_ ' ~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 UA Ag Meo! Sa ss ae REPT Recorg 1B Suy P88 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Director, Intelligence Community Staff Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff Director, CCISCMS FROM: 28X1 Chief, Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center SUBJECT: TEEE Spectrum Article on Satellite Reconnaissance This memorandum forwards, for your information, an article from the IEEE Spectrum magazine dealing with satellite reconnaissance. It 1s a compendium of information on intelligence gathering, a la Jeffrey Richelson, and appears to consist of information that has been published 25X1 25x1 25X1 Attachment: Article Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-77 I ~ — Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 SECRET SUBJECT: IEEE Spectrum Article on Satellite Reconnaissance Prepared by: C/UDAC, 25x1 Distribution: Original - Addressee w/att 1 = DCI, watt 1 = D/ICS via DD/ICS, w/att 1 ~ D/CCISCMS, w/att 1- General Counsel, w/att Y- D/OCA, w/att 1 = D/PAO, w/att 1 = D/Security/CIA, w/att 1 = NIO/FDIA, w/att 1 - Exec. Registry, w/att 1 - UDAC Chrono, w/att 1 = UDAC Subj, watt ‘SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7‘The hide-and-seek of peacekeeping Eyes in the skies oc The monitoring gaps © The pobtics , Bs rf OF CHERNOBYL*Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : ClA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 ae aa lacy Pe} Ione must brush When considering the future of arms cont utopian rhetoric aside dnd accept that nuclear weapons are here to stay. say veteran arms controllers. When Mikhail S. Gorba- thee pruposes to banish nuclear weapons fram the world by the year 2000, when Ronald Reagan declares his intent 10 render nu- tear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” experts like Milo Nor dyke shake theie heads and smile. “The idea of anuclear-weapons-free world is nonsense," said [Nordyke manager of arms control and verification programs at Lawrence Livermgre National Laboratory. As arsenals shrink, the uncertainty tat accompanies al verification methods be- ‘comes more and tnore critical, Nordyke said. “There is a level that you just cannot go below.” ion forthe foreseeable future, according to Nordyke ‘not, How can nuclear weapons be eliminated? but, How can they be controlled to reduce the threat of war? For those who believe the answer lies in verifiable treaties, the outlook is bleak. Technology is part of the problem. Remote sensing alone ‘will be hard-pressed to track easily concealed, movable weapons like the cruise missile. But the growing role that politics has played in verification is even more critical. “There is near-unanimous agreement that—probably for techni- cal reasons less than for politcal reasons—verifying future agree- ‘ments will require so-called intrusive measures, which would permit the superpowers to station inspectors and sensors inside cach other’s borders. But the same distrust that spurs calls for these measures makes them difficult to negotiate. Moreover, experts like Nordyke stress that even if engineers devise some sensor that can peer through concrete, even ifthe superpowers ‘exchange hordes of observers, there will always be a margin of doubt; there wil always be those who seek to exploit this doubt, using verification (0 un- ddermine rather than up- hold arms control “There's this belief that somehow technology can sweep aside the mountain cf political problems that hhas impeded the process over the years,"” said Roger Hagengruber, who as director of systems dies at Sandia National Laboratories oversees @ number of verification projects. The advent of Satellites like the Vela made the Limited Test Ban Treaty possible, but re is no comparable “technological rabbit 10 John Horgan ‘Associate Editor_ x 189235/86/0700-007081.00. 1986 FEL ‘Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 Mecca Sie Buna Suse ernie a earn} pull out of the hat today,” said Hagengruber agengruber said that any “breakthrough” in arms control in the future will depend not on new technology but on changes (of political atitudes within the Soviet Union and the United States. On the Soviet side, said Hagengruber, “the rel break- through is going to be an increased understanding of the need for in-country activities.” In the United States, he continued, “the breakthrough would be to avoid the polemical extremes that dominate the debate right now."* On one side of the US. debate, Hagengruber said, are those who believe that arms control treaties ‘canbe “based on faith” and should be sought regardless of verifa, bility; on the other side are those who insist that unless a tea canbe “perfectly” verified, itis valueless, “The answer les some Where in between,” said Hagengruber US. questions value of arms control Even fervent believers in arms control acknowledge that the Soviets record on compliance isnot pristine. For example few accept the Soviets explanation that a radar facility under con $trustion nea the town of Krasnoyarsk i or acking satellites and not incoming missles, and thus is not a potential violation ‘of the 1972 Anti-Balistc Missile Treaty. Moreover, Soviet calls fora freeze and the elimination of nuclear weapons have not been accompanied by detailed proposals for verification, according To US. officials Nevertheless, experienced negotiators contend that the Soviet infractions have ite military significance, and thatthe USSR appears more willing than ever to meet US. con- cerns about verifation ‘But the Reagan administration has questioned the value of ams control for securing the nation, Pas agreements have restrained only the United States, according to Administration official, ‘because the Soviets have F violated mos of them sce EE Tables 1, land i. 10 FS May over the vociferous f objections of Congress and allies inthe North Av BTantic Treaty Organics 8 tion, President Reagan de 8 Clared that the United States would no longer consider ite bound thesecond Strategic Aris imitation Talks treats GALT IN, signedin 1979 Referring tothe SALT I decision, Defense Sect tary Caspar W. Weiner Following SALT provi: sions, the United States ‘has destroyed 27 ICBM Taunchers, like this Titan Hilo; the USSR has dis ‘mantied 281 siloDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 ————————EE a 7 PECTRUM VOLUME 23) -NUMBERT Qp JULY 1986 attr ang pubisner: ‘Bonate Crvatianaen ‘Weancn Ear na US. Conta niet § sacintaat Ear: T ligence Agency's i id Srcen first "spy" satelite i ‘anager ‘dubbed Discoverer, could i i hardly have been called an z Instant success. The goal 3 invoary 1960 was to orbt i the. werd first photore ; Connaissaron state and i j em lleva flim capsule aa Fate K Ria cretion ee a ; 7A Fagot Jann Horgan, mosphere from space. But } Kirby Sa sono Pete ealaaretvesy i BooRah Bian cot ony ater a ozone wt Soheunany Achare Hatch the mission finally work 28 to 3 ‘Estoral Researcher: Revert Bavidon Thora Cortes Comore, flamed US. Ar Fore Bren hace st a fo snagood hepa . . re re Rvcapels tn hugut 80, The ago of pec enahtace had bagun— Ears Rupr Sent hoe monte afer pilot Francie Gay Powers was shot Gown in U2 ‘toa tern: Mgpaot WOR pt Review ‘Ria Wetand Sapecvtaon edtonetassstsnt ‘Many Ry Danign Consultan: Gua Sauter agreements. But whether monitoring technology can keep track of advances in offensive weaponry is questionable. Spectrum editors John Adam, John ‘Wwitiamh Sauncers private ‘and think tanks to help flog ‘ut, Thelr report begins on pan ‘Robert 0. Moran (Manager rere, ee nein Sea) ue Cyt Tle ‘Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7,Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 aires 39° Spectral lines Verification and arms control Donald Christiansen ‘A personal perspective on the vagaries of arms control strategies and treaty monitoring Special analysis 34 Nuclear power The puzzle of Chernobyl Mark A. Fischetti Taken by surprise, technologists pose scenarios, map the radiation plume, and call for better emergency natification Special report aan 42 Voritcation: Peacekeeping by technical means John A. Adam Verification of compliance with arms control agreements sometimes resembles a game of hide-and-seek 48 Part 1—Counting the weapons John A. Adam Many top-secret ‘eyes in the skies’ keep vigil over Soviet weaponry; just how sharp are they? ST Part 2~Monitoring the tests Glenn Zorpette Missile fights and test explosions are watched closely to determine whether an adversary's new weapons might upset the strategic balance 67 Part 3—The Sovet ‘spy gaps’ ___Stophen M. Meyer ‘Any lag there may be In the USSR's technical systems for monitoring 's offset by Soviet access to US. military Inteligence 70 Part 4—The poles of peece pacts John Horgan Technical monitoring capabilities are but part of the solution for arms Control; attitudes of the superpowers are becoming more crucial 8 24 Technically speaking 25 Splnotts 28 Whatever happened to? ‘30. Managing technology 81 EES Tools & Toys 83 Calendar 85 Papers ar invited 88 Now and recent IEEE publications 88 IEEE tables of contents 98 Scanning the Institute 98. Coming in Spectrum fis) ‘Some of the world's fret direct evidence of the Chernoby! nuclear react ‘ieacter came from Landsat Ys ater the accident, the blue pixel at the northwest comer Of he left contour marks. ‘exposed ‘and burning reactor core ‘Smoke spews to the west of the pixel. The contours show ‘constant, relatively low temperatures, ngicating the absence of tra of meligown at adjacent reactors, 8 Conjecture at the tine See'.34 Photer Ocean Earth Corp.Sipa (Chairman: Donald Costa over A Bet Ata Bogue karatont Oranges Lester Enstman. ximosrly Ovemerson Kae, Rotor Cawrence, Raper in Sob Metacass Gan is Res toward haart, Jon peste es ~~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 @Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : ClA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 “SPECTRAL LINES JULY 1906 | VOLUME 23 / NUMBER 7 Verification and arms control 11 sometimes seems useful 10 compare the complexities of peacekeeping at an international evel with hose involving (0 neighbors Tmagine your next-door neighbor collecting guns. If he dis played them openly, showed them off proudly, and occasional- ly used one for hunting small game, you would probably fel litle or no threat. If, on the other hand, he was secretive and luncommunicative about the collection or its uses, you might ‘cel abit uncomfortable Furthermore if occasionally you were ‘o hear an unexplained gunshot, about which he professed ‘no knowledge, you might even fee! prompted o begin small firearms collection of yoir own Ifyou felt really threatened, you might atempt to discuss the matter with your neighbor and, with his agreement, set some limit on the size or caliber of your individual collections and keep them in plain sight, On the other hand, the very premise of a possible threat to-either you or your neighbor would suggest that alss-than- ftiendly environment existed, along with t least some degree ‘of mistrust. Could you ever be sure under such conditions that your neighbor was not producing explosive canisters in his basement and storing them out of sight justin case your motives were not completely aboveboard? ‘The very notion that a person ora nation felsit necessary ‘o determine the extent, nature, and location of a potenti adversary’s weapons underscores the unstable nature of the relationship and suggests tha it could be upset by even minor misstep or slight misunderstanding. ‘Seasoned negotiators look in two distinct directions as they attempt to develop useful and reasonably long-lived interna. tional arms accords. They carefully watch the heads of sat ‘often with trepidation, for signals that may alter the negot ing environment, or cause them to modify thet own posture. ‘They look also to the technologists for improvements in the ‘monitoring capabilities that can strengthen the accords ‘The objective of arms veification isto assure one or more ‘ot th eoumtie siting at ata contr teat th th oer) {do ot violate the apreemeit Also, goseenments mia Deine: «ted knowing whether an adersity is Hatin exec « eaty fequirement so that they can use the iforttation tor propaganda purposes, or perhaps for leverage in other negotiations Radical shifts in peacekeeping strates cass make: reaty provisions obsolete, Those apyprisaclies that cist hat neither party ean protect against a massive attack are based jon the strategic theory of stability through sta deterrence The Anti-Balistic Missle Treat, in force since October 1972, is casein point, Tr based on the theory of limiting the defenses “agains intercontinental Ballistic asks shat gt Temp sersanies to seale up offensive weapons ta ove efenyes Halse prohibits one nation fi gaming ‘ve over another by escalating is deters againe artigo SWrike, But a strategy of mutually assured defense hich i sn ain) of SDL-—wouldreguite superior "eyes" tor both sides, 1s sell as means for destin engi ales baie Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 | is detected. The switch from the former strategy 1 the lati would necessitate passing through a series of destabilizing steps and back again until ultimately stability i restored. Both sides ‘would have to be sensitive to the end objective and tolerant of any transient treaty violations. ‘Arguments are frequently heard about whichis more impor- tant the polities or the technology of peacekeeping, In fact the two are handmaidens. Verification technology is merely tool, albeit a vital one, inthe peacekeeping arsenal of any nation or group of nations. The verification proces itself may sometimes be a destabilizing influence. For example, based ‘on improved monitoring technology, the United States strongly contends thatthe Soviets’ $S-25 is anew missile, in violation of SALT If, while the Soviets disagree. The difference from the older SS-13 may be marginal, and might have been unde- tectable with earlier technology. there often seems tobe litle logit and much contradiction in peacekeeping efforts itis because with so much at stake, actions and reactions take place at several levels. First, hetoric at the leadership levels often bears litle relationship to reality, ‘but nevertheless sets the tone forthe arena in which the practi tioners of treaty negotiation must toil, Heads of state may pos- tute; treaty makers may bluff and parry. The technologist on the other hand, needs to be concerned with improving his knowledge of surveillance and countermeasures so that sub- stantive changes in an adversary’ arsenal that might drastically "upset the balance of power can be detected. Inthe event of war, of course, the monitoring technology that was used for treaty verification can be turned to targeting enemy weaponty ‘and confirming missle trajectories, ‘As weapons get smaller and more mobil they ae more casi- ly hidden. For example, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles can be readily deployed on ships, submarines, and in garages, and ‘mobile misies lke the US. Pershing Il and the Soviet 5-20, ‘an be deployed in irregular patterns that make them difficult to coun eal, tose working on monitoring techuology would probably do best to make no assumptions concerning arty ‘ontro tates thersele, cluding the likelihood of gompi ance of violation. In practice, of course, they must respond to the policymakers, who may requite a &eetain monitoring ‘apability— or example, the Vela satellite to verify compliance with the Limived Test Ban Treaty of 1963. But they should not ‘De unduly intlucuced by fashionable trategies—they nist seek few ways 10 identity and count weapons curren outlawed OF possible new weaponty ‘With the growing difficulty of effective verification, there issome reason Wo believe thats mix of remote and on-site tech mnques may henevesiry Some studentsof the subject sre pie posing the mspinative once ofa jon LIS. Semel picet fe study and pt in plage just sch a hybrid weitivation ps sam. Such a cooperative venture may seem less radial with the passage ot inke- particularly as other nations nel hase diypose fl patio rtOri'h, pn tees Wt “Donald Chratunsen aDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy ‘Declassified in Part - Approved for Release 2012/11/06 CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 TH A ETT PEACEKEEPING BY TECHNICAL MEANS Each day US. reconnaissance satellites and planes produc hundreds of images of the Soviet Union that must be inter preted. It is an imprecise and complicated process. Is that white blur near the building different from the blur inthe last picture? ‘Does that cluster of misile launchers near Plesetsk put the Soviets cover the agreed Umit? Listening deviges intercept more data. During the 20 or sotest fights of a new strategic ballistic missile, data is collected that fills thousands of reels of magnetic tape. These must be processed, analyzed, and correlated to determine the characteristics ofthe new missiles—an effort requiring tens of thousands of manhours, ‘according to one account by former US. Defense Secretary Harold ‘John A, Adam Associate Editor proved for Release 2012/11/06 Brown. The result sa mixed pot of technical data varying Over: ‘Analysts boil this down into timely intelligence xssments, and policymakers then compare the reports with written treaty. This leads to interpretations that are occasionally straightforward but oftentimes fraught with ambiguities. Such is the stuff of treaty verification. Front-page news ac counts frequently allude tit, The Reagan administration signals ius intent vo scuttle the 1979 SALT Il arms pact, saying through Secretary of State George P. Shultz: “We want fo get avay from the techaicaltes, oto speak, of what this unraified and increas ingly obsolete treaty may or may not have called for.” The Soviet, leader, General Secretary Mikhail . Gorbachev, puts forth a pro: pposal—some critics say a publi relations ploy—to abolish nuclear ‘weapons by the year 2000 and says that “the Soviet Union has DU Rec ae Pa eur Ruck Sec Pe eed 10100070014-7 _Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 no objection to any verification procedures.” Meanwhile, hartied US. and Soviet arms negotiators in Geneva are reported to be deadlocked about the “verifiability” of new accords. Despite all "he media coverage, however, information on the actual vrifica- tion issues and abilities appears to be sketchy. ‘At present the United States and the Soviet Union scrutinize cach other through “national technical means'-an assortment ‘of sensors scattered throughout the earth and beyond, from the "mucky ocean bottom to the high orbits of space. The globalintelli- sence system includes satelite that take still photographs or movies o1 enemy weaponry, electronic ferrets that intercept tele- metry and communications, seismic networks that take the pulse ‘of underground nuclear explosions, and radars on the ground ‘and at sea that follow the fight of test missles. Unlike cloak ‘and-dagger human espionage, this technical monitoring i legal, sanctified by the United States and the Soviet Union beginning ‘withthe 1972 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) agree ‘ment. ‘Such nonintrusive observation, most experts agree, has pro- duced a stabilizing effect on superpower politics. Each side knows ‘shat the other is doing. This helps reduce surprises and damp ‘vaggerations of the worst fears about the opponent. The remote Sensing technology also has made nuclear arms agreements like SALT and Il and the Limited Test Ban Treaty politically palat- able, because each side can very independently thatthe other ts not cheat But today verification ang arms control are teetering upon another threshold. Gone are'The days when “spy” satelites had the sole ask of monitoring eaily observable missile silos, antibal- listc missile radar, or strategic submarines equipped with nuclear ‘missles. These modern war instruments take years to build and {are s immense that construction must be completed outside any Structure that eould cover it. Now, however, anew line of offensive strategic weaponry is proliferat ceisare deploying mobile missiles and that ean be sheltered in garages. Intelligence and arms control specialists afe wrangling with questions like these: Should mobile land concealable weaponry be limited or allowed to multiply? Should certain bomb ot missile testing be halted? Could such test bans be confidently monitored to halt some developments in weaponry? ‘Many experts agree with Ralph Earle Il, former director ofthe US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who said, “If we ‘sant to go beyond the existing limitations treaties, | vertainly think that cooperative measures that include, but are not limited to, on-site inspections are need Tn the past, arms control agreements benefited directly from improvements in remote surveillance. The Vela Hotel satelite, de- signed by the US. Air Force and two national laboratories to detect sudden ight lashes and gamma-ray bursts from above-ground rruclear explosions, made the Limited Test Ban Treaty possible. The frst two Vela satellites, built by TRW Inc, were sent aloft hr 17, 1963—seven days afte the ceaty’ between the United Siates, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union went into Another prime example isthe SALT fagreement, which limited aniballstie missile systems. The United States was able t sign his treaty in May 1972 partly becauseit was confident that photo- reconnaissance satellites Finally had resofution that was sharp rnough to monitor Soviet vompliance. The topesecret U.S. Nu tional Reconnaissance Office had launched is ne Big Bitd satel ‘he coarse S0-meter resolution offered by civilian Landsat imag crv was adequate to detect deployment of Soviet mobile SS-20 ‘ussite aimed toward Western Europe. Image interpreters at West Cormany’s Ocean Burth Corp. concluded that five SS-20 bases stad ar least one new 88.28 base are deplored umong the pine heats north of Kirov. A telltale sign of one complex at lefts ne cul de sac. The images were made in August 1985. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 lite on June 15,1971. Built by the Lockheed Corp. itwasthe frst spy satellite capable of both wide-area searching and close inspec- Lion; its resolution was reportedly 20 centimeters from an or 145 kilometers high. The capability of earlier US. spy satelite, like the KH, irs lofied in 1966, had sown the idea forthe negoti ations, according toa former offical at the US. Central Intel ‘sence Agency's National Photographic Interpretation Center, Implicit in both the Limited Test Ban and SALT I treaties was the common understanding that the arms race was costly and could be limited without compromising national security. Today, ‘however, the fsues are not as simple. The more complex relation ship between verification, military intelligence, and national secur- ity typified bythe cruise misile problem. Sayre Stevens, former CIA deputy director of intelligence with more than 20 years of ‘experience observing Soviet weaponry, described the tend. “There {shigh interest," hesai, “in both the United States and the Soviet Union to protect likely targets through dispersal, concealment, ‘and other techniques that make targeting —and verification—di ficuk “To limit weaponry, it must be “countable,” and therefore in ‘most cases today it must also be targetable. But military leaders favor strategic forces that are hard to detect, i {nd submarines, because such weaponry cannot be e Stroyed in a preemptive strike, ‘A retired US. admiral, Suansfield Turner, who directed the CLA from 1977 to 1981, told Spectrum: “Cruise missiles are good in the strategic environment. They don't threaten anybody with a first strike. They are very likely untargetable, so they leave you ‘comfortable if you have them. They don't make the other fellow ‘nervous. So why do we worry about counting them? It's because arms controllers have gotten out of control.” He added that be- ‘cause they are not a good first-strike weapon, “I don't realy care if the Soviets have 10 000 cruise missles.” But though the argument can be made thatthe current genera- tion of relatively slow-flying cruise missiles are less threatening. ‘than accurate hypersonic ICBMs, many would take issue with the idea that small nuclear misiles should be allowed to proliferate without bounds, Similar arguments can be heard for antisatelite weaponry and biological and chemical agents. Perhaps because of this discord, little concrete progress has ‘been made in arms control since the 1979 SALT Il treaty, which adroitly pu off the cruise missile problem, Manfred Eimer, assis- tant director for verification and intelligence at the US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, sid: “We're in desperate need toavail ourselves of technological opportunites. We've learned ‘lot about how to draft treaties and so on, but independent of that, itis clear things are getting smaller and harder to verify.” ‘Strategic arms controllers face another fundamental problem ‘that isles echnical. According to John Steinbruner, director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the United ‘States is primarily interested in cutting existing arsenals to alleviate ‘a perceived threat to US. ICBM forces and a politcaly sensitive Immbateace of weapons deployed in Europe: By contrast, he argues thatthe Soviet Union is chiefly concerned with restricting techni= al improvements that ate seen as an emerging threat to itself. ‘Tas the Soviets wish to shackle the US, Suategic Defense Initia- tive and to halt all testing of nuclear explosives. “*With the United States committed to revising the past and theSoviet Union to shaping the future, viable compromise requires, arrangements that do both,” Steinbruner explained recently in fanactilein Foreign Affairs iSummer 1985 issue). Such a compro~ ‘ne-—quarstative reductions in old weapons and qualitative con straints on new ones —was arguably worked out in SALT Il, but, appears stalled at present ‘Nevertheless, despite the current political mood, he US. gov certiment still sponsors projects to verify potemtal arms control lascords, like & compechensive test ban t0 hal all experimental nuclear blasts. Anda half-dozen researchers at U.S. national lab- ‘oratories are investigating technologies and cooperative tech- hhigues under which mobile ai eruise mussiles aight be made 9/266 xo er EISEN TEL “aDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 ae ary oa top-se aor Brean ee ay eeaens ‘When a Titan 34D ragket exploded shortly after launching from ‘Vandenberg Air Foree Base in southern California in April the accident sent chills through the U'S. intelligence community, The classified cargo of the rocket was a reconnaissance satellite; it was the second such failure within nine months. Coming on the heels ofthe US. space shuttle Challenger disaster in January, it ‘meant new surveillance satellites would be grounded for months. ‘Worse yet, only one imaging satellite for intelligence was left in orbit. ‘The debate tit followed underscored two fundamental points about the US. network of “eyes in the skies” theearth-observing telescopes in space are essential for national security, and the or- bital surveillance network appears to be more fragile than iti extensive. {twas not until last year thatthe Soviet Union maintained an ‘uninterrupted presence of photoreconnaissance satlltes in or- bit, according to Nicholas L. Johnson, an expert on Soviet space developments and an advisory scientist at Teledyne Brown Engineering, Colorado Springs, Cola. The United States, by con- ‘rast, usualy relies upon two or thee such satellites in space at ime. They generally ly over the poles in an elliptical orbit from a low of 150 kilometers, where there is sill some atmospheric drag, to a high of $30. At typical orbits the same latitude is revisited every hour and a half, But because ofthe earths rota- tion, the longitudinal point moves about 22.5 degrees west each ‘orbit. In other words if the frst pass. ‘of the satellite was over Moscow, the ‘nett would be about 2500 kilometers tothe west, over Prague, Ceechoslo- vakia. Such an orbit affords only in- termittent views of many spots on the globe, and even then clouds may be a problem. So imaging te- sourees for intelligence are usually concentrated along afew strategic ally important paths; many US government bureaucracies jostle lover what targets will be closely inspected, ‘According to one former Defense Department official: "If the Soviets put something up in ary Shagan (a missile testing and radar sit] we see itright away. [they putt out in the boondocks itmay be months, years ‘or longer before we know it is there." Ralph Earle I, achief US. nego- lator at the SALT I talks and for mer director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ‘explained it another way: “Obvious. John A. Adam ‘Associate Editor ly one would like to have three times as many satellites up there as we usually have.” ‘We have yet to be surprised’ But because significant strategie changes usually occur with slacial speed, even the intermittent coverage that current imag. {ng satelite provideis invaluable According to Wiliam E. Col by, ex-director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “We've been monitoring Soviet weaponry for the last 30 years and we have yet to have surprise.” The lat surprise he ald, was the Sputak launch in 1957 The uss ofthese remote sensing satelite, operated by the top- secret US. National Reconnaissance Office, are manifold. The) monitor Middle East ruce agreement; help predict crop yields in the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, Argentina, and Indi, and monitor disasters like the Soviet nuclear reactor explosion in Chernobyl or the Guatemalan earthquake. The space-borne imaging systems are instrumental in targeting Soviet and other military installations and for compiling accurate military maps Butthe mos critical job the satelite have may be keping watch ‘over Soviet strategic weaponty to ensure that the USSR cannot overtly “beak out” of an arms control reat If the United States andthe Soviet Union are to cut their stockpiles of nuclear weaponry by 50 pereent—a goal negotiators, are aiming at now in Geneva—each side must be extremely con fident thatthe other isnot cheating If 10 the extent of achieving a first- § strike capability, With smaller BS strategic stockpiles the counting of f enemy weaponry must be more precise since smaller changes take ‘on greater significance ste ech nology for monitoring these new |S agreements up to the task, or have Gevelopments. in. concealsble mobile weaponry outstripped mon {oring means? And with movable systems like the newly deployey Soviet $8.25, how ean the Unite’ States be sure itis not "double counting"? ‘With eertain cooperative mea sues to aid verification, the techn cal means for monitoring new {eeaties—whether it bea new satel lite sensor of a tamperproof holo- sraphic imprint on a, mobile missleseem within reach ln the U1 A US. strategic nuclear sub- ‘marine, theSam Rayburn, bares its ‘missile launching tubes. It wos decommissioned last Year 10 kee; the United States in compliance with the SALT Il agreement 46 _ Reais Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 » CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 view of Manfred Eimer, assistant director for verification and intelligence atthe US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “"Remote sensing has hardly begun.” Indeed, giant strides have yet to be made in visible, infrared, and radar sensors that could ‘make possible more constant presence in space, giving the United States added confidence to enter into better-quality arms pacts. ‘A second factor, more mundane but just as important, i that surveillance satelites will soon become cheaper to use due to their ability o be serviced and refueled by space shuttle crews. With ‘operational shuttles, a satelite costing several hundred mi dollars will no longer be rendered useless after three months because its film or fuel ran out. Finally if more sensors begin collecting information in orbit, the already overwhelming data processing and handling burden will increase enormously. Some advances in parallel comput however, are making engineers optimistic about processing ‘multispectral and radar images on spacecraft by the early 1990s. Moreover, researchers are examining the use of artificial in- teligence to filter the reams of information. (See “The art and science of photointerpretation,” p. 52.) From spy planes to satellites Since the late 1950s, when the United States flew then- superseeret U-2 reconnaissance missions over the USSR to view Soviet bombers and the world’s first intercontinental ballistic ‘missile test ste [Fig. 2), the surveillance task has mushroomed, Nuclear arsenals bave swelled from hundreds of delivery vehicles {n'1960 to several thousand today. And since the early 1970s, single missle has been ableto carry 10r more nuclear warheads, ‘each independently targetable, so the firepower of one missile ‘ould destroy both Boston and New York. A more recent trend thas been to make “deliverable” warheads easier to conceal; they ‘an now be placed on small mobile launching systems like cruise ‘missiles. Arms controllers thus have a big, diverse pot to deal with ‘To compound problems, national arsenals are asymmetrical in respect to one another and are indifferent stages of development But concurrent with this evolution of weaponry isthe increas- ing sophistication of monitoring systems. On Aug. 11, 1960, three ‘months after Francis Gary Powers was shot down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union, the United States recovered the first film caD- sule from the world's frst photoreconnaissance satellite the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency's Discoverer. ‘Space can easily seem so distant and alien that one forgets in fact how close it is. The atmosphere tapers off at around 125 kilometers—or less than the distance from New York to Phila- elphia, For spy telescopes in an orbit a atmosphere, that distance is hardly astronot ‘Nevertheless, satellites like Discoverer, ying at the altitude of the U:2, were no match forthe spy plane in terms of producing high-quality photographs. “It was looked upon more an interim measure,” recalled Lyman Kirkpatrick, who retired ~ exsvutive direster of the CIA im 1965, afer sering it th gency singe ts founding. Merzover, according to Artur C. Lun: vn director oF the CLA's National Photoxraplic Inte pretation ‘Cenczr during 1986-73, the U-2 had covered only s action of the Soviet Union. So the center’ “database” of high-tesolution litelligence photos was deficient. Probably not until the Keyhole 8 (KH-8) satelite made ts debut in July 1966 did zhe United States fully recover from the loss of the U-2 fights in the op ion o: Jeffrey T. Richelson, assistant professor of goverament at the American University, Washington, DC. It was also during ine that fesolition was reported to be sharp enough once again tw consider the possiblity of monitoring arms agreements. Un 1986, when the U-2 first began flying, the technical means ‘vere sailable to monitor strategie weaponry, acconding 10 Din ‘A. Brugioni, atone time the CIA's top image interpweter. I fact, 101955 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, following an earlier at tempt by Franklin D. Roosevelt. proposed an “open skies” ar rangement witl the USSR. This would allow overfigh's fom another’ territory and an exchange of “complete bli Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7, ‘our military establishments,” in Bisenhower’s words. The pro- ‘posal was rejected by the Soviet Union, no dovbt partly for fear that the data would be used for military targeting.) 150-kilometer range no problem ‘The Keyhole 8 was built chiefly for close-look inspections. A newer satellite, Big Bird, also known as Keyhole 9, had the abil {ytoconduct wide-area tearches or close-look inspections. Both these met US. intelligence needs for 15 years or more. The last (Of the Big Bird saelites reportedly was carried atop the Titan rocket that exploded in April. First launched in June 1971, the KH-9 wasinstrumental in verifying SALT I the first arms limita- tion agreement signed by the superpowers. (Negotiations for the Lreaty began in November 1969 and were concluded in May 1972.) With its reported 20-centimeter resolution, the satelite could readily detect anibalstic launching facilites from 14S kilometers high and determine whether any dub.ous activities were taking place {Inrecent years Big Bird has worked in tandem with the Keyhole 1 reconnaissance satelite built by TRW Inc. The Titan booster that exploded last August was reported to be carrying a KH-1I, with an estimated cost of atleast $500 million. First launched in December 1976, the KHL-II wasa pioneering satelite that could Defining terms (Charge-coupled devica: alight sensitive semiconductor tn stores electrical charges In plcture elements (pixels) propor tional to the amount of light faling on them: aso reterred to 85 CCDs, hey ae read electronically, substituting fr fim in some photoreconnalssance satelites Human latelligonce: the gathering of inteligence by human intermediate-range nuclear weapons: nuclear weaponry i Europe and A 8 arange less than 5500 kllometo Stategic miss weight; andrest carry Quantitative limitation: the limits on th ‘weaponry: the SALT Il agreement limited each side's misslie hers but called for no big cuts in stratagic forces i: a lem to denote weaponty of forces capable ot ‘tfectig another nation’s fighting ability behind ne | ‘of the Batlle, as distinguished trom tactical or Standing Consultative Commission: @ body created under the SALT agraement by he United States: to ptvately resolve compliance disputes between ther: ‘10up Convenes in Goneva twice a year; the U.S. commissioner Feports io thoUS Prasident andhas asta of representatives fom a nal dozen government agencies, including come in the unetigence tela Throw weight: the maximum weight of the wae Guidance units, andany chal or decoys th by amissite over a particular ranga and trajectory. Vorlication: the technological, analytical, and polit ‘oss that dotontunes compliance with arme contr treat ttlectiva vetiication deters Wola Toavoid lave accusations of other nal any violatwns are detected goon enough toenable the cther Countis*“ounter a potential military Imbalance format acs,22] A computerenhanced photograph (above), reportedly taken bya US. digita-imaging satellite, shows the Soviet Union's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier under construction ai the ‘Nikolayey shipyard on the Black Sea. The carrier expected 10 ‘be named the Kremlin when i becomes operational in 1994, is being built in two sections: the bow (A), 264 meters long, and the stern (B), 73 metersiong. The sternof the Khatkow, the fourth Kiev-class carrier, appears inthe background (C). According 10 Jane’s Defense Weekly, this photograph was taken by a KHL! satellite, which typically operates 240 10 530 kilometers above the earth ts resolution, slightly better than I meter, is probably /06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 not the best that can be achieved with current technology; iti ‘comparable in sharpness 10 @ photo of the Soviet Thuratam test ‘site taken by a U-2 py plane in 1959 bottom). Because the rocket booster aperture at the base of the USSR's only launch pad at the time (D) was 15 meters in diameter, US. photoinierpreters ‘concluded that the Soviets were sil using cucilary rockets to boost their intercontinental ballistic missiles. These were 100 ‘cumbersome to be deployed en masse 80 the assessment allayed Sears of a missile gap. The photo was reportedly taken from an ‘altitude of about 20m. U:2 plots discovered thesiteinthe Asian desert by following railroad tracks o a deed end. relay digital imagery through a communications satelite down toa ground station near Washington, D.C, within minutes. Such “soft copy” images—rather than hard-copy photograph—would then be digitally manipulated in workstations and stored in large ‘computers for later retrieval In short, the KH-Il introduced an entirely new method of photoreconnaissance and interpretation Charge-coupled devices (CCDs), invented by ATAT Bel! Laboratories in 1970, made the KH-II breakthrough possible. ‘These semiconductors have the added advantage of a greater dynamic range than film so that the imagery is not over- oF underexposed. Because it is not limited by film capacity, the KH-II can stay in orbit as long as its fuel lats—two and a half to three yea depending on the number of adjustments made to the satellite's normal polar orbit. One KH-II stayed in orbit for three years and ‘two months, according to Anthony Kenden, writing ina recent issue of Journal of the British Interplanetary Society New satellite to debut when shuttle resumes ‘The newest addition to the US. reconnaissance repertoire, the KH-12, isa craft so big that it cannot be hurled into space by the Titan 34D. It reportedly will render both Big Bird and the KHLII obsolete; its resolution of objects on earth may be less than 10centimeters. Only the space shutle can lift this four-story-high 9070014Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 satelite into space and the job wil ikely draw on its maximum lit capacity. The KH-12 is scheduled to be one of the first customers when the orbiter resumes lying. (The Ait Fore i also building a Tian 34D7 rocket, projected tobe ready by 1968, that could lt shuttle payloads the aze ofthe Keyhole 12) Besides having all the atrbutes of its predecessor, according to Richelion, the new satelite can seein the dark by using ther tal infrared sensor. A further advantage i tha it can bese. viced and refueled in orbit by the space shuttle. ‘Because the KH-12 program is highly secre, anew civilian proj- éct, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Hub- bie Space Mescope, provides the best example for estimating the level of today’s space surveillance technology. This $1.2-ilion instrument, designed solely for astronomical observation, is as big asa railroad boxcar and is expected to last 15 yeas in space with in-orbit servicing. John Pike, associat director for space policy a the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. called the space telescope an unclassified version of the KH¢i2. Because the KHC12, Uke the telescope, must tin the shut tle cargo bay, it probably has no larger than the 24metr primary ‘optics ofthe space telescope. ‘Originally the space telescope was 1 use a 3-meterdiameter primary mirror, according o Bertram R Bulkn, the space tele- Scope program manager a Lockheed Missiles & Space Co, Sun- nyvale, Calif. With Semeter optic, scientists could have peered ‘out to 18 billion Uight-years, where astronomers believe the edge Of the universe ies. But bemause 24meter optics were “more ‘managtable,” the Lockheed program manager said, they had to Settle forthe scientifically less-appealing 14 milion light years. He added thatthe hardware needed o grind the smaller miror was “more adaptable.” Lockheed Missiles & Space Co, reportedly the builder ofboth the KH-12 and the Big Bird reconnaissance satellites, i espon- sible forthe systems engineering ofthe space telescope. On its ‘-square-mile Sunnyvale complex in what the company calls the largest clean room in the United States, the 13-meter-long telescope was tested lat spring. ‘The Il 230-kilogram telescope wil be close to the maximum load ofthe shuttle: Oly the new Atlantis orbiter will be able to hoist itinto space according to Bulkin and aNASA spokssman, The Titan 34D rocket can boost load a great as 13 600 kg into tow earth orbit, but its cargo bay isnot large enough for the telescope, which isso big that it must be shipped from Califor nia to the launching pad at Cape Canaveral, Fa, by ocean freighter through the Panama Canal “think anything above a24-mete telescope would probably nd up by being a segmented telescope that might be pat ofthe Space tation,” Bulkin sad. “I dont see them Building anything bigger than this one for shuttle launching.” Bulkin explained broadly how the telescope works. By exten- sionit may help explain the basic conceps behind the latest eret. Satelite, Light enters the frontend of the orbiting Cassegran Type telescope and i elected from the primary mirror 10 the Secondary mirror 4S meters away. The ight isthen rected back hough a hole inthe centr ofthe primary mirror to focal plane, where the apertures of ive scientific instruments ae located. Any {wo instruments can be used 1 view the light simultaneously and transfer the images to CCDs or eathode-ray tubes. Images are ‘hen recordedon ape or transmitted through tracking and data relay satelite to earth for processing. Because ofthe extreme sensitivity neded to gather faint star light, the NASA space telescope would be blinded if directed toward earth, But if the telescope were designed tobe less se sitive and turned toward the globe from an orbit equivalent 10 ‘hat of the KH-IL reconnaissance satelite. a simple calculation ‘hows that its theoretical ground resolution would be 7.16 em sje ines Se" piace coe sieht “The calelations are based on the ielescope's existing optical system and tz wide-fetdand planetary camer, high usseipht _. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070014-7 arrays of charge-coupled devices for near instantaneous imag ing. Each array is composed of 800 by 800 picture elements; each pixelis 15 microns across. The effective focal length ofthe Perkin- mer optical system is $7.6 meters. Officials at Lockheed add- ‘ed that the designers of the space telescope, on which optical assembly began in the mid-1970s, made use of existing technologies rather than pushing the state of the art. ‘This estimate of theoretical resolution corresponds to what several knowledgeable sources have told Specirumt: actual esohy- tion on current US. reconnaissance satellites is sharp, but not capable enough—even under the best platform stability and at- ‘mospheric conditions—to distinguish whether a man sitting in Red Square is reading Pravda o¢ Izvestia. The bold front-page logos of the (wo Soviet newspapers are slightly amaller than the ‘numbers on a typical auto license plate (Fig. 3). This also does ‘ot conflict with what has been publicly sated about resolution capabilities. Former CIA director Colty told a Senate commit- teen 1979: “You can see the tanks, you see the artillery, but you may not quite see the insignia on the felow’s uniform.” ‘Such optical acuity, however, is good enough to precisely den- Us cuecmmialasy liste ad resolehion, of wager eae Reselution* atte oY x Fire! te peigee wth on satelite: Vrs to Pe age oF tify components of nuclear weaponry and confidently describe rmistle sites and aircraft, Moreover, if absolutely desired, resolu- tion can sometimes be moved closer tits theoretical capability after an image is received. One way is o compensate for known, Senior deficiencies: another isto combine several shots ofthe same scene digitally. [See "The art and science of photo interpretation,” p32) = Despite the impressive capability of current telescopes in space, ways to increase resolution of optical telescopes have by no means round t0 a halt. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center and Perkin-Elmer Corp., Danbury, Conn, are studying ways to in- crease the resolution by a factor of 10 more for the next genera- tion of astronomical space telescopes. Plans call for building a telescope with an effective primary mirror of 25 meters or con- structing a two-dimensional phased array of telescopes. Allen issinger. the program's manager at Pe fet, said both ap- proaches depend on a manned station in space and neither will bbe realized until the year 208 at the earliest. The company expects toconduct some optical interferometry experiments and orbital assembly techniques on 3 shuttle experiment in the early 1990s. A geosynichronous stew is being considered for the 2030 time 9 | Aframe, Wissinger added. For earth-observing systems, atmospheric distortion restricts resolution to a few centimeters no matter how high telescopes are positioned in space. So the allure of such interferometric telescopes for treaty verification probably has less to do with in- creasing resolution from low earth orbit than it does with using systems in geosynchronous or Molniya orbits of 20 00010 40 000. km. One array of cameras could then furnish ull or nearly full. lime coverage of alarge area. “Although systems ofthis type are ‘overwhelming to contemplate, they ae probably feasible,” said I. Richard Vyce, director of advanced program development Litton/ltek Optical Systems, Lexington, Mass. Just as important as adequate resolution is proper and timely coverage of areas. A catalog of imagery to detect changes over time in each swatch of Soviet territory is crucial. “If you have. repeated coverage of a place you can tell a great deal not only of the changes,” said exCIA official Lundahl, “but also of the very slippery subject of intention. "I's like having a movie but the frames are weeks and months apart,” he added. Infrared sensors view ‘hidden’ sites Since the early 19608 US. surveillance satellites have used ‘multispectral infrared sensors for a number of tasks that con- found visible light systems—from observing surface deforma- tions caused by underground nuclear explosions to distinguishing ‘camouflage from natural vegetation. Infrared sensors can also bbe used to detect underground missile silo complexes, which are ‘warmer than their immediate surroundings. ‘The KH-12satellite willbe the first space platform with suffi-