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Abstract
This study examines the civil service systems adopted in the post-communist Central and
Eastern European democracies. While these new democracies underwent a process of civil
service reform with the goal of increasing the level of bureaucratic professionalism and
efficiency, civil service performance varies greatly in the region. Motivated by this empirical
puzzle, this work answers two main questions: (1) What do the civil service systems created
through civil service laws look like? and (2) In the absence of differences in institutional
design, why do administrative apparatuses function better in certain countries than in others?
In response to the first question, by using original data, this study finds that the formal
provisions that regulate the civil service systems (as stipulated in civil service laws) differ only
professionalism and independence from political interference. Using four case studies, I answer
the second question by taking into account the interplay between party competition and the
modernization of state bureaucracy. In countries with party systems that display signs of
institutionalization (e.g., low fragmentation and low volatility), there is little political
patronage, the civil service is filled with professionals chosen on a meritocratic basis, which
enhances the system's overall quality. In contrast, countries with underinstitutionalized party
systems (e.g., high fragmentation and high volatility) cannot rely upon party competition to
constrain patronage politics. In such countries, the civil service is saturated with politically
n
For my parents, to whom I owe my love for knowledge
and
111
Acknowledgements
It has been a great privilege to work on my thesis with two wonderful scholars and mentors,
Carol Leff and Zach Elkins, who have encouraged me to challenge the traditional ways of
investigating existing questions. In particular, I thank them for providing a critical eye
toward scientific integrity and rigor in my research. I also want to thank the remaining
members of my thesis committee, Bill Bernhard and Jim Kuklinski, for taking the time from
their busy lives to improve my thesis with helpful suggestions and advice. Of course, none of
this work would have ever materialized in the form of a dissertation without the support of
the Political Science Department's secretaries, Julie Elliott and Brenda Stamm, who have
The financial support offered by the Cline Center for Democracy and the Comparative
Constitutions Project has been indispensable to my work, allowing me to complete this thesis.
My gratitude goes to Peter Nardulli, Zach Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton for
making me a member of their research teams. Having accepted a job as a political affairs
officer, before actually completing this project, I have had the luxury of enjoying the fruits of
my labor prematurely. As such, I must thank my colleagues at the United Nations for giving
My friends were more important to me in this process than they can realize. Alexandra
Cupan supported me when theories broke down and data were not available and I am
indebted to her for our lifelong friendship. Svitlana Chernykh has been sympathetic to the
challenges of graduate school and I am grateful for her support. With her own successful
doctoral defense approaching, she continues to be a great scholar. I would also like to
acknowledge: Michelle Garvey, for her unbridled optimism; Ruslan Konstantinov, for his
refreshing skepticism; Marja Engel, for her analytical mind; Florin Fenic, for helping me
choose a research question; Adriana Prata, for always listening when I needed her; and
iv
Georgina Cheng and Wallapak Polasub, for being such wonderful roommates and friends.
Of course, none of this would have been possible without the support of my family. In
particular, I wish to thank my parents for encouraging me to always reach higher and to never
convinced that I have acquired my love for news from seeing him read newspapers). I thank
my mother for her unwavering support and her devotion to my success. And, of course, for
her tasty food. I thank my sister, Diana, for setting a very high standard of excellence in both
her professional life and her personal life - one that I can only hope to achieve. She is a model
for me and I would not have started my doctoral studies had she not encouraged and
supported me to do so. I thank my brother-in-law, Radu, for being such a generous and kind
person. I also thank my nieces, Alexandra and Emma, who have alleviated many of my
worries and frustrations with kisses and smiles. I am convinced that they will grow up to be
wonderful scientists themselves. During my graduate career I have acquired a new family, the
Nguyen family. I thank me, ba, Bobby, Tony, and Auntie Tuyeet for their support.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge my husband, Houbi. I am grateful to him for his never-dying
belief in my ability to complete this project. Because we met and got married during our
graduate studies, I consider graduate school to be our first joint adventure. Our moves to the
San Francisco Bay Area and New York City are only the beginning of our life together and I
anticipate with pleasure the many future adventures upon which we will certainly embark.
v
Table of Contents
List of Figures . ix
List of Tables x
List of Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
0.1 Why Should We Study the Civil Service in CEE? 4
0.2 How Should We Study Civil Service Reform? 6
0.2.1 Research Design - Analysis of Civil Service Systems 7
0.2.2 Research Design - Party Competition and Civil Service Reform . . . . . . . 9
0.3 Organizational Summary 9
VI
Chapter 3 Civil Service Systems 42
3.1 Why Do We Need a Civil Service Law? 46
3.2 Dimensions of Civil Service Systems 48
3.2.1 Capacity 49
3.2.2 Professionalism 59
3.2.3 Independence from External Influence 78
3.2.4 Transparency 82
3.2.5 Accountability 84
3.3 Conclusions 88
vn
Conclusions 156
Appendix A 161
Bibliography 190
vm
List of Figures
3.1 Timeline of Civil Service Laws in CEE and Central Asia (by Date of Adoption). 47
3.2 Dimensions of Civil Service Systems 48
3.3 Composition of Public Employment 50
3.4 Component Units of the Civil Service 51
3.5 Civil Service Employment and Government Effectiveness Worldwide 55
3.6 Civil Service Employment and Quality of Bureaucracy Worldwide 56
3.7 Civil Service Employment and Quality of Bureaucracy, and Civil Service Em-
ployment and Government Effectiveness in CEE 57
3.8 Number of Civil Servants Per Capita Over Time in Select CEE Countries 58
3.9 Types of Civil Service Systems 65
3.10 Hiring Sequence : 66
3.11 Compression Ratios in Select CEE Countries 76
3.12 Simplistic Model of Merit System Effects 89
3.13 Extended Model of Merit System Effects 91
3.14 Quality of Bureaucracy Over Time in CEE 1985-2005 92
5.1 Timeline of Civil Service Laws in CEE (by Date of Adoption) 120
5.2 Dynamics of Patronage Politics 121
5.3 Relationship Between Civil Service Expansion and Economic Growth. 126
5.4 Civil Service Expansion and Economic Growth by Year in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia 127
A.l Civil Service Employment and Government Effectiveness (by Region) 163
A.2 Civil Service Employment and Quality of Bureaucracy (by Region) 165
IX
List of Tables
1.1 Standardized Coefficients from Regression of Regime Type 2004 on Selected In-
dependent Variables 22
4.1 Testing Commonly Held Assertions About the Romanian Civil Service System. . 103
4.2 Level of Education in the Romanian Civil Service 108
4.3 Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in the Romanian Local Civil Service . . . .112
4.4 Transparency of Recruitment in the Romanian Local Civil Service 113
4.5 Cross-Regional Findings 116
A.l Civil Service Laws in Central and Eastern Europe and the Central Asian Republics 161
B.l Structure of CEE Civil Service Laws According to the First Level Heading . . . . 167
B.2 Principles Governing the Civil Service 172
B.3 The Right to Strike. 183
x
List of Abbreviations
E U European Union
W B World Bank
xi
O D S Civic Democratic Party (Obcanska Demokraticka Strana)
Polskiej)]
xii
S L D Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)
Unia)
xiii
Introduction
The third wave of democratization cannot be called a success. The experiences of the past
decade indicate that not all electoral democracies inevitably mature into democratic states.
combining democratic forms with authoritarian features. Others are threatened by the
weakness of the rule of law. 1 What explains this phenomenon? One of the most intriguing, yet
overlooked, hypotheses is that the very institutions necessary for facilitating effective
governance are undermining the process of democratization. In this study, I look at the state
bureaucracy 2 as an agent that can either facilitate and/or obstruct democratic governance.
The tensions between democratic politics and the state are most apparent in the formerly
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Almost two decades after
political movements targeted the monolithic state apparatuses in these countries, many state
democratic institutions. Despite a series of reforms, enacted to reduce bureaucratic bloat and
increase bureaucratic efficiency, many state administrations have expanded while their
capacities for governance have declined (Ganev 2001). Notwithstanding the repeated
commitments made by governments to reform their civil service systems along rational lines, 4
'For details on "hybrid regimes" see Collier and Levitsky (1997) and (Diamond 2002).
2
In this work, I use the terms "state administration," "bureaucracy," and "civil service" interchangeably.
3
I define "politicization" as the extent to which the government, or its collection of ministers, has the
"formal-legal possibility to exercise civil service policy authority, and the extent to which the exercise of this
authority is restricted by formal-legal procedural constraints" (see Meyer-Sahling 2001).
4
The concept of bureaucratic rationality is primarily associated with Weber's work and I discuss it exten-
1
the quality of bureaucratic institutions has improved, at best, only marginally.
Why should the quality of bureaucratic institutions be relevant for democracy? Simply
put, the civil service is vital for the rule of law. As the principal enforcer of the law, the
bureaucratic apparatus is the main actor that affects the extent to which rule of law exists in
a country. 5 The rational character of bureaucracy, the specialization of labor, and the
From this perspective, we can think of the bureaucracy as an apparatus that supports
freedom and is pivotal to the quality of the democratic state. 6 Civil service reform, then, is an
In other words, the quality of bureaucratic institutions determines the extent to which the
rights and liberties provided by laws are respected and realized. In the context of regime type,
the quality of bureaucracy influences both the quality of democracy and the extent to which
that institutions in a democratic regime are of higher quality (i.e., more transparent,
however, we have very little information to support this hypothesis. Motivated by this gap in
1. What are the characteristics of the civil service systems created in CEE after the
collapse of communism?
The answer to the first question can be supplied by studying specific elements of
institutional design. My approach is to look empirically at the civil service acts from sixteen
CEE countries in order to identify concrete variables that can describe the civil service. I then
place these variables under a number of conceptual dimensions that are intellectually
sively in Chapter 2. The main features of a rational bureaucracy are meritocratic recruitment and promotion,
independence from political actors, and vertical organization.
5
The civil service is necessary, but not sufficient, for the rule of law. Rule of law also requires, among other
things, that the laws are public knowledge and are clear in meaning (Carothers 2006).
6
This study is an extension of previous work on democratization. I use O'Donnell's (1999, 2001) distinc-
tion between democratic regime and democratic state to study whether all democratic regimes evolve into
democratic states. The "regime" refers to the means of access to power (i.e., elections), whereas the "state"
refers to the social relations formalized in a legal system (i.e., rule of law).
7
Good governance refers to "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised
for the common good" (World Bank Institute). In contrast, in a country with poor governance the state is
run for the benefit of a narrow clique or elite and lacks the funds and technical capacity for efficient public
administration (Camerer 2006).
2
interesting and meaningful: (1) capacity, (2) professionalism, (3) independence from external
influence, (4) transparency, and (5) accountability. I use the Weberian bureaucratic model as
inefficient phenomenon, Weber was convinced that bureaucracy is superior to any other
organizational form, and explained its primacy by pointing to the immanent rationality of
bureaucratic organizations.
Using this information, I identify systemic institutional differences that could explain why
some systems function better than others. Prom a policy perspective, my study has significant
implications: if certain institutional variations are more effective than others at increasing
professionalism (for example) within the civil service, then a country reforming its
administrative system need only adopt the "right" institutional model. If, however, differences
in outcome are not explained by institutional idiosyncrasies, the success of the reform process
will depend on other factors than those related just to institutional design.
An analysis of the civil service systems, as created by civil service laws, reveals a set of
institutions that display primarily meritocratic features. However, accounts in the literature
(e.g., Nunberg 1999) indicate that these laws had little empirical impact on the quality of
measures of institutional performance, such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
indicator for "quality of bureaucracy". If civil service laws are neither necessary nor sufficient
for increasing the quality of the bureaucracy, what factors can explain why administrative
The answer to my second research question lies in the relationship between party
competition and the process of modernizing state bureaucracies - a relation which I capture
countries with party systems that display signs of institutionalization (e.g., low fragmentation
and low volatility), there is little political patronage, as party competition is able to constrain
patronage. Using two case studies (Hungary and the Czech Republic), I show that in such
systems the passage of a civil service law reinforces the efforts to depoliticize the civil service
(e.g., Hungary). But the adoption of a civil service law is not a necessary condition for
constraining patronage. Party competition on its own can act as a constraint by limiting the
extent of political patronage, even in the absence of a civil service law (e.g., the Czech
3
Republic).
and high volatility) cannot rely upon party competition to constrain patronage politics. In
such cases, three outcomes are possible: (1) a civil service act is passed to protect the
governing party's (or coalition's) appointees in the administration from future dismissal, in
the event that the present-time opposition bloc wins the right to govern (e.g., Poland's first
civil service law in 1996); (2) a civil service act is adopted to purge, from the civil service, the
employees appointed by the previous government (e.g., Poland's second civil service law in
1998); or (3) a civil service act is not deemed necessary as the party in power faces no credible
opposition, and thus has little incentive to protect its appointees because it thinks it will
The transformation of the civil service during democratic transitions is a largely understudied
topic. While political scientists have a good understanding of the adoption of electoral
institutions (for example) and their effects, there is much less knowledge on how civil service
systems evolve in the transition from one political regime (e.g., authoritarianism) to another
(e.g., democracy).
Most analysts charged with studying democratic transitions focus on the causes of
attention is paid to the administrative apparatus and its transformation during the transition
to democracy. One plausible justification for this omission is the assumption that all
was implicit in the process of democratization (i.e., creation of electoral and political
institutions), but little to no attention was paid to the necessity of redesigning the state
administration during the period of transition to democracy. 8 To fill this void in the
literature, I focus on the idiosyncratic features of the post-communist civil service systems.
Political scientists rarely study bureaucracies and when they do, they treat them as an
4
Nevertheless, bureaucracies are important for the evolution of social, political, and economic
processes. In many countries the bureaucracy is the only significant social sector willing to
assume the responsibility for societal transformations. In other countries, the bureaucracy is
the main employer of the professional and technical resources necessary for the
implementation of reforms.
The institutional changes in the policy process are interesting from a historical perspective.
But they are also intriguing because they lead to changes in the quality of governance.
Institutional reform (and civil service reform in this study) may result in better governance.
institutions that are superior to the extant ones. Alternatively, reform may result in
governments adopting institutions that are sub-optimal. The question, then, is whether
institutional reform produces the most (or at least more) efficient and functional institutions
or whether it results in institutional backsliding. One is inclined to lean towards the first
conclusion, if only for the reason that there is a perception of political development as being a
progressive force. However, the second scenario seems equally plausible, especially when we
consider the pressures exerted by internal and external actors, and the accompanying
But why should we even expect democracies to have better institutions? 9 One reason is
that democratic institutions, in general, are seen as being developmental (they facilitate and
promote economic growth and structural transformation) and socially inclusive (they pursue
social policies that provide equitable entitlements for all citizens). One can argue that the
these effects. Nonetheless, a closer look at the administrative systems in these countries
reveals that few attempts have been made either to depoliticize the former communist
When is civil service reform more likely to result in bureaucracies that are not
legal-rational? I believe this outcome occurs when the processes of party-building and
state-building are intertwined (occur simultaneously), creating ideal conditions for patronage
politics. Eastern Europe appears to confirm Shefter's thesis: if party-building precedes the
9
Good institutions are not a prerequisite for democracy. However, in the absence of effective institutions,
as I will argue throughout this study, the democratic regime can be undermined.
5
consolidation of the state bureaucracy, then party builders will use patronage-based strategies
(Shefter 1994).
voters simply "vote the rascals out" (Powell 1989)? Are parties so important for constraining
patronage politics? One can argue that parties are not as vital as they once were for
governing and for guaranteeing democratic accountability. This may be true for some
accountability. But scholars who study fledgling democracies increasingly emphasize the need
competition through their platforms, policy positions, and legislative behavior. If party
positions during a campaign or in the legislature are unstable over time, voters will not enjoy
genuine choices. They may have the opportunity to throw the rascals out, but they may well
end up inadvertently replacing one set of rascals with another. If, on the other hand, parties
develop meaningful labels, which associate them with certain policy positions (much like
brand names for commercial products), voters will have a real choice and clearer standards by
which to judge politicians in future elections. Once individual parties establish identities in
party members, and especially leaders, begin monitoring one another's behavior to ensure
that their party's reputation is not sullied, for example, by an individual member's corruption
or erratic behavior. 11
Eastern Europe can potentially provide a controlled setting for exploring a phenomenon
evident in many of the world's new democracies: the development of highly politicized
bureaucracies. We can use the opportunity afforded by the confluence of the fall of
communism, the introduction of democratic politics, and the process of re-building the state
in Eastern Europe to analyze the two-fold relationship between democratization and public
10
For example, Fish 1998, Mainwaring 1998, and Haggard and Kaufman 1994.
11
The term "horizontal accountability" refers to the control that some state agents exercise over the lawful-
ness of the actions of other such agents (O'Donnell 1998a, 23).
6
administration reform. On the one hand, democracy cannot be consolidated without a well
functioning state and an operational bureaucracy that is able to implement the decisions of a
democratically elected government (Linz and Stepan 1996). 13 On the other hand,
democratization can bring corruption in the short term by temporarily weakening the state
and loosening social inhibitions, which leads to a state of confusion about standards of
This project is composed of two main parts: (1) an in-depth analysis of the civil service
systems created by their corresponding civil service acts (in Chapter 3) and (2) an extensive
analysis on the effect of the nature of party competition on the success of civil service reform
(in Chapter 5). To showcase the differences between the de jure civil service systems and the
de facto institutions, I look at Romanian civil servants' perceptions regarding the public
What does it mean to say democratizing states are reforming their civil services? Ideally, it
means that actors are creating conditions for a more transparent, accountable, professional,
and independent administrative process. This process takes place through the implementation
of particular policies established in civil service acts. These legislative acts provide valuable
information on the characteristics that make civil services more professional, independent,
transparent, and accountable. But the absence of such elements from civil service laws is
relevant as well, and by looking at the acts comparatively, I can pinpoint their omissions.
In terms of methodology, I collected the civil service laws that have been adopted since the
fall of communism in CEE and constructed an original cross-national dataset that allows me
to ascertain the main characteristics of the civil service systems created in CEE after the
collapse of communism. While the same countries have adopted multiple laws (for details, see
Figure 3.1), I look at only one law per country. In most cases this is the most recent law, a
choice made out of necessity as the most recent laws are the ones that are more easily
accessible. Ideally, I would compare different laws adopted in one country over time, to see
what changes were made to the system. Unfortunately, only the most recent version of these
12
For other works on the relationship between democracy and public administration reform, see Anusiewicz
et al. 2001, Grzymala-Busse 2007, O'Dwyer 2006, and Painter and Pierre 2005.
13
Linz and Stepan (1996) refer to the bureaucracy as the fourth arena of post-communist democracies.
7
laws is available.
In terms of geography, my study is based on the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These countries
vary significantly in terms of the nature of the communist regime, the level of economic
development, and cultural and religious prevalence. Ideally, this study would include all the
post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, while I was able to identify some of the civil service laws for most of these
states, I was unable to obtain them (see Table A.l for a list of the laws, by country). Missing
from the study are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
this study the authoritarian republics in Central Asia. This is unfortunate, because a
comparison of the systems in authoritarian states with the ones in democratic countries would
have made this investigation even more valuable. Future research should be focused in that
direction.
Several organizations (such as the World Bank and the Political Risk Society) have created
composite indices for "government effectiveness" and "quality of bureaucracy." I use these
measures to evaluate whether the transition to democracy has led to better quality
meritocratic bureaucracy, I use country reports from the World Bank, the Organization for
Government and Management (SIGMA). Data on employment, salaries, and spending come
from case studies, national statistics institutes, and the International Labor Organization
(ILO). For my case study on Romania, I use surveys and reports from the Institute for Public
Politics.
Taking into account the paucity of information regarding how CEE administrations
function practically, I complement this large-N study with a case study of the Romanian civil
service. I base this discussion on a 2004 survey of almost 1,000 civil servants conducted by the
8
0.2.2 Research Design Party Competition and Civil Service Reform
In Chapter 5 I analyze the relationship between party competition, political patronage, and
state bureaucracy modernization. Inspired by Shefter's (Shefter 1994) thesis about the
strategies to mobilize support. To test the hypothesis that political patronage is less common
in countries with an institutionalized party system, I use a controlled comparison of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. I find that, regardless of whether or not a civil
service law has been adopted, patronage politics is most pervasive in countries with
party systems (Figure 5.2 showcases the interplay between party system institutionalization
The literature on party systems offers several useful measures of party system
party system development in CEE (such as umbrella parties composed of multiple parties
which share very few similarities and which would deflate the measure of fragmentation), I
complement this data with a timeline analysis of the party system in each country.
To capture the extent of patronage politics (the discretionary appointment to civil service
positions by a political party), I look at two indicators: expansion of the state administration
(which is not explained by functional needs) and turnover rates in the public administration
The following is a map of the organization of this study. Chapter 1 presents a conceptual and
theoretical framework for studying the relationship between democracy and the rule of law,
with an emphasis on the role of the civil service in strengthening the rule of law. Moving into
the empirical domain, Chapter 2 provides a summary of the evolution of the civil service over
time, as well as the current administrative models. In this chapter, I also present an overview
of the civil service under communism. In light of their high degree of politicization and
9
ineffectiveness, the need for civil service reform becomes clear. In Chapter 3, I move to the
most interesting aspect of the reform process: an analysis of the civil service acts, the legal
foundation for the reform process. Using detailed information from these laws, I study the
variation in the resulting civil service systems. The question, then, is whether there is a
difference between how these systems are designed de jure and how they are functionally
implemented de facto. An in-depth look at the Romanian case, using a survey of civil
servants, will provide an answer in Chapter 4. Lastly, I consider the question of why some
civil services are more politicized than others. In Chapter 5 I test the impact of party
10
Chapter 1
Getulio Vargas
This chapter presents the theoretical logic driving the analysis of the civil service systems
at the core of my research. I first discuss the limitations of the procedural definition of
democracy and argue for an emphasis on quality of institutions in assessing the extent to
which a state is democratic. In particular I examine the role of the bureaucratic apparatus in
democratic regime bestow upon its constituents, benefits that are absent in an authoritarian
regime? Prom existing studies we know that democracy is associated with higher levels of
economic development (either because countries become democratic as they reach a certain
development). We also know that citizens enjoy more rights and liberties in a democracy than
under an authoritarian regime, as the recognition of core rights and liberties is intrinsic to
democracy. Nonetheless, we know little about how democratic institutions compare to their
quality institutions?
In this study I focus on the bureaucracy because the quality of bureaucratic institutions
determines the extent to which rights and liberties provided by laws are respected and
11
realized. What this ultimately means is that the quality of bureaucracy will influence the
such rights and liberties are either formally acknowledged and not realized, or not even
acknowledged.
What does it mean to say institutions are better? It is difficult to answer such a question
in the abstract. In the case of the bureaucracy, a better quality institution is one that displays
other things. Chapter 2 elaborates on the topic of better quality bureaucracies by reviewing
Why has there been limited research on the quality of democratic institutions? Mazzuca
(2007) believes that this omission is explained by an emphasis in the literature only on certain
political procedures, and specifically on those procedures related to access to state power.
The interest in procedures regarding access to power in different political settings is one of
the most important common denominators in the field of comparative regime analysis.
original definition, the concepts developed by regime analysts seek to describe the diverse
forms of access to state power across countries and over time. Within this procedural
Przeworski et al. 1996, Schumpeter 1947) have defined democracy primarily in terms of
elections, adding only as corollary conditions the freedoms and guarantees necessary for the
conduct of free and fair elections. Comprehensive views on democracy stand in contrast to
these "minimalist" definitions. For instance, Dahl (1971) introduces the concept of polyarchy
to emphasize the necessity of including rights and freedoms in the concept of democracy,
rights and freedoms that have at least the same weight as the character of elections. 1
An important shift of focus occurred with O'Donnell's work on Latin America. Beginning
in the mid-1990s Latin America scholars started researching problems related to the exercise
12
controls. While O'Donnell's (1999, 2001) distinction between democratic state and a
democratic regime was not new, 2 it had the merit of shifting the attention from democracy as
O'Donnell's differentiation between democratic regime and democratic state helps explain
the distinction between access to and exercise of power. By definition, democratic regimes are
understood to have "the patterns, formal or informal and explicit or implicit, that determine
the channels of access to principal governmental positions; the characteristics of the actors
who are admitted and excluded from such access; and the resources and strategies that they
are allowed to use for gaining access" (O'Donnell 2001, 14). Therefore, the democratic regime
refers to the process through which political actors occupy the highest positions in the state,
specifically by competing in free and fair elections (i.e., procedures related to the access to
political power). In contrast, the democratic state refers to "aspects of legal theory, insofar as
the legal system enacts and backs fundamental aspects of both agency and democracy"
(O'Donnell 2001, 8). Being a state implies a set of social relations, which are formalized in a
legal system. But most importantly, a democratic state implies the rule of law. A democratic
necessary condition for being a democratic state, but it is not a sufficient condition.
It is important to differentiate between the form of access to power and the form of
exercise of power as procedural aspects of the political process because many of the
democratic transitions that occurred in the past thirty years are characterized by a process of
change primarily in the institutions of access to political power. Therefore, the distinction
between democratic state and democratic regime is useful when thinking about democracy as
a concept that goes beyond the existence of a set of institutions (e.g., elections) and allows for
Taking a step further, the institutional changes that occur in electoral democracies
(regimes that meet the procedural minimum of having free, fair, and competitive elections)
and are designed to create a democratic state, are best understood as part of a process of
13
organizations. While democratization is a process that involves the institutions related to
exercise of power.
The state's failure to deliver basic public services - an essential attribute of Weber's
bureaucracy - and to enforce citizens' rights - at the center of O'Donnell's concerns - are
charge of public services normally lack the "technical training and occupational specialization"
state resources is consumed in particularistic exchanges with powerful actors in the society, a
In the next section I develop the link between the quality of bureaucratic institutions and
democracy by bringing in an additional concept: rule of law. In this context it will become
clear why poor institutional quality can undermine the democratic regime itself.
How do we define the rule of law? In a state governed by rule of law, the laws, and not some
individuals or groups, define appropriate behavior and no one is above the law (Esquith 1999,
335). 4 For Weingast (1997, 245) rule of law represents a "set of stable political rules and
rights applied impartially to all citizens," and a state ruled by the law is defined as a society
living under universal laws, not under discretionary political power. Consequently, rule of law
implies the protection of individual private rights through a universalistic application of the
law.
law. From a minimalist perspective, the rule of law means that whatever the law is, it must
14
similar cases. A comprehensive definition of the rule of law takes into account the character of
the laws themselves. In a democracy individuals, as legal persons, are carriers of rights and
obligations derived from the law. Moreover, in manifold social and political interactions
(O'Donnell 1998b). The formal provisions of this equality lay the groundwork for future
equalization, which takes place in the process of exercising our rights. Thus, in the broader
context, the rule of law refers to the universal, non-arbitrary application of inclusive and
non-discriminatory laws. In other words, public officials must act secundum legem and the
The democratic conception of the rule of law implies the universalistic application of the law
based on a belief in the supremacy of the law, individual freedom, and equality of treatment. 5
Rule of law is essential to democracy for various reasons. First, it enforces accountability: no
governmental official or officeholder is above the law and that in case of abuse of the law there
will be no impunity for them. 6 Second, rule of law offers what Rawls calls justice as regularity
and fairness: it brings predictability to human behavior, providing certainty regarding what
the law asks from citizens and the effects its application will have on the individual (Rawls
1971, 237) 7 Therefore, order through rule of law confers a sense of predictability to actions.
Lastly, rule of law implies that equality among citizens, a prerequisite essential for the
effectiveness of individual rights, is secured by democratic laws. As we can see in Figure 1.1,
Predictability and equality are essential determinants of the quality of democracy. Citizens
in democratic countries are beneficiaries of a set of civil and political rights. However, in some
countries these freedoms are supported by a respect for the supremacy of the law, while in
other countries civil and political rights are infringed. These differences have a great bearing
on the overall quality of democracy. In O'Donnell's terms, the state is more democratic when
5
Linz and Stepan argue that the rule of law can be seen as a prerequisite of a consolidated democracy
(1996, 10).
6
In this sense, the state must install provisions to prevent those who make and administer the law from
using their positions for their own advantage.
7
Rule of law is formal justice, "the regular and impartial administration of public rules" by the legal sys-
tem. For Rawls, "a legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the pur-
pose of regulating and providing the framework for social cooperation" (1971, 235).
15
Figure 1.1. R e g i m e T y p e and Rule of Law 2004.
Sources: World Bank and Polity IV. 'Rule of Law' spans from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
indicating a stronger rule of law. The 'Regime Type' measure runs from -10 to 10, with -10
indicating a fully authoritarian regime and 10 a fully democratic regime. N=126.
2.5-
2-
1.5-
(0
d 01
o
3 -.5-
DC
-1-
-1.5
-2
-2.5
-10 -5 0 10
Regime Type
citizens axe treated equally by its institutions and are protected against any arbitrariness of
the law.
In the absence of rule of law, the state itself goes through a crisis. On the one hand, the
various forms of discrimination and disparity in the application of the law will create a
general sentiment of distrust in the democratic institutions, weakening the prospects of
consolidating democracy. On the other hand, in the absence of a "behavioral, legal, and
normative distinction between public and private" (O'Donnell 1999, 181), we can expect the
development of a patronage-based, clientelistic system that in the end will undermine the
democratic regime. This gap between formal rules and actual behavior poses a serious threat
to the formal institutions of the regime.
Why is the bureaucracy an essential element of the rule of law?8 Rule of law is strengthened
8
Another element crucial to the rule of law is the judicial system. In every democracy civil, political, and
social rights are backed by the legal system, which is represented by courts. In addition to bureaucracy, the
legal system ensures the supremacy of the law over a territory. Moreover, an independent, impartial and effec-
tive judiciary holds a central role in the realization of an accountable government. Judicial independence is not
16
Figure 1.2. Quality of Bureaucracy and R u l e of Law 2004.
Sources: World Bank and ICRG. 'Rule of Law' spans from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating
a stronger rule of law. 'Quality of Bureaucracy' takes values from 0 to 4, with higher values
indicating a more professional and meritocratic organization. N=139.
Quality of Bureaucracy
in a system that holds public officials accountable and ensures not only that the law is applied
properly, but also that it will be applied in the same manner in the future, in equivalent cases
accountability, and independence account for the extent to which such a non-discretionary
environment is created. Figure 1.2, shows that there is a strong positive correlation between
For example, the blurring of the distinction between private and public spheres will hinder
application of the law - the norm. A state with an unprofessional, nepotistic, and patrimonial
bureaucracy lacks the rule of law and is ineffective as a democratic state. According to
Weber, "the genuine patrimonial office differs from the bureaucratic one" in that the former
"lacks the bureaucratic separation of the 'private' and the 'official' sphere." In more concrete,
designed to benefit the individual citizen, but to protect citizens (Pope 2000). Judiciary weakness manifests
itself through the failure of a court's decisions to be implemented, the low effectiveness of courts that results
in long delays in case processing, and the shortage of skilled and knowledgeable personnel. However, judicial
corruption represents the "use of public authority for the private benefit of court personnel when this use un-
dermines the rules and procedures to be applied in the provision of court services" (Buscaglia 2001, 135). The
judicial system is not the object of this study.
17
organizational terms, the lack of separation between public resources and private property
means that under patrimonialism "office is treated like a benefice, as purely personal affair of
the ruler, and political power can be exploited by means of contributions and fees" (Weber
1968, 1028). The proliferation of favors and personal privileges is the common element of the
The state has specific functions and the civil service plays an important role in carrying
out these functions. In a democratic society the state has two main roles. 9 First, it provides
fair and equal conditions and guarantees for the personal rights of individuals, based on a
predictable environment for the economic activities of individuals and legal entities. If indeed
government officials weave the future with the help of knowledge, as Plato contends in The
But how can the bureaucracy be the answer to governance problems when it is generally
perceived as being the cause of many societal evils? 10 For example, Tullock (1965) sees
bureaucracies are sometimes perceived as threats to civil and political freedoms (see Preston
1987 for a detailed discussion on the relationship between bureaucracy and freedom).
This view of bureaucracy is due to a notion of freedom quite different from that in the
democratic context. Freedom is not the absence of constraints, but rather the ability to
choose freely and exercise our rights, benefiting from equal treatment. The central features of
a modern bureaucracy - hierarchy, a technical division of labor, fixed jurisdictions, and formal
rules (Weber 1947) - ensure the respect of democratic rights and freedoms. For Preston, "our
choices are free precisely because they are made within a bureaucratic context, and our
freedom can only be enhanced if the logic of bureaucracy is extended and more rigorously
18
Bureaucracy is certainly susceptible to a number of ailments: inefficiency, multiplication of
administrative functions, 'red tape,' impersonal officials working according to a fixed routine,
etc. Such institutional degradation can take place both under an authoritarian regime and
under a democratic regime. However, the main stigma of bureaucracies in democratic regimes,
inefficiency - defined as delays in implementing policies - has only a limited negative impact
on the exercise of freedoms. A bureaucracy, even an inefficient one, can provide greater
in the application of the law. A modern bureaucracy (see Chapter 2 for a definition of modern
bureaucracy) is a bedrock element for the rule of law, ensuring that the relationship between
the state and its citizens is based on stable norms and expectations.
Bureaucracy has survived because of its strengths: the development of the classic bureaucratic
model not only represented real administrative and managerial progress in most instances,
but it embodied and advanced several significant democratic ideals (Wriston 1980). Bennis
noted that the "bureaucratic 'machine model' Weber outlined was developed as a reaction
against the personal subjugation, nepotism, cruelty, emotional vicissitudes, and capricious
judgement that passed for managerial practices in the early days of the industrial revolution"
(1965, 31). Similarly, Bendix argued that "bureaucracy developed with the support of
democratic movements that demanded equality before the law and legal guarantees against
At a general level, the emergence of a merit bureaucracy strengthens the viability of the
unstable especially during electoral cycles. The public administration offers stability in the
interpretation and application of rules. Historically the civil servant evolved from being an
employee of the ruler to being an employee of the state. Concomitantly the bureaucracy
evolved from personal apparatus of the ruler to impersonal body with unmatchable
administrative expertise.
"The bureaucracy, looking toward its enduring tasks and gradually gaining an
intimate familiarity with the realities surrounding them, became an objectifying
influence in public affairs. It grew into a storehouse of information. It projected
policy in terms of demonstrable cause-and-effect relationships, thus erecting
19
barriers to both despotic fiat and mere off-the-cuff judgement" (Marx 1963, 64).
In this sense the bureaucracy operates as a source and manifestation of rationality and the
The weakness of the institutional system is usually doubled by a low public legal
conscience. The weak implementation of laws undermines citizens' confidence in using the law
to resist any act of corruption. 11 But most importantly, a weak administrative system implies
discretion in the application of the law on the part of those who are charged with
administering the law. In this situation, the use of law is dependent on an individual's will
and exercise of power. Hence, the idea of laws as independent rules - crucial to the rule of law
- is implicitly destroyed, "for the concept of a rule is not that of a standard for action which
we may take up or leave as suits us" (Ingram 1985, 361). In this situation, the quality of
democracy will be largely dependent on the gap between the existence and employment of the
law. 12
For example, the classic bureaucratic model has also had a significant "democratizing"
The United States federal bureaucracy is, for instance, significantly more representative of the
United States population than is the Congress, and it is the commitment of bureaucracy to
accommodation - that is significantly responsible for the slowness with which it moves
(Berkeley 1971). The key democratic concept of equality before the law is similarly embodied
The conclusion is inescapable: despite its weaknesses, the emergence of bureaucracy has
corruption and the willful misuse of power, the impersonal and inflexible rules and regulations
11
Levin and Satarov (2000) analyze the effects of a weak judiciary in the Russian context and conclude that
a weak judiciary makes citizens perceive state officials as having legal immunity. As a consequence, citizens are
less likely to resist "grassroots corruption." Moreover, corruption in Russia has become a routine element of
everyday life.
12
For a legal system to enforce the rule of law, it must commit to a universal system of rules and accept
that all cases and individuals should be treated equally. The same law has to be applied to all relevant cases
and individuals and failure to do so will detract from the idea of the rule of law.
13
In that respect, Rohrschneider (2005) argues that the public's perceptions of democratic institutions, such
as the parliament, are shaped by how well arbitrating institutions - bureaucracies and judiciaries - administer
policies and adjudicate conflicts.
20
of bureaucracy have been a relief (Wriston 1980). If democratic states are to endure, uphold
law-based rule, safeguard human rights, and offer opportunities for development, such states
must govern not only democratically, but effectively as well. "Good governance" is widely
cited as a prerequisite for international aid or as a goal of governments. For example, at the
2005 United Nations World Summit, the 191 member states reaffirmed their commitment for
the eight Millennium Development Goals regarding the promotion of democracy, human
Finally, in the literature, authors have looked at the characteristics of the bureaucracy and
the legal system primarily with respect to economic development (Buscaglia 2001 ; 15 Johnson
1982; Knack 1998; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Rauch and Evans 2000). They
state.
One of the variables political scientists have employed in explaining the type of regime
attention has been paid to the rule of law as an explanatory variable for regime type. Figure
1.1 shows that there is a positive relationship between the strength of rule of law and the type
of regime characterizing a country, i.e., countries with a stronger rule of law are more likely to
be democracies. But we do not know in which direction the causal arrow points: Does
democracy lead to a strong rule of law, or does a stronger rule of law pave the way toward a
democratic regime?
It is very difficult to answer this question because of the scarcity of data. The only
14
Good governance "relates to effective problem solving, decision making or the efficient allocation and
management of public resources" (Coston 1998, 481). Conversely, "poor governance" entails corruption, unpre-
dictability of legal frameworks and their inconsistent implementation, and non- participatory decision-making.
15
Buscaglia (2001) suggests that judicial corruption hampers economic development by undermining the
stability and predictability in the interpretation and enforcement of the law.
16
"For a country that starts with weak institutions - low levels of democracy and rule of law - an increase
in democracy is less important than an expansion of the rule of law as a stimulus for economic growth and
investment [...] [Consequently] even if democracy is the principal objective in the long run, the best way to
accomplish it may be to encourage the rule of law in the short run" (Barro 1991, 410).
21
Table 1.1. Standardized Coefficients from Regression of R e g i m e T y p e 2004
on Selected I n d e p e n d e n t Variables
Note: Significance signs are * for p<0.05; ** for p<0.01; and *** for p<0.001.
measure of rule of law available starts in 1996 and is part of the World Bank's Governance
a linear regression analysis as an explanatory variable for the type of regime a country had in
2004. To measure regime type I use the Polity IV data. The advantage of using the Polity
data over Freedom House is that Polity focuses primarily on aspects related to the process of
access to power, e.g., elections. By contrast, the Freedom House data incorporate aspects
related to the rule of law. I also use GDP per capita as an explanatory variable for regime
type. The data come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Table 1.1 shows the four models used to fit the data. The low R 2 values indicate that the
models do not explain much of the variance in the data. However, it is important to note that
rule of law has positive coefficients and is significant in all four models, whereas GDP per
capita is not significant. For example, the strength of the rule of law for a country in 1996 has
a positive impact on the regime type of that same country in 2004. At the same time neither
the growth in GDP per capita between 1996 and 2004, nor the level of GDP per capita in
22
1.3 Bureaucratization and Party System Characteristics
The rule of law concept is suddenly everywhere, "a venerable part of Western political
philosophy enjoying a new run as rising imperative of the era of globalization" (Carothers
1998, 95). Its status has risen to that of a panacea for the numerous and varied ills of
skepticism towards the government. Western observers believe that enhancing the rule of law
will allow states to move beyond the first stage of political and economic reform to consolidate
both democracy and market economies and often urge countries to adopt policies intended to
The rule of law promises to move countries past the first, easy phase of political and
economic liberalization to a deeper level of reform. But that is a promise hard to fulfill. As
countries in CEE discovered, the process of rewriting constitutions, laws, and regulations is
Public servants must be retrained, and institutions must be restructured. Citizens also must
be brought into the process if conceptions of law and justice are to be truly transformed.
The primary obstacles to such reforms are not technical or financial (though these are, of
course, relevant), but political and human. Reforms orchestrated to strengthen the rule of law
will succeed only if they confront the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled
by the law. Respect for the law cannot easily take root in a system rife with corruption.
Entrenched elites cede their traditional impunity only under great pressure. Bureaucratic
rationalization would require them to support reforms that would create competing centers of
A first step in strengthening the rule of law is the adoption of a civil service act that
provides for concrete ways to strengthen bureaucratic institutions and makes them more
efficient, transparent, independent, and accountable. The adoption of such a law is not
random, however. The level of institutionalization 17 of the party system as well as the balance
of forces between the opposition and the government coalitions help explain the timing of the
reform process. I discuss the effect of party system characteristics on bureaucratic reform in
Chapter 5.
17
In an institutionalized party system the competition takes place between established, programmatically
distinct, and relatively fixed parties, which have medium to long time horizons (Mainwaring 1998).
23
Chapter 2
Following the heady days when one communist regime after another collapsed in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE), international support - from the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and other sources - centered on guiding the countries in the region in their
journey toward the free market. These efforts focused primarily on macroeconomic
stabilization and privatization. However, the first attempts at implementing the economic
reform agenda revealed the importance of state bureaucracy: reforms that were theoretically
of international actors turned to public administration questions: How could the state
economic, and administrative), reformers needed to take into consideration the fact that civil
service reform in CEE was not just a case of state creation upon the ruins of communist
bureaucracies (if state creation implies a tabula rasa) (see Derlien and Szablowski 1993 for a
discussion on the parallel reform processes). Each country had firmly in place institutions and
behaviors that could not be ruptured or adapted overnight. Unlike countries that must
rebuild classical administrations that have collapsed or new nations that are forced to erect
governments from scratch, CEE countries are crafting a set of institutions that combine
aspects of pre-communist and communist legacies with elements borrowed from abroad,
democratic transition (Nunberg 1999). This is why it is important to outline the main
bureaucracy as a model for administrative organizations. This is the best place to present
24
Weber's ideas on state administration. Whereas in colloquial terms 'bureaucratization' has a
and of the rationalization of society. As CEE societies are developing (politically and
economically), the natural result, from a Weberian perspective, is that they will develop
legal-rational bureaucracies.
The Weberian approach to administrative development has come under attack in the 1970s
and 1980s - criticisms clustered into the New Public Management (NPM) approach (see
Aucoin 1990; Hood 1996; Pollitt 1990). The main tenet of NPM is that civil service systems
are about efficiency and effective management, resembling the private sector. Hence, private
sector management objectives and practices should be applied in the public sector (Ingraham
1996). NPM was specific to developed democracies (confined to Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development - OECD- member states) and it is rarely discussed in relation
to civil service systems that lack basic Weberian features. In the ensuing discussion, I will
This chapter starts with a short review of the historical evolution of civil service systems.
This overview puts into context the developmental stage of current administrations. I then
present the main features of the Weberian and NPM approaches. Using the scarce
The chapter ends with a brief assessment of the two distinctive perspectives on administrative
Throughout the world, governments play a crucial role in the production and delivery of
public services. The extent to which the government is involved in society may vary from
country to country, but all countries share one common feature: negative public attitudes
towards "bureaucrats." For a long time, policy preparation and planning was the domain of a
small number of higher functionaries (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1996). In the second half of
the twentieth century their numbers surged, as their role shifted from mere execution of
policies to policy-planning. This class of civil servants finds itself subject to criticism as part
of a more general disapproval of the size of government. One may wonder how and why the
25
civil service developed in this way and if all recent condemnations are justified.
I shall follow Raadschelders and Rutgers's (1996) typology on the evolution of civil service
The tale of the civil servant begins in the Middle Ages with the emergence of the first
nation-states. Originally civil servants represented one of the three types of servants to the
monarch: court, army, and clerical or civil servants (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1996, 71).
Civil servants were a minority within the royal household (largely outnumbered by the court -
employees charged with maintaining the royal household - and the army) and provided
Berman (1983) and Gladden (1972) credit the papacy with the creation of the first "civil
service system." The expansion of papal power, in the years between 1050-1150, conflicted
with the territorial expansion of secular lords. To successfully wield authority, the Roman
1983, 208). The papal chancery, papal exchequer (or Apostolic Chamber), and the papal court
(Consistory) are regarded as the first modern government departments. Although changes in
a Europe dominated by customary law would prove to be slow, some early examples of secular
government appeared in 1066 when William the Conquerer created the first known chancery. 1
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, kings established their own specialized
departments in order to strengthen their monarchical claims for authority over the use of
1
Gratian's Concordance of Discordant Canons promoted principles characteristic to modern administra-
tions. Gratian prescribed that the church should be organized in territorial units administered by clerici as
subordinates of the central authority. He stated that a clerk could make a career only based on merit and not
on seniority and that he could be appointed only after passing a test of capability. These were the elements of
a legal bureaucratic structure created by the church (Berman 1983, 213).
26
force (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1996, 72). With the advent of universities, rulers recruited
more and more laymen instead of clergymen. This is also the period during which
nation-states were born. As the ruler of one of the first states recognized internationally,
Frederick II of Sicily decreed the Constitution of Melfi, considered the "birth certificate of
However, there are several significant differences between the modern civil servant and the
civil servant of the Middle Ages. The latter was much more similar to a household servant,
working on behalf of the king. There was no distinction between the public and private
realms, and policy planning was restricted to the royal council and parliaments.
This phase in the development of the civil service system is characterized by a process of
formalization in the administration of state issues. In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, secular lords managed to establish their monopoly over the use of force and the
was required. Secretaries were organized in formal government departments, while councils
functionary to the monarchy, not allowed to undermine its function (Raadschelders and
Rutgers 1996, 74). This represented a shift in political ideology: the monarchy was not
designed for the betterment of a person (or of a limited group of persons); instead, it was
In the seventeenth century, while the public and private spheres continued to be
inseparable, the concept of "ideal" higher functionary was put forth for the first time. Martin
Luther advocated a separation of office and officer. The higher functionary was to be loyal
and neutral, well educated and impartial (Gladden 1972). Concomitantly, the centralization
standing army.
Throughout Europe, central governments started relying more and more on civil servants
to represent their interests in the administrative territories. These civil servants bore different
names: "intendants" (later "prefects") in France and Landrate in Prussia, and they all
signaled a transfer of the monopoly on power from one person to a group of persons. In
27
Prance a bureaucratic elite developed separately from the aristocracy, recruited from among
With the rise of mercantilism and the state's focus on the economy, attributes such as
judicial knowledge and writing ability were no longer sufficient for becoming or remaining a
civil servant. States started developing pre-entry training as well as formal application and
recruitment procedures (see Raadschelders 1998 and 2003 for a discussion on the
Netherlands). While historians noted the professionalization of the civil service (most notably
in the fields of training and recruitment), they also pointed out that patronage and corruption
were common, government departments were not specialized, and public functionaries lacked
In conclusion, three important factors explain why rulers needed an efficient bureaucracy
and started paying more attention to the structure and functioning of their administrative
apparatuses: (1) territorial expansion of states, (2) the state becoming the main actor in
international relations (after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648), and (3) the advent of
absolutism in the fifteenth century and of mercantilism in the seventeenth century. All these
The process of specialization and differentiation in governmental tasks that took place in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in a split between the political and
administrative facets of governing. Two developments led to this result: (1) the legislative
branch became the prerogative of political officials, while the execution of tasks was left to
administrative personnel; and (2) as the state started performing more and more roles in the
society, more nonpolitical functionaries were hired to deal with the extra work. The
differentiation between politics and administration provided the foundation upon which a
During this time the public officer came to be seen not as an officeholder but as an
employee of the state (Church 1981). Moreover, the distinction between higher and lower
functionaries became more visible, as tasks in the field of policy planning and preparation
necessitated better-trained personnel. "Slowly and decisively, preference was given to so-called
28
complete department" (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1996, 81).
Nevertheless, the public service was still plagued with patronage (Gladden 1972). Several
developments helped to bring the administrative system closer to its present form: (1) a
ranking system was introduced, allowing opportunities for promotion; (2) officials were given
a regular salary and guaranteed a pension, which strengthened their loyalty to the state; and
The developments listed by Gladden (1972) gradually led to the creation of the 'civil service.'
and training programs finalized the development of an administration that was both public
and subordinate to, but separate from, politics. For example, in the United States the Hatch
Acts of 1939 and 1940 imposed limitations on federal, state, and municipal employees and on
the extent to which they could participate in partisan politics. However, only after 1945 did
the civil service acquire full legal protection. In Great Britain civil servants enjoyed de facto
job security, but tenure was not guaranteed until the Crown Proceeding Act of 1947 (Chester
1981). In Prance the Civil Service Act was passed in 1946, establishing legal protections for
Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996) point to the growing government intervention in society
to explain the professionalization of the civil service. During this period, the public demanded
more public services, especially in light of the social turmoil caused by industrialization.
Governments started offering new public services (such as health care and electricity), which
required agencies that were technical in nature. With the growth of the size of government,
the civil servants became more aware of their status and demanded protections and
guarantees.
The main development in this phase comprises the continuation of the processes of
2
Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996, 81-82) note that the system in place in the United States differed sig-
nificantly from the European ones. While the European systems were centered on 'career staffing,' the United
States system used short-term 'program' staffing, with a rotation in office occurring after each election. In the
second half of the nineteenth century the United States moved from a party- centered system to a bureaucratic
authority system, political neutrality becoming idiosyncratic to the civil service.
29
professionalization and specialization. Authors notice two different paths. In Prance,
Germany, and the United States part of the civil service developed into a highly specialized
corps directly attached to the government. Such civil servants are loyal to the government in
power and often return to purely administrative jobs at the end of the politicians' terms. In
Great Britain and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the civil service developed into a
neutral and loyal body of generalists that remains in office when a new government is sworn
Civil service acts have become the norm, and the focus is on increasing performance and
decreasing bureaucratic delays. At the same time, the bureaucracy became subject to
extensive criticism, not only for its expanding size, but also for its lack of efficiency and
representativeness.
Weber (1947, 1965), who introduced the concept of bureaucracy to the social sciences, was
convinced that bureaucracy is superior to any other organizational form and explained its
What elements of bureaucracy explain its rationality? The main features were developed
by Weber in the volume Economy and Society (1968) and have been expanded over time by
other authors (see Gajduschek 2003 for a discussion of other authors' interpretations of and
following features:
1. "They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal
official obligation.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.
4. The office if filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free
selection.
30
5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualification. In the most rational case,
6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to
pension [...].
9. The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and
10. He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office"
In Weber's view, all bureaucratic organizations are evolving, moving from the patrimonial
form to the legal-rational (or modern) form. The patrimonial type of bureaucracy involves an
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of
those exercising authority under them (Weber 1947, 328). Unlike the modern bureaucracy, in
a patrimonial bureaucracy obedience is owed to the person who occupies the traditionally
At the other end of the spectrum, the legal-rational type of bureaucracy is characterized
by "a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to
authority under such rules to issue commands" (Weber 1947, 328). In such a system,
obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order, and not to a person. State
officials derive their authority from professional credentials and policy-making expertise. The
competence.
31
What explains Weber's assumption that all bureaucracies would ultimately become
universal increase in both rationality and bureaucratic structures. As, in his view, the two
necessarily go hand in hand, the natural conclusion was that bureaucracies would evolve to be
rational. That is why in Weberian terms bureaucracy is an organizational form that derives
with legal-rationality. Bureaucracies in established democracies can be slow, too complex, and
even annoying, but they are not highly discretionary (an essential characteristic of
The Weberian (or classical) approach to civil service reform has been prevalent until the
late 1970s and 1980s, when dissatisfied with Weber's emphasis on rationality, authors
During the 1980s a "paradigm shift" occurred (Ingraham 1996), with a move away from what
is now seen as the traditional, progressive era set of doctrines of good administration,
emphasizing orderly hierarchies, depoliticized bureaucracy, and the elimination of overlap, and
toward what has been called New Public Management or NPM (Hood 1996). NPM is
shorthand for a group of administrative doctrines that figured prominently in the agenda for
NPM grew out of the conviction that the government had growr? too big and that it must
delegate some of its activities to private institutions. Its core concept is that private
management is superior to public management, with an emphasis on the citizen (or customer)
and a focus on accountability for results. Structurally, NPM favors the decentralization of
3
Mazzuca (2007) considers that there is little hope for the new democracies that have patrimonial bureau-
cracies to become stable democracies. Most consolidated democracies have undergone the process of bureau-
cratization before democratizing. Therefore, he concludes, "we know little about the development of the coun-
tries that have democratized the access to power in a context where patrimonialism is the prevailing form of
exercise."
32
authority and control, and a wide variety of alternative service delivery mechanisms, including
quasi-markets, with service providers competing for resources from policy-makers (Aucoin
1990, Manning 2002). 4 NPM fit into the larger tenet, conveyed by its advocates, that the
government should "steer, but not row" (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
NPM doctrinaires believed that public sector jobs should function according to the same
principles as private sector jobs. They were of the opinion that the so-called merit systems and
other public personnel practices protected the incompetent, the inefficient, the lazy, the burnt
out, and even the corrupt. Consequently, public personnel practices had to be overhauled to
allow greater competition and increase overall efficiency (Caiden 2004). NPM promoted the
devaluing of the career service and the opening of most senior positions in government to
individuals who had spent some or all of their careers in the private sector. Managers (or
public administrators in more traditional language) were viewed as the principal actors in
governance, with politicians being something of a necessary evil for governing (Peters 2001).
As a recent World Bank study of administrative change in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Russia has noted, the CEE countries have steered curiously clear of the NPM approach, as the
implicit systems and models adopted so far have been centralized hierarchies of the Weberian
tradition (Nunberg 1999). Western international agencies, such as the World Bank, SIGMA
(Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), or the European Union (EU) did
not challenge the "strong national and organizational cultural preferences in CEE countries for
these classical traditions" (Nunberg 1999, 264). In fact, such institutions seem, on the whole,
Manning asserts that it is "certainly commonplace for weary consultants and development
agency staff to maintain that there is little in the NPM technical/managerial amalgam that is
appropriate for the politicized public sectors in many developing countries" (2002, 297). 5
4
The NPM argument for autonomous agencies is that service providers should concentrate on efficient
production of quality services, with the distractions of evaluating alternative policies removed. NPM was con-
ceived as a device for improving efficiency and responsiveness to political principals (Manning 2002).
5
As far as SIGMA is concerned, its programs have been informed by skepticism, if not "the rejection of
the transfer of the concepts of the new public management that derive from the managerialist administrative
systems of Anglo-Saxon countries" (Goetz 2001a, 1035).
33
2.3 T h e Civil Service in Central and Eastern Europe
Theoretically, public administrations are non-political bodies serving the political government
in power at a certain time; they act with professionalism and impartiality according to defined
rules and procedures that are applied universally; they are organized hierarchically,
distinction between private and public spheres, and receptiveness to political pressure. All
these features can be traced back to the way the bureaucracy functioned during communism.
During communism, a parallel party bureaucracy, consisting of party loyalists, was created
to mirror the state administration. This party bureaucracy developed policies, gave orders,
and controlled the state bureaucracy. In some countries, the party bureaucracy was integrated
into the administration, such that one person could be both a senior party official and a
although quite rational from the point of view of its political and ideological functions
some bureaucratic features (hierarchy, files, secrecy), but overall it was characterized by a lack
examinations, and no merit system. Advancement into the nomenklatura occurred primarily
on the initiative of the communist party, not the aspiring bureaucrat. Political qualifications,
such as "political maturity and reliability, devotion to the party and people, ability to orient
oneself towards the party line, conviction in the future of the communist cause, responsibility
and personal loyalty," were elevated to the status of central credentials for recruitment and
6
In a study tracking the careers of 989 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the
Soviet Union from 1912 to 1969, Levytsky (1969) found that a majority of these members had served in the
civil service.
7
The term translates literally to "nomenclature" - a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, in-
cluding a description of the duties of each office. However, in common use, it became synonymous with the
appointees designated by the communist party.
34
promotion (Voslenskii 1984, 46-81). 8 The effect was that the "administrative side of the
I must emphasize that there was some variation across different countries as to the relative
weight of political criteria in personnel policy. In some countries, political reliability was a
political loyalty was the worst requirement, while state servants made definite
efforts to maintain their professional integrity [...] Political control over
appointments was strong, but officially a so-called 'triple requirement' was
established for state servants: political loyalty, professional merits and moral
integrity. After launching the economic reforms in 1968, a more liberal regime was
built and the equal importance of those three requirements was emphasized. (Vass
2001, 154; similarly Gyorgy 1999, 143)
Since communism was an authoritarian system based on (1) collective ownership of all
means of production and (2) political repression, we would expect it to display low levels of
autonomy for individual actors in any area. We would imagine a centralized, vertically and
horizontally integrated hierarchy, where the center (i.e., central committee of a communist
party and its government apparatus) directed resources and controlled activities of
organizations and individuals. In reality, central planning was a mere illusion, a fagade for the
dichotomy between the real rules and the official ones. Local groups tried to maximize their
share of the social pie and used economic planning as an instrument and an ideological
smokescreen to amass monopoly power over the allocation of scarce resources, information,
Consequently, corruption occurred at the lower levels of administration. Civil servants were
often willing to circumvent administrative procedures in return for favors from citizens. The
legal system was extensive, detailed, and, to a large extent, unpublicized and if civil servants
8
Under this system, personnel policy and its execution were exclusively in the hands of the party leaders,
which led to a strengthening of the client-patron networks (Bauman 1979, 187).
9
"At the post-totalitarian stage, and especially in the age of Communist sclerosis, the Nomenklatura grad-
ually became a device for political advancement of persons who made a successful career inside the profes-
sional bureaucracy. Membership in the Nomenklatura became more of a supplementary burden and an im-
posed set of ritual obligations than a source of power and prestige. The Communist Party membership became
a ticket, bought to continue one's professional career" (Sootla 2002, 29).
35
in lower level positions had followed the letter of the law, the entire system would have been
obstructed (Sootla 2002). 10 Nevertheless, this bypassing of rules and regulations had a long
lasting effect, creating a culture where corruption and arbitrariness became ordinary. 11
The distinction between public and private property was absent, and the entire economy
was controlled by governmental ministries and subject to uniform regulation. This blurring of
the distinction between public and private not only led to enterprises behaving like the "civil
service" (fulfilling similar functions), but also to civil servants behaving like corporate
managers (Beblavy 2005). In other words, the two groups were part of a unified system under
which civil servants lacked the distinction between state and private interests/property. By
comparison, in a democracy civil servants have to behave as service providers in a free market.
We know that communist bureaucracies played an important role in managing the state,
and especially the economy. Therefore, it is hard to believe that institutions with such a large
role were devoid of any positive features. Empirically, however, it is difficult to identify their
beneficial aspects. Anusiewicz et al. (2001) point to the relatively high level of transparency in
the system; the mechanisms of accountability; long tenures, especially at lower tiers; and the
clear division of responsibility for different administrative tasks. While this may be the case,
it is undeniable that the Soviet-style bureaucracies deviated from the Weberian type in
multiple ways. Among these are: (1) the disparity between the actual and formally prescribed
rules; (2) the superior position of the party organs and party officials vis-a-vis state
administrators; (3) the overlapping jurisdiction and blurred division of labour between the
government and party hierarchies; (4) the frequent reliance on 'political judgement' (rather
than formal regulations); (5) the widespread tolerance of extra-legal and illegal practices; (6)
the importance of ideology and the centrality of charismatic elements in political leadership;
and (7) the widespread patronage associated with the nomenklatura system of appointments
(Rigby 1982). 12
10
The instrumental treatment of regulations prevented any deadlock in the communist system. The bending
and stretching of rules was essential for the effective operation of the society and these practices were accepted
and tolerated as the way of getting things done and correcting for the rigidity of the centralized economic sys-
tem. Some critics have even suggested that 'work according to rules' would have been synonymous with paral-
ysis of the system, and 'work according to rational calculation' would have seriously jeopardized the positions
of state administrators.
11
A number of studies (Hough 1969, Rigby 1979, and Schapiro 1970) suggest that Soviet-style politico-
administrative systems were characterized by the existence of a 'second polity' (analogous to the 'second econ-
omy'). This 'second polity' was abounding with patronage and informal connections (Bauman 1979).
12
Hough's study on the Soviet prefects portrays an administrative system lacking such elementary bureau-
cratic features as "a clear line of subordination and clearly defined spheres of responsibilities in the party ap-
36
It is undeniable that the communist era had enduring effects on the administrative
combined with the absence of any institutions of accountability, which were destroyed under
dictatorship. 13 The challenge now is for states to transform the communist "politbureacracy"
(Verheijen 1999) into a permanent, professional, and impartial civil service, capable of serving
Before analyzing the different civil service systems created by their respective civil service acts
(in Chapter 3), I will briefly discuss the two main perspectives on the reform process in CEE.
On the one hand, we have the modernization theory that, in a classical Weberian perspective,
views legal-rational bureaucracies as an integral part of the overall political and economic
integral part of democracy. On the other hand, the Europeanization approach focuses on the
Modernization theory
Political scientists and sociologists explain the evolution of the CEE bureaucracies primarily
through the lens of modernization theory. Viewed from this perspective, post-communist
2001a). Moreover, liberal democracy is associated with a specific type of public administration
paratus", resembling the "Napoleonic administration of appointed local prefects." The prefect's power was not
formally regulated; it differed in relation to tasks, successes in fulfilling duties, and personal links with the top
leadership. Remuneration of the party 'prefects' (i.e., secretaries) depended on the fulfillment of plans, and
their promotion occurred on the basis of political commitment to or existence of "certain political and psycho-
logical values." Bending and breaking the law was tolerated, especially when the fulfilment of tasks is at stake;
success justified all irregularities, such as using personal connections, petty bribery, blackmail, etc. The activi-
ties of administrative organs were not subject to any clear limitations as far as their interference with the lives
of citizens was concerned (Hough 1969, 189-300).
13
According to Mungiu-Pippidi, corruption manifests itself not only as the use of public office for personal
gain, but more broadly as the widespread infringement on the norms of impersonality and fairness that pre-
sumably characterize modern societies (2002/2003, 82).
37
(i.e., legal-rational bureaucracy). For example, Linz and Stepan identify 'rational-legal
bureaucratic norms' as the 'primary organizing principle' of the state apparatus, which is one
of the five major arenas of a 'modern consolidated democracy' (the other arenas being civil
society, political society, economic society, and the rule of law). Ko.iig (1992) regards the 'real
'conventional West European system' as its developmental objective (similarly Hesse 1993a).
How does the modernization theory perspective explain civil service reform? Prime
explanatory power is accorded to: the constellation of domestic actors as, for example, in
Meyer-Sahling's (2001 and 2008) explanation of Hungary's front-runner status in civil service
'checked executive;' and the influence of communist and pre-communist legacies, most notably
cultural, behavioral, attitudinal, and mental orientations that are seen to hamper institutional
reform. As far as the latter variable is concerned, much has been made of the lack of popular
trust in public institutions (see Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001) and the effects of distrust within
administrative institutions, notably between officials and elected executive politicians (Vass
1999). This is not to say that modernization accounts are oblivious to the direct effects of
both external pressure and assistance on institutional change in the region. In this respect,
Brusis and Dimitrov (2001) analyze the impact of IMF pressures on executive arrangements
for budgetary policy-making. However, as a general rule, international factors are treated as
contextual variables that establish opportunities and constraints for domestic reforms, rather
Initially studies written from the modernization perspective were optimistic about the
outcome of civil service reform. Over time this optimism gave way to restraint. The
expectations for a radical and fast break with the institutional legacies of communism, which
had informed Western analyses of state administration during the early years of the transition
(see Hesse 1993a and 1993b), were replaced by more pessimistic assessments that highlighted
14
The 'real socialist' administration is shorthand for the organization of state power under communism that
was based on: the explicit rejection of a mechanism for effective separation of powers; a unifed state admin-
istration comprising all tiers of the state apparatus, with strong hierarchical controls and subordination; the
intertwining of party bureaucracy and state administration, with the former having directive authority over
the latter; a general disregard for the rule of law, so that party decisions took precedence over legal norms;
a personnel system that relied on politicized cadres and a party-controlled nomfinclatura; the reluctance to
acknowledge a separate public service identity; and an emphasis on economic planning and social control as
central administrative functions (Konig 1992). Also, see the previous discussion of communist bureaucracies in
Subsection 2.3.1.
38
reform delays and evidence of systematic gaps between reform legislation and the actual
administrative practice.
Europeanization A p p r o a c h
Since the mid-1990s, 'Europeanization' has evolved as the second major perspective on
administrative development in the region (Grabbe 2001, Lippert et al. 2001). The key
i
questions for the Europeanization approach are: (1) To what extent and in what ways have
the political systems of the Member States been transformed under the influence of European
integration, 15 and (2) What effect did the accession process have on the CEE public
administrations?
The literature centers on anticipatory effects (i.e., the manner in which future member
states prepare their administrative systems for accession) and anticipated effects (i.e., the
membership negotiations and eventual EU accession. Yet this emphasis has been criticized as
overly restrictive. Hence, some authors frame membership negotiations and accession as part
of a broader 'return to Europe' (Lippert et al. 2001). However, to the extent that
administrative Europeanization in CEE has been empirically investigated, the more narrow
understanding has prevailed (Nunberg 2000). The emphasis in such studies has been on the
challenges faced by states in adopting and implementing the EU body of law (acquis
communautaire) and preparing for what, in EU parlance, has become known as the 'European
As with modernization accounts, the Europeanization approach regards the legacy of the
et al. 2001). The key developmental objective is not, therefore, to build a modern bureaucracy
that would fulfill traditional roles for the state, but instead to create a public administration
that allows the future member states to act as effective players in the EU's multi-level
15
See Knill 2001 for a detailed account of the Europeanization of national administrations.
39
governance system (Lippert et al. 2001).
Grabbe (2001) points out that there is little chance (or danger) that European integration
will lead to the emergence of a uniform model of public administration amongst the applicant
member states make such an outcome unlikely. But EU-compatibility is seen as the decisive
In terms of the actors involved, the Europeanization perspective explicitly recognizes the
significance of external pressures and expectations and the role of both international agencies
and Western governments in shaping the path of administrative reform in CEE. The
monitoring, imposing legislative and institutional templates, supplying aid and technical
How Europeanized are the administrations of the CEE applicant states? Empirical
assessments until now have concentrated on linkage issues, i.e., the institutional arrangements
that link national executives and EU authorities and the institutional practices that have
evolved at the national level to support national-EU connections (Agh 1999; Lippert et al.
2001; Verheijen in SIGMA 1998). What these studies show is that European integration
appears to have acted as a force for institutional change, but that this transformation
occurred only at the top levels where experts are required to manage accession negotiations
factor in the emergence of post-communist core executives (Goetz and Wollmann 2001; Zubek
2001). However, there is little evidence for strong horizontal and vertical diffusion effects. In
fact, Goetz (2001) argues that European integration appears to contribute to the creation of
'enclaves' within the administration. These 'enclaves' are formed by civil servants who are
highly professional and deal with the European Union institutions. Unfortunately their
technocratic excellence is an exception and does not diffuse across institutions (Goetz 2001). 16
16
Nunberg observed that "EU accession institutions stand out from overall public administration organs in
quality and efficiency [...] Staff associated with the dedicated EU management institutions have high status,
are multilingual and have higher skills and educational levels than general civil service staff. Remuneration
levels tend to be higher, resulting from explicit bonus programs or circumvention of standardized civil service
constraints." Moreover, there is the danger of a "post- accession brain drain of skilled personnel that many
expect to occur in national EU structures [...] Talent may be lost to Brussels or to the private sector" (2000,
20).
40
The conclusion is that in much of CEE administrative development has not advanced
'according to plan,' i.e., in line with the aspirations of domestic modernizers and
Europeanizers, the initial expectations of many external analysts, or the reform agendas of
international organizations. Nunberg's sombre conclusion reflects a widely shared sentiment:
"bureaucracies of the ancien regime have proved strikingly resistant to wholesale
transformation, dashing notions that modern, 'Western-style' administrations could be
installed with minimal effort and maximal speed" (1999, 265-6). What exactly do the civil
service systems in the CEE post-communist democracies look like? The next chapter
discusses them in depth.
41
Chapter 3
In this chapter I analyze the civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 1 to
What are the characteristics of the civil service systems created in CEE after the
collapse of communism?
To this end, I identify systemic institutional differences that could explain why some systems
function better than others. This research has important policy implications. If certain
institutional variations are more effective at increasing professionalism (for example) within
the civil service, then countries reforming their administrative system need only adopt the
"right" institutional model. But if differences in outcome are not explained by institutional
idiosyncrasies, the reform process should focus on other factors (such as party system
What does it mean for a civil service system to function well? What is the definition of
civil service performance? A civil service system that performs well is one that is highly
quality created by the Political Risk Society, a political risk assessment company. The
measure gives a high number pf points to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength
services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat insulated from
political pressure and has an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries
that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive a lower number of points
42
day-to-day administrative functions.
The information in this chapter makes an important contribution to the scarce amount of
comparative research focused on the civil service. The upper (managerial) level civil service
has received more attention (Aberbach et al. 1981; Bekke and van der Meer 2001; Dogan 1975;
Farazmand 1997; O'Dwyer 2006, Pierre 1995; Rose 1985; Verheijen 1999) and with few
exceptions (Rose 1985; Verheijen 1999) these works focus exclusively on the interaction
between political and administrative systems. 2 Moreover, a majority of these studies looks at
Western European systems (with the exception of O'Dwyer 2006 and Veheijen 1999). More
recently, international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (through its Public Management (PUMA) and Support for
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have taken an interest in generating information
on civil service systems. Their approach, excluding SIGMA's work on CEE, has placed a
heavy emphasis on the export of New Public Management (NPM) concepts (see Chapter 2 for
details on NPM). While these studies are informative, they fail to generate comparative work,
There are two main gaps in the literature with respect to the civil service: (1) a majority
of the studies looks at only one country, with the literature devoid of works that examine the
civil services collectively and in relation to one another; and (2) prior studies attempting to
identify the dimensions of civil service systems have failed empirically, as these dimensions
present analysis fills these two gaps in the literature, by identifying the dimensions of civil
2
It is worth mentioning that there are also several historical studies that look at the evolution of the civil
service systems through phases of development. For example, Pierre (1995), Raadschelders and Rugers (1996),
and Raadschelders (1998) distinguish between five phases: (1) civil servants as personal servants; (2) civil ser-
vants in the state service; (3) civil servants in public service; (4) civil service as protected service; and (5) the
civil service as professional service. They suggest the following factors to explain the evolution: the impor-
tance of nation state building; the demarcation between the public and private domains of life; the creation of
a separate civil service identity with respect to, amongst other things, their legal status; the expansion of gov-
ernment tasks; and the increasing professionalism of the civil service.
3
Attempts to systematize civil service systems have proved inadequate. For example, Morgan and Perry
(1988) advocate a configuration approach modeled on four properties that serve as parameters: rules, struc-
tures, roles, and norms. Similarly, Heady (1996) proposes five dimensions along which civil service systems
can be placed. These configurations are, nevertheless, inadequate for analyzing the CEE cases. For example,
Verheijen and the other authors contributing to his extensive comparative study on CEE attempt to position
the civil service systems according to Morgan and Perry's parameters and along Heady's dimensions. They
conclude that such an undertaking is "difficult" and forces a high degree of subjectivity (Torres-Bartyzel and
Kacprowicz 1999).
43
service systems and looking at a large number of cases (16 countries). Only by comparing one
system to another can we identify what makes some systems function better than others.
My approach is to look empirically at the civil service acts from sixteen countries to
identify concrete variables of the civil service systems. 4 I then place these variables under a
number of conceptual dimensions that are intellectually interesting and meaningful: capacity,
advantage of being exhaustive, ensuring that significant, but less obvious, characteristics do
not escape my analysis. By the end of this chapter I hope to determine where these systems
are situated on an imaginary merit-spoils system scale (i.e., to determine how meritocratic
My research indicates that the civil service systems designed by civil service acts combine
meritocratic elements with the means for direct political influence through preferential
procedures. I also find that, despite the widely-held negative public sentiment and anecdotal
evidence from the literature of a bloated system, CEE civil services are lean compared to
those of developed democracies. Cross-national longitudinal data show that countries have
followed very different employment patterns after 1990, and that a change in the number of
I use the concept of "civil service system" as a core abstraction in this chapter. Civil
service systems are defined as "mediating institutions that mobilise human resources in the
service of the affairs of the state in a given territory" (Morgan and Perry 1988, 85-86). 5 By
using civil service systems instead of better known concepts, such as bureaucracy, I can avoid
certain misconceptions. Bureaucracy has manifold meanings even in the Weberian sense: a
form of organization, a state of societal development, and a staff of officials supporting the
implementation of authority. In our everyday lives, the term "bureaucracy" has acquired
(rightly or wrongly) a pejorative meaning, which hinders objective research. Moreover, the
two terms - civil service system and bureaucracy - are not conceptually equivalent, as civil
4
What variables should be used to describe civil service systems? In general, the variables chosen depend
on the problems being researched (Miller and Friesen 1984). Hall (1972) suggests that a thorough characteri-
zation of organizational configurations should include variables "describing their technology, environment, type
of personnel, structure, process, and organizational output." Hall states that the variables chosen should inter-
relate to produce predictive configurations.
5
Heady (1996) and Morgan (1996) have a similar understanding of civil service systems.
44
service system is a sub-dimension of bureaucracy.
This investigation relies on a thorough examination of the rules and procedures regulating
the civil service. These regulations are assembled into civil service laws (or civil service acts). 7
I collected the civil service laws adopted since the fall of communism in CEE and constructed
an original dataset that enables me to analyze the civil service systems along the
aforementioned dimensions. While the same countries have adopted multiple laws (see Figure
3.1), I look at only one law per country. In most cases this is the most recent law (this choice
was made out of necessity as the most recent laws are the ones more easily accessible). 8
Why should we look at civil service laws? As detailed in Section 3.1, civil service laws
regulate crucial aspects of the civil service, such as recruitment practices and advancement
procedures (among other things). Hence, they are the ideal reservoir of information regarding
the civil service. Moreover, these data have not been explored by any researcher to date.
The sixteen countries in my study (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) vary greatly in terms of the nature of the
authoritarian (e.g., Czech and Slovak Republics), national accommodative (e.g., Hungary and
Poland), or patrimonial (e.g., Bulgaria and Romania); by level of economic development (in
1990 GDP per capita ranged from $690 in Moldova to $7,300 in Slovenia; in 2006 GDP per
capita ranged from $490 in Moldova to $12,000 in Slovenia 9 ); or by cultural and religious
prevalence (for example, Poland and Hungary are predominantly Catholic, Romania and
Bulgaria are Orthodox, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is Muslim). Some of these countries have
been part of the Soviet Union (e.g., Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova), while others
were part of federal states that have disintegrated since the collapse of communism (e.g.,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia were part of the
6
Using the concept of civil service systems presupposes an institutional approach. According to Bekke et
al. (1996) institutions are not identical to organizations, but should in fact be separated from them (see also
North 1990). Institutions are the driving force behind organizations because they direct organizational behav-
ior. In that sense, civil service systems are to be seen as sets of rules and authority relations, which shape the
behavior of the members of the civil service. A rule contains norms about prescribed behavior and constitutes
a point of convergence for the expectations of the actors involved.
7
I use the terms civil service laws and civil service acts interchangeably.
8
Ideally, I would compare different laws adopted in one country over time, to see what changes were made
to the system. Unfortunately, only the most recent version of these laws is available.
9
Based on data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
45
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the Czech Republic and Slovakia formed Czechoslovakia), and
the rest were independent states under the influence of the Soviet Union. Finally, the
majority of these countries, but not all of them, have become members of the European Union
(or are on course for accession). These cases also greatly vary by level of bureaucratic
Ideally, this study would include all the post-communist states in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, I was unable to obtain the civil service laws
for Russia and the authoritarian republics in Central Asia (see Table A.l for a list of the laws,
states with the ones in democratic countries would have made this investigation even more
This chapter is organized into several subsections. I first discuss the importance of civil
service laws, as well as their main elements. I then analyze each dimension of the civil service
system, using original data collected from civil service laws. I complement this information
with figures from case studies and country reports compiled by international organizations.
By the end of the chapter, I find that CEE systems display many similarities and conclude
that the institutional setting does not explain the variation in performance.
It is imperative to know why civil service acts are indispensable. After all, if they were not
essential, analyzing them would be futile. This section pays tribute to the civil service law.
As a special regulation, the civil service law constitutes the means through which basic
aspects regarding civil servants can be defined: who is qualified to be a civil servant, what are
his/her rights and duties, what are the circumstances under which the employment
relationship ends, what bodies manage the civil service, and so forth. According to SIGMA
independence, while at the same time ensuring the accountability of the staff
10
Missing from the study are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
46
Figure 3 . 1 . T i m e l i n e of Civil Service Laws in C E E and Central A s i a (by D a t e
of A d o p t i o n ) .
Note: The laws I analyze are in red.
Kazakhstan
Russia
Romania
Bosnia- Georgia Serbia & Lithuania 2
Montenegro
Herzegovina Moldova
Poland Kyrkyzstan Latvia?. Slovakia s,,m,ja B<)Snia,
Croatia Lithuania Turkmenistan Bulgaria Azerbaijan Armenia Czedi Herzegovina 2 Kyrgyzstan 2 Croatia 3
Hungary Ukraine Latvia Estonia Albania Poland 2 Albania 2 Macedonia Croatia 2 Republic Belarus Montenegro Serbia Tajikistan
1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007
enable the government to adapt the administration to changing needs (e.g., through
restructuring, to cut costs or to reallocate human resources from one part of the civil
service to another)
give the public administration legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry and make citizens
and other groups of state employees accept the features underlying a professional civil
service
The civil service law is also the mechanism through which civil service reform is carried
out. A majority of CEE countries have adopted such laws. 11 Some of these laws have been
modified, while others have been repealed and replaced with new ones (see Figure 3.1 and
Table A.l for details on the timeline of adoption for the civil service acts). This legal effort is
driven by the belief that a permanent and stable professional civil service is necessary for the
state to perform its functions in a satisfactory manner. Specific civil service laws are
the general provisions of the Labor Code, which had negative repercussions on the level of
47
Figure 3.2. Dimensions of Civil Service Systems.
Capacity
Professionalism
personnel qualifications
recruitment procedure
rules for advancement
training programs
average tenure and turnover rates
salary system
Transparency
Accountability
In writing this analysis, one of the more challenging issues was deciding how best to organize
the interesting information gathered from inspecting the civil service acts. While being
amongst the options considered, a discussion of the civil service systems around the structure
of the laws was the least appealing. This is why I opted to depict these systems along
dimensions13 that reflect the larger implications embodied in these provisions (see Figure 3.2).
For instance, an enumeration of the civil servants' rights may appeal to a civil servant
interested in knowing what he/she is licensed to do. However, these rights become
thought-provoking when we put them in the context of a larger category called 'job protection
l3
Some of these dimensions, such as professionalism, accountability, and transparency, are listed among the
principles governing these systems. Please see Appendix B for a complete list of principles.
48
guarantees,' which in turn is part of a larger concept of 'independence from external
influence.' To anchor these provisions in the empirical reality, I corroborate the legal
information with statistics from various studies, primarily World Bank and SIGMA reports
(for more details regarding the civil service laws, please see Appendix B).
These topics are not mutually exclusive, but hopefully they are commonly exhaustive.
What I mean by this is that some of the issues I discuss under one theme may be pertinent to
other themes, as well. For example, wage policy is relevant not only to professionalism (the
dimension under which I address it), but also to capacity, transparency, and independence.
When this is the case, I make a reference sending the reader to the appropriate section.
3.2.1 Capacity
Because the civil service plays such a preeminent role in securing a properly functioning state,
administrative capacity is an essential characteristic of a civil service system. One could argue
that this dimension is all-encompassing; after all, isn't professionalism an aspect of capacity?
Here, I opt for an understanding of capacity limited primarily to size. I discuss the definition
of the civil servant (the scope of the law) because before we start to tally, we need to know
exactly who we are supposed to count. I will consider the issue of wages and their proportion
of gross domestic product (GDP), as well as other salary related issues under the dimension of
professionalism.
As authors have used different definitions of the civil service, I believe the best way to
start is by specifying what the civil service is and how it fits into the overall public
administration (see Figure 3.3). Part of the public employment, the civil service is formed of
civilian, central and local government employees, who are not in the domains of education,
W h o Is a Civil Servant?
Determining who is a civil servant is one of the most important aspects of a civil service law.
The difficulty arises in trying to create a balanced description that is not too narrow (thus
leaving a majority of the public personnel outside the protection of the act) and yet not too
inclusive either (which would nullify the purpose of the reform process by not enhancing the
49
Figure 3.3. C o m p o s i t i o n of P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t .
Slate-Owned Enterprises
Employees
As a general trend, the scope of the civil service has been defined in the literature
conservatively to include only those workers holding public authority or directly involved in
service is justified by the reduced role of the state: many activities previously carried out by
the central or local governments will be carried out in the future by the private sector. 14
From the analysis of the CEE laws it is clear that the scope of the law is defined by taking
50
Figure 3.4. C o m p o n e n t U n i t s of t h e Civil Service.
Civil Service
The scope of a civil service act is generally denned by referencing the institutions whose
employees are considered civil servants. As a rule, the civil service is composed of the
administrative staff in central administrative organs (e.g., office of the president, office of the
well as the support staff in regional and local agencies, and in administrative organs of local
governments (see Figure 3.4). Expressly excluded are positions filled through direct elections
(e.g., president, member of the legislature, mayors, etc.). For details on the exact institutions
The Hungarian and Lithuanian systems have a special category of civil servants: civil
relations (Verheijen 1997), civil servants of political or personal confidence have a tenure equal
to that of their appointing authority, which means that they do not form part of the
permanent civil service. In Lithuania, they occupy very high positions in the administrative
structure, as ministry and state secretaries. Because of the nature of their appointment, their
enrollment is generally limited. In Hungary, political advisors cannot number more than 5%
of the staff in an institution (SIGMA 2002h). Even so, because their responsibilities are not
clearly defined, they frequently encroach upon the duties of the permanent staff and state
secretaries. This situation spurs unhealthy competition in the top echelons of the
and civil servants have different bases of legitimacy. While politicians derive their legitimacy from the popular
vote, civil servants act on the basis of their qualifications.
51
administrative hierarchy, and makes it difficult for independent, professional policy advice to
What is the effect of this openly declared political class of civil servants? In Lithuania,
before the adoption of the 1999 Civil Service Act, approximately 30% of the civil servants
were dismissed or transferred after a general election. By contrast, after the legislative
reform, "the civil service has remained reasonably stable and shielded from politics, in spite of
2002g). After a change of government, only political advisers are removed from office.
However, during their tenure in office, political advisors can have great influence over policy'
decisions. In Lithuania, in each ministry and in the Prime Minister's office, political advisers
form a type of cabinet. The influence and size of these cabinets vary and depend on the
personality of the Prime Minister. While some Prime Ministers have favored larger cabinets,
others lean toward policy-making by professional career civil servants, under the control of
Similarly, in Hungary political advisors are generally removed from their positions when
there is a change of government, but they keep their civil servant status and can return to the
position they occupied before being politically appointed. Nonetheless, experience has shown
that these administrative secretaries end up leaving public service altogether when removed
from office, representing a loss of experience and expertise for the civil service (SIGMA
2002h). Moreover, the total dependency on ministerial goodwill to stay in a managerial office
The patent demarcation between civil servants and political appointees has some potential
advantages. This special class can insulate regular civil servants from political interference.
For the appointing authority, a political appointment solves the problem of trust. Political
appointees can act as a quasi-cabinet in which policies are designed, leaving their
implementation to the politically neutral civil servants. Civil servants of political confidence
Still, why does the scope of the law matter? For cross-national research, one needs a clear
definition of the variable to be analyzed. But such clarity is lacking when it comes to the
definition of the civil servant. For example, under the Estonian law, judges are part of the
52
civil service. But they are expressly excluded in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovakia. To
add to the conceptual tangle, in Moldova and Lithuania only Supreme Court and
Constitutional Court judges are outside the scope of the law. 16 Taking into account this
variation in scope, it is of little wonder that most comparative studies include only a small
number of countries. This variation explains also the lack of sound comparative data on
Size
In the 1990s the World Bank started to emphasize downsizing as a key component of
administrative reform in developing countries. Its argument was that many civil services were
overstaffed and that this underutilized workforce placed a great strain on a country's budget
(see MacGregor et al. 1998 for a discussion on the role and modalities of downsizing in
developing countries). Other authors (most notably O'Dwyer 2004 and 2006) have argued
efficiency and was in fact an indicator of patronage politics. However, in any given case, it is
impossible to determine a priori how much of this expansion was functional and how much
was political. A considerable part of the growth could be explained by the demand for greater
levels of government services during economic development (Wagner's Law, which contends
that economic development generates demand for greater levels of government services).
Patronage politics could (and undoubtedly did) play a role. For example, Gimpelson (2003)
notes that the Russian civil service declined in size in the early 1990s, only to swell by more
than 15% between 1994 and 2000. But when compared to OECD countries, 17 the Russian civil
service at almost 1.8% of total employment, and 0.8% of the population, is quite lean (the
16
Similarly, in Hungary, the law covers the employees of the National Radio and Television Board, while
under the Czech law members of the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting are not considered civil
servants. In Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, and Slovakia the civil service act applies to members of
the Audit Office, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina it does not apply to the Auditor-General and the Deputy
Auditors-General (though it is unclear whether it applies to the rest of the employees in the office). In Esto-
nia, the Public Service Act extends to police officers, border guard officials and prison officers, while the scope
of the Hungarian law excludes these categories. The Slovak and Slovene laws give civil servant status to mem-
bers of the police force, prison warden and customs officers, but specify that they are governed by special regu-
lations.
17
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and United States.
When regional comparisons are made, I exclude the CEE countries from the OECD sample.
53
Table 3 . 1 . Civil Service E m p l o y m e n t Worldwide (as % of P o p u l a t i o n ) .
Government Administration
Region
Central Local
Africa
0.9 0.3
(20 countries)
Asia
0.9 0.7
(11 countries)
Eastern Europe and former USSR
1.0 0.8
(17 countries)
Latin America & Caribbean
1.2 0.7
(9 countries)
Middle East and North Africa
1.4 0.9
(8 countries)
OECD
1.8 2.5
(21 countries)
Total sample = 86 countries 1.2 1.1
average for the OECD countries is 10% of total employment and 4.3% of total population).
The size of the civil service is a very contentious matter. While public opinion and
researchers usually share the belief that the civil service is very large and unnecessarily
inflated, very little data exist on the actual size of the civil service. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) asks states to report data on the size of their 'general government
employees' (see Figure 3.3) annually. Unfortunately this data are not disaggregated, so we do
not know whether the increase (or decrease) in size is the result of an increase (or decrease) in
The most reliable data are based on a World Bank cross-national survey of approximately
100 countries, carried out in the early 1990s. 18 Worldwide, civil service employment averaged
(on an unweighted basis for all countries of the sample) 2.3% of the population. It was the
highest in the OECD countries (at 4.3%) and the lowest in Africa (at 1.2%) (see Table 3.1).
Do higher numbers correspond to higher quality work from the civil service? Is the
government more effective when there are more civil servants per capita? Figures 3.5 and 3.6
show a positive relation between civil service employment (as % of population) and
'government effectiveness' (as measured by the World Bank) 1 9 on the one hand, and 'quality
18
The quality of the data varies per country. The authors (Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso, and Mukherjee)
conclude that the data are comparable for 86 countries, but they do not specify exactly in how many countries
the survey was administered. They also refer to the data as being from the 'early 1990s' but no exact year is
specified.
19
'Government effectiveness' measures "the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
54
Figure 3.5. Civil Service E m p l o y m e n t and Government Effectiveness World-
wide.
Source: World Bank
Note: Civil service employment data are from the early 1990s. 'Government effectiveness' runs
from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 indicating a very effective government. I used the 1996 score, the first
score in the series. N = 119
2.5
1.5
w
CO
CD i-
c
CD
> .5"
*
o
CD
*=
LLI - r^"-""
o- \-^*"^
t ^ ^*r%
c
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rnm
-.5-
CD
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>
o _ t
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-1.5-
-2H
-2.5 H
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10
Civil Service Employment as % of Population
of bureaucracy' (as measured by the International Country Risk Guide - ICRG) 2 0 on the
other. The positive relationship holds for CEE countries, though it is weaker (see Figure 3.7).
What these figures show is that, not surprisingly, a larger civil service is associated with
better quality public services. 21 This is consistent with O'Donnell's (1999) assertion that the
antonym of big is not small, but lean. That is, there is nothing inherently bad about large
civil services. 22
In CEE during the 1990s, there was an expectation that civil services would downsize
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (Kaufmann et al. 2007, 3).
20
'Quality of bureaucracy' captures the strength of the bureaucracy. "High points are given to countries
where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interrup-
tions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous
from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack
the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be
traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions" (ICRG Codebook).
21
Using data on regional variation in bureaucratic employment in Russia, Gehlbach (2008) illustrates the
importance of accounting for economies of scale in the state administration.
22
The positive relationship does not hold across geographical regions. For a breakdown of the trends by
region, please see Figures A.l and A.2.
55
Figure 3.6. Civil Service E m p l o y m e n t and Quality of B u r e a u c r a c y Worldwide.
Source: World Bank and ICRG
Note: Civil service employment data are from the early 1990s. 'Quality of bureaucracy' runs
from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating a high quality bureaucracy. I used the data from 1993 with the
exceptions of Belarus, Ukraine, and Croatia for which the closest available data were from 1998.
For the same reason, I used the 1999 scores for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Slovenia. N = 99
o
CO
o
5
co
CD
CO
*
o
To
O
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10
(Brym 2004, Gimpelson 2003, O'Donnell 2006). The motivation for downsizing has usually
been a combination of fiscal discipline (governments trying to reduce the costs of public
administration) and a desire to move toward a more market oriented economy. 23 Most authors
report that the legacy of the socialist system, in which the state was supposed to provide for
everything, is a bloated public sector. They argue that a contraction in the role of the state
How have CEE civil service systems evolved since the collapse of communism?
Cross-national longitudinal data on civil service employment are very scarce. All the data
available come from a limited number of case studies. But we can use these data to get an
idea of the trends in employment. As shown in Figure 3.8, for some countries (i.e., Hungary)
the number of civil servants declined in the 1990s, while in other countries it increased, either
23
Neoliberals advocate limiting the government and importing market mechanisms into the public arena
(Albert 1993; Pierson 1994).
24
Interestingly, Lee and Strang (2003) uncover a diffusion effect in public sector employment in OECD
countries between 1980 and 1997. This mutual influence exists among nations that are geographically close
and that trade extensively, but not among competitors. Moreover, downsizing is contagious, while upsizing is
not.
56
Figure 3.7. Civil Service Employment and Quality of Bureaucracy, and Civil
Service Employment and Government Effectiveness in CEE.
Source: World Bank and ICRG
Note: Civil service employment data are from the early 1990s. 'Government effectiveness' runs
from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 indicating a very effective government. I used the 1996 score, the first
score in the series. 'Quality of bureaucracy' runs from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating a high quality
bureaucracy. I used the data from 1993 with the exception of Croatia for which the closest
available data were from 1998. For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Slovenia I used the
1999 scores. Data missing for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. N = 14
m
m
CD
c
CD
.>
t5
CD
S=
Hi
tz
<x>
c
CD
>
O
O
-2.5'
2 3 4 5 6 7
o
CO
o
3
CO
CD
DO
O
>>
CO
8 i
57
Figure 3.8. N u m b e r of Civil Servants P e r Capita Over T i m e in Select C E E
Countries.
Source: Nunberg (2000), O'Dwyer (2006), and SIGMA.
o
0> 10
Q. a.
O
Poland Slovakia
Q.
w 6-|
moderately (in the Czech Republic) or dramatically (in Poland and Slovakia). 25 The 'quality
constant for all four countries during the time period for which we have data. 2 6 In conclusion,
employment data offer only a limited amount of information. We cannot tell whether
pattern may be a confirmation of Wagner's Law, which states that economic development
generates demand for greater levels of government services (Gimpelson and Triesman 2002).
However, what we can say is that in comparison with other regions (in Table 3.1), CEE civil
25
The Romanian newspaper "Ziarul Financiar" reported on August 19, 2005 that the number of civil ser-
vants in Romania increased by 10% since the collapse of communism.
26
Between 1993 and 2000, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were rated 3 (on a scale from 0 to 4, with
higher numbers indicating a better quality bureaucracy). Poland's rating jumped from 2.33 (in 1990) to 3 (in
2000). Hungary's rating also increased, from 3 (in 1993) to 3.7 (in 1997).
58
services do not appear to be "bloated."
3.2.2 Professionalism
In Plato's "The Statesman" government officials are weaving the future with the help of
knowledge. In CEE, their role is more limited: to formulate and implement the full range of
government programs associated with the transition to a market economy. How much
into professional career services focused on performance and providing services to ordinary
citizens? To assess this development, I will look at several aspects of the civil service system:
(1) requirements for entry in the civil service; (2) recruitment system; (3) career development;
Personnel are a major element of administrative capacity. Only committed, well-trained and
skilled staff, in brief professional personnel, can carry out the complex functions of the
government. One avenue through which governments can increase civil service professionalism
is by imposing certain preconditions for admittance into the system. For the system to attract
What are the requirements for becoming a civil servant? In this respect, there is much
similarity among CEE systems. Common criteria are: (1) citizenship; 28 (2) full capacity to
act; (3) age; 29 (4) good health; (5) educational background (I discuss this in detail below); (6)
lack of criminal record; (7) absence of a prior public service dismissal; (8) professional
experience (if required by the position and generally waived for entry level positions); and (9)
59
Out of this myriad of conditions, educational background and experience are the ones most
closely linked to professionalism. However, in most cases the laws are silent on the minimum
educational requirement. When it is mentioned, the standard varies: level VII education in
Bosnia and Herzegovina; high school level for managerial positions in Bulgaria; secondary
education in Slovenia. 31 In a study on the Russian bureaucracy, Gimpelson (2003) noted that
the level of education drops sharply at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. While the
highest chief and leading positions in federal agencies at the federal level are almost all held
by specialists with higher education, 20% of those holding senior positions have only a
secondary specialized education. Among junior positions, the ratio is even more worrisome:
37% with higher education as opposed to 43% with secondary specialized education. Hence, it
follows that 20% do not have even a secondary specialized education, which directly conflicts
with the federal law on civil service. In contrast, in Hungary, Gajduschek found that the
proportion of civil servants with a university degree had increased from 4 1 % in 1994 to 48% in
Prom the preceding information, there is little variation in terms of prerequisites that
would directly impact the professionalism of the cadres (or if such variation does exist, it does
not result from the prescriptions found in civil service acts, but from those established by
secondary legislation). However, the civil service systems analyzed here differ significantly in
one respect: the existence of a national school of public administration. The model for such a
school is the French Ecole Nationale D'Administration (ENA). ENA is the school where a
majority of French senior officials are instructed. Founded in 1945 by Charles de Gaulle, ENA
graduates roughly 100 students each year and was created in a move to make the recruitment
process more rational and democratic. By having a system solely based on academic
proficiency and competitive examinations, recruitment for top positions could be made more
criminal indictment before the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina); (5)
absence of professional record in the communist regime (Latvia).
31
In the Czech Republic, education obtained by studies at the Political University of the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy, and
at political and security colleges and training institutions in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) does not qualify as university-level education (2002 Czech Civil Service Act, article 7.7)
32
This may also be the consequence of a higher number of university graduates. During the communist
period, university enrollment was limited to a few dozen students for each specialization.
60
In an attempt to increase the professionalism of their recruits, Latvia, Poland, and
Romania have founded such institutions. In spite of its name, the Latvian School of Public
Administration is a training institute, its main functions being to "formulate civil service
training programmes, co-ordinate and ensure the process of the training of civil servants, and
formulate drafts of regulatory enactments, conceptual issues, reports, programmes and other
documents related to the training of civil servants" (2000 Civil Service Act, section 5). Civil
servants do not have to attend the school's programs before entering the civil service, a
The Polish National School of Public Administration is modeled after the ENA. Its
graduates are exempt from the preparatory service and enjoy preferential treatment for
nominations to become civil servants (1998 Civil Service Law, articles 27 and 29). Admission
to its program is very competitive; it recruits individuals who already hold a Master's degree
about 50 students per year, which represents approximately 0.03% of the total number of civil
servants. 33 This number is significant because of the way the Polish civil service system is
designed. There are two categories of employees in the civil service: 'civil service employees'
and 'civil servants.' The latter enjoy more job protection guarantees. Graduates of the
National School of Public Administration are nominated as civil servants after graduation.
Civil service employees can become civil servants if they acquire the necessary experience and
education (graduate degree), but one can remain with the 'civil service employee' status all
throughout the duration of employment. However, by 2002, only 10% of officials had become
The Romanian National School of Political and Administrative Studies has also had only
limited success. Despite its competitiveness (it has a small enrollment of about 40 students),
the school has struggled to place its graduates in desirable government posts. As an interim
measure, some graduates are awarded fellowships for internships abroad through external
assistance programs, while other graduates go into the private sector (Nunberg 1999, 89).
33
This calculation was made by taking into account that in 2002 employment in the civil service was at
178,700 workers.
61
Lustration Laws
Post-communist democracies face the challenge of coming to terms with their own past.
Perhaps the most thorny aspect of this problem is in defining the role that participants in,
collaborators with, or beneficiaries of the old regime will play in the new society. This process
of decommunization or lustration (derived from the Latin lustrace which stood for a purifying
ritual) is carried out through lustration laws. 34 The goal is to eliminate the mindset and
culture of communism by banning people who are associated with the previous regime from
elected or appointed positions in the new democratic institutions. To justify these laws,
proponents of lustration laws usually cite the concepts of justice and fairness, the practical
requirements of implementing democracy and a market economy, and public confidence in the
Lustration laws, when applied, 36 had unintended consequences: they depleted the system
understanding that without the managers, most of those whom had a party card, building a
capitalist society was on course for failure (Stewart and Stewart 1995, 905).
It is difficult to quantify how effective these laws are. We know that the magnitude of this
effect varies from country to country. For example, in the Czech Republic by 1993, 210,000
officials had been screened (but not all were civil servants - some were in elected positions).
But in Slovakia the law remained dormant for most of its existence (Ellis 1996). In Estonia,
the government introduced in 1992 a program called "Purge the Place," designed to replace
J
those civil servants who had entered into service during the Soviet regime (Sootla and Roots
1999, 252). By the spring of 1994, 73% of Estonian top officials had held their positions for
less than three years and altogether 37% of civil servants had been replaced (Sootla and Roots
1999, 240), 37
Are systems that have adopted lustration laws better off in the long term than those that
34
Lustration laws are not specific to post-communist regimes. They were employed in post-Nazi Germany
and today in Iraq, in the process of de-Baathification.
35
The international community generally condemns lustration laws because they go against the principles
of freedom of expression, freedom of political belief, and freedom from discrimination, as well as disregarding
the ex post facto application of the law (that is, the principle that acts committed before the adoption of a law
criminalizing them are not crimes).
36
Lustration laws were not applied with the same fervor in all countries. Thuir adoption and execution de-
pended primarily on how much influence the former communist elites had in the new system. For example, in
the Czech Republic the law was applied scrupulously, whereas in Romania it was mostly ignored.
37
Estonia does not have a lustration law per se but the rigid conditions for acquiring Estonian citizenship
have the same effect.
62
Table 3.2. Career v s . Position Civil Service S y s t e m s .
did not? The answer depends on whether these systems were able to attract capable recruits
and could afford to invest in their preparation. The advantage is a purging of past mentalities
S y s t e m of R e c r u i t m e n t
Civil service systems can be organized on a classical career model (closed system), a position
model (open system), or a combination of the two. The distinguishing feature of a career
system is that applicants enter the service in the first post of a specific career path (Bossaert
and Demmke 2003). Within this career, the civil servant can then be promoted according to
the legal requirements, take up new posts, and rise through the pay scales. Career systems are
very hierarchical and characterized by long tenures. By contrast, position systems are based
on the principle of recruiting the best person for the position. Civil servants in position
systems usually have both private sector and public sector experience, easily moving between
the two domains (for a comparison of the two systems, please see Table 3.2).
Is a career model more conducive to professionalization? On the one hand, a career system
prevents patronage (at least in high level positions) and, over time, leads to the creation of a
knowledgeable and dependable labor force. On the other hand, seniority or years spent in the
civil service assures a relatively slow progression on a career path whose end is modestly
rewarding (see forthcoming discussion on compression ratios and public versus private sector
pay). Additionally, politicians find ways to circumvent career systems. For example,
Gajduschek (2007) finds that in Hungary heads of department can make arbitrary promotions
63
by appointing someone to a so-called "titular position" that lifts the person to a higher
pay-grade than would have been given according to seniority. 38 Similarly, Goetz and Wollman
find that in the region there "is a more or less systematic gap between ostensible legislative
A majority of CEE countries have adopted systems that are closer to the career based
model. 39 Figure 3.9 displays the CEE systems along a continuum, from career to position
models. At one extreme, the systems closest to the career model display career paths in which
civil servants are organized in categories or classes (A, B, C) and in which civil servants gain
advancement according to the seniority principle. At the other extreme, in the Estonian
system, the most similar to the position model, civil servants can enter the system at any
position. Bossaert and Demmke found that in 2000 30% of senior civil servants were selected
from the private sector (2003: 37). The countries in the "mixed" category display features
closer to the career model than to the position one (the greater spatial distance between the
Czech Republic and Estonia than between the other groups of countries in the figure is
intentional).
How does a mixed system work? In Bosnia and Herzegovina - and the countries in its
group - positions are filled first through internal recruitment (from the same institution or
from other institutions) and only if they are not filled with existent civil servants will they be
advertised externally. In Poland, only civil servants can apply to senior positions, but
graduates of the National School of Public Administration can be appointed directly to senior
positions. Hungary and Lithuania (as previously discussed) have a special category of political
appointees - civil servants with limited tenure appointed to senior positions without having to
Republic former members of the government and the parliament can be appointed in
By comparison, in a study that looked at some of the OECD countries, the World Bank
found a preference for the position model over the career model (8 out of 14 countries chose a
38
For analysis of similar loopholes in the Hungarian Civil Service Act, see Gyorgy (1999) and Meyer-
Sahling (2001).
39
The preference of one system over another is explained by each country's history and connections with
Western states. Bossaert and Demmke (2003) assert that Estonia's choice was strongly influenced by the
Nordic models (and especially by the Swedish and Finnish systems), Slovenia's choice by the Austrian and
German models, and Romania's choice by the French model.
64
Figure 3.9. T y p e s of Civil Service S y s t e m s .
position system). 4 0
The hiring procedure (either for entry level positions or for senior positions, depending on
the system) displays several similarities across the CEE cases (see Figure 3.10). Examinations
are used to test the candidates' knowledge. The examination committees are composed of
civil servants from the hiring institution (in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Macedonia, Slovakia,
and Slovenia) or civil servants and experts in the field (in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Bulgaria). 41
The introduction of the open competitive selection procedure is a decisive step towards the
creation of a transparent civil service based on the principles of equal access and merit. This
procedure permits a relatively high degree of objectivity in selecting the most capable
entrants and can offset the politicization of the civil service. Nevertheless, the competitive
selection procedure has not yet established itself as the only method. For example, the
Latvian Civil Service Act states that it is permissible not to hold an open competition for a
vacant post in the civil service, except for the position of head of a government agency, if the
government's decision with regard to the post in question is in the national interest (article
8.4). Similarly, in Lithuania, article 13 of the corresponding act provides that civil service
65
Figure 3.10. Hiring Sequence.
Note: Taking the oath signifies entrance into the civil service legal relationship. Civil servants are
required to take an oath in 69% of the cases. By taking the oath, they express their commitment
to respect laws and fulfill their duties. Failure to take the oath constitutes cause for termination
of employment.
I
Public announcement
-f -
Submission of
required documents
* - -
Verification of
requirements
~~ f ' "'
Examination
t
1
Examination
Committee
i
i
Examination
Procedure
''
Selection of Appeal of the
candidate decision
Probationary period
Oath
Article 27 of the Slovene Act stipulates that officials are to be selected by means of a public
selection procedure, unless any other statutory provisions specify otherwise.
One important aspect of the recruitment system is who makes the appointment decision.42
Needless to say, selection is crucial in any personnel system and this arrangement alone could
be enough to determine how politicized the system is. At one end of the spectrum, with a
system less susceptible to politicization, are Croatia and Slovakia, in which the examination
results are binding: whoever has the highest score is declared the winner of the competition.
42
In some countries, the decision of appointment can be appealed. Such appeals can be introduced with the
Civil Service Commission within 30 days (Albania), Civil Service board within 15 days (Croatia), State Civil
Service Administration within 7 days (Latvia), Civil Service Agency (Macedonia), and the appellate commis-
sion (Slovenia; judicial review of the appellate commission's decision is done by the administrative court). In
Bulgaria candidates can appeal only the decision to be admitted to the competition (but not the decision of
the examination committee), while in Montenegro civil servants have only the "right to insight into the docu-
mentation of the public announcement" (2005 Civil Service Act of Montenegro, article 27).
66
At the other end of the spectrum, we have the situation in which the examination committee
puts together a list of the best three candidates based on the results of the examination and
previous qualifications, and either the direct superior (Albania and Estonia) or the head of
the institution (Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia) decides on who will be
To ensure that newly appointed civil servants possess the necessary skills and knowledge to
be successful in their positions, all civil systems under analysis here contain a probationary
period. The length of the probationary period varies, by system, from 4 to 12 months. This
program offers the state extra time to assess the recruit's professional skills, before
The conundrum now is to what extent these legal provisions are applied in practice. In a
study on the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary, Nunberg (2001) found that the
development of merit-based practices was at best embryonic. Even where formal provisions
for merit-based recruitment and promotion existed, they were inconsistently applied. Open,
competitive recruitment that relied on external advertisements was utilized in all three cases,
but it was not uniformly required. Finally, within countries, recruitment practices varied
Career D e v e l o p m e n t
1. Training Programs
professional training" (Nunberg 1999, 33). Training is vital for cadres that have spent much of
their working life in a hierarchical command structure where there was little room for
require not only a shift in attitudes about government service and performance, and political
neutrality, but also an improvement of their knowledge. As these countries aspire to, or are
already members of, the European Union (EU), technical and policy skills in economics,
finance, management, law, and informatics need continuous strengthening and updating to
43
For the rest of the countries in my sample, it is not mentioned who makes the appointment.
44
Slovakia has added an extra step to achieve this goal - employees first undergo a "preparatory service"
which can vary from 6 to 24 months, according to the level of education and the future position.
67
meet international standards.
Successful civil services throughout the world use training programs to develop skilled
cadres for the public administration. Similarly, drafters of the civil service laws expect an
equivalent effect in their respective countries: all civil service acts analyzed contain a right
and an obligation to participate in training programs while in service, at the expense of the
state. 4 5 In several countries, special institutes were created to design and implement
(Institute for Public Administration and European Integration), Czech Republic (State
Public Administration), and Romania (National Training Institute for Public Administration).
47
Overall, the trend is to tie training programs to professional development. 48
Training policy in most systems is centrally organized and falls within the responsibility of
practice training courses are mostly ad hoc and episodic, most occurring at the local level
with external donor financing. Thus the training program has been driven neither by an
overarching vision of training goals for government nor by a systematic assessment of existing
skills and needs, as exemplified in Romania's public service (Nunberg 1999, 90-91).
Data on the resources devoted to training and on the number of employees who undergo
training are very scarce. In Poland, between 1992 and 1996 the total spending on training as
a percentage of total spending on wages and derivatives increased from 0.11% to 3.18%
(SIGMA 1997c). During the same period the number of employees increased by 40%. In
Slovakia between 1993 and 1995 the budget for training programs more than doubled
(SIGMA 1997c), while the number of employees increased by only 13%. These states appear
68
In Estonia, budget regulations require each ministry to allocate no less t h a n 3% of its
wages and salaries budgets to training. However, this standard was not met in 1997, when
spending on training averaged roughly 2.6% of the wage bill and in 1998 it dropped to 1.9%.
(Nunberg 2000, 194). In Lithuania, each institution has a "budgetary envelope" of between
1% and 5% of salary payroll for training (SIGMA 2003a). From 2001 to 2002, the number of
employees attending the courses of the Institute of Public Administration more than doubled
(from 2,700 in 2001 to 6,156 in 2002; unfortunately we do not know what percentage of the
Just how effective are these programs? In the short-term they seem to have little impact:
training in individual bodies" (SIGMA 2003d, 8; also see the SIGMA Country Reports
2. Performance Evaluation
Performance appraisals are periodic evaluations of the civil servants' compliance with their
duties and success in carrying out their tasks. 5 0 They usually take place annually (in Latvia
and Poland they take place every two years, while in Moldova every three years). 5 1 In general,
The result of the evaluation is taken into account for promotions, positive appraisals
69
performance appraisals can act both as a carrot (allowing for early promotions in case of
Civil servants with good performance are rewarded not only by being promoted to a higher
position/pay scale, but also by being given an award. The nature of the awards varies from
These periodic checks on civil servants' performance are effective in raising the level of
professionalism in the system only if they are abided by. However, this is not always the case.
For example, in Montenegro, in 2007 (three years after the introduction of the system),
performance appraisals had not been used in all ministries and administrative bodies: by
some calculations, only 30% of institutions had carried out a performance appraisal and the
performance evaluation of managers had not been evaluated at all (SIGMA 2007c, 11).
Similarly, in Bulgaria job evaluations were non-existent in 2005 (SIGMA 2005b, 17). By
contrast, in Estonia by the end of 2000, 8 1 % of all institutions had conducted evaluations of
all civil servants with more than three years of service. However, "promotions and bonuses
[were] very loosely linked to the appraisal system, although superiors [were] encouraged to
take the appraisal results into account when considering promotions and salary increases"
(SIGMA 2003f, 12). In Croatia researchers found that the new appraisal system failed to
19), while in Romania, the absence of a job evaluation methodology led to an arbitrary
customary, but the appraisal system opened the door to abuses by giving considerable
The lack of consistency can lead to patronage. In Hungary, officials rated "outstanding"
can receive bonuses whose upper limit is not determined. A 2001 amendment limiting such
54
Usually civil servants still have to accrue a certain experience before being promoted. The time spent in a
position varies from six months in Estonia to three years in Bulgaria and Romania.
55
For example, in Romania one cannot be promoted in the year following the one for which a civil servant
was rated 'unsatisfactory' or 'satisfactory.' Two consecutive negative evaluations lead to dismissal from the
civil service in all cases.
S6
The systems that set up awards are: Bulgaria (diploma, silver and gold siga of honour of the respective
administration, money, and material prize), Czech Republic (written approbation and material prize), Estonia
(monetary award and valuable gift), Hungary (honorary titles), Lithuania (note of appreciation, personal gift,
and a lump sum of money), Macedonia (monetary award), Montenegro (exact rewards are to be determined by
secondary legislation), and Slovakia (financial reward and material gift).
70
bonuses to the equivalent of six monthly salaries was removed in 2003 (SIGMA 2003e, 13).
Such a wide and unrestricted discretion may easily lead to arbitrariness in determining
However, as the SIGMA reports show, these appraisals either are not carried out, or, if they
are, in a majority of cases they are a formality or they encourage arbitrariness and patronage.
It is important to know the educational background and career path of (especially) civil
servants because of the influence they have on the policy-making process. For example,
background and career paths of bureaucratic elites in Western democracies affected both their
attitudes and their influence on the overall policy process. Meltsner (1976) showed that
economists, who are prominent in the policy-making process in the United States, prefered
particular policy outcomes. Laegreid and Olsen (1984) also found that the older a senior
bureaucrat was at appointment, and the more "traditional" their training, the more resistant
they were to policy changes. Meanwhile, Caroll (1990), Gregory (1991), and Pusey (1991)
argue that the increasing levels of mobility among Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian
civil servants have impeded their ability to provide substantive policy advice in complex
technical areas. Despite this plethora of evidence on the Western systems, there is no similar
discussion for the CEE systems (or, for that matter, for any new democracy).
There is little information on turnover rates in CEE systems. Using individual ministry
estimates, Nunberg approximates the turnover rate in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and
Hungary at a level between 7 and 11% (2000, 13). These figures are not extremely high by
international attrition standards, 5 7 but may reflect an unacceptable drain of scarce skills to
High levels of attrition are to be expected and may even be desirable in countries where
profound renovation of civil service cadres is sought. By this argument, we can expect high
57
Nunberg reports turnover rates of 2-3% for Canada, 4% for Netherlands, 10% for Sweden, and 4.9% in
the United States (2000, 42). The turnover rate in Prance was 2.2% in 2001 (Gajduschek 2007 and OECD
2004b).
71
Table 3.3. Civil Service Turnover R a t e s in Estonia in 1997.
Source: State Chancellary of Estonia
Average 13.43
attrition rates in the first years of democracy, with the slope leveling off in the later years.
The Czech Ministry of Finance estimated its turnover in 1993-1994 at 20-25%, while for 1998
turnover decreased to 11%. But in 1997 the Czech Ministry of Culture reported a staff
turnover of 20%, much higher than the one reported by established civil service systems
(Nunberg 2000, 125 and 166). By comparison, in Estonia, the average turnover rate for the
What is an "acceptable" level of staff turnover? Staff turnover must strike a reasonable
balance between the need to adjust and update staffing skills to continuously evolving
requirements and the expenses associated with recruitment and loss of knowledgeable staff.
The million dollar question is: what kind of civil servants leave the system? In Estonia,
Nunberg finds that 50% of the staff trained in programs sponsored by the European Union
has left the civil service (2000, 265). 58 Similarly, in Hungary a local consulting firm (Koz
Politika) estimated the turnover rate for civil servants at 8.9% per year, with higher turnover
amongst young, educated staff, which implies that the turnover rate amongst future managers
72
(2007) found that 76% of managers in the central administration and 68% of those in the
local administration had been in their given position for only three years or less. If politically
induced dismissals occur, they are more likely to characterize the higher echelons of the civil
service. King (2002) reports that 94% percent of the civil servants she interviewed in Estonia,
Lithuania, Poland, and the Czech Republic affirmed that civil servants were usually replaced
forbidding the appointment or dismissal of managerial civil servants during election times
the administration due to turnover that is dependent on party membership. 62 The policy
process is encumbered and resources have been spent without any concrete result. 88% of the
respondents in King's (2002) study reported incidences of aborted policies or abrupt policy
reversals arid 69% saw a direct link to personnel changes in key civil service positions. Also,
Salary S y s t e m
The professionalization of the civil service presupposes that the system must be able to
attract the best professionals. To achieve this goal, salaries in the public sector must be
competitive with the ones in the private sector. For example, the Bulgarian act specifies a
"guaranteed minimum:" the basic salary "for the lowest job position foreseen for a civil
servant cannot be less than three times the minimum working salary for the country" (1999
The monthly pay is generally composed of basic salary (calculated according to one's rank
and/or grade), supplements (for length of service, complexity of work, official rank, etc.) and
bonuses (for working in dangerous conditions, work performed during holidays or weekends,
61
Gy6rgy (1999) states that turnover rates have decreased in Hungary after the adoption of the civil service
law, but no comparative data are presented.
62
In Croatia, SIGMA recorded more than 2,000 dismissals after the 2003 parliamentary elections (SIGMA
2005b).
63
To increase the appeal of a civil service career, in Hungary, once a year, civil servants receive one extra
salary (the thirteenth salary), disbursed in January of the following year (1997 Hungarian Civil Service Act,
article 49).
73
Table 3.4. Central Government Wages Across R e g i o n s in t h e 1990s.
Source: Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997
Before discussing whether salaries in the public sector are competitive with those in the
private sector in CEE, I want to briefly touch upon differences in pay policies across the
world. It is difficult to make international comparisons of public wages due to data scarcity.
(1997) warn that the data should be taken with a grain of salt. The main findings, reported
in Table 3.4, indicate that the heaviest fiscal weight of the central government wage bill
(please note that this data are only for wages in the central government) is in the Middle East
and North Africa (9.8% of GDP) and the lowest in Eastern Europe and the Former USSR
(3.7% of GDP). When measured as a multiple of per capita GDP, central government wages
appear the highest in Africa. But the authors warn that this result is most certainly
corrupted by the underestimation of informal production (which thus deflates the value of the
GDP) and by a preponderance of franc-zone countries in the sample (which have much higher
salaries than in the rest of the continent). Conversely, the relatively low multiplier for the
OECD countries is explained by high employment in the civil sector (see Table 3.1) and by
smaller skill differentials between public employees and the rest of the working population.
Thus, regional generalizations are misleading. A better image of the wage policy can be
74
obtained by looking at individual country data. For example, in the Czech Republic the
central government wage bill as percentage of GDP decreased by 16.6% between 1994 and
Are public sector salaries competitive compared to private sector wages? Nunberg (2000)
finds that in the Czech Republic public sector salaries represent 30 to 80% of the salaries paid
in the private sector for similar positions. Heads of institutions and departments receive only
about 30% of what they would make in the private sector. In the lower ranks, civil servants
can make up to 80% of the wage paid for a similar position in the private sector (Nunberg
2000, 72). This means that if civil service jobs are attractive at lower positions, one would
have no interest in a career in the system as the salary ratio declines in the upper echelons
Pay policies undermine the professionalization of the system. In the Czech Republic,
Estonia, and Hungary civil service pay is compressed and noncompetitive. The compression
ratio of top to bottom salaries is a serious constraint on governments' ability to attract and
retain qualified personnel at the middle and higher levels (see Figure 3.11 for a comparison
Bonuses and supplements represent a high percentage of the final salary, a particularity of
these systems (see Table 3.5 for details on the bonuses set out in civil service laws). For
example, in Estonia, bonuses and supplements represent up to 30% of the salary (Nunberg
2000, 187). The civil service acts generally impose upper limits on these variable salary
components to limit the discretionary power of the awarding authority (usually the civil
servant's direct superior). 68 This is not a generalizable finding. For example, the Hungarian
law allows heads of institutions to determine wages for some employees differently from the
64
The data for these calculations come from O'Dwyer (2006, 209) and Nunberg (2000, 87).
65
The situation was slightly better in Hungary, where in 1997 civil service pay was "only" 10% less than the
private sector average (Nunberg 2000, 281).
66
Low compression ratios may be the consequence of a regime's preference for an egalitarian salary struc-
ture.
67
By some reports, compression ratios reach as high as 7 in Hungary when Oiie takes into account al-
lowances and supplements, but this information was not captured in the data Nunberg used.
68
For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina a civil servant promoted to a higher position after positive per-
formance appraisals "shall be entitled to a salary increase not higher than 30% of the salary established for
that position" and the "salary shall be raised by 0.5% for each started year of service, and not higher than a
total 20%" (2003 Civil Service Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina, article 38). Similarly in Lithuania, bonuses can-
not exceed 55% of the salary, while additional pays cannot exceed 60%, and combined bonuses and additional
pays may not exceed 70% of the basic salary (2002 Lithuanian Civil Service Law, articles 23, 25, and 26). The
bonus for length of service in Poland is 5% of the basic monthly salary after the first 5 years of employment,
and 1% for each subsequent year up to a total of 20% (1998 Polish Civil Service Act, article 82).
75
Figure 3 . 1 1 . Compression Ratios in Select C E E Countries.
Source: Nunberg (2000)68
S3
o
1 6
IVI
W
4
| W - "
u sua
2 ;
U
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom United States
regular pay-table system. The rationale behind this rule is to attain the services of
well-qualified professionals who otherwise would not accept a civil service position for the
wage they would earn according to the pay-table. Unfortunately, the law offers discretionary
powers to managers by offering no procedural rule. Consequently, the organization head can
provide anyone with an exceptionally high wage (Gajduschek 2007). 69 Similarly, in Poland
but with little transparency and few links to merit or performance' (Nunberg 1999, 35).
Bonuses and supplements can have a dual effect. On the one hand, they increase the low
basic salaries, thus making civil service positions more attractive. On the other hand, they
encourage clientelism because the civil servant's direct superior (or the head of the
institution) has discretionary power in deciding to whom and how these bonuses and
Several civil service acts mention the right to pension, an attractive element of a career in
government service. For example, to encourage tenure in public service, the Estonian civil
service law stipulates that pensions increase according to one's length of service: by 10% for
10 to 15 years in service and by 50% for more than 30 years of service). Several other civil
69
The personal wage was abolished for only central government organizations in 2001, yet it still exists in
municipalities.
76
Table 3.5. Salary B o n u s e s .
Note: The salary structure is left to secondary legislation in the case of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia,
Montenegro, and Slovenia
service acts (Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) specify civil
servants' right to pension, but no details are given. Demmke and Bossaert (2003) assert that
this omission is intentional and is explained by the financial difficulties these transitioning
A guaranteed right to pension can represent a powerful incentive for a career in the civil
service, especially if more countries switch to a private pensions system. However, the amount
of one's pension depends on the salary obtained during service and as long as salaries remain
uncompetitive in comparison to the private sector, the right to pension can do little in
Just how unattractive do low salaries make a civil service position? In February 2008, the
Consequently, some positions in the local administration have remained unoccupied for the
past 17 years.
Low comparative salaries are not conducive to a professional civil service not only because
they fail to lure and retain skilled personnel, but also because they create an incentive for civil
servants to accept outside payments in exchange for their services (i.e., corruption). The low
77
compression ratios favor corruption at higher levels in the administration.
Civil Service R e s e r v e s
Lastly, in connection with the professionalism dimension, I would like to comment briefly on
the establishment of a reserve corp of civil servants from which organizations can select future
employees. Such a system is characteristic to Estonia, Hungary, and Moldova. In Estonia and
Hungary the names of civil servants who have been dismissed for reasons not imputable to
them (such as restructuring or closing of the institution) are maintained in a central register
for a certain period of time. If vacancies occur during this time, the positions are offered first
to the persons on the reserve lists. By contrast, in Moldova the reserve lists comprise the
While designed to ensure that dismissed civil servants find some other appropriate position
(and thus to keep skilled staff in the civil service), the Hungarian reserve system does not
work smoothly. One problem is that the law still gives organization heads arbitrary power to
decide whether to appoint a civil servant from the reserve list or to hire someone else. This
may explain why, in 2003, only 29 out of 1,373 civil servants placed on the reserve list found
new positions in the public administration. For reference, in the same year, 7,348 new civil
The civil service has to meet two somewhat contradictory requirements. On one hand, it is
responsible for fulfilling goals set up by the ruling political party. On the other hand, it has to
provide politicians with professional, unbiased advice and expertise, both in policy making
and implementation (Bekke and van der Meer 2001). This duality of requirements is reflected
in two polar "classical" models of civil service systems. The merit system, from Weber's
considered a negative factor, since it means that political aspects prevail over professional
ones. According to Weber, ideally, political will should be conveyed by the party in power to
the administration through channels other than direct political control over the civil service.
The opposite civil service system model is the spoils system that envisages civil service
positions as spoils of war for the ruling party. This arrangement allows for direct political
78
control over administrative personnel to ensure that the political will is implemented without
any bureaucratic distortion. 70 However, the experience of the United States, which subscribed
to this model throughout the 19 t h century, revealed the negative effects of this arrangement:
Prom the late nineteenth century until the 1980s, the merit system was dominant in
modern public administrative systems. Since then, the New Public Management (NPM)
movement has challenged the merit system for its rigidity and its relative unresponsiveness to
organizational efficiency.71 However, NPM supporters hardly ever analyze the impact of merit
system deregulation on the politicization of public administration and its potential negative
The main goal of a civil service act is to confer civil servants special guarantees that will
insulate them from external pressures in general, and, more specifically, from political
interference. In this respect, the laws contain an extensive list of rights and guarantees.
One of the most effective ways to insulate civil servants from external pressures (political or of
any other nature) is by guaranteeing them appointments for an indefinite period of time. Civil
servants have the right to unlimited tenure in all CEE civil service systems I examine, with the
exception of Macedonia (for an extensive list of the rights conferred on civil servants, please
see Appendix B). This is a positive element for reducing the politicization in the civil service.
restructured, and closed down at an impressive rate. Civil servants should not be vulnerable
to such institutional changes. However, the legal provisions are not reassuring. With the
exception of the Hungarian law, no civil service act refers to mass work-force cuts, which
79
Dismissal procedures seem to meet the standards of a career system, with cases in which a
civil servant may be laid off being described in a detailed manner (see Appendix B for an
Nonetheless, there are two circumstances that undermine the tenure guarantee:
Civil servants may be dismissed in the case of reorganization or reduction of staff numbers,
abolition of the organization or its tasks, or ineptitude. The latter must be documented by
especially high in cases of reorganization and ineptitude, since organization heads make these
judgments. The only legal guarantee against arbitrariness is that the former civil servant may
sue the government if he/she can prove that the dismissal was unfair and/or its reasoning was
false. It may take several years until the court reaches a decision. Meanwhile, the former civil
servant has to pay for lawyers and other expenses. Not surprisingly, in Hungary, only a few
persons laid-off from well-paid managerial positions have so far sued the government.
Incidentally, most of them won their cases (SIGMA 2006d). Gajduschek (2007) reports that,
as a result, the practice of dismissal from managerial positions has changed in Hungary. The
typical way of laying off a manager these days is through a "common agreement" between the
civil servant and the government. Since the law allows a common agreement but does not
limit the amount paid to the former civil servant from public money, the amount is usually
To prevent this kind of abuse, some systems have special steps that must be carried out
before a civil servant is dismissed. In cases of restructuring, civil servants are generally offered
a similar position in another office (of equal or lower rank) and if such a position is not
available, they are dismissed (by exception, the Estonian law expressly forbids dismissals via
reorganization). In case of liquidation when the office has a legal successor, the new body
inherits the existing employees. However, if there is no legal successor, and in the absence of a
80
Table 3.6. Guarantees Against Arbitrary Dismissal.
Note: According to civil service acts, civil servants placed off-duty are entitled to a certain per-
centage of their monthly salary for a specified period of time. Secondary legislation may offer
additional guarantees.
Guarantees
Country Priority at Severance Placement Successor must Early
employment pay off-duty assume employees retirement
Albania
Bosnia and
/ / /
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia / /
Czech
/
Republic
Estonia / /
Hungary /
Latvia /
Lithuania /
Macedonia
Moldova / /
Montenegro /
Poland
Romania
Slovakia /
Slovenia /
What would constitute an additional protection mechanism for civil servants against
unreasonable dismissals? Laws can confer several types of safeguards (see Table 3.6). In
Croatia, the cost of severance pay (which amounts to a minimum of three months salary) acts
as a deterrent for the government against termination of service (SIGMA 2003d, 19). The
absence of such guarantees leaves wide room for abuse: in Bulgaria dismissals based on
individual judgments (e.g., performance appraisals) were characterized as arbitrary and the
possibilities to challenge such dismissal decisions were legally limited (SIGMA 2006d, 4).
However, regulations are not necessarily an assurance that arbitrariness will not creep in.
2003e, 15) dismissals had a discretionary nature, even though these systems contain provisions
similar to the ones in Croatia. See also the related discussion on politically motivated
81
3.2.4 Transparency
Having a good connection with key decision makers is often considered a valuable asset
because it can be used to facilitate the exchange of bribes and gifts for favors and services. A
connection with a highly ranked public official may be abused, depending on the context: to
buy a job, to smuggle goods or to destroy criminal evidence. In organizations, one may
member.
corruption in an organization is the degree of transparency, or the lack thereof. When the
decision making process is completely impenetrable, corrupt behavior can hardly be detected.
At the other extreme, under full transparency, decisions can easily be verified. Connections
cannot be abused in a fully transparent organization. Legal and corruption experts and
corruption (Klitgaard 1997). In an affiliated effort, the vast informal public administration
literature on transparency focuses on how transparency can be achieved and how factors that
limit transparency can be surmounted (see for example Bac 1996 and 1998, Woodhouse 1997).
The civil service acts contain very few regulations that would ensure transparency in the
the law. The scope of these provisions is limited to general duties: to serve and assist the
public, to perform activities in an impartial manner, to provide information to the public, and
to not seek or accept any gains for fulfilling these duties (for a complete list of the duties,
please see Appendix B). Based on the acts alone it is impossible to say anything about the
What we can assess by analyzing these laws is the transparency of the recruitment process.
At face value, these systems are transparent, with vacancies being promoted in (local and/or
Table 3.7). Despite these procedural guarantees, Nunberg (1999) reports that the Romanian
system creates only an appearance of transparency. Even though vacancy announcements are
published in the press, the decision-making process is decentralized, making it less likely to
73
The issue of lack of transparency in the allocation of bonuses and the determination of promotions was
discussed in the sections "Salary system" and "Career development," respectively.
82
Table 3.7. P u b l i c i t y P r o c e d u r e for Vacant Positions.
Note: The blank boxes indicate that no information was given in the law
Yet how willing are civil servants to be transparent about their work? SIGMA found that
the Slovak civil servants' mentality favors secrecy and confidentiality, and that the tendency
to wrongly apply the civil service legislation renders the administration non-transparent
(SIGMA 2003b, 8). By contrast, the Lithuanian civil service was rated "more open in this
regard than other countries, including EU Member States" (SIGMA 2003a, 4).
83
3.2.5 Accountability
an advanced administrative system. There are two different aspects of the accountability
dimension:
Institutional arrangements to hold public servants accountable for their actions (by the
The civil service acts do not address this latter issue, so I will focus on the means of holding
civil servants accountable. I look at three aspects: (1) incompatibilities and conflict of interest
provisions; (2) obligations to disclose assets; and (3) commitments to impose disciplinary
measures.
Provisions on incompatibilities and conflict of interest are relevant because legal and moral
individual or affinity group interests stand higher. While rights protect the employee,
incompatibilities insulate the institution from those activities of the employees that may
By law, civil servants are prohibited from (1) exercising any gainful activity except those of
a scientific, pedagogical, publishing, literary or artistic nature; 7 5 (2) occupying a position that
would put them in direct hierarchical relation (of leadership or subordination) with a relative;
76 77
(3) being a member of the directing or control body of a political party; (4) starting a
business that would operate in the same area of activity as the one in which he/she is
74
In this respect, Nunberg (1999) reports that in Romania, parliamentary review functions as a mechanism
of cross-system accountability. A parliamentary committee on public administration, composed of 26 members
(12 appointed by the opposition and 14 by the ruling party), reviews and amends legislation regarding central
and local government institutions. Additionally, the Court of Accounts is charged with overseeing the forma-
tion, management, and use of the financial resources of the government and the public sector (1999, 64).
75
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary (in the case of senior officials),
Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia.
76
This restriction applies in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, and Slovakia.
77
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary.
84
Table 3.8. Legal Loopholes.
Note: In these countries regulations on conflict of interest and incompatibilities can be circum-
vented with the approval of the direct superior, head of institution, or minister.
Country
Provision Bosnia and Croatia Estonia Hungary Lithuania
Herzegovina
Civil servants cannot
perform other tasks / / / /
for remuneration
Civil servants cannot
be in hierarchical
/
relationship with a
relative
Civil servants cannot
enter into contracts
on behalf of the state /
with companies where
they own shares
78
employed as a civil servant; (5) entering into contracts on behalf of the public
administration institution at which he/she holds office with companies in which he/she
manages 10% (Lithuania) or 20% (Slovenia) of the shares; (6) being a member of management
or supervisory bodies of companies or other legal persons subject to oversight by the state
body in which he/she is employed; 79 (6) being employed by a company over which he/she
exercised supervision within two (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Czech Republic) or three
(Estonia) years after the date of release of office; and (7) exercising any other activity that can
cause a conflict between the public duties and his/her private interests or that could affect
his/her impartiality. 80 Additionally, in two cases (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania) a
civil servant who becomes a candidate for a public office shall be considered on leave from the
civil service and will be reinstated in the previous position at the end of the mandate.
However, the laws also offer loopholes that allow civil servants to circumvent these
regulation (see Table 3.8). With the approval of a superior (direct supervisor, head of the
institution, or minister), civil servants can engage in activities that can jeopardize the
85
Disciplinary Measures
Civil servants can be held responsible for a wide range of misconducts. These can vary from
"minor" breaches of official duty (e.g., disrespect for working hours, unjustified absence from
work, failure to wear tags, etc.) to "grave" violations of their obligations (e.g., abuse of
authority, unjustified refusal to follow orders, engaging in activities incompatible with the
position, unlawful management of funds, breaking confidentiality rules, etc.). Accordingly, the
disciplinary measures imposed vary with the gravity of the offense. There is a continuum of
punishments, ranging from reprimand (or warning, remark, reproach) and written reprimand
(with the infraction documented in the personal file), to punitive suspension of salary and/or
duties, 8 1 suspension from promotion, 82 demotion, 83 suspension, and dismissal. The measure is
customarily imposed by the direct superior, or in the case of a more severe punishment, by
A number of systems establish disciplinary commissions that have the role of investigating
the offense and holding hearings. 85 Based on their recommendation, the person empowered to
make decisions imposes a disciplinary measure. Table 3.9 summarizes my findings on the legal
procedures invoked when a disciplinary action is applied. In a majority of cases, the accused
civil servant must be heard and is allowed to bring evidence in his/her defense. The initial
decision can be appealed either in specialized bodies or in regular civil law courts (for details
In conclusion, theoretically the laws strike a balance between holding civil servants
accountable for their actions and offering them adequate means with which to defend their
rights. But in practice, referring to the Czech Republic, Nunberg reckoned that the "fluidity
81
The amount of the salary suspension varies by country, from 5-10% in Romania to 30% in Macedonia,
Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
82
As a punishment, civil servants cannot be promoted in general for up to two years (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Poland). Croatia has the most severe system, with a ban on promotions for two to fours
year, while Bulgaria has the most lenient system with a ban for only one year.
83
Demotion consists of being assigned to a position lower in rank/grade and with a lower salary for gen-
erally up to one year (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Moldova, and Romania) or of being recalled from a senior
position (Czech Republic and Slovakia).
84
In some cases, the law imposes a statute of limitations which varies depending on the gravity of the vi-
olation. The period in which legal proceedings can be started varies from one month (Montenegro) to three
years (Hungary) since the act was committed. Usually disciplinary measures are recorded in the civil servant's
personal file and the entry is deleted for good behavior after a certain period of time.
85
In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary such commissions are formed within each institution. In
Macedonia the minister responsible for the respective institution establishes a commission to conduct the disci-
plinary commission. In Montenegro, Poland and Slovakia, disciplinary commissions are appointed by the heads
of the institution.
86
Table 3.9. P r o c e d u r e for Imposing a Disciplinary M e a s u r e .
Note: The blank boxes indicate that no information was given in the law
87
and ambiguity of reporting lines and oversight responsibilities generate an aura of uncertainty
and chaos in the policy process, further diffusing accountability" (2000, 19). 86
Disclosure of A s s e t s
The privatizations of the early 1990s created opportunities for many public employees to
in these countries. Taking into account these factors, civil servants should have an obligation
to declare their assets at least when they enter and leave the service, if not periodically during
the employment period. Such a declaration would increase accountability in the civil service.
However, only five systems, out of a total of 16 (31.25%), have such a requirement. 87 This
information, corroborated with the previous discussion on legal loopholes, works against an
3.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, beyond the merit facade, the laws provide a means for direct political influence,
through the appointment process, arbitrary allocation of salary bonuses, and dismissal
procedures. But I argue that, in addition to institutional design, several other factors can
explain the variation in bureaucratic performance displayed in Figure 3.14. Among these
factors, the emphasis is on the role of politics and politicians as a major reason why elements
of the spoils system appear in the civil service law. 88 Chapter 5 discusses the role of
possible to run a full-fledged, sophisticated merit system. If wages are so much lower in the
public sector compared to the private sector, as it is/was everywhere in CEE, it is difficult to
86
The laws are silent with respect to ensuring a civil servant's accountability to the people. One can hope
this void is filled by secondary legislation.
87
Bulgaria, Moldova, and Slovakia require annual declarations, Bosnia and Herzegovina only upon appoint-
ment, and Romania upon entering and leaving service. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova, the declara-
tion must include not only personal possessions, but also possessions of the immediate family.
88
For example, Meyer-Sahling (2001) provides an in-depth examination of various stakeholders and their
role in the formation of civil service regulations in Hungary. On the one hand, ;Jmost all actors preferred and
attached great value to the merit system. However, he notices a conflict between the general values rooted
in the merit system advocated by the new political elite and the practical needs for loyal subordination and
for rewarding those who assisted the party or its leaders before coming to power, which encouraged a spoils
system.
88
Figure 3.12. Simplistic M o d e l of Merit S y s t e m Effects.
Merit System
Depoliticization Professionalization Performance
(created by law)
find enough, if any, qualified candidates for certain civil service positions. Entry exams may
be useless if the number of vacant positions exceeds the number of qualified candidates. Since
wages are low, the pay-table cannot be applied to professionals who are paid higher wages in
the private sector. Consequently, exceptions to the general pay rules must be made in order
state functions. This, as well as severe financial austerity, results periodically in a significant
reduction in the number of public employees. Whole public administration organizations may
be abolished or privatized. Whereas employment security, a sine qua non of merit systems,
can be assured in normal periods, it is both politically and financially impossible in the
circumstances of transition.
The hypothesis of this chapter is that different institutional settings generate different
levels of performance. Figure 3.12 shows a simplified version of the impact of institutional
politicization in the civil service, while, at the same time, it increases the level of
This model is inaccurate for several reasons. Depoliticization can directly affect
depoliticization is not the only factor that impacts professionalization. During the past
decade, the proportion of youths studying at universities has more than doubled, leading to
A large proportion of unemployed graduates strives to find positions in the civil service, even
if they only use such positions as springboards for a career in the private sector. This may
explain why professionalization - at least in terms of education - has improved during the past
89
decade and especially in the past few years.
The model presented in Figure 3.12 assumes that politicization can be prevented merely by
introducing merit system legal regulations. The facts, however, reveal that other factors may
be relevant - potentially even more relevant than an ambiguous civil service law - in this
regard. Such factors could include having a political and administrative culture that attaches
value to merit-based functions, and consequently, makes extreme levels of political intrusion
into the civil service politically costly. Furthermore, the lack of attractiveness of civil service
positions, due to low wages or other reasons, may make most of these positions worthless as
political spoils. But, as discussed in Chapter 5, the most important factor in ensuring
depoliticization, and thus fostering institutional performance, is the nature of the party
system.
The uni-directional model also suggests that more politicization always means less
One explanation for elevated professionalism is, as mentioned above, that the general level of
education in society has rapidly increased during the past few years. Another reason may be
that the civil service, in sociological terms, may still provide more reliable employment than
the private sector, in a state of flux during a transition period. Despite low wages preventing
politicians from using these positions as rewards for their supporters, they still may be desired
positions for large strata of the society. A revised and extended model is presented in Figure
3.13.
90
Figure 3.13. Extended Model of Merit System Effects.
Party System
Characteristics
Merit System
Depoliticization Performance
(created by law)
Professionalization
Increasing
level of
Unemployment
education in
the society
91
Figure 3.14. Quality of Bureaucracy Over Time in CEE 1985-2005.
Sources: ILO and ICRG. The red vertical lines indicate when a civil service act was adopted.
In some cases, multiple laws were adopted in one country, hence the multiple lines. "Quality of
bureaucracy" runs from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating a high quality bureaucracy. Data missing for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
Albania Bulgaria
Year
Year Year
Estonia Hungary
Year
92
F i g u r e 3.14. Continued from the previous page . . .
Latvia Lithuania
Year
Moldova Poland
3
1990 199S 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Year
Romania
Serbia and Montenegro
u
CO
OQ
o
V
I 1990 199S
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Year
Slovakia Slovenia
Year Year
93
Chapter 4
The discussion in the previous chapter revealed that the civil service laws in CEE created civil
service systems that are formally meritocratic in nature. Taking into account the
quality of bureaucracy (as measured by ICRG) to improve after the implementation of these
acts. But Figure 3.14 reveals a mixed result: the quality of bureaucracy improved only in
Albania and Hungary, worsened in Moldova, and remained constant in the rest of the countries.
1
Why have the indicators not improved in spite of progressive institutional reform? I believe
the answer lies in the ineffective implementation of these legislative acts. For example, in
successive reports on Romania, SIGMA pointed out that the provisions of the 1999 Civil
Service Act were not applied in practice (SIGMA 2002b, SIGMA 2005d, SIGMA 2006h).
In this chapter I will focus on the Romanian civil service. If indeed the civil service system
did not improve due to a failure in the implementation of the law, how does the system look
in practice compared to the legal provisions? For example, the law stipulates that recruitment
must be made on a meritocratic basis. Do we notice patronage in practice? Second, the law is
designed to encourage long tenures. Are civil servants building a career in the civil service or
do they stay in the administration only because of a lack of alternatives? I hope to answer
these and other similar questions using a survey of almost 1,000 civil servants. The survey
was conducted in 2004 by the Institute of Public Politics and offers valuable insights into civil
Ideally one would have (at least) one similar survey measuring civil servants' attitudes
before 1999, the year when the Romanian Civil Service Act was adopted. Unfortunately such
a study does not exist. Figure 4.1 shows that the quality of bureaucracy (as measured by
1
lt is difficult to draw any conclusions with respect to Croatia because of a lack of data. Also, in the case
of Latvia and Lithuania we see some fluctuation in ratings, with a slight decline followed by an improvement
in grading. Estonia suffered from the reverse process: slight improvement followed by a decline.
94
Figure 4 . 1 . Quality of Bureaucracy in R o m a n i a Over T i m e
Note: The red line marks the adoption of the Civil Service Act in 1999.
4"
3.5"
3-
>,
CJ
CO
o 2.5"
3
CO
Q)
J5 2-
CD
O
>
.t=
3
D 1 -
O
.5"
0-
I , , , 1 , ,_
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
ICRG) has remained constant after the law's implementation. 2 Nevertheless, the law may
have impacted to varying extents discrete dimensions of the civil service system (e.g. may
rating). The ICRG measure is an aggregate measure which does not allow for such in-depth
analyses. Consequently, a survey is an ideal instrument for seeing how the Romanian system
fares along the dimensions discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, using a survey of civil servants
has the great advantage of providing an internal evaluation of a system about which
The survey provides a contextual description of the public sector, including characteristics
of respondents, their reasons for joining the public sector and the length of time worked in
government. In addition to such general questions, the survey consists of a series of questions
that allows me to test a series of widely held views regarding public officials. The literature on
civil services is awash with statements often repeated but without substantive evidence -
more akin to "urban myths" than empirical observations and this survey enables me to test
2
The figure shows an increase in the quality of bureaucracy during the late 1980's and early 1990's. This
jump is most certainly due to the collapse of communism and adoption of democracy, which undoubtedly led
to a more transparent and meritocratic system. However, the overall rating remains very low, especially when
compared to other post-communist systems.
95
and support or refute such hypotheses. Finally, the survey allows some assessment of which
An important limitation of case studies is the problem of external validity. What do the
findings from the Romanian case say about other Central and Eastern European countries?
What about countries in other regions of the world? To answer these questions, I will use the
World Bank's Public Officials' Survey on the views of public officials, concerning their
The quality of the Romanian bureaucracy is very poor. In 2005, the Romanian
bureaucracy was the only CEE bureaucracy given a rating of one by ICRG (see Figure 3.14).
Considering the very low starting point, one could argue that if civil service acts are to
produce effects, one would notice the biggest impact in such a low performer.
Corruption is widespread in the Romanian society. In a survey assessing the effect of the
quality of public institutions for economic investment, businesspeople ranked Romania last
among the transitioning democracies in Eastern Europe, 80% of interviewees reporting they
had had to make "additional payments" to have public servants do their job. 3
What these numbers tell us is that while Romania has tried to move beyond its communist
past, the legacies of the Ceauescu era weigh heavily on the country's public institutions. The
creation of a meritocratic civil service system through the civil service act did not have the
I begin this chapter with a brief sketch of the political and administrative backdrop. This
narrative is useful in providing the context for civil service reform. I then use the civil
servants survey to sketch the image of the Romanian civil service system along the dimensions
influence. I conclude the chapter with an analysis of the World Bank's Public Officials'
Survey to ascertain whether the findings in the Romanian case are specific or universal.
4.1.1 Background
During the communist era, the Romanian administration was highly interconnected and
3
The data is available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/.
96
under the influence of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). 4 Conforming to the pattern
existent in the rest of the Soviet Bloc, the party largely determined the administrative
structure. However, a distinctive characteristic of the Romanian system was the early and
sustained domination of the party by one man, Nicolae Ceauescu. Beginning in 1967,
Ceauescu was both general secretary of the RCP and head of the State Council. By
constitutional amendment, in 1974 the post of President of the Republic was created and
Nicolae Ceauescu was named as president. This event signaled a consolidation of centralized
and personalized rule. Policy by presidential decree became frequent and, by the late 1980s,
political leadership in Romania had taken on dynastic dimensions: key positions in the
The centralization of political authority had a variety of consequences for the structure of
public administration. Bureaucratic expansion was common: at the end of the 1980s, the
Council of Ministers, numbering over sixty members, was larger than the corresponding
councils of any other Eastern Bloc government except for the Soviet Union (Nunberg 1999).
In 1989, Romania had the largest number of ministries and central organizations of any
country in the region. At the same time, the internal structure of the bureaucracy was quite
unstable. Agency reshuffling and changes in high-ranking executives were frequent; between
1985 and 1988, for instance, there were over twenty government reorganizations affecting
central functions such as defense, finance, and foreign affairs (Nunberg 1999).
Overall, the bureaucracy was highly stratified and played only a modest role in planning or
policy decisions. Decision-making authority was reserved for a few high-level executives, with
very little discretion given to those at lower levels. Local governments had virtually no
autonomy. Moreover, administrative procedures were extremely formal and encouraged civil
servants to find ways to circumvent the rules. The result was a bureaucratic class that was
97
Much of this system was changed with Ceauescu's fall and the introduction of democratic
politics. The new Constitution adopted in 1991 creates a system with clear separation of
republic with a bicameral parliament, both chambers of which are elected by universal
suffrage to four-year terms. 6 The president is also elected through direct suffrage for a five
year-term, and the presidential mandate is limited to two terms. The court system is led by a
Constitutional Court consisting of nine judges appointed to nine-year terms by the legislature
and the president. In addition to this body of constitutional review, the judicial branch is
composed of the Supreme Court of Justice, the last authority on civil and criminal matters,
This constitutional and political framework, established early in the transition process,
provides the context for ongoing reforms in the Romanian public administration. The very
speed with which the institutions of government have been transformed poses significant
challenges. The scope and pace of legal and institutional reforms have taxed the state's ability
to implement such reforms effectively. Civil service reform did not constitute a priority for the
for example, than to dislodge deeply rooted bureaucratic practices and ways of thinking.
Whether these institutional and behavioral obstacles can be overcome will be the real test of
Until 1997, Romanian governing and opposition parties were divided over both the necessity
of reforming the state apparatus and the direction of the reform process (SIGMA 2002b).
administrative practices remained largely untouched. This lack of action was all the more
problematic because the deficient state apparatus, inherited from the previous political
6
In March-April 2008 the Romanian parliament voted to reform the electoral system used for parliamen-
tary elections. Under the old system deputies and senators were elected based on a proportional representa-
tion, open-list system. The new system divides each district (jude^) and the Municipality of Bucharest into
single-member districts. Candidates win automatically if they receive over 50% of the votes in their district.
Nevertheless, the overall composition of parliament will be proportional: the two-tier seat allocation method
used in the old closed-list system is retained, using the Hare quota at the county level, and then d'Hondt
quota for nationally cumulated votes and seats remaining after the county-level allocation, with a five per-
cent legal threshold applied throughout. The prime minister, representing the largest parliamentary group, is
appointed by the president.
98
regime, left a power vacuum that led to the domination of the state by political, social, and
A turning point was reached in 1997 when international organizations, led by the World
Bank and IMF, pushed the newly elected government to initiate structural reforms of the
state and make systemic changes. This position was strongly supported by the European
Union (EU) in its opinion of 1997, and regular reports of 1998 and 1999. The issue became
part of the political discourse but little was achieved in the practical sense, in spite of the
reform being depicted as the "last chance" for Romania to become a full-fledged democracy
Among the positive steps taken, the most notable was the creation of the Ombudsman
office in 1997. In spite of the good intentions, the institution suffered from insufficient means
and limited power to carry out its tasks effectively. Another encouraging development was the
adoption of the Civil Service Act, passed by parliament in December 1999. The law, which
came into force in July 2000, was not implemented for a long time because of the December
2000 general elections and the low managerial capability of the Civil Service Agency (SIGMA
2002b). Even when applied, it is questionable that this institutional effort has produced
positive outcomes. Overall, "the same impression lingers that laws are passed to check boxes
in the matrices of conditionality imposed by international partners, rather than these laws
The Civil Service Law was adopted as a precondition for Romania to start EU accession
negotiations in Helsinki in 1999. Its declared purpose was to insulate civil servants from
political pressure and create a modern, European-style civil service. Nevertheless, the law had
a bigger impact because of its omissions, rather than its provisions: it failed to establish any
obstacles against the politically motivated reshuffling within the public sector whenever a new
government assumed power. 7 In other cases the law's provisions were well intended but could
not be applied in practice. For example, the legal obligation that each of the 110,000 civil
servants from the central and local administrations take at least seven days of training per
year creates an annual public liability of $50 million. This volume far exceeds the capability
of the National Training Institute for Public Administration, which can train only 10% of the
7
In most cases dismissals are justified by reorganizations, but reorganizations are only comprised of a
change in the institution's name.
99
personnel per year (Ioni^a, 2008, 165). 8
By 2005 SIGMA was reporting that some of the actions taken by the new government had
effectively reversed the small progress made in the preceding years. For example, in the past,
directors of public institutions were political appointees at the discretion of the government.
After each general election all directors would be replaced with appointees loyal to the new
stipulated that these managers must be civil servants, insulated from political influence.
However, by 2005 some of the directors were hired based on management contracts.
Consequently, they did not have to fulfill the requirements for civil service and did not benefit
from the law's protection (SIGMA 2005d). Overall, SIGMA noted a reversal in the trend
towards professionalism in state structures after the 2004 elections: visible appetite for
patronage politics and numerous, abrupt, and arbitrary removals of incumbents whenever a
competent (highly paid) professionals (SIGMA 2006h). But this is a small group of civil
servants that does not correctly reflect the overall picture of the Romanian civil service.
Ioni^a, concludes that the Romanian civil service is a "mass of disgruntled and ineffective staff
punctuated by small and transient groups who understand and try to push forward
meaningful reforms" (2008, 166). Moreover, he argues that Romania does not have a civil
service in the Western sense, but a "collection of sectoral and opaque bureaucracies operating
Public institutions are very heterogeneous in terms of the rules by which they operate and
their managerial practices. Many institutions use public-interest arguments to create special
rules applicable only to their purview, yet job performance is not measured in any meaningful
way. The National Agency of Civil Servants (a state secretariat under the Ministry of
Administration and Internal Affairs) is reluctant to develop measures of performance for fear
8
A number of special interministerial committees were established to deal specifically with public adminis-
tration reform issues. Additionally, the Central Unit for Public Administration Reform (CUPAR) was estab-
lished in the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs to assist the process and organize consultations
with social stakeholders. With the help of international donors (mainly the EU), special study grants and fast-
track career schemes were created for would-be civil servants educated in Western universities.
100
of a backlash from institutions. Annual evaluations do not rank employees according to their
actual performance; every employee is awarded the highest grade. Instead of rewarding
individual effort, performance supplements are to be shared equally by the whole team. In
general, management is fragmented and discretionary and employees use anonymity to cover
their incompetence. 9 The decision-making process is very cumbersome and inefficient. For
government, cabinet meetings could last 12-14 consecutive hours, with ministers and advisors
coming in and out and trying to outmaneuver each other by sneaking draft documents into
Job turnover is high, and consequently there is little institutional memory. The Romanian
civil service remains secretive, and relevant information is kept away from the public as the
only comparative advantage for otherwise unemployable clerks. Loyalty to the manager elicits
rewards and civil servants tend to be naturally selected according to this trait.
Political independence of the civil service is a novel concept, the assumption being that
election winners will apportion all public jobs amongst themselves. 10 After each parliamentary
election, the winning parties talk about "algorithms" for the allocation of positions in the civil
service, based on the so-called principle of political proportionality (i.e. based on electoral
results). These discussions are held publicly, despite the fact that the Civil Service Act sets
strict criteria for becoming a civil servant, one of which is open competition.
Finally, corruption, when it occurs, is not so much the result of isolated individual acts to
extract revenue in exchange for service (petty corruption), although this is annoying to
citizens and more easily quantifiable. Rather, the most dangerous form of corruption entails
political clientelism, which results in systematic discriminatory treatment or favors for various
In this institutional landscape one is left to wonder what the profile of a Romanian civil
servant looks like. Is he a petty clerk who has survived in his functional role since the time of
communism? Or a new dropout from the private sector, frustrated by the low income but
unsure of his skills, clinging to his job, taking refuge in daily routines, playing bureaucratic
9
This assessment is based on an interview with Veronica Junjan, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the
University of Twente. She has consulted for the City of Cluj in its application of the civil service law.
10
When arbitrary and politically driven purges occur, the people with the most expertise leave the civil
service either because they are the most visibly associated with the previous leadership or because they are the
most professionally mobile segment of the civil service as a result of their expertise.
101
power games, and yielding to political pressures from above? Or is he a person who regards
service in the public administration as a step to a future political career or a lucrative job in
In the following section I will sketch the portrait of a Romanian civil servant using a
survey of almost 1,000 civil servants. For a summary of the findings, please see Table 4.1, The
last column indicates whether, based on the survey, commonly held beliefs have been
confirmed or not.
4.2.1 Description of t h e D a t a
The following analysis is based on the Civil Service Barometer survey, which was carried out
by the Institute for Public Politics, Bucharest, Romania (www. i p p . r o ) . The field research was
conducted by Gallup Organization Romania between September 27 and October 18, 2004.
Data collection was done through questionnaires, each consisting of 86 items, on a sample of
Sampling was designed on a three-stadium, probabilistic basis, with distinct samples for
each category selected: institutions, departments, and civil servants. Questionnaires were
distributed in all 42 administrative units (41 counties - jude^e- and the municipality of
Bucharest) and in 83 mayoralties of towns and the municipality of Bucharest, The selection of
the 83 local urban units and the institutional departments was probabilistic. Results have a
What does the typical Romanian civil servant look like? The civil servant is a woman (70% of
those interviewed were women), probably married and with one child. 11 She is under 45 years
old 12 and has a college degree (67% of respondents have at least a college degree). She has
held another position before her current one (the case for 83% of local civil servants), most
likely in the private sector (61% of civil servants have previously worked in the private sector).
11
In spite of the fact that women are prevalent in the civil service, men occupy almost half of the executive
positions.
12
Thirty-three percent of respondents are between 20 and 34 years old, 32% are between 34 and 44 years
old, and 34% are over 45 years old.
102
Table 4.1. Testing Commonly Held Assertions About the Romanian Civil Service System.
Note: These findings axe based on the Romanian Civil Service Barometer.
Prior Assertion Survey Question(s) Used Findings
Romanian civil service is composed of A22. For how many years have you been working in the
Not confirmed
employees from the communist era public administration?
A6. In addition to your native tongue, what other languages
can you speak?
A4. What is your level of education?
Civil servants have a low level of
A5b. What is your educational background Partially confirmed
professionalism
A l l . How would you characterize your computer skills?
A24. What is your field of work in your current position?
A35. Have you undergone training programs?
A29. Where do you see yourself working in 5 years?
A63/64. Since the beginning of the year have you taken steps
A civil service job is an intermediary step
to find another job? If so, where? Partially confirmed
to getting a job in the private sector
A30. What are the main reasons for working in the public
administration?
A28. How did you find out about your present position?
A42. On what basis are civil servants selected to attend
training programs?
The civil service lacks transparency A46. Do annual reviews correctly reflect individual performance? Confirmed
A53. Do you think the sanctions applied in your department
are justified?
A55. Do you think bonuses are allocated based on merit?
A31b. Have you ever been subjected to abusive acts resulting
in relocation, temporary or permanent transfers, or were you
Civil servants enjoy little job security allocated tasks not in your job description Partially confirmed
A34. To what degree does your job description match the
tasks you are actually assigned?
Continued on the next page ...
Table 4.1. Continued from the previous page ...
Prior Assertion Survey Question(s) Used Findings
A32. In your opinion how important is political affiliation in
obtaining a job in the public administration?
A50. How often do political factors influence hiring decisions
in your institution?
The civil service is politicized Partially confirmed
A51. In your opinion, how are civil servants who are
members of the same political party as their superior treated
compared to civil servants affiliated with a different party
than their superior?
A38. How happy are you of the quality of the training
Training programs do not improve performance program you underwent? Not confirmed
A40. Would you like to attend more training programs?
A47. What factors do you think would be most
The civil service is not adequately equipped to effective in increasing performance in the civil service?
Confirmed
meet society's needs A88. Which of these factors do you think would be the most
effective in ensuring an adequate behavior of civil servants?
A48. How much independence do you have in your activity?
A49. When were you last consulted by your superior about a
The civil service has a strict hierarchical
decision regarding your sphere of activity? Partially confirmed
organization that inhibits individual initiative
A73. Are civil servants encouraged to express their opinions
on acts of their superior, without fear of repercussions?
A78. What is your opinion about the anti- corruption measures
taken by the government?
Policy credibility is low Confirmed
A80. In your opinion, how good are the government's measures
regarding the civil service?
A73. Are civil servants encouraged to make public
illegal behavior, without fear of repercussions?
The level of accountability is low Partially confirmed
A75. How widespread is the conflict of interests among civil
servants?
There is low emphasis on service delivery A74. Whose interests does your institution serve? Not confirmed
Lastly, she has entered public service after 1989, when the communist regime was overthrown
(significantly, 87% of local civil servants have entered public employment in the last fifteen
years). 13
4.2.3 Capacity
Civil servants were also asked to identify the main impediments to their professionalism.
They pointed out two types of factors: psychological and institutional. The most common
corruption - 12.3%
Taking into account the low level of salaries in the Romanian civil service, the results of
the survey are not surprising. However, when asked about what would motivate them to work
harder, civil servants did not only point to increases in salaries (which 88% of respondents
indicated would make them improve their own performance), 14 but also to non-monetary
factors, such as creation of a sense of belonging to the civil service corps (esprit de corps) and
a clear division of labor. In spite of all their grievances, almost eight out of ten civil servants
expressed being proud of working in the local administration. Moreover, almost 90% of
13
Thirty-one percent of employees have been working in the civil service for less than five years, 36% for
5-10 years, 20% for 10-15 years, and only 13% for more than 15 years.
14
Civil servants want an increase in their salaries ranging from 91% to 192%. Nevertheless, 43% of employ-
ees would continue to work in the public administration even if their salary would be lowered by 15% and 51%
would continue working in the public sector even if salary increases would not reach the level promised by the
government.
105
respondents are satisfied or very satisfied with their current job, pointing to the following
reasons: (1) connections with colleagues and direct superior; (2) working schedule and
Civil servants display moderate optimism about the future of public administration. They
expect the most important changes to be an increase in the level of autonomy for the public
level of skepticism regarding the chances of public administration reform, with only 14.7%
indicating that they expected the pace and results of the reform process to improve in the
Work Environment
How do civil servants view their work environment and their relationships with colleagues
and superiors? Civil servants report a high level of inertia in the public administration:
almost 70% of interviewees indicate that their superiors and colleagues are resistant to
changes. However, 68% of civil servants believe their opinion is taken into consideration by
their fellow workers. In a majority of cases (71%) managers praise their subordinates when
they successfully fulfill a task, and 66% of civil servants corroborate that they have been
asked by their superior to provide input on how to best conduct an assignment. These
answers paint the image of an environment in which employees have a high level of
independence, but also in which almost half of the personnel are not encouraged to express
A majority of civil servants (82%) rate the collaboration among departments as efficient.
In spite of the fact that many employees view colleagues as friends, 50% of respondents reckon
that they cannot rely on their colleagues for help in fulfilling their duties.
Most civil servants (63%) work supplementary hours, either because they cannot finish
their work during regular hours (36%), or because they are passionate about their work (23%)
or for money (11%). One third of employees work between five and ten extra hours a week;
however, managers are less likely to stay after work than lower level civil servants.
Overall, the work environment is characterized by (1) resistance to changes (inert system)
- over 70% of respondents report that their colleagues and superiors are resistant to change;
106
(2) stressful conditions - 57% of civil servants find their job taxing; (3) respect for individual
interviewees think that their work is noticed by their superiors and find that their opinions
are listened to; (4) satisfaction with the job - 80% of civil servants are proud to be working
for a public institution; and (5) flexibility - 78% of public employees believe that they have
enough independence to perform their functions (thus contradicting the myth of inflexibility
and hierarchical rigidity within the public administration). However, in order to get a
complete picture of the Romanian local civil service, these features must be corroborated with
other pieces of information. For example, while civil servants declare that they feel their
opinions are taken into consideration by their superior, 51% report that they do not feel
encouraged to express their opinions when they disagree with their superior. Moreover, 42%
This type of obedience and secrecy is worrisome considering the legislative effort to create
job safety and encourage transparency. One explanation may be that civil servants are
encouraged to maintain secrecy over any event that may damage the image of the institution.
This conclusion was reinforced by Professor Junjan, who estimated that superiors gave ratings
of 'excellent' and 'good' to the majority of employees so that their departments would seem to
4.2.4 Professionalism
Educational Background
Level of education is one of the prerequisites for entry in the civil service (1999 Civil
Service Act, art. 6). Yet, the law is silent on the specific educational background of
candidates. In practice, a majority of civil servants have a college degree (67% when adding
both College and Graduate values from Table 4.2), specializing in engineering (41%),
economics (27%), or social sciences (15%); only 2% of respondents have a degree in public
As shown in Figure 4.2 the educational profile of civil servants does not match the
requirements of the civil service system: while 4 1 % of employees have studied engineering,
only 27% of the work of civil servants is technical. Only 3% of employees have a degree in law,
but 10% of respondents serve in the legal department. While 27% of local civil servants have
107
Table 4.2. Level of Education in t h e R o m a n i a n Civil Service
High school 22
Junior college 11
College 53
Graduate 14
Public
Administration
s'
\ .'* Other .
i \\ ! /
\V/ /
i -'
| Engi caring i <' Ecoromics
i 418 rv 27%
imbalances can be rectified with training programs, but as discussed below, a majority of civil
Also related to the level of professionalism, 85% of civil servants are proficient in a foreign
language and almost all civil servants (98%) can use a computer. 15
Career Development
A majority of local civil servants see themselves working within the same institution for
15
The infrastructure of the Romanian civil service is developed: 82% of respondents report having perma-
nent access to a computer, 13% received a cell phone from their institution, and 4% have a car at their dis-
posal. As expected, these latter requisites are intended for civil servants in managerial positions.
108
the next five years (only 26% of respondents expect to occupy a different position, while 37%
believe they will hold the same position). Only 6% of respondents see themselves in the
private sector in five years. However, 42% of those interviewed admitted to having taken steps
towards finding a new job and 18% indicated the private sector as the preferred domain for
future work. The difference between the 6% of respondents who see themselves in the private
sector and the 18% who prefer private over public sector jobs is very intriguing. The
explanation may be that these employees have already tried to secure a job in the private
sector but, not being competitive enough, were unsuccessful. This would reinforce the
conventional view that public jobs are filled with people who have failed to obtain a job in the
private sector.
For many civil servants, job security is the main reason for working in the public
administration, in spite of the low levels of payment. Sixty percent of interviewees pointed to
job security as their primary motive, while 30% acknowledged that they had no job
alternatives. An overwhelming majority (80%) of civil servants are dissatisfied with their
salary and 48% are disgruntled with their chances of career advancement, but almost 90% of
respondents declare being satisfied with their jobs. The natural inference is that for a majority
of civil servants their job is simply convenient; a cozy, stable job without responsibility.
Article 31 paragraph 1 of the Civil Service Law specifies that public servants have the right
obligation for civil servants to undergo professional development courses for at least seven
days per year. Nevertheless, the law does not create an obligation for public institutions to
provide these courses. Consequently, 60% of local civil servants have undergone professional
training since occupying their current positions, but only 40% in the previous year. On
average, the length of the training program has been ten days in 2003, but 22% of
respondents reported training courses shorter than seven days. The level of satisfaction with
the quality of the training programs is high, with 75% of employees finding training programs
focused mostly on teaching computer skills, foreign languages, and managerial skills.
109
4.2.5 Independence from External Influence
Managerial Arbitrariness
The Romanian civil service system displays several elements of arbitrariness. In most
cases, the hierarchical superior decides who takes part in training programs (43%) and only
rarely (in 30% of the cases) is such a decision made based on an employee's request.
Additionally, one fifth of local civil servants report having been given tasks not included in
their job description. A worrisome fact is that 7% of interviewees declared that they had been
same institution. 16
Article 54 paragraph 5 of the Civil Service Law (as amended up to 2004) stipulates that
every civil servant must receive a copy of the job description upon being sworn in to office. A
large proportion of civil servants had been hired before this regulation was enacted.
Consequently, many civil servants do not possess a detailed account of their responsibilities.
As a result, it is not surprising that 22% of civil servants believe they have been asked to
perform tasks different from those inherent to the position they occupy.
The practice of annual appraisal also exhibits elements of arbitrariness. One third of civil
servants declared that performance evaluations did not correctly reflect individual
performance within their departments. 1 7 On a related point, the allocation of bonuses and
financial supplements lacks transparency: half of civil servants stated that they did not have
enough information to gauge whether bonuses were allocated on merit, while 16% answered
that the way bonuses were given was not justified by individual performance.
One relevant aspect regarding the arbitrariness in managerial decisions is that 19% of
respondents disclosed how in the previous three yea rs there had been civil servants within
their departments who had been disciplined and sanctioned for low performance. However,
the current legal system does not allow for disciplinary sanctions to be applied in cases of
unsatisfactory work (though one can be demoted, denied advancement in position, or even
dismissed). As long as low performance does not constitute an occasion for disciplinary
16
Ideally one would track the careers of a number of civil servants to see unlawful transfers not only within
the same institution but across institutions as well.
17
Thirteen percent of civil servants asserted that the criteria used for annual evaluations are not poor. Re-
markably, the percentage of respondents decrying the quality of the scale is higher among managerial civil
servants, 21% versus 12% for lower-level civil servants.
110
misconduct, the sanctions are illegal and can be appealed in court.
The 1999 Civil Service Law does not prohibit civil servants from becoming members of
political parties and explicitly allows public employees to form unions. However, the level of
membership in social and political organizations is relatively low. Only 6% of civil servants
are members of a political party, while 35% are union members. 19 Party membership is higher
at the managerial level (12%) than at the lower levels (only 5%). It is hard to determine
whether this means that party affiliation is a prerequisite for occupying a higher-level position
within the administration (or for retaining it), but this imbalance is interesting to note.
Twenty-one percent of local civil servants have relatives in the public administration. From
this category, 28% found out about their current job through their relatives and applied to
the vacant position. This means that 6% of local civil servants both had relatives in the
public administration and used these relatives to obtain information about job openings,
European Union assessment reports between 1998 and 2004 have called attention to the
systemic nature of corruption in the public administration and criticized the limited
governmental actions taken to curb corruption (Commission of the European Union, Regular
servants reveals an alarming reality. One third (33.8%) of those interviewed opine that
32.5% of civil servants report that conflicts of interest are prevalent in public institutions (see
Table 4.3). By comparison, a survey representative of the entire population revealed that 35%
of Romanians estimate that a majority of civil servants are corrupt. 2 0 With respect to
phenomenon, while 33% consider corruption as something that occurs only at the highest
Ill
Table 4 . 3 . Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in t h e R o m a n i a n Local Civil
Service
Answer
Question Very Moderately Not
common common common
How widespread is corruption among
4.6% 29.2% 44%
civil servants?
How widespread is conflict of interest
4.3% 28.2% 42.9%
among civil servants?
(77%) point to the low salaries as the main obstacle to professional integrity. From a policy
perspective this finding is very valuable suggesting that an increase in the level of salaries can
approximately 28% of civil servants report having felt discriminated against. The most
common cause of discrimination is age (12%) , 22 but it is notable that 7% of employees have
felt prejudices from others because of their political affiliation. This fact, coupled with the
reality that four out of ten employees see benefits in having the same political affiliation as
their managers, points to a politicized civil service system. However, only 7% of those
questioned answered affirmatively to the inquiry of whether the civil service served obscure
4.2.6 Transparency
vacancies is the local press. However, personal connections still play an important role in the
recruitment process, with one fifth of respondents using informal sources to learn about
Article 51, paragraph 4 of the Civil Service Law (as amended up to 2004) states that the
details regarding examinations for recruitment in the public service are published in the
Official Gazette at least 30 days before the test date. At the same time, article 5, paragraph 3
22
This form of discrimination is not directed against a certain age group. The correlation between respon-
dent's age and whether they felt discriminated against because of their age is only 0.03.
23
When asked whether the civil service worked for citizens, 60% of respondents answered affirmatively and
when asked whether it served the interests of the state, 30% responded 'y es -'
112
Table 4.4. Transparency of Recruitment in t h e R o m a n i a n Local Civil Service
states that examinations take place according to the principles of open competition,
transparency, professional skills and knowledge, and equal access to public service jobs for all
candidates who meet the requirements. Table 4.4 shows however that very few candidates use
the Official Gazette to learn about job vacancies. The official Gazette is not widely
distributed, which may explain why almost 20% of employees have acquired information
Knowledge, experience, and skills are the most important considerations in getting hired,
but four out of ten civil servants reckon that "connections" (i.e. who you know) play an
important role in the recruitment process. Also, a quarter of respondents report that a
candidate's political affiliation is important or very important for being hired in the public
4.2.7 Accountability
The survey does not contain many questions that address the issue of accountability. From
the little information it does contain, the level of accountability in the Romanian civil service
24
Similarly, 55% of interviewees report that political factors influence hiring decisions in the institutions
where they work.
113
Figure 4.3. Factors Important in t h e Hiring P r o c e s s
Note: The remaining up to 100% is represented by "No Response."
appears low. Only half of those civil servants surveyed would consider denouncing illegal acts
without fear of repercussions. Also, one third of respondents estimate that the conflicts of
4.2.8 Conclusions
This civil service survey reveals a series of problems confronting the Romanian local public
the exercise of working relationships. International organizations generally use the term
perspective, this survey prompts two significant findings. First, the rift between the
institutional environment created through legislation and the lack of progress in institutional
performance (as pictured in Figure 4.1) reinforces the idea that institutional reform cannot be
reduced to a series of legislative acts, but presupposes a concerted effort to ensure the
enforcement of the law and the respect for the law by all actors involved in the process.
Second, the survey shows that the institutional environment greatly influences performance
and that public officials are not inherently rapacious rent-seekers. Instead, civil servants
respond to the incentive structures they face. The incentive system as well as the institutional
environment may differ from country to country: Romanian civil servants respond best to
increases in salaries, b u t other civil servants may see other factors as having a positive effect
114
on their performance and integrity.
The Romanian case study raises several questions. First, are the problems plaguing the
Romanian civil service unique to this post-communist country, or do they exist in other
post-communist democracies? And second, are these features specific only to CEE or do they
travel across regions? To capture this variation across countries (and regions), I turn to the
World Bank Public Officials' Survey, a series of surveys designed to convey information on the
views of public officials on their institutional environment. The surveys were carried out in
1999 and 2000 in fifteen countries. 25 The main findings are summarized in Table 4.5. 2 6
4.3.1 Post-Communist P h e n o m e n o n
Comparing the information from Tables 4.1 and 4.5, we notice that there are several common
patterns that transcend national borders. The civil service systems in Albania, Bulgaria, and
7. Insufficient resources
25
The countries included in the study are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Bulgaria, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Indonesia, Kenya, Moldova, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines. The data on Moldova, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Vincent and Grenadines are
missing.
Unfortunately the raw data are not available. Efforts to contact the investigators were unsuccessful in
procuring the raw data. The following conclusions are based on a World Bank research paper written by
the main investigators (Manning et al. 2000) and on a summary of the data for each country, available at
http://go.worldbank.org/27RII63J40.
26
I have excluded the East Caribbean countries because the questions used in these countries differ signifi-
cantly from those used in surveys in the other regions.
115
Table 4.5. Cross-Regional Findings.
Note: The colors indicate the different geographical regions the countries belong to: black
for Central and Eastern Europe, green for Africa, red for Latin America, and blue for
Asia.
Partially Not
Assertion Confirmed
Confirmed Confirmed
Bulgaria
The recruitment system is not transparent Albania Argentina
Indonesia
nor merit-based Bolivia Guyana
Kenya
Bulgaria
Argentina
Corruption is a significant problem in the Bolivia
civil service Guyana
Bangladesh
Kenya.
The civil service is politicized Albania Bolivia Guyana
Public officials are poorly prepared for Albania Bulgaria Bangladesh
their jobs Bolivia Guyana Indonesia
Bolivia Bangladesh
Policy credibility is low
Guyana. Indonesia
Albania
Bulgaria
Public jobs are attractive/civil servants do
Guyana Bolivia
not want to move to the private sector
Indonesia
Kenya
Civil service does not have adequate Bulgaria Albania Argentina
resources Kenya. Guyana Indonesia
Albania
Bulgaria
Guyana
There are few accountability mechanisms Argentina
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Kenya,
There are few or no incentives for good Argentina Bangladesh
performance Guyana Indonesia
Albania
Argentina
Management in the civil service is deficient Guyana
Bangladesh
Kenya
116
These similarities are not surprising. All three countries compared (Albania, Bulgaria, and
Romania) have inherited similar administrative structures and procedures. Some of the
specificities of the communist bureaucracies were the dominance of the party bureaucracy
over the state bureaucracy, the role of the administration as an instrument of suppression, a
These factors combined to create a highly specific starting position for the development of
permanent professional and impartial civil service systems, which started after 1989.
Although all three countries have adopted civil service laws that create a meritocratic
system (as detailed in Chapter 3), the outcome of the reform process is similar: a politicized,
corrupt, and underfunded administration. The results confirm once more the futility of the
reform process in the absence of political will, resources, and an enforcement mechanism.
The situation in the other geographical regions is similarly bleak. There are certain
in Argentina and Guyana; the civil service in Guyana lacks necessary resources, but it is
adequately funded in Argentina), but the intra- and inter-regional similarities are bigger than
the differences.
Some important similarities within the Latin American sample (Argentina, Bolivia, and
Guyana) are the characterization of corruption as a serious problem and the questionable
credibility of government policies. The Asian countries (Bangladesh and Indonesia) display
civil services in which the public servants are adequately prepared for their jobs and face
credible policies, but also are subject to few mechanisms of accountability and few incentives
for good performance (these are also the main inter-regional points of disparity, differentiating
Across regions, corruption is singled out as a significant hindrance in the civil service, the
systems lack mechanisms of accountability, and the management work is deficient. These
common points are impressive considering the large variation between the countries analyzed:
they vary in population size (from 740,000 in Guyana to 223 million in Indonesia), gross
domestic product per capita (from $419 in Bangladesh to $8,700 in Argentina), and Freedom
117
House democracy scores (from 4 in Bangladesh to 1.5 in Bulgaria).
If the adoption of a law does not account for the quality of bureaucracy, what does? What
explains whether the administrative apparatus improves in one country, but not in another?
In the next chapter I argue that electoral competition can constrain the politicization of the
civil service when they are institutionalized. Institutionalization means that elections present
voters with a choice among a manageable number of stable parties with familiar
coalition-building partners.
27
All data are for 2006. Data are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Freedom
House. A lower Freedom House score indicates a more democratic system.
118
Chapter 5
Joel Hellman
The analysis in Chapter 3 revealed the meritocratic nature of the CEE civil service
systems, as designed by the civil service acts. However, both institutional performance
indicators and accounts in the literature (Verheijen 1999 and Nunberg 1999, among others)
show that these laws had little empirical impact on the quality of bureaucratic institutions.
This lack of effect is intriguing, as civil service reform has many times been heralded as the
As noted in the previous chapter, these laws have been adopted over a wide time span (see
Figure 5.1). While some countries have rushed to adopt civil service acts soon after becoming
democratic (e.g., Hungary and Latvia), other countries have postponed this process for a
decade (e.g., Romania) or more (e.g., the Czech Republic and Slovakia). Moreover, some
countries have adopted multiple civil service acts within the span of a decade (e.g., Poland
and Croatia).
This variation in the date of adoption of civil service acts is intriguing particularly in light
of the similarities observed between the laws themselves. Why did Hungary adopt its (only)
civil service law in 1992, just two years after the first free elections? What made Poland adopt
two different laws within an eighteen month period? 2 Why did the Czech Republic and
Slovakia wait for almost ten years after becoming independent, democratic states, to regulate
'"The passing of civil service legislation is [...] rightly seen as a vital ingredient of the reform process. A
stable, competitive, accountable and democratically reliable civil service is a pre-condition for success not
only of administrative reform, but for political stability and economic development as well" (Hesse 1998, 175).
However, "[cjivil service laws have seldom been the expected catalysts for the stabilization, depoliticization
and professionalization of the central administration. Rather than being a starting point for the development
of civil service policies, the adoption of laws has become an objective in itself. Apart from Hungary, none of
the candidate countries has come close to the development of a civil service policy, in addition to the necessary
legal framework" (Verheijen 2000, 29).
2
The first law was adopted on July 5, 1996 and the second one on December 18, 1998.
119
Figure 5.1. Timeline of Civil Service Laws in C E E (by D a t e of A d o p t i o n )
Bosnia- Romania
Herzegovina Moldova' Lithuania 2 Slovenia
Croatia Lithuania Poland Bulgaria Latvia 2 Slovakia Czech Bosnia-
Hungary Latvia Estonia Albania Poland 2 Albania 2 Macedonia Croatia 2 Republic Herzegovina 2 Montenegro Croatia 3
I
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003- 2004 2005
Based on these empirical puzzles (an apparent lack of effect of civil service acts and a
variation in the timing of adoption of such laws), this chapter seeks to answer the following
questions:
1. What factors are important for the success of civil service reform, as measured by the
measures by looking at the magnitude of patronage politics. Political patronage is the power
civil service acts are designed to increase meritocracy and eliminate discretionary recruitment,
I will be able to assess whether civil service laws have a positive impact on constraining
patronage politics. 3
The answer to these questions lies in the relationship or balance between party
with party systems that display signs of institutionalization (e.g. low fragmentation and low
patronage. In such cases, the passage of a civil service law reinforces the efforts to depoliticize
the civil service (e.g., Hungary). But the adoption of a civil service law is not a necessary
condition for constraining patronage. Party competition on its own can play that role,
limiting the extent of political patronage, even in the absence of a civil service law (e.g., the
Czech Republic). 4
3
For operationalization of patronage politics, please see Subsection 5.2.1.
4
In such systems the adoption of a civil service law that would insulate the public administration from po-
120
Figure 5.2. D y n a m i c s of P a t r o n a g e Politics
Timing of Adoption
Early Late
Party System
Institutionalization
In contrast, countries with under institutionalized party systems (with high party
fragmentation and high volatility) cannot rely upon party competition to constrain patronage
politics. In such cases, three situations can occur: (1) the passage of a civil service act is
intended to protect the governing party's (or coalition's) appointees in the administration
from future dismissal, in the event the present opposition wins the right to govern (e.g.,
Poland's first civil service law of 1996); (2) a civil service act is adopted to purge from the
civil service the employees appointed by the previous government (e.g., Poland's second civil
service law of 1998); or (3) the passage of such a law is not deemed necessary as the party in
power faces no credible opposition, and thus has little incentive to protect its appointees,
Figure 5.2 showcases the interplay between party system institutionalization and political
patronage. Regardless of whether a civil service law has been adopted or not, patronage
politics is most pervasive in countries with underinstitutionalized party systems and less
121
5.1 Case Selection
The CEE countries are ideal cases for testing the role of the party system in constraining
patronage, using controlled comparisons. To exclude rival hypotheses and focus on the effects
of party-building on the civil service, I have chosen to compare the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia. These countries match one another closely in terms of their recent
political history (as Soviet satellite states), their rate of economic development (as the
economic leaders of post-communist Eastern Europe), and their proximity to Western Europe
(all four border West European countries). With respect to the political and cultural
characteristics, all four are primarily Catholic. Hungary and Poland shared a similar type of
communist regime, national-accommodative, while Slovakia and the Czech Republic (as part
Comparisons between Hungary and Poland, on one hand, and the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, on the other hand, allow me to control for the communist regime legacy.
Hungary was the first post-communist state to adopt a civil service law. Poland followed
suit four years later (in 1996). These two countries are the early adopters of civil service
legislation. At the other end of the spectrum, the Slovak and the Czech Republics adopted
civil service legislation only under the pressure of the European Union, in 2001 and 2002,
respectively.
These four cases also differ markedly in terms of how the process of party-building has
played out. Consequently, by comparing them, the analysis can focus on the key variable of
party system development. The extent of patronage politics has been most dramatic in
Slovakia, where the nationalist party of Vladimir Meciar became the dominant party,
governing in the presence of a fragmented, weak opposition. Patronage politics has also
occurred in Poland, where the party system has been overcrowded by small, organizationally
unstable parties that have produced internally divided governments and fractured oppositions.
The Hungarian and Czech experiences, while not devoid of interventions by parties seeking
patronage, have been characterized by modest (or no) expansion of the state administration.
Their party systems have been orderly and stable, by regional standards.
Lastly, by looking at a small number of cases, I can follow the civil service reform process
in more depth. The failed attempts to adopt such laws as well as the behind-the-scenes
122
negotiations among parties convey valuable information about the commitment of these four
This research is inspired by Martin Shefter's (1994) thesis about the sequence of
democracies, Shefter concluded that when party-building preceded the consolidation of state
Because electoral competition was introduced before the consolidation of the post-Communist
state administrations, the door was open to patronage politics, enabling underdeveloped and
resource-seeking parties to use the administration for their own party-building (by offering
My research adds a caveat to this theory: the extent of party system institutionalization
explains the magnitude of patronage politics. This caveat originates from the empirical
constrains patronage politics, but only in the presence of an institutionalized party system. In
institutionalized party systems voters are presented with a manageable number of stable
systems that meet these criteria create favorable settings for coherent governments and
This chapter is also an extension of previous work on the relationship between party
competition, political patronage, and the state. In a study of the Latin American
democracies, Geddes (1994) noticed that the Brazilian state in its democratic phases
depending on the robustness of the party competition. Asia's new democracies have also faced
serious challenges from their inability to control patronage politics (Montinola 1999), while
(Aidt 2003; Alexander 2002). Historically, anarchic party competition led to patronage
politics in the French Third Republic, and dominant party politics in post-fascist Italy led to
123
unjustified state expansion (Shefter 1994). In the United States the spoils system and the
urban machine are epitomes of political parties using state resources for their own internal
party-buidling (Shefter 1994). Looking at Eastern Europe, O'Dwyer (2006) concludes that
"runaway state-building" (use of state resources for party building) was more likely to occur
in countries with weak party competition. Similarly, Grzymala-Busse (2007) concludes that
the extent of state exploitation is closely linked to the nature of party competition in CEE.
These studies look at the interplay between parties and the public administration in the
context of party-building (i.e., they focus on parties' use of state resources to build
constituencies). My research examines the relationship between parties and the civil service
from a different perspective: how the nature of the party system influences the process of civil
service reform.
5.2.1 O p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of P a t r o n a g e P o l i t i c s
I use two indicators to capture patronage politics: (1) extent of civil service expansion and (2)
turnover rates. Because of data limitations regarding turnover rates, I am placing more
E x p a n s i o n of t h e Civil Service
One of the ways patronage politics manifests itself is through a rapid expansion of the state
But what are the criteria for assessing rapid growth and effectiveness? I do not intend to set
an absolute threshold value for political patronage that could be applied across space and
time. Instead, I look at state expansion in relative terms, making cross-national comparisons.
For example, if the Polish and Slovak public administrations doubled in size in a ten-year
period, while the Hungarian and Czech bureaucracies (assuming they were facing the same
constraints) grew at a much slower pace (or even contracted), then we can infer that the
124
But how much of this state expansion is a sign of patronage politics and how much is
expansion will serve functional needs (to provide more state services) rather than merely
political ones. Without doubt, a considerable part of these states' post-communist expansion
was necessitated by the transition to a market economy. Moreover, some authors contend that
although the communist state employed a large proportion of the labor force, the core public
administration (the civil service) was small compared to the rates of OECD member states
(Seleny 2007).
is not an easy task. My research design can help: by comparing countries facing the same
geopolitical and economic structural constraints, big differences in state expansion can be
similar levels of economic development and facing the same task of transforming a command
imperatives were not the only ones at work. If, furthermore, there is additional empirical
evidence suggesting that patronage politics is more widespread in those countries whose
administrations expanded most rapidly, then the case for patronage-based expansion becomes
much stronger.
Figure 5.3 shows that a higher number of civil servants is not necessarily associated with
economic growth. The most striking case is that of Hungary, where the relationship between
number of civil servants (per 1000 people) and economic growth (as measured by growth in
GDP per capita in constant $2000) is negative: higher levels of economic growth are
associated with lower levels of employment in the civil service. On the other hand, Poland
displays a positive relationship between the rate of growth in the civil service and economic
growth. Additionally, if we follow the year by year data (in Figure 5.4) we find that state
expansion is not always associated with economic expansion. For example, Figure 5.4 shows
that between 1993 and 1998 both the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced cycles of
economic growth followed by economic decline. Yet, while the Czech civil service remained
relatively constant, the Slovak civil service expanded rapidly. Most notably, the two countries
started with a similar proportion of civil servants, suggesting that in Slovakia the civil service
125
Figure 5.3. Relationship B e t w e e n Civil Service E x p a n s i o n and E c o n o m i c
Growth.
Note: Economic data are from the World Bank (World Development Indicators). Data on civil
service employment are from O'Dwyer (2006), Nunberg (1999), and SIGMA.
r- a-
I
r
6 B 10 -6 -* -2 0 2 4 6 B 10
Poland Slovakia
r
-12 -10 -8 -12 -10 -S -6 -2 0 2
Both the Hungarian and the Polish economies grew throughout the 1990s. However,
despite this parallel, civil service employment in the two countries followed different patterns:
while the Hungarian civil service contracted slightly, the Polish administration grew
constantly. One important observation is that in 1990 the proportion of civil servants per
capita in Hungary was five times higher than that in Poland. However, the Czech case shows
that economic growth can occur at lower levels of civil servants per capita and secondary
information in the Polish case supports the premise that state expansion did not occur for
Turnover R a t e s
Using the turnover rate (defined as the ratio of employees replaced in a given time period to
the total number of employees) as an indicator for patronage politics has one great advantage
over measures of bureaucratic expansion: it captures purges from the state administration
126
Figure 5.4. Civil Service Expansion and E c o n o m i c G r o w t h by Year in t h e
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Note: Economic data are from the World Bank (World Development Indicators). Data on civil
service employment are from O'Dwyer (2006), Nunberg (1999), and SIGMA.
Legend: denotes the Number of Employees per 1,000 Citizens; stands for Growth in Gross
Domestic Product
Poland Slovakia
_v
s
,*' ^ ^
1
1
\
\\
S
and the replacement of officials with party favorites, even when such purges do not lead to an
A moderate turnover rate (some authors put it at around 5-8%) is considered 'healthy' as
it means new expertise enters the system. However, high turnover rates are usually an
indicator of dismissals for political reasons. One can expect the turnover rate to be high at the
beginning of the transition period, as new governments try to replace (especially high-level)
bureaucrats with officials they can trust. But as the democratic institutions consolidate, the
turnover rate should level off and approach the rates observed in established democracies.
There are no data on turnover rates for Poland. World Bank reports conclude that the
turnover rate in Poland is high, with the highly skilled and senior civil servants being more
likely to leave the public administration (Nunberg 1999; World Bank 2006a). However, no
127
Table 5.1. Turnover R a t e s in t h e Czech Republic, 1994-1997.
Note: The data are from Vidlakova (1999).
Office Year
1994 1995 1996 1997
Territorial Financial Offices 8% 8.7% 7.2% 7%
Customs Services 7.3% 7.5% 7.1% 6.6%
Entries/Exits Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Entries 4.1% 5.5% 6.6% 6.5% 6.9%
Exits 7.9% 7.2% 21% 4.7% 3.1%
In Hungary and the Czech Republic turnover rates are around 7% (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2),
in line with the levels observed in established democracies, which vary from 2% in Canada
and the United Kingdom to 10% in Sweden (Nunberg 2000, 42). The highest turnover rate
observed in Hungary, 21% in 2001, coincided with a shakeup in the governing coalition caused
by a series of political scandals. This result reiterates the impact of party competition on the
civil service. The turnover rate did not increase after parliamentary elections (when we would
be more likely to see politically motivated replacements) in either the Czech Republic or
Hungary (1996 was an electoral year in the Czech Republic and 2002 was an electoral year in
Hungary).
In Slovakia, turnover rates are reported to be much higher (see Table 5.3). While the data
available are only for 1995, it shows a rate two times higher than that in the Czech Republic,
for the same year. At the end of 1994 and continuing in 1995, the newly reinstated Meciar
government made it a goal to eliminate all non-HZDS supporters from the public
2007).
Why and how does patronage politics matter? One concern involves the matter of wasted
resources and the costs associated with unnecessary and/or underutilized personnel. Such a
128
Table 5.3. Turnover R a t e s in Slovakia in 1995, by Level of E d u c a t i o n .
Note: The data are from Nemec (1999).
Entries/Exits Level of E d u c a t i o n
Primary Secondary University Average
Entries 35.6% 15.2% 22.4% 24.2%
Exits 24.3% 6.9% 18.5% 16.6%
misuse of funds is undesirable in any state, but even more so in a country facing economic
challenges, as is the case for transitioning democracies. However, the presence of patronage
politics has even greater ramifications for effective state governance and economic
rationalization, which social scientists (starting with Weber) have identified as a crucial
countries, Evans and Rauch (1999, 2000) show that "Weberianness" (or bureaucratic
rationalization) is the key to effective governance and economic growth. Over time acute
democracies and especially in nascent ones, by violating the democratic norm of inclusion
delivering public goods, which in turn breeds general disillusionment with democracy. Such
"Weimar democracies" may have a hard time resisting internal challenges from non-democrats
What are some other possible explanations for bureaucratic expansion in the post-communist
countries, and in these four countries in particular? The comparative literature offers a
number of alternatives. The goal is not to rule them out definitively but to highlight their
6
The effects of patronage are more extensive. For example, Johnson et al. (1997) showed that businesses
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have responded to politicization by going "underground." In-
stead of registering their activities, managers prefer not to pay taxes and not to benefit from key publicly pro-
vided services, such as legal enforcement of contracts. The result is a "bad equilibrium" with low tax revenue,
high unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP, and low quality of publicly provided services (see also Frye
and Shleifer 1997).
The quality of governance and public institutions plays a critical role in other areas as well. In a study on
Peru, Menendez and Recanatini (2002) provide empirical evidence that access to public services is affected by
the quality of governance.
For more on the negative effects of corruption see Azfar (2001), Knack and Keefer (1995), Lambsdorff (1999),
Mauro (1995, 1998), and Olson et al. (2000).
129
shortcomings in explaining the variation observed in my sample of countries.
1. Economic Factors. Some authors point to the demands of the transformation from a
command economy to a market economy to account for the expansion of the administration.
Brym contends that while the Russian bureaucracy is expanding in a manner akin to a
"Hydra that grows two heads for each one that is cut off," the functioning of a democratic
explanation does account for part of the growth. But the magnitude and speed of the Polish
and Slovak expansions go well beyond the demands of economic restructuring. Also, why do
we see such a different pattern in Hungary and the Czech Republic, which underwent a
similar transformation process? One cannot assume (and the discussion for each case will
confirm) that administrative reform in these countries was insulated from the ambitions of
Another strand of the economic explanation asserts that economic development generates
demand for greater levels of government services - what is known as Wagner's Law
(Gimpelson and Treisman 2002). While there is some empirical evidence to support this
hypothesis (Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997), Wagner's Law cannot explain the phenomenon
observed in post-communist Europe. Hungary has a higher GDP per capita than both Poland
and Slovakia, yet a much lower rate of administrative expansion. 7 And while the Slovak and
Polish economies grew at a higher rate than the Hungarian economy (5.7%, 6.06%, and 4.28%
respectively 8 ), the difference in growth cannot account entirely for the different rates of
expansion of the state administration. For comparison, in Bulgaria between 1990 and 1995
the central administration expanded by almost 33% while its economy contracted by 9%
(Verheijen 1999, 126). We can conclude that rapid state expansion is as likely in countries
2. Institutional Design. Another explanation may lie in the formal institutions these
countries adopted after the collapse of Communism. All four republics are parliamentary
systems (although Poland flirted with presidentialism at one point, the system remained
parliamentary).
7
According to the International Financial Statistics Reports (available from the International Monetary
Fund) in 1994 the GDP per capita in Hungary was $4,010, in Poland was $2,686, and in the Slovak Republic
was $2,897. In 1999 the GDP per capita in Hungary was $4,685, in Poland was $4,448, and in the Slovak Re-
public was $3,823.
8
International Financial Statistics data for 1994-1999.
130
All four states currently have legislation regulating the civil service. Hungary adopted a
civil service law in 1992, being the first of the post-Communist states to do so. In Poland, a
civil service act was rapidly pushed through the parliament in 1996 before the elections, only
to be annulled by the new incoming government. Eventually, in 1998 a civil service act was
adopted. In Slovakia, such a law was adopted only in 2001 with a corresponding law in the
Czech Republic in 2002, as a result of intense pressure from the European Union.
One may be inclined to attribute the lack of patronage politics in Hungary to the early
adoption of the Legal Status of Public Officials Act (1992). If we assume that regulating the
status of the civil servant is the necessary and sufficient condition for curbing patronage
politics, we cannot explain the case of the Czech Republic. Between 1993 and 2000 the state
administration contracted by 0.5%. However, it was only in 2002 that the Czech Republic
adopted a civil service act, and only to comply with the requirement for accession to the
European Union. On the other hand, Poland adopted its first civil service law in 1996, and
the civil service continued to expand until 2000, the latest year for which data are available
3. The New State Factor. The Slovak Republic gained its independence in 1993. Can the
believe not. On the one hand, Czechoslovakia was a federal state in which each of the two
republics had its own state apparatus. On the other hand, as seen in Figure 5.4, most of the
expansion did not take place immediately after 1993 (which could have been attributed to the
creation of new institutions necessary for an independent state). Instead, the growth was
concentrated in a two-year period which coincided with the "reform of the public
administration" undertaken by Meciar, as detailed in the discussion below. Also, the Czech
Republic became an independent state in 1993 as well, yet it has not experienced the
4- Accession to the European Union (EU). Joining the EU required states to strengthen
However, the reform process was driven by domestic political factors. While the prospect of
joining the EU appeared in the early 1990s, it was only in 1997 that the European
Commission began formal evaluations of the applicant states. EU accession often served as an
131
improve state capacity (Goetz 2001). Moreover, if the effect existed, all countries should have
By 1992 the party systems in the CEE countries already displayed different degrees of
voters were generally given very few options, the most common of which was having to choose
between repackaged communist elites and communist dissidents. Overall, the euphoria of
regime change acted as a substitute for party organization. The successor of the Communist
Party benefited from having the most developed organizational base, while the anticommunist
blocs often relied on powerful personalities, such as Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic and
Lech Walesa in Poland, whose authority derived in great part from their 'moral'
As often happens after founding elections, political elites who were once united by their
shared opposition to communism became dissatisfied with their party and other coalition
members once they took power (or opposition), resulting in the fracturing of the initial
democratic movements into many new parties. In some systems, such new parties have built
stable electoral bases over time, surviving the transition period (see the Socialist Party in
Hungary, for example). In other cases, parties entered and exited the political arena with
impressive speed, depriving voters of the chance to hold parties accountable for their actions
(as was the case with Poland in the first democratic years).
I use electoral data from the following three sources to assess the extent of party system
measures I employ (fragmentation, dominance, and volatility) are only partially useful in
showing the extent of party system institutionalization. For example, the measure of
fragmentation does not convey the degree of cohesion in a party formed of multiple other
parties (see for example the discussion on SDK in Slovenia, a make believe party which
consisted of five parties and which splintered three years after it was formed). To make up for
these measures' limitations, I discuss in depth the evolution of the party system for each of
132
my cases.
fragmentation of a party system using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) index of the number of
effective parties:
counted as a party. Many electoral alliances have formed with the sole goal of passing the
electoral threshold or ensuring that the member parties win enough votes to gain the right to
form the government. Once in power, these alliances often show little programmatic cohesion
and the constituent parties behave as individual actors. Therefore, when electoral data are
available, I count such groupings as multiple parties, taking into consideration the
2. Dominance. Dominance refers to the electoral strength of the largest party (or electoral
coalition) relative to the next most popular alternative. It can be measured as the difference
in vote share between these two entities (Sartori 1976). The greater the vote differential, the
more remote the possibility that the governing party may lose future elections. Hence, the
3. Electoral Volatility. Volatility measures the degree of party system stability (Toole 2000).
In volatile systems, parties lack stable support bases and their vote shares fluctuate from one
election to the next. Some parties disappear between electoral cycles, while others are
Electoral volatility is calculated using Pedersen's (1979) formula. Let pi>t stand for the
133
percentage of the vote obtained by party i in election t. Then the change in the strength of i
For the entire party system, the total net change (TNC) for election t will be:
n
TNCt = Y^ \APiA where
0 < TNCt < 200
and n stands for the total number of parties competing in the two elections. Taking into
account that the net gains for winning parties are numerically equal to the net losses of the
parties that were defeated in the election, we can calculate the volatility for election t (Vt) as:
TNC
Vt = -1 where 0 < Vt < 100
Volatility shapes the time horizons of government coalition members. In highly volatile
systems, parties are more likely to engage in patronage during their tenure in government,
using state resources to compensate for a lack of organizational power. In systems with low
levels of volatility, parties can rely on a more stable vote share, diminishing the need to
engage in patronage. 9
Throughout the 1990s, the Polish party system has been underinstitutionalized, generating
unstable governments and fractious opposition parties over time. Each national election in
Poland produced a major shift in both the organization of individual parties and the party
system as a whole. Consequently, both the governing coalitions and the opposition parties
were fluid, weakly organized, and fragmented. This made for large and gridlock-prone
coalitions that, in the absence of common ideology, were held together by their desire to stay
in power. For voters, the large number of parties in governing coalitions weakened voters'
9
At the same time, low levels of volatility increase the fear of electoral retribution.
134
Table 5.4. N u m b e r of Governments in P o s t - C o m m u n i s t P o l a n d .
Note: The time periods correspond to parliamentary terms. In 2007, the parliament voted for its
own dissolution and elections before the term were organized.
ability to hold parties accountable, creating an incentive for each party to free-ride and use its
Thus, the party competition in Poland offered voters few avenues to hold parties
accountable for the quality of their governance. This fragmentation of the party system has
led to thirteen different governments in sixteen years, six of which occurred from 1991 to 1997
(see Table 5.4). Moreover, only one of these thirteen democratic governments, that of Jerzy
Several events contributed to the fragmentation of the Polish party system. The
Communist Party lost the first partially free elections of 1989 to the Solidarity (Solidarnosc),
which won 99% of the Senate (upper house) seats and 35% of the Sejm (lower house) seats.
Although the elections were not entirely democratic, they paved the way for a peaceful
transition to democracy, which was substantiated after the Polish parliamentary elections of
1991. But the elections of October 27, 1991 precipitated the disintegration of the Solidarity
because of: (1) a lack of cohesion among members, except in the case of their mutual
opposition to the Communist Party and (2) an electoral law based on pure proportional
representation, which encouraged the Solidarity factions to run on their own (Szczerbiak
entered the parliament without any one party winning more than 13% of the electoral vote.
This led to unstable (and unpredictable) government majorities, with three changes of
The 1993 elections brought two unexpected developments in Polish politics. First, the
Communist Party, reorganized into the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland Party
135
(SdRP), returned to government as part of a heterogeneous coalition (the Democratic Left
Alliance, SLD) comprised of more than 30 left-wing parties. Second, a majority of the
Solidarity successor parties failed to pass the newly instituted electoral threshold for
Lech Walesa's Non-Party Bloc for Support of Reform (BBWR) and the Democratic Union
(UD). In terms of the overall vote, 35.2% of all votes were wasted on parties that failed to win
seats in parliament.
After the 1993 elections only six parties or coalitions had parliamentary representation, in
addition to representatives of the German minority. With only 37.17% of the parliamentary
seats, SLD entered into a governing coalition with the communist successor Polish Peasants'
Party (PSL). 1 0 PSL gained a reputation for political opportunism, having formerly partnered
with the Solidarity. The three SLD-led governments between 1993 and 1997 were internally
divided, as demonstrated by the premature collapse of two of them in a parliament that did
not include a strong opposition (together, SLD and PSL controlled almost 66% of the
parliamentary seats).
The 1997 elections brought another reorganization of the party system. Many
post-Solidarity political groups coalesced into the Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS). AWS
was a newer version of the anti-communist electoral coalition that ruled between 1989 and
1991, comprised of 36 different political groupings (Toole 2000). AWS formed an unstable
government with the Freedom Union Party (UW), which left the government in 2000. n The
1997-2001 parliament looked very similar to the 1991-1993 legislature, with the return of a
The 2001 parliamentary elections produced yet another realignment of the Polish party
system, as the AWS failed to pass the electoral threshold and the SLD won the elections in an
alliance with the Labor Union (UP). The 2001 elections also saw the appearance of four new
parliamentary parties, three of which had been founded less than a year before the elections. 12
After the 2005 elections, for the first time in Poland's post-communist era, no new parties
had gained representation in the legislature. The same six parties from the 2001-2005 term
10
The name Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe is sometimes translated as Polish People's Party.
11
During the 1997-2001 parliamentary term, AWS controlled 43.69% of the parliamentary seats, while UW
controlled 13.04% of the seats.
12
The four new parties were Platforma Obywatelska (PO), Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SRP),
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS), and Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR).
136
Table 5.5. Characteristics of t h e Polish P a r t y S y s t e m .
Note: These numbers are based on the results of elections for the Polish Lower House, the Sejm.
were represented in the Sejm. In the first year after the elections, the Law and Justice Party
(PiS) formed a minority government. In 2006 it entered into a governing coalition with the
populist Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland Party (SRP) and the nationalist League of
Polish Families (LPR). Association with these parties, on the margins of Polish politics,
harmed PiS's reputation. When accusations of corruption and sexual harassment against the
leader of SRP surfaced, PiS chose to end the coalition and called for new elections. While PiS
gathered 32.1% of the votes in the 2007 elections (an improvement over the 27% obtained in
the 2005 elections), the election was a defeat for PiS. The Civic Platform (PO) won the
One can say that the only constants in the Polish legislature have been the successor to the
Communist Party (SLD) and the representatives of the German minority (who do not have to
meet the requirements regarding electoral thresholds). Table 5.5 presents a summary of the
The image painted by Table 5.5 is that of a party system in which no party possessed a
significant electoral advantage. 13 As noted in the previous discussion, the party system was
much more fractionalized than the numbers would indicate. For example, both SLD (winner
in 1993 and 2001) and AWS (winner in 1997) were electoral alliances formed of multiple
137
The volatility measure paints a more accurate image of the Polish party system,
characterized by unstable parties often lasting for just one parliamentary term. Parties and
alliances could see an aggregate gain in vote share of as much as 43.69% from one election to
the next (as AWS did in the 1997 elections). By comparison, Mainwaring reports levels of
9.7% for the advanced industrial democracies, and 25% for the Latin American democracies
(1998, 71).
In conclusion, the political arrangements of the transition grew out of the semi-democratic
agreement forged in the 1989 Roundtable discussions between the Solidarity movement and
the then communist government. Parties were highly fragmented and ideologically fluid, often
associating in broad fronts that included groups with widely divergent political and social
bases. The result was a series of unstable governments characterized by a rapid succession of
fragile and often unorthodox ruling coalitions, and a lack of ongoing, consistent administrative
reform policy.
Successive governments have taken quite disparate views on which, if any, administrative
changes were desirable, creating instability in the Polish civil service. The July 5, 1996 Civil
Service Act adopted by the SLD-PSL coalition was quickly repealed by the AWS-UW coalition
and replaced with the December 18, 1998 version of the law. In 2006, the PiS-SRP-LPR
governing coalition completely modified the law yet again (Majcherkiewicz 2008).
The first steps toward civil service reform were taken in 1991 and 1993 (Taras 1993, Wiatr
governments in four years), and a lack of political backing from the parliament resulted in a
lost opportunity for the quick depoliticization and professionalization of the civil service. 15
When the parliament passed the Civil Service Act in 1996, Poland was praised for being
"well ahead of most other countries in the region" in the process of developing a professional
government service corps (Nunberg 1999, 44). 16 Yet, the law's implementation was stalled,
\
15
The Bielecki government had prepared a Civil Service Act in 1991, but it was rejected by the highly frag-
mented Sejm. The next draft was prepared by Hanna Suchocka's government in 1993, and it included a com-
prehensive set of public administration reforms. However, when the post-communist Pawlak government came
to power the whole set of administrative reforms was rejected.
16
Nunberg praised the law as being progressive, providing the legal basis for a politically neutral civil ser-
vice, creating an organizational structure for ongoing civil service management, and establishing the principles
of recruitment and promotion based on merit (Nunberg 1999, 44).
138
primarily on the grounds that it was politically biased; favoring former communist cadres and
positions. However, the law was an important step in creating a modern bureaucracy by
separating politics from public administration, with secondary legislation clearly identifying
Under the newly adopted legislation, directors general (heads of institutions), who hold the
most senior administrative positions in the Polish civil service, were to preserve their positions
preceding the 1997 elections the SLD-PSL coalition replaced 7 1 % of directors general. These
changes caused even more outrage because of the fact that many of the newly appointed civil
servants were former communist apparatchiks who had abruptly resigned from their party and
Consequently, after AWS won the right to form the government with UW in the 1997
elections, the Buzek government withheld the nominations and proposed a new law, passed by
the parliament in December 1998. As proof of the law's strong partisan nature, all AWS and
UW members of the parliament present during the vote supported the law, while an
overwhelming majority of the SLD and PSL deputies voted against it. 1 7 Despite political
differences between the reformers of 1996 and 1998, some parts of the institutional framework
were preserved. For example, in both acts a clear separation was made between the political
and administrative spheres. In practice, however, the civil service was not immune to political
interference. Article 144a from December 2001 is an example of an attempt by the Miller
competitions for senior administrative positions (Majcherkiewicz 2006). 18 A year later, the
amendment was declared unconstitutional by the Polish Constitutional Court, which found
that the amendment was in violation of the constitutional principle of equal access based on
merit.
With a new governing coalition (PiS-SRP-LPR), in 2006 the law suffered extensive
17
Only one SLD deputy abstained, while 135 deputies voted against the law. Out of 19 PSL deputies, one
voted in favor of the law, while the rest voted against it. The data is available at h t t p : / / o r k a . s e j m . g o v . p l /
SQL.nsf/listaglos?0penAgentfe88.
18
Miller himself was considered a communist apparatchik (Majcherkiewicz 2006). He justified the neces-
sity for direct appointments (without competition) by stating that the system of nomination to civil service
positions was too cumbersome and protracted and that it was preventing positions from being filled in time.
Nevertheless, his system led to the nomination of political appointees without any administrative experience.
139
revisions, which according to analysts reversed the positive trend toward professionalization.
According to Majcherkiewicz, the changes "redefined the concept of the Polish civil service by
limiting civil servants to lower administrative positions, thus reserving senior positions for
individuals with political connections," and thereby constituted a return to the communist
In conclusion, "plans to create a professional body of civil servants have, however, been
hindered by frequent redrafting of the relevant statutory legislation and a general reluctance
to recruit high-level officials through open competitions" (Zubek 2001, 919). During the 1990s
influence of party politics in the management of personnel policy" (Goetz and Wollman 2001,
880) and instability (Verheijen and Rabrenovic 2001, 411) as incoming governments show
little willingness to work with the administrative staff which served their predecessors in
government. Three different legal regimes governing the civil service were instituted by three
different governing coalitions. Polish civil service laws appear to have a proprietary nature: a
particular civil service law is "our" civil service law, or "their" civil service law, depending on
whether one takes the perspective of the current government or its political opposition. 19
In contrast to the Polish electoral system which tends to create weak governing coalitions, the
Hungarian electoral system creates very strong governments that have the support of large
(national lists) in two-round elections with a five percent electoral threshold. This
arrangement can lead to "manufactured majorities," situations in which a party that has
received only a third of the popular vote can hold what is essentially a majority in parliament.
For example, in 1994, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) won only 36% of the electoral
vote but received 54% of the legislative seats. It is therefore not surprising that in the first
free elections of 1990, there were high vote differentials between the first and second largest
19
Toonen (1993) talks extensively about the abuse of legal instruments by goal-directed politicians in CEE.
140
/ Table 5.6. Characteristics of t h e Hungarian Party S y s t e m .
are more stable because of the adoption of the positive vote of no confidence, which conditions
the dismissal of the government, by the parliament, on the ability of the parliament to
span, Hungary had only six different governments (see Table 5.7).
The electoral system limits the number of parties that get seats in the legislature: only
seven parties in 1990, much fewer than the twenty-nine parties in the 1991 Polish parliament.
As the winner of the elections, the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)
governed in coalition with the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP) and the Christian
Democratic People's Party (KDNP). The youth-oriented Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz)
was the main opposition party. In exchange for the presidential appointment of its designee,
Arpad Gonz, SzDSz acquiesced in temporarily giving up the two-thirds majority rule required
141
After the 1990 elections, MDF lost much of its support. By 2006 it controlled only 3% of
the legislative seats. However, the Hungarian party system became institutionalized over
time, with low levels of fragmentation and predictable governing coalitions. After the 1994
elections, the Socialist Party (MSzP) entered into a coalition with SzDSz, together occupying
over 70% of all legislative seats. For MSzP, which already controlled more than 50% of the
seats, the oversize coalition served two purposes: (1) increase the government's legitimacy by
diluting its post-communist label (Sandor 2001), and (2) ensure the necessary votes for the
adoption of essential economic reforms. MSzP would continue this governing partnership with
In opposition, the Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) emerged as the main conservative party.
After the disappointing results obtained in the 1994 elections and with the collapse of MDF
(the main right-wing party), Fidesz changed its political position from liberal to conservative.
This shift caused a severe split in membership, with many party leaders defecting to SzDSz.
However, Fidesz won enough votes in the 1998 elections to gain the right to form the
The Fidesz-led government, under Prime Minister Viktor Orban, was marked by numerous
political scandals which included: Orban's efforts to strengthen the position of the prime
minister to the detriment of the parliament (which was to meet only every three weeks); an
attempt to eliminate the requirement for a two-thirds majority necessary for passing
government interference in the media; and political scandals involving high-level officials with
the Hungarian oil mafia (Seleny 2007). By 2001, the numerous political scandals led to a de
facto, if not actual, breakup of the coalition that held power in Budapest. A bribery scandal
in February triggered a wave of allegations against the Independent Smallholders' Party, the
junior coalition partner. The affair resulted in the ousting of Jozsef Torgyan from both the
The 2002 elections were heavily contested, and enjoyed record-high turnout levels (over
70%). Viktor Orban's group lost the parliamentary elections to the opposition Hungarian
Socialist Party (MSzP), which set up a coalition with its longtime ally, the liberal Alliance of
Free Democrats (SzDSz). Fidesz, however, remained the main opposition party, with 48% of
142
The MSzP-SzDSz government led by Peter Medgyessy resigned two years after taking office
under pressure from SzDSz, after allegations appeared in the Hungarian media regarding
Gyurcsany, who is still heading the executive today. Gyurcsany faced strong popular
opposition when, after his party had won the 2006 elections, audio recordings revealed his
admission that he had lied about the state of the economy for the past two years. In spite of
front-runner in administrative reform among CEE countries. Hungary had many advantages
over other countries in the region. Its well-educated bureaucracy had long been exposed to
Western traditions (Nunberg 2003, 60) and the country had started a process of civil service
professionalization under the last communist government, led by Miklos Nemeth. The process
of professionalization was fostered by the measures adopted by the Kadar regime in the 1960s
when the relaxation of restrictions on university admissions led to the gradual expansion of
the professional class, an important pool for recruiting civil servants. By the 1980s, a new
group of highly trained technocrats had reached mid-level positions within the government
By October 1989, the Nemeth government had already adopted an agenda for
administrative reform, which was started by the Antall government. Some elements (e.g.,
downsizing) of the reform package were pursued much more intensely than others (e.g.,
institutions, the Antall government was able to carry out the downsizing process. However,
successive coalition governments on both the right and left, driven largely by clientelistic
The Civil Service Act of May 5, 1992 created a core elite civil service, distinct from the
much larger public service, and awarded higher pay and additional privileges to the members
of this elite. The law also established the principles of political neutrality and professionalism,
identifying a limited number of positions for political appointment. For the most part,
though, Hungarian civil service policy in the 1990's largely served to retain former communist
143
cadres, locking in their acquired rights and benefits with only minimal regard for standards
based on merit or performance (Nunberg 2003, 76). Although the law itself was inspired by
the Weberian civil service model, no government took significant steps in implementing it.
The first post-transition government had no choice but to retain large numbers of former
The Antall government also prevented the merit clauses of the Civil Service Act from
being enforced because their implementation would have limited his government's ability to
engage in patronage. The civil service became a mix of former apparatchiks and newly
appointed political clients (Nunberg 1999, 2003). 20 In fact, Antall's strategy was to recruit
most of the first generation top officials from the lower managing ranks of the ministerial
The reform process was also hindered by the fractionalization of MDF into separate
legislative groups. The radical factions wanted a complete break with the communist past,
advocating far-reaching personnel changes in the bureaucracy, which the government could
not undertake as it could not find the personnel with whom to replace all (or almost all) of
these civil servants. Antall died in the last year of his term, leaving in place a caretaker
government. The chances for meaningful merit reform were lost, as the Socialist government
installed after 1994 had little interest in enforcing merit clauses that might have reduced the
Two more major reforms took place in 1997 and 2001. Both reforms attempted to partially
depoliticize the civil service. However, neither of them restricted the avenues for governments
to intervene in personnel policy insofar as the recruitment, appointment, and transfer of civil
servants was concerned. In addition to these two reforms, in 1998 the MSzP-SzDSz
government (under Prime Minister Horn) proposed a detailed reform program to limit the
20
Nunberg contends that "the belief that Hungarian bureaucrats were well-qualified professionals was a
view in which many Hungarians took considerable pride, regardless of political affiliation. The justification for
keeping these cadres in place was thus tied intricately to a nationalist self-perception of professional superior-
ity" (2003, 77).
144
possibility of government intervention in personnel policy (Agh 1998). The program was never
Additionally, any measure to depoliticize the civil service conflicted with MSzP's interests.
Soon after taking office, the Horn government replaced a large number of senior officials
promoted by Antall with officials recruited from outside the bureaucracy. As the successor to
the Communist Party, MSzP was able to pool people from various backgrounds through its
wide-reaching social network. And as a result, what should have been an ambitious civil
service reform program was transformed into a "small-scale institutional adjustment of the
status quo aiming to alleviate the most pressing problems of the day" (Meyer-Sahling 2004,
93).
When it took office in 1998, the Fidesz-FKgP-MDF coalition government led by Prime
Minister Orban had even less incentive to work with inherited government bureaucrats than
the Horn government. Many of the senior bureaucrats recruited by Horn had held senior
positions before 1989. As a result, the Orban government initiated sweeping changes in the
senior ranks of the civil service by bringing in trusted appointees from outside the public
elite corps of top civil servants under the direct control of the Prime Minister, to enhance
result, the Prime Minister became effectively unconstrained in the capacity to appoint senior
officials.
In conclusion, Hungary's front-runner status in adopting a civil service law was not echoed
by a successful campaign to depoliticize the civil service. While in Poland patronage politics
led to an expansion of the civil service, in Hungary the size of the civil service remained
choosing often to replace a small number of existing civil servants with new ones they could
trust. 2 1 To Hungary's advantage, the early institutionalization of the party system (with low
levels of party fragmentation and party continuity) constrained the parties' ability to engage
in patronage politics.
21
After the 2002 and 2006 elections, the MSzP-SzDSz coalition governments continued the cycle of replac-
ing senior civil servants. In fact, many of the new appointments were officials previously appointed by the
Horn government and removed by the Orban cabinet (Meyer-Sahling 2008).
145
Table 5.8. Characteristics of t h e Czech P a r t y S y s t e m .
Note: The 1990 and 1992 results are for the Czech National Council.
5.6.1 E v o l u t i o n of t h e P a r t y S y s t e m
The Czech system, unlike the system in Poland yet similar to the system in Hungary,
presented voters with a manageable number of parties that engaged in predictable coalitions.
Facing a credible opposition, and hence the possibility of being voted out of office, the Czech
Since the mid-1990s, the Czech system has been anchored by two major parties, the
conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social Democratic Party (CSSD). There
are also several smaller parties, most notably the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) on the
center right, and the Communists (KSCM) on the left. Over time, the party system has
simplified, with the majority of smaller parties being eliminated. Compared to the Polish
system, the Czech party system displays stronger elements of institutionalization: stable
coalition patterns, low volatility, and low fragmentation (see Table 5.8).
Analogous to the Hungarian process of party system institutionalization, the Czech party
system quickly developed robust and stable party competition based on a clearly
distinguishable left-right, socioeconomically based issue space (Kitschelt et al. 1999b). In the
1990 elections, the anti-communist umbrella group Civic Forum (OF) won a majority of
legislative seats. As had happened before with the Solidarity in Poland, the OF splintered
once the Communist Party threat had receded. In 1991, Vaclav Klaus (the Minister of
Finance) broke away from OF, founding the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and taking much
of the OF membership with him. Together with the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and
146
Table 5.9. N u m b e r of Governments in P o s t - C o m m u n i s t Czech Republic.
Note: The time periods correspond to parliamentary terms.
After ODS, the most notable party to the Civic Forum was the Social Democratic Party
(CSSD), which after 1992 emerged as the fastest growing party in the Czech Republic. CSSD
defined itself as an alternative to the ODS vision of neo-liberal economic reform. The
increasingly competitive nature of the party system was evident in the narrow winning
margins in parliamentary elections. While in 1992 ODS enjoyed a 20% lead over its closest
competitor (the Left Bloc), in 1996 the lead had shrunk to just 3% (CSSD was the second
largest party in the legislature). In CSSD Czech voters had a clear and credible alternative to
After the initial positive results of economic reform began to wear off, CSSD gained
steadily in strength in the parliament, enjoying more than 30% of parliamentary seats starting
with the 1996 legislature. An economic crisis, coupled with party financing scandals resulted
in the demise of the ODS-led coalition government in November 1997. After winning the
pre-term 1998 elections, CSSD formed a minority government, which ODS - now the second
largest party in parliament - officially tolerated (as shown in Table 5.9, the CSSD government
Table 5.8 summarizes the characteristics of the Czech party system. Excluding the 1990
elections in which OF functioned as an umbrella party, the vote differential was 7.8%, less
than the corresponding values for both Poland (10.7%) and Hungary (13.2%). After the 1998
elections, the Czech system experienced low volatility: 14.6% compared to Hungary's 23.7%
for 1998-2006. This combination of low vote differential and low volatility reflected robust
22
While on the left side of the political spectrum, CSSD was not a communist successor party. In contrast,
in a majority of the post-communist democracies, the major left-of-center party tended to be a communist
successor of some sort.
147
competition in elections: two stable parties whose organizational strength enabled them to
survive outside of the government and to compete in elections with relative parity. By
comparison, in Poland, the vote differential was low at times, but the fragmentation of power
among coalition members and the high volatility led to an underinstitutionalized party
system. In terms of fragmentation, the Czech system's 3.09 effective parties puts it in line
with Western European party systems (Linz and Stepan 1996, 277).
The Czech governing coalitions were more stable than the corresponding Polish ones. The
governing formulas in Czech politics were relatively familiar, and consisted of the Christian
Democrats entering into governing coalitions with either the Social Democrats (during
2002-2006) or the Civic Democratic Party (1996-1998, and 2006-present). The Communist
Party (KSCM), while a member of every democratic legislature, has always been excluded
With fewer turnovers of the government, there were fewer opportunities for administrative
reshuffling, and the Czech administration experienced considerable autonomy from patronage
politics. This does not mean that patronage politics was completely absent, but the frequency
of accountability violations among political institutions remained low and their scope
relatively small. Furthermore, violations prompted investigations and the requisite sanctions
(Krause-Deegan 2006). These findings confirm my expectations: the timing of party- and
state-building created incentives for party patronage, but the presence of a credible opposition
Although the Czech Civil Service Act was adopted in 2002, it was put in force only in 2004.
Efforts to draft such a law began with the founding of the Czech Republic as an independent
state in January 1993 (Vidlakova 2000). The first Klaus government, formed after the 1992
parliamentary elections, promised to quickly adopt an act on the legal status of civil servants.
The draft was prepared by the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs in June 1993, and was
approved by the government in August 1993. 23 As was the case in Hungary and Poland, the
23
Labor ministries are not a frequent choice for coordinating civil service reform, but both the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia chose this route. Beblavy argues that both ministries placed an almost exclusive emphasis
on the labor and social aspects of civil service reform, particularly on employee protections, at the expense of
the rest of the civil service reform (2005, 61).
148
main focus of this act was the transformation of the existing structure, inherited from the
communist period, into an efficient, well-qualified organization. Nevertheless, the law was
subjected to new scrutiny by the coalition members. By July 1994 it became obvious that the
legislature would not even get to vote on it. The most contentious provisions were the
establishment of a permanent civil service (with guaranteed tenure) and the adoption of a
In spite of this failure, the attempts to prepare the draft indicate that in the Czech
Republic "administrative reform had been put firmly on the political agenda, and that its
significance for democratic government and successful economic transition was acknowledged"
The importance of a stable civil service was articulated several times by President Vaclav
Havel. In his address to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1995 he emphasized that the
backbone of every well functioning state is an efficient state administration (Vidlakova 2000).
In response, the second Klaus coalition government committed once again to adopting a civil
service law. An external working group established within the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs undertook this challenge. The basic principles of this draft were different from the
previous project, as the working group abandoned some of the elements of a career system, as
well as the principle of a permanent civil service (Suleiman 2003). However, opposition to the
law and the budgetary strains of 1997 suspended work on the legislative draft. Once again,
The Social Democratic government headed by Zeman committed itself, in the summer of
1998, to depoliticizing the state administration, in order "to stabilize the state apparatus,
improve its efficiency and eliminate its dependence on short-term political pressure" by
adopting a civil service law (Vidlakova 2000). A legislative draft that imposed high
requirements for professional civil servants and established protections from external pressure
was submitted to the CSSD minority government at the end of 1999. 26 The Civil Service Act
24
It should also be noted that as much as 90% of the normative acts adopted between 1990 and 1992 fo-
cused on the public administration, its rights, duties, and organizational structure (Suleiman 2003, 299), which
is understandable in a country that had just broken away from a federal state.
25
After the Klaus government collapsed amid allegations of corruption, the caretaker government led by
Tosovsky adopted a resolution on public administration reform, which also included a draft of the civil service
act. The government served only for seven months, insufficient time for the law to be adopted.
26
CSSD and ODS signed a power sharing agreement in 1998 (the so-called Opposition Agreement) which
granted ODS a number of parliamentary positions (but no ministerial portfolios) and the right to be consulted
on major political decisions, in exchange for not initiating no-confidence votes.
149
was adopted on June 14, 2002 and came into effect in January 2004, only months before the
Czech Republic became a member of the European Union. The accession talks undoubtedly
sped up the legislative process. While the EU benchmarks do not contain explicit provisions
regarding the public administration, the European Commission has made it clear that
acceding countries would need to increase their administrative capacity to successfully apply
the European body of law (acquis communitaire). In fact, in countries where sufficient civil
service legislation had not been passed prior to relevant accession negotiations (the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia), the passage of such an act usually became a focal point of
We can argue that the bipolar Czech system created a domestic political deadlock over
reform (within the government or between the government and key stakeholders). The EU
negotiations helped to overcome this stalemate, creating credible exogenous pressure on the
parties involved in the reform process. 27 Nevertheless, as argued by many authors, even in
countries where EU pressure and assistance has been pivotal in the overall reform, the EU's
role in the implementation phase is much weaker and less focused (Beblavy 2005, Verheijen
2002). Moreover, the bipolar system also prevented parties from engaging in patronage
politics.
Nationalism was the main factor in Slovak politics in the early 1990s. During the early
post-transition years, Slovak politicians focused on national identity issues and demands of
autonomy to a much greater extent than other politicians in the region. 28 This position was
justified by the belief that despite the communist regime's post-1968 efforts to promote the
"equalization" of Czechs and Slovaks, it was not until after 1989 that Slovakia achieved real
autonomy within the federation in all areas except defense, foreign relations, and national
The 1990s were dominated by one party, Vladimiir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic
27
Similarly, in Slovakia the civil service law was adopted only under pressure from the European Commis-
sion.
28
Almost every country had a nationalist party, but only in Slovakia did it play such a crucial role in gov-
erning.
150
Table 5.10. Characteristics of t h e Slovak P a r t y S y s t e m .
Note: The 1990 and 1992 results are for the Slovak National Council.
Slovakia (HZDS). While in power, between 1992 and 1998 (with a small break from March to
October 1994), HZDS enjoyed overwhelming organizational and institutional advantages over
a fragmented opposition (Fish 1999). In 1998, when the opposition finally won the right to
govern, the governing coalition was comprised of eight parties, united primarily by their
opposition to HZDS.
Being the biggest winner of the 1992 elections (for the Slovak National Council, while
Slovakia was still part of Czechoslovakia), HZDS faced a weak and internally divided
opposition. As shown in Table 5.10, HZDS maintained a 20-plus percentage point advantage
on its closest rival in parliamentary elections (after 1998 when HZDS became an opposition
party, the difference between the first two parties in terms of percentage of votes was much
smaller). Worse still, the opposition parties displayed an inconsistent behavior, often
cooperating with Meciar's party in exchange for short-term gains (O'Dwyer 2006). Facing no
credible opposition, HZDS had little incentive to restrain its use of patronage. As shown in
Figure 5.4, most of the civil service expansion occurred during HZDS's tenure in government
(1993-1998).
The Slovak party system failed to generate accountability because it did not offer voters
meaningful choices at election time. There were too many parties in the opposition, which
deprived voters of a meaningful weapon to punish the governing HZDS. Additionally, the high
turnover rates (reflected in the high volatility in Table 5.10) meant that there was little
The first party to invoke the nationalist theme was the Slovak National Party (SNS),
which called for Slovak autonomy during the 1990 elections. SNS was deemed too extremist,
151
Table 5.11. N u m b e r of Governments in P o s t - C o m m u n i s t Slovakia.
Note: The time periods correspond to parliamentary terms.
and ironically, Vladimifr Meciar - who became Prime Minister of the Slovak Federal Republic
(O'Dwyer 2006). In 1991, Meciar's rhetoric changed abruptly, with his calling for the
liberation of Slovakia from Czech domination. This shift precipitated a leadership struggle
within VPN, the fall of the Meciar government, and the disintegration of VPN.
The 1992 elections exposed a deeply polarized political scene, clearly dominated by the
nationalist HZDS. HZDS won almost half of the parliamentary seats, forming a government
with the markedly more nationalist SNS. Losing its parliamentary majority temporarily in
1994, Meciar's HZDS returned to power in the 1994 elections, when another nationalist,
post-communist party, the Slovak Workers' Party (ZRS) was added to the coalition. The
weakened continuously. For example, while the opposition managed to bring down the Meciar
October, after clearly winning the elections. Together with SNS and the now-defunct ZRS,
HZDS and Meciar governed undisturbed until 1998 (see Table 5.11).
The Slovak opposition finally coalesced and defeated HZDS in 1998. Ironically, the
opposition's unification was caused by a HZDS decision. Just before the 1998 elections, in an
effort to prevent several opposition parties from gaining representation, HZDS changed the
electoral law, establishing a five percent electoral threshold, even for parties that were in
electoral alliances. This had the unintended effect of forcing the opposition parties to form a
large umbrella party, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). Although HZDS won the most
152
votes in the 1998 elections, it was unable to form a government because it had eliminated its
potential coalition partners by enforcing the new threshold requirement and forcing the
opposition to unite.
But SDK was not a coherent, internally unified party. It consisted of five distinct parties:
the Democratic Union (DU), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic
Party (DS), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), and the Green Party (SZ). With
only 28% of the legislative seats, SDK was forced to enter into a governing coalition with
three other ideologically diverse parties: Party of the Democratic Left (SDL'), Party of the
Hungarian Coalition (SMK), and Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). The SDK-led
government of Mikulas Dzurinda is credited with bringing Slovakia into the European Union.
However, tensions within SDK led to its disintegration, so that in 2002 there were eighteen
political parties in the parliament, whereas in 1998 there were only six (Malikova 2002).
SDK's largest successor party was the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU),
headed by Dzurinda. SDKU won the 2002 elections and Dzurinda continued as Prime
Minister. During this period, HZDS was a strong opposition party, using votes of
no-confidence to destabilize the government. However, HZDS's power faded in 2006, when it
Very soon after 1989, it became quite clear that the two federal republics - Czech and Slovak
- would part ways. As a newly independent state, Slovakia adopted a series of governmental
resolutions with the goal of creating real self-governing institutions (Nemec 2002). While civil
service reform figured highly on the government's priority list, the process was postponed
After HZDS consolidated its position in parliament in the 1994 elections, civil service
reform was reduced to a series of government statements given in January 1995. These
statements expressed the government's intention to establish "an administration system that
[would] better address the needs of the citizens, and [would] be simpler and financially less
demanding" (Nemec 2002, 141). Ironically, between 1994 and 1998, the Slovak civil service
29
Twice Meciar, first as Prime Minister of the Slovak Federal Republic, and then as Prime Minister of Slo-
vakia, was deposed by the parliament.
153
doubled in size.
HZDS began its 1994-1998 term with the "night of the long knives" (Grzymala-Busse
2003, 1143) on November 3 r d , when the Meciar government eliminated all non-HZDS
supporters from the state administration. They were replaced with HZDS party activists and
The Meciar government presented a draft for the civil service law in 1994, which was
rejected by the parliament. A new civil service act was presented for parliamentary approval
on July 15, 1997 and was approved in the first and second readings. This law was highly
criticized by the trade unions for offering few social benefits, but was deemed acceptable for
establishing civil servants' independence from politics - which would have benefited HZDS, as
it had already filled the administration with party members (SIGMA 2003b). However, with
the parliamentary elections approaching, the law was not submitted for final approval. The
bill was reintroduced in parliament in March 2001, when discussions stagnated because of a
conflict among coalition partners over a different issue, namely the number of regional
self-governing units into which the country would be divided (East European Constitutional
Review, Country Reports, 2001, 2/3). The law was finally adopted by the parliament in July
With the arrival of the SDK-led government in 1998, the distribution of posts continued.
SDK first replaced all 79 local (okresni) leaders and all eight regional (krajske) leaders loyal
to the outgoing government (Malikova 2002). These positions, as well as others in state
enterprises, banks, the oil sector, etc., were distributed among the coalition members. The
difference was that the dispersion of power led to a diffusion of appointments: no longer did
The law has been highly criticized by trade unions for failing to guarantee the political
independence of civil servants. Civil servants can be easily dismissed through institutional
restructuring, and managers have discretionary powers in the allocation of "personal bonuses"
(SIGMA 2003b). Like the Czech case, the "law was designed to satisfy the EU" (SIGMA
2003b, 2-3), and did not signal the political parties' commitment to the creation of a
154
5.8 Conclusions
The post-communist experience in CEE validates Shefter's thesis about the sequence of
However, the extent of patronage politics varied across cases: it was lower in countries with
party systems that institutionalized in a short period of time (Hungary and the Czech
Republic), and higher in countries where party system institutionalization was a prolonged
I am not arguing that patronage politics was absent in Hungary and the Czech Republic.
As the detailed discussion of these cases revealed, they were by no means immune to such
practices. For example, in Hungary, both anecdotal evidence and the turnover rate observed
in 2001 indicate that political factors often interfered with administrative independence.
However, this chapter showed that under certain institutional arrangements (which result in
stable parties that build their constituencies on ideological bases), patronage politics can be
constrained.
The adoption of legislation regulating the civil service does not, in and of itself, constrain
patronage politics, nor does it signal the commitment of various parties to reform the public
administration along Weberian lines. Just as a civil service law can serve to depoliticize and
increase the level of professionalism in the civil service (Hungary, to a certain extent), it can
also serve to protect political appointees and secure their positions (the case of Poland), or to
fulfill some exogenously imposed benchmark (the Czech and Slovak Republics). The analysis
in this chapter showed that the nature of party competition is a better predictor for the
extent of political patronage than the mere adoption of a civil service law.
155
Conclusions
This study has important policy implications: it shows that the adoption of a civil service act,
per se, does not inevitably lead to an improvement in institutional quality. Additionally, my
findings indicate that legislative efforts undertaken to purportedly achieve institutional reform
international actors. In other instances, governments use the veil of reform to create more
The systematic analysis of the civil service systems created in CEE - the basis of this
how to design better functioning institutions. Otherwise, the same institutions that are
designed to foster governance can undermine the regime itself, by eroding its legitimacy. In
the case of the civil service, I argue, a well functioning system is one that is highly
manner. An institution with such features fosters the rule of law and good governance.
By using original data, this study found that the civil service systems, designed by relevant
legislation, primarily display elements of professionalism. However, beyond the merit fagade,
civil service laws also provide the means through which direct political influence over the civil
service is realized. These circumstances can explain why, overall, the process of retooling and
redeploying the state administration (i.e., civil service reform) inherited from the former
regime in post-communist CEE has produced mixed results, even among the relatively
successful transition countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
and economic transformation, initial economic decline, lack of civil society, etc.) have
156
undoubtedly set back the modernization of the civil service, I argue that politics and
politicians are a major reason why elements of the spoils system appear in civil service laws.
The interference of political actors is apparent in the way civil service acts are applied: with
delays and, often, not to completion. Moreover, the nature of party competition can explain
the success (or failure) of the process of bureaucratic rationalization. In countries with
underdeveloped party systems, parties engage in political patronage, co-opting people into
What are some characteristics of the CEE civil service systems? In terms of institutional
design, these systems display many similarities. A majority of CEE countries have adopted
structures that are closer to the career-based model. Characterized by hierarchies and long
tenures, such systems are designed to prevent patronage (at least in high level positions) and,
over time, should lead to the creation of a knowledgeable and dependable labor force.
However, in practice - as the discussion on the political appointees in Hungary and Lithuania,
covered in subsection 3.2.2, has shown - politicians find ways to circumvent the tenure
requirement for occupying high level positions by creating special categories of civil servants
However, as this study has shown, only one third of the laws have such provisions designed to
insulate institutions from those activities of the employees that may undermine the goals of
the civil service. Moreover, the analysis revealed that, by law, civil servants are not insulated
from external pressures (political or of any other nature). While a majority of the acts
stipulate unlimited tenure, they do not offer enough guarantees to protect civil servants from
Civil service laws are also silent with respect to the means of ensuring transparency in the
the law. However, transparency enhancing actions are all the more important in bureaucratic
Beyond the legislative effort, the professionalization of the civil service presupposes that
the system must be able to attract the best professionals by offering salaries that are
competitive with the ones found in the private sector. To achieve this goal, civil service acts
157
set guaranteed salary minimums. However, secondary data show that, in some cases, public
sector salaries represent 30% to 80% of the salaries paid in the private sector for similar
positions. Consequently, pay policies actually undermine the professionalization of the system.
Moreover, bonuses and supplements represent a high percentage of the final salary, which
means that the awarding authority (usually the civil servant's direct superior) has a high
The arbitrary and/or perfunctory application of legal provisions is another feature of the
CEE civil service systems. For example, while the laws mandate annual training programs
organized by the central government, in practice, because of the lack of funds, training courses
are mostly ad hoc and episodic, and occur at the local level with the help of external donor
performance are either not carried out in all institutions, or, if administered at all, result in
every employee being rated as "satisfactory," so that the department's prestige does not suffer.
The case of Romania demonstrates the rift between the institutional environment, created
through legislation, and the actual institutional performance, manifested as a lack of progress
in reform. This rift reinforces the idea that institutional reform cannot be reduced to a series
of legislative acts, yet presupposes a concerted effort to ensure the enforcement of the law and
respect for the law by all actors involved in the process. The civil servants' survey analyzed in
Chapter 4 also shows that the institutional environment greatly influences performance and
that public officials are not inherently rapacious rent-seekers. Instead, civil servants respond
to the incentive structures they face. The incentive system, as well as the institutional
environment, may differ from country to country. In this case, Romanian civil servants
respond best to increases in salaries, but other civil servants may see different factors as
having a positive effect on their performance and integrity. It is encouraging to find that,
Another significant finding from this study is that, despite the v, idely-held belief among
i
the public and in the literature, CEE civil services are lean compared to those of developed
democracies. Cross-national longitudinal data show that countries have experienced very
different employment patterns since 1990, and that a change in the number of employees did
not translate into a better or worse quality of bureaucracy. While the changes in the size of
158
the civil service in CEE did not translate into a better quality bureaucracy, in a
servants per capita and quality of bureaucracy. Moreover, a larger number of civil servants are
positively associated with higher government effectiveness. What this means is that there is
However, when an increase in the size of the civil service is not associated with an increase
in institutional quality, the expansion of the bureaucracy may be a sign of patronage politics -
advantage over their adversaries. The study in Chapter 5 validates Shefter's thesis about the
support. However, the extent of patronage politics varied across cases: it was lower in
countries with party systems that became institutionalized in a short period of time (Hungary
and the Czech Republic), and higher in countries where party system institutionalization was
a prolonged process (Poland and Slovakia). These findings are relevant for policy-makers
because they show how patronage politics can be constrained under institutional
arrangements, which result in stable parties that build their constituencies on ideological
bases.
liberalization. As we have learned from the experiences in CEE, but also more recently in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the success of electoral institutions depends to a great extent on the
development of the state. And this study has sought to reemphasize the role of the state in
establishing a democracy. For countries that are transitioning to democracy, the lesson is that
the adoption of a civil service system that promotes professionalism does not necessarily
translate into a professional civil service. Other factors, such as the nature of the party
From these various findings, we can expect civil service reform to have very different
degrees of success, according to the particular party system competition in place in any
particular state. Consequently, the impact of the party system transcends such short-term
159
phenomena as governmental stability. Indeed, understanding the nature of party competition
tells us much about the quality of other institutions (e.g., civil service), and indirectly informs
us about the quality of democracy. With democracy's seeming universalism, alas with varying
160
Appendix A
161
Table A . l . Continued from the previous page ...
Country Law N a m e Number Adoption Date
Law on Public Service 52 April 21, 1994
Latvia State Civil Service Law September 7, 2000
Amending Law September 14, 2006
Act on Public Servants 1-836 April 4, 1995
Lithuania Act on Public Service VIII-131 July 8, 1999
Amending Law IX-855 April 23, 2002
Act on Civil Servants 2477 July 20, 2000
Macedonia
8 Amending Laws 2001-2007
Law on Civil Service 443-XIII May 4, 1995
Moldova
19 Amending Laws 1996-2002
Act on Public Servants April 26, 2004
Montenegro
and Public Employees
Civil Service Act July 5, 1996
Poland Law on Civil Service 49 December 18, 1998
Amending Law December 23, 1999
Civil Service Law 188 December 8, 1999
Romania
13 Amending Laws 2000-2006
Act on Public Service 119-FZ July 31, 1995
Russia
Amending Law 35-FZ February 18, 1999
Act on Public Servants September 16, 2005
Serbia
Amending Law July 13, 2007
Act on Civil Service 312 July 3, 2001
Amending Law 143 March 15, 2002
Slovakia
Amending Law 185 June 25, 2002
Amending Law 411 July 3, 2002
Act on Civil Servants 2759 June 11, 2002
Slovenia
Amending Law 5004 November 30, 2005
Act on State Service 233 March 5, 2007
Tajikistan
Amending Law 429 June 8, 2007
Act on Service in June 12, 1997
Turkmenistan
State Bodies
Act on Public Service 3723 December 16, 1993
Ukraine Amending Law 97 January 16, 2003
Amending Law 432 December 12, 2006
Uzbekistan - - -
Act on Federal 577 September 27, 1996
Serbia and
Public Institutions
Montenegro
Amending Law 650 December 4, 1998
162
Figure A . l . Civil Service Employment and Government Effectiveness (by Region)
Source: World Bank
Note: Civil service employment data is the early 1990's. 'Government effectiveness' runs from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 indicating a very effective
government. I used the 1996 score, the first score in the series.
Africa Asia
(N = 32) (N = 17)
CO
Civil Service as % of Population Civil Service as % of Population
I '5
o
C3
ivi
i .
o
w
<D .11i . *
rvi
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s\.
CO
CO
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^ \ ... o
9. ff)' \
"0 \
O Government Effectiveness tr
^1-
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. o
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II 3
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Figure A.2. Civil Service Employment and Quality of Bureaucracy (by Region)
Source: World Bank and ICRG
Note: Civil service employment data is the early 1990's. 'Quality of bureaucracy' runs from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating a high quality bureaucracy. I
used the data from 1993 with the exception of Belarus, Ukraine, and Croatia for which the closest available data was from 1998. For the same reason,
I used the 1999 score for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Slovenia
Africa Asia
(N = 17) (N = 10)
OS
Z 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10
OECD
(N = 21)
Technical Characteristics
The structure of the CEE civil service laws varies a great deal. In some cases, such as the
2005 Croat Act, the table of contents offers a valuable insight into the provisions of the law.
In other cases, such as the 2001 Slovak and the 2002 Slovene laws, the chapter headings do
not convey the same amount of information and we need to look in depth at specific articles
167
Table B.l. Continued from the previous page . . .
Country First Level Heading
Bulgaria 1999 1. General Provisions
2. Establishing the Service Legal Relationship
3. Civil Servant's Status
4. Amendment to the Service Legal Relationship
5. Insignia of Honor and Prizes. Service Liability
6. Termination of the Service Legal Relationship
7. Service Book and Length of Service
8. Protection Against Illegal Termination of the Service Legal
Relationship
9. Disputes
10. Control on Observing the Civil Servant's Status
Croatia 2005 1. Introductory Provisions
2. Rights and Obligations of Civil Servants
3. Management in the Civil Service
4. Adminission in the Civil Service and Job Assignment
5. Classification of Posts in the Civil Service
6. Transfers
7. Assessments of Performance and Efficiency of Civil Servants
8. Advanacement in the Civil Service
9. Training of Civil Servants
10. Accountability for Breaches of Official Duty
11. Liability for Damage
12. Placing at Government Disposal
13. Termination of the Civil Service
14. Governmental Employees
15. Personal Files and the Central Register of Civil Servants and
Governmental Employees
16. Oversight
17. Transitional and Final Provisions
Czech Republic 1. General Provisions
2002 2. Preparation for Service
3. Service Relationship
4. Obligations and Basic Rights of Public Servants, Limitation
of Certain Rights of Public Servants, Orders for Performance of
Service and Rewards for Exemplary Service
5. Disciplinary Liability
6. Conditions for Performance of Service
7. Compensation for Damage
8. Social Security of Public Servants
9. Provision of Information to Public Servants and Consultations
with Public Servants in Matters of Performance of Service and
Conditions of Performance Thereof, Rights of Trade-Union Bodies
the Council of Public Servants, Representatives of Public Servants
for Safety and Protection of Health in Performance and the Rights
Thereof
10. Remuneration of Public Servants, Candidates, Other
Employees in Administrative Authorities and Organizational
Aspects Relating to Employment of Such Bodies
11. Joint Provisions
12. Transitory and Concluding Provisions
Continued on the next page ...
168
Table B . l . Continued from the previous page ...
Country First Level Heading
Estonia 1999 1. General Provisions
2. Employment in Service
3. Rights of Public Servant
4. Duties of Service
5. Internal Procedure Rules of Administrative Agency
6. Incentives, Promotion of Officials and Disciplinary Action
7. Evaluation of Officials
8. Suspension of Service Relationship of Officials
9. Release of Officials from Service
10. Reserve of Officials
11. Length of Service
12. Service Record and Employment Record Book
13. Settlement of Disputes
14. Implementing Provisions
Hungary 1997 1. Introductory Provisions
2. Commencement and Termination of Public Service Legal
Relationship
3. Scope of the Public Service Legal Relationship
4. Disciplinary Liability and Liability for Damages
5. Public Service Legal Disputes
6. Public Service Register
7. Conciliation of interests of Public Officials
8. Regulation on the Public Service Legal Relationship of
Administrators and Blue-Collar Workers
9. Miscellaneous Provisions
Latvia 2000 1. General Provisions
2. General Management of the State Civil Service
3. Appointment to the Civil Service Position
4. General Duties of the Civil Servant
5. Official Duties of the Civil Servant
6. Rights of the Civil Servant
7. Career in the State Civil Service
8. Transitional Provisions
Lithuania 2002 1. General Provisions
2. Positions of Public Servants
3. Recruitment to Positions of Public Servants
4. Duties and Rights of Public Servants
5. Career Development of Public Servants
6. Remuneration
7. Incentives and Remuneration of Public Servants
8. Social and Other Guarantees for Public Servants
9. Dismissal of Public Servants from Office
10. Training of Public Servants
11. Management of the Public Service
Macedonia 2000 1. General Provisions
2. Employment of Civil Servants
3. Rights and Duties of Civil Servants
4. System of Salaries and Allowances for Civil Servants
5. Liability of Civil Servants
6. Assessment of Civil Servants
7. Termination of Employment
8. Transitionaland Final Provisions
Continued on the next page ...
169
Table B . l . Continued from the previous page ...
Country First Level Heading
Moldova 2002 1. General Provisions
2. Legal Status of a Civil Service Employee
3. Admittance to Civil Service. Rendering Civil Service
4. Remuneration and Social Guarantees to Civil Servants
5. Cessation of Civil Service
6. Final and Interim Provisions
Montenegro 2004 1. Basic Provisions
2. Employment
3. Posts of Civil Servants and State Employees
4. Rights and Obligations
5. Liability of Civil Servants and State Employees
6. Transfer of Civil Servants and State Employees
7. Appraisal, Promotion and Establishment of Capability
8. Expert Training of Civil Servants and State Employees
9. Termination of Employment
10. Abolitions of an Authority, i.e., Tasks and Reorganization
11. Protection of Rights of Civil Servants and State Employees
12. Supervisions over the Enforcement of the Law
13. Punitive Measures
14. Transitory and Final Provisions
Poland 1998 1. General Provisions
2. Organisation of the Civil Service
3. Establishing Employment Relationship in the Civil Service
4. Staffing Senior Positions in the Civil Service
5. Alterations and Termination of Employment Contract within
the Civil Service
6. Duties of Civil Service Corps Members
7. Rights of Civil Service Corps Members
8. Training and Development in Civil Service
9. The Disciplinary Liability of Civil Service Corps Members
10. Amendments to Binding Regulations
11. Interim and Final Provisions
12. Final Provisions
Romania 1999 1. General Stipulations
2. Stipulated Categories of Civil Servants and Classification of
Civil Servants
3. Paritary Committees
4. The Management of Civil Services and of Civil Servants
5. Rights and Obligations
6. Selection and Appointment of Civil Servants
7. Evaluation Activity and Civil Servant's Career
8. Disciplinary Penalties and Responsibility of Civil Servants
9. Modification and Ceasing of Work Relations
10. Permanent and Transitory Dispositions
Slovakia 2001 1. Fundamental Provisions
2. Civil Service Employment Relationship
3. Collective Bargaining in the Civil Service
4. Common, Interim, and Final Provisions
Slovenia 2002 1. Part One
2. Special Provisions Relating to Civil Servants in State Bodies
and Local Community Administrations
170
Figure B . l . Distribution of C E E Laws According t o L e n g t h in Words
V)
V
'C
S 4 - - - - '
3
o
<"
o
s_
<u
2 :
1 - - -
z
: :
0
5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55
In terms of length, most laws are under 10,000 words. The Czech law is the obvious outlier
with over 50,000 words (see Figure B.l). Are longer laws "better" than shorter ones? Yes and
no. On the one hand, as expected, longer laws are more detailed. However, they can also be
example, the 2000 Latvian act, at just under 6,500 words, contains just as much essential
information as the Czech law, which is almost nine times its length. In conclusion, size is not
The principles of the civil service act as a foundation for the entire system created by the law.
Principles such as professionalism and political neutrality, career continuity and legality are
must be paired with kindred recruitment, promotion, guarantees, etc. clauses. Their value is
The fact that "political neutrality" and "legality" are the two most common principles
speaks to these countries' commitment to a modern civil service system. In sharp contrast to
communist systems, the emphasis is on independence from political interference, rule of law,
171
modern bureaucracy ("hierarchical subordination" makes it look as if policy drafters have
Some of the provisions listed as principles are interesting because of their uniqueness (such
as Moldova's "democracy"), while other do not qualify as principles at all, though they are
Principle Countries
Political neutrality Albania 1999
Bulgaria 1999
Latvia 2000
Lithuania 2002
Montenegro 2005
Poland 1998
Romania 1999
Slovakia 2001
Slovenia 2002
Legality/Law/ Albania 1999
Rule of law Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Bulgaria 1999
Croatia 2005
Lithuania 2002
Macedonia 2000
Moldova 2002
Montenegro 2005
Slovenia 2002
Accountability/ Albania 1999
Responsibility Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Bulgaria 1999
Croatia 2005
Lithuania 2002
Moldova 2002
Montenegro 2005
Slovenia 2002
Professionalism Albania 1999
Latvia 2000
Moldova 2002
Poland 1998
Slovakia 2001
Slovenia 2002
Transparency Albania 1999
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Latvia 2000
Lithuania 2002
Macedonia 2000
Moldova 2002
Continued on the next page ...
172
Table B . 2 . Continued from the previous page . . .
Principle Countries
Career continuity/ Albania 1999
stability Bulgaria 1999
Latvia 2000
Romania 1999
Slovenia 2002
Equality/ Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Non-discrimination Lithuania 2002
Macedonia 2000
Romania 1999
Slovenia 2002
Effectiveness Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Latvia 2000
Romania 1999
Slovakia 2001
Professional Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
impartiality Croatia 2005
Poland 1998
Slovakia 2001
Loyalty Bulgaria 1999
Latvia 2000
Moldova 2002
Hierarchical Bulgaria 1999
subordination Croatia 2005
Moldova 2002
Respect Montenegro 2005
Code of Ethics Slovakia 2001
Slovenia 2002
Publicity Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Slovenia 2002
Efficiency Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002
Romania 1999
Independence Albania 1999
Romania 1999
Predictability/ Macedonia 2000
Reliability Poland 1998
Service to the public Albania 1999
Moldova 2002
Scope of t h e Laws
Only some acts contain express lists of the public employees covered by the law. Below are
2
Additional principles are (by country): Albania 1999: "integrity;" Hungary 1997 - "Public Officials'
Interest-Conciliation Forum shall participate in the development of the ethical norms;" Lithuania 2002: "ca-
reer development;" Macedonia 2000: "fairness;" Moldova 2002 - "competence; initiative; protection of legal
activity of a civil service employee; democracy;" Montenegro 2005 - "liability for lawful, efficient and rational
utilization of public funds;" Romania 1999 - "selected by competence;" Slovakia 2001: "flexibility;" Slovenia
2002 - "not accept gifts (of a value higher than 15.000 tolars), confidentiality, diligence as manager, protection
of professional interests, open competition, transferability."
173
their provisions:
B o s n i a and Herzegovina 2003: "The civil servants of the Diplomatic and Consular Service
and the Border Service shall be subject to the application of this Law." (article 6)
Croatia 2005: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to civil servants in state bodies, the
courts, penal institutions, the administrative staff of the Croatian Parliament, the
administrative staff of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia, the
administrative services and offices of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the
Ombudsman, the administrative staff of the Gender Equality Ombudsman, the State
Audit Office, and other bodies established to perform civil service (hereinafter: state
bodies)." (article 2)
Estonia 1999: "The Public Service Act shall extend, insofar as not otherwise provided by or
on the basis of the Constitution or specific laws, to: 1) the Auditor General; 2) the
Legal Chancellor; 3) judges; 4) police officers; 5) border guard officials; 6) prison officers;
H u n g a r y 1997: "The scope of this act covers the public service legal relationship of public
officials, administrators and blue-collar workers of the Prime Minister's Office, the
administration agencies), regional and local agencies, public administration offices of the
counties and the capital, office of the representative body and official administrative
representative body). In the lack of differing provision of any act, the provisions of this
act shall govern the public service legal relationship of public officials, administrators
and blue-collar workers of the Office of the President of the Republic, the Office of the
Parliament, the Office of the Constitutional Court, the Office of the Commissioner of
the Parliament, the State Audit Office, the Council of Public Procurement, the Office of
the National Radio and Television Board and the Office of Economic Competition."
(article 1)
174
M a c e d o n i a 2000: "Civil servant [...] is a person employed in the bodies of state
administration and in the expert services of: the Assembly of the Republic of
Macedonia, the president of the Republic of Macedonia, the government of the Republic
Court of the Republic of Macedonia, the courts, the Republic Judicial Council, the
Ombudsman, the Public Prosecution, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia
and the State Audit Office. The provisions of this Law shall appropriately apply to
persons employed in the bodies of the units of local self-government and of the City of
Skopje who perform activities as defined in paragraph (1) of this Article as well as
persons who perform delegated matters in accordance with law and to persons employed
in the public services and institutions that perform functions of the state delegated as
the State Archives Services; Local public administration authorities, their autonomous
diplomatic, tax service, Center for combating economic crises and corruption, state
inspectorates, customs, state security, interior affairs bodies, defence bodies as well as
persons holding public functions with the above specified public authorities." (Annex 1)
Poland 1998: "Civil Service corps shall consist of employees employed in servants' positions
in: 1) the Chancellery of the Prime Minister; 2) Offices of Ministers and Chairmen of
Committees which are members of the Council of Ministers and offices of central
175
constitute structures supporting local agencies of Government administration,
for Strategic Studies; 5) headquarters, inspection offices and other organisational units
and guards as well as heads of poviat services, inspections and guards." (article 2)
Slovakia 2001: "(1) A Service Office, for the purposes of this Act, shall be a) ministry or
other central state administration body; b) body or office which performing state affairs,
(i.e. 1. Office of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter as "Office of
the National Council"), 2. Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, 3. Supreme
body; d) other state administration body; e) unit of the Police Force; f) Academy of the
Police Force; g) organisational unit of the military forces assigned by the competent
organisational unit of the Slovak Intelligence Service; j) unit of the Railway Police; k)
basic unit of the Prison Wardens and Judicial Guards Corps of the Slovak Republic. (2)
Prosecutor's Office. (3) The Supreme Service Office shall be a Service Office with no
superior Service Office. (4) Superior Service Office shall be a Service Office managing,
Only some acts contain express lists of the public employees not covered by the law. Below
176
Standing Committee on Military Matters, Judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (hereinafter the Constitutional Court), Judges of the Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (hereinafter the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Governors and
Vice-Governors of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter the Central
Bank), the Auditor-General and the Deputy Auditors-Generals of the Supreme Audit
Institution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter the Supreme Audit Institution) are
not civil servants and their legal status shall be regulated by law.
Members of the Presidency, the Chair of the Council of Ministers, the Ministers and the
Deputy Ministers, the Governor and Vice Governors of the Central Bank are not civil
servants." (article 4)
"This Law shall not apply to the persons employed at the BiH Central Bank." (article
6.3)
Bulgaria 1999: "The following people are not civil servants in the context of this Act: 1.
the members of the political cabinets, the deputy regional governors and the deputy
administration." (article 3)
Czech Republic 2002: "(1) This Act shall not apply to the members of the Government
and members of the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting. (2) This Act shall
not apply, with the exception of remuneration and rights specified in paragraph 1 above,
to the Head of the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic (hereinafter the
"Office of the Government"). (3) This Act shall also not apply, with the exception of
for a member of the Government, to advisors and employees who carry out further,
the Government and deputy Head of the Office of the Government; d) the head of an
organizational department working for the Head of the Office of the Government, to
advisors and employees who carry out further, otherwise designated activities for the
Head of the Office of the Government; e) employees who only carry out auxiliary,
177
maintenance or manual work in administrative authorities, as well as to employees who
work." (article 2)
Estonia 1999: "This Act, except 1 - 4, 6, 9, 10, 40 - 43, 76 and 153 159, shall not extend
to: 1) members of the Riigikogu; 2) the President of the Republic; 3) members of the
H u n g a r y 1997: "The scope of this act does not cover: a) with the exception of the system
of remuneration and the exceptions set forth in the act governing their legal status, the
Prime Minister, the ministers and the parliamentary under-secretaries of state; b) in the
lack of differing provision of any act, the agencies of the Hungarian Army, the Customs
Guard, the Police, the National Security Services, the Guardian Regiment of the
Republic, the Fire-Department, the Customs and Finance Guard, the Law Enforcement,
the Civil Defence and the Armed Security Guard; c) in the lack of differing provision of
any statutory law, those employed for performing public services subject to the scope of
the framework of assignments in the interest of the public and of communal works."
(article 2)
Latvia 2000: "The Prime Minister, the Minister, the Minister of Special Assignment, the
Deputy Prime Minister (hereinafter - the Minister), the Minister of State, the
Parliamentary Secretary and persons who perform secretariat services for those officials
(assistants, advisors, public relations specialists) are not civil servants." (article 3.3)
Lithuania 2002: "This Law shall not apply to: 1) state politicians; 2) judges of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the Supreme Court of Lithuania, the
the Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, his deputies, members of the
Board and other servants of the Bank of Lithuania; 4) heads of public institutions and
agencies appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic, other state officials
appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic, except for paragraph 3 of
Article 33 of this Law; 5) chairmen of state (standing) commissions and councils, their
deputies and members appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic, as well
178
as chairmen and members of commissions, councils, boards of funds established under
special laws, except for paragraph 3 of Article 33 of this Law; 6) servicemen in the
and receiving remuneration from the state and municipal budgets, as well as state
M a c e d o n i a 2000: "The provisions of this Law shall not apply to persons wearing uniform in
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to military and civil personnel serving in the Army of
institutions nor to the persons with special duties and authorities employed in the
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of internal Affairs and the intelligence Agency, unless
M o l d o v a 2002: "Not coming within the purview of the present law are the President of the
the Constitutional Court, members of the Supreme Court of Justice, members of the
Supreme Council of Magistrate, councilors of the local public management bodies and
mayors, legal status of which is governed by the constitution and other relevant laws."
(article 3.3)
Montenegro." (article 2)
Slovakia 2 0 0 1 : "(7) Civil service of the members of the Police Fo'ce, members of the Slovak
Intelligence Service, members of the Corps of Prison Wardens and Judiciary Guards,
members of Railway Police, Customs Officers and professional soldiers and members of
(8) This Act shall not apply to: a) Members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic
the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as "President
179
of the Supreme Audit Office") and Vice-President of the Supreme Audit Office of the
of Service Offices not performing tasks pursuant to paragraph (2) or paragraph (4)."
.Slovenia 2002: "Public companies and commercial companies, where the state or local
communities are controlling shareholders or have prevailing influence, shall not be a part
state attorney's office and in independent bodies competent for violations, diplomats,
professional members of the Slovenian Army, civil servants in the field of defence, civil
protection and rescue, police officers, inspectors, employees in the customs and tax
officers in security services and other public officers with special authorisations, may be
necessary due to the specific nature of the tasks or the performance of special duties and
Rights
2. Protection from the state during fulfillment of service (Albania, Bosnia and
5. Adequate organizational and technical conditions (Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, and
Slovakia);
180
6. Be treated with respect by superior (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Czech
Republic);
7. Form labor unions/take part in union activities (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
9. Be member of political parties (Albania - but not of the steering committees; Bulgaria -
but cannot be guided by and protect the interests and will of the political party to
which belongs; Lithuania; and Macedonia - but cannot participate directly in campaigns
during office hours nor wear or place party symbols at the office);
10. Salary and additional remuneration for years of service, extra work, etc. (all countries);
11. Equal pay for equal work (Croatia and Czech Republic);
12. Pension (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia);
13. Promotion (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, and Montenegro);
14. Training for professional development, paid by the state (all states, except for Albania,
15. Health benefits (Albania - for civil servant and dependents; Bulgaria, Lithuania,
16. Annual leave (paid and unpaid). On average, civil servants are entitled to 20-25
working days of paid leave, though the actual numbers vary from 18 in Montenegro (it
can reach up to 26, depending on year of service) to 50 in Bulgaria (for senior members)
and 35 in Estonia and the Czech Republic. In addition, civil servant are entitled to
unpaid leave of variable length (the most 'generous' are Poland where civil servants can
17. Other types of leave. Several countries offer medical leave (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia), while other stipulate the right of civil
3
The state shall "assist the trade union organisations in the implementation of their activities, providing
them gratis with rooms and other facilities necessary for the implementation of their functions" (article 46)
181
servants to take time off for special circumstances such as getting married (Bulgaria),
death of a family member (Bulgaria and Lithuania), or provide for maternity leave
(Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia). Indicative of the effort to improve the level of
professionalism, a majority of the countries offer the right to leave for training or
continuing education; 4
19. Working hours. When they are specified, working hours are limited to 40 hours per
week, 8 hours per day (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia);
and
20. Other rights: work for an international organization (Albania); be rewarded according
(Bulgaria); submit proposals regarding the civil service, petitions, and complaints
(Croatia); return to the same position in case of special leave (Croatia, Czech Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania); state will pay tuition of child whose both parents have been in
service for more than 15 years (Estonia); housing and food costs reimbursement for
seek protection in court (Macedonia); housing (Moldova); one hot main meal (Slovakia);
Duties
1. Know, respect, and implement the laws/comply with legal regulations during the
and Slovakia);
4
In Bulgaria and Croatia civil servants are paid during the training leave. To ensure their return to the
public service, Croat civil servants must serve in the civil service for twice the duration of the study after the
end of the training program. In the Czech Republic civil servants can take such a leave for 5 days per year, in
Latvia for 20 days per year, and in Estonia for 3 months every 5 years. In Lithuania, civil servants in service
for at least 3 months can take up to 1 year of leave to improve their qualifications.
182
Table B . 3 . T h e Right t o Strike.
3. Protect the reputation of the state/refrain from activities that would damage the
reputation of the institution (Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Slovakia) or harm the interests
4. Perform assigned tasks in a professional, timely, and effective manner: all countries,
except Albania. Under the Croat law, the performance of tasks must be realized in
accordance with the "principle of accessibility to public scrutiny" (article 15). Under
several acts (Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Romania) there is also an express
183
obligation to execute the orders given by superiors, if they are not illegal. Civil servants
may also be asked to perform additional tasks (or tasks different from the ones implied
Macedonia, and Slovakia). Related, under the Slovak law civil servants' political
activities should not affect their service, while Romanian civil servants should refrain
from expressing political beliefs. Under the Macedonian law, civil servants should not be
guided by their political beliefs or personal financial interests in the realization of their
duties;
6. Serve and assist the public (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, and Moldova). In
Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland civil servants must acknowledge and respect the rights
of the public;
Lithuania, Macedonia;
9. Disclose their name and position (Czech Republic, Macedonia, and Slovakia);
11. Respect working hours and use them only for official duties (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Bulgaria);
13. Not to seek or accept any additional gains for fulfilling their duties (Albania, Bosnia and
Croat civil servants are also forbidden, in article 18, from offering "gifts or other benefits
184
to other civil servants, their relatives or spouses or common-law partners for personal
gain");
14. Not to undertake any work that would constitute conflict of interest (Albania, Czech
15. Not to use government property for personal gain (Albania, Croatia, Lithuania, and
Macedonia);
16. Not make announcements in the name of the institution, unless expressly authorized
17. Bear responsibility for the legality of their acts (Albania and Lithuania);
18. Not to behave in a manner inconsistent with the Code of Ethics (Albania and Czech
Republic);
19. Notify the institution regarding criminal proceedings started against him/her (Czech
Interestingly, under the Bosnian law, a civil servant is prohibited from occupying real estate
displaced person has claimed an occupancy right" (article 14.5). In Moldova, public servants
must "study public opinion and take it into account while performing service duties" (article
10.2.f).
Code of Ethics
The Code of Ethics is generally left to secondary legislation (Croatia 2005, Montenegro 2005,
Slovakia 2001, Slovenia 2002). Estonia 1999 contains the Code as an annex to the law. The
185
2. The activities of an official shall be based on respect for the Constitution of the
3. An official shall adhere, in his or her activities, to the legally expressed will of
10. An official shall always, in his or her activities, subject departmental interests to public
interest.
12. An official shall make decisions based on public and generally understandable criteria.
13. An official shall avoid creating a situation which arouses or may arouse suspicion with
14. An official shall treat property entrusted to him or her economically, expediently and
prudently.
15. An official shall use information which becomes known to him or her through official
16. A person exercising public authority is characterised by honesty and respect for the
17. An official shall be polite and helpful when communicating with people.
19. An official shall do his or her best in the public service by constant individual
development.
20. An official shall facilitate the spread of the above principles in every way."
186
Termination of Service
The most common circumstances under which the employment relationship ends are:
Retirement;
Death;
Mutual consent.
Incompatibilities;
Resignation.
A unique provision, in Poland a civil servant can be dismissed for 'loss of impeccable
The age of retirement varies from 55 for women and 60 for men (in Poland), to 62 years and
6 months (in Lithuania), and 65 years (in Estonia, Croatia, and Slovakia). In Moldova, civil
servants can retire up to five years before the retirement age, but get only 75% of the pension.
In case of resignation, civil servants must give notice whose length varies from 15 days in
187
Appeal Bodies
The bodies that solve appeals against decision concerning civil servants must be independent
bodies, free from political interference. In some systems, civil or administrative courts have
jurisdiction over these cases (Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary), while in other the decision of
the appeal body can be contested in civil courts (Albania, Montenegro, and Poland).
National Assembly (two proposed by the Council of Ministers, one by the High State
Control, and two by a meeting of local government representatives) for a term of seven
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil Service Board is composed of three members who are
Croatia: Civil Service Tribunals are composed of judges appointed by the Government;
established with the General Directorate for Public Service. The law does not specify
the mode of selection of the members, only that its composition must differ from that of
government on proposal of the ministry competent for administrative affairs (at least
one member must represent the trade unions). Their term is of fours years, and cannot
be reelected.
Minister on motion by the Head of Civil Service from among civil servants for six years.
The members of the commission established with the Government are appointed by the
188
members of the other commission are appointed by the respective state bodies. They
example, members of the Albanian Civil Service Commission are given a level of immunity
189
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Author's Biography
Angelica Ghindar was born in Iai, Romania on March 14, 1980. She attended Alexandru
loan Cuza University in her native city and graduated with an LL.B in public and private law
in June 2002. After graduating, she came to the United States to pursue her graduate studies.
consolidation and institutional reform, she defended her thesis in December 2008. In
November 2008 she began her career as a political affairs officer at the United Nations in New
York City.
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