were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.

The Circular itself recognized private

2016
[LAND TITLES AND DEEDS]
Agcaoili Book; Atty. Panes Lectures; LA Notes
Sec. 1 Title of Decree This decree shall be known as the Property Registration Decree.
Regalian Doctrine (Art. 12, Sec. 2 of the 1987 PC)
- all lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to the State
Jura Regalia
private title to a land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, or from its
successors
- The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines. This
refers to Royal Rights that all lands were formerly held by the King.
- (Maam Panes): refers to private ownership and how private ownership of lands were
given by virtue of the royal rights possessed by the King
Exceptions to Regalian Doctrine
1) Native Title(Carino v. Insular) refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains
which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/Indigenous Peoples, have never been public lands, and are thus
indisputably presumed to have been held the same way since before Spanish
Conquest
Time Immemorial - A period of time when as far back as memory can go,
certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of an
owner, and utilized a defined territory developed to them, by operation of
customary law or inherited from their ancestors with their customs and
traditions
2) Ancestral Domain (Cruz v. Secretary)
ownership of lands.
- Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.
- The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island were
covered by OCT in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.
- CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
SECOND CASE: G.R. No. 173775 a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064 issued by PGMA classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural
land.
During the pendency of the 1st case, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island into
1. (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
2. (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (A/D).
3. (15m) buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants , owners of beach resorts in Boracay filed with this
Court an action to nullify PGMAs proclamation claiming that it infringed on their prior vested
rights over portions of Boracay; there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land; and Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is
deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the
first PLA. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
OSG argued that petitioners-claimants Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It
is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain into A&D. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the
lots for disposition.

SECRETARY OF DENR V. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP ISSUE:

October 8, 2008 W/N petitioner claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.
The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
This case involves 2 petitions regarding the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
secure titles over their occupied lands.
HELD:
FIRST CASE: G.R. No. 167707Certiorari on CA decision affirming RTC granting declaratory REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO RECLASSIFY LANDS OF THE
relief field by Mayor Jose Yap et al and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes PUBLIC DOMAIN Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
1976, (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. President Marcos declared the area 1) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No.
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism 2874 and CA No. 141;
Authority (PTA). Hence, subsequent issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 2) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos; and
1801. 3) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
- Petitioners claim that Proclamation and PTA Circular precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes; Marcos declaration raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their 1935 CONSTITUTION 1973 CONSTITUTION 1987 CONSTITUTION
occupied lands and Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
of private ownership; Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, 1. agricultural 1. agricultural 1. agricultural
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered 2. forest or timber 2. industrial/commercial (maybe A/D)
in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. 3. residential 2. forest/timber
4. resettlement 3. national parks
OSG invoked Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code that Boracay Island was 5. mineral 4. mineral
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as 6. timber/forest
public forest, which was NOT available for disposition and since Boracay Island had not been 7. grazing lands
classified as A & D whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. 8. others by law

ISSUE: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
the lands in Boracay. RTC neither Proclamation nor the Circular mentioned that lands in Boracay administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
1
 TORRENS SYSTEM.
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that Act
Made the Court of Land Registration
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the On February 1, 1903
Does not create title nor vest one, simply confirms and register
conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935,
introduced the HOMESTEAD SYSTEM,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are Act No. 926 titles
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from First Public Land i. OCENPO of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the Act preceding July 26, 1904
inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public October 7, 1903 SALE OR LEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS.
domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is title to public lands permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored in the Philippines owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not
remained in the domain
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership. govt and its title judges of courts have the authority to determine classification of
sprung from Treaty lands
SPANISH RULE of Paris CFIs had power to adjudicate cases relating to land titles and
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the disputes
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown. Cadastral system of registration when in the opinion of the
President, the public interest requires that the title to any lands be
The Laws Of The First introduced Regalian doctrine and laid the foundation that all lands settled and adjudicated, he shall order the DoL to make survey
Indies And The that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by Act. No. 2259 thereof, w/ notice to all persons claiming an interest therein.
Royal Cedulas grant, belong to the public domain Cadastral Act Thereafter, DoL shall be represented by SG, shall institute the
Ley Hipotecaria provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as Feb. 11, 1913 registration proceedings by filing a petition in the proper court
Or The Mortgage possessory claims. against the possessors stating that public interest requires the titles
Law Of 1893. to such lands be settled and adjudicated.
The Royal Decree partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Of 1894 Or The established possessory information as the method of legalizing Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Maura Law possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were Filipinos the same privileges.
set forth in said decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an Act No. 2874 For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
1) informacion posesoria or possessory information title, Second Public concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
2) when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a
LandAct November required.
title of ownership
29, 1919 ***POSITIVE ACT REQUIRED
3) only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
Under Jones Law Courts are no longer authorized to determine classification of lands
4) uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
Gave the executive through the President the exclusive prerogative
adverse,
5) from the date of its inscription. to classify public lands into A & D, mineral or forest. After
6) However, possessory information title had to be perfected one declaration of A&D, this law requires publication and notice
year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and
1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal State.
concessions which took various forms, namely: Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under
a) titulo real or royal grant; Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the
b) concesion especial or special grant; public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894.
c) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
d) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and Amendments of this Requirement
e) informacion posesoria or possessory information title. CA No. 141 Republic Act (RA) No. 1942
PUBLIC LAND ACT OCENPO 30 Years
1935 Constitution; PD No. 1073,
December 1, 1936
OCENPO since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
AMERICAN RULE
Philippine Bill of 1) AGRICULTURAL ( those public lands acquired from Spain which There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
1902 incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
are not timber or mineral lands)
US assumed 2) MINERAL (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
administration of a. absolute grant (freehold system) occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
the Phil. Is. After the b. lease (leasehold system) predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
1898 Treaty of Paris 3) TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS. since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
Act No. 496 established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes (2) The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
Land Registration absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the the public domain.

2
 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
PD No. 892
February 16, 1976 No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
Spanish Titles may February 16, 1976.
no longer be used Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered landsshall be governed
as evidence of by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
ownership due to Act No. 3344.
the rise of several Evidences of Ownership during Spanish Regime
conflicting claims of 1) Royal Grant
2) Special Grant
ownership
3) Adjustment Title
4) Title by Purchase
5) Possessory Information Title
6) Gratuitous Title
Amended and updated the Act. No. 496
enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property
PD No. 1529,
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as
Property
unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.
Registration Decree
Broadened the jurisdiction of RTCs with regard to original registration
June 11, 1978
of title to lands
Created the former LRC which is now Land Registration Authority
A POSITIVE ACT DECLARING LAND AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS REQUIRED. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such asan official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8
of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF STATE OWNERSHIP OF
THE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS ON THE PERSON APPLYING FOR REGISTRATION
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is A/D.
1) presidential proclamation or P
2) an executive order; E
3) an administrative action; A
4) investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a R
5) legislative act or a statute. L
The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In this case records bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is A/D.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Who may classify lands?
JUDICIARY (ANKRON AND DE ALDECOA )These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 (October 7, 1926). During that
time, the President had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. Hence, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence. To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases
under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, lands are considered agricultural.
However, this presumptiondid not automatically converted all lands of the public domain
as A&D agricultural lands for it would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to
the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa
attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or
more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners,
such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves
of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.In any case, the assumption
in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent
on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the
courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the
classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became
private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative
to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain.
Here, private claimants, unlike the HEIRS OF CIRIACO TIROL who were issued their title in
1933, did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of
the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then
to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands.
When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or
their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to
determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot
bank on Act No. 926.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS CONTINUED POSSESSION UNDER ACT NO. 926 DOES NOT CREATE
A PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS ALIENABLE. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years
under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v.
Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain.
It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the
governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.
The term public landreferred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. (Emphasis
Ours)
EXCEPT FOR LANDS ALREADY COVERED BY EXISTING TITLES, BORACAY WAS
AN UNCLASSIFIED LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN PRIOR TO PROCLAMATION
NO. 1064. SUCH UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE CONSIDERED PUBLIC FOREST
UNDER PD NO. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.PD
No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a PUBLIC FORESTas a mass
of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
3
 Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no
doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.Nevertheless,
that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island; that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do
not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushesA forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis supplied)
PROCLAMATION NO. 1801 IS NOT A POSIITIVE ACT. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private
ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into an agricultural land but merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the
Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. Therefore,
Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801shows that the proclamation is
aimed atadministering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It
does not address the areas alienability.
IT WAS PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 OF 2006 WHICH POSITIVELY DECLARED PART OF
BORACAY AS ALIENABLE AND OPENED THE SAME TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP.
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. In
issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised
the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject
to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no
authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until
released and rendered open to disposition.
PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM LAW. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No.
1064 violates the provision of the (CARL) or RA No. 6657barring conversion of
public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public
forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural
land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained
an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705., the prohibition under
the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice on this point:Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of
the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a
prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for
forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE UNDER CA NO. 141. NEITHER DO THEY HAVE VESTED RIGHTS OVER
THE OCCUPIED LANDS UNDER THE SAID LAW. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
1) OCENPO of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Why pb of 1902 and act. No. 926 and pn 1801 reliance must fail?
because of the absence of the 2nd of a/d their entitlement to a government grant
under our present public land act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for
is already alienable and disposable. this is clear from the wording of the law itself.
where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of OCENPO of
their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
All is not lost, however. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements.
They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into
other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent,
subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no
longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest
cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is
as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection
are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent
as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken,
and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment
of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are
emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human
lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.
4

REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT
FACTS: Respondent Celestina Naguiat filed for an application for registration of 4 parcels of land
located in Zambales. She alleges that she is the owner of the subject lands having acquired
them from LID Corporation. LID Corp. acquired the land from Calderon, Moraga, Monje and their
predecessors in interest who have been in OCENPO for more than 30 years. She believes that
the lots are not mortgaged nor encumbered.
RP opposed the application alleging
1) No OCENPO since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
2) muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his OCENPO ;
3) applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of . . .; and that
4) parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to RP not subject to
private appropriation.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat which was subsequently affirmed by the CA.
Hence, the appeal before the SC. The Republic faults the CA on its finding which respects the
length of Naguiats occupation of the subject property and for not considering the fact that she
has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest land to A&D
property.
ISSUE: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain?
RULING: SC had an opportunity to discuss the concept of Regalian Doctrine in this case. It states
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State that is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.
The burden of proof to overturn the presumption that the land subject of an application is
alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. The SC said that the CA, in this case, assumed
that the lands in question are already A&D. CA ratiocinated that the possession of Naguiat of the
lands created a legal fiction where without judicial declaration, the same ceases to be a public
land and becomes private property ipso jure.
Respondent Naguiat did not present any incontrovertible proof that there has been a positive
act from the government which reclassified the land applied for as A&D. The tax receipts cannot
be a sufficient proof for there is no information about the classification of the property on it.
Instead, the applicant could have obtained a Certificate of Land Classification from the DENR as
a valid proof. Since the land is unclassified, according to SC, the same cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation. Occupation on such land in the concept of an owner, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership and be registered title. To this, the application of Naguiat to have
the lands registered is denied.
ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
347 SCRA 128
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of
RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together with its implementing rules and
regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For this reason, it prays that the petition be
dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa countered the constitutionality of IPRA and its
implementing rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources. Also,
that the law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, it might include private lands found within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the petition, and
7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same. According to the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains. That this is in
contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that only agricultural lands of the
public domain can be considered as alienable and disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys natural resources and 1/3 of
the countrys land will be concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while 60 million other Filipinos
will share the remaining. These figures violates the constitutional principle of a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot be Alienated or
Ceded
Sec. 2Nature of Registration Proceedings, Jurisdiction of Courts
Judicial Proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be
in rem
Based on generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system
CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
all applications for original registration of title to lands,
including all improvements and interests therein, and
over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
The court through its clerk of court shall
furnish the Land Registration Commission with
o 2 certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or
issued in applications or petitions for land registration,
o with the exception of stenographic notes,
within 5 days from the filing or issuance thereof
History
- conceptualized by Sir Robert Torrens from South Australia
- the purpose is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the system
What is Torrens System?
- Those systems of registration of transaction with interest in land whose declared
object is, under governmental authority;
- To establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty,
- To simplify its transfer
What are the Purposes of Torrens System? (Legarda v. Saleeby)
1) To quiet title to land;
2) To put a stop forever to any question of the legality of title
Exception
Claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate or which may
arise subsequent thereto
once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure without necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.
Advantages of the Torrens System
1) Substitutes security for insecurity
2) Reduced the cost of conveyances and time occupied
5
 3) Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage
4) Simplified ordinary dealings
5) Affords protection against fraud
6) Restored to their just value many estates, held under good holding titles, but
depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the
reoccurrence of any similar faults
THREE PRINCIPLES in the TS
1) Mirror Principle
o if there are several transfers, the TCT will be a mirror in that it should be
identical to the current facts. If the seller sells the land, the old title must be
identical to the new one in terms of technical description, so as to reinforce
the concept that the buyers should be able to rely on the face of the title.
o Exception
a) when a person deals with a registered land with someone that is
not the registered owner
b) when the party has actual knowledge of facts which should impel
a reasonably cautious mind to make such inquiry to the lack of
title;
c) in cases of banking and financing institutions
2) Curtain Principle
o The concept that the buyer should be able to rely on the face of the title,
and should not go beyond the certificate. In a way, the buyer does not have
to go behind the curtain to ascertain the truth of the title, because the
Torrens Certificate guarantees him that.
3) Insurance Principle
o Equates registration to a guarantee by the State
LAWS PRIOR TO 1529, See Table under Sec. v. Yap
PD 1529
How is jurisdiction over the RES acquired?
A: Sec. 23
1) Publication
2) Mailing
3) Notice
Who may apply for registration?
A: Sec. 14, p. 1-4OPAL
1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
OCENPO of AD lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier
2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws
3) Those how have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right
of accession or accretion under the existing laws
4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided by law
Where and how to file the application for Registration?
With the RTC of the province or city where the land is situated. The TC shall issue an
order setting the date and hour of initial hearing, and the public shall be given notice
thereof by means of publication, mailing and posting. Any person claiming an interest
in the land may appear and file an opposition, stating all his objections to the
application. The case shall be heard and all conflicting claims of ownership shall be
determined by the court.
Once the judgment becomes final, the court shall issue an order for the issuance of a
decree and the corresponding certificate of title in favour of the person adjudged as
entitled to registration.
Thereupon. The LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY shall prepare the corresponding
decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate certificate of title which
shall be sent to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the land lies for
registration.
Jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to property
Sec. 19(2), BP 129
With the RTC where assessed value of the property exceeds 20k
If Manila, if the assessed value of the property exceeds 50k
Exceptions
o Forcible entry
o Unlawful detainer of lands or buildings
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
TITLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Source of right Merely confirms a title already existing
Foundation of ownership Mere evidence of ownership
Best evidence of ownership Best evidence of title
LEGARDA V. SALEEBY
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CASE: Land is registered under the name of two persons
FACTS:
o That the plaintiffs LEGARDA and the defendant SALEEBY occupy, as owners, adjoining lots
which existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on
the lot of the plaintiffs LEGARDA. Upon petition to the Court, Legarda was able to obtain a
decree of registration which included the stonewall.
o Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs LEGARDA discovered
that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been
included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed
o The lower court however, without notice to the defendant SALEEBY denied said petition
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including
the wall, in the name of the defendant SALEEBY.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in granting to SALEEBY the stonewall as his registered
property? NO
RULING:
The REAL PURPOSE OF THAT SYSTEM is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa,"
to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the
proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director
of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and
binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and
final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest.
The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government
itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the
registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to
again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and
intent of the law.
THE REGISTRATION, UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM, DOES NOT GIVE THE OWNER ANY
BETTER TITLE THAN HE HAD. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates
in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
6
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A
registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral
proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period
prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of
titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the
parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who
should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular
parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In
view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is
forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the
rule, EXCEPT as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at
present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. REGISTERED TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY
PRESCRIPTION (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All
persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system
has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has
been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System,"
at page 823, says: "THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT IN THE CASE OF TWO CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE, PURPORTING TO INCLUDE THE SAME LAND, THE EARLIER IN DATE PREVAILS,
WHETHER THE LAND COMPRISED IN THE LATTER CERTIFICATE BE WHOLLY, OR ONLY IN
PART, COMPRISED IN THE EARLIER CERTIFICATE. Hogg adds however that, "IF IT CAN BE
VERY CLEARLY ASCERTAINED BY THE ORDINARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO
WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, THAT THE INCLUSION OF THE LAND IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF
PRIOR DATE IS A MISTAKE, THE MISTAKE MAY BE RECTIFIED BY HOLDING THE LATTER OF THE
TWO CERTIFICATES OF TITLE TO BE CONCLUSIVE." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System,"
supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates
purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where
more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two
certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that WHERE TWO CERTIFICATES PURPORT TO INCLUDE THE SAME
REGISTERED LAND, THE HOLDER OF THE EARLIER ONE CONTINUES TO HOLD THE TITLE" (p.
237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud
to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
GENERAL RULE: "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court,
EXCEPTION: fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year.
Q: If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a
direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration?
We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in
that way.We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of
real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or
purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real
intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in
date shall prevail.
In the present case, the appellee SALEEBY was the first negligent (granting that he was the
real owner, and if he was not the real owner he cannot complain) in not opposing the registration
in the name of the appellants. Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the
absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment.
There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
IN CASE OF DOUBLE REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT, THAT THE
OWNER OF THE EARLIEST CERTIFICATE IS THE OWNER OF THE LAND. That is the rule
between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered,
transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee
of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the
right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would
be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule
that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496
indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the
vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut
off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had
had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.
UNDER THE RULE OF NOTICE, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE PURCHASER HAS EXAMINED EVERY
INSTRUMENT OF RECORD AFFECTING THE TITLE. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof
of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record
would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of
what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of
the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of
real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875
and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.)
In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been
recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were
interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of
its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a
purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in
the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that
all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law.
The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times,
shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory,
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence
and contents of a public record.
7
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that
said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that
the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as
an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of
which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate.
The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the
prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate
and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the
difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser,"
used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been
wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under
the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is
notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth
of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for
example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had
sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in
question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his
vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by
reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of
notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in
the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act
No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the
owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for
damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first
certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and
his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired
rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The
purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in
the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence,
should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the
first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do
we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the
record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will
be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS Corp. vs.CA
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
FACTS:
In 1982, Solid State, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title on a parcel of
land located at Imus, Cavite which was allegedly registered by Virata in his name by fraudulently
obtaining a title through an administrative reconstitution of a non-existent original title of the
land, and that by reason of said reconstitution, there now exists a cloud on the title of Solid
State. Solid State alleges that it bought the land from Julian Pearanda who obtained the same
through the grant of application for the sale of a friar land from the government. The land was
registered in the name of Pearanda in 1969 under CA 32. Pearanda's occupation of the land is
derived through a voluntary assignment of right of the former occupant, Mabini Legaspi, and
that the same is free from claims and conflicts and that the said applicant has established his
rights over the subject land, in view of which, said investigator recommended that said lot be
awarded to applicant Julian Pearanda according to law.
Viratacountered saying that he bought the land from Mabini Legaspi who obtainedownership in
1957 on the subject land after the Director of Lands sold the same at public auction. Official
Receipts of payment for the instalments were shown as a proof. The title was reconstituted since
the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned including the ROD office which holds the title to the
subject property. Legaspi also denied that she sold the land to Julan Pearanda. RTC ruled in
favor of Virata which was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal before the
SC.
..
Issue:
WON CA correctly held that Virata is the true and lawful owner of the subject property? NO.
Ruling:
Solid State contends that Act No. 1120 or Friar Lands Act provides the procedure for the sale
and disposition of
the friar lands to private persons. The acquisition by Pearanda was in compliance with all legal
requisites laid down by the law for the validity of the sale. He further contended that the
issuance to Mabini Legaspi of a COT in her favor was a violation of the Friar Lands Act as there
was no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and occupants at
the time said
lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating
therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter then shall accept
the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the instalments and at the
interest specified in the certificate. Subject to a resolutory condition that non-payment of price in
full may cancel the sale. The court said that the title Pearanda has the valid acquisition from
the government of the subject friar land since it was in compliance with law and hence, the sale
in favor of Solid State is valid and binding. Contrary to that, the
SC said while the sale of the lot to Legaspi occurred much earlier in time, the same cannot be
considered as a ground to for him to be considered the true owner of the land. Legaspi did not
present an evidence showing that a certificate of sale was ever issued by the BoL in his favor.
The existence of the official receipts showing payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does
not prove that the land was legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale. Legaspi also
alleged that he purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which procedure is nowhere
provided in the pertinent laws conveying friar lands. The law expressly state that an actual
occupant of the land shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a private sale not in a public
auction. There was also absence of a deed of conveyance to Legaspi by the government after
the full payment of the instalments on the disputed lot.
Time and again, registration does not vest title to the land, but merely a procedure to
establish
evidence over realty. Even if the 1 year period has already lapsed, the title did not become
incontrovertible but it is a null and void for not complying with the requirements of the law.
Therefore, Virata could not have validly obtained title to the land
FULLTEXT RULING:
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would be well for this Court to discuss them jointly.
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made by the respondent appellate court and
supported by the records (p. 22, Rollo). It does not however accept the legal conclusion made by
the appellate court and trial court that the registered title of private respondent to the land
should prevail over its own title.
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act provides the
procedure for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private persons; that pursuant thereto,
the acquisition by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian Pearanda of the disputed Lot 7449,
which was formerly part of the friar lands estate, was in compliance with all legal requisites laid
down in Act No. 1120, for the validity of the sale by the government in favor of Pearanda of
such friar lands.
8
It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to respondent's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi, and the
issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was
no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
There is no dispute here that the land involved in this case is a friar land and that the laws which
are applicable are Act No. 1120, known as the Friar Lands Act, providing for the administration
and temporary leasing and sale of certain haciendas and parcels of land, commonly known as
friar lands, and Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September 15, 1936 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 316 dated June 9, 1938, which provided for the subdivision and sale
of all the portions of the friar lands estated remaining undisposed of.
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part:
. . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate
which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and
occupant the amount of land so held by him at the price so fixed payable as provided in this Act
at the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands . . . and that upon the payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler
and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be
issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty two of
the Land Registration Act.
Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act
shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis ours)
Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316 provides in part:
. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona
fide occupantsof any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten hectares, shall
be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private sale and at a price to be fixed
in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, after taking into consideration its location, quality, and any other circumstances
as may affect its value, the provisions of section 12, of Act 1120, as amended, to the contrary, . .
. (Emphasis ours)
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were purchased by the government
for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the government.
1) The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that the government
has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant.
2) The occupant then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so
fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate.
3) The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so called certificate
of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid
for in full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon the issuance of the certificate of
sale in his favour subject only to the cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon
is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849.)
4) Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interests, the
government shall then issue a final deed of conveyance in favor of the purchaser.
5) However, the sale of such friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the
Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws, however, required
that the sale shall be approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. In
short, the approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for
the validity of the sale.
It is undisputed that SOLID STATEs predecessor, Julian Pearanda was the actual occupant of
Lot 7449 when he filed his application to purchase the said lot on November 22, 1968; that on
December 16, 1989, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the sale of the
lot without auction to Pearanda; that a sales contract was executed between the Director of
Lands and Pearanda on February 28, 1969 for a consideration of P 1,198.00 payable in 10
monthly installments; that upon the full payment of the price, the Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued the final deed of conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of
Pearanda. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in the name of
Pearanda, and when the latter sold the land to petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT
No. T-80889 was issued in favor of the latter.
Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by Pearanda was in compliance with law. The
execution of the sales contract vested the right of ownership in Pearanda over the land. There
is no doubt whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it was approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made by Pearanda in favor of the petitioner
transferred the ownership of the land in favor of the latter resulting in the proper issuance of TCT
No. T-80889 in its name.
On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the acquisition of title by respondent VIRATAare
clearly shown in the records. The latter's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a
sale by public auction held on May 5, 1943 conducted by the Bureau of Lands and friar lands
agent Severino Rivera, and paid the purchase price thereof in installments in 1943; that on
December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite
requesting the issuance of certificates of title to several persons including Mabini Legaspi, in
whose favor TCT A-2188 was issued; that subsequently on December 6, 1957, she sold the
disputed land to respondent Virata, which was evidenced by a deed of sale registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 10, 1957; that on the same date, TCT No. 11520 was
issued in the name of Virata. Due to the fire which gutted the building housing the Registry of
Cavite on June 7, 1959, the latter administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. 11520 on
September 1, 1959, based on the owner's duplicate certificate and renumbered the same as TCT
No. 1120 RT 1660.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier than the date of
acquisition of same lot by petitioner's predecessor, and the evidence presented by respondent
Virata indicates that the latter's predecessor paid the purchase price of Lot No. 7449 on
installments. Nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in the records of this case
however, would show that a certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of
Lands, which would vest ownership and title over the land in favor of Mabini Legaspi .
The existence of the official receipts showing payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does
not prove that the land was legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale having been
executed by the government in her favor. Viewed from all angles, the acquisition of the lot by
Legaspi was highly irregular and void, and not in compliance with the procedure
mandated by law for the sale of friar lands. For one thing, Mabini Legaspi allegedly
purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in Act No.
1120 or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. 316. The laws expressly state that an actual occupant of
the land shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a private sale and not in a sale at public
auction (Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was there any deed of conveyance issued
to Legaspi by the government after the full payment of the installments on the disputed lot.
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there was neither allegation nor proof that the sale
was with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. The absence of such
approval made the supposed sale null and void ab initio. Without the certificate of sale to
prove the transfer of the ownership of the land from the government Mabini Legaspi and without
the required approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We find that
Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner acquire ownership over the land in 1943. The
ownership or title over the friar land, specifically Lot No. 7449 remained in the government
until Pearanda, petitioners predecessor, lawfully acquired ownership over the same
lot on February 28, 1969 by virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not vest ownership upon her
over the land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and
again, it has been held that registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such
title over a particular property. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any
better title than that what he actually has (De man et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-
46935 December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June 22, 1984, 129
SCRA 656).
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the certificate of
title was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the government,
said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the acquisition
of the property was in violation of law.
Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet
title is imprescriptible. In one case, this Court ruled that an adverse claimant of a registered
land who is in possession thereof for a long period of time is not barred from bringing an action
for reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property against a registered owner
relying upon a Torrens title which was illegally or wrongfully acquired. In actions for
9
reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was void ab
initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing. Being null and void, the sale
made to Mabini Legaspi and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced no legal
effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est nullum producit affectum. There being no title to the land
that Mabini Legaspi acquired from the government, it follows that no title to the same land could
be conveyed by the former to respondent Virata. Even assuming that respondent Virata was a
purchaser in good faith and for value, the law is, as between two persons both of whom are in
good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful
holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights .
Further if a person happened to obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice of another with or
without bad faith, the certificate of title which may have been issued to him under the
circumstances may and should be cancelled or corrected. Our unavoidable conclusion in this
case is that the title of petitioner under the Torrens land system should be upheld
considering that no previous valid title to the same land existed.
Petition granted.
RTCs Exclusive Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 (2) of PD 1529)
1) All applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and
interests therein
2) All petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine
all question arising upon such applications or petition
MTCs delegated jurisdiction
MTCs may hear and determine land registration cases in the following instances:
1) Lot sought to be registered is not subject to controversy or opposition
2) Lot is contested, but the value thereof does not exceed 100, 000
a. Such value is ascertained by
by the affidavit of the claimant
by the agreement of the respective claimants (if there be more than one), or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property

GREY ALBA VS. DE LA CRUZ

SC Administrative Circular 6-93-A
17 SCRA 49
Nov. 15, 1995
Facts:
1) Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the effectivity of this A.C. shall be
Petitioners are heirs of Segunda Alba Clemente. They, as co-owners sought for the
transferred by the Executive Judge of the RTC having jurisdiction over the cases to E.J. of
registration of a parcel of
the appropriate Courts of limited jurisdiction for the required raffle among the branches of
land located in Baliuag, Bulacan. The land is said to be an agricultural one used for the raising of
the court under his administrative supervision
rice and sugar cane. This petition for registration was granted by the court. Subsequently,
2) But those already commenced as of the date of effectivity shall remain w/ said courts,
Anacleto Dela Cruz objected before the court asking for the revision of the case. Dela Cruz
except when the parties agree otherwise
alleged that the decree of registration was fraudulently obtained by the petitioners and that
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC.,
included in the parcels of land Albas sought to register is the two parcels of land he inherited
vs. RoD Paranaque.
from his father which was a state grant. To this the court revised its decision which excludes the
[G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
two parcels of land claimed by Dela Cruz.
FACTS:
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Anacleto De La Cruz? YES.
PETITIONER CORPORATION was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On July 15,
Ruling:
1996, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc
It is admitted that Dela cruz was occupying the two parcels of land at the time the appellants
and was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 20, 1997. As a
presented their petition for registration. That Dela Cruz did not appear in the petition as an
consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the TCTs over real
occupant and also that he is alleged to be a tenant for the Albas the reason why the latter did
properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz,
not include his name in the petition as occupant.It is proved that the Uncle of the petitioners,
Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on November 20, 1997, a petition for
who took care of them after their parents died, have leased theproperty to Anacletos Father.
amendment of titles with the RTC of Paraaque City impleading as respondent the ROD of
Anacleto agreed that there was a lease but the two parcels of land he is claiming were not
Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended,all state that they were issued
included in the lease contract.The fact that the petitioners were able to have the subject land
by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the
registered will tell us that such registration isconclusive upon and against all persons, including
petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City.Subsequently,
the government, whether their names are mentioned in theapplication or included in the general
petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds
description to all who it may concern. By express provision of the law, such asthe Land
of Paraaque City.Hence, Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition now impleading
Registration Act, the world are made parties-defendant by the description in the notice to
ROD of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City. Court dismissed
all whom it mayconcern.Though, Anacleto De la Cruz was not served with notice, he
due to improper venue since properties are in Pasay In the meantime, however, on
was already made a party defendant by publicationand the entering of the decree in
January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of
1908 must be held conclusive against all persons including him.The SC said it waserror
improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
for the lower court to have opened the decree and modified the judgment on account
and the properties are located in Pasay City.[7]MR denied
of absence, infancy, or otherdisability. It could have been opened only on the ground
that the decree was obtained through fraud.
PETITIONER BEFORE SC
The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the following
While it was alleged that there was fraud, the SC did not consider such allegation. It ruled that
reasons:
the petitioners
1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper venue;
honestly believed that Anacleto was occupying the lands as their tenant. Specific, intentional
2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless still a matter of
acts to deceive and depriveanother of his right, or in some manner injure him, must
right on petitioners part to amend its petition in order to correct the wrong entries therein;
be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positivefraud.To this, the SC said
and
that the Lower Courts decision be reinstated and the decision of the Appellate Court bereversed.
3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in Paraaque City, so
venue was properly laid despite that erroneous allegation in the original petition.[11]

OSG
JURISDICTION OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES
The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment said that trial court did not acquire
VENUE
jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated
in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction
over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.

10
PETITIONERS REPLY JURISDICTION V. VENUE On February 15, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply. INDEED, IT WAS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE TAKEN A
TC had jurisdiction over the petition, but that venue appeared to be improperly laid based on the PROCEDURAL SHORT-CUT BY DISMISSING MOTU PROPRIO the complaint on the ground of
erroneous allegation therein on the location of the properties. improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its
proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and
ISSUE: May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully
venue? NO. adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the
right to be heard on his cause.[18]
RULING: While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below was clearly
that of improper venue,the Solicitor General confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction
between the two must be drawn. PETITIONER CORRECTLY INVOKED THE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IN SEEKING THE AMENDMENT OF ITS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE. The jurisdiction of the RTC
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT VENUE OF AN ACTION over matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is
MATTER conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration
nature of an action is conferred only by law. It as fixed by statute may be changed by the Decree, viz:
may not be conferred by consent or waiver consent of the parties, and an objection on Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the
upon a court which otherwise would have no improper venue may be waived by the failure generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
jurisdiction over the subject matter of an of the defendant to raise it at the proper time.
action COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the In such an event, the court may still render a all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest
consent or agreement of the parties. valid judgment therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
jurisdictional Procedural (may be waived); to provide determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
convenience to the parties rather than restrict
their access to the courts as it relates to the The COURT through its CLERK OF COURT shall
1. furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings,
place of trial. exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration,
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court 2. WITH THE EXCEPTION of stenographic notes,
a. laying of venue is procedural rather 3. within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
than substantive.
b. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person rather than the subject In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of the
matter. titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated,
c. Provisions relating to venue establish a pursuant to the following rule:
relation between the plaintiff and Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
the defendant and not between the interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
court and the subject matter.
situated.[19]
d. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction,
touches more of the convenience of
the parties rather than the substance of VDA. DE ARCEO VS. CA
the case. 185 SCRA 489
Facts:
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled: Spouses Arceo are owners of four parcels of unregistered lands located in Bulacan. They had one
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by respondent trial court on the Son namedEsteban who had 5 children. Estebans children and their children are the parties
ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish involved in this case.In 1941, Spouses Arceo executed a donation inter vivos in favor of Jose, one
between jurisdiction and venue. of Estebans children. Since 1942,Jose paid the taxes, took personal possession of the land and
claimed it as his own. In 1941, also, Arceos supposedly
VENUE, IN INFERIOR COURTS AS WELL AS IN THE CFI (NOW RTC), MAY BE WAIVED signed a deed of donation mortis causa to give away the subject properties in favor of all his
EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is grandchildren includingJose. However, the said document was notarized in 1944 only after Mrs.
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as Arceo died.
venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to Subsequently, the wife of Jose, together with their children, filed with the cadastral court an
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held application for
and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to registration in their names the subject lands. This was contested by Pedro and Lorenzo, Joses
belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. siblings contending thatthey are entitled to a part of the subject parcels of land.The cadastral
court rejected the registration and distributed the properties according to law on
THOUGH TECHNICALLY WRONG, MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES FOR WHOSE intestatesuccession instead. The CA affirmed its decision.
CONVENIENCE THE RULES ON VENUE HAD BEEN DEVISED. Thus, unless and until the Issue:WON the cadastral court has jurisdiction in determining the ownership of lands?
defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have
been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically Ruling:
wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been As to the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of PD 1529 provides that RTC, sitting as a land
devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper registration court, is no
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

11
longer circumscribed as it is in the previous law. PD 1529 eliminated the general jurisdiction of
RTC and the limitedjurisdiction of RTC acting merely as a cadastral court; the purpose of this is to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
In this case, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction in the determination of
issues on
ownership, which at the same time involves the issue on the right of registration. There would be
a multiplicity of suits or the registration will be prolonged if not impossible should the cadastral
court decide not to pass upon the issue of ownership.
As to the issue of co-ownership:
Joses wife contends that they acquired the lot through acquisitive prescription. This was rejected
by the SC. The Civil Code provides that prescription does not lie against co-owners, unless the
following requisites concur.
a. There is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership.
b. He has made known to the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive
ownership over the property.
c. Clear and convincing evidence thereof.
d. His possession is OCEN.
This circumstances were not present in the case at bar. The fact of paying taxes cannot defeat
the right of coowners to their right to enjoy the use of their property, the same does not confer
title upon a claimant.
Nonetheless, the SC granted the petition and have the lands registered under the name of Jose
and his heirs by
virtue of the valid deed of donation inter vivos. The Supreme Court further ruled that the
donation mortis causa did not revoke the first donation. The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable subject to few exceptions. Finally, the court said
that the disposition in favor of Jose of the subject properties should be respected.
Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded
under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered
lands.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
may be
recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to
remain in force; provided, that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth
be registered under Section 113 of this Decree.
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No deed,
conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under
the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such instrument
shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or city where the land lies.
(a) The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary Entry Book and a
Registration Book. The Primary Entry Book shall contain, among other particulars,
1. the entry number,
2. the names of the parties,
3. the nature of the document,
4. the date, hour and minute it was presented and received.
5. The recording of the deed and other instruments relating to unregistered lands
shall be effected by any of annotation on the space provided therefor in the
Registration Book, after the same shall have been entered in the Primary Entry
Book.
(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law, the Register of Deeds
shall forthwith record the instrument in the manner provided herein. In case the Register
of Deeds refuses its administration to record, said official shall advise the party in interest
in writing of the ground or grounds for his refusal, and the latter may appeal the matter to
the Commissioner of Land Registration in accordance with the provisions of Section
117 of this Decree. It shall be understood that any recording made under this section
shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall endorse among other
things, upon the original of the recorded instruments, the file number and the date as well
as the hour and minute when the document was received for recording as shown in the
Primary Entry Book, returning to the registrant or person in interest the duplicate of the
instrument, with appropriate annotation, certifying that he has recorded the instrument
after reserving one copy thereof to be furnished the provincial or city assessor as required
by existing law.
(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim and other instruments
in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to unregistered lands, if made in the
form sufficient in law, shall likewise be admissible to record under this section.
(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this section, he shall collect
the same amount of fees prescribed for similar services for the registration of deeds or
instruments concerning registered lands.
REGISTRATION UNDER THE SPANISH MORTGAGE LAW
TITULO DE PROPRIEDAD NO. 4136The case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz would soon be
the coreof subsequent decisions declaring the infamous Titulo de PropriedadNo. 4136 as a
forgery foisted upon the courts and bereft of any validity and efficacy as evidence of ownership.
In this case, petitioners-heirs did not adduce
evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 wasbrought under the operation of P.D. No.
892 despite their
allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Proof of compliance with P.D. No. 892 should be
theCertificate of Title covering the land registered.
REGISTRATION UNDER ACT NO. 3344; ineffective as against 3 rd persons
The inscription under Act No. 3344 of a transaction relating tounregistered land was held
noteffective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the law on double sale of the same
property. The registration should be made in the property registry to be binding upon third
persons; mere registration of a sale in ones favour does not give him any right over the land if
the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
CHAPTER II
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient execution of the
laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive and accelerated land reform and
social justice program of the government, there is created a commission to be known as the
Land Registration Commission under the executive supervision of the Department of Justice.
Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land Registration Commission
shall have a chief and an assistant chief to be known, respectively, as the Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner of Land Registration who shall be appointed by the President.
The Commissioner shall be
duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar
with at least ten years of practice in the legal profession, and
shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance.
The Deputy Commissioner, who shall
possess the same qualifications as those required of the Commissioner,
shall receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos per annum less than
that of the Commissioner.
He shall act as Commissioner of Land Registration during the absence or disability of
the Commissioner and
12
 when there is a vacancy in the position until another person shall have been
designated or appointed in accordance with law.
The Deputy Commissioner shall also perform such other functions as the
Commissioner may assign to him.
They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary in the interest of
the functioning of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to the Commissioner, and by a
Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall each receive compensation at the rate of three thousand
four hundred pesos per annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner.
All other officials and employees of the Land Registration Commission including those of the
Registries of Deeds whose salaries are not herein provided, shall receive salaries corresponding
to the minimum of their respective upgraded ranges as provided under paragraph 3.1 of Budget
Circular No. 273, plus sixty per centum thereof across the board, notwithstanding the maximum
salary allowed for their respective civil service eligibilities.
The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without prejudice to such
benefits and adjustments as may from time to time be granted by the President or by the
legislature to government employees.
All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration.
Section 6. General Functions.
(1) The Administrator of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land
registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the
corresponding certificates of title;
b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of
the Commission;
c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of
Deeds;
d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Courts of
First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties
and functions in relation to the registration of lands;
e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration
of lands
and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations
therefor;
f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey
plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.
(2) The Land Registration Authority shall have the following functions:
a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the
Land Bank, and other agencies in the implementation of the land reform program of
the government;
b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings;
c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled
under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled
lands.
SEC. 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. There shall be at least one Register of Deeds for
each province and one for each city.
Every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand pesos
during the last three years shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds,
and every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than three hundred thousand pesos
during the last three years, shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds and
o one second Deputy Register of Deeds.
The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial jurisdiction of each
Registry upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration, with the
end in view of making every registry easily accessible to the people of the neighboring
municipalities. The province or city shall furnish a suitable space or building for the office of the
Register of Deeds until such time as the same could be furnished out of national funds.
Registry of Property
in accordance with Sec. 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease,
or other voluntary instrument except a will- purporting to convey or affect registered
land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if
the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it
does not affect innocent 3rd persons.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned.
Between the two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens
System, the law gives ownership priority to
1) First registrant in good faith
2) First possessor in good faith
3) Buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title
Effect of Registration
Constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.
SEC. 8. Appointment of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies and other subordinate
personnel; salaries. Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines uponrecommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Deputy Registers ofDeeds and all
other subordinate personnel of the Registries ofDeeds shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice upon therecommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration.The salaries of
Registers of Deeds and their Deputies shallbe at the following rates:
(1) First Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in first class Registries
shall be three thousand four hundredpesos per annum less than that of the Deputy
Commissioner.
(2) Second Class Registries The salaries of Registers ofDeeds in second class
Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than those of
Registers of Deedsin first class Registries.
(3) Third Class Registries The salaries of Registers ofDeeds in third class Registries
shall be three thousand four hundredpesos per annum less than those of Registers of
Deeds insecond class Registries.
(4) The salaries of Deputy Registers of Deeds and SecondDeputy Registers of Deeds shall
be three thousand four hundredpesos per annum less than those of their
corresponding Registersof Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds, respectively.
(5) The Secretary of Justice, upon recommendation of theCommissioner of Land
Registration, shall cause the reclassificationof Registries based either on work load or
the class of province/city, whichever will result in a higher classification, for
purposesof salary adjustments in accordance with the rates hereinaboveprovided.
13

SEC. 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and DeputyRegisters of Deeds. No
person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been admitted to the practice of law
in the Philippines and shall have been actually engaged in such practice for at least three years
or has been employed for a like period in any branch of government the functions of which
include the registration of property.
The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Provided, however, That
no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding office as such upon the passage of this
Decree shall by reason hereof, be removed from office or be demoted to a lower category or
scale of salary except for cause and upon compliance with due process as provided for by law.
SEC. 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of Deeds
constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered
lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office issituated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science
stamps and that
the same are properly cancelled.
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith
o deny registration thereof and
o inform the presentor of such denial in writing,
o stating the ground or reason therefor, and
o advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section
117 of this Decree.
Office of the Register of Deeds
Public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands
and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated
NATURE OF THE DUTIES OF LRA
General Rule:Its duty is ministerial those acts of functions that conform to an instruction or a
prescribed procedure. They act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record. If the LRA is in
doubt as to the issuance and preparation of the decree, it is their duty to refer the
matter to the court. In this sense, they act as officials of the court and not as administrative
officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
The validity of the document is not for the register to determine for it is a function of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Validity is to be decided after the registration in a litigation. In case of
doubt, it shall be referred to the LRA
LRA shall after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on
the doubtful question which shall be conclusive and binding upon all RoDs
Exception:LRA officials may exercise discretion in the following instances:
a) When obeying the courts order would result to double titling;
b) When there are several copies of title but only one is presented with the instrument
to be registered
c) Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of conveyance
bears the signature of only one spouse;
d) Where there is pending case in court where the character of the land and the validity
of conveyance is in issue;
o In this case, the matter of registration may well await the outcome of that
case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be
protected by the filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
e) Where required certificates and documents are not submitted
May the RoD be compelled by mandamus?
No. Since the registration is a judicial function, it cannot be compelled by mandamus. The
interested party must resort to the available administrative remedy before he can have recourse
to the courts.
SEC. 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of
vacancy, etc.
1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a
province or city, or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the
occasion of the absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the
Register of Deeds to discharge his duties, said duties shall be
performed by the following officials, in the order in which they are
mentioned below, unless the Secretary of Justice designates
another official to act temporarily in his place:
a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy
Register of Deeds, by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or
by the second Deputy Register of Deeds, should there
be one;
b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or
second Deputy Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or
City Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscal designated by the
Provincial or City Fiscal.
2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of
Deeds without pay, or in case of vacancy in the position, the
Secretary of Justice may, in his discretion, authorize the payment
of an additional compensation to the official acting as Register of
Deeds, such additional compensation together with his actual
salary not to exceed the salary authorized for the position thus
filled by him.
3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending
establishment of a Registry of Deeds and the appointment of a
regular Register of Deeds for the new province or city, the
Register of Deeds of the mother province or city shall be the ex-
officio Register of Deeds for said new province or city.
SEC. 12. Owners Index; reports. There shall be prepared in
every Registry an index system which shall contain the names of all
registered owners alphabetically arranged. For this purpose, an index
card which shall be prepared in the name of each registered owner
which shall contain a list of all lands registered in his name.
The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration
Commission within ten days after the month to which they pertain his
monthly reports on collections and accomplishments. He shall also
submit to the Commission at the end of December of each year, an
annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his Registry.
SEC. 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief
Geodetic Engineer in the Land Registration Commission who shall be
the technical adviser of the Commission on all matters involving
surveys and shall be responsible to him for all plats, plans and works
requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in said office. He shall
perform such other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned to
him by the Commissioner.
PD 239
- Only the LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU has authority to approve original survey
plans for registration purposes.
- The grant of authority to the LRC to approve original survey plans has resulted in
wasteful overlapping or duplication of functions. There was therefore a need to
14
 centralize in one agency, the LMB, the function of verifying and approving original substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus
survey plans for all purposes in order to assure compliance with established standards cannot issue.
and minimize irregularities in the execution of land surveys

Survey Plan
- serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land portion thereof already covered by previous land registration, and to
forestall the possibility of which by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.

LABURADA V. LRA
FACTS: Spouses Laburada were the applicants for registration of a
parcel of land located in Mandaluyong City, RTC, acting as land
registration court, granted such application. After the finality of the
decision, the Sps filed a motion before the RTC requiring LRA to issue
the corresponding decree of registration, which was then granted by
RTC. However, the LRA refused to do so. To this, the Sps Laburada filed
an action for mandamus.
LRA contends that such refusal is grounded on the fact that a portion of
the subject property was a subject of a land decree in court of land
registration, that if it will be pursued, it will result to double titling
which destroys the policy and purpose of the Torrens System. The SG
sought to have the petition of the Sps Laburada dismissed after it
found out on its investigation that the title issued for the subject lot
cannot be located.
ISSUE: w/n the LRA can be compelled to issue the decree of
registration through an action for mandamus (for ministerial duties)?
NO
HELD:
There are three reasons why Mandamus is not the right remedy
1) JUDGMENT IS NOT YET EXECUTORY
- The judgment Sps Laburada seek to enforce is not yet
executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration
Law. They do not have any clear legal right to implement it.
It was ruled previously that a judgment of registration does
not become incontrovertible until after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
2) A VOID JUDGMENT IS POSSIBLE
- LRAs refusal to issue a decree is based on documents which,
if verified, may render the judgment of the TC void. To this,
LRAs hesitation to issue a decree is understandable, even
imperative. If it issues the decree, it will destroy the integrity
of the Torrens System. LRA is mandated to refer to the courts
any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the
issuance of a decree of registration. They are specifically ABRIGO V. DE VERA
called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under
cadastral land registration proceedings. Since in this case, the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to
the subject property has already been decreed by the court the first registrant in good faith
for registration. Hence, LRA is divested of jurisdiction. then, the first possessor in good faith; and
3) ISSUANCE OF A DECREE IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
- It is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
ministerial act, which may be compelled thorough the Torrens system.
mandamus. This is because it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion. Writ of mandamus can only be had FACTS:
when the plaintiffs legal right to the performance of the Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go covered by a
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and tax declaration. Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free
complete. But where the right sought to be enforced is in patent over the parcel of land involved.The said free patent was later on cancelled by a TCT.

15

On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the Spouses
Abrigo.
On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera registered the sale
and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents, injunction,
preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against Villafania.
The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant (RTC) case
that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant
case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.
RTC JUDGMENT
Compromise Agreement approved.
Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the
house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Tigno-Salazar
and Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the
premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the
[vendees] declared the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as
damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages
and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
CA JUDGMENT
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence
dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania had already transferred
ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was
deemed void.The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no
sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must
thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property.
HELD: DE VERA
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first
sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived
their right. Subsequently a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the
Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property.
Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the
property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act
3344 For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system because,
during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the
property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to
bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered
under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not
effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the
right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as
opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case,
the priority in time principle was not applied, because the land was already covered
by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For
the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the
Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under
Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
NOTES:
The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which
provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument except a will
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and
the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the rules of registration under
Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without
prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this
Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any
right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held therein that Article
1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496.
Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first
sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution
sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners.
Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court held that Article 1544 of
the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter
was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this
is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps
into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of
no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said
execution sale.
3. Good-Faith Requirement
16
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable
in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith
must concur with the registration.We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals, which
we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does
not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that
such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he
governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights
except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as
provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of
her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer.
But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if
he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad
faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able
to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he
must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the
first buyers rights) - from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by
registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.34 (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from
all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a person
dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine
the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register
or certificate of title.Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards
registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees
thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance anapplication for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorizedrepresentatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable landsof
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision ofexisting laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right ofaccession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a
retro may file an application for theoriginal registration of the
land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire duringthe pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee aretro, the
latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him,unless prohibited by
the instrument creating the trust.

CHAPTER III Registration the entry of instruments or deeds in book or public registry. To register, means to
(ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS) enter in a register, to record formally or distinctly, to enroll; to enter in a list.
SECTION 14
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) The first title issued in the name of a registered owner by
the ROD over a parcel of land registeredunder the Torrens System by virtue of
a) Judicial or
b) Administrative proceedings.

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Subsequent issuance of ROD pursuant to any voluntary
and involuntary instrument relating to the sameland.
Note: Registration proceedings may be in rem or in personam. The following are its distinctions.
In rem Binds the whole world
In personam To enforce a personal right against a person
SECTION 14 (1)
Quasi in rem Deals with status, ownership or liability of a particular
OCENPO
property. It only operates on the question between the parties.This is
-Registration under
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
the first paragraph of
claimants.
Section 14 requires
the concurrence of the following
REQUISITES:
(1) Land applied for is an agricultural public land classified as alienable and disposable land
atthe time;
(2) Application for registration is filed with the proper court;
(3) Applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in OCENPOthereof,
under bona fide claim of ownership;
(4) Such possession and occupation has been effected since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

SECTION 14 (2) PRESCRIPTION

PRESCRIPTION LACHES
an extraordinary mode of the unreasonable delay in the
acquiring or losing of ownership bringing of a cause of action
17
and other real rights through the before the courts of justice. It is
lapse oftime in the manner and also referred toas sleeping on
under the conditions laid down by your rights
law.
A matter of time A question of equity
It is statutory not statutory
It is based on law based on equity
based on a fixed time the period varies
on a case-to-case basis
The basis for Sec. 14 (2) is found in Article 1113 of the Civil Code
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unlessotherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall notbe the object of prescription.
Maam: You have to be specific, because not all lands of public domain are inalienable.
Patrimonial properties of theState are still considered public domain.
Patrimonial property Property owned by the State but which is not devoted to public use,
public service, or thedevelopment of national wealth. It is wealth owned by the State in its
private capacity.
For private lands, which are patrimonial properties of the State, to be acquired via
prescription, thefollowing must concur:
1) Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription, 10 years possession in good faith and with just title; or
2) Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription, uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least30 years, regardless of good faith and just title; andThere must be an
express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
forpublic service or the development of the national wealth
MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
Facts:
In 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
located in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed that he purchased the land from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in OCENPO of the land for more than 30
years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanans witness, testified before the court that the property originally
belonged to a 22- hectare property owned by Lino Velazco, her great-grandfather. Lino had 4
sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Esteban is Aristedes grandfather. The
property was divided among the 4 of them.
In 1996, Magdalena, Estebans wife, became the administrator of all the properties of the
Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena died, their son Virgilio succeded them in
administering the properties, including the subject land, which is owned by his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. Eduardo sold this to Malabanan.
Also, a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was presented verifying the said
land as A and D. RTC ruled in favor of Malabanan. Republic appealed, now represented by the
OSG, CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/Ruling:
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND, IN ORDER TO BE REGISTRABLE
UNDER SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529, SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A&D AS OF
JUNE 12, 1945.
The OSG contends that all lands certified as A&D after June 12, 1945 cannot be registered either
under Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act.
The SC said such interpretation renders the mentioned provision virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government form giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as A&D. Such unreasonableness
is aggravated of the fact the before June 12, 1945, Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state. The SC cited the case of Naguit. Such decision provides that the Sec. 14 (1)
of PD 1529 only requires the property sought to be registered as already A&D at the
time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State has not yet released the land as A&D at the time of the application, it is presumed
that the State is still reserving its right to utilize the property. But in this case, the property was
already classified as A&D, this shows an intention of the State to abdicate its authority over the
land.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT A LAND CLASSIFIED AS A&D BE DEEMED
PRIVATE LAND AND THEREFORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO ACQUISITION BY PRESCRIPTION.
In this case, the petitioners primarily based their registration bid on Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529 or
prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
SC said, unlike Sec 14(1), Sec 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. The SC also said that the rules on prescription under the Civil Code is applicable in
Sec 14 (2).Article 1113 of the Civil Code says that only the patrimonial property of the state
can be subject to prescription. Also it is clear that land which is part of public dominion cannot
be alienated even if it is declared A&D. There must be a declaration of the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial for the period of prescription to run. Without these,
the property remains to be of public dominion.
Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession while
Sec. 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act, while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and
the Civil Code.
Also, Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act is based on possession,
Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529 is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. The rules
on prescription under the Civil Code do not apply to Sec 14 (1) since there is no such intent
manifested by the legislature and that PD 1529 is neither superior nor inferior than Civil Code,
legislature is not bound to adhere on Civil Code framework.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT MALABANAN IS ENTITLED TO REGISTER THE
PROPERTY BASED ON SECTION 14 (1) OR SECTION 14(2) OF PD 1529 OR BOTH.
The SC said that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish that Malabanan thas acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since June, 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, as evidenced a tax declaration, is to the year 1848. Therefore, they
cannot register the land under Sec. 14 (1). Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2)
as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared A&D in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of the national wealth. The classification of the subject property as A&D
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription
RP V. CA AND NAGUIT
Section 14 (1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. A
contrary interpretation renders par. (1) Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D.
SEC. 14 (3) ACCESSION AND ACCRETION
A. Accession Refers to the right of an owner of a thing to its products as well as whatever is
inseparablyattached thereto as an accessory. The accessory follows the principal.
18
 Basis in the Civil Code
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or
artificially.
Requisites of Accession (applies to lakes, creeks, and streams):
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the river.
B. Accretion and Alluvion
Accretion defined as the addition of portions of soil, by gradual deposition through the
operation of natural causes, tothat already in the possession of the owner. (Blacks Law)
Alluvion It refers to the accretion made by flow of rivers. A form of accession natura ,
which is provided for in Articles457 and 461.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which theygradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters ipsofacto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost.However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by payingthe value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
Requisites of Accretion or Alluvion:
1) The change must be sudden;
2) The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and not temporary over
flooding of anothers land;
3) The change of the river must be a natural one, not by artificial means;
4) There must be definite abandonment by the government;
5) The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry up or disappear.
Rationale of the law on accretion:
- It is primarily anchored on the principle or right of accession in Art. 457. Also, to
compensate the ownerfor the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of
his lands.
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP IN ANY MANNTER PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
o RESERVATION FOR SPECIFIC PUBLIC PURPOSE
GRANDE V. CA
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
Petitioners Grande are the owners of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Magsaysay,
province of Isabela. They inherited the said land from their mother who inherited the same from
her parents. The land is registeredin the name of the parents of their mother. When it was
surveyed for purposes of registration in 1930, the northeasternboundary was the Cagayan River.
Since then, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of thecurrent of
the Cagayan River. That by 1958, an alluvial deposit of 19, 964 square meters, more or less, had
been addedto the registered area.
In 1958, Grandes filed an action to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion. They alleged
that they andtheir predecessor-in-interest were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
of the said land until the Calalungsentered upon the said land under claim of ownership in 1948.
The Calalungs, on the other hand, asserts that they havebeen in continuous, open, and
undisturbed possession of the land since prior to the year 1933 up to the present.
RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes and ordered Calalungs to vacate the premises. The lower court
said that theland in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land, the same
belongs to Grandes. That the samecannot be acquired by prescription since it is considered a
registered property under Section 46, Act 496, hence, it couldnot be acquired by prescription. CA
overturned RTCs decision saying that prescription has already set in favor of the Calalungs.
Issue: WON Calalungs acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription?
Ruling:
It is undisputed that under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners Grande are the lawful owners of
said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. Any alluvial
deposits adjoining ones land does not become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece
of land is one thing, and registration under Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. To
obtain the protection of imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws where in certain judicial procedures have been provided.
In this case, Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial property until the present action.
The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled to the
protection of imprescriptibility, which means it was subject to acquisition through prescription by
3rd persons. Furthermore, in this case, the CA found that Calalungs were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934 until 1958. The law on prescription applicable to the case is that
provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code since the New Civil Code rules on
prescription were not yet in force. The SC finally said that Calalungs acquired
the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription.
Alluvial formation along the seashore forms part of the public domain
- It may only be disposed of if there is a formal declaration by the government that the same is A
and D. Its
disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Land Management Bureau.
SEC. 14 (4) IN ANY OTHER MANNER PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
1) Presidential proclamation reserving lands for specific public purpose
The president has the authority to set aside lands from sale/public acquisition and
reserve them topublic use, even though this might defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. Lands covered by reservationare not subject to entry and may not be the
subject of lawful settlement.
Example:
1) Proclamation 791. It set aside a parcel of land for the University of the Philippines College
of Agricultureeven though a logger-corporation had been possessing the land by virtue of a
timber license. (International hardwood vs. University of the Phil.)
2) Proclamation 350 was a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center even though the
occupant possessed asales patent. (Republic & Mindanao Medical Center vs. CA)
3) Proclamation 180 set aside a parcel of land upon which a public school was to be built. The
occupant couldnot prove OCENPO and could not therefore assert a superior right over the
school. (Republic vs. Doldol)
RP BY MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER V. CA
FACTS:
In 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with Bureau of
Lands for Sales Patent of a land situated in Davao City, the subject property applied for was a
portion of what was known as DavaoCadastre. Bureau of Lands accepted sealed bids for the
purchase of the land. The Director of Lands annulled the auction sale by reason of non-
participation of Eugenio due to non-service of notice.
Bidding was held where Eugenio was the lone bidder, he equaled the bid previously submitted
by Dr. Ebro which is P100.50 per hectare. An order of award was then given to Eugenio.
Thereafter, A survey was conductedand the same was approved. In 1936, the DL ordered the
amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio saying that aportion of the property is needed by
the Philippine Army for military campsite. The area excluded was identified was Lot1176 B 2,
the land in question which consists of 12.8 hectares.In the same year, President Manuel
Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85withdrawing the subject lot from sale
19
and settlement and reserving it for military purposes. Then, Eugenio paid for the
installment for the Sales Patent, thispayment did not include the military campsite after it was
excluded from the application. Finally, in 1948, the SalesPatent was awarded to him by DL and
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.Subsequently, President Ramon
Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 which opened the subject property
todisposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act for resettlement of the squatters.
However, the same revocationwas superseded by another order reserving the lot for
medical center site. In 1969, Mindanao Medical Center applied forthe registration of the
land under Torrens System claiming a fee simple title. Respondents De Jesus opposed
theregistration on the ground that his father has prior vested right on the property.
RTC Davao ruled in favor of MMC. CA overturned RTCs decision recognizing De Jesus alleged
vested right.
ISSUE:WON De Jesus has vested right and is consequently entitled to the registration of the
property in dispute?
RULING:
No. President Magsaysays proclamation (No. 350) legally effected a land grant to MMC of the
whole lot and notonly a portion thereof. Such land grant amounts to a fee simple title or
absolute title in favor of MMC.
Section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Codeempowers the president to reserve
from sale or otherdisposition to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use
of which is not otherwise directed bylaw. The land reserved shall be used for the specific
purposes directed by such Executive Order until otherwiseprovided by law.
Section 83 of the Public Land Actauthorizes the President to issue proclamation to declare
lands reserved forpublic use or when the public interest requires it.
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any
there be," butEugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights
over the property reserved. Wee-settledis the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear
and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the publicdomain was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessoryinformation
title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the
property must beheld to be part of the public domain
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed
between Eugenior de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void, because
Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in
1936.
B. LAND ACQUISITION BY PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Ownership by Corporations
History
1935 It allowed private juridical entities to acquire alienable
Constitut lands of public domain, which shall only be less than 1,
ion 024 hectares.
1973 Section 11, Article 14 of the said constitution stated that
Constitut no private corporation xxx may hold alienable lands
ion except bylease not to exceed 1000 hectares in area.
1987 Section 3, Article 12 retained the 1973 Constitutions
Constitut limitations, but added lease period not exceeding 25
ion years and renewable for not more than 25 years.
General Rule: Corporations are disqualified from owning alienable
lands of public domain except through lease.
Exception: Where at the time the Corporation acquired the land, its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with OCENPO as to entitle him
registration in his name. The Constitutional prohibition will no longer
apply as the land, by virtue of prescription has become private. (Suzi
vs. Razon)
DOL V. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER
146 SCRA 509
Facts:
In 1981, Acme Plywood and Veneers Co. Inc. applied for a land registration of 5 parcels (481, 390
sqm) of landit allegedly acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, both member of the Dumagat
tribe. The Infiels substantiates theirownership saying that their ancestors have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until it cameinto their possession. Acme
contended in its application that their adverse and continuous possession since 1962 and by
tacking theirpossession to that of the possession of the Infiels, they have already acquired title
over it; that the ownership of landsby corporations is governed by the 1935 Constitution. Acme
further proves that the subject land is a private land after itownership was given to the non-
Christian tribes pursuant to RA 3872. That also, they have introduced more than 45million
pesos worth of improvements on the land. Also that their ownership is recognized by
Municipality of Isabelathrough the donation it made which was accepted by the former.
The Director of Lands opposed to nothing of the allegations except the applicability of the 1935
Constitution. DLcontends that the registration was commenced only in 1981 which was long
after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Article 14 Section 11 of the 1973 Constitutionprohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable landsof the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.
This proscription is not found in the 1935Constitution which was in force the time Acme bought
the land in question. Hence, it cannot be registered under Sec. 48of CA 141. RTC and CA ruled in
favor of the Director of Lands.
Issue:WON the title Infiels transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of Acme?
And WON 1973Constitution should apply?
Ruling:
The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient transferable title in
1962 whenAcme purchased it. Acme also had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 constitutionprohibiting Corporations from acquiring and owning
private lannds.Even if the land remained technically public land despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and theirancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no question to Acmes right to
acquire the same since there is no prohibition for corporation to acquire incomplete or
imperfect title.The only limitation was that corporations could not hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1, 024.1973 Constitution also cannot defeat a right
already vested before the law came into effect, or invalidate transaction then
perfectly valid and proper
What is a Corporation Sole?
It is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. It consists of one
person only, and hissuccessors (who will always be one at a time), who are incorporated
by law to give them some legal capacity toadminister church properties that come into
their possession.
They are not treated as ordinary private corporation. As by the nature of its incorporation,
it is empowered bylaw to purchase and hold real estate and personal property.
Vested rights
It is some right or interest in property, which has become fixed and established and no
longer open todoubt or controversy. It cannot be impaired without violating ones right to
due process.
Judicial confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
20

AYOG VS. CUSI
146 SCRA 15
FACTS:
In 1953, the Director of Lands granted Binan Development Co., Inc. its Sales Application of the
land located in Davao City with an area of 250 hectares. There were protesters but then their
protest was dismissed by the Director and ordered them to vacate the subject lot. No appeal was
made from the decision. Despite that, the squatters defied the Director of Lands order to
vacate. An ejectment suit was brought which caused the delay of the issuance of the patent.
The Director of Lands recommended to the Secretary of Natural Resources the approval of the
Sales Patent saying that the Corporation had complied with the said requirements long before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, that the land in question was free from claims and
conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was legal, and the said issuance is an exception to
the prohibition of ownership by private corporation.
The Secretary of Natural Resources noted that the applicant had acquired a vested right to
issuance. Subsequently, the ejectment suit was decided in favor of the corporation. However,
the squatters alleged that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution was a supervening
fact that will make the issuance of patent illegal since no private corporation is
allowed to hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares.
ISSUE: WON BInan Development Corporation may validly acquire the Sales Patent despite the
prohibition embodied in the 1973 Constitution? Yes.
RULING:
The said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Corp. because it has already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time of the
1973 Constitution took effect. Such vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated
by the new Constitution.
A vested right is defined as when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some
person as a present interest, or, it is some right or interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. In this case, it is undisputed that
prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, the right of the corporation to purchase the land
in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or
controversy.Its
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law had the effect of segregating the said
land from public domain. The petitioners contention that their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the property should fail, the SC said, they should have applied for patent applications
if it is true.
ZARA V. DOL
FACTS:
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of 107 hectares parcel of
land pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited
by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish
grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should
the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the
benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141as
amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and
adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately
preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de
Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares,
more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S.
de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same
Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30,
1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public
land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.)
have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the
de Villas have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was OCENCO that
the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case
No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising
the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No.
601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is
already "res-judicata" in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by
prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision
of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a
motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact
that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former
registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order
dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged
public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another
land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the
same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forestry filed a brief as appellee.
ISSUE:
whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa,
Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent
application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous
possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land
Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
HELD:
Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic
Act No. 2061to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative:
- for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or
- for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years.
It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the
judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since
the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive
notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in
view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by
such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited
provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public . The basis of
the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately
owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the
claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary
personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in
possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for
trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
21
 Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title. The Supreme Court of the
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES United Statesthrough Justice Holmes had this to say:It might perhaps be proper and sufficient to
(SECTION 48 (b) of CA 141) say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
Period of possession for Judicial Confirmation of imperfect title: under a claim of private ownership. It will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
Historical Background before the Spanish Conquest, and never to have been in Public Land. It was further ruled that
LAW DATE OF RULE Carinos kind of title, a native title, is an exception to Jura Regalia.
EFFECTIVIT
Y CRUZ V. DENR
PLA- 926 Oct. 17, OCENPO of agricultural lands for 10 FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of
1903 years before the effectivity of this Act RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together with its implementing rules and
2nd PLA Nov. 29, OCENPO of agricultural lands regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
2874 1919 (excluding timber and mineral lands) of grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous people.
the public domain, under bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
JULY 26, 1894 that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
RPLA 141 Dec. 1, 1936 Possession and occupation of lands of serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For this reason, it prays that the petition be
the public domain since JULY 26, 1984 dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa countered the constitutionality of IPRA and its
implementing rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
only limited to Filipinos ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources. Also,
RA 1942 June 22, Possession and occupation for atleast that the law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in the Constitution.
1957 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of the application Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
PD 1073 January 25, Land must be A&D (not anymore domains and ancestral lands, it might include private lands found within the said areas.
1977 agricultural lands of the public
domain, it must be possessed and Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
occupied since June 12, 1945
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the petition, and
7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The amendment from agricultural lands to A & D is not a substantial amendment
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same. According to the Rules
because only agricultural lands are alienable. The prevailing rule for OCENPO is not of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
anymore 30 years. It is now since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The amendment was made to
jive with Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529. Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
Did PD 1529 and PD 1073 (which removed the 30 yr requirement for OCENPO) 1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains. That this is in
preclude application for registration of alienable lands of public domain commenced contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that only agricultural lands of the
only after June 12, 1945? public domain can be considered as alienable and disposable lands.
No, considering Section 14(2) still allows acquisition of alienable lands of public domain 2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys natural resources and 1/3 of the
through prescription. In civil law, prescription is one of the wars of acquiring public land. So countrys land will be concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while 60 million other Filipinos will
even if the possession was commenced later than June 12, 1945, you may still qualify share the remaining. These figures violates the constitutional principle of a more equitable
under Section 14(2). distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources
Requirements for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title 4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot be Alienated or
1) The land must form part of the A&D agricultural lands of the public domain; Ceded
2) Applicant must have been in OCENPO
3) Under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945
Ancestral Domain- refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
RA 8371
Oct. 29, 1997 Ancestral Land refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families, and
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
CARINO V. INSULAR predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional ownership
Facts:
Carino applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in Benguet province. Carino alleges Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains, which, as far back as memory
that: reaches, have been held under claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs.
a. His predecessors has been in the possession of the land for more than 50 years.
b. He was inherited the land under the Igorot customs. Time Immemorial period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain IPs are known
However, it was not shown that Carino has a document of title to prove ownership such as royal to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner
grant. Thedispute arose when the government opposed the registration contending that the land
in question belonged to the State. IPRA connotes group or communal ownership. Ancestral domains are private, but
That the Spanish law provides that all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown (Jura Regalia), and it community property
could not have beenacquired by Carino since prescription does not lie against the crown. Private- since it is not part of the public domain
Community ancestral domain is owned in common and not by 1 particular person
Issue:WON Carinos application should be granted? YES.
Ruling:
Ownership over the natural resources STILL belong to the State

22
 - ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and conserve them for future
generation. The rights of IPs take the form of management and stewardship After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirementsfor a grant of title under
P.D. No. 27, an EmancipationPatent which may cover previously titled or untitled property shallbe
Modes of Acquisition of Ancestral domains and ancestral lands by the IP issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
a) Applicant must be a member of indigenous cultural group;
The Register of Deeds shall complete the entries on theaforementioned Emancipation Patent and
b) He must have been in possession of an individually-owned ancestral land for not less
shall assign an originalcertificate of title number in case of unregistered land, and in caseof
than 30 years
registered property, shall issue the corresponding transfercertificate of title without requiring the
c) By operation of law (IPRA), the land is already classified as A&D land, even if it has a
surrender of the ownersduplicate of the title to be cancelled.
slop of 18% hence there is no need to submit a separate certification that the land is
A&D
Incase of death of the grantee, the Department of AgrarianReform shall determine his heirs or
Transfer of land or property rights successors-in-interest and shallnotify the Register of Deeds accordingly.In case of subsequent
1) Only the members of the ICCs/IPs transfer of property covered by anEmancipation Patent or a Certificate of Title emanating from
2) In accord with customary laws and customs anEmancipation Patent, the Register of Deeds shall effect the transferonly upon receipt of the
3) Subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land supporting papers from the Departmentof Agrarian Reform.
was transferred to a non-member of ICCs/IPs
No fee, premium, of tax of any kind shall be charged orimposed in connection with the issuance
Mining Operations on Ancestral Land of an original EmancipationPatent and for the registration of related documents.
General Rule: Not allowed
Exception: If the ICCs concerned consent to it
TENANT EMANCIPATION DECREE
In the event of an agreement of mining operations (PD 27)
1) Parties shall agree upon the Royalty payment (Oct. 21, 1972)
2) The Royalty payment shall form part of trust fund for the socio-economic well-being of Applicability/Coverage
the ICC This applies to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands
Members of the cultural communities are given priority in awarding of SMALL-SCALE MINING primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of
CONTRACTS- Sec. 7, 7076
sharecrop or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) estate or not
1) Jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs
o Condition precedent to the acquisition of jurisdictions: Exhaustion of all Retention Limits/Award Ceiling
remedies provided under their customary laws and a certification from the A farmer shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the family-size farm of
dispute and that it was not resolved. o 6 hectares if not irrigated
2) It has the authority to issue Certificates of Ancestral Lands Title (CALT) and o 3 hectares if irrigated
Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
3) It has OEJ over petition for cancellation of CADT and CALT alleged to have
been fraudulently acquired to any person Landowner Retention Limit
4) Issuance of certification as a precondition to grant of permit for disposition o 7 hectares if such landowner is cultivating such
5) Power to cite for contempt and issue restraining orders area or will now cultivate it

Ancestral Domains Office Cost of Land/Compensation

- Responsible for identification, delineation, and recognition of ancestral lands/domains The land shall be equivalent to 2 times the average
harvest of 3 normal crop years
It shall be paid by the tenant in 15 equal annual
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER, EMANCIPATION PATENT, AFFIDAVIT OF NON- amortizations including interest at the rate of 6% per annum
TENANCY

SEC. 104. Provisional Register of Documents. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall Requisite before the title to the land owned be actually issued
prepare by automate data processing a special registry book to be known as the Provisional to the tenant farmer
Register of Documents issued under PD-27 which shall be kept and maintained in every Tenant farmer should become a full-fledged member of a duly
Registry of Deeds throughout the country. recognized farmers cooperative

Said Registry Book shall be a register of: Transferability of title acquired to PD 27

a) All Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) issued pursuant to P.D. No. 27; and Only through hereditary succession or to the Govt in accordance
b) All subsequent transactions affecting Certificates of Land Transfer such as adjustments, w/ pertinent laws
transfer, duplication and cancellations of erroneous Certificates of Land Transfer

SEC. 105. Certificates of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents.

The Department of Agrarian reform shall pursuant to P.D. No. 27issue in duplicate, a
Certificate of Land Transfer for every landbrought under Operation Land Transfer, the original
of which shallbe kept by the tenant-farmer and the duplicate, in the Registry ofDeeds. COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
(RA 6657)
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 Aug. 7, 2009
Agrarian Reform - redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits
produced, to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless,
irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors
and support services designed to lift the economic status of the
beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical
redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor
administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work
Agricultural land land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or
industrial land.
Agricultural activity cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by person whether natural or juridical.
Coverage
All public and private agricultural lands including lands of public
domain suitable for agriculture
All lands in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress
All other lands owned by the govt devoted to or suitable for
agriculture
All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless
of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon
o Except landholdings of landowners with a total area of
5 hectares below
Exemptions and Exclusions from CARP coverage
1) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and
breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves;
2) Private lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for
prawn farms and fishponds, provided that the same have not
been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the CARP;
3) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to
be necessary for:
a. National defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes,
seeds and seeding research and pilot production
center
b. Church sites and convents, mosque sites and
Islamic centers, common burial grounds
c. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by
inmates
d. Government and private research and quarantine
centers
e. All lands with 18% slope and over, except those
already developed
Agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into
residential,commercial or industrial uses excluded
This is based on DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which
providesthat with respect to the conversion of
agricultural lands covered byRA No. 6657 to non-
agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR toapprove
such conversion may be exercised from the date of
itseffectivity or on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands
already classified ascommercial, industrial or
residential before that date no longer needany
conversion clearance from the DAR.
Homesteads
While PD No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants
from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social
legislation, it cannot defeat the very purpose of the
Public Land Act which has been enacted for the welfare
and protection of the poor.
Qualified Beneficiaries
Landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof,
landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of
priority
1) Agricultural lessees and share tenants;
2) Regular farmworkers;
3) Seasonal farmworkers;
4) Other farmworkers;
5) Actual tillers or occupants of public lands
6) Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries
7) Others directly working on the land
children of landowners who are qualified shall be given
preference. Actual land-tillers shall not, however, be ejected or
removed therefrom
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness,
aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive
as possible
Support services shall be extended equally to women and men
agrarian reform beneficiaries
Retention Limits of Landowners
o Maximum of 5 hectares
o 3 hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner
subject to the following qualifications
1. Atleast 15 years of age
2. He is actually tilling the land or directly managing
the farm
Retention limits shall not apply to LGUs acquiring private
agricultural land by expropriation or other modes of acquisition
be used for public purposes
Disposition or Sale of retained land by land owner
Valid, as long as the total landholding that shall be owned by the
transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not
exceed the landholding ceilings
Award ceiling to beneficiaries
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 o 3 hectares
o It may be a contiguous tract or several parcels of land
cumulate up to the prescribed award limits
Landless Beneficiary owns less than 3 ha. Of agricultural lands
Determination of just compensation
1. Cost of acquisition of the land
2. Value of the standing crop
3. Current value of like properties
4. Its nature, actual use, and income
5. Sworn valuation by the owner
6. Tax declarations
7. Assessment made by government assessors
8. 70% zonal valuation by the BIR
Manner of Payment
It shall be paid by the beneficiaries to the LBP in 30 annual
amortization of 6% interest per annum
Payment for the first 3 years may be at reduced amounts
LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded, it
may be foreclosed by the LBP for nonpaymnet of an aggregate of
3 annual amortizations
Beneficiary whose land was foreclosed shall be permanently
disqualified from becoming a beneficiary
Transferability of awarded lands (CLOA)
only through hereditary succession, to the government, or to the
LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries through the DAR for a
period of 10 years
Voluntary Land Transfer
landowners of agricultural lands may enter into a voluntary
arrangement to direct transfer of their lands to qualified
beneficiaries subject to guidelines set in the law
Payment shall be made by the farmer-beneficiary to the land
owner under terms to be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
It shall be binding upon them, upon registration with the approval
by the DAR
Approval is deemed given, unless notice of disapproval is
received by the farmer-beneficiary within 30 days from the date
of registration
In case they dont agree on the price, the procedure for
compulsory acquisition shall apply
LBP may extend financing to the beneficiaries
When the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes, or that the land will have greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes
The DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the land-owner, may
authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its
disposition Provided that the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation Irrigated and irrigable lands, shall not be subject to
conversion
Jurisdiction of DAR
a) Adjudication of all matters involving implementation
ofagrarian reform
b) Resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure
relatedproblems
c) Approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
d) readjustment of agricultural lands into
residential,commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural
uses
Appeals
DAR decision
15 days from the receipt CA by certiorari
Notwithstanding appeal to the CA, the decision of the DARshall be
immediately executory.
Jurisdiction of DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
a) Determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of CARP
b) Cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellationof
EPs and CLOAs which are registered with the ROD.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties which has the following
elements:
1. Parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agriculturallessee
2. Subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land
3. Consent between the parties to the relationship
4. Purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agriculturalproduction
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
oragricultural lessee
6. Harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant
oragricultural lessee
Note: If the action is brought before the trial court, it must determine
first the existence of tenancy relationship. If there is, then it should
dismiss the case. It there is no such relationship, then it has
jurisdiction over the case. Finding by DAR of such relationship is
merely preliminary and does not bind the courts.
An action to enforce rights as a tenant is barred by
prescription
If not filed within 3 years
Special Agrarian Court designated by the RTC shall have the
following original and exclusive jurisdiction
1) All petitions for the determination of just compensation
tolandowners, and
2) Prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657
Titles issued pursuant to PD 27 and RA 6657 shallbecome indefeasible and
imprescriptible after 1 yearfrom their registration in the ROD
Jurisdiction of DAR and DARAB
DAR DARAB
Prior to registration with the ROD After registration with ROD
Case involving issuance, recall or Issuance, correction or
cancellation of CLOAs and EPs cancellation of CLOAs or EPs
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MODES OF ACQUIRING PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND
1) Operation Land Transfer
2) Volutary Offer to Sell
3) Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme
4) Compulsory Acquisition
5) Voluntary Stock Distribution in the case of corporation
Agricultural landsare only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do
not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Lands converted to non-agricultural
uses prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 are outside its coverage Natalia vs. DAR
Lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural
land. It declared as unconstitutional the provision in RA 6657 insofar as it included livestock
farms in the coverage of agrarian reform Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SAR (1989)
1) the requirement of public use has been settled by the Constitution itself. It noted that (n)o
less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform which is the reason why private
agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
retention limits. The Court also declared that the law is a valid exercise by the State of the
police power and the power of eminent domain.
2) On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to
show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated.
3) And on the alleged payment of public money as just compensation without the
corresponding appropriation, the Court said that there is no rule that only money already in
existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. The earmarking of fifty billion pesos
as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word initial simply means that additional amounts may
be appropriated later when necessary.
4) Finally, on the contention that the law is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of
the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which
is the only medium of payment allowed, the Court held that the law is not an ordinary
expropriationwhere only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken
by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose, but deals with a
revolutionary kind of expropriation (which) affects all private agricultural lands. (S)uch a
program will involve not mere millions of pesos (but) hundreds of billions of pesos will be
needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is
already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Based on the slogan: Land for the Landless
1935 constitution mandated the policy of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic
security of all the people, especially the less privileged.
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarianreform program
- founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
- who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
- in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
To this end, the State shall
- encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
- subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
o taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and
subject to the payment of just compensation.
- In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners.
o The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
3844- Agricultural land reform code (aug. 8, 1963)
PD 27 - compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for land owners (Oct. 21, 1972)
EO 228 - full ownership in favor of PD 27 beneficiaries and providing valuation of still unvalued
lands
PP 131- CARP and EO 229 providing mechanisms for its implementation
RA 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, by P. Aquino (June 10, 1988)
NATALIA REALTY V. DAR
Lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL are
outside its coverage
HELD:
Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than DAR. Thus, for instance, the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision for residential use and developed such prior to the passage of the law excluded the
area for CARL coverage because it ceased to be devoted to agricultural activity.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by
such conversion.It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portionsof the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision within the coverage ofCARL.
LUZ FARMS V. SECRETARY
Farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine not covered
in determining the area of land to be excluded, AO No. 9 fixed the following retention limits, viz.:
1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the
landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of
cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
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