to be relevant to the petition. (Atillo vs.

Bombay, 351 SCRA 361

[2001])

o0o

G.R.No.183926.March29,2010.*

GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE, petitioner, vs. LUIS

ESTEBANLATORRE,respondent.

ActionsVenueWheretheactionintheRegionalTrialCourtisforthe
DeclarationofNullityoftheDeedofAbsoluteSaleinvolvingarealproperty,
the venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court of the place
wheretherealpropertyorpartthereoflies.Sections1and2,Rule4ofthe
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue.
Actionsaffectingtitletoorpossessionofrealpropertyoraninteresttherein
(real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On
the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and
triedinthepropercourtswheretheplaintifforanyoftheprincipalplaintiffs
resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
TheactionintheRTC,otherthanforCollection,wasfortheDeclarationof
NullityoftheDeedofAbsoluteSaleinvolvingthesubjectproperty,whichis
located at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City. The
venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City,
wheretherealpropertyorpartthereoflies,nottheRTCofMuntinlupaCity.
SameSamePleadingsandPracticeInthisjurisdiction,weadhereto
theprinciplethatthenatureofanactionisdeterminedbytheallegationsin
the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading It is also a settled
rulethatwhatdeterminesthevenueofacaseistheprimaryobjectiveforthe
filing of the case.In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the
nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself,
ratherthanby

_______________

*THIRDDIVISION.
 89

VOL.617,MARCH29,2010 89

Latorrevs.Latorre

itstitleorheading.Itisalsoasettledrulethatwhatdeterminesthevenueof
a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. In her Complaint,
petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the
strengthoftwobasicclaimsthat(1)shedidnotexecutethedeedinfavorof
respondent and (2) thus, she still owned one half () of the subject
property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint is a real action involving the
recoveryofthesubjectpropertyonthebasisofhercoownershipthereof.
SameSameCertiorariWherethedenialbyaregionaltrialcourtofa
Motion to Dismiss is done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the
aggrieved party could file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition.
Respondentalsodidnotdoverywell,procedurally.WhentheRTCdenied
hisMotiontoDismiss,respondentcouldhavefiledapetitionforcertiorari
and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amountingtolackofjurisdiction.However,despitethislapse,itisclearthat
respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue,
contrary to petitioners assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was
denied,respondentfiledaMotionforReconsiderationtocontestsuchdenial.
EveninhisAnswerAdCautelam,respondentstoodhisgroundthatthecase
oughttobedismissedonthebasisofimpropervenue.
Appeals Three (3) Modes of Appeal from Decisions of the Regional
TrialCourt.PetitionercamedirectlytothisCourtonaPetitionforReview
onCertiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil
Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid
down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3)
modesofappealfromdecisionsoftheRTC,namely:(1)ordinaryappealor
appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
actionbytheRTCintheexerciseofitsoriginaljurisdiction(2)petitionfor
review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellatejurisdictionand(3)petitionforreviewtotheSupremeCourt.The
first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of
Appeals(CA)onquestionsoffactormixedquestionsoffactandlaw.The
secondmodeofappeal,coveredbyRule42,is

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90 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Latorrevs.Latorre

brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact

and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the
SupremeCourtonlyonquestionsoflaw.
Same Questions of Law Questions of Fact Words and Phrases A
questionoflawariseswhenthereisdoubtastowhatthelawisonacertain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
thetruthorfalsityoftheallegedfacts.Aquestionoflawariseswhenthere
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
questionoffactwhenthedoubtarisesastothetruthorfalsityofthealleged
facts. Our ruling in VelayoFong v. Velayo, 510 SCRA 320 (2006) is
instructive:Aquestionoflawariseswhenthereisdoubtastowhatthelaw
isonacertainstateoffacts,whilethereisaquestionoffactwhenthedoubt
arisesastothetruthorfalsityoftheallegedfacts.Foraquestiontobeone
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
theevidencepresentedbythelitigantsoranyofthem.Theresolutionofthe
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.Onceitisclearthattheissueinvitesareviewoftheevidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
questionisoneoflaworoffactisnottheappellationgiventosuchquestion
by the party raising the same rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
whichcase,itisaquestionoflawotherwiseitisaquestionoffact.
Same Hierarchy of Courts Pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts,directresortfromthelowercourtstotheSupremeCourtwillnotbe
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the
lowertribunals.InherReplytorespondentsComment,petitionerprayed
that this Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would
requiretheexaminationbythisCourtoftheprobativevalueoftheevidence
presented,takingintoaccountthefactthattheRTCfailedtoadjudicatethis
controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus
becomesexceedinglyclearthatthefilingofthecasedirectlywiththisCourt
ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine,
direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the
lowertribunals.ThisCourtisacourtoflastresort,andmustsoremainifit
is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
andbyimmemorialtradition.

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VOL.617,MARCH29,2010 91
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PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional
TrialCourtofMuntinlupaCity,Br.256.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt.
Sycip,Salazar,Hernandez&Gatmaitanforpetitioner.
VeranoLawFirmforrespondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
MuntinlupaCity,Branch256,datedApril29,2008.
Thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:
InOctober2000,petitionerGenerosaAlmedaLatorre(petitioner)
filedbeforetheRTCofMuntinlupaCityaComplaint3forCollection
andDeclarationofNullityofDeedofAbsoluteSalewithapplication
forInjunctionagainstherownson,hereinrespondentLuisEsteban
Latorre(respondent),andoneIfzalAli(Ifzal).
Petitioner averred that, on September 28, 1999, respondent and
Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease4 over a 1,244square meter
real property, situated at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias
Village, Makati City (subject property). Under the said contract,
respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and
registered owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that
respondentsdeclarationthereinwas

_______________

1Rollo,pp.322.
2ParticularlydocketedasCivilCaseNo.00178Id.,atpp.2426.
3Rollo,pp.3137.
4Id.,atpp.5560.

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92 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Latorrevs.Latorre

erroneousbecausesheandrespondentwerecoownersofthesubject
propertyinequalshares.
Petitionernarratedthat,onMarch14,1989,sheandrespondent
executedtheirrespectiveDeedsofDonation,conveyingthesubject
property in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis
Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Thus, Transfer
CertificateofTitle(TCT)No.1619635wasissuedinthenameofthe
Foundation. Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and
respondentexecutedseparateDeedsofRevocationofDonationand
Reconveyance of the subject property, consented to by the
Foundation, through the issuance of appropriate corporate
resolutions.However,theDeedsofRevocationwerenotregistered
hence,thesubjectpropertyremainedinthenameoftheFoundation.
Petitionerinsisted,however,thatrespondentwasfullyawarethatthe
subjectpropertywasownedincommonbybothofthem.Toprotect
herrightsascoowner,petitionerformallydemandedfromIfzalthe
payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however,
refusedtoheed.
Moreover,petitioneraverredthat,onoraboutAugust16,2000,
shediscoveredthatrespondentcausedtheannotationofanadverse
claim on the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership
overthesamebyvirtueofaDeedofAbsoluteSale6datedMarch21,
2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of respondent.
Petitioner claimed that the deed was a falsified document that her
signature thereon was forged by respondent and that she never
received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration for her
share of the subject property. Thus, petitioner prayed that Ifzal be
enjoinedfrompaying the rentals to respondent, and the latter from
receiving said rentals that both Ifzal and respondent be ordered to
pay petitioner her share of the rentals and that respondent be
enjoinedfromassertingfullownershipoverthesubject

_______________

5Id.,atpp.120121.
6Id.,atpp.6163.

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VOL.617,MARCH29,2010 93
Latorrevs.Latorre

property and from committing any other act in derogation of

petitionersintereststherein.Petitioneralsoprayedforthepayment
of moral and exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs of
thesuit.
RespondentimmediatelyfiledaMotiontoDismiss7 on the sole
groundthatthevenueofthecasewasimproperlylaid.Hestressed
thatwhilethecomplaintwasdenominatedasoneforCollectionand
DeclarationofNullityofDeedofAbsoluteSalewithapplicationfor
Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to and
interest over the subject property. Respondent insisted that all of
petitioners claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over
onehalf () portion of the subject property. Since the subject
propertyislocatedinMakatiCity,respondentarguedthatpetitioner
shouldhavefiledthecasebeforetheRTCofMakatiCityandnotof
MuntinlupaCity.
 Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of
jurisdiction,assertingthathewasimmunefromsuitbecausehewas
an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an international
organization.
TheRTCissuedaTemporaryRestrainingOrderdatedNovember
6,2000,restrainingIfzalfrompayinghisrentalstorespondentand
enjoining the latter from receiving from the former the aforesaid
rentals. The RTC also directed both Ifzal and respondent to pay
petitioner her share of the rentals, with the corresponding order
against respondent not to commit any act in derogation of
petitionersinterestoverthesubjectproperty.
InitsOrderdatedJanuary2,2001,theRTCdeniedrespondents
motion to dismiss. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action
whether real or personal was determined by the allegations in the
complaint,irrespectiveofwhetherornottheplaintiffwasentitledto
recoverupontheclaimsas

_______________

7Id.,atpp.3841.

94

94 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Latorrevs.Latorre

sertedamatterresolvedonlyafter,andasaresultof,atrial.Thus,
trialonthemeritsensued.
Undaunted, respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam8 dated
March 19, 2001, insisting, among others, that the case was a real
actionandthatthevenuewasimproperlylaid.9Respondentnarrated
thathewasaformerOpusDeipriestbutheleftthecongregationin
1987afterhewasmaltreatedbyhisSpanishsuperiors.Respondent
alleged that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to
2000, and that he provided for petitioners needs. Respondent also
allegedthat,foralmost20years,theOpusDeidivestedtheLatorre
familyofseveralrealproperties.Thus,inordertosparethesubject
propertyfromtheOpusDei,bothpetitionerandrespondentagreed
todonateittotheFoundation.In1994,whenrespondentgotmarried
andsiredason,bothpetitionerandrespondentdecidedtorevokethe
said donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation.
However, due to lack of funds, the title was never transferred but
remainedinthenameoftheFoundation.
Respondent asseverated that he and his wife took good care of
petitioner and that they provided for her needs, spending a
substantial amount of money for these needs that because of this,
andthefactthattherentalspaidfortheuseofthesubjectproperty
wenttopetitioner,bothpartiesagreedthatpetitionerwouldconvey
hershareoverthesubjectpropertytorespondentandthat,onMarch
21, 2000, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondent.
RespondentfurtherallegedthatsometimeinMarchtoMay2000,
the relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated.
Petitionerleftrespondentshousebecauseheandhiswifeallegedly
ignored, disrespected, and insulted her.10 Respondent claimed,
however,thatpetitionerleftbecauseshe

_______________

8Id.,atpp.4254.
9Id.,atp.49.
10Supranote1.

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VOL.617,MARCH29,2010 95
Latorrevs.Latorre

detestedhisactoffiringtheirdriver.11Itwasthenthatthiscasewas
filedagainsthimbypetitioner.
In the meantime, in its Order dated May 15, 2003, the RTC
dismissed petitioners claim against Ifzal because the dispute was
clearlybetweenpetitionerandrespondent.
On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent,
disposingofthecaseinthiswise:

While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of

possession of a real property situated at 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias
Village, Makati City, the same should have been filed and tried in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to
hearthematterasaforementionedthesamebeingclearlyarealaction.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the aboveentitled case is
herebyDISMISSEDforwantofjurisdiction,allinpursuancetotheabove
citedjurisprudenceandRule4oftheRulesofCourt.
SOORDERED.12

Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,13

whichtheRTCdeniedinitsOrder14datedJuly24,2008forlackof
merit.
Hence,thisPetition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating the
venueasjurisdictionandintreatingpetitionerscomplaintasareal
action.
WhiletheinstantcasewaspendingresolutionbeforethisCourt,
petitioner passed away on November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioners
counselprayedthat,pendingtheappointmentofarepresentativeof
petitioners estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to
petitionersotherson,FatherRobertoA.Latorre.15

_______________

11RespondentsCommentRollo,pp.101118.
12Rollo,p.26.
13Id.,atpp.9199.
14Id.,atpp.2930.
15Id.,atpp.232233.

96

96 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Latorrevs.Latorre

Asearlyasthefilingofthecomplaint,thiscasehadbeenmarred
by numerous procedural infractions committed by petitioner, by
respondent,andevenbytheRTC,allofwhichcannotbedisregarded
bythisCourt.
First.PetitionerfiledhercomplaintwiththeRTCofMuntinlupa
CityinsteadoftheRTCofMakatiCity,thelatterbeingtheproper
venueinthiscase.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provideananswertotheissueofvenue.16Actionsaffectingtitleto
or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)
shallbecommencedandtriedinthepropercourtthathasterritorial
jurisdictionovertheareawheretherealpropertyissituated.Onthe
otherhand,allotheractions(personalactions)shallbecommenced
and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the
principaldefendantsresides.17TheactionintheRTC,otherthanfor
Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of
AbsoluteSaleinvolvingthesubjectproperty,whichislocatedatNo.
1366CaballeroSt.,DasmariasVillage,MakatiCity.Thevenuefor
suchactionisunquestionablythepropercourt

_______________

16SECTION1.Venueofrealactions.Actionsaffectingtitletoorpossession
ofrealproperty,orinteresttherein,shallbecommencedandtriedinthepropercourt
whichhasjurisdictionovertheareawhereintherealpropertyinvolved,oraportion
thereof,issituated.
xxxx
SEC.2.Venueofpersonalactions.Allotheractionsmaybecommencedand
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendantoranyoftheprincipaldefendantsresides,orinthecaseofanonresident
defendantwherehemaybefound,attheelectionoftheplaintiff.
17Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation, 432 Phil.
927,938939383SCRA353,363(2002).

97

VOL.617,MARCH29,2010 97
Latorrevs.Latorre

ofMakatiCity,wheretherealpropertyorpartthereoflies,notthe
RTCofMuntinlupaCity.18
Inthisjurisdiction,weadheretotheprinciplethatthenatureof
an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself,
ratherthanbyitstitleorheading.19Itisalsoasettledrulethatwhat
determinesthevenueofacaseistheprimaryobjectiveforthefiling
ofthecase.20InherComplaint,petitionersoughtthenullificationof
theDeedofAbsoluteSaleonthestrengthoftwobasicclaimsthat
(1)shedidnotexecutethedeedinfavorofrespondentand(2)thus,
she still owned one half () of the subject property. Indubitably,
petitionerscomplaintisarealactioninvolvingtherecoveryofthe
subjectpropertyonthebasisofhercoownershipthereof.
Second. The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it
denied respondents motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue.
TheRTCinsistedthattrialonthemeritsbeconductedevenwhen
itwasawfullyglaringthatthevenuewasimproperlylaid,aspointed
out by respondent in his motion to dismiss. After trial, the RTC
eventuallydismissedthecaseonthegroundoflackofjurisdiction,
even as it invoked, as justification, the rules and jurisprudence on
venue.Despitetheconductoftrial,theRTCfailedtoadjudicatethis
caseonthemerits.

_______________

18Emergency Loan Pawnshop Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 524, 530 353
SCRA 89, 93 (2001), citing Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 564 (1989) and Commodities Storage and Ice Plant Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,340Phil.551274SCRA439(1997).
19Gochanv.Gochan,423Phil.491,501372SCRA256,263264(2001).
20OlympicMinesandDevelopmentCorp.v.PlatinumGroupMetalsCorporation,
G.R.Nos.178188,180674,181141,and183527,May8,2009,587SCRA624.

98

98 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Latorrevs.Latorre
 Third.Respondentalsodidnotdoverywell,procedurally.When
theRTCdeniedhisMotiontoDismiss,respondentcouldhavefiled
apetitionforcertiorariand/orprohibitioninasmuchasthedenialof
themotionwasdonewithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofjurisdiction
orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction.21
However,despitethislapse,itisclearthatrespondentdidnotwaive
hisobjectionstothefactofimpropervenue,contrarytopetitioners
assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such
denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his
groundthatthecaseoughttobedismissedonthebasisofimproper
venue.
Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for
ReviewonCertiorariunderRule45,inrelation to Rule 41, of the
Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In
Murillov.Consul,22welaiddownadoctrinethatwaslateradopted
by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this
Courthadtheoccasiontoclarifythethree(3)modesofappealfrom
decisionsoftheRTC,namely:(1)ordinaryappealorappealbywrit
oferror,wherejudgmentwasrenderedinacivilorcriminalaction
bytheRTCintheexerciseofitsoriginaljurisdiction(2)petitionfor
review,wherejudgmentwasrenderedbytheRTCintheexerciseof
itsappellatejurisdictionand(3)petitionforreviewtotheSupreme
Court.
Thefirstmodeofappeal,governedbyRule41,isbroughttothe
Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is
broughttotheCAonquestionsoffact,oflaw,ormixedquestionsof
factandlaw.Thethirdmodeofappeal,

_______________

21EmergencyLoanPawnshopInc.v.CourtofAppeals,supranote18.
22ResolutionoftheCourtEnBancinUDK9748,March1,1990.

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VOL.617,MARCH29,2010 99
Latorrevs.Latorre

provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on

questionsoflaw.
Aquestionoflawariseswhenthereisdoubtastowhatthelawis
onacertainstateoffacts,whilethereisaquestionoffactwhenthe
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.23 Our
rulinginVelayoFongv.Velayo24isinstructive:
 Aquestionoflawariseswhenthereisdoubtastowhatthelawisona
certainstateoffacts,whilethereisaquestionoffactwhenthedoubtarises
astothetruthorfalsityoftheallegedfacts.Foraquestiontobeoneoflaw,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.Onceitisclearthattheissueinvitesareviewoftheevidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
questionisoneoflaworoffactisnottheappellationgiventosuchquestion
by the party raising the same rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
whichcase,itisaquestionoflawotherwiseitisaquestionoffact.25

In her Reply to respondents Comment,26 petitioner prayed that

thisCourtdecidethecaseonthemerits.Todoso,however,would
requiretheexaminationbythisCourtoftheprobativevalueofthe
evidencepresented,takingintoaccountthefactthattheRTCfailed
toadjudicatethiscontroversyonthemerits.This,unfortunately,we
cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the
casedirectlywiththisCourtranafoulofthedoctrineofhierarchyof
courts.Pursuanttothisdoctrine,directresortfromthelowercourts
totheSupremeCourtwillnotbeentertainedunlesstheappropriate

_______________

23Suarezv.Villarama,Jr.,G.R.No.124512,June27,2006,493SCRA74,80.
24G.R.No.155488,December6,2006,510SCRA320.
25Id.,atpp.329330.(Citationsomitted.)
26Rollo,pp.141152.

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100 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Latorrevs.Latorre

remedysoughtcannotbeobtainedinthelowertribunals.ThisCourt
isacourtoflastresort,andmustsoremainifitistosatisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by
immemorialtradition.27
Accordingly,wefindnomeritintheinstantpetition.Neitherdo
wefindanyreversibleerrorinthetrialcourtsdismissalofthecase
ostensiblyforwantofjurisdiction,althoughthetrialcourtobviously
meanttodismissthecaseonthegroundofimpropervenue.
WHEREFORE,theinstantPetitionisDENIED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Acting Chairperson), LeonardoDe Castro,**

PeraltaandMendoza,JJ.,concur.
 Petitiondenied.

Note.Priortoforeclosuresale,anactionforthereleaseofthe
mortgage is a personal action, following the doctrine laid down in
Hernandezv.RuralBankofLucena,81SCRA75(1978),possession
and ownership over the properties subject of the mortgage having
remained with, in this case respondentmortgagor. (Banco De Oro
EPCI,Inc.vs.Daguna,570SCRA388[2008])
o0o

_______________

27Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corporation, 434 Phil. 28, 34 384

SCRA589,593(2002).
**AdditionalmemberinlieuofAssociateJusticeRenatoC.CoronaperRaffle
datedMarch23,2010.

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