Digests Finals

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
BRILLANTES, JR. V. YORAC
Facts:
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d etat attempt
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where President
Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on Elections
and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the
respondent is not even the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by
Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of
the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court,
where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief
Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of
the COMELEC
Held:
Yes, it is unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.
Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore
revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be
withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is
doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from
challenging its withdrawal.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This
is still a government of laws and not of men
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BORROMEO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CONSTITUTIONAL
Facts: LAW I
On August 18, 1988, the petitioner wrote a letter to the Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman,
coursed through the CSC Chairman, requesting an opinion on whether or not the money value of
the terminal leave of retired Constitutional Commission members should include the allowances
received at the time of retirement. The petitioner, in his letter, further stated that while retired
members of other Constitutional Commissions received terminal leave pay computed on the basis
of highest monthly salary including allowances, the former's terminal leave was computed solely
on the basis of highest monthly salary.
Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential representing the unpaid
COLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSC Chairman informed the petitioner that the
release of the corresponding advice of allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of his
terminal leave differential had already been requested from the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM).
On January 25, 1990, in a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman, the DBM denied the petitioner's
request for payment of terminal leave differential for the following reasons, among others:
1) Computation of the money value of vacation and sick leave is based on "basic pay" or "basic
salary" pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by R.A. No.
1081.
2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No. 1146, the term salary refers to the basic pay or salary received by
an employee, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay and allowance.
3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento cannot be validly invoked as
precedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action since said claims were processed without prior
involvement of the DBM
The petitioner seeks the nullification of CSC Resolution Nos. 90-514 and 90-945. He urges that the
COA decision which interposed no objection to the computation of his terminal leave pay based on
salary plus allowances had already become final and executory since no timely appeal had been
taken therefrom.
Issue:
W/n the terminal leave pay of petitioner Borromeo, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) until his retirement on April 1, 1986, be computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary
plus cost of living allowance (COLA) and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) or
solely on the basis of highest monthly salary without said allowances?
Held:
Yes. It is clear from RA 91 0 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based on highest monthly
salary plus transportation, living and representation allowance. The computation of terminal leave
pay, which is given on the same occasion of retirement and which arises from the same
considerations of government gratitude that for most retirees is based on a lifetime of service, be
accorded similar treatment.
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The Solicitor General stresses that under Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1081 and Executive Order No. 1077, the computation of the money
value of the terminal leave pay is based only on monthly basic salary.
Since terminal leave pay may also be considered a gratuity, then applying the rule on liberal
interpretation of retirement laws, the basis for its computation in the case of members of the
Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions must be the same as that used in computing the 5-year
lump sum gratuity under RA 910 as amended and Administrative Order No. 444. The Court is
cognizant of the incongruity that may ensue if the terminal leave pay of members of the Judiciary
and Constitutional Commissions is computed only on the basis of highest basic monthly salary.
GAMINDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an
oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the
Philippines confirmed the appointment.
However, on February 24, 1998, Thelma sought clarification from the Office of the President
as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that Thelma's term of office would
expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
Thelma remained in office after February 02, 1999.
On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit
requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff
may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,
1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that
the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional intent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC
Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99002 101 (99), disallowing in
audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her coterminous staff, effective
February 02, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or not the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
Held:
YES, the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
The court ruled that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to
the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the
date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the
membership of the Civil Service Commission. While all the members of the Commissions are
deemed to start on the same date, their terms of office expire on different dates.
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In Republic vs. Imperial, the court held that the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on
a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and
three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two year interval between the expiration
of the terms.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of
the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, the
Court considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1
(2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a
seven year term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
reappointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three years, without
reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under
an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000,
and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.
Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other
emoluments, including that of her coterminous staff
In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the
term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the
law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. The
term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office
is not affected by the holdover. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.
FUNA V. VILLAR
Doctrine:
A COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years
cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration
of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and
constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the
constitutional ban.
Facts:
Funa, suing as a taxpayer and citizen, challenged the constitutionality of the appointment of
Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit.
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Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as
COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to
April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as COA Commissioner
to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment.
He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the
expiration of the term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the
chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven
(7) years which is yet to lapse.
He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed
to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the
appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman.
This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and
academic. To Villar, all the requisites have not been met, it being alleged in particular that
petitioner, suing as a taxpayer and citizen, lacks the necessary standing to challenge his
appointment.
The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in
a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to
sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act.
Issue:
Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having
served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid
Held:
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
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The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President
for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed
or extended another appointment.
In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise
served the full term is barred from being reappointed.
In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term ofseven years, then
he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner.
The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission
by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate
of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to
the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in
the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance,
validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be
for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of
the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt
the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to
any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under
the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
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reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity
FUNA V. DUQUE III

Doctrine:
The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the
President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as independent. Although their respective functions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such
functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and
rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IXA of
the 1987 Constitution. To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987
Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain
inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to
wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government owned or -controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Facts:
Duque was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as Chairman of the CSC which
was thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Subsequently, President Arroyo
issued EO 864. Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following government-owned or government-controlled
corporations: (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
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Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as
well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, otherwise known as The Administrative
Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of
the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC
and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
Held:
Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of
Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification in Section 2, Article IX-A, which is the
disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duques tenure as Chairman
of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to Section 7,
paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered
by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other
office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency
of the government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures
to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans membership in
a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity where
he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no
irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the
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career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary
functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairmans
membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers
and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions
associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-
related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not
anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or
unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or
approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also
notes that Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed
by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set
by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind
an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques designation as
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the
independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises
control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the
control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government
corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of Labor,
respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The
corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing
Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are
under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence
vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de
jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one
who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired.
That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one
having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment
9
is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the
de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public
or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if
he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in
order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the public with persons whose
ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duques official actions covered by this clarification
extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and memoranda approving
appointments to positions in the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on
compensation and employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
MACALINTAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Doctrine:
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings.
Facts:
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as suffering from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing
to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated.
R.A. No. 9189 appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental
budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the
necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens. The
Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has
seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people.
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage
of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
Issues:
Macalintal argues, among others,
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1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
President and Vice-President, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.
Held:
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile
(insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to
return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race.
To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The
canvassing and proclamation of the P and VP elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no
way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice
President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this
Court holds that Section 25 which created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) of
R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

Doctrine:
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. The agencies which the Constitution
has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved
appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
11
In granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the
reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. The plain
implication of Article IX (A), Section 5 of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the
appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the
previous year.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal
autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
Facts:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel
the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its budget for
fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all
sources of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total
fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report,
no release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the
documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent constitutional
bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes, it is unconstitutional. Respondents justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as
due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is
totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a
shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A),
Section 5 of the Constitution.
If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and
regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month
that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering
insignificant altogether, such mandate.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner
may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to
that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing
12
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the
distinction established by the Constitution.
While the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is
an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the
Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy.
Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not
withhold full release of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but also
Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the present ruling that
the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a
shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a
situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total
appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be
practically impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also
vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other entities to an
automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the
constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the
previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected. In the parallel provision
granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the
reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. The plain
implication of Article IX (A), Section 5 of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing
the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the
previous year.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [XYZA - 3]

MERAM V. EDRALIN
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs, permanently enjoining the Minister of Natural Resources and the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) from enforcing and implementing the decisions of the Merit
Systems Board and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the appointment
of the petitioner to the contested position of Administrative Officer V in the Bureau of Forest
Development.
On July 29, 1982, the private respondent Filipina V. Edralin, who was a training officer of the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) was proposed for appointment to the position of
Administrative Officer V, R-73, Administrative Division of the BFD. Petitioner herein and Mr.
Hermecio M. Agravio who hold the positions of Administrative Officer III, R-70 and Supply Officer V,
R-70 respectively, filed their protest against the proposal.
13
In his memorandum, the Director also pointed out that the Board found that Mrs. Filipina V. Edralin,
Training Officer, Range 60, assigned in the Training Center was not next-in-rank.
On August 12, 1982, the respondent Minister forwarded the permanent appointment of respondent
Edralin to take effect on August 17, 1982, as Administrative Officer V to the Commission for
appropriate action.
In his letter, the Minister explained that he assessed the recommendation of the Promotions Board
and considered also other aspects which are vital to the dynamism of the service; and upon seeing
that respondent Edralin is eminently qualified for the position, the person on whom he can repose
his trust and confidence, and who possesses the necessary integrity, knowledgeability and sound
judgment, he decided to appoint her to the said position for the best interest of the service.
On September 1, 1982, the respondent Minister rendered a decision, embodied in two separate
letters, dismissing the protests. In his letter to the petitioner which was received by the latter on
September 10, 1982, the Minister assured her "that when another opportunity comes, and I have
had a chance to better appreciate your qualities and capabilities, then I would certainly consider
you for the appointment to a more senior position."
Petitioner and Agravio appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB) pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1409. On January 13, 1983, the Merit Systems Board
promulgated a decision in favor of Hermecio M. Agravio, revoking the previous approval of the
appointment of respondent Edralin and directing the Minister to appoint, in her stead, Agravio to
the contested position.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of respondent's
letter-petition, and passing upon the same, and thereafter, setting aside the decisions of the Merit
Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission.
Held:
No. P.D. No. 807 was promulgated on October 6, 1975. Section 19 (6) of this decree provides:
"Sec. 19 (6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to appeal initially to the
department head and finally to the Office of the President an appointment made (1) in favor of
another next-in-rank employee who is not qualified, or (2) in favor of one who is not next-in-rank,
or (3) in favor of one who is appointed by transfer and not next-in-rank, or by reinstatement, or by
original appointment if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the written special
reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for such appointment: Provided, That final
appeal shall be to the department head concerned if the appointment is issued to a qualified next-
in-rank employee. Before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall
consult the Civil Service Commission. x x x"
There is nothing in the above-quoted provision which connotes exclusivity of jurisdiction in the
Office of the President to take cognizance of the specific cases cited above. Furthermore, even if it
were so, with the promulgation of P.D. No. 1409, this power of review by the Office of the President
was not only divested of its exclusivity but was, in fact, repealed altogether. The petitioner,
therefore, correctly filed her protest with the MSB in accordance with P.D. No. 1409. Moreover,
respondent Edralin is now estopped from questioning the orders of the MSB and the Commission
14
since she submitted to the jurisdiction of these two bodies by filing for reconsideration with the
MSB and upon denial of the same, by appealing to the Commission.
Furthermore, civil service laws are not enacted to penalize anyone. They are designed to
eradicate the system of appointment to public office based on political considerations and to
eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making
appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis
of appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better government.
(See Gervais v. New Orleans Police Department, 77 So 2d. 393; Civil Service Board of City of
Phoenix v. Warren, 244 P 2d. 1157 citing State ex rel. Kos v. Adamson, 226 Minn. 177, 32 N. W. 2d
281, 284)
In the case at bar, the BFD personnel who are considered next-in-rank to the vacated position were
identified. Respondent Edralin was not one of them. In fact, she was nine or ten salary ranges
below the next-in-rank personnel. Subsequently, the MSB made the same finding in its decision.
Evidently, therefore, the foremost consideration why respondent's appointment was ordered by
the Office of the President notwithstanding the fact that petitioner was more qualified and that she
was next-in-rank was because of her petition to the President in the form of a letter rather than an
appeal and which started by introducing herself as "Filipina Villeses-Edralin, wife of Efren E. Edralin
of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte."
The clear intent of her letter-petition was not to appeal in accordance with P.D. No. 807 but to elicit
some kind of favorable response from the President based on considerations of blood ties,
influence, or ethnic and regional affiliations. To a certain extent she succeeded but this Court must
strike down the practice of political, ethnic, religious, or blood ties being used to get choice
appointments for it goes against the very purpose behind the establishment of the civil service in
our country. As earlier stated, appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit
and fitness and should never depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee
is to the powers that be. And granting that the respondent possesses the qualifications required
for the contested position, it cannot be denied that the petitioner equally possesses the same
qualifications, if not in greater degree, and more important, she is next-in-rank to the vacated
position. Therefore, she deserves to be appointed to the disputed item.
DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE

Facts:
Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by
the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August
6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions
of the position.
On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the
same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communication directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as
Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he
commenced these proceedings.
15
The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, Section 4 of which reads: "No officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law."
It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified
service." An d this Court, in an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Montemayor in the case of Lacson
vs. Romero, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778, involving the office of provincial fiscal, ruled that officers or
employees in the unclassified as well as those in the classified service are protected by the above-
cited provision of the organic law. But there is this difference between the Lacsott case and the
case at bar: Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61
entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at
pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer.
Issue:
Whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to another
position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Held:
Yes. It is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service should be brought
within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 1 of this Article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination." The first clause is a definition of the scope of Civil Service, the men and women
which Section 4 protects. It seems obvious from that definition that the entire Civil Service is
contemplated, except positions "which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature." This theory is confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on
November 30, 1936, to implement Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177
explains Civil Service almost in the identical words of that Article of the organic law. As a
contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as
conceived by the framers of the Constitution. "The principle of contemporaneous construction may
be applied to the construction given by the legislature to the constitutional provisions dealing with
legislative powers and procedure. Though not conclusive, such interpretation is generally
conceded as being entitled to great weight."
We are led to the same conclusion by the existing provisions at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. Civil Service as embracing both classes of officers and employees possessed definite
legal and statutory meaning when the Constitution was approved. Section 670 of the Revised
Administrative Code already provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to
the classified or unclassified service." and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all
not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then Section 671 described persons in
the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of
bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government
whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."
16
The rules of construction inform us that the words used in the constitution are to be given the
sense they have in common use. It has been said that we must look to the history of the times,
examine the state of things existing when the Constitution was framed and adopted, and
interprets it in the light of the law then in operation.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence
in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is. the position of city engineer policy-
determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of
its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City
Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him by Section 2557 of the
Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city
engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to
possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which
"highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical
men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city
engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in
character and could very well be discharged by non- technical men possessing executive ability.
Section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution requires that "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in banc," and warns that "no
treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of the Court." The question arises as to whether this judgment operates as invalidation
of Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code or a part of it so as to need at least eight votes
to make it effective.
The Court therefore held that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of
Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is
removed for cause, and that respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may
adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE V. GONZALES

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION V. ANGARA
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. JAVIER
Doctrines:
1. The Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final determination as to which positions
in government are primarily confidential or otherwise
2. A primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the
appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their
relationship.
Facts:
Respondent Javier was first employed as Private Secretary in the GSIS, a GOCC, on February 23,
1960, on a "confidential" status. On July 1, 1962, respondent was promoted to Tabulating
17
Equipment Operator with "permanent" status. The "permanent" status stayed with respondent
throughout her career. She spent her entire career with GSIS, earning several more promotions,
until on December 16, 1986, she was appointed Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees of
the corporation.
On July 16, 2001, a month shy of her 64th birthday, respondent opted for early retirement and
received the corresponding monetary benefits.
On April 3, 2002, GSIS President Garcia, with the approval of the Board of Trustees, reappointed
respondent as Corporate Secretary, the same position she left and retired from barely a year
earlier.
Respondent was 64 years old at the time of her reappointment. In its Resolution, the Board of
Trustees classified her appointment as "confidential in nature and the tenure of office is at the
pleasure of the Board."
Petitioner alleges that respondent's reappointment on confidential status was meant to illegally
extend her service and circumvent the laws on compulsory retirement.
R.A. 8291, or the GSIS Act of 1997 was petitioners basis for her claim. According to the said law,
the compulsory retirement age for government employees is 65 years.
Respondent's appointment was characterized as "confidential" by the GSIS following the exception
under Rule XIII of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, as
amended that a person who has already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be
appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position in the government.
On November 2, 2002, the CSC invalidated the appointment of Ms. Javier as Corporate Secretary,
in a letter for the reason that the position was not declared primarily confidential by the Civil
Service Commission or by any law.
CSC replied that the position of Corporate Secretary is a permanent (career) position, and not
primarily confidential (non-career); thus, it was wrong to appoint respondent to this position since
she no longer complies with eligibility requirements for a permanent career status. More
importantly, as respondent by then has reached compulsory retirement at age 65, respondent was
no longer qualified for a permanent career position.
The Court of Appeals concluded that indeed, such a position is primarily confidential in nature.
Issues:
1. Whether the courts may determine the proper classification of a position in government
2. Whether the position of corporate secretary in a GOCC is primarily confidential in nature
Held:
CAREER vs NON-CAREER
Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2)
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure
Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career positions, which are
characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
18
is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited
to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. Examples of non-
career positions are elective officials and their personal or confidential staff and secretaries and
other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff.
1. YES. The courts may determine the proper classification of a position in government.
At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for
determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that gives an
enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential.
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil
service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the
petitioner.
The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular position, such
as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by prior classifications
made by other bodies.
It is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of government, such as the
petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional
role as final arbiter of all justiciable controversies and disputes.
2. The position of corporate secretary in a government owned and controlled corporation, currently
classified as a permanent career position, is primarily confidential in nature.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence
in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of [discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
It still stands that a position is primarily confidential when by the nature of the functions of the
office there exists "close intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its
functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character.
The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation
of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints against judges of first instance, which are
confidential in nature.
It is from De los Santos that the so-called "proximity rule" was derived. A position is considered to
be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing authority
and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered communication and
discussion on the most confidential of matters.
The following were declared by the Court to be not primarily confidential positions: City Engineer;
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor; members of the Customs Police Force or Port Patrol; Special
Assistant of the Governor of the Central Bank, etc.
19
In fine, a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of
the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their
relationship.
Ineluctably therefore, the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any GOCC, for that matter, is
a primarily confidential position. The position is clearly in close proximity and intimacy with the
appointing power. It also calls for the highest degree of confidence between the appointer and
appointee.
The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its highly confidential
character. The secretary reports directly to the board of directors, without an intervening officer in
between them.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrine:
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a
scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force his resignation
Facts:
On June 29, 1989, Icasiano (private res) was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division
of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Cory.
On October 10, 1994, respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the
Philippines that the Icasiano be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr.
Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for Icasianos reassignment, as approved by
the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation.
On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the Icasiano of his reassignment, effective October
17, 1994.
Private Respondent Icasiano requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the
reassignment, but the latter denied the request.
He then prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for a
reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he
subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
The Court of Appeals ruled that for lack of a period or any indication that it is only temporary, the
reassignment of Icasiano from Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, QC, to
Vocational Schools Superintendent of the MIST pursuant to the Memorandum of Sec. Gloria to the
President of the Philippines, is hereby declared to be violative of Icasianos right to security of
tenure, and the respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the same.
Issue:
20
Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of QC to
Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure
Held:
YES. The Court upholds the finding of the CA that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears
to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for the
President to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications
and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education."
It can thus be gleaned that the subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private
respondent has been described as fit for the reassigned job, being an expert in the field.
Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is
specified or fixed.
Said fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no
definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of
the security of tenure of the private respondent.
Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service.
The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to
cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a
scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of
tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.
DARIO V. MISON
Doctrine:
Transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the
silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to dismiss
public servants at a moment's notice. If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it
should have said so in clearer terms. Plainly the concern of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution of 1987 is to ensure compensation for "victims" of constitutional revamps - whether
under the Freedom or existing Constitution - and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow
reorganization.
In order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16, two requisites, one negative and
the other positive, must concur, to wit:
1. The separation must not be for cause
2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned.
Facts:
21
In 1986, Cory Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO
IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE... the mandate of the people to completely
reorganize the government.
In January 1987, she promulgated EO 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE". Among
other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
In February 1987, a brand new constitution was adopted. On January 1988, incumbent
Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on
the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel
placement. It also provided that by February 1988, all employees covered by EO 127 and the
grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President on reorganization shall be: a)
informed of their re-appointment, or b) offered another position in the same department or
agency, or c) informed of their termination.
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials stating that they shall continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those
incumbents whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who are not re-
appointed, shall be deemed separated from the service. A total of 394 officials and employees of
the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with the
CSC.
On June 1988, the CSC promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees,
the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310. Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Commissioner Mison instituted
certiorari proceedings.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION," was signed into law containing the provision:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have
been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or
reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for
the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees,
including casuals and temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and
retirement and other benefits xxx
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy,
petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the statute. On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more
Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988
Resolution filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the said
Resolution.
Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his relief on
orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality of his
dismissal, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 (SEC.
59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees
22
of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they
are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of
the Freedom Constitution. Incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall
receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled.
A provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could not
have been legally deemed to be an "incumbent whose position is not included therein or who is
not reappointed to justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither the Executive
Order (under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the
Secretary of Finance abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather,
increased it to three. Nor can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not been
"reappointed" (under the second paragraph of the section) because "reappointment therein
presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been
abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed that which has been abolished." He claims,
finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public officials without cause
ended on February 25, 1987, and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed security of tenure under
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Vicente Feria asserts his security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by Section 59
of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 - during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS," the Commissioner of Customs has the
power "to appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," and that his
position, which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for
purposes of reorganization.
Provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) explicitly authorize the removal of
career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution. For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no
defense. That contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is
applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria), in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the
Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or
reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not been reappointed,
they had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59
incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all those positions were
considered vacant."
The Commissioner's two petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service
Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees
above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the
Resolution, dated November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"
vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason
23
Held:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
No. The State can still carry outIreorganizations provided that it is done in good faith. Removal of
career officials without cause cannot be done after the passing of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate
separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of
general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of
the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose
resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy.
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus,
and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935 Constitution. Transition periods are
characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the
passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of
tenure.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and
necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately
stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the
first stage. We are on the second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article
XVIII of the permanent basic document. After February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees
have acquired security of tenure.
The present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of
reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It
must also pass the test of good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes
place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where
there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by
the existence of ample funds.
The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since after February 2, 1987 no
perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has
occurred, which would have justified (all things being equal) the contested dismissals. There is also
no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually
24
undertaken, for that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which
would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59
thereof, "Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed
shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed
personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under
Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnels except
those appointed by the President." Thus, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and
Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being
Presidential appointees.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. The occupancy
of a position in a holdover capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have
lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987
when the 1987 Constitution became effective. After the said date the provisions of the latter on
security of tenure govern.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY

Doctrine:
Nepotism is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it
raises its ugly head. One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or
issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of
the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Who may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the
respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who
was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has
become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service
system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. We overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges
Facts:
George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President in Northern Samar, filed a complaint against
Pedro O. Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. The Civil Service
25
Commission found no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and
misconduct. However, they found Dacoycoy guilty on two counts of nepotism as a result of
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their
assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. On Dacoycoys appeal to the CA, it ruled that respondent did
not appoint or recommend his two sons, hence, not guilty of nepotism.
Issue:
Whether or not Pedro O. Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
Held:
Yes, Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. He is behind the appointing or recommending authority in the
appointment of his two sons. While it is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to
the positions of driver and utility worker, Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of
the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito and appointed Ped, was a subordinate of
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. Dacoycoy authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of
first level employees under his immediate supervision. Furthermore, it was respondent Dacoycoy
who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his
performance as very satisfactory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description
form that his father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is
quite obvious.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. CORTES

Facts:
On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued
Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of
respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes,
abstained from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the
respondent's appointment.
In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G.
Lamorena rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on
nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct
and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however,
sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her
appointment is not yet complete.
On April 4, 2008 the Civil Service Commission-NCR (CSC-NCR) Field Office informed Chairperson
Quisumbing that it will conduct an investigation on the appointment of respondent Cortes.
On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson
Quisumbing that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the
rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing
authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En
Banc.
26
On August 11, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullified Resolution 10-
0370 dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes be
reinstated to her position as IO V in the CHR.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in
the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
Held:
Yes. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of
Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of
Commissioner Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in
a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.2 In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the
CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.
In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority
referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the
individual Commissioners who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for
appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official
by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is
intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the
efficiency of its personnel
Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not by
the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to
the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition
meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can
never have relatives to speak of.
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body.1wphi1 What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's
abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil
sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for
the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and
neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
27
VELOSO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CONSTITUTIONAL
Facts: LAW I
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An
Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials
of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2
thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms,
subject to the availability of funds as certified by the City Treasurer. .xxx..
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments to some former city councilors
including herein petitioners the total amount of P9, 923,257.00.
On August 8,2005, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila,
issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-100(05)07(05) stating that Ordinance No.
8040 is without legal basis and the amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and
tantamount to double compensation. After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance.
Upon review, the COA rendered the assailed the decision sustaining ND (Notice of Disallowance)
No. 06-010-100-05. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The COA opined that the
monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term compensation. Though it recognizes the
local autonomy of LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such monetary
reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by Congress which ordains
the conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to the former councilors. In response to the
question on its jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the disbursement, the COA held that it is
vested by the Constitution the power to determine whether government entities comply with laws
and regulations in disbursing government funds and to disallow irregular disbursements.
The petitioners come before the court claiming that the respondent committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the monetary award given
under the EPSA partakes of the nature of an additional compensation prohibited under the Salary
Standardization Law, and other existing laws, rules and regulations, and not a GRATUITY
voluntarily given in return for a favor or services rendered purely out of generosity of the giver or
grantor.
Issue:
Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds
Held:
Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and functions of the
COA, to wit:
28
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct
the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may
be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this
constitutional mandate to COA. Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit
jurisdiction extends to the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction
likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and universities, other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity from or through the government. The power of the COA to
examine and audit government agencies cannot be taken away from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of
the Constitution mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government
or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of
the [COA]."
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over
all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of
the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in
our form of government.
The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to disapprove payments which
it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the Government; to determine the meaning of "public
bidding" and when there is failure in the bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds
29
unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance will mean discontinuance of foreign aid; to
disallow a contract even after it has been executed and goods have been delivered. Thus, LGUs,
though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [XYZA 1, V 4]

CAYETANO V. MONSOD
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
JALOSJOS, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BUAC V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion
of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The
residents of Taguig were asked this question: Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality
of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided
for in Republic Act No. 8487
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of
sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the No votes won, indicating that the people
rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass
of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private
respondents, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of
the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the
petition as an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged
that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion and dismissing the
petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102
constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the
Committees on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were
presented by petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which
they did.
30
Petitioner contends that the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the
determination of the will of the electorate because the revision is incomplete. He claims that:
Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision
Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for Yes and a total of 12,602
votes for No. The revision committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in
the Final Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the
physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation
of the contested ballots.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
Held:
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect,
but finality. This is so because the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have
always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the
appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC
has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion
GOH V. BAYRON
Doctrine:
One of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall elections. When
the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures," such
appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct
of recall elections.
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to "enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall." The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also
granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.
The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
Facts:
Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and
confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of
duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."
31
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution No. 9864 found the recall petition
sufficient in form and substance, but suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until the
resolution of the funding issue. Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Clarification which prayed for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of
merit. Goh filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Lift Suspension, as well as to direct
COMELEC's authorized representative to immediately carry out the publication of the recall
petition against Mayor Bayron, the verification process, and the recall election of Mayor Bayron.
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882. Commissioner Tagle stated that "in order for the
Commission to effectively undertake actions relative to recall petitions, First, the budget proposal
to Congress for the FY 201 should contain a specific line item appropriated for the funding of the
conduct of recall elections; or Second, if feasible, we can request a supplemental budget from
Congress for the FY 2014 to specifically answer for the funding of recall proceedings."
Commissioner Padaca called for a holistic look of the GAA. She submitted that "the allocation for
the Commission in the GAA is primarily geared toward our Constitutional mandate, that is, the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall xx x." Therefore, the interpretation of the provisions of
the GAA should be read with the intent to pursue COMELEC's mandate. Commissioner Padaca
further pointed out that the COMELEC was "able to conduct special elections, all of which lack a
specific line item in the applicable GAA. The lack of a specific appropriation or line item in the GAA
did not deter [COMELEC] from conducting and supervising an electoral exercise that was legally
called upon by the people." However, Commissioner Padaca recognized the limitations set by
Section 2 of the 2014 GAA on the COMELEC's use of its savings.
The Office of the Chairman, on the other hand, submits the COMELEC's annual budget for the
COMELEC En Banc's approval and directs and supervises the operations and internal
administrations of the COMELEC.
Commissioner Guia states that the majority opinion suggests that recall elections can only be
funded through a supplemental budget law. He opines that the majority adopts a strict
interpretation of the budget law when it states that there is no line item for the conduct of recall
elections in the 2014 GAA. Commissioner Guia proposes a liberal approach: that the 2014 GAA
should be construed as merely failing to provide sufficient funds for the actual conduct of recall
elections, and not as preventing COMELEC from exercising its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. Commissioner Guia's liberal approach to interpreting the budget law
makes the remedy of funding recall elections by way of augmenting an existing line item from
savings a theoretical possibility. Commissioner Guia, however, recognizes that the GAA's Sec. 69 of
the General Provisions and Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the COMELEC limit the items that
can be funded from the COMELEC's savings. He suggests that curative legislation be made to
enable COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held:
Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882.
The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
32
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.
COMELECs budget in the 2014 GAA:
Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide for a
line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually
expressly provides for a line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections.
This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its
Resolution No. 9882 is a "line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall
votes and plebiscites.'"
Also, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has "a line item for the
'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'" This admission of
the COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation. To be valid, an
appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may
be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature. For
example, the purpose can be to '"conduct elections," which even if not expressly spelled out
covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to fund
elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but
also special or recall elections.
On savings:
Nowhere in the COMELEC's comment, however, does it dispute the existence of savings. In the
transcript of the hearing for the COMELEC's 2014 budget, the COMELEC estimated to have PhPl0.7
billion savings around the end of 2013. However, since the DBM did not include a line budget for
certain items, Chairman Brillantes estimated that the PhP 10.7 billion savings will be reduced to
about PhP2 billion after the COMELEC augments expenses for the purchase of its land, warehouse,
building, and the overseas absentee voting. This estimate was made under the assumption that
the 2014 GAA will provide a line item budget for the COMELEC's land, warehouse, building, and the
overseas absentee voting.
The COMELECs alleged lack of authority to augment the project recall elections from savings:
We reiterate that the 2014 GAA provides a line item appropriation for the COMELEC's conduct of
recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient funds from its
current line item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" to
conduct an actual recall election, then there is therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds
for the current year. This is a situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC Chairman's
power to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall
votes x x x" in its budget appropriation. Also, we thus find unnecessary the COMELEC's protests
regarding the difference between "Projects" and "Programs" for their failure to allocate funds for
any recall process in 2014. Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to
perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of x x x recall." Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed
insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item
appropriation from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly authorized
in the 2014 GAA.
33
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS V. TAGLE
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) PARTY LIST V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
COMMISSION ON AUDIT [XYZA 2]

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
On 2 February 1989, the COA sent a letter to Caltex Philippines, Inc. (CPI), hereinafter referred to
as Petitioner, directing the latter to remit to the OPSF its collection, excluding that unremitted for
the years 1986 and 1988, of the additional tax on petroleum products authorized under the
aforesaid Section 8 of P.D. No. 1956 which, as of 31 December 1987, amounted to
P335,037,649.00 and informing it that, pending such remittance, all of its claims for
reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in abeyance. 6
On 9 March 1989, the COA sent another letter to petitioner informing it that partial verification
with the OEA showed that the grand total of its unremitted collections of the above tax is
P1,287,668,820.00, broken down as follows:
1986 P233,190,916.00
1987 335,065,650.00
1988 719,412,254.00;
directing it to remit the same, with interest and surcharges thereon, within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the letter; advising it that the COA will hold in abeyance the audit of all its claims for
reimbursement from the OPSF; and directing it to desist from further offsetting the taxes collected
against outstanding claims in 1989 and subsequent periods.
In its letter of 3 May 1989, petitioner requested the COA for an early release of its reimbursement
certificates from the OPSF covering claims with the Office of Energy Affairs since June 1987 up to
March 1989, invoking in support thereof COA Circular No. 89-299 on the lifting of pre-audit of
government transactions of national government agencies and government-owned or controlled
corporations.
In its Answer dated 8 May 1989, the COA denied petitioner's request for the early release of the
reimbursement certificates from the OPSF and repeated its earlier directive to petitioner to forward
payment of the latter's unremitted collections to the OPSF to facilitate COA's audit action on the
reimbursement claims.
By way of a reply, petitioner, in a letter dated 31 May 1989, submitted to the COA a proposal for
the payment of the collections and the recovery of claims, since the outright payment of the sum
of P1.287 billion to the OEA as a prerequisite for the processing of said claims against the OPSF will
cause a very serious impairment of its cash position.
On 7 June 1989, the COA, with the Chairman taking no part, handed down Decision No. 921
accepting the above-stated proposal but prohibiting petitioner from further offsetting remittances
and reimbursements for the current and ensuing years.
34
On 16 February 1990, the COA, with Chairman Domingo taking no part and with Commissioner
Fernandez dissenting in part, handed down Decision No. 1171 affirming the disallowance for
recovery of financing charges, inventory losses, and sales to MARCOPPER and ATLAS, while
allowing the recovery of product sales or those arising from export sales.
Issue:
Whether or not COA lost its jurisdiction in completely ignoring and showing absolutely no respect
for the findings and rulings of the administrator of the fund itself and in disallowing a claim which
is still pending resolution at the OEA level
Held:
No. As to the power of the COA, which must first be resolved in view of its primacy, the Court finds
the theory of petitioner that such does not extend to the disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and
properties, but only to the promulgation of accounting and auditing rules for, among others, such
disallowance to be untenable in the light of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and related
laws.
Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 2(l). The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct
the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts, of the Government and, for such period as
may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or, unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
These present powers, consistent with the declared independence of the Commission, are broader
and more extensive than that conferred by the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the
Commission was empowered to:
Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all accounts pertaining to the
revenues, and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust
by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities
including government-owned or controlled corporations, keep the general accounts of the
35
Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers pertaining
thereto; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the
prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds and
property.
Upon the other hand, under the 1935 Constitution, the power and authority of the COA's precursor,
the General Auditing Office, were, unfortunately, limited; its very role was markedly passive.
Section 2 of Article XI thereof provided:
Sec. 2. The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues
and receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in
accordance with law and administrative regulations, all expenditures of funds or property
pertaining to or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall
keep the general accounts of the Government and the preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It
shall be the duty of the Auditor General to bring to the attention of the proper administrative
officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, or extravagant. He shall also perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.
As clearly shown above, in respect to irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of funds, the 1935 Constitution did not grant the Auditor General the power
to issue rules and regulations to prevent the same. His was merely to bring that matter to the
attention of the proper administrative officer.
The ruling on this particular point, quoted by petitioner from the cases of Guevarra
vs. Gimenez and Ramos vs.Aquino, are no longer controlling as the two (2) were decided in the
light of the 1935 Constitution.
There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of the Auditor General under the 1935
Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized them to
disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our present Constitution
retains that same power and authority, further strengthened by the definition of the COA's general
jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Administrative
Code of 1987. Pursuant to its power to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations
for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
funds, the COA promulgated on 29 March 1977 COA Circular No. 77-55. Since the COA is
responsible for the enforcement of the rules and regulations, it goes without saying that failure to
comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment of the proposed expenditure.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino,
obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan (ERL for brevity) in the amount of
US$310 million. The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that
time suffering severely from the financial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the
Marcos regime.
As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to
rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans. Accordingly, the
government committed to rehabilitate the DBP to make it a viable and self-sustaining financial
36
institution in recognition of its developmental role in the economy. The DBP was expected to
continue providing principally medium and long-term financing to projects with risks higher than
the private sector may be willing to accept under reasonable terms. The governments
commitment was embodied in the Policy Statement for the Development Bank of the
Philippines which stated in part:
4. Furthermore, like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP will now be
required to have a private external audit, and its Board of Directors will now be opened to
adequate private sector representation. It is hoped that with these commitments, DBP can avoid
the difficulties of the past and can function as a competitive and viable financial institution within
the Philippine financial system.
On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central
Banks Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, in line with the
governments commitment to the World Bank to require a private external auditor for DBP. Thus,
on December 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124
On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing firm for
calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident
auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services
were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with
Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months earlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's covering
handwritten note sought the COA's concurrence to the contract.
During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the DBP paid the
billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14despite the objection of the COA.
On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and
holding the following persons personally liable for such payment.
Issue:
Whether or not the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and
audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any
circumstance?
Held:
COAs power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs authority to
define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COAs findings
and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government
agencies and officials are concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the COA audit over
private audit can be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission, as follows:
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, after consultation with the honorable members of the
Committee, I have amended my proposed amendment by deleting the word EXCLUSIVE because I
was made to understand that the Commission on Audit will still have the preponderant power and
authority to examine, audit and settle.
37
The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors who
require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however, remain bound by the
findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph
of Section 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the
courts.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be
taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that:
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any
guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its
power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor
ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit,
and its findings nor conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent
private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of
a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to
only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when
there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government
corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows
money from abroad.
In these instances, the government enters the marketplace and competes with the rest of the
world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the government must abide with the
reasonable business practices of the marketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will do
business with the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure
loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered
national economy as in the case at bar. By design the Constitution is flexible enough to meet these
exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this flexibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar instances,
will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute limiting or removing such flexibility.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal eloquently the intent of Section 2,
Article IX-D of the Constitution. As this Court, has ruled repeatedly, the intent of the law is the
controlling factor in the interpretation of the law. If a law needs interpretation, the most dominant
influence is the intent of the law. The intent of the law is that which is expressed in the words of
the law, which should be discovered within its four corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative
history. In the case of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution is evident from the bare language of Section 2 itself. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm expressly and even elucidate further this intent beyond any
doubt whatsoever.
38
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS V.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Doctrine:
To determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is
considered public; otherwise, it is private.
In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact that a
corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not necessarily qualify it as a public
corporation.
Facts:
PSPCA was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the Philippine
Commission in order to enforce laws relating to the cruelty inflicted upon animals and for the
protection of and to perform all things which may tend to alleviate the suffering of animals and
promote their welfare.
In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1) power to apprehend violators
of animal welfare laws and (2) share 50% of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts
pursuant to the violations of related laws. However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled the said
powers. President Quezon then issued Executive Order No. 63 directing the Commission of Public
Safety, Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army,
Mayors of chartered cities and every municipal president to detail and organize special officers to
watch, capture, and prosecute offenders of criminal-cruelty laws.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the Commission on Audit visited petitioners office to
conduct a survey. PSPCA demurred on the ground that it was a private entity and not under the
CoAs jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to audit by
respondent COA
Held:
No, petitioner is a private domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
1. At the time the petitioner was formed, the applicable law was the Philippine Bill of 1902, and,
emphatically, as also stated above, no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein.
The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private
corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63,
issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the revocation of the
powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest corrected a serious defect in one
of the laws existing in the statute books.
As a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has to be given
retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner
39
belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation, which the
Court will further elaborate on under the fourth point.
2. A reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No government
representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the
successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance
with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may
adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its
officers in accordance with its by-laws in force.
3. Employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS and not through the GSIS
4. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that
circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the
public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are
private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary
objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by
law to discharge functions for the public benefit. It must be stressed that a quasi-public
corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the
former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public
corporation. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with
gifts or donations from private individuals.
Amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 revoked the powers of the petitioner to arrest offenders
of animal welfare laws and the power to serve processes in connection therewith.
5. All corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is
applicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private
corporations as creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the
activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the
reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it that its creature
acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
Petitioner Tirso B. Savellano furnished the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with a confidential
affidavit of information denouncing the National Coal Authority (NCA) and the Philippine National
Oil Company (PNOC) for non-payment of taxes totalling P234 Million on interest earnings of their
respective money placements with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) since October 15, 1984 to
said date. Investigation by the BIR confirmed the reported tax liabilities, and upon demands
thereafter made, NCA and PNOC paid to the BIR a total of 15,986,165.05 and 93,955,479.12,
respectively.
By a letter dated November 28, 1986, then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr. recommended to
the Minister of Finance payment to petitioner Savellano of an informer's reward equivalent to 15%
of the amount of P15,986,165.00 paid by NCA, or P2,397,924.75.
40
The records do not show when the informer's reward in the PNOC case was recommended for
payment; only that it was approved by then Finance Undersecretary Marcelo Fernando. Petitioner
Savellano was paid his informer's reward in the PNOC case in the total amount of P14,093,321.89
in four (4) installments, the last of them on December 1, 1987.
On February 8, 1989, respondent Commission on Audit (COA) rendered COA Decision No. 740 7
disallowing in audit the payment of informer's reward to petitioner Savellano in the NCA case on
the ground that payment of an informer's reward under Section 281 of the National Internal
Revenue Code is conditioned upon the actual recovery or collection of revenues, and no such
revenue or income was actually realized or recovered on any benefit accrued to the government,
since two (2) government agencies were involved. The income realized by the BIR out of the
withholding taxes paid by the NCA was a reduction of the income of the latter, resulting in a zero
effect in revenues realized or recovered. Respondent COA also impugned the propriety of the claim
for informer's reward based on inter-governmental violations. In its view, allowance of claims of
the kind would not only place a premium upon violations committed by government agencies but
also induce collusion among government offices in order to obtain the informer's reward. It
reasoned that if the State cannot be held responsible for the tortious acts of its employees unless
the latter acted as special agents, with more reason it should not be held liable to pay informer's
reward upon violations committed by government agencies.
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought reconsideration of COA Decision No. 740. He
was followed by petitioner Tirso Savellano and Mrs. Potenciana Evangelista, former Chief of the BIR
Accounting Division after the COA Resident Auditor issued Revised Certificate of Settlement and
Balances dated July 20, 1989, directing the withholding of salaries or any amount due them and to
the following BIR officials/employees/persons who were being held personally liable for the
disallowed amount of P11,397,924.75.
These pleas were denied due course in COA Decision No. 1930. Hence, these separate petitions,
which were ordered consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated March 10, 1992 in G.R. No.
102258.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent COAs disallowance is unlawful
Held:
No, the exercise by respondent COA of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that give life to the check-and-balance system inherent in a republican form of
government such as ours. Such exercise cannot be regarded as an unlawful or unwarranted
invasion of, or interference with, the authority and power of the executive agency concerned to
determine whether or not a person is entitled to a reward provided by law and the amount thereof.
This is not to say, however, that the disallowance in audit by respondent COA is in itself final. The
same may be set aside and nullified by this Court, if done with grave abuse of discretion.
The informer's reward granted to petitioner Savellano is based on Section 316 (now 281) of the
National Internal Revenue Code. One of the reasons for respondent COA's disallowance of the
informer's reward under consideration is that there was actually no revenue realized or recovered
as two (2) government agencies were involved. This view is simplistic and merits no concurrence.
It overlooks the fact that the two (2) government agencies involved, NCA and PNOC, possess legal
41
personalities separate and distinct from the Philippine government. Although both are
government-owned and controlled corporations, NCA and PNOC perform proprietary functions.
Their revenues do not automatically devolve to the general coffers of the government. Unless
transferred to the Philippine government through the vehicle of taxation, no part of their revenues
is available for appropriation by the Legislature for expenditure in government projects; such
revenues remain said agencies' in their entirety, to be applied to and expended for their own
exclusive purpose. Clearly, then, when said revenues are subjected to tax, the portion thereof
corresponding to such tax becomes, in its own, revenue for the government accruing to the
General Fund.
That the informer's reward was sought and given in relation to tax delinquencies of government
agencies provides no reason for disallowance. The law on the matter makes no distinction
whatsoever between delinquent taxpayers in this regard, whether private persons or corporations,
or public or quasi-public agencies, it being sufficient for its operation that the person or entity
concerned is subject to, and violated, revenue laws, and the informer's report thereof resulted in
the recovery of revenues.
Collusion cannot be presumed. In the case at bar, there is no showing of collusion between
petitioner Savellano as informer and any official or employee of the BIR or the Department of
Finance. Neither is there any evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the
official acts of the BIR and the Department of Finance in approving the claim of petitioner
Savellano for informer's reward.
Respondent COA considers the payment of informer's reward in this case as placing a premium
upon violations committed by government agencies and therefore, improper. At first blush, it
would appear that by paying the informer's reward, the government punishes itself for violations
committed by its own agencies. This, however, is more apparent than real. The delinquencies of
these agencies are not condoned, much less rewarded. It is the person whose information led to
the discovery of their transgressions who is being rewarded. Although this results in a reduction in
the amount of revenues actually received, the net effect is that the government still gains from the
remaining amount paid, which otherwise would have been lost to it.
42
UY V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DELA LLANA V. CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS [X 5, A 2, V 5, C -5]

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V. PURISIMA
CARPIO MORALES V. COURT OF APPEALS (6TH DIVISION)
LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CUENCO V. FERNAN
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
FRANCISCO, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GUTIERREZ V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Doctrine:
The precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure
the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and
balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper
subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Facts:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief
Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the
respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by
respondent Senate of the Philippines.
Petitioner was charged with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft
and corruption. He argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were
either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright
dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment. On the other
hand, the prosecution told the media that it is possible that some of his properties were not
included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not
been made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the
prosecutors reminding them that under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials they
are not allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending
impeachment case. Respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
however, commenced the trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioners motion for a
preliminary hearing was denied.
43
Issue:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Ijurisdiction
Whether or not the certiorari of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged
violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment
Court
Held:
No, by the nature of the functions of the Senate discharged when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and
counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of
any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Courts power of expanded judicial review
Impeachment, described as the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy, was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with
the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of
parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. Impeachment refers to the power
of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the
Constitution; it is a mechanism designed to check abuse of power.
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. the
power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GONZALES III V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Doctrine:
The Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service,
more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
Facts:
Complaint-affidavit was lodged with the Resident Ombudsman at the main office in Manila of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) by Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen, against the
petitioner, Renato A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the
office of the then Associate Commissioner Bayani M. Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance
that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of 10,000.00 in
exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration (ACR) which was subsequently
withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an
additional amount of 7,000.00. Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit executed by a
certain Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment by Walter
Beck and his wife to the petitioner.
44
The petitioner categorically denied in his counter-affidavit that he demanded nor received any
amount of money from Walter Beck. In addition, the petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife,
Monica Beck, came to the BID office in Manila to follow-up his visa application. On the said
occasion, when the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a visa
application, Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the petitioner with having
demanded money from them. This incident prompted the petitioner to file a criminal complaint for
oral defamation.
BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil
service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and
administrative charges be filed against the petitioner. Upon review of the case, the criminal charge
was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence; however, the Ombudsman found the
petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed the
penalty of dismissal from the government service. His subsequent motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant administrative case should also have been dismissed
Held:
Yes, the complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the charge
in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial evidence. In administrative
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as
is required in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to the
petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same, but he did not. This
significant omission in his affidavit is fatal in establishing the alleged administrative liability of the
petitioner. It also appears that Purisima Terencio had apparently been doing most of the legwork
for the Beck couple in facilitating the release of the subject ACR. Consequently, there is logical
basis to assume that it was to Terencio that the alleged payment was made by the Beck couple.
The rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until proven otherwise does not apply to the
case at bar for the reason that Terencio had the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable
wrath of the Beck spouses for reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The
Ombudsman should have been more prudent in according credence to the allegations of Terencio
coming as they do from a supposed fixer.
ESTARIJA V. RANADA
MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
CAOIBES, JR. V. OMBUDSMAN
FRIVALDO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Doctrine:
45
If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon and assumed
office in due time. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (League), represented by its
President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission
on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. In his answer dated May
22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being
in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines
Held:
No. Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution provides that all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen
of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code also provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
If the petitioner really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He claims he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections
in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United
States as his adopted country. However, even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in
the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of
the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
46
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. It is true as the petitioner points out that the
status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.
Further, the Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the
Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of
his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There
were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them
subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been
coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS V. DESIERTO
URBANO V. CHAVEZ
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS [XYZA & CHAD]

SANTIAGO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LAMBINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
47

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CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

GAMINDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FUNA V. DUQUE III

MACALINTAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [XYZA - 3]

DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE V. GONZALES

GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. CORTES

DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [XYZA 1, V 4]

COMMISSION ON AUDIT [XYZA 2]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS [X 5, A 2, V 5, C -5]

CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS [XYZA & CHAD]

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