2013 Ali Pasha Cenghich Isis PDF

CENTRE DHISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE OTTOMANE
CENTER FOR OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
EUROPE AND THE

OTTOMAN WORLD

EXCHANGES AND CONFLICTS
(sixteenth to seventeenth centuries)
Edited by
Gbor KRMAN
and
Radu G. PUN
THE ISIS PRESS

ISTANBUL
FRONTIER ELITES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
DURING THE WAR FOR CRETE (16451669):
THE CASE OF ALI-PASHA ENGI
Domagoj Maduni
To the most Illustrious and Excellent noble, known for every honour and
worthy of every praise, Sir Antonio Bernardo, Governor-General in Dalmatia
and Albania, a bow and warmest salutations. After the fortunate victory of
Your Excellency, who has, accompanied by his potent army, come to (aid) the
noble City [Kotor], where Your valorous prudence made Your enemies retreat
shamefully, with furled banners, and shame on their faces, whom the Lord, the
Holy Virgin and the glorious St. Trifun had not permitted the fulfillment of
their desires [].1
This is an excerpt from a letter received by Antonio Bernardo, Ve-

netian governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania, in September 1657, at the
end of the unsuccessful two-month Ottoman siege of the Venetian town of
Kotor, whose defence he personally supervised. At first glance this may seem
a typical letter, written in flowery Baroque style, congratulating the Venetian
commander on this victory with characteristic invocations of God, the Virgin
Mary and a local town saint, St. Trifun. However, what makes this letter more
interesting is that it was written by Ali Pasha engi, governor (sancakbey) of
the subprovince (sancak) of Herzegovina, one of two commanders in charge
of the besieging force; a commander who moreover, by his own testimony,
did practically everything in his power (short of attacking the forces of the
other sancakbey) to undermine the success of this siege: from sabotaging ar-
tillery to revealing the plans of attack to the defenders.
The intriguing personality of Ali Pasha engi, member of one of the
most prominent families of Bosnian Ottoman lords,2 and his conduct during
1 All Ill[ustrissi]mo et Ecc[ellentissi]mo nobile sapiente di ogni honore, et honorata laude degno
Sig[no]re Antonio Bernardo G[e]n[er]al di Dalmatia, et Albania inchino, et molto cara salutatio-
ne. Doppo felicita la vittoria di V.E. la quale si porto bene in quella nobil Citt con sua potente
Armata, et sua prudenza valorosa facendo ritirare vergognosamente li vostri nemici con bandiere
in sacco, et con faccia vergognosa, alli quali Dio, la Beata Vergine, et il glorioso San Trifone non
permisse di adempire il suo desiderio [...], Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe) Senato, Dispac-
ci, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar (PTM) b[usta] 482. [letter] num[ber] 134. (Cattaro, 13. Ottobre
1657), the attachment to the letter.
2 The engi family gained popular fame in the latter nineteenth century through the epic poem
Smrt Smail Age engia [Death of Ismail engi Aa], published in 1846 by the famous
48 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
the Venetian-Ottoman war over Crete has already drawn significant attention
from historians. To date, the most detailed study remains that of Montenegrin
historian Gligor Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletako turskim ra-
tovima XVI do XVIII vijeka (Yugoslav Lands in the VenetianOttoman wars
in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries).3 Working from extensive Venetian
archival materials, Stanojevi provides a very detailed account of Ali Pashas
activities before and after the siege of Kotor in 1657. His work was further
expanded by the well-known Serbian historian Radovan Samardi, who en-
riched Stanojevis research with Ragusan archive material. Several studies
have been written about the engi family as a whole, yet so far Ali Pasha
engi personally has not been the subject a separate study.4 Moreover both
authors, like most others, dealt with Ali Pasha engi in the context of na-
tional narratives, constructed around the theme of the liberation wars of the
Croatian, Serbian or Montenegrin peoples from the Turkish yoke. As such
these historiographical works commonly take our people (with changing
national denominators) as the main historical agent, and even more problem-
atically, at the same time back-project nineteenth- and twentieth-century na-
tional categories onto early modern realities and identities, often resulting in a
one-sided and distorted interpretation of historical events.5 Not surprisingly,
in these historical accounts Ali Pasha, in addition to being a Turk (that is an
enemy and oppressor), is depicted in even more negative tones: as a traitor to
the Empire who served his Venetian masters for money and personal gain,
Croatian poet Ivan Maurani. Composed in the age of Croatian national revival, Mauranis
poem, inspired by an actual event the death of a sancakbey of Herzegovina in an ambush by
Montenegrins in 1840, as an act of vendetta and written in the modern Croatian language,
celebrated the genre of epic folk literature and the struggle of the Yugoslav peoples for liberation
from the Turkish yoke. The person of Ismail Aa stands for Turkish oppression and the famous
verses which Maurani puts into Smail Agas mouth: Hara, rajo, hara! rie, Hara, hara, il
jo gore bie! [Harac, reaya, harac! he growls, Harac or it will be worse!], became an
integral part of popular national historical discourse not only of the Croats but also of the Serbs
and Montenegrins.
3 Gligor Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletako turskim ratovima XVIXVIII vijeka
[Yugoslav lands in the VenetianTurkish Wars 16th17th centuries] (Belgrade, 1970).
4 Radovan Samardi, Kandijski rat (16451669) [The War for Crete 16451669], in idem,
Istorija Srpskog Naroda [History of the Serbian people], vol. 3, part 1 (Belgrade, 1993), 336
424. Other works of importance on Ali Pasha engi include: Balzs Sudr, A hdoltsgi pask
az oszmn belpolitika forgatagban (16571665) [Pashas from Ottoman Hungary in the turmoil
of Ottoman politics 16571665], Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 124 (2011): 896897; Hamdija
Kreevljakovi, engii: prilog prouavanju feudalizma u Bosni i Hercegovini [The engi
dynasty: a Contribution to Research on Feudalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Sarajevo, 1959).
5 For a good survey of the historiography on the HabsburgVenetianOttoman frontier zone on
the Eastern shore of Adriatic, see Wendy C. Bracewell, The Historiography of the Triplex
Confinium: Conflict and Community on the Triple Frontier, 16th18th Centuries, in Frontiers
and the Writing of History, 15001850, ed. Steven Ellis and Raingard Esser (Hannover and
Laatzen, 2006), 211228. The only exception to the model of writing described above are studies
by authors of Bosnian Muslim provenience, such as Hamdija Kreevljakovi, previously
mentioned.
FRONTIER ELITES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 49
gain, and who was even by Turkish standards extremely venal, greedy, cor-
rupt and cruel toward his Christian subjects.6
Yet was it really so? The present article attempts to offer another inter-
pretation by moving away from the national narrative and positioning the case
of Ali Pasha engi into another conceptual context, that of the frontier, of
borderlands located on the edges of empires. The frontier in this case is the
western fringe of the Ottoman Empire in the Dinaric mountains, bordering the
Republic of Venice and the Habsburg Empire; the area also known as the
triple frontier or triplex confinium.7 The frontier is not just a boundary area
between two or more states. It is a zone of marches, semiautonomous militar-
ised political entities, and of separate military/administrative units whose for-
tifications mark the frontiers limits. But above all, the frontier is the space of
shared military, social and economic patterns on both sides of the boundary
line, where life is governed by interactions (either peaceful or violent) with
the zones across the boundary. More than anything else, this transitional char-
acter of life on the frontier influences the specific mentality of the inhabitants.
As such, it can be said that the frontier constitutes a world in itself, with its
own rules, where life differs from life in the states interior.8 By reconstruct-
ing the world of Ali Pasha engi, this paper will attempt to shed some light
on the events that led an Ottoman sancakbey to put himself so openly on the
Venetian side.
6 A classic example of such an evaluation is Radovan Samardi writing that: Ali Pasha engi,
the local sancak bey, was even by Turkish standards extremely greedy, corrupt and cruel. He
allowed the Venetians to bribe him, to that extent that he worked more for them than for the
sultan, however he was still an overly burdensome lord to his Christian subjects., Samardi,
Istorija, 375. Compare also the similar assessment by Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 217, 237.
7 In recent decades, research on this frontier has made significant progress mainly thanks to the
project Triplex Confinium. See: Drago Roksandi, Triplex Confinium, ili o granicama i regi-
jama Hrvatske povijesti 15001800 [Triplex Confinium, or concerning the border and regions of
Croatian history, 15001800] (Zagreb, 2003), especially 229242 with an extensive bibliography
of the works produced by the project. See also: Egidio Iveti and Drago Roksandi, eds.,
Tolerance and Intolerance on the Triplex Confinium: Approaching the Other on the
Borderlands Eastern Adriatic and Beyond, 15001800 (Padua, 2007). For a position of this
particular borderland in the wider context of the Ottoman frontiers, see Alfred Rieber, Triplex
Confinium in Comparative Context, in Constructing Border Societies on the Triplex Confinium,
ed. Drago Roksandi and Nataa tefanec (Budapest, 2000), 1329.
8 For further discussion concerning the classification of frontiers and a survey of the
methodological/theoretical approaches, see Daniel Power, Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the
Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe, in Frontiers in Question: Eurasian
Borderlands, 7001700, ed. Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (London, 1999), 112; Mark L.
Stein, Guarding the Frontier: Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe (London and New
York, 2007), 1317. See also Andrew C.S. Peacock, The Ottoman Empire and Its Frontiers, in
The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. Andrew C.S. Peacock (Oxford, 2009), 130.
50 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
Historical Context: The Adriatic Theatre of Operations during the War for
Crete (16451669)
When war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire broke out anew in
1645, after almost seventy years of peace, no one could have predicted that it
would last for more than two decades. Indeed, the opening events of the war
all pointed to the possibility that this conflict would not last long. After suc-
cessfully landing forces on Crete, taking the Republic by surprise, the Otto-
mans went from one victory to another. By 1648 almost the entire island,
with the exception of the town of Candia and a few strongholds, was in Otto-
man hands.9 However, in Dalmatia the situation was rather different. Initial
successes by the Bosnian army in 1646 were followed by two campaigns full
of military failures, which in March 1648 culminated in the loss of the famous
fortress of Klis, seat of a sancakbey. As a result of Venetian military oper-
ations in 16471648, almost the entire sancak of Klis, the central region south
of the Dinaric mountains dividing Dalmatia from Bosnia, was completely
destroyed and depopulated, while the neighboring sancak of Lika to the west
was heavily devastated.10 This had serious strategic consequences for the
conduct of military operations in this region. The Ottomans lost all logistical
bases south of the mountains, and the nearest that could be used to launch the
campaign against the Dalmatian towns was Livno in Herzegovina, further
from the coast. This in turn resulted in a significant increase in the
Bosnian armys marching time, and shortened its operational campaign time-
frame.
However, the most serious consequence of this success of Venetian
arms, and the high losses among the Ottoman frontier lords, was the re-
bellion of the Empires Christian subjects on the frontier. Some, like the semi-
autonomous regions of Poljica and Makarska, rose in arms and openly pro-
claimed their allegiance to the Republic, accepting Venetian protection.11
Others, like the semi-nomadic Morlacchi inhabiting Ottoman Dalmatia and
9 For the opening of hostilities and the first Ottoman campaigns resulting in the conquest of Crete
see: Ekkehard Eickhoff, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen: Umbruch in Sdosteuropa (Stuttgart,
1988), 1728, 4059; Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth
Century (Philadelphia, 1991), 104148.
10 For a more detailed account of these events see: Feruccio Sassi, Le Campagne di Dalmazia
durante la Guerra di Candia (16451648), Archivio Veneto 20 (1937): 211250; 21 (1937): 60
100; Gligor Stanojevi, Dalmacija u doba kandiskog rata [Dalmatia in the age of the Candian
War] (Belgrade, 1958), 109111, 118120; Samardi, Istorija, 344357.
11 Makarska was the first Christian community on this frontier to defect to the Venetian side,
accepting a Venetian governor in August 1646. Although Poljice engaged in negotiations with the
Republic from the beginning of the war, it waited for Venetian forces to capture the fortress of
Klis before openly declaring for the Republic; see Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 99100, 114, 121;
Samardi, Istorija, 346347, 363364.
Lika, migrated in tens of thousands to Venetian-controlled lands.12 On the

southeastern zone of the frontier, the Republic was less successful. The Ve-
netian attempt in 1649 to initiate large-scale rebellion among Albanian Chris-
tians failed,13 resulting also in a quieting of the tribes in Herzegovina and
Montenegro, which by that time were only waiting for the appearance of
some substantial Venetian force to rise in arms. Despite this failure, the Re-
publics influence among the tribes of Herzegovina and Montenegro remained
very strong and until the end of the war the Ottomans were forced to devote
significant resources to keep them pacified.
At the same time, the Venetian forces reached their limits with these
conquests. The Venetian expedition to Albania in 1649 ended without any
significant gains for the Republic, and when in 1654 the operation to capture
the fortress of Knin, recently rebuilt by the Ottomans in the centre of Dalma-
tian hinterland, ended in complete failure, it was a clear sign that the Otto-
mans had regained strategic initiative in this theatre.14 In 16541657 the Re-
public committed the majority of its forces to the Aegean in an attempt to
close the Dardanelles and force the Empire to conclude some kind of a peace
agreement. However, the great Venetian victories at sea backfired. The de-
struction of the Ottoman fleet in 1656 brought a change of government in
Constantinople, yet not with the results the Republic was hoping for. The new
regime headed by Kprl Mehmed Pasha turned its attention to the Repub-
lics possessions in Dalmatia, well within reach of Ottoman land forces.15
12 On the Morlacchi rebellion/migration, see: Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 113118; Domagoj Madu-

ni, Capi di Morlacchi: Integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive System in Dal-
matia and the Formation of the Morlacchi Elite (16451669), in Trkenkriege und Adelskultur in
Ostmitteleuropa vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert / Anti-Ottoman Wars and the Culture of No-
bility in East-Central Europe, 16th18th centuries, ed. Robert Born and Sabine Jagodzinski (forth-
coming).
13 The entire operation was envisioned very ambitiously. Its goal was to bring the war deeper
into the Ottoman hinterland by initiating wholesale rebellion among Christians in the wide area
stretching from Herzegovina to Ohrid, acquiring for the Republic the new regnum of Albania.
The Venetian expeditionary force that sailed from Zadar in December 1648 also carried the five
Catholic bishops whose seats were in the Albanian lands and the so-called Sultan Yahya, alleged
son of Sultan Murad III and pretender to the Ottoman throne. For more on the Venetian expedi-
tion to Albania; see: Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 211213; Marko Jaov, Le guerre Veneto-
Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmatia (Venice, 1991), 8990. For more on Sultan Yahya, see: Peter
Bartl, Der Westbalkan zwischen spanischer Monarchie und Osmanischem Reich: Zur Trken-
kriegsproblematik an der Wende vom 16. zum 17. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden, 1974), 179199;
Franjo Difnik, Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji [History of the Candian War in Dalmatia]
(Split, 1986), 209210.
14 The attack on Knin proved to be greatest Venetian defeat on this front. Out of a force of
around 6,000, the Republic lost some 1,400 men. For more on this battle, see: Jaov, Le guerre
Veneto-Turche, 107110; Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 134; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 475. num.
120. (Zara 26 Aprile 1654), attachment number 14, dated 1654. 10. Aprile, Zara.
15 On the four battles in the Dardanelles, see: Setton, Venice, 182189; Christoph K. Neumann,
Political and Diplomatic Developments, in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, ed. Surai-
ya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge, 2006), 4950; Eickhoff, Venedig, 135141, 148160.
52 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
Rumours of the young sultan personally leading the army to Dalmatia fortu-
nately proved false,16 yet the campaign of 1657 still proved to be one of the
most critical in this theatre. For the first time, the Ottomans almost simulta-
neously launched attacks against two Venetian strongholds, Split and Kotor,
dangerously stretching the already weak Venetian forces in Dalmatia. Yet
poor coordination and political factors (to be discussed in more detail further
on) prevented the Ottomans from achieving any success.17
On the other hand, the Ottoman success in breaking the blockade of
the Dardanelles during 1657 gave the central government free hands for the
next campaigning season. Throughout the entire winter and spring of 1658,
the Senate received disturbing news of massive Ottoman preparations for the
deployment of the Empires forces in Dalmatia.18 Fortunately for Venice, at
the last moment the Ottoman army was diverted to the north, to deal with the
Portes vassal Gyrgy Rkczi II, prince of Transylvania. Rkczis interven-
tion in Poland as Swedens ally (without the Portes prior blessing) and his
subsequent refusal to yield the principality provoked full-scale Ottoman inter-
vention with the goal of deposing this troublesome vassal.19 For the next
seven years, the Empires entanglement in Transylvanian and Hungarian af-
fairs which escalated into open war with the Habsburgs, tied down the ma-
jority of the Empires resources and resulted in a lack of military action in
Dalmatia. The Empires limited military commitment on the Dalmatian front
also continued throughout the last four campaigns of the war, when the Otto-
mans concentrated all their efforts on eliminating the last Venetian stronghold
on Crete and bringing this war to an end.20
Yet the lack of major encounters in Dalmatia after 1648 brought no re-
duction in the level of everyday violence. As the years passed and both sides
begun to show signs of exhaustion, warfare degenerated into a closed circle of
skirmishes, forays, raids and counter-raids. From year to year, military oper-
ations closely followed the changing seasons. With the coming of St.
Georges day the army of Bosnian sipahis would assemble at Livno and begin
their slow move toward the coast. Every year, the same script would be fol-
lowed: fields would be pillaged, crops burned, and occasionally a half-hearted
attack on some Venetian stronghold would be attempted. Then with the com-
16 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656).
17 For more concerning the events of 1657, see: Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 136138; idem,
Jugoslovenske zemlje, 243251.
18 Already in March 1657, the governor-general in Dalmatia received letters from the Republics
representative at the Porte that Dalmatia was destined as the main target for the campaign seasson
1658; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num 163. (Zara, 10. Marzo 1658), attachment:
Leterra da Segretario Ballorino.
19 Katalin Pter, The Golden Age of the Principality (16061660), in History of Transylvania,
vol. 2, ed. Lszl Makkai and Zoltn Szsz (Boulder, 2002), 140144.
20 For more on the epic siege of Candia, see: Setton, Venice, 193228; Eickhoff, Venedig, 230
264.
ing of St. Demeters day, the Bosnian army would disband, and the raiding
season for the Venetian irregulars would begin. As the years passed, the casu-
alties mounted on both sides. However, probably the worst consequence of
the prolonged war on this frontier was the breakdown of social order, the
spread of chaos, anarchy and the loss of respect for laws and property at all
levels of society: from simple raya who became highway robbers, to beys and
aas who increased tax pressure on their subjects beyond all measure. The
situation was not helped at all by a series of pashas in Bosnia more concerned
with extortion and filling their own purses than with waging war. This con-
cludes the sketch of the wider historical context in which the actions of Ali
Pasha engi should be positioned.
I am Cengi Alai-Bey of Herzegovina and everybody knows me21
Originally from Egil in Azerbaijan, the engi family (taking its

family name Cengi from its supposed estate at Cangri north of Ankara) came
to Bosnia in the mid-sixteenth century, where they established their power
base in the sancak of Herzegovina. By the first half of the seventeenth century
the family was completely naturalised and connected by marriage ties to other
influential clans in the region, becoming one of the most powerful families in
the eyalet of Bosnia.22 Of Ali Pasha engi little is known before the begin-
ning of the war for Crete. As a dignitary, we know that he maintained good
relations with the Republic of Ragusa, and as was customary in these parts
invited them to send representatives (with gifts) to his wedding23 or informed
them of the birth of his son.24
When the war between the Empire and the Venetian Republic started,
Ali Pasha dutifully answered the call to arms, as every other Ottoman lord
most likely did; the first reports of his activities date from summer 1648,
when as alaybey of Herzegovina (commander of the sancaks sipahi cavalry)
he joined the Bosnian pashas army assembling at Livno. The first contact
between Ali Pasha and the Venetian representatives was to say the least curi-
ous, and speaks much of his character and of how he understood his position.
When in March 1648 the fortress of Klis surrendered to Venetian forces after
21 Io son Cengi Allai Bei dellErcegovina e tutti mi conoscono, ASVe Senato, Dispacci,
PTM b. 467. num. 460. (Zara, 25. Agosto 1648.), attachment: Lettera scritta da Alli Bei Cengijch.
22 Safvet Baagi beg, Najstariji ferman begova engia [The oldest ferman of engi beys],
Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Bosni i Hercegovini 9 (1897): 437452.
23 Dravni Arhiv Dubrovnik (henceforth DAD) Acta Sanctae Mariae Maioris (henceforth
ASSM), vol. 1942, B 23, 5 (no date and numeration). For this and other archival references from
the Ragusan state archives, I would like to thank my dear colleague Vesna Miovi.
24 DAD ASSM, vol. 1942, B 24, 16 (no date and numeration). Although in the early phase of his
life he did not hold the honorary title pasha, in this article I refer to him with this name as
customarily used in historiography.
54 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
half a month of siege, the defenders were granted honours of war and all al-
lowed to leave freely, with the exception of six Ottoman lords who were to
remain as hostages and be exchanged for twelve Venetians in Ottoman cap-
tivity.25 Accordingly in July, Governor-General Lunardo Foscolo sent Fra
Vincenzo Maduncich to the Bosnian pasha in Livno as his representative,
tasked with finalising the terms of the prisoner exchange.
When in August Fra Vincenzo returned from the camp of the Bosnian
pasha, he presented Foscolo with a rather surprising letter written by Ali
Pasha engi, alaybey of Herzegovina. The letter was nothing less than an
offer for a local cease-fire, with a promise of mediation in concluding peace
between the Republic and the Porte. For the last three years nothing has been
done in these parts but fight, and nothing else is seen but fighting, subjects
perishing, some made slaves and some put to the sword, and all other kind of
ravages, wrote Ali Pasha. engi went on to inform the governor-general
that he had been approached by the Ottoman lords from Lika, representatives
of the merchants community and many others, and asked to send this letter
expressing their wishes that everything should return to the state as it was ab
antico. Yet there was one condition to engis call to the governor-general to
dispatch a person authorised to open cease-fire negotiations: that the Republic
should immediately return the newly conquered and refortified fortress of
Klis, and all other captured strongholds in the sancak of Lika. The governor-
general dutifully informed the Senate of this event, stating that this offer is
more ridiculous than worthy of any attention, but that he had nevertheless
answered with all sincerity and in a formal manner, stating firmly that Klis
was now a possession of the Republic and would remain so.26 The Senate
approved his conduct, agreeing that: La lettera scritta da quel truco col mo-
tivo di pace non si vede, che habbia alcun fondamento; nevertheless instruct-
ing him to continue listening for anything that might be said in this regard and
inform them accordingly.27
In spite of the Senates dismissive tone, subsequent events in Constan-
tinople, the deposition and execution of Sultan Ibrahim and the change of
government in the Empire,28 might indicate that Ali Pashas offer was not
entirely groundless. Soon after the deposition of Sultan Ibrahim, rumours
started to circulate in Sarajevo and Ragusa that peace was to be concluded
25 For more on negotiations and contact concluded between the Venetian commander, Governor-
General Lunardo Foscolo and Mehmet Mustaibegovi, sancakbey of Klis, see: Difnik, Povijest,
178192; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 466. num. 389. (Di Galea Salona, 7. Aprile 1648),
attachment: Scrittura con Turchi di Clissa.
26 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 467. num. 460. (Zara, 25. Agosto 1648), attachment: Lettera
scritta da Alli Bei Cengijch.
27 ASVe Senato Rettori, R-21, f. 54v, Adi 5. Settembre 1648.
28 Setton, Venice, 152153.
with the Republic.29 And indeed, in March 1649 Foscolo received a letter
from the Venetian bailo in Constantinople through the Bosnian pasha, which
informed him that the Ottomans were showing willingness to open peace
talks. The letter was also accompanied by another one from the Bosnian
pasha, who wrote to Foscolo that the imperial courier was on his way with
orders to suspend the hostilities.30 Additionally, it became obvious in the fol-
lowing years that engi was not without protectors at the Porte; specifically
in 1650, when he was appointed as sancakbey of Herzegovina, and even for a
31
short period as pasha of the eyalet of Kanizsa (in 1651). All this could indi-
cate that engis offer represented a probe, initiated by some power or pres-
sure group, intended to test the Venetians disposition.
Be that as it may, Ali Pashas main concern as sancakbey was to pacify
the Christians in his domain, stirred by the arrival of the Venetian expedition-
ary force in the bay of Kotor and by the capture of the Ottoman stronghold of
Risan in February 1649. Most problematic was the community of Niki, a
leading tribe among the Christians of Herzegovina, who at the arrival of the
Venetian force rose in arms and captured the small town of Grahovo.32
engi, at that time still only alaybey of Herzegovina, skillfully used news of
the prospective peace and wrote a warning letter to the Niki chieftains.33
Ali Pasha addressed them as antichi amici, who had always been in amore
et amicitia with his late father, expressing his understanding for their current
transgression, yet warning them to think hard, because they know very well
how long is the arm of felice Gran Signore and his ministers, the grand vizi-
ers, and that not even the Re Christiano can defeat him [] Open your eyes,
engi goes on, especially now, when peace between the Empire and the Re-
public is at hand, your lands are in the lowlands and it does not require more
than two or three thousand horse and foot to destroy them.34 engis ac-
tions, combined with the meagre performance of Venetian forces, shook the
29 See, for example, ASVe Senato Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 542. (Cattaro, 1. Marzio 1649),
attachments: Avvisi di Ragusa di quelli Signori; Avvisi di Saraevo.
30 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 544. (Cattaro, 6. Marzo 1649), attachments: Copia
del Capitolo Contenuto nelle lettere dellEcc.mo Bailo; Lettere di Bassa di Bosnia; ASVe Senato,
Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 545. (Cattaro, 7. Marzo 1649).
31
His first decree to the Ragusans dates from August 1650, so he must have been appointed a
short time before. In this ferman engi still does not use the title of pasha, but in another from
January 1651, his name is recorded as ex-governor of the Kanizsa eyalet and governor of the
Herzegovina sancak, and he also uses the title of pasha. Vesna Miovi, Dubrovaka Republika u
spisima namjesnika Bosanskog ejaleta i hercegovakog sandaka [The Ragusan Republic in the
decrees of the Bosnian pashas and sancakbeys of Herzegovina] (Dubrovnik, 2008), 240.
32 Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 212.
33 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 544. (Cattaro, 6. Marzo 1649).
34 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 468. num. 544. (Cattaro, 6. Marzo 1649), attachment: Lettera
di Allai Begh Cenglijich, e di quelli da Castel Nuovo scritta alli Nixichi.
56 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
resolve of local Christians, who refrained from openly joining the Venetians
in their attack on Podgorica.35
After his appointment as sancakbey, engi pursued pacification of
Christians in his region even more vigorously. He demonstrated that his inten-
tions were serious by not holding back from use of force when necessary. The
policing operation conducted against Niki, which had refused to provide
him with the customary gift after his appointment as sancakbey, turned into
an exceptionally bloody skirmish, even by local standards, with more than
two hundred persons on both sides killed or wounded. However, his tactics
worked: facing relentless pressure, the Christians backed down and conceded
to his demands that they provide him with a gift. Moreover, the Christians of
Niki were soon reconciled by engis mediation with the Muslim lords
from Herceg-Novi and Risan, and as a guarantee of their good faith consented
to send hostages to Herceg-Novi. In the course of a single year and with skill-
ful use of the carrot and stick strategy (where the carrot was appeals to old
family allegiances and ties), engi managed to eradicate Venetian influence
in the region under his control.36 What alarmed the Christian tribes even more
was that he started to rebuild some of the ruined forts and guard towers, and
to garrison them, all with the aim of establishing firmer control over the
land.37
The next year, 1651, engi also demonstrated the skills necessary for
survival in the Ottoman political arena. After receiving news of his deposi-
tion, Ali Pasha left for Constantinople, where by paying 20,000 silver coins
and twenty-five slaves to the Grand Vizier he not only managed to keep the
office of sancakbey of Herzegovina but was also charged with governance of
the nearby province of Montenegro.38 Most probably in order to cover these
expenses, after his return from Constantinople engi imposed heavy taxation
on Christians in his domain. Not surprisingly, the worst-hit was the com-
munity of Niki, from which (as a sort of punishment for rebellion) engi
demanded harac of 5,000 Reali in 1652 and 1653.39 In summer 1652, engi
dutifully joined the army of the Bosnian pasha, again on campaign in Dalma-
tia, leading a thousand men from his sancak, where for an entire season he
was engaged in rebuilding the fortresses of Zadvarje and Knin in Dalmatia,
destroyed by the Venetians in the previous years.40 All in all, so far the con-
duct of Ali Pasha was no different from that of any good and faithful Ottoman
lord, who followed and executed imperial orders, blockaded Venetian at-

36 Ibid, 217218.
37 Ibid, 219220.
38 Ibid, 221222.
39 Ibid, 232.
40 Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 130. See also ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 473. num. 125. (Zara,
17 Agosto 1652), attachment: Costituto di Durac Spachia Dulimenovich, 17. Agosto 1652. Zara.
tempts to open commerce (by ordering seizure of goods which they attempted
to export through Ragusa),41 kept his Christian subjects in obedience with a
firm hand and dutifully participated in military campaigns.
Sancakbey of Herzegovina and Confidente of the Republic of St. Mark
Then in 1653, a curious event took place: Ali Pasha engi made con-
tact and engaged in active correspondence with Vincenzo Bolizza, a noble
from the Venetian town of Kotor. The Bolizza (Grbii) family was well-
known in the region and its members were held in high esteem by the Ve-
netian government. In the course of the first half of the seventeenth century
three of its members were given the title of cavaliere di San Marco and two
brothers (Francesco and Vincenzo) were charged with the important task of
maintaining a courier service for the transfer of diplomatic letters between
Venice and Constantinople. The family also enjoyed great respect among the
Christians under Ottoman rule, with whom they kept up active correspond-
ence throughout the war.42 As such, the Bolizza family acted as the gateway
between the Republic of St. Mark and the wider hinterland of the bay of
Kotor. Almost all correspondence with the chieftains of the Christian tribes
and local Ottoman lords went through them. Moreover, both Vincenzo and
Francesco Bolizza were engaged in what the Venetians called a guerra
sporca and would today be labelled black ops, that is: intelligence-
gathering, organising liquidation of the enemies of the Republic in Ottoman
lands, sabotage of military facilities and similar activities. Indeed, Vincenzo
Bolizza could be called the Venetian spy-master in the region. Taken out of
context, Ali Pashas actions may seem strange, yet a closer look at the histori-
cal developments just beforehand renders them perfectly logical.
The war was entering its eighth year, and war-weariness was more
than visible among the local Ottomans. Their casualties in the first years of
the war were very heavy and numbered in the thousands of dead and captured,
including two sancakbeys, a feat of which the Venetian commander, Lunardo
Foscolo, was rather proud. Even shortly before engis decision to contact
41 One of the first decrees (dated 18 August 1650) of Ali Pasha engi as sancakbey of
Herzegovina was to renew the imperial order prohibiting commerce with the Venetian Republic,
ordering the kadis of Mostar, Nevesinje, Ljubinj, Cernica and Konjic to confiscate all Venetian
goods exported through Ragusa; see Vesna Miovi, Dubrovaka Republika u spisima namjesnika
Bosanskog ejaleta i hercegovakog sandaka [The Ragusan Republic in the decrees of the
Bosnian pashas and sancakbeys of Herzegovina] (Dubrovnik, 2008), 130.
42 In this study I have opted to use the Italian spelling of the family name as found in
contemporary documents, instead of the Slavic Bolica. For more on this notable family from
Kotor, see: Lovorka orali, Kotorski plemii iz roda Bolica kavaljeri Svetog Marka, [Kotor
nobles from the family Bolica Knights of Saint Mark], Povijesni prilozi 31 (2006): 149159;
Paolo Preto, I servizi segreti di Venezia: Spionaggio e contraspionaggio ai tempi della
Serenissima (Milan, 2010), 241242.
58 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
the Venetians, in November 1652 at the end of the campaigning season,

Alaybey Filipovi, the head of another influential Ottoman family, was cap-
tured in an insignificant skirmish by Venetian Morlacchi irregulars and im-
prisoned in Verona. News about the fate of this famous Ottoman lord quickly
spread on the frontier.43 Additionally, loss of territories in Dalmatia forced
numerous sipahi and other timar holders into exile, flooding the nearby lands
in search for shelter at the estates of their relatives and friends. At the end of
1652, the Republic welcomed the Portes invitation to send its official repre-
sentative, ambassador Giovanni Capello, to open peace talks with the Empire.
With the arrival of the Venetian ambassador, the conviction that peace was
imminent spread in the region. The ambassador entered the Empire through
Herceg-Novi, and on his voyage inland was greeted by Sancakbey engi,
through whose lands he was passing.
In such an atmosphere of hope, engi used the passage of ambassador
Capello through his lands as the occasion to establish contact with Vincenzo
Bolizza.44 Ali Pasha gave Bolizza a pure-bred Arabian horse, and Vincenzo
in turn responded with an equivalent gift. In March 1653, writing from Zadar,
Governor-General Lorenzo Dolfin informed the Senate that Vincenzo Bolizza
had contratta amicitia, et confidenza con Ali Bassa Cenghijch Sangiacco
dHercegovina.45 From that time, through the mediation of Vojvoda Petar,
the principal chieftain of the Niki tribe, engi kept friendly and most cor-
dial correspondence with Vicenzo Bolizza in Kotor and with the governor-
general in Zadar, regularly asking for supplies of sugar, candies, soap and
other commodities.46 Seen in the local perspective, his conduct was nothing
out of the ordinary. By 1653, other Ottoman beys from the frontier regions
had also established contact and maintained friendly relations with the Repub-
lics representatives. Some became Venetian informers (or, as the Venetian
sources called them, confidente47) in order to protect their estates from raids,
or to ensure better treatment in case of capture; others had even more personal
reasons, such as for example Achmet Spahia, one of the principal beys from
Solin, who provided intelligence to the Republic to further negotiations for
the ransom of his children, captured by Venetian Morlacchi.48
The true motives of Ali Pasha engi will remain unknown; however,
his attitude to the war at hand was unmistakable. During 1653 Ali Pasha
43 Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 130131.

45 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 474. num. 17. (Di Spalato, 4. Marzo 1653); see also the atta-
chment: Lettera del Sangiaco dHercegovina scritta al Cav.re Bolizza.
47 For a typology and classification of the persons in the Republics service, see: Preto, I servizi
segreti, 4150.
48 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 471. num. 12. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651); num. 101. (Zara, 20.
Aprile 1652).
engi went to Constantinople for the second time, and after the collapse of
peace talks he returned home rather disappointed. In December 1653 he wrote
to Bolizza, stating that this war has over time become outdated, and called
for the opening of trade between Kotor and its hinterland, urging Bolizza to
convince his superiors that the Republic should send him a representative
with whom all details of an agreement could be clarified. It seems that this
time, engis initiative was well received. In January 1654 the Venetian en-
voy sent from Kotor, Francesco Zifra, found engi with an entourage of
5,000 men demonstrating his power and forcing another gift of 3,000 reali
from local Christians. Although Zifra came as personal envoy of Francesco
Bolizza, not as the official representative of the Republic, his arrival repre-
sented an important step in development of the relationship between engi
and Venice.49
Ali Pasha engis talks with Zifra strayed from the topic of free trade
in the region, and combined subtle threats with requests for material gain. It
seems that the young Sultan had made no great impression on Ali Pasha
engi, who openly said to Zifra that: at the moment the Empire is ruled by
a weak Sultan who more resembles bostangi than a ruler, and that to make
peace, the Republic need only bribe the grand vizier and a few other minis-
ters; he also offered his services for this task. Additionally, Ali Pasha also
asked for expenses for his trip to Constantinople, where he claimed to have
advocated the interests of the Republic. Finally, engi complained to Zifra
about the gravity of his situation, since the pasha of Bosnia and the sancakbey
of Shkodr had for some time been pressuring him to attack the Venetian
stronghold of Perast in the bay of Kotor. So far, claimed engi, he had been
able to excuse himself with the bad weather, yet in spring he was not sure he
would be able to ignore these commands any further; thus he sent a clear mes-
sage to the Senate about what could happen if his favors were not obtained.50
The Senate advised caution and instructed Governor-General Dolfin to at-
tempt to appease engi with some moderate gift, quattro o cinque vesti di
quella qualita, che giudicasse conveniente.51
Still, in spite of all professions of love and friendship toward the Most
Serene Republic expressed in his letters so far,52 Ali Pashas actual conduct
turned out to be not that peaceful. When in March 1654 Venetian forces at-
tacked the Ottoman fortress of Knin in Dalmatia, among the 5,0006,000
strong Ottoman relief force that routed Venetian attackers was a contingent
led by Ali Pasha engi; on this occasion he even suffered a wound to the

50 Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 233; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 475. num. 106. (Zara,
9. Febrario 1653), attachment: Relatione di Franceso Zifra da Nixichi; num. 111. (Di Galea Se-
benico, 2. Marzo 1654).
51 ASVe Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 46v, Adi 18 Marzo 1654.
60 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
leg.53 Then in May, despite all previous assurances, Ali Pasha assembled a
war party and launched an attack against the Venetian port of Perast. Al-
though the attack came as a surprise to the Venetians, it was executed half-
heartedly and was largely a consequence of pressure put on Ali Pasha by
other Ottoman lords, mainly the aas from Herceg-Novi, who for years had
demanded the destruction of this nest of corsairs.54 In the end, this operation
did not much influence the relationship between engi and Venice. The Re-
publics officials continued to maintain friendly correspondence with him,
and if anything, it only brought him more esteem in their eyes.55
Unfortunately, the attack did not stop further raids by these Christian
corsairs; it could even be said to have intensified them. Over previous years, a
veritable small war had been fought between two nests of corsair, Christian
Perast and Muslim Herceg-Novi, a war that brought raids and destruction be-
yond the Bay of Kotor and from which the Republic of Ragusa, in fact the
neutral party in this war, suffered greatly. Venetian irregulars, hajduks from
Makaraska and Kotor Bay, considered Ragusa, a tributary state of the Otto-
man Empire, as a legitimate target, and also used its territory to launch attacks
on the Ottoman lands in Herzegovina. The Ottomans in turn accused Ra-
gusans of complicity with the hajduks in allowing them free use of the Repub-
lics territory. When Ali Pasha was again in Constantinople in the winter of
16541655, defending himself against the accusations of overtaxation which
had caused his deposition and seeking reappointment as sancakbey with
grandiose promises to recapture Klis if given command in Herzegovina, at
home the situation deteriorated.56
During the spring of 1655, Venetian hajduks conducted a series of dar-
ing raids which resulted in open conflict between the aas of Herceg-Novi
and the Republic of Ragusa.57 Frustrated by Ragusan passivity in preventing
these raids, some of the Ottoman lords from Herceg-Novi turned to highway
53 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 475. num. 114. (Zara, 29. Marzo 1654).
54 Historiographical views on the Ottoman attack on Perast in 1654 differ greatly. On the one
side, some, such as Serbian historian Radovan Samardi, see the year 1654 as crucial in the
history of Kotor Bay. According to Samardi, in 1654 a large-scale migration of Christian
outlaws from Herzegovina, the so-called hajduks, took place to the Bay of Kotor, and the attack
represented a major Ottoman military operation conducted with the aim of pacifying the hajduks.
On the other side, Gligor Stanojevi claims that no migration took place around 1654 and
considers this a minor episode, one of many similar that took place during this war. This defence
of Perast, over the centuries, became more famous than its actual importance. For more, see:
Samardi, Istorija, 377389; Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 234235.
55 In February 1655, engi asked the Venetian representatives in Kotor for some fancy gifts he
owed to the new Bosnian pasha; the Senate, to keep him well-disposed toward the interests of the
Republic, approved this request; see Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 237238; ASVe Senato
Rettori, R-28, f. 329r, Adi 27. Febraro 1654. mv.
56 Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 238; ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 477. num. 40. (Zara,
li 3. Giugno, 1655).
57 Samardi, Istorija, 379380.
robbery, and under the pretext of taxation plundered merchant caravans from
Sarajevo heading for Ragusa, practically closing Ragusan trade. Additionally,
in February 1656, several aas from Herceg-Novi officially accused Ragusans
at the Bosnian pashas court of complicity in the Christian attacks on their
lands, demanding high financial recompense for the damage to their estates.58
However, indiscriminate robbery of the caravans heading for Ragusa
backfired, provoking the anger of the influential merchant community of
Sarajevo, which although initially well disposed toward the Herceg-Novi
aas, were by June 1655 demanding their heads. Moreover, such robbery also
supplied the Ragusans, who had started an active diplomatic campaign, with
excellent arguments to accuse the lords of Herceg-Novi of being no more than
brigands, both in Sarajevo and at the Porte. It did not take long for Ragusan
envoys at the Porte with excuses that the Republic was afraid of sending
harac to the sultan because of these outlaws, and with appropriate distribution
of gifts to obtain imperial commands ordering the return of stolen Ragusan
goods and the arrest of the offenders. From April 1655 to July 1656, several
such imperial commands were issued,59 with either the sancakbey of Herze-
govina (at that time Ali Pasha engi once more) or the pasha of Bosnia
charged with their execution.60 This entire affair was, as far as Ali Pasha was
concerned, rather inconvenient. Some of the accused Herceg-Novi notables
were his relatives, and he did all he could to protect them and reconcile them
with the Bosnian beylerbey. On the other hand, the activity of the Ragusan
envoys at the Porte brought unwanted central government attention to his do-
main, while engi was treading on dangerous grounds by protecting offi-
cially declared outlaws.
When in June 1656 another large caravan was taxed on its way to
Ragusa for no less than 6,000 reali, the Ragusan government ordered a levy
of 800 men to deal with the outlaws responsible; pressed from all sides, the
Bosnian pasha was finally forced to make a move.61 In August 1656 the pasha
unwillingly begun his slow progress from Livno to Herceg-Novi. This also
provoked a reaction from the Venetian side, which carefully monitored all
Ottoman preparations. The Venetian command was alarmed by the size of the
pashas entourage and above all by rumours that the Ragusans had offered
him as many guns as were needed for the attack on Herceg-Novi. The danger
that the pasha could use the forces at his disposal to attack Venetian Kotor,
58 Ibid, 381.
59 Vesna Miovi, Dubrovaka Republica u spisima osmanskih sultana [The Republic of Ragusa
in the acts of the Ottoman sultans] (Dubrovnik, 2005), 297.
60 For more on the role of the Bosnian pasha and the sancakbey of Herzegovina in Ragusan
diplomacy, see Vesna Miovi, Beylerbey of Bosnia and Sancakbey of Herzegovina in the Di-
plomacy of the Dubrovnik Republic, Dubrovnik Annals 9 (2005): 3769.
61 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 14. (Sebenico, 19 Giugno 1656).
62 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
instead of Herceg-Novi, moved the Venetian governor-general to gather his

forces and head for Kotor.62
However, the entire affair was quickly over: the Bosnian pasha de-
stroyed two or three towers belonging to the most incriminated outlaws and
reconciled with the rest through the mediation of engi, and then left.
Meanwhile Ali Pasha, aiming to prevent similar dangers in future, initiated
negotiations with the Republics representatives in Kotor for a local cease-
fire, with the goal of suspending the raids and forays in the area. In August,
Vincenzo Bolizza and Ali Pasha engi met in person in the presence of a
dozen Ottoman notables, exchanged gifts and concluded the terms of a cease-
fire based on the agreement that no offensive actions would be undertaken
unless explicitly ordered by the ruling powers; these terms were to be pre-
sented to the pasha of Bosnia and to the Senate. According to the report com-
piled by Bolizza, Ali Pasha openly stated in the presence of other Ottoman
lords che se ben vi sia guerra tra communi Prencipi, si potrebbe pratticare tra
confinanti buona intelligenza, quiete e divertimento delle Hostilita per terra, et
per acqua con deviamento de Legni Corsari benefittio de gluni, et de
glaltri sudditi.63
In spite of all the polite rhetoric and professed good intentions, the
main motive of both sides in this peace initiative remained to pursue their
own interest. Ali Pasha aimed to deflect unwanted central government atten-
tion from his domain, while the Ottoman lords needed a free hand to pacify
the Christians of Montenegro, who at that point had refused to pay tribute for
years.64 On the other hand, Governor-General Antonio Bernardo aimed by
this action to secure Kotor from possible Ottoman attack, so that he could
concentrate his forces on the defence of Dalmatia. Establishing some form of
peace in the Bay of Kotor would have also brought another important benefit:
the opening of trade with the Ottoman hinterland, which would have brought
badly needed grain and food supplies to the Venetian possessions in the Adri-
atic (especially important that year because an outbreak of plague in southern
Italy had temporarily closed this traditional grain market).65 Additionally,
while these negotiations were going on, Bernardo at the same time maintained
an active correspondence with the chieftains of Niki attempting to organise
a sudden takeover of Herceg-Novi. Thus it should come as no surprise, that in
spite of the best intentions of all interested parties, this cease-fire was short-
62 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 36. (Zara, 23. Agosto 1656).
63 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 37. (Dalla Galera nel Porto di S.a Croce di Ragusi,
31. Agosto 1656), especially the attachments: letter of Vincenzo Boliza to Governor-General
Bernardo and his report written immediately upon his return to Kotor; num. 41. (Cattaro, 15.
Settembre 1656).
64 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 40. (Cattaro, 11. Settembre 1656).
65 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 39. (Cattaro, 4. Settembre 1656). The plague in
Puglia continued until the end of the year, preventing the import of grain from that market; see
num. 58. (Trau, 30. Ottobre 1656).
lived. Especially so since forces beyond the control of local parties had been
put in motion, and the attention of the Ottoman government was already fo-
cused on these peripheral provinces.
The Siege of Kotor in 1657
When in June 1656 the Venetian fleet crushed the Ottoman navy in the
engagement known as the Third Battle of the Dardanelles, it precipitated
the fall of the government and gave impetus to the rise of a new and energetic
grand vizier, Kprl Mehmed Pasha. Soon very disturbing news started to
reach Dalmatia that the new government wanted to avenge this defeat on sea
by a victory on land, and that Dalmatia had been chosen as target for a major
military campaign for the following year.66 According to news reaching Ven-
ice, the Ottoman plans were most disturbing. For the campaign of 1657, the
plan was to attack simultaneously several places along the coast: Zadar,
ibenik or Split in Dalmatia, and Kotor to the south. Parallel to the extensive
military and logistical preparations, the Ottoman government also changed
key commanders on these frontiers. Seydi Ahmed Pasha was appointed as
Bosnian beylerbey with extraordinary powers, an experienced warrior but out
of favour with the new regime in Constantinople.67 Ali Pasha engi man-
aged to keep the post of sancakbey of Herzegovina, in spite of Ragusan at-
tempts to arrange his arrest because of his protection of the Herceg-Novi
aas.68 However his kinsman Jusufbegovi, sancakbey of Shkodr, was not so
lucky. Unlike engi, who had proved rather skilful in the political intrigues
of the Empire and managed to avoid deposition more than once, Jusufbegovi
was deposed in spite of a gift of 3,000 scudi sent to Constantinople. The Porte
66 The news arriving in Dalmatia was spectacular. First, in October 1656, rumours had it that for
the next campaign the sultan was planning to send the grand vizier personally, and that the Tatar
khan had offered 120,000 soldiers for the occasion in exchange for 300,000 ducats; see ASVe
Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 48. (Spalato, 6. Ottobre 1656). Soon, even more alarming
rumours were heard, that the young sultan had expressed the wish to personally lead an army
against Dalmatia next year; yet he was dissuaded by the new grand vizier; see num. 54. (Trau, 16.
Ottobre 1656).
67 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 77. (Sebenico, 22. Genaro 1656 mv.); Samardi,
Istorija, 382383. On his person, see Anton von Gvay, Versuch eines chronologischen Ver-
zeichnisses der trkischen Statthalter von Ofen (Vienna, 1841), 3233; Sudr, A hdoltsgi
pask, 893895.
68 Ragusan envoys at the Porte managed to obtain an imperial order against Ali Pasha engi,
because of the protection he had given to the beys of Herceg-Novi. In December two kapicis
arrived in Herzegovina to arrest him and bring him to Constantinople. However, engi managed
to dodge this arrest by taking shelter before their arrival, and the kapicis were not able to find
him. Thus, only his son Kadri Bey was arrested and entrusted to the custody of the Bosnian
pasha. In the end, this episode passed without any consequences for Ali Pasha engi, who
remained firmly in position; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 67. (Sebenico, 9.
Decembre 1656).
64 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
appointed of its own choice as sancakbey of Shkodr: Mehmed Pasha Varlac

(Varlaz in the Venetian sources), a former Janissary aa, and charged him
with the attack on Kotor.69
However, Jusufbegovi was not ready to acknowledge deposition.
Aiming to meet the new sancakbey by force of arms, he started to assemble
loyal followers and even called upon his Christian subjects to join him. Fol-
lowing the well known maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend,
Jusufbegovi turned to the Venetians. In January his lieutenant and one of his
kinsmen arrived personally in Kotor to ask for the Republics support in this
affair.70 According to Venetian sources, Jusufbegovi openly told the courier
who brought him the imperial command ordering him to cede the post and
depart to Constantinople, that he would do neither; what is more, that he was
ready to use his scimitar against anyone who sought to depose him.71 Ve-
netians were quick to jump on this opportunity and offered Jusufbegovi,
whom they had tried to poison only three years earlier,72 protection and asy-
lum in Kotor. The Republic even went as far as to put a price on the heads of
both the new sancakbey Varlac and his main supporter in the region, Cafer
Aa, a renegade previously known as Conte Voin Tujevi.73 By April 1657,
Jusufbegovi had assembled several thousand men and was heading to meet
the new sancakbey in open field. Near the town of Alessio in Albania, their
vanguards met in a short skirmish resulting in dozens of dead.74
In order to put an end to this conflict, the new Bosnian beylerbey,
whose trust Ali Pasha quickly won over,75 asked engi to mediate and ar-
69 Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 239. In Turkish sources, he is referred to under the name
Hisim Mehmed Pasha. For this reference, as well as for insightful comments on the draft of this
paper, I am very grateful to Balzs Sudr.
70 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 72. (Sebenico, 4. Genaro 1656 mv.).
71 [] ad ogni modo le [Jusufbegovi] sono arrivati ordini espressi del Gran Sig.re, spediti con
un Spahi, e perch debba ceder la carica, et venirsene alla Porta. Il Giusuf Begovich con tutto ci
ha ricusato interpidamente di obedire, risponendo ne voler ceder la carica, ne volersi portare
Costantinopoli, anzi che haverebbe impiegata coraggiosamente la sua Scimitara molto ben ag-
guzzata contro chi voleva deponerlo dal Sanzaccato, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num.
91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657).
72 Preto, I servizi segreti, 310.
73 The Republic offered an award of 100 gold coins for the head of the renegade Cafer Aa, and
200 gold coins to whoever killed the new sancakbey, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num.
97. (Zara, 8. Maggio 1657). The Venetians held the renegade Voin to be one of the main initiators
of the Ottoman attack, crediting him with convincing the Porte to start this campaign. For more
on his person, see: Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 215, 243, 245249, 252; Samardi,
Istorija, 387.
74 risponendo ne voler ceder la carica, ne volersi portare Costantinopoli, anzi che havereb-
be impiegata coraggiosamente la sua Scimitara molto ben agguzzata contro chi voleva deponerlo
dal Sanzaccato, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657).
75 Already in February, engi headed for Sarajevo where the new beylerbey was expected, with
the aim of personally meeting him; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 480. num. 86. (Zara,
undated letter).
range some form of reconciliation between the two.76 engi was successful
and soon they agreed to a cease-fire. Yet Governor-General Antonio Bernardo
was not ready to let this opportunity slip away so easily. He instructed Bolizza
to contact his friend Ali Pasha, who in Bernardos estimate was huomo
venalissimo, che per danari senza alcun riguardo e solito di prevaricare facil-
mente contro il servitio, e comandamenti Regij and attempt to convince him
to act as a disruptive element and deepen the conflict. Additionally, Bernardo
also instructed Bolizza to hint to engi about the possibility of assigning a
desirable stipend if he were ready to become a confidente of the Republic.77 It
seems though that the Venetian offer came too late. By the beginning of May,
Jusufbegovi gave in to pressure and accepted his deposition.78 However, as
it turned out the conflict was only temporarily muted, not resolved. Both
Jusufbegovi and Ali Pasha, whose estates Varlac had plundered because of
his support given to his relative, continued to nurture ill feeling toward the
new sancakbey and only awaited the right opportunity to get rid of him.
Alarmed by the extensive Ottoman preparations and the multitude of
clear signs that Kotor was to be the target of Ottoman attack in the summer,
Bernardo personally left for Kotor and corresponded with Christian chieftains
in its hinterland. Bernardo used all of his skill and influence in an attempt to
sway them to openly side with the Republic in the coming fight: from ex-
pressing readiness to attack Herceg-Novi, which the Christians of Herzegov-
ina had sought to capture from the beginning of the war, to flattery and offer-
ing stipends. Bernardo even offered an award of 2,000 gold coins to the tribe
willing to capture and bring to Kotor an Ottoman artillery train, or 1,000 gold
coins for its destruction. Yet the results were far from satisfactory: the Mon-
tenegrin clans joined the ranks of the Ottoman army, the Christians of Herze-
govina mainly remained passive, while the Christians of northern Albania (the
Klimenti, Kui and Piperi), in spite of their promises of support, waited for
news of the outcome of the struggle under the walls of Kotor.79
Although the Republic failed to initiate rebellion among the Christians
in Kotors hinterland, Bernardos diplomatic efforts yielded unexpected fruits,
compensating for this failure: the Republic managed to enlist Ali Pasha
engi to its cause. The prospect of being free of the new threat in his do-
main, Sancakbey Varlac and his supporters, and the promises of support and
material gain finally lured engi to the Venetian side. Yet Ali Pashas arrival
76 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 91. (Zara, 7. Aprile 1657).
78 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 97. (Zara, 8. Maggio 1657), attachment: lettera
scritta dall Albanese liberato dell Ecc.mo s.re Antonio Bernardo Prov.re Gnal spedito da sua
Ecc.za per avvelenare il Sanzacco di Scuttari, e Voin nominato Zafer Aga rinegato.
79 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno 1657); Stanojevi, Jugo-
slovenske zemlje, 247248. See also the correspondence between Governor-General Bernardo
and the Christian chieftains, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno
1657), attachments numerated 110.
66 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
in Kotor, at the invitation of Vincenzo Bolizza, to personally confer with the

Governor-General and to establish una vera amicitia, was prevented by a
sequence of events set off by Bernardos departure from Zadar.80
The Governor-Generals arrival in Kotor prompted the Bosnian pasha,
who by June had already gathered significant forces in Livno, to attempt to
capture Split by a daring surprise attack. Not waiting for his forces to assem-
ble in full, and leaving heavy siege artillery behind, the pasha rushed toward
Split, arriving in front of the city gates on 13th June 1657. However, his gam-
ble did not play out. It did not take long for the Venetians to rush reinforce-
ments to the threatened town through its unblockaded port. When on 20th June
Governor-General Bernardo arrived in person at the head of a naval squadron,
to the sounds of drums and trumpets, and flying a multitude of unfurled ban-
ners, all aimed at creating the impression that he was leading a much larger
force than was actually the case, Ottoman morale broke down; the pasha
judged that the opportunity was lost and decided to withdraw.81 Having lost
500 men without achieving anything, the pasha attempted to find at least
some compensation in plundering the large nearby village of Bosiljina.
Unfortunately for him, the attack on this populous and well-fortified
village turned into one of the most embarrassing Ottoman operations in this
theatre of war. The inhabitants put up stiff resistance to buy time for the
women and children to be evacuated by sea, causing heavy and completely
unnecessary casualties to the Ottoman force. Meeting with such unexpected
opposition, the pasha in the end even ordered light artillery brought up to
speed the conquest. Having finally subdued the village, the Ottoman army
retreated to Livno, devastating the countryside of the community of Makarska
along the way. The morale of the Ottoman force was very low and the pashas
reputation suffered greatly. In spite of heavy casualties Venetian sources
mention the improbable figure of almost 1,000 men, most of them frontier
sipahis there was only some meagre plunder to show for the entire oper-
ation.82 This otherwise insignificant military operation was to have important
consequences. After this failure, not wishing to risk any new loss of reputa-
80 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 101. (Budua, 9. Giugno 1657), attachments nume-
rated 1113.
81 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 103. (Di Galera sotto Budua la notte di 16 venen-
do li 17 Giugno 1657); num. 104. (Spalato, 20. Giugno 1657). On the attack on Split, see also:
Grga Novak, Povijest Splita [History of Split], vol. 2 (Split, 1961), 10931106.
82 Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 137; Jaov, Le guerre Veneto-Turche, 118121; ASVe Senato, Di-
spacci, PTM b. 481. num. 105. (Zara, 22. Giugno 1657). For Bernardos reports on the attack on
Bosiljina, see ibid, num. 106. (Spalato, 1. Luglio 1657). The attack on the village of Bosiljina also
became one of the best remembered events of this war, with the participation of women in the
villages defence assuring the fame of the event. The motif of the heroic women of Bosiljina who
fought against the Turks was recorded by Venetian contemporary chronicles, and even more
importantly it entered epic folk songs and poetry; thus its memory was kept alive for a long time;
see: Andrija Kai Mioi, Razgovori ugodni naroda slovinskog [Pleasant talks of the Slavic
people] (Zagreb, 1862), 288290; Difnik, Povijest, 243247.
tion and the potential wraith of the Porte, the Bosnian pasha remained pas-
sively in Livno for the duration of the entire 1657 campaign, securing his alibi
by conducting several smaller raids.83
In the meantime Sancakbey Varlac, appointed as commander in chief
of the attack against Kotor in 1657 and with Ali Pasha engi under his
command, gathered his troops and on 30th July arrived in Kotor Bay. Ali
Pasha dutifully answered the call to arms, yet as it turned out he was follow-
ing a different agenda than his superior. Unlike the sancakbey of Shkodr,
who arrived leading 5,000 men, Ali Pasha brought barely 1,000 men from the
sancak of Herzegovina, half of whom were Christians. Before leaving Niki,
Ali Pasha sent a letter to Governor-General Bernardo justifying his actions as
a necessity, done under pressure, since his enemies had made accusations at
the Porte against him and Jusufbegovi that they were principally to blame for
Kotor not being captured. engi also notified the governor-general that he
and his men would form a separate camp, and asked to be treated as friends.84
Bernardo showed understanding for Ali Pashas situation. After in-
forming the Senate of his firm belief in engis good intentions toward the
Republic, and expressing high hopes of the benefits that could come out of
this affair, he sent a trusted agent to Ali Pasha with a gift of 100 gold coins.
Through this courier Bernardo first excused himself for sending such a small
amount (pleading the insecurity of the roads at the time) and, secondly, com-
municated to engi his proposed future course of action. The governor-
general approved of Ali Pashas plan to camp separately from the troops of
Sancakbey Varlac, and urged him to attempt to position the latters forces so
they could be most exposed to the fire of Venetian guns, assuring him that he
and his men would be preserved. As for engi, Bernardo asked him to at-
tempt to ensure that guns would not be firing directly at the city wall, or that
they would be loaded with insufficient gunpowder so that the cannon balls
83 The pashas use of artillery in attacking a simple village, and the heavy casualties suffered in
the attack, were looked upon with scorn by the Venetians. In his letter to Ali Pasha engi, Go-
vernor-General Bernardo did not miss the opportunity to lament the pashas military prowess:
Il vostro Basso di Bossina ha perso pi di mille de voi combatenti sotto una nostra villa chiamata
marino overo Bosciglina et si siamo maravigliati che lui in persona sia stato con tanto pezzi di
canone contro una villa per che li veri guerrieri non vano sotto le Ville con canoni se non sotto la
Citt et cosi non doverebbe tratar lhonor del Gran s.re et perder tanta gente per una sol villa di
dieci case se bene pi ha abbruggiato alcuna Capane havendo Noi in fazza sua caduto fori dalla
d.(et)ta villa tutto il popolo di donne et putti et lasciato solamente pochi homeni per difender sino
lultimo sangue come valorosamente hanno fatto, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num.
108. (Cattaro, 12. Luglio 1657), attachment: Lettera scritta dall Ecc.mo S.re P.re Gen.le Bernar-
do al Sang.co Cengich.
84 Ali Pasha engi wrote to Bernardo upon his departure for Kotor: giuro a V.E., che il
Ser.(enissi)mo Prencipe, et lei conoscerebbero qual buon amico le sia il Cenghich, et io non ven-
go levato dal comando di Herzegovina ma per non poter far di meno, mi bisogna capitar contro
Cattaro, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 112. (Cattaro, 19. Luglio 1657), attachment:
Tradutione della lettera scritta in serviano allIll.(ustrissi)mo et Ecc(ellentissi).mo sig.(no)re
Antonio Bernardo Prov.(vedito)re G(enera)l in Dalmatia et Albania Dal s.(igno)re Alli Bassa
Cenghich di Herzegovina. ricevuta sotto li 17 lug.(li)o 1657.
68 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
would lose much of their impetus before hitting the wall. If Sancakbey Varlac
put his own gunners in charge of the artillery, Bernardo suggested that engi
should eliminate them, either in the confusion of battle or in an ambush. In
any case, the Governor-General urged Ali Pasha to sabotage the Ottoman ar-
tillery by any means possible, questo e il tempo opportuno di farci conoscere
il vostro affetto, et di raguagliare del tutto destintamnete con ogni solecitudine
diligenza, he wrote at the end of his letter.85
And indeed once the attack had begun, almost everything went accord-
ing to the script devised by Bernardo, who could report to the Senate with
some satisfaction that whether by accident or due to the actions of engi,
the shots fired did no damage at all, either missing the walls completely and
falling into town, or having too little impact to cause any damage.86 The
Christians in Ali Pashas retinue served as couriers between him and the Gov-
ernor-General in the town, bringing news of planned Ottoman attacks and
reports on the state of morale in the Ottoman camp.87 Misfortunes continu-
ously befell the Ottomans for the entire duration of the siege. Already by 21st
August, only one heavy siege gun and four smaller pieces were operational,
all the rest having either been hit by Venetian counter-fire88 or suffered acci-
dents and burst (for which engi took credit).89 Additionally, fifteen sacks
of gunpowder mysteriously caught fire, an incident for which engi also
claimed credit, assuring the Governor-General that soon all the cannon would
be neutralised.90 Although engi failed to fulfill this promise, since Sancak-
bey Varlac increased guards around the artillery, nevertheless Ali Pasha had
fully demonstrated his worth. When the Senate warned Bernardo that the
Turks cannot be trusted, since they are infidel by nature, he responded by
stating that the siege had already lasted for more than twenty days and that to
the amazement of all, no breach had yet been made in the walls, attributing
this to the actions of engi. What is more, added Bernardo, it was engi
85 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 112. (Cattaro, 19. Luglio 1657), and attachment:
Risposta alla sop.ta lett.ra dellEcc.mo Sig.re Prov.or Gnal Bernardo al Cenghich Bassa di Her-
zegovina espedita sotto li 18 luglio 1657 col confidente espresso.
86 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 116. (Sebenico, 6. Agosto 1657); num. 118. Zara
(14. Agosto 1657).
87 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 132. (Cattaro, 4. Ottobre 1657).
88 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 121. (Liesena, 21. Agosto 1657), and the
attachments to the letter.
89 In his letters to Governor-General Bernardo, Ali Pasha engi took credit for disabling three
Ottoman cannons; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 125. (Di Galera dalle Bocche
di Cattaro, 28. Agosto 1657), attachment: Lettera di Cav.re Vi.o Bolizza a Ecc.mo S.re Antonio
Bernardo P.re Gnal.
90 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 126. (Cattaro, 29. Agosto 1657), attachment: letter
of Ali Pasha engi to Vincenzo Bolizza dated 28th August 1657.
who had put his trust in him, since in his letters he had openly impegnandosi
col suo proprio sigillo di trattar fatti di fellonia pregiuditio del suo Re.91
As the weeks passed, morale dwindled in the Ottoman camp, situated
in hostile territory and surrounded by Christian tribes. Sancakbey Varlacs
attempts to bring up fresh reinforcements from Albania also failed, his couri-
ers being captured by local Christians and handed over to the Venetians. Var-
lac, growing more and more desperate, contented himself with devastating the
countryside, and put all his trust in the arrival of the Bosnian pasha.92 How-
ever, Seydi Ahmed Pasha was following his own agenda. His progress from
Livno to the Bay of Kotor was extremely slow; the pasha spent significant
time extorting money from the regions his army was passing through. When
the pasha finally arrived at Herceg-Novi on 24th September (after thoughtfully
pillaging most of the Ragusan Republics eastern parts) it became clear that
he had no intention at all of risking another siege.93 At the council of war held
in the Ottoman camp, the Bosnian pasha allowed himself to be persuaded by
Ali Pasha engi, Jusufbegovi and their supporters that the attack held no
prospect of success.94 So it was that after more than two months, on 4th Octo-
ber, the Ottoman army started its retreat without even once attempting to
storm the towns walls.95
Under such circumstances, when one of the principal commanders and
a significant part of the aas were openly hostile to the commander-in-chief,
and with the Bosnian pasha more concerned with the political implications of
a defeat and with filling his own purse, one could say that the attack was
doomed to failure before it even started. Ali Pasha engi had two simple
goals. First, by sabotaging the attack, to cause dissatisfaction at the Porte with
the new sancakbey and thus bring about his deposition; second, by demon-
strating his usefulness to the Republic of St. Mark, to further his negotiations
for a yearly stipend. After this failed attack, the star of the new sancakbey of
Shkodr faded. Over the next two years his support at the Porte waned, until
finally in February 1660 Jusufbegovi again managed to take control of the
sancak of Skhodr.96 The other goal, the Venetian stipend, remained out of
Ali Pashas reach despite the fact that he had more than fulfilled the Gover-
nor-Generals expectations. In the middle of the siege, aware of his value to
the Venetian side, engi asked for a gift of 1,000 gold coins and the Senates
91 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 123. (Liesena, 24. Agosto 1657).
92 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 127. (Cattaro, 11. Settembre 1657).
93 Samardi, Istorija, 388.
94 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 131. (Dalla Galera dal stretto delle Catene in
Canal di Cattaro, 30. Settembre 1657), and the attachments to the letter.
95 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 132. (Cattaro, 4. Ottobre 1657).
96 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 486. num. 284. (Zara, 28. Febrraio 1659. mv.).
70 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
assent to his yearly stipend;97 yet once the siege was over, his negotiating
position weakened considerably. The chronic shortage of cash experienced by
the Venetian side,98 combined with the political upheaval caused by the failed
siege of Kotor, prevented final approval of his case. Negotiations concerning
his stipend dragged out over the following years, the final outcome being that
the issue was never satisfactorily resolved.
Ali Pasha and the Republic in the Years after the Siege of Kotor (16581664)
Never again did Ali Pasha take such active steps in support of the Re-
public in wartime. Immediately after the end of the siege, mutual accusations
erupted among the Ottoman commanders. On one side were the Bosnian
Pasha Seydi Ahmed, engi and Jusufbegovi; while on the other was San-
cakbey Varlac, who blamed all of them for the failure of the attack.99 In the
following months, one by one, the main actors of this peculiar event left the
scene. The first to disappear from the historical stage was Varlacs main sup-
porter in the region, the renegade Voin or Cafer Aa: he was killed by the son
of Vojvoda Ilijco, leader of the Albanian Christian tribes, who brought his
head to Kotor and collected the bounty set by the Venetians for his death.100
The rebellious Jusufbegovi was called to Edirne in February 1658. Rumours
reaching Venetians concerning his fate, that he was to be either decapitated or
reinstated, proved false.101 Instead Jusufbegovi was appointed sancakbey not
of Shkodr, where his family power base was located, but of the nearby san-
cak of Ohrid.102 Seydi Ahmed Pasha entered popular memory as one of the
most corrupt and autocratic of the Bosnian pashas, whose rule was marked by
extortions, lawlessness and arbitrariness such as was rarely ever seen again.
He remained at the head of the Bosnian eyalet until March 1659, when he
finally left the region (to the great relief of both Muslims and Christians) and
went north to take over the more prestigious office of pasha of Buda.103
97 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 481. num. 123. (Liesena, 24. Agosto 1657), attachment: letter
of Ali Pasha engi to Governor-General Bernardo dated 23. August 1657.
98 In a period of more than six months (August 1657 January 1658) only 20,000 ducats arrived
in Dalmatia; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 154. (Spalato, 14. Gennaro 1657
mv.).
99 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 136. (Cattaro, 4. Novembre 1657).
100 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 161. (Zara, 21. Febraro 1657. mv.), attachment:
Lettera di Cav.re Bolizza et di altri, che avvisano la morte data Voino rinegato.
101 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num. 163. (Zara, 10. Marzo 1658); num. 167. (Zara,
19. Marzo 1658).
103 For the assesment of Seyvid Ahmeds rule in Bosnia, see Radovan Samardi, Veliki vek
Dubrovnika [Ragusas great century] (Belgrade, 1983), 147170.
As for Ali Pasha engi, the accusations that he was a traitor and that
the Latins had bought him followed him till the end of his life, resulting in his
absence from the region for more than four years. In February 1658 news ar-
rived in Zadar of changes in the sancak of Herzegovina. This time engi
could not avoid deposition and in April the new sancakbey was appointed.104
Nevertheless, Ali Pasha engi did not fall from grace: he was granted the
105
title of pasha of Eger and was commanded to join the pasha of Budas
troops on campaign against Prince Gyrgy Rkczi II of Transylvania, who
by refusing to abdicate had provoked an Ottoman punitive expedition against
his principality.106 For months Ali Pasha engi cut all communication with
the Venetians, and only sporadic news of his fortunes in Transylvania came
south, picked up by the network of the Republics informers and confidential
agents in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Ragusa.
In August 1658, a messenger from the north arrived at Ali Pashas
home in Herzegovina bringing the first news of Rkczis victory at Plls
(Romanian Puli), close to Lippa (Rom. Lipova). According to the news
brought by this courier, in the Transylvanian princes victory over the force
led by the pasha of Buda in July 1658, Ali Pashas oldest son Kadri Bey was
killed, his brother captured by the Hungarians and Ali Pasha himself heavily
wounded.107 The news about his brother and son proved to be false, while it
seems that Ali Pashas good conduct during the battle made an impression
upon his superiors. In the following months Ali Pashas star was on the rise:
he was first appointed captain of Yanova (Hung. Jen/Rom. Ineu),108 and in
September 1658, beylerbey of Temesvr (Rom. Timioara).109
In the meantime, news concerning Ottoman preparations for the 1659
campaign began to reach Dalmatia. After quelling a rebellion in Asia, the
Empire was finally free to turn its attention to this front. For 1659, the Porte
planned a repeat of events from 1657, yet this time with the grand vizier lead-
ing the attack on Zadar and Sancakbey Varlac, supported by no fewer than
104 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 482. num. 157. (Zara, 14. Febraro 1657 mv.); b. 483. num.
176. (Zara, 25. Aprile 1658).
105
In his letter to Nikola Zrinski (Mikls Zrnyi), dated 24th May 1662, Ali Pasha (at that time
pasha of Kanizsa) gives the list of his previous positions, and claims that before his posts in Te-
mesvr and Yanova, he also held the title of pasha of Eger; see Augustin Theiner, ed., Vetera
Monumenta Slavorum Meridionalium historiam illustrantia maximam partem nondum edita ex
tabulariis Vaticanis deprompta et collecta, vol. 2, A Clemente VII. usque ad Pium VII. (1524
1800) cum additamentis saec. XIII. et XIV (Zagreb, 1875), 164. I am grateful to Balzs Sudr for
calling my attention to this source.
106 Pter, The Golden Age, 146147.
107 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 483. num. 205. (Spalato, 11. Agosto 1658).
108 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 484. num. 216. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1658).
109 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 484. num. 231. (Curzola, 6. Febraro 1658. mv.); Sudr, A
hdoltsgi pask, 897. See also Joseph Hammer, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, vol. 6
(Pest, 1830), 3536.
72 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
twelve sancakbeys of Rumelia, charged with the attack on Kotor.110 In the

midst of this gloomy news, in April 1659 Governor-General Antonio Ber-
nardo received a letter from Ali Pasha. Characteristically, engi proposed
using his newly acquired influence and contacts (claiming that the new Pasha
of Bosnia, Melek Ahmed Pasha, was his sworn brother) to divert all Otto-
man forces to the north, if the Republic was ready to send him 1012,000
silver reali. In this letter, Ali Pasha warned the governor-general: Consider-
ate, come possa esser meglio per voi, se volete, che questo anno lessercito
contro di voi non venga; mandatomi intiero un miglaro e mezzo de cecchini,
per dar alli Serathia.111 engi also sent his son Kadri Bey back to Herze-
govina, who in his name requested from Bernardo several specific gifts
(mainly luxury goods such as velvet, or furniture of Italian manufacture) and
a token of recognition of friendship towards his father, who was such a good
friend and did everything in the interests of the Republic.112
Such grandiose offers of great favours, combined with requests for
gifts, were typical for Ali Pasha and did not depart much from his previous
offers from 1648 or 1657; yet this time they came from a beylerbey, and his
high position demanded that they not be dismissed lightly. The campaigning
season in Dalmatia passed rather uneventfully even without any intervention
from engi, yet the Republic deemed it wise to maintain good relations with
this Ottoman lord. Thus by November 1659 Governor-General Bernardo had
gathered all the items from the list of gifts provided by engis son, and after
the Senate had given its blessing, sent them via Vincenzo Bolizza to Ali Pa-
shas home in Herzegovina in December 1659.113
In the following years, contacts between engi and the Venetian gov-
ernors in Dalmatia became rare and infrequent. In March 1660, Antonio Ber-
nardo, who dedicated much of his energies to nurturing warm relations with
Ottoman lords in the hinterlands and Christian chieftains, was replaced by
Andrea Corner, who did not follow such a policy. Moreover, once appointed
pasha of Temesvr, engi entered the higher spheres of Ottoman political
life and his relationship with Republic of Venice also changed. Events in the
south became of secondary importance; he was now playing a bigger game.
engis activities in the turbulent years between 1659 and 1662 are mainly
obscure: it seems that he remained pasha of Temesvr till early 1660,114 was
110 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 18. Aprile 1659).
111 ASVe Senato, Dispacco, PTM 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 18. Aprile 1659), attachment: Letter
of Ali Pasha engi to Governor-General Antonio Bernardo.
112 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 485. num. 248. (Spalato, 18. Aprile 1659), attachment:
Letter of Kadri Bey to Governor-General Antonio Bernardo, received in Kotor on 28th April
1659.
113 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 16. Novembre 1659); ASVe Sena-
to, Rettori, R-34, f. 309v310r (Adi 5 Decembre 1659).
114 The last confirmed mention of him as beylerbey of Temesvr is the letter to him from Gbor
Haller, captain of Vrad (Rom. Oradea) from late September 1659, Magyar Orszgos Levltr
later appointed to a province in Asia, but was soon recalled to Europe due to
increased hostilities along the Ottoman-Habsburg border.115
More regular contacts with the Republics representatives were ree-
stablished only during the spring of 1662, when engi arrived in Sarajevo in
the role of serdar, entrusted with the command of this southern battlefield.
Though Ali Pasha was charged by the Porte with conducting attacks against
Venetian possessions in the Adriatic (most probably Split),116 it soon became
clear that he was not willing to repeat the mistake of many of his predecessors
and risk his luck against fortified Venetian strongholds. Instead engi chose
the community of Makarska as the target of his attack.117 From his point of
view, this region represented a perfect choice. Not only were its defences very
weak compared to other Dalmatian towns, but it was also one of the commu-
nities that at the start of the war had risen in rebellion against Ottoman rule
and defected to the Venetian side. Moreover, for the entire duration of the
war, Makarska functioned as a base for Venetian hajduks, who raided the san-
cak of Herzegovina heavily, resulting in a bloody feud between this com-
munity and neighboring Ottomans. Thus engi could count on wide support
from the local beys for the attack on Makarska; and also, equally important,
he could justify this attack to the Venetians as a necessary operation against
pirates and robbers, or the pacification of rebels and outlaws, not as an act of
hostility against the Most Serene Republic.
In May 1662, engi wrote a letter to his good acquaintance Cavaliere
Vincenzo Bolizza, informing him that he had orders to attack Venetian
strongholds in Dalmatia, yet, because of the warm affection he held for the
Republic, he would do all he could to divert his forces toward Transylvania;
he closed his letter with the veiled threat: Credo che il publico habbi partico-
lar cognitione di queste mie buone operationi, e ne att[en]do la ricom-
pensa.118 engis return to Bosnia coincided with the arrival of a new gov-
ernor-general, Girolamo Contarini, who demonstrated more inclination to-
ward frontier diplomacy and maintaining good relations with nearby Otto-
Magyar Kamara Archvuma E 190 Archivum Familiae Rkczi 31. d. nr. 7743. For this
reference, as well as for those from the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and for his help with
Hungarian literature and contemporary chronicles, I am greatly indebted to my dear friend Gbor
Krmn. The additional data he tracked down, as well as his constructive and friendly
suggestions, were of immense help when preparing the final version of this essay.
115 Sudr, A hdoltsgi pask, 897. engis return to Europe from Asia can probably be
dated to spring 1661. In a letter from April 1661, Vincenzo Bolizza informs the Governor-
General about the Ottoman preparations for the upcoming season and mentions that amico
Cenghich was with the Ottoman army in Belgrade; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 488,
num. 71. (Spalato, 9 Aprile 1661).
116 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 488, num. 126. (Zara, 27 Aprile 1662), attachments to letter
with news from Ottoman lands.
117 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 488, num. 127. (Zara, 4. Maggio 1662).
118 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 5. (Spalato, 8. Giugno 1662), attachment: Letter
of Ali Pasha engi to Vincenzo Bolizza (received in Kotor on 9th May 1662).
74 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
man officials than had his predecessor. However, the Republic had no oppor-
tunity to demonstrate its gratitude, since a few days later a confidential agent
from Sarajevo informed the Governor-General via Ragusa that engi had
been recalled to Edirne. It seems that Ali Pasha was attempting to avoid con-
ducting any kind of military operation at all, and had sent friendly letters to
the leaders of Makarska, probably asking for tribute and submission to Otto-
man rule. Unfortunately for engi, his letters were intercepted by some of
his enemies and sent to the grand vizier, resulting in his deposition. Rumours
that this time Ali Pasha would lose his head for sure, proved wrong again.119
His next post was that of pasha of Kanizsa, and, probably in recognition for
his good services, at some point engi was given Pcs in Hungary as ar-
palk. In August 1662, both Governor-General Contarini and Cavaliere
Bolizza received cordial letters from Ali Pasha, written from Kanizsa in Hun-
gary, reassuring them that he was still in the grand viziers favor and again
asking for some gift in recognition of his services.120
engi spent the rest of the 1662 campaign in Hungary, where he was
engaged in fighting the forces of the CroatianHungarian magnates Zrinski
and Batthyny. The death of Vincenzo Bolizza in August 1662 temporarily
interrupted further communication between Ali Pasha and the Republic,121
and it was not until the pasha returned to the south in winter 1663 that more
regular contact was reestablished. In February 1663 Governor-General Con-
tarini and Ali Pasha engi exchanged warm letters, full of expressions of
friendship, via Nicolo Bolizza, who had taken over his uncle Vincenzos
role.122 The occasion for revival of contacts was, as always, Ottoman prepara-
tions for an attack on Kotor next summer. In his usual manner Ali Pasha
hinted that he could be of great help on this occasion, especially in regard to
his position as (future) sancak of Herzegovina, and as commander charged
with the closing the Bay of Kotor. His offers fell on fertile soil and in April
1663 the Governor-General recommended to the Senate that it would be very
useful to maintain good relations with this Ottoman lord and proposed that a
collection of luxury gifts be sent to engi, including two expensive suits:
one of Damascus silk and another of velvet.123
119 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 5. (Spalato, 8. Giugno 1662), attachment: Copia
di lettera scritta da Ragusa a Spalato da Hebreo Confidente (dated Ragusa 16th May 1662).
120 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 17. (Spalato, 16. Agosto 1662), attachments:
Lettera del Bassa Cenghijcj scritta al P.re Gl. Contarini; Lettera del Bassa Cenghijcj scritta al
K.re Bolizza; Sudr, A hdoltsgi pask, 897.
121 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 15. (Spalato, 16. Agosto 1662).
122 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 53. (Zara, 18. Febraro 1662. mv.), attachments:
Lettera scritta da Ali Bassa Cenghijch all Ecc.mo S.r Gl. Contarini; Copia di Lettera scritta in
risposta dallEcc.mo S.r Gl. Contarini ad Ali Bassa Cenghijch.
123 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490. num. 68. (Zara, 22. Aprile 1663.), and attachment:
Copia di lettera dAli Bassa Cenghijch (received in Kotor on 8th Aprile 1663). It seems that the
actual appointment of Ali Pasha to the sancak of Herzegovina did not occur before May 1663: the
Unfortunately for engi, an escalation of hostilities in Hungary inter-

rupted the deal. The beginning of a new war between the Ottomans and the
Habsburgs again directed the majority of Ottoman forces to the north, remov-
ing the threat to Kotor. Yet this time Ali Pasha was not ready to let the oppor-
tunity slipping by and decided that the Venetians needed more convincing,
and that the time was right to settle some unpaid debts. Accordingly engi
was exceptionally active in the campaign season of 1663. First, during June
and July engi led a 23,000 strong force on a raid against Dalmatia, pillag-
ing the districts of Trogir and ibenik, but refraining from doing any serious
damage.124 Ali Pashas actions caused him no loss of standing with the Gov-
ernor-General, who even went as far as to justify engis actions to the Sen-
ate (probably quite rightly) as a way for him to avoid joining the main Otto-
man army in Hungary, under the pretext of being engaged in the conduct of
military operations in Dalmatia.125
However, Ali Pasha directed the majority of his efforts at bringing the
region of Makarska back under Ottoman rule, and thus neutralising this nest
of Venetian irregulars once and for all. In early August 1663 engi was
again ready; he had gathered 5,500 men and went on a raid against Makarska.
In spite of numerical superiority, the Ottoman force failed to achieve any con-
crete results. Moreover, because of support from the Venetian navy, present in
nearby waters, the defenders managed to inflict significant casualties on the
Ottomans.126 This setback did not discourage Ali Pasha, who began to gather
an even stronger force and in September had at his disposal in Livno a host of
67,000 men. At same time he dispatched letters to the chieftains of Makar-
ska, inviting them to return to the rule of the Gran Signore, promising them
amnesty and security, otherwise threatening that we shall take your sisters
and wives, and their sufferings will fall on your souls.127
The Venetians watched all these actions carefully, and alarmed by
Ottoman preparations, Governor-General Contarini reminded the Senate of
instruction of the Ragusan Senate to its envoys bringing the customary gifts to Ali Pasha on the
occasion of his appointment is dated 19th May 1663; see Miovi, Dubrovaka republika u spisima
namjesnika bosanskog ejaleta, 240. Although after having been a beylerbey it would have been a
demotion to return to the rank of sancakbey, this was not the case with Ali engi, as he received
Herzegovina as a mtesarrif: this solution of giving smaller provinces to former beylerbeys to
administer was a relatively common method of finding a place for pashas currently without
vilayets of their own; see Sudr, A hdoltsgi pask, 896.
124 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490, num. 80. (Zara, 24. Giugno 1663); num. 83. (Zara, 6.
Luglio 1663); num. 85. (Spalato, 7. Luglio 1663).
125 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490, num. 87. (Spalato, 25. Luglio 1663).
126 Venetian reports put the number of dead at 150 and wounded at 250, yet these figures seem
to be too high. ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490, num. 93. (Spalato, 27. Agosto 1663).
127 [] le sorelle, e moglie vi si prenderanno, e li torti, che si faranno ad esse, saranno sopra
lanimo vostro, ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 99. (Spalato, 13. Settembre 1663),
attachment: Lettera di Ali Bassa Cenghijch scritta alli capi di Primorie. See also: num. 95. (Spa-
lato, 3. Settembre 1663).
76 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
his proposal to send gifts to engi in September 1663.128 Contarini also

wrote a personal letter to Ali Pasha accompanied by two expensive pistols,
assuring him of the friendship of the Republic.129 In response Ali Pasha justi-
fied his attacks on Makarska as necessary operations against the main source
of all the problems on this frontier, the hajduks. engi warned the Governor-
General to restrain these irregulars from attacking Ottoman lands, since oth-
erwise they would draw the main Ottoman army to this front the next year and
he would not be able to stop it. Moreover, aware of the Republics military
weakness in the region, and with such a host at hand, engi judged the mo-
ment right to raise the stakes. In his letters to the governor-general, he also
asked for repayment of 17,000 reali which he had supposedly given as a bribe
to the Bosnian pasha during the siege of Kotor in 1657, claiming that the late
Vincenzo Bolizza knew all the details of this affair. Contarini decided to buy
time, and assured engi that after all relevant information was collected, the
matter would be resolved.130
In the meantime, the Ottoman force left its base in Livno and went on
the march. The Venetians closely watched the movement of this host from
day to day, but not until the very end was its designated target clear: Split,
ibenik, Zadar or some other stronghold.131 So far engis strategy was
working well. His operations in Dalmatia at least gave the appearance of con-
ducting proper military operations against the enemies of the Empire; at the
same time he managed to advanced his cause with the Republics rulers, and
although it was highly unlikely that a sum as high as 17,000 reali could be
obtained, luxury gifts and some lesser compensation were at hand. From
Knin, engi took his forces westward and united with the force of the Cap-
tain of Biha, aiming to attack the estates of the Croatian magnate Count Petar
Zrinski. The reputation of both Zrinski brothers (Petar and Nikola) as enemies
of the sultan and the chief troublemakers on the frontier more than justified
this move. Yet Ali Pashas luck had run out. Near Otoac in Croatia, the
Ottoman host was ambushed by 4,000 men led by Petar Zrinski and almost
completely destroyed. In the end engi returned to Livno leading only small
a portion of his force (reliquie della rotta), also suffering great family loss
in this encounter; one of his sons was killed, while his brother was captured
and held prisoner by Petar Zrinski.132
128 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 102. (Spalato, 23. Settembre 1663).
129 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 104. (Spalato, 14. Ottobre 1663).
130 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 104. (Spalato, 14. Ottobre 1663): Lettera di Ali
Bassa Chenghijch scritta allEcc.mo s.re P.re Contarini.
131 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 106. (Spalato, 15. Ottobre 1663); num. 107.
(Spalato, 19. Ottobre 1663); num. 108. (Spalato, 19. Ottobre 1663).
132 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 109. (Spalato, 21. Ottobre 1663.); num. 110.
(Spalato, 31. Ottobre 1663). According to another Venetian source it was his brother who died,
and his son the bey of Biha who was captured; see Sudr, A hdoltsgi pask, 897.
This defeat caused Ali Pasha great loss of reputation, very much weak-
ening his position and providing his enemies with an occasion to begin the
campaign to depose him.133 In November 1663, engi sent a new letter to
Contarini along with an expensive Bulgarian vase as a return gift for the pis-
tols. Yet despite everything, the tone of engis letter did not change. He
insisted again that Venice restrain the hajduks, and demanded restitution of
his 17,000 silver coins spent during the 1657 siege. Ali Pasha was well aware
of the precariousness of his situation and the dangers he was facing. He badly
needed either cash, which could be used to buy good will and protection, or
some results he could present to the grand vizier (as for example pacification
of the Venetian irregulars), whose invitation to Belgrade he was expecting
any day. While negotiating with the Governor-General, engi was also ac-
tively trying to appease his superiors, sending letters to Belgrade promising
the capture of Klis next season.134
Throughout the entire winter of 16631664, engi kept up a lively
correspondence with Governor-General Contarini, either through letters or
(from January 1664, when he deemed it too dangerous to put his words on
paper) through trusted Christians who acted as his messengers. engi fed the
Venetians information on the Ottoman preparations and an alleged conspiracy
between some of the frontier beys and the Venetian Morlacchi, aiming not
only to return the Morlacchi to Ottoman rule, but also to capture two Venetian
fortresses, Klis and Gripe near Split, by treason. engi was willing to pro-
vide names of the conspirators only after he had received the money he was
due. In the end, Ali Pasha also asked for six hunting dogs from Venice, most
probably to test the limits of Venetian compliance with his demands.135
Despite the support of Governor-General Contarini, who actively ad-
vocated appeasing cos stimato commandante and urged the Senate to dis-
patch not only the gifts already approved, but also qualche moderata summa
di denari,136 the affair was never settled. In February 1664, escorted by
auses, engi left for Belgrade. Conflicting rumours about his fate circulated
(engi had been killed, confirmed as pasha of Bosnia, etc.) until March
1664, when it was confirmed that he had again been given command of
Kanizsa in Hungary.137 In April the gifts approved for Ali Pasha by the Sen-
ate finally arrived from Venice and Governor-General Contarini immediately
133 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 110. (Spalato, 31. Ottobre 1663), attachment:
Scrittura sopra la rotta ricevuta dal Cenghijch.
134 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 119. (Spalato, 22. Decembre 1663).
135 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 125. (Spalato, 26. Gennaro 1663. mv.): Constitui-
to del mezzo aspedito da Ali Bassa Cengich.
136 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 122. (Spalato, undated).
137 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 125. (Spalato, 26. Gennaro 1663. mv.); num. 130.
(Spalato, 11. Febraro 1663. mv.), attachment: Due relationi sopra la Morte di Ali Bassa di Bossi-
na; b. 492, num. 137. (Spalato, 29 Marzo 1664).
78 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
contacted his son, at that time alaybey of Herzegovina.138 However, it was

too late: a few days later engis son informed the Governor-General that his
father had been executed at the sultans command.139 Thus Ali Pasha engi,
who for almost sixteen years had been a dominant figure on this frontier, fi-
nally met his end. Although Ali Pasha proved to be skilled in playing the
game of Ottoman politics he managed to avoid deposition several times,
even conspiring with the enemies of the sultan in order to get rid of his politi-
cal enemies in the end he failed to prevent a serious military blunder from
causing his downfall.
Conclusion
The case of this controversial Bosnian potentate well illustrates the

complexities of the Empires frontier. Undoubtedly, the prospect of material
gain was an integral part of the relationship between engi and Venice, and
the Venetians were well aware of this. In January 1664 Governor-General
Contarini warned the Senate to have no illusions concerning the true disposi-
tions and motives of Ali Pasha engi, since lottima volont sua e fondata
solamente in la venalita, sul interesse, e se si allienara dalla confidenza un
cosi auttorevole ministro, stimo gran discapito al servitio.140 But this paper
has attempted to show, through detailed reconstruction of Ali Pashas histori-
cal context, that he was also moved by other motives than simple material
gain, and that we should not see this Bosnian grandee only in black and white,
judging him simply a traitor. Above all, Ali Pasha engi should be seen as a
landed lord for whom dynastic interests came before anything else.
As the war between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire
that had began so well for the Ottomans progressed from year to year, casual-
ties among the Ottoman frontier elite mounted. Even before the war the
landed incomes of the Ottoman elites on this frontier were below the Empires
standards,141 but in conditions of protracted warfare, with their estates fre-
quently raided and plundered, many were facing complete material ruin. With
no prospect of imminent victory and peace, it should come as no surprise that
some concluded that their dynastic/family interests diverged from those of the
Empire they served, and decided to seek their own means to ensure survival in
what was becoming an endless conflict.
138 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM. b. 492. num. 142. (Spalato, 20 Aprile 1664).
139 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 492. num. 143. (Spalato, 27 Aprile 1664).
140 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 122. (undated).
141 See Kornelija Jurin Starevi, Krajike elite i izvori prihoda: Primjer jadranskog zalea u
16. i 17. stoljeu [Frontier Elites and Sources of Incomes: The Case of the Adriatic Hinterland in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries], Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju 55 (2005): 246247.
During this war, Venice developed a vast network of informants and

confidential agents on the Ottoman side, such as they never had before or
since. These included not just the Empires Christian subjects but also large
number of Muslims from all social strata. Some were motivated by pure need
for survival, as for example the sipahi Hasanbeg Vlahovi from Duvno, who
offered a yearly tribute of 100 reali (in grain) and undertook to act as a Ve-
netian informer in exchange for protection of his estates from the Venetian
irregulars raids.142 Many cooperated with Venetians to help free their rela-
tives from captivity. Finally, some did so for pure material gains, for example
the janissary aa from Shkodr who passed diplomatic correspondence be-
tween the Senate and its bailo at the Porte. Cavaliere Vincenzo Bolizza main-
tained a lively correspondence with a range of Ottoman officials covering the
area from Herceg-Novi to Sarajevo and Belgrade. These Venetian confidants
included captains of fortresses (Zadvarje, Herceg-Novi), janissary aas (Her-
ceg-Novi, Shkodr), a kadi (Herceg-Novi) and also a scribe at the court of the
Bosnian pasha in Sarajevo, who for years kept the Republic well-informed
about Ottoman plans and the Imperial orders arriving in his office.
Moreover, there was no shortage of candidates willing to enter the Re-
publics service. For example when in July 1663 the Captain of Zadvarje,
Hasan Bey, was executed on charges of being a Venetian confidant (by none
other than Ali Pasha engi),143 his brother, who inherited the post, offered
his services to the Republic.144 In November 1663, the Republic even went as
far as to enlist an aa from engis household as its informer, who kept the
145
Governor-General well informed concerning the pashas actions. Nothing
testifies so vividly to the crisis of Ottoman rule in this region as that so many
members of the local elites were willing to cooperate with the Republic.
Still the two most important Venetian acquisitions were without
doubt Ali Pasha engi and his kinsman Jusufbegovi. The case of the latter
even more aptly illustrates the effects of protracted warfare on local frontier
elites. Until the events of 1656 and his deposition, Jusufbegovi was warlike
and aggressive, faithfully serving the Empire in its war with the Republic. In
the eyes of the Venetian government, he was one of their principal enemies in
the region. However the events of 1656 pushed Jusufbegovi into Venices
arms. Until the end of his life, despite promises given at the Porte,
Jusufbegovi never embarked on another attack on Kotor, limiting his actions
142 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 489. num. 23. (Spalato, 18. Settembre 1662). Under similar
conditions, in 1659 Governor-General Antonio Bernardo accepted under the Venetian protection
no fewer than 28 villages: b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 16. Novembre 1659); num. 278. (Spalato,
9. Gennaro 1659. mv.); ASVe Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 307rv, Adi 5 Decembre 1659.
143 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 490. num. 87. (Spalato, 25. Luglio 1663).
144 Moreover, as the final act of irony, the luxury vestments that arrived for engi, were instead
used as gifts for the Captain of Zadvarje; see ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 492. num. 144.
(Trau, 5. Maggio 1664).
145
ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 491. num. 113. (Spalato, 28. Novembre 1663.)
80 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
to simple raids and policing operations against rebellious Christian communi-

ties in Montenegro and Albania. The Republic did not object to such behav-
iour and maintained warm relations with him. In January 1667 Jusufbegovi,
at that time holding the rank of beylerbey, requested the Republic to send him
a good doctor (the petition was also supported by the Bishop of Kotor and the
young Cavaliere Bollizza), which was done in July 1667.146 When
Jusufbegovi died in January next year, Governor-General Antonio Priuli
informed the Senate with great regret of the death of this Ottoman lord, who
was tanto ben disposto verso gl affari di V[ostr]a Ser[enit]ta, e professava
tutta la confidenza col Cav[allie]re Bolizza.147
As for Ali Pasha engi, his conduct also matches the pattern of many
other Ottoman notables from the region, who at the beginning of the war ea-
gerly took up arms but whose enthusiasm waned as the conflict dragged on.
His relationship with the Republic can best be described as a double game, in
which both sides attempted to play the other. On the one hand he professed
friendship and good will to the Republic, feeding the Venetians with news
from Constantinople or the region, although they would have acquired this
anyway through their extensive network of informers. His statements of how
he had refused orders to attack the Bay of Kotor (before 1657), or Dalmatia
(after 1662) were true more often than not, yet this refusal resulted from his
loss of faith in the meaning of this war, and here too he was not a unique case.
On the other hand, engi as sancakbey ruled his Christian subject with an
iron hand. By use of force and threats of violence he not only imposed heavy
taxation (thus securing his own material base), but was also rather successful
at suppressing any Venetian influence in his lands.
Although it is true that he was reluctant to attack fortified Venetian
towns, truth be told, the resources at his disposal in 1663 were such as to
make any other military commander think twice before embarking on such a
risky operation. On the other hand, he had no problems in pursuing Venetian
irregulars and attacking their strongholds (Perast in 1654 and Makarska in
1663, to mention just the main military operations). Apart from his actions
during the siege of Kotor, which can undoubtedly be labeled as open treason
(it must also be noted that he was not the only Venetian ally in the Ottoman
camp, and that for many the attack on the Venetian stronghold figured more
as a sideshow to the internal power struggle), in the end it can still be argued
that, despite everything, engi served the Empire till his death. Moreover,
one can even argue that engi was only temporarily pushed to extreme ac-
tions by central government meddling in local affairs. After the siege of Ko-
tor, engi dutifully continued to support the Empires military enterprises in
the north, in Hungary, where he served faithfully (even more than in his own
146 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 497. num. 236. (Di Galera in Porto di Curzla, 4. Agosto
1667).
147 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 498. num. 36. (Zara, 4 Febraro 1667. mv.).
own domain) for almost four years and managed to enter the higher ranks of
Ottoman provincial administration.148
As for the accusations of excessive greed, we need only remember that
the theme of Turkish venality was a common national stereotype in Early
Modern times, and that Ali Pasha managed to escape numerous attempts to
depose him from the post of sancakbey and later that of beylerbey. We can
only guess the expenses this caused him,149 which he had to compensate
somehow. Further, his behaviour was always that of a great lord, courteous
and lavish in exchange of gifts and demanding what he felt was due to him.
Ali Pasha pursued not wealth per se, but wealth as a means for achieving an
ulterior goal, which his Venetian friends referred to as grandeza. Although
certainly not in the same category as for example Seydi Ahmed Pasha (one of
Kprls principal rivals for the post of grand vizier), seen in a local per-
spective, the cursus homorum of Ali Pasha engi is rather impressive: start-
ing as an alaybey, he easily acquired the title of pasha and became sancakbey
of Herzegovina, yet only his departure for Transylvania (in 1658) and his
conduct on the battlefield there catapulted him into the higher echelons of
Ottoman state administration. In the last few years of his life, before his ill-
fated return to the Dalmatian front, he held the post of governor in some prov-
inces of the Empire (Eger, Temesvr, Kanizsa).
As this study has shown, engi never managed to secure a yearly sti-
pend or obtain any sizeable sum of money from the Venetians. For him the
relationship with the Republic had a different value: the Serenissima was
more a source of luxury goods of western manufacture than of material
wealth. Yet even more importantly, his contacts with the Republic should be
seen in terms of dynastic or family diplomacy, a part of the lifestyle befitting
a great lord. Naive offers of mediations from 1648 and later to conclude peace
between Venice and the Empire are best understood in that light. Maintaining
diplomatic relations with the Republic of St. Mark served primarily to in-
crease Ali Pashas status among the other Ottoman lords on the frontier, as
148 kos Barcsai, the prince appointed by Kprl Mehmed in place of Gyrgy Rkczi II,
accused Ali Pasha engi of conspiring against him with his deposed predecessor; see his letter
to the grand vizier (13 April 1659); see Sndor Szilgyi, ed., Erdlyi orszggylsi emlkek
trtneti bevezetsekkel [Documents of the diets of Transylvania, with a historical introduction],
vol. 12, 16581661 (Budapest, 1887), 236. Although the chronicler Jnos Bethlen, one of the
leading Transylvanian politicians of the age, did not find this unimagineable (cf. Jnos Bethlen,
Erdly trtnete 16291673 [The history of Transylvania 16291673], ed. Jzsef Jankovics
(Budapest, 1993), 4041), we have no specific data which would support this claim. Barcsai
referred to a lively correspondence between Ali Pasha and Rkczi, which was then prohibited by
Kprl Mehmed; see Simon Renigers report to Emperor Leopold I (Constantinople, 21st
February 1659), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Kt. 131.
Fasc. 64. Conv. E. fol. 35.
149 In 1651, according to news circulating in the region, engi had sent 20,000 reali and 25
slaves to Constantinople in to prevent his deposition. Even if these figures are overestimated, they
serve as a good illustration; see Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 221.
82 DOMAGOJ MADUNI
did having the ear of the governors-general from whom favours could be
asked, such as freeing certain prisoners or sending gifts for his friends.
Although Ali Pasha served in several battles, garnering wounds as well
as taking prizes worthy of good tales (Ali Pasha allegedly captured a stallion
from beneath the son of Gyrgy Rkczi, which he then sent to Herzegovina
in January 1661 as a gift for his son Kadri Bey)150 he never considered him-
self a warrior. His vision of himself as a lord is best described by his state-
ment to a Venetian envoy in 1654, to whom he said: We Turks acquire posi-
tion either through the nobility of blood, or through the profession of arms. I
have met the first condition.151 As if he knew that in the end, war would be
his doom.
150 ASVe Senato, Dispacci, PTM b. 486. num. 268. (Spalato, 9. Gennaro 1659 mv.).
151 Stanojevi, Jugoslavenske zemlje, 233.

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CENTRE DHISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE OTTOMANE

CENTER FOR OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

EUROPE AND THE

THE ISIS PRESS

This is an excerpt from a letter received by Antonio Bernardo, Ve-

Lika, migrated in tens of thousands to Venetian-controlled lands.12 On the

12 On the Morlacchi rebellion/migration, see: Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 113118; Domagoj Madu-

I am Cengi Alai-Bey of Herzegovina and everybody knows me21

Originally from Egil in Azerbaijan, the engi family (taking its

35 Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 212216.

Sancakbey of Herzegovina and Confidente of the Republic of St. Mark

the Venetians, in November 1652 at the end of the campaigning season,

43 Stanojevi, Dalmacija, 130131.

49 Stanojevi, Jugoslovenske zemlje, 232234.

instead of Herceg-Novi, moved the Venetian governor-general to gather his

The Siege of Kotor in 1657

appointed of its own choice as sancakbey of Shkodr: Mehmed Pasha Varlac

in Kotor, at the invitation of Vincenzo Bolizza, to personally confer with the

twelve sancakbeys of Rumelia, charged with the attack on Kotor.110 In the

Unfortunately for engi, an escalation of hostilities in Hungary inter-

his proposal to send gifts to engi in September 1663.128 Contarini also

contacted his son, at that time alaybey of Herzegovina.138 However, it was

The case of this controversial Bosnian potentate well illustrates the

During this war, Venice developed a vast network of informants and

to simple raids and policing operations against rebellious Christian communi-

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