Professional Documents
Culture Documents
whetherhedesirestopresentevidenceonhisbehalf,andallowhim
to do so if he so desires. (People vs. Gumimba, 517 SCRA 25
[2007])
o0o
G.R.No.189122.March17,2010.*
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
620
620 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
accusedwhohasbeensentencedtoprisonmusttypicallybeginservingtime
immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his
conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is
deniedbailloseshislibertytopayadebttosocietyhehasneverowed.Even
iftheconvictionissubsequentlyaffirmed,however,theaccusedsinterestin
bailpendingappealincludesfreedompendingjudicialreview,opportunityto
efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.
On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by
swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized
societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention
of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the community
frompotentialdangerandtheavoidanceofdelayinpunishment.Underwhat
circumstancesanaccusedmayobtainbailpendingappeal,then,isadelicate
balancebetweentheinterestsofsocietyandthoseoftheaccused.Ourrules
authorizethepropercourtstoexercisediscretioninthegrantofbailpending
appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishablebydeath,reclusionperpetuaorlifeimprisonment.Intheexercise
of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised
not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
consideringthattheaccusedhasbeeninfactconvictedbythetrialcourt.
Same Judgments Certiorari Grave Abuse of Discretion Words and
PhrasesGraveabuseofdiscretionisnotsimplyanerrorinjudgmentbutit
is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdictionordinary abuse of discretion is
insufficient.ItcannotbesaidthattheCourtofAppealsissuedtheassailed
resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or
disallowbailpendingappealinacasesuchasthiswherethedecisionofthe
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
nonbailabletobailableisexclusivelylodgedbytheruleswiththeappellate
court.Thus,theCourtofAppealshadjurisdictiontohearand
621
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622
622 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
justification commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
released on bail undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal or other similar circumstances) not present. The
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances. The implications of this distinction are discussed with
erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice
FlorenzD.Regalado,anauthorityinremediallaw:Underthepresentrevised
Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
followingrules:xxxxxxxxxe.AfterconvictionbytheRegionalTrial
Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than20yearsisimposed,andnotoneofthecircumstancesstatedinSec.5
oranyothersimilarcircumstanceispresentandproved,bailisamatterof
discretion(Sec.5)f.AfterconvictionbytheRegionalTrialCourtimposing
apenaltyofimprisonmentexceeding6yearsbutnotmorethan20years,and
anyofthecircumstancesstatedinSec.5oranyothersimilarcircumstanceis
presentandproved,nobailshallbegrantedbysaidcourt(Sec.5)xxx.
Same Same Judicial Discretion Words and Phrases Judicial
discretion has been defined as choicechoice occurs where, between
twoalternativesoramongapossiblyinfinitenumber(ofoptions),thereis
more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to
thedecisionmakerTheestablishmentofaclearlydefinedruleofactionis
the end of discretion.Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate
courtintoamerefactfindingbodywhoseauthorityislimitedtodetermining
whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into
merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years.
In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the
appellatecourtbyrequiringittodetermineasingularfactualissuewhether
any of the five bailnegating circumstances is present. However, judicial
discretionhasbeendefinedaschoice.Choiceoccurswhere,betweentwo
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is
more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to
the decision maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly
definedruleof
623
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624
624 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
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625
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626
626 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
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which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
Peralta,J.,DissentingOpinion:
Bail Bail Pending Appeal Cases when an accused is charged with
Murder but was convicted with Homicide mean only one thing, that the
lowercourtfoundtheevidenceforthecrimechargednotstrong,hence,the
accuseds conviction of a lesser offensethe denial of the same accuseds
application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his
guiltforthecrimechargedisstrong,wouldunintentionallybesuggestiveof
the outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court.The Philippine
Constitution itself emphasizes the right of an accused to bail with the sole
exception of those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong. Cases, like in the present case, when an
accused is charged with Murder but was convicted with Homicide, mean
onlyonething,thatthelowercourtfoundtheevidenceforthecrimecharged
notstrong,hence,theaccusedsconvictionofalesseroffense.Therefore,the
denial of the same accuseds application for bail pending appeal on the
groundthattheevidenceofhisguiltforthecrimechargedisstrong,would
unintentionallybesuggestiveoftheoutcomeoftheappealeddecisionofthe
lowercourt.Thediscretionwhethertogranttheapplicationforbailornotis
giventotheCAincasessuchasthepresentone,onthereasonthatthesame
appellatecourtcanreviewthefactualfindingsofthelowercourt.However,
this will no longer be the case if a Petition for Certiorari is filed with this
Court as it is not a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries
brought about by the majority opinion casts confusion rather than an
enlightenmentonthepresentcase.
SameSameThesetofcircumstancessuccinctlyprovidedinSection5,
Rule114oftheRulesofCourthasbeenprovidedasaguidefortheexercise
oftheappellatecourtsdiscretioningrantingordenyingtheapplicationfor
bail, pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6)years,otherwise,ifitisintendedthatthesaiddiscretionbeabsolute,no
suchsetofcircumstanceswouldhavebeennecessarilyincludedintheRules.
TheCAshouldhaveappliedtheprovisionsofSection5,Rule114ofthe
Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court is given the discretion to grant
bailtothepetitionerafterconsideringtheenumeratedcircum
627
VOL.615,March17,2010 627
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
stances, the penalty imposed by the trial court having exceeded six years.
Although this Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court,thesetofcircumstancessuccinctlyprovidedinSection5,Rule114of
theRulesofCourtshouldbeconsidered.Thesaidsetofcircumstanceshas
been provided as a guide for the exercise of the appellate courts discretion
in granting or denying the application for bail, pending the appeal of an
accusedwhohasbeenconvictedofacrimewherethepenaltyimposedbythe
trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. Otherwise, if it is
intended that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of circumstances
would have been necessarily included in the Rules. Thus, if the present
ruling of the CA is upheld, anyone who has been charged with a capital
offense,oranoffensepunishablebyreclusionperpetuaorlifeimprisonment
butconvictedbythetrialcourtofalesseroffense,wouldnolongerbeable
to apply for bail pending ones appeal. And by that premise, the discretion
accorded to the appellate court in granting or denying applications for bail
for those who have been convicted by the trial court with imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years as penalty would have to be rendered nugatory and
theprovisionsofSection5,Rule114ofthe2000RevisedRulesofCriminal
Procedurewouldalsoberendereduseless.
SPECIALCIVILACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorari.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Esguerra&Blancoforpetitioner.
CapelanLawFirmcollaboratingcounselforpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforrespondents.
CORONA,J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of
thelawforhisreleasetoguaranteehisappearancebeforeanycourt
asmayberequired,1istheanswerofthecriminaljusticesystemtoa
vexingquestion:whatistobedonewith
_______________
1Section1,Rule114,RC.
628
628 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
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theaccused,whoseguilthasnotyetbeenproven,inthedubious
interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?2
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accusedsinterestinpretriallibertyandsocietysinterestinassuring
theaccusedspresenceattrial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to
bail.4 An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an
appellatecourtconfirmsthathisconvictionislegalandproper.An
erroneouslyconvictedaccusedwhoisdeniedbailloseshislibertyto
payadebttosocietyhehasneverowed.5Eveniftheconvictionis
subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,
opportunitytoefficientlypreparehiscaseandavoidanceofpotential
hardships of prison.6 On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual
who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests
in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the
accusedsflightfromcourtcustody,theprotectionofthecommunity
from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment.8
Underwhatcircumstancesan
_______________
2 Verilli, Donald, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives,82ColumbiaL.Rev.328(1982).
3Id.
4SeeSection5,Rule114,RulesofCourt.
5Keller,Doug,ResolvingASubstantialQuestion:JustWhoIsEntitledtoBail
PendingAppealUndertheBailReformActof1984?,60Fla.L.Rev.825(2008).
6Leibowitz,Debra,ReleasePendingAppeal:ANarrowDefinitionofSubstantial
QuestionUndertheBailReformAct,54FDMLR1081(1986).
7Keller,supra.
8Leibowitz,supranote6.
629
VOL.615,March17,2010 629
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
accusedmayobtainbailpendingappeal,then,isadelicatebalance
betweentheinterestsofsocietyandthoseoftheaccused.9
Ourrulesauthorizethepropercourtstoexercisediscretioninthe
grantofbailpendingappealtothoseconvictedbytheRegionalTrial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or
life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
consideringthattheaccusedhasbeeninfactconvictedbythetrial
court.10
TheFacts
_______________
9Keller,supra.
10Yapv.CourtofAppeals,411Phil.190,202358SCRA564,573(2001).
11DecisiondatedJanuary14,2009inCriminalCaseNo.07179pennedbyJudge
ElmoM.Alameda.Rollo,pp.198235.
12NoticeofAppealdatedJanuary14,2009.Id.,atp.238241.
13ResolutiondatedApril8,2009inCAG.R.CRNo.32159pennedbyAssociate
JusticeMartinS.Villarama,Jr.(nowamember
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630 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
pendingappeal,thatthediscretiontoextendbailduringthecourse
of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Citing wellestablished jurisprudence, it ruled that
bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that
petitioner.
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his
continuedconfinementduringtrialwillpermanentlyimpairhishealthorput
hislifeindanger.xxxNotably,thephysicalconditionof[petitioner]does
not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison,
thoughheclearlypreferredtobeattendedbyhispersonalphysician.14
Forpurposesofdeterminingwhetherpetitionersapplicationfor
bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also
consideredthefactofpetitionersconviction.Itmadeapreliminary
evaluationofpetitionerscaseandmadeaprimafaciedetermination
thattherewasnoreasonsubstantialenoughtooverturntheevidence
ofpetitionersguilt.
Petitionersmotionforreconsiderationwasdenied.15
Petitionernowquestionsasgraveabuseofdiscretionthedenial
of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions
justifyingdenialofbailunderthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule
114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that,
wherethepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourtismorethansixyears
butnotmorethan20yearsandthecircumstancesmentionedinthe
thirdparagraphofSection5areabsent,bailmustbegrantedtoan
appellantpendingappeal.
_______________
ofthisCourt)andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesJoseC.Reyes,Jr.andNormandie
B.PizarroofthethirdDivisionoftheCourtofAppeals.Id.,atpp.3645.
14Id.,atp.43.
15Id.,atp.47.
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TheIssue
ThequestionpresentedtotheCourtisthis:inanapplicationfor
bailpendingappealbyanappellantsentencedbythetrialcourttoa
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that
bailshouldautomaticallybegrantedabsentanyofthecircumstances
mentionedinthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114oftheRules
ofCourt?
Section5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourtprovides:
Sec.5.Bail,whendiscretionary.UponconvictionbytheRegional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
orlifeimprisonment,admissiontobailisdiscretionary. The application
forbailmaybefiledandacteduponbythetrialcourtdespitethefilingofa
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accusedchangedthenatureoftheoffensefromnonbailabletobailable,the
applicationforbailcanonlybefiledwithandresolvedbytheappellatecourt.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
samebailsubjecttotheconsentofthebondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelleduponashowingbytheprosecution,withnoticetotheaccused,
ofthefollowingorothersimilarcircumstances:
(a)That he is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstanceofreiteration
(b)Thathe has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a
validjustification
(c)That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole,orconditionalpardon
632
632 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Petitionerclaimsthat,intheabsenceofanyofthecircumstances
mentionedinthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114oftheRules
of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years
imprisonmentshouldautomaticallybegranted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of
proceduralandsubstantiverules.
BasicProceduralConcerns
ForbidGrantofPetition
PetitionerfiledthisspecialcivilactionforcertiorariunderRule
65oftheRulesofCourttoassailthedenialbytheCourtofAppeals
ofhisurgentapplicationforadmissiontobailpendingappeal.While
thesaidremedymayberesortedtochallengeaninterlocutoryorder,
such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was
renderedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseof
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
applicationforbailpendingappealdespitethefactthatnoneofthe
conditionstojustifythedenialthereofunderRule114,Section5[is]
present,muchlessprovenbytheprosecution,17however,petitioner
actuallyfailedtoestablish
_______________
16SeeSection1,Rule65,RC.
17SeePetition,p.14.Rollo,p.16.
633
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Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
_______________
18Dueas,Jr.v.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,G.R.No.185401,21
July2009,593SCRA316,344.
19Id.
634
634 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
tivedutyortoavirtualrefusaltoperformthedutyenjoinedbyorto
actatallincontemplationofthelaw.Inotherwords,forapetition
for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice
andarbitrarinessintheexerciseofdiscretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment
capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court.
Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As
observedearlier,theCourtofAppealsexercisedgravecautioninthe
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for
bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a
thoroughassessmentofpetitionersclaimofillhealth.Bymakinga
preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of
granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was
frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The
appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner
butfolloweddoctrinalrulingsofthisCourt.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals
erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of
theRulesofCourt.However,theextraordinarywritofcertiorari
will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous
conclusionsoflaworfact.21Inthisconnection,Leev.People22is
apropos:
_______________
20Id.,atp.345.
21Fortichv.Corona,352Phil.461289SCRA624(1998).
22441Phil.705393SCRA397(2002).
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Inotherwords,certiorariwillissueonlytocorrecterrorsofjurisdiction
andnottocorrecterrorsofprocedureormistakesinthecourtsfindingsand
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or
prohibitiononlywhenitisshownthatthecourtactedwithoutorinexcessof
jurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.However,thisCourtgenerally
frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To
tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
reviewbycertiorariwillnotonlydelaytheadministrationofjusticebutwill
alsoundulyburdenthecourts.23(emphasissupplied)
WordingofThirdParagraphofSection
5,Rule114ContradictsPetitioners
Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for
bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals
with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism,quasirecidivism,habitualdelinquencyorcommissionof
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of
theconditionsofhisbailwithoutavalidjustificationcommissionof
the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon
circumstancesindicatingtheprobabilityofflightifreleasedonbail
undueriskofcommittinganothercrimeduringthependencyofthe
appeal or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition
and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice
FlorenzD.Regalado,anauthorityinremediallaw:
_______________
23Id.
636
636 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
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UnderthepresentrevisedRule114,theavailabilityofbailtoanaccused
maybesummarizedinthefollowingrules:
xxxxxxxxx
e.After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonmentexceeding6yearsbutnotmorethan20yearsisimposed,and
not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstanceispresentandproved,bailisamatterofdiscretion(Sec.5)
f.After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonmentexceeding6yearsbutnotmorethan20years,andanyofthe
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present
and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5) x x x24
(emphasissupplied)
_______________
24Regalado,Florenz,IIRLC417(TenthRevisedEdition[2004]).
Justice Regalado was ViceChairman and, later, CoChairman of the Committee on
RevisionoftheRulesofCourtwhichproposedthepresent(2000)rulesoncriminalprocedure
(Rules110127oftheRulesofCourt).
Itshould be noted, however, that Justice Regalado speaks of application for bail pending
appealincaseswhereinapenaltyofimprisonmentexceeding6yearsbutnotmorethan20
yearsisimposed.(Emphasissupplied)AcarefulreadingofthethirdparagraphofSection5,
Rule114doesnotimposethelimitofnotmorethan20years.
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paragraph3ofSection5,Rule114ispresentthenbailshallbedenied.25
(emphasissupplied)
Inthefirstsituation,bailisamatterofsoundjudicialdiscretion.
Thismeansthat,ifnoneofthecircumstancesmentionedinthethird
paragraphofSection5,Rule114ispresent,theappellatecourthas
thediscretiontograntordenybail.Anapplicationforbailpending
appeal may be denied even if the bailnegating26 circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where
none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constituteabuseofdiscretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whetheranyoftheenumeratedcircumstancesinfactexists.Ifitso
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.
Giventhesetwodistinctscenarios,therefore,anyapplicationfor
bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages:(1)thedeterminationofdiscretionstage,wheretheappellate
courtmustdeterminewhetheranyofthecircumstancesinthethird
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present this will establish
whetherornottheappellatecourtwillexercisesounddiscretionor
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending
appealand(2)theexerciseofdiscretionstagewhere,assumingthe
appellants
_______________
25Herrera,Oscar,IVRL455456(2007).
Justice Herrera was Consultant to the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Courtwhichproposedthepresent(2000)rulesoncriminalprocedure(Rules110127of
theRulesofCourt).
26 These circumstances are herein referred to as bailnegating because the
presenceofanyofthemwillnegatetheallowanceofbail.
638
638 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances,otherthanthosementionedinthethirdparagraphof
Section5,Rule114,includingthedemandsofequityandjustice27
onthebasisthereof,itmayeitherallowordisallowbail.
Ontheotherhand,iftheappellantscasefallswithinthesecond
scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the
exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the
proofofthepresenceofanyofthecircumstancesthatareprejudicial
totheallowanceofbail.Thisissobecausetheexistenceofanyof
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sounddiscretionapproach.
Petitionerdisregardsthefineyetsubstantialdistinctionbetween
thetwodifferentsituationsthataregovernedbythethirdparagraph
of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and
trivializestheestablishedpolicygoverningthegrantofbailpending
appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals
thatitinterpretsthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114tocover
all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in
suchasituation,thegrantofbailpendingappealisalwayssubjectto
limiteddiscretion,thatis,
_______________
27Discretionimpliesthat,intheabsenceofapositivelaworfixedrule,thejudge
is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice.
(Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTCNegros
Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City , G.R. No. 179878, 24 December 2008, 575
SCRA575andLunav.Arcenas,34Phil.80[1916]bothcitingGoodwinv.Prime[92
Me.,355]).
639
VOL.615,March17,2010 639
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_______________
28Rosenberg,Maurice,JudicialDiscretionoftheTrialCourt,ViewedfromAbove,
22SyracuseL.Rev.635,659(1971)citedinPainter,MarkandWelker,Paula,Abuseof
Discretion:WhatShouldItMeaninOhioLaw?,29OhioN.U.L.Rev.209(2002).
29StevenAlanChildress&MarthaS.Davis,2StandardsofReview15.8,at296
(1986)citedinPainterandWelker,supra.
30NegrosOrientalPlantersAssociation,Inc.v.PresidingJudgeofRTCNegros
Occidental,Branch52,BacolodCity,supranote21.
640
640 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
dersnugatorytheprovisionthatuponconvictionbytheRegional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua,orlifeimprisonment,admissiontobailisdiscretionary.
Thejudicialdiscretiongrantedtothepropercourt(theCourtof
Appealsinthiscase)toruleonapplicationsforbailpendingappeal
mustnecessarilyinvolvetheexerciseofjudgmentonthepartofthe
court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its
own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its
understandingoftheapplicablelawonthematter.31Inviewofthe
understandingoftheapplicablelawonthematter.31Inviewofthe
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or
not,underallcircumstances,theaccusedwillbepresenttoabideby
his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give
due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the
applicant,33amongotherthings.Moreimportantly,thediscretionto
determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that
theappealisnotfrivolousbutraisesasubstantialquestionoflawor
fact which must be determined by the appellate court.34 In other
words,athresholdrequirementforthegrantofbailisashowingthat
the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but
presentsafairlydebatableissue.35Thismustbesootherwise,
_______________
31Moradav.Tayao,A.M.No.RTJ93978,07February1994,229SCRA723.
32Reyesv.CourtofAppeals,83Phil.658(1949).
33Id.
34UnitedStatesv.Motlow,10F.2d657(1926)(Butler,CircuitJustice).
35See DAquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (1959) (Douglas, Circuit
Justice).
JusticeDouglasoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,inhiscapacityasaCircuit
Justice,wasoneofthefirstjudgestodiscussthedefinitionofsubstantialquestion.
Heequatedthephrasewithan
641
VOL.615,March17,2010 641
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
theappellatecourtswillbedelugedwithfrivolousandtimewasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient
attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this
comportswiththeverystrongpresumptiononappealthatthelower
courtsexerciseofdiscretionarypowerwassound,36speciallysince
the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be
reversedormodifiedbytheCourtofAppealsexceptforsubstantial
error.37
Moreover, to limit the bailnegating circumstances to the five
situationsmentionedinthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114is
wrong. By restricting the bailnegating circumstances to those
expresslymentioned,petitionerappliesthe
_______________
issue that is fairly debatable. Later, he provided additional guidance to district
courtstryingtodeterminewhetheradefendantsappealwouldraiseafairlydebatable
issue:
[T]hefirstconsiderationisthesoundnessoftheerrorsalleged.Arethey,oranyof
them,likelytocommandtherespectoftheappellatejudges?ItisnotenoughthatIam
unimpressed.Imustdecidewhetherthereisaschoolofthought,aphilosophicalview,
a technical argument, an analogy, an appeal to precedent or to reason commanding
respectthatmightpossiblyprevail.(Herzogv.UnitedStates,75S.Ct.349,351(1955)
(Douglas,CircuitJustice)
SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Barbeau,92F.Supp.196,202(D.Alaska1950),affd,193
F.2d945(9thCir.1951),cert.denied,343U.S.968(1952)Warringv.UnitedStates,16
F.R.D.524,526(D.Md.1954)UnitedStatesv.Goo, 10 F.R.D. 337, 338 (D. Hawaii
1950).
36Lunav.Arcenas,supranote21quoting2EncyclopediaofPleadingandPractice
416,418.
Thus,thegeneralruleandoneofthefundamentalrulesofappellateprocedureis
thatdecisionsofatrialcourtwhichlieindiscretionwillnotbereviewedonappeal,
whetherthecasebecivilorcriminal,atlaworinequity(Cuanv.ChiangKaiShek
College,Inc,G.R.No.175936,03September2007,532SCRA172,187188).
37Section10,Rule114,RulesofCourt.
642
642 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
expressiouniusestexclusioalterius38ruleinstatutoryconstruction.
However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five
situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to the following or other similar
circumstances.Hence,undertherules,similarlyrelevantsituations
otherthanthoselistedinthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114
may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail
pendingappeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way
that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd
situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed
bailnegating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending
appealincaseswherethepenaltyimposedismorethansixyearsof
imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of
bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years
imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bailnegating
conditionsispresent,bailpendingappealincaseswherethepenalty
imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied
evenwithoutthoseconditions.
Isitreasonableandinconformitywiththedictatesofjusticethat
bailpendingappealbemoreaccessibletothoseconvictedofserious
offenses,comparedtothoseconvictedoflessseriouscrimes?
_______________
38Theexpressmentionofoneimpliestheexclusionofallothersnotmentioned.
643
VOL.615,March17,2010 643
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
PetitionersTheoryDeviatesfromHistoryand
EvolutionofRuleonBailPendingAppeal
Petitionersinterpretationdeviatesfrom,evenradicallyalters,the
historyandevolutionoftheprovisionsonbailpendingappeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under
Sections3to6,Rule110ofthe1940RulesofCriminalProcedure:
TheaforementionedprovisionswerereproducedasSections3to
6,Rule114ofthe1964RulesofCriminalProcedureandthenofthe
1985RulesofCriminalProcedure.Theyweremodifiedin1988to
readasfollows:
644 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Sec.4.Capitaloffense,defined.Acapitaloffense,asthetermis
usedinthisRules,isanoffensewhich,underthelawexistingatthetimeof
itscommission,andatthetimeoftheapplicationtobeadmittedtobail,may
bepunishedbydeath.(emphasissupplied)
Thebasicgoverningprincipleontherightoftheaccusedtobailislaid
downinSection3ofRule114ofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedure,as
amended,whichprovides:
Sec.3.Bail, a matter of right exception.All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except
thosechargedwithacapitaloffenseoranoffensewhich,underthelawatthe
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishablebyreclusionperpetua,whenevidenceofguiltisstrong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no
longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to
thisCourtsincehisconvictionclearlyimportsthattheevidenceofhisguilt
oftheoffensechargedisstrong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as
well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court enbanc lays down
thefollowingpoliciesconcerningtheeffectivityofthebailoftheaccused,to
wit:
1)When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law
existingatthetimeofitscommissionandatthetimeoftheapplicationfor
bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusionperpetua and is out on
bail,andaftertrialisconvictedbythetrialcourtoftheoffensechargedorof
alesseroffensethanthatchargedinthecomplaintorinformation,hemaybe
allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his
appeal,unlessthepropercourtdirectsotherwisepursuanttoRule114,Sec.
2(a)oftheRulesofCourt,asamended
2)Whenanaccusedischargedwithacapitaloffenseoranoffense
whichunderthelawatthetimeofitscommis
645
VOL.615,March17,2010 645
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
AmendmentswerefurtherintroducedinAdministrativeCircular
No. 1294 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important
changesinthesaidrulesasfollows:
646
646 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
orlifeimprisonment,beadmittedtobailasamatterofright,withsufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule.
(3a)
SECTION5.Bail, when discretionary.Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetuaorlifeimprisonment,thecourt,onapplication,mayadmitthe
accusedtobail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal
subjecttotheconsentofthebondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
yearsbutnotmorethantwenty(20)years,theaccusedshallbedenied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing
bytheprosecution,withnoticetotheaccused,ofthefollowingorother
similarcircumstances:
(a)That the accused is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
thecircumstanceofreiteration
(b)That the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the
conditionsofhisbailwithoutvalidjustification
(c)That the accused committed the offense while on
probation,parole,underconditionalpardon
(d)That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicatetheprobabilityofflightifreleasedonbailor
(e)Thatthereisundueriskthatduringthependencyofthe
appeal,theaccusedmaycommitanothercrime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court,onmotionandwithnoticetotheadverseparty.(n)
SECTION6.Capitaloffense,defined.Acapital offense, as the term
isusedintheseRules,isanoffensewhich,underthelawexistingatthetime
of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail,
maybepunishedwithdeath.(4)
647
VOL.615,March17,2010 647
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
TheaboveamendmentsofAdministrativeCircularNo.1294to
Rule114werethereafteramendedbyA.M.No.00503SCtoread
astheydonow.
Thedevelopmentovertimeoftheserulesrevealsanorientation
towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It
indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail
pendingappealshouldbeallowednotwithleniencybutwithgrave
cautionandonlyforstrongreasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after
conviction for a noncapital offense by the Court of First Instance
(predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendmentsmadeapplicationsforbailpendingappealfavorableto
the appellantapplicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts
for noncapital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a
matterofrightatanystageoftheactionwherethechargewasnot
foracapitaloffenseorwasnotpunishedbyreclusionperpetua.39
TheamendmentsintroducedbyAdministrativeCircularNo.12
94madebailpendingappeal(ofaconvictionbytheRegionalTrial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or
lifeimprisonment)discretionary.Thus,AdministrativeCircularNo.
1294 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post
convictiongrantofbail.
A.M.No.00503SCmodifiedAdministrativeCircularNo.12
94byclearlyidentifyingwhichcourthasauthoritytoact
_______________
648
648 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
onapplicationsforbailpendingappealundercertainconditionsand
inparticularsituations.Moreimportantly,itreiteratedthetoughon
bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No.
1294. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
CriminalProcedurewhichentitledtheaccusedtobailasamatterof
right before final conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a
matterofdiscretionuponconvictionbytheRegionalTrialCourtof
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending
appeal policy, the presence of bailnegating conditions mandates
the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial
courtforanoffensepunishablebydeath,reclusionperpetua or life
imprisonmentwherebailisprohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards
approachtobailpending appeal? What is more in conformity with
anexabundantecautelamviewofbailpendingappeal?Isitarule
whichfavorstheautomaticgrantofbailintheabsenceofanyofthe
circumstancesunderthethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114?Or
isitarulethatauthorizesthedenialofbailafterdueconsiderationof
allrelevantcircumstances,evenifnoneofthecircumstancesunder
thethirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114ispresent?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to
frownonbailpendingappealparallelstheapproachadoptedinthe
United States where our original constitutional and procedural
provisionsonbailemanated.41While
_______________
40SeeHerrera,supranote19,p.457.
41Inparticular,intheUnitedStates,thehistoryofbailpendingappealhasbeen
divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct periods: (1st period) 1879 to
1934,(2ndperiod)1934to1956,(thirdperiod)1956to1984and(post1984period)1984
to present. The first period, during which the rules on the matter were just being
developed,showed liberality in the grant of bail pending appeal. The second period
producedamorerestrictiverule,onewhich
469
VOL.615,March17,2010 469
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
thisisofcoursenottobefollowedblindly,itnonethelessshowsthat
our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in
otherdemocraticsocieties.
Inourjurisdiction,thetrendtowardsastrictattitudetowardsthe
allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that
judicial discretionparticularly with respect to extending bail
should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for
strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave
caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 1294 amending Rule
114,Section5.43
Furthermore,thisCourthasbeenguidedbythefollowing:
Theimportanceattachedtoconvictionisduetotheunderlyingprinciple
thatbailshouldbegrantedonlywhereitisuncertainwhethertheaccusedis
guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by
convictionitwould,generallyspeaking,beabsurdtoadmittobail.After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence
which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burdenis
_______________
limitedbailtodefendantswhocouldprovethattheirappealwouldraiseasubstantialquestion
whichshouldbedeterminedbytheappellatecourt.Thethirdperiodsawtheenactmentofthe
BailReformActof1966establishingastandardwhereinbailmaybeallowedpendingappeal
unlessitappearsthattheappealisfrivolousortakenfordelay.Underthatstandard,thecourt
could deny bail if the defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Hence, bail
pendingappealwasagainfavored.Thepost1984periodisdeterminedbytheenactmentand
implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The law was purposely designed to make
restrictivetheallowanceofbailpendingappeal.AstheActslegislativehistoryexplains,prior
law had a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction and Congress wanted to
eliminatethatpresumption.(Keller,supranote5.)
42Obosav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.114350,16January1997,266SCRA281.
43Id.
650
650 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
upontheaccusedtoshowerrorintheconviction.Fromanotherpointof
viewitmaybeproperlyarguedthattheprobabilityofultimatepunishmentis
so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis
supplied)
Afterconvictionbythetrialcourt,thepresumptionofinnocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At
theriskofbeingrepetitious,suchdiscretionmustbeexercisedwith
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pendingappealshouldbeguidedbyastringentstandardsapproach.
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule
114oftheRulesofCourt.Itislikewiseconsistentwiththetrial
_______________
44Id.SeealsoYapv.CourtofAppeals,supranote10.
45Id.
46See Obosa v. Court of Appeals and Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra. See also
Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 C R P: A
C,p.492(2009).
651
VOL.615,March17,2010 651
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Velasco,Jr.andNachura,JJ.,concur.
Peralta,J.,SeeDissentingOpinion.
Mendoza,J.,IJoinTheDissentForReasonsStated.
DISSENTINGOPINION
PERALTA,J.:
The denial of an application for bail pending appeal on a case
wheretheaccusedwaschargedwithMurderbutwasconvictedwith
Homicideseriouslyposessomeimportantquestions.
Bydenyingtheapplicationforbailpendingappealofanaccused
whowaschargedwiththecrimeofMurderbutwasconvictedofthe
crimeofHomicide,isthisCourt,ineffect,sayingthattheevidence
ofguiltforthecrimeofMurderis
652
652 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
strongdespitethelowercourtsfindingofproofbeyondreasonable
doubtofthecrimeofHomicide,abailableoffense?
Bydenyingtheapplicationforbailpendingappealontheground
that the evidence of guilt for the crime of Murder is strong, is this
court,inaway,unknowinglypreemptingthejudgmentoftheCourt
ofAppealsastothemaincase?
IntheeventthattheCourtofAppealssustainstheconvictionof
the accused of the crime of Homicide, a bailable offense and the
accused decides to file a Petition for Certiorari before this Court,
will the denial of the application for bail of the accused still be
effective?
Withduerespecttothepresentponencia,anaffirmativeresponse
totheabovequestionswouldbringaboutsomeabsurdities.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
providesthefollowing:
653
VOL.615,March17,2010 653
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
appealeddecisionofthelowercourt.Thediscretionwhethertogrant
theapplicationforbailornotisgiventotheCAincasessuchasthe
presentone,onthereasonthatthesameappellatecourtcanreview
thefactualfindingsofthelowercourt.However,thiswillnolonger
bethecaseifaPetitionforCertiorariisfiledwiththisCourtasitis
not a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries brought
about by the majority opinion casts confusion rather than an
enlightenmentonthepresentcase.
Thefollowingdiscussion,inmyopinion,shouldshedlightonthe
matter:
BeforethisCourtisaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule65ofthe
1997RulesofCivilProcedurewhichseekstonullifyandsetaside
theResolutions1datedApril8,2009andJuly14,2009oftheCourt
ofAppeals(CA).
Theantecedentfactsarethefollowing:
Arising from a shooting incident that happened on January 12,
2007atpetitionerJoseAntonioLevistesofficewhereRafaeldelas
Alas died of gunshot wounds, petitioner was charged with murder
undertheAmendedInformationdatedMarch15,2007inCriminal
CaseNo.07179oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofMakatiCity,
Branch150.
Petitioner,onFebruary23,2007,filedanUrgentApplicationfor
Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela2 on the ground that the
evidence of the prosecution was not strong. The trial court, in its
Order3datedMay21,2007,grantedpetitionersapplicationforbail.
Subsequently, trial ensued and, on January 14, 2009, the trial
courtrendereditsDecision4findingpetitionerguilty
_______________
1Rollo,pp.3645.
2Id.,atpp.150154.
3Id.,atpp.164197.
4Id.,atpp.198235.
654
654 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Consequently,initsOrder5datedJanuary14,2009,thetrialcourt
Consequently,initsOrder5datedJanuary14,2009,thetrialcourt
canceledpetitionersbailbond,rulingthat:
Accused Jose Antonio Leviste y Casals was charged with the crime of
Murder,acapitaloffenseoranoffensewhichunderthelawatthetimeofits
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusionperpetuatodeath.Theaccusedispresentlyoutonbail.Aftertrial,
the accused was however convicted of Homicide, a lesser offense than that
chargedintheInformation.Accusedwasaccordinglysentencedtosufferthe
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prisionmayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Sec.5,Rule114oftheRulesonCriminalProcedurewhichisdeemedto
havemodifiedSCAdministrativeCircularNo.292datedJanuary20,1992,
provides:
Bail, when discretionary.Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua, or
lifeimprisonment,admissiontobailisdiscretion
_______________
5Id.,atpp.236237.
655
VOL.615,March17,2010 655
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
ary.Theapplicationforbailmaybefiledandacteduponbythetrial
court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmittedtheoriginalrecordtotheappellatecourt.However,ifthe
decisionofthetrialcourtconvictingtheaccusedchangedthenatureof
theoffensefromnonbailabletobailable,theapplicationforbailcan
onlybefiledwithandresolvedbytheappellatecourt.
InObosav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.114350,January16,1997,266
SCRA 281, 78 SCAD 17, the Supreme Court, speaking thru the Third
Division,stated:
xx x that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an
accused,whoischargedwithacapitaloffense,appealshisconviction
for a noncapital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in
decidingapplications for bail considering that the accused on appeal
maystillbeconvictedoftheoriginalcapitaloffensechargedandthat
the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts
wouldbewelladvisedtoleavethematterofbail,afterconvictionfor
a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the
appellatecourtssounddiscretion.
Inviewoftheaforecitedrulesandprevailingjurisprudenceonthematter,
the bailbond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is deemed
cancelled. Accused being considered a national prisoner is ordered
committed to the Makati City Jail, Makati City, pending his transfer to the
NewBilibidPrisonatMuntinlupaCity.
SOORDERED.
PetitionerfiledaNoticeofAppeal6datedJanuary14,2009and
on January 15, 2009, filed with the CA an Urgent Application for
AdmissiontoBailPendingAppealandanUrgentExParte Motion
for Special Raffle and to Resolve the Attached Application for
Admission to Bail. The CA, in its Resolution dated April 8, 2009,
denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal, the
dispositionreading:
INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOINGREASONS,theUrgentApplication
forAdmissiontoBailPendingAppealisherebyDENIED.
_______________
6Id.,atpp.238239.
656
656 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
SOORDERED.
_______________
7Id.,atp.47.
8Id.,atp.16.
657
VOL.615,March17,2010 657
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
_______________
9334Phil.253266SCRA305(1997).
658
658 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
areamererehashofthebaselessjustificationsandargumentsmade
bytheCAindenyinghisapplicationforbail,argumentswhichhave
alreadybeentackledandrefutedbyhiminthepresentpetition.
Petitioner,inaManifestationdatedNovember25,2009,notified
thisCourtthathehadfiledaVeryUrgentMotionforaMedicalPass
beforetheCA,ashehadtoundergomedicaltreatmentatthesoonest
possibletime.
In his December 21, 2009 Reply [to Respondent People of the
Philippines Comment dated 20 November 2009], petitioner
reiteratedtheargumentsheraisedinhispetition.
InaletterdatedNovember25,2009,whichwasreceivedbythe
OfficeoftheChiefJusticeonDecember7,2009,Mrs.TeresitaC.de
lasAlas(wife),Ms.DinnadelasAlasSanchez(daughter),andMs.
NazarethH.delasAlas(daughter)expressedconsenttothegrantof
bailtothepetitioner.
Thepetitionisimpressedwithmerit.
Sections 5 and 7, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
CriminalProcedure,asamended,providethat:
659
VOL.615,March17,2010 659
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Priortotheaffectivityoftheaboveprovisions,thegoverningrule
in the granting or cancellation of bail was encapsulated in
AdministrativeCircularNo.1294,10statingthat:
_______________
10DatedOctober1,1994,amendingthe1985RulesofCriminalProcedure.
660
660 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
xxxx
SEC.5.Bail,WhenDiscretionary.Upon conviction by the Regional
TrialCourtofanoffensenotpunishablebydeath,reclusionperpetuaorlife
imprisonment,thecourt,onapplication,mayadmittheaccusedtobail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal
subjecttotheconsentofthebondsman.
Ifthe court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
butnotmorethantwenty(20)years,theaccusedshallbedeniedbail,orhis
bailpreviouslygrantedshallbecanceled,uponashowingbytheprosecution,
withnoticetotheaccused,ofthefollowingorothersimilarcircumstances:
(a)That the accused is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstanceofreiteration
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from
legalconfinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of
hisbailwithoutvalidjustification
(c)That the accused committed the offense while on probation,
parole,orunderconditionalpardon
(d)Thatthecircumstancesoftheaccusedorhiscaseindicatethe
probabilityifflightofreleasedonbailor
(e)That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal,theaccusedmaycommitanothercrime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court,onmotionandwithnoticetotheadverseparty.
_______________
11Supranote9.
661
VOL.615,March17,2010 661
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Incancelingpetitionersbailbondanddenyinghisapplication
for bail pending appeal, the trial court and the CA, as well as the
OSGinitsCommenttothepetition,reliedonObosav.CA,12where
thisCourtruledthatbailcannotbegrantedasamatterofrighteven
afteranaccused,whoischargedwithacapitaloffense,appealshis
conviction for a noncapital crime. The said case, however, is not
applicable. In Obosa, the petitioner therein was convicted and
applied for bail pending appeal prior to the affectivity of the
amendments brought about by Administrative Circular No. 1294
thus,thesetofcircumstances,asnowseeninthepresentRules,was
yet tobepresent.Granting arguendothat the present provisions of
Section5,Rule114canbemadeapplicabletopetitionerObosa,this
Court,inthatsamecase,stilldeemedhimtobedisqualifiedfromthe
grant of bail on the basic reason that, aside from Obosa being
convictedoftwocountsofhomicide,circumstancesa,b,dandeof
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court were present. In the
presentcase,aswillbediscussedlater,notoneofthecircumstances
thatwouldwarrantthedenialofbailispresent.
Incidentally, magnified in the denial of petitioners application
forbailpendingappealwastherelianceoftheCAonthejudgment
ofconvictionrenderedbythetrialcourt.AccordingtotheCA,the
evidence of guilt of the petitioner, as found by the trial court, was
strong,therefore,theprovisionsofSection7ofRule114ofthe2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were applicable, the crime
chargedbeingmurder.
However, it must be remembered that although petitioner was
chargedwiththecrimeofmurder,hewasconvictedofthecrimeof
homicide. Prior to the said conviction, the trial court, after bail
hearing,grantedbailtopetitioner,thus:
_______________
12Id.
662
662 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
to bail, the court hereby grants the motion and, allows the accused to post
bailintheamountofP300,000.00forhisprovisionalliberty.Accusedshall
bedischargedorreleasedonlyupontheapprovalofhisbailbytheCourt.
SOORDERED.13
Ultimately, after the trial of the case, the trial court found
petitionerguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofhomicide,
not murder as originally charged, demonstrating the consistency of
thetrialcourtsfindingsinthebailhearingandintheactualtrialof
the said case. Nevertheless, the CA, in denying petitioners
application for bail, relied on Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Courtinsistingthattheevidenceofguiltofthepetitionerwasstrong.
By ruling thus, the CA has not accorded respect to the factual
findingsofthetrialcourt.Itisatimehonoredlegalprecept,inthis
regardthatthefindingsoffactofthetrialcourtareaccordedgreat
respect by appellate courts and should not be disturbed on appeal
unless the trial court has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some
fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance which, if
considered,wouldalterthesituation.14Moreover,thereseemstobe
adisparitybetweenthepronouncementoftheCAthatthetrialcourt
found the evidence of guilt of the petitioner strong and the
explanationofwhytheformerconsideredittobeso.TheCAruled
that:
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13Rollo,p.197.(Emphasissupplied.)
14People v. Dizon, 329 Phil. 685, 695 260 SCRA 851, 858 (1996), citing People v.
Gomez,229SCRA138(1994).
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VOL.615,March17,2010 663
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
apparentlyplacedinhishandappellantsconductinrefusingtobesubjected
toparaffintestisnotthenaturaltendencyofapersonclaimingselfdefense
and neither was appellant threatened or intimidated by the victims averred
pugnacious, quarrelsome or troubleseeking character of the victim. And
evenassumingarguendothat there was unlawful aggression, the trial court
foundthatthefive(5)gunshotwounds(four)[4]shotsevenaimedathead,a
vital organ) were not reasonable means to repel the same, and the evidence
demonstrated a determined effort on the part of the appellant to kill the
victimandnotjusttodefendhimself.However,appellantwasconvictedof
the lesser offense (homicide) since the qualifying circumstances of
treachery,evidentpremeditationandcrueltyorignominy,allegedinthe
AmendedInformation,werenotdulyprovenatthetrial.15
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15Rollo,p.44.(Emphasissupplied.)
664
664 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
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16 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202 358 SCRA 564, 573 (2001),
citingObosav.CourtofAppeals,supranote9.
665
VOL.615,March17,2010 665
Levistevs.CourtofAppeals
Petitiondismissed.
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17Rollo,p.22.
1869yearsand7monthsolduponthefilingofhispetition.
19ManifestationdatedNovember25,2009Rollo,pp.327328.
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