was paid by result and not in terms of the time that he
spent in the workplace, Macasio is not covered by the Labor Standards laws on
overtime, SIL and holiday pay, and 13th month pay under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the 13th month pay law.
Macasio filed a motion for reconsideration, but sad to say it was denied by the
NLRC. As a result, Macasio elevated his case to the CA through a petition on
certiorari.
Subsequently, CA reversed the NLRCs ruling for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. However, CA agreed with LA and NLRC that Macasio was a task
basis employee. CA emphasized that as a task basis employee, Macasio is excluded
from the coverage of holiday, and SIL, and 13th month pay only if he is likewise a
field personnel. In this case, the elements that characterize as field personnel
are evidently lacking. Thus, CA awarded Macasios claim for holiday, SIL and 13th
month pay for three years, with 10% attorneys fees on the total monetary award.
The CA, however, denied Macasios claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack
of basis.
Upon the motion of reconsideration that was denied, petitioner David filed a petition
on certiorari to the Supreme Court. In his petition, he maintains that Macasios
engagement was on a pakyaw or task basis. Hence, the latter is excluded from
the coverage of holiday, SIL and 13th month pay.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that Macasio is entitled to these labor standards benefits.
Held:
Yes CA correctly found that NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that Macasio is not entitled to the labor standards benefits. The following factors
show that NLRC erroneously did not consider in granting Macasio to the labor
standards benefits,
Macasio is Davids employee
Under the four-fold test of employment relationship, there are four elements need
to be considered the existence of the employer employee relationship:
(1) The selection and engagement of the employee
(2) The payment of wages
(3) The power of dismissal
(4) The power to control the employees conduct
In the case at bar, Macasios relationship with David satisfies the four-fold test:
(1) First, David engaged the services of Macasio, thus satisfying the first element
in the said test. This was confirmed in his Sinumpaang Salaysay where he
stated that nag apply po siya sa akin at kinuha ko siya na chopper.
(2) Second, David paid Macasios wage.
(3) Third, David had been setting the day and time when Macasio should report
for work. This power to determine the work schedule obviously implies power
of control.
(4) David had the right and power to control and supervise.
Therefore, the totality of surrounding circumstances of the present case sufficiently
points to an employer-employee relationship existing between David and Macasio.
Macasio is engaged on pakyaw or task basis:
LA, the NLRC and the CA found that Macasio was engaged or paid on pakyaw or
task basis. This factual finding binds the Court under the rule that factual findings of
labor tribunals when supported by the established facts and in accord with the laws,
especially when affirmed by the CA, is binding on this Court.
A distinguishing characteristic of pakyaw or task basis engagement, as opposed
to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in
working. In a task-basis work, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that
payment is reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the number
of time spent in the completion of work. Once the work or task is completed, the
worker receives a fixed amount as wage, without regard to the standard
measurements of time generally used in pay computation.
On the issue of Macasios entitlement to holiday, SIL, and 13th month pay:
The LA dismissed Macasios claims pursuant to Article 94 of the Labor Code in
relation to Section 1, Rule IV of the IRR of the Labor Code, and Article 95 of the
Labor Code, as well as Presidential Decree (PD) No. 851.
The NLRC, on the other hand, relied on Article 82 of the Labor Code and the Rules
and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851. Uniformly, these provisions exempt
workers paid on pakyaw or task basis from the coverage of holiday, SIL and 13th
month pay.
In reversing the labor tribunals rulings, the CA similarly relied on these provisions,
as well as on Section 1, Rule V of the IRR of the Labor Code and the Courts ruling in
Serrano v. Severino Santos Transit. These labor law provisions, when read together
with the Serrano ruling, exempt those engaged on pakyaw or task basis only if
they qualify as field personnel.
In the case of Macasio, clearly shows the existence of the question of law
regarding the correct interpretation of the afore-mentioned labor provisions and
implementing rules.
Article 82 of the Labor Code provides the exclusions from the coverage of Title I,
Book III of the Labor Code provisions governing working conditions and rest
periods.
Art.82.Coverage.The provisions of [Title I] shall apply to employees in all
establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members of
the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic
helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid
by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
xxxx
Field personnel shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly
perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch
office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty.
The wordings of Article 82 of the Labor Code additionally categorize workers paid
by results and field personnel as separate and distinct types of employees who
are exempted from the Title I provisions of the Labor Code.
The pertinent portion of Article 94 of the Labor Code and its corresponding provision
in the IRR reads:
Art.94.Right to holiday pay.(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage
during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly
employing less than (10) workers.
xxxx
SECTION1.Coverage.This Rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxxx
(e)Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract
basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for performing
work irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof.
On the other hand, Article 95 of the Labor Code and its corresponding provision in
the IRR47 pertinently provides:
Art.95.Right to service incentive.(a) Every employee who has rendered at least
one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days
with pay.
(b)This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit
herein provided, those enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days and
those employed in establishments regularly employing less than ten employees or
in establishments exempted from granting this benefit by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment after considering the viability or financial condition of such
establishment. [emphases ours]
xxxx
Section1.Coverage.This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for performing work
irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof.
Under these provisions, the general rule is that holiday and SIL pay
provisions cover all employees. To be excluded from their coverage, an
employee must be one of those that these provisions expressly exempt,
strictly in accordance with the exemption.
Under the IRR, exemption from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay refer to field
personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by
the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis. Note
that unlike Article 82 of the Labor Code, the IRR on holiday and SIL pay do not
exclude employees engaged on task basis as a separate and distinct category
from employees classified as field personnel. Rather, these employees are
altogether merged into one classification of exempted employees.
In short, the payment of an employee on task or pakyaw basis alone is insufficient
to exclude one from the coverage of SIL and holiday pay. They are exempted from
the coverage of Title I (including the holiday and SIL pay) only if they qualify as
field personnel.
In the case at bar, Macasio does not fall under the definition of field personnel
which states the following circumstances:
(1) Macasio regularly performed his duties at Davids principal place of business.
(2) His actual hours of work could be determined with reasonable certainty.
(3) David supervised his time and performance of duties.
Since, Macasio cannot be considered as field personnel then he is not exempt
from holiday pay and SIL. Thus, he is entitled to SIL and holiday pay.
In this instance, the NLRC clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion as when
NLRC did not consider whether Macario was a field personnel or not before
dismissing his complain.
With regard to the entitlement of 13th month pay:
The governing law on 13th month pay is PD No. 851.52 As with holiday and SIL pay,
13th month pay benefits generally cover all employees; an employee must be one
of those expressly enumerated to be exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 85153 enumerates the exemptions from the
coverage of 13th month pay benefits. Under Section 3(e), employers of those who
are paid on x x x task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a
specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof are
exempted.
In the case at bar, PD No. 851 exempts employees paid on task basis in
entitlement of 13th month pay. Macasio was employed on a pakyaw or task basis.
Therefore, Macasio cannot be entitled in 13 th month pay.