THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016

VICENTE D. CABANTING AND LALAINE V. CABANTING, Petitioners, v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), promulgated on September 28, 2011, and the Resolution 2dated May
16, 2012, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On January 14, 2003, petitioners bought on installment basis from Diamond Motors Corporation a 2002
Mitsubishi Adventure SS MT and for value received, petitioners also signed, executed and delivered to
Diamond Motors a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage. Therein, petitioners jointly and severally
obligated themselves to pay Diamond Motors the sum of P836,032.00, payable in monthly installments in
accordance with the schedule of payment indicated therein, and which obligation is secured by a chattel
mortgage on the aforementioned motor vehicle. On the day of the execution of the document, Diamond
Motors, with notice to petitioners, executed a Deed of Assignment, thereby assigning to BPI Family Savings
Bank, Inc. (BPI Family) all its rights, title and interest to the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage.

Come October 16, 2003, however, a Complaint was filed by BPI Family against petitioners for Replevin and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), praying that petitioners be ordered to pay the
unpaid portion of the vehicle's purchase price, accrued interest thereon at the rate of 36% per annum as of
August 26, 2003, 25% attorney's fees and 25% liquidated damages, as stipulated on the Promissory Note
with Chattel Mortgage. BPI Family likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin but it failed to file a
bond therefor, hence, the writ was never issued. BPI Family alleged that petitioners failed to pay three (3)
consecutive installments and despite written demand sent to petitioners through registered mail, petitioners
failed to comply with said demand to pay or to surrender possession of the vehicle to BPI Family.

In their Answer, petitioners alleged that they sold the subject vehicle to one Victor S. Abalos, with the
agreement that the latter shall assume the obligation to pay the remaining monthly installments. It was
then Abalos who made payments to BPI Family through his personal checks, and BPI Family accepted the
post-dated checks delivered to it by Abalos. The checks issued by Abalos for the months of May 2003 to
October 2003 were made good, but subsequent checks were dishonored and not paid. Petitioners pointed
out that BPI Family should have sued Abalos instead of them.

Trial ensued, where BPI Family dispensed with the testimony of its sole witness and formally offered its
documentary evidence. When it was petitioners' turn to present its defense, several hearing dates were
cancelled, sometimes due to failure of either or both the petitioners' and/or respondent's counsels to appear.
What is clear, though, is that despite numerous opportunities given to petitioners to present evidence, they
were never able to present their witness, Jacobina T. Alcantara, despite the court's issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum ad testificandum. Said failure to present evidence on several hearing dates and petitioners'
absence at the hearing on February 13, 2008 prompted BPI Family to move that petitioners' right to present
evidence be deemed waived. On the same date, the RTC granted said motion and the case was submitted
for decision. There is nothing on record to show that petitioners ever moved for reconsideration of the Order
dated February 13, 2008.

On April 14, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in the view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. and against the defendants VICENTE D. CABANTING and LALAINE
V. CABANTING, by ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff Bank the sum of Php742,022.92, with interest at
the rate of 24% per annum from the filing of the Complaint, until its full satisfaction, as well as the amount
of P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.3

Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, herein petitioners appealed to the CA. However, in its Decision dated
September 28, 2011, the appellate court affirmed with modification the judgment of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated April 14, 2008 is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION. The defendants-appellants are ordered to
pay the plaintiff-appellee the sum of Seven Hundred Forty Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Five Pesos
and Eighteen Centavos (P740,155.18), in Philippine currency, with legal interest of 12% per
annumfrom the filing of the Complaint, until its full satisfaction. The award of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) as attorney's fees is DELETED.

Costs against the defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA ruled that a preponderance of evidence was in favor of respondent, as the evidence, coupled with
petitioners' admission in their Answer, established that petitioners indeed executed a Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage and then failed to pay the forty-three (43) monthly amortizations. Moreover, since
petitioners were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence, there is nothing on record to prove
their claim that there was a valid assumption of obligation by one Victor S. Abalos. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated May 16, 2012.

Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, petitioners now raise the following
issues:

1. Whether or not respondent bank may be held entitled to the possession of the motor vehicle subject of
the instant case for replevin, or the payment of its value and damages, without proof of prior demand;

2. Whether or not petitioners were deprived of their right to due process when they were deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence in their behalf.5

The petition is devoid of merit.

The CA is correct that no prior demand was necessary to make petitioners' obligation due and payable. The
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage clearly stipulated that "[i]n case of my/our [petitioners'] failure to
pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We x x x or any of us may now or in the future owe to the
holder of this note x x x then the entire sum outstanding under this note shall immediately become due and
payable without the necessity of notice or demand which I/We hereby waive." 6 Petitioners argue that such
stipulation should be deemed invalid as the document they executed was a contract of adhesion. It is
important to stress the Court's ruling in Dio v. St. Ferdinand Memorial Park, Inc.,7 to wit:

A contract of adhesion, wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other, is not
strictly against the law. A contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being
that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. Contrary to petitioner's
contention, not every contract of adhesion is an invalid agreement. As we had the occasion to state
in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Perez:

x x x In discussing the consequences of a contract of adhesion, we held in Rizal Commercial Banking

Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

It bears stressing that a contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that we have,
on occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the
dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing, Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per
se; they arc not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to
reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.

The validity or cnforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be determined by the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the situation of the parties concerned. Indeed,
Article 24 of the New Civil Code provides that "[in] all contractual, property or other relations, when one of
the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age, or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection." x x x 8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Here, there is no proof that petitioners were disadvantaged, uneducated or utterly inexperienced in dealing
with financial institutions; thus, there is no reason for the court to step in and protect the interest of the
supposed weaker party.

Verily, petitioners are bound by the aforementioned stipulation in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage
waiving the necessity of notice and demand to make the obligation due and payable. Agner v. BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc.,9 which is closely similar to the present case, is squarely applicable. Petitioners therein
also executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage containing the stipulation waiving the need for notice
and demand. The Court ruled:

xxx Even assuming, for argument's sake, that no demand letter was sent by respondent, there is really no
need for it because petitioners legally waived the necessity of notice or demand in the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and knowingly signed in favor of respondent's predecessor-in-
interest. Said contract expressly stipulates:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

In case of my/our failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We are obliged to pay under this
note and/or any other obligation which I/We or any of us may now or in the future owe to the holder of this
note or to any other party whether as principal or guarantor xxx then the entire sum outstanding under this
note shall, without prior notice or demand, immediately become due and payable. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A provision on waiver of notice or demand has been recognized as legal and valid in Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. Court of Appeals, wherein We held:

The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor
demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand
is not necessary under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly
waive demand. Hence, since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand was
unnecessary for them to be in default.

Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an
action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires
the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin
could be filed.10

Clearly, as stated above, Article 1169 (1) of the Civil Code allows a party to waive the need for notice and
demand. Petitioners' argument that their liability cannot be deemed due and payable for lack of proof of
demand must be struck down.

There is likewise no merit to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of due process when they were
deemed to have waived their right to present evidence. Time and again, the Court has stressed that there is
no deprivation of due process when a party is given an opportunity to be heard, not only through hearings
but even through pleadings, so that one may explain one's side or arguments; or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling being assailed.11 The records bear out that herein petitioners were
given several opportunities to present evidence, but said opportunities were frittered away. We stress the
fact that petitioners did not even bother to move for reconsideration of the Order dated February 13, 2008,
deeming petitioners to have waived their right to present evidence. Such is glaring proof of their propensity
to waste the opportunities granted them to present their evidence.

Lastly, the CA is correct that the interest rate being charged by respondent under the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage is quite unreasonable. In New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. (NSBCI) v.
Philippine National Bank,12 the Court ruled that "the interest ranging from 26 percent to 35 percent in
the statements of account - 'must be equitably reduced for being iniquitous, unconscionable and
exorbitant.' Rates found to be iniquitous or unconscionable are void, as if it there were no
express contract thereon. Above all, it is undoubtedly against public policy to charge excessively for the
use of money." However, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence and banking regulations, the Court must
modify the lower court's award of legal interest. In Nacar v. Gallery Frames,13 the Court held, thus:

xxx the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to
embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi- contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of
the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,

an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion
of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which
time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.14

Thus, legal interest, effective July 1, 2013, was set at six percent (6%) per annum in accordance
with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas - Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on September
28, 2011, and the Resolution dated May 16, 2012 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91814 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION by ordering payment of legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the time of filing of the complaint up to June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at the lower rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas - Monetary
Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and applicable jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED. cralawla wlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ. chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
CASE DIGEST: Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016]
QUICK LINKS:

Full text of the Decision (Bersamin, J.)

Dissenting opinions:

Sereno, C.J.

Leonen, J.

Concurring and dissenting: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659)

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno
Aguas.

The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and
penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659
the following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman
Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio O.
Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two former
officials of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The information read:

[the] accusedall public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total
value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through
any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means,
described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or
transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in
several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their
personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSOs
accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious
expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,

connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW

The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused, including
petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted except those of
the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial
of her petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this remains unresolved.

After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them.

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused
within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was
sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.

Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme
Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to
assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence YES.

PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial
of her demurrer to evidence.

HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its

discretion in denying GMAs demurrer to evidence.
General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such
an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides, the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.

Exception: In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may
require. So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial (citing Ong v. People [G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000]).

2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the

existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte NO.

A. As regards petitioner GMA

HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayans declaration in

denying GMAs demurrer that GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and
committed plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence
of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution sought
to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the
basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is
notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused
was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy. This was
another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal
charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main
plunderer and her co-conspirators , who may be members of her family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information
was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner.
Citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, The gravamen of the conspiracy chargeis that each
of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.

Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law
required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights
of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made
answerable for.

In fine, the Prosecutions failure to properly allege the main plunderer should
be fatal to the cause against the petitioners for violating the rights of each
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an
implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers.
The sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the
marginal note of OK of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiies requests in that manner, GMA violated the
following:

a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and
intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and
specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of
additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request.

HELD: GMAs approval of Uriartes requests for additional CIFs did not make
her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass,
accumulate and acquire illgotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the
information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMAs approval of
Uriartes requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any
criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her
approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.

a. An examination of Uriartes several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No.
1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished:

(1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;

(2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the
expenditure; and

(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.

The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSOs image and the integrity
of its operations. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as
to how specific the requests should be made.

b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007.
Consequently, although only 15% of PCSOs revenues was appropriated to an operation
fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSOs revenues,
already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In
short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.

PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would
misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her
power of control over PCSO.

HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command

responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the
superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those
terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.

The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true
for all litigations. This case involves neither a probe of GMAs actions as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue
(compare to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo [G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011]).

B. As regards Aguas

HELD: Aguas certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers

were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit
plunder or any other crime. Without GMAs participation, he could not release any
money because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever
irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied
conspiracy to commit plunder.

3.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established all

the elements of the crime of plunder NO.

A. WoN there was evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten

wealth in the total amount of not less than P50 million NO.

HELD: The Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or

Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired
illgotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the
CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

B. WoN the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information was proved by the Prosecution NO.

SANDIGANBAYAN: In order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury,
the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act;
and that what was necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public
coffers.

HELD: The common thread that binds all the four terms in Section 1(d) of Republic Act
No. 7080 together (misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds) is that the public officer used the property taken. Pursuant to the maxim
of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
Case Digest
Criminal Procedure
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167764
Facts:
That on or about
July
5
1994 in the City
of Iloilo
, Philippines both
Vicente Foz. Jr and Danny G
Fajardo
as columnist and Editor
-
Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeachi
ng the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the
malicious
intent of inju
ring and exposing said Dr.
Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and
publish i
n the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR.
PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN,
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of
professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of
him as a physician, which imputation and
insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact
and
therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of
the
said Dr.
Edgar Portigo. .
Petitioners pleaded not guilty,
but the RTC found them guilty as charged
.
Petitioners
motion for reconsideration
was denied
they
appealed to C
A but their appeal and their
motion for reconsideration were denied h
ence
, this petition
.
P
etiti
oners raise for the first time the issue
that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to
vest,
j
urisdiction in
the RTC of Iloilo City
.
Issue:
W
hether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over t
he offense of libel as
charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
Held:
Venue in criminal cases is an
essential element of j
urisdiction
. For jurisdiction to be acq
uired by
courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one
o
f its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial j
urisdiction of the court
.T
he jurisdiction of
a court over the case is
determined by
the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court
may
validly take cogniz
ance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the
offense was commit
ted somewhere else,
the court should
dismiss the action for want of j
urisdiction
.
In
Agbayani v. Sayo
, the
rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as fo
llows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If t
he offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer
whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed
in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense.
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of
the publication of the alleged libelou
s article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city
where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo
actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The allegations in the Inf
ormation that Panay
News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region
only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not
establish that the said publi
cation was printed and first published in Iloilo City. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of
the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of th
e offense. The Information filed
against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr.
Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly
and
positivel
y indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the
offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place
.
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a li
bel case under Article 360, the Court finds
that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting
petitioners of
the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with
the court
of competent jurisdiction