B.M. No.

914, October 01, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D.

CHING, APPLICANT.

Facts:

Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,

the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the
1987 Constitution.

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section

1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."

The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 however, did

not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter
only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable
time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching
the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs.
Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule, the period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino. However, the court cautioned
in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite.

In the present case, Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child

of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11
April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.

In 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of

Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed
an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.

In a Resolution of the Court, he was allowed to take the

Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship to
which he complied. He submitted the following; a.
Certification issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is
a certified public accountant; b. Voter Certification showing
that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and c.
Certification showing that Ching was elected as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union.

In 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were

released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath.
Pursuant to the resolution of the Court, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission
to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine
citizenship.

The OSG, in its comment, points out that Ching was a

Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
625. However, Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond
the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. But
the OSG recommends however, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case, that there should
be relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the
phrase reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625
prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

In the same year, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching

therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship
and his Oath of Allegiance. Ching, already thirty-five (35)
years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached
the age of majority.

Issue:

1. Whether Ching validly elected his Philippine citizenship,

or not. And by that, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination, or
not. As regards to the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship, what is the meaning of the
phrase reasonable time"?

Held:

It should be noted, that the 1973 and 1987

Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative
effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for
those covered by the 1935 Constitution. Hence, If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the
old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon

reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in
this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot

constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship.

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight

of Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is a
Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us
to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement
of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a

commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient.[20] One who is privileged to
elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to
such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with
fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his
grasp. As such, the Court resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

B.M. No. 1154, June 08, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, PETITIONER.

Facts:

Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the

Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia
Bar.
In he said petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did
not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato
City, for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident

when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the
face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been

using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that
he is not a member of the Bar.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose

the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor,
advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as closed and
terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds
that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits

that some of his communications really contained the word
Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the
office clerk.

The OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure

against Meling stating that the reasons of Meling in not
disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have
known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In
fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same
for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions
to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in

this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed

against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC

states that the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney
in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable.
Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have typed
the letters.

As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the

unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a
person liable for indirect contempt of court.

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not

be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the
Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the
Court.[7]
Issue:

Whether Meling is disqualified for admission to the Bar,

or not. What constitutes concealment in relation to being an
evidence of good moral character of the applicant?

Held:

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation

of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for

the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a
member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to
be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the

Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the
law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law.

Despite the declaration required by standard form

issued in connection with the application to take the 2002
Bar Examinations, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to

determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. Melings concealment of
the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases
against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral
character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing

fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. The title attorney is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the

court, such as Meling in this case.

The Petition is therefore granted insofar as it seeks the

imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as
a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar
is hereby suspended until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition
seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine
Bar, the same is dismissed for having become moot and
academic.
 A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, CLERK OF COURT VI,

SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, MARAWI CITY, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

A contract was executed between Sophia Alawi, who

was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City and Ashari M. Alauya, the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City for
the purchase on installments of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the

President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of
his contract with the company on the grounds of bad faith,
deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence committed by Alawi. Alauya also sent a copy of
the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. and the
NHMFC insisting on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof.

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co., Sophia

Alawi filed with the Court a verified complaint accusing
Alauya in addition to other grounds of usurpation of the title
of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.

In his defense, Alauya says he does not wish to use the

title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators.

Issue:

Whether Alauya usurped the title of attorney, or not. Is

Alauya entitled to use Attorney although only passing the
Shariah Bar?

Held:

The Court has already had occasion to declare that

persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to
the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.

The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His

disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
warrant his use of the title of attorney. He is therefore,
reprimanded and warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003

EMILIO GRANDE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment for

deceit and violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended

party in Criminal Cases filed with the Regional Trial Court
for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de
Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant
checks drawn against her account, as settlement of the civil
aspect of the case against Grande. Grande refused to accept
the check, but de Silva assured him that the same will be
paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She
manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check
which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, Grande was prevailed
upon by Atty. de Silva to accept the check.

When Grande deposited the check, the same was

returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason:
"Account Closed." Grande then wrote a letter to Atty. de
Silva. However, his demand was ignored; hence, he
instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The Prosecutor then
filed the necessary information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. de Silva.

Later on, Grande filed the instant administrative

complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

Resolutions were sent requiring Atty. De Silva to

comment on the administrative complaint filed against her.
However, they were returned unserved. Thus, the case was
referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Commissioner found respondent guilty of deceit,

gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. Thus,
he recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting

the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.

Issue:

Whether Atty. de Silva committed breach of trust in

issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted
a violation of her oath, or not.

Held:

Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the

penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138,
Section 27of the Rules of Court.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a

lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this
qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter
upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the
lawyer's moral character in serious doubt may render her
unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason

whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,
because it is important that members of the legal
brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of
morality. Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and
more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders
highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the
very core of her profession.
 Needless to state, Atty. De Silvas persistent refusal to
comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an
explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which
merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She
can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients. We can
not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair
name of an honorable profession.

In view of the foregoing, Atty. De Silva was suspended

from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years.
 B.M. No. 712, July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF

SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO AL C. ARGOSINO, PETITIONER.

Facts:
Mr. Al.C. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the Bar Examinations. In his Petition, he disclosed the fact
of his criminal conviction and his probation status.
The conviction is in connection with the death of one
Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr.
Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, were
convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. In a judgment, each of the fourteen (14)
accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
Days after the judgment, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court which
was then granted.
Mr. Argosino was allowed to take the Bar Examinations
by the Court's En Banc Resolution. He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office. For that reason, he filed this petition
for the purpose of allowing him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that
the Judge had already terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order.
Issue:
Whether Mr. Argosino is allowed to take the attorney's
oath of office and be admitted to the practice of law, or not.
Does Mr. Argosino possess the requirement of good moral
character in order for him to be admitted in the Bar despite
of his previous conviction?
Held:
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands
it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Such
requirement to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. Good moral character is a requirement the
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"

activities, prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral
duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed
of good moral character.
 Now that the original period of probation granted by the
trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred
to above.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for

its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he
has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and
learned profession of the law.

A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of

her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of
continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting and
contracting marriage with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea
under scandalous circumstances while the Atty Tapucars
marriage to Remedios subsists, as nothing on record shows
the dissolution thereof.

Records show that prior to this disbarment case, Atty.

Tapucar had already been administratively charged and
penalized for the same reason. He was also dismissed from
the service as a Judge and despite this. Despite all of that,
Atty. Tapucar continued to cohabit with Elena. He completely
abandoned Remedios and his children by her. The children
allegedly continued to suffer misery because of their fathers
acts, including deception and intrigues against them

Remedios was forced to file the present petition for

disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to
shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel
acts of their own father.

Issue:

Whether Atty. Tapucars actions merit the penalty for

disbarment, or not.

Held:

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not

only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.*
 As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they
must live up to the standards and norms expected of the
legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always.
Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and
private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and,
after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that Atty. Tapucar here

was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates
this professional infractions. For having occupied that place
of honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to
be free from any appearance of impropriety. Surely, Atty.
Tapucar could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial
Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity

and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession
charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the
defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of
decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as moral character. To achieve
such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor
and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve
not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.

On these considerations, the Court may disbar or

suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus
proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised

with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct
which seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite

previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court, Atty. Tapucar
continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to
investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far
from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him.
The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he
still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal
profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed,
evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him
and could not be explained away. Circumstances shos Atty.
Tapucars disregard of family obligations, morality and
decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a
serious flaw in Atty. Tapucars character, his moral
indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put
the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of
the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for
strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby disbarred.

 A.C. No. 6593, February 04, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO AND

ROMANA P. VALENCIA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a case for disbarment

against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty.
Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Discipline charging them with gross immorality.

In Atty. Garridos defense, he denied Maelotisea's

charges and imputations. He alleged that Maelotisea was not
his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed
he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways.
As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years, Atty.
Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia
to whom he confided his difficulties. Atty. Garrido denied
that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that most of their children were
educated in private schools; all graduated from college
except for one, who finished a special secondary course. Atty.
Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and
had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were

contracted before he became a member of the bar, with the
third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia.
Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he
became a lawyer.

Atty. Valencia on the other hand denied that she was the
mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was
not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage
between them was void from the beginning due to the then
existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty.
Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic
relationship between her and Atty. Garrido. Maelotisea kept
silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had
maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty.
Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to
this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things
were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also
alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of

Governors (IBP Board of Governors) ruled that Atty. Garrido
exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality
required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby disbarred for gross immorality. However, the case
against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit of the complaint.
 Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution but
was denied and then later sought relief pleading that he be
allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession.

The Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed

her Comment on the petition recommending a modification
of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the
view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-
year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and
tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes
that no other administrative case has ever been filed against
Atty. Garrido.

Issue:

Whether the actions of Atty. Garrido and Atty Valencia

warrants for disbarment, or not. Does it warrant for
disbarment in spite of the fact that the offense was
committed before a lawyer becomes a member of the bar?

Held:

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure -

such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant - do not
apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and
fitness for membership in the Bar.

First, admission to the practice of law is a component of

the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public. The
admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.

Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the

standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the
outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively,
his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed

between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the
complaint is not material in considering the qualification of
Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice
of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the
legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important
that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law.

The possession of good moral character is both a

condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude
a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into
any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer. Admission to the
practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this
may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar.
 In light of the public service character of the practice of
law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public
interest concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of desistance cannot
have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant,

or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. We make these distinctions as
the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the

evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a
pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

He did not possess the good moral character required of

a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. As a lawyer,
he violated his lawyer's oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey
the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed
the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage
while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He
openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
 He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code,
which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession."

With regards to Atty.Valencia, she should be

administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality.

Her contention that they were not yet lawyers when

they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions, for good moral character is required as a
condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there
is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in
the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life.
Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void
ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility.

Although the second marriage of the respondent was

subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of
morality required of them as members of the Bar.

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that

corresponds to objective reality. The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as
the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior

to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty.
Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to
Maelotisea), and that he already had a family, despite that
she married Atty. Garrdo. These circumstances, to our mind,
support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido's

marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains
that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6)
children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward
off Atty. Garrido's advances. Instead, she continued her
liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with
Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of
Atty. Valencia's presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even
left his second family and six children for a third marriage
with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed
outside of the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia's expressed belief

that Atty. Garrido's second marriage to Maelotisea was
invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this
may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on
confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's
marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the
honesty of this expressed belief.
 Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we
find Atty. Valencia's actions grossly immoral. Her actions
were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she
married a man who, in all appearances, was married to
another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were
also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the
confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability
and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the
subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencia's conduct could not but be
scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the
community's sense of decency; while she professed to be the
lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a
house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not
object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second
marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule

7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her
behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal
profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.

In conclusion, membership in the Bar is a privilege

burdened with conditions. We resolve to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P.
Valencia for this reason.

The records show the parties' pattern of grave and

immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental
and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them
for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court. We are convinced
from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present
case is one of them.
 In like manner, Atty. Valencia's behavior over a long
period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and
serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush
aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession
and without placing the integrity of the administration of
justice into question.

The court resolved to disbar both Atty. Angel E. Garrido

and Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for
gross immorality, violation of Code of Professional
Responsibility.