IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

APPEAL NO. SC 104/2016

UNDER SS.8,13(1,2(a)),14 Supreme Court Act,

SS.27(1,2,3) Bill of Rights Act 1990;

IN THE MATTER OF Privacy Act 1993 and

S.123(2(a,e)) Human Rights Act 1993

BETWEEN Friedrich Joachim Fehling,

P.O.Box 95, Harihari 7863, NZ,
engineer against royal corruption for the
GENERAL PUBLIC’s interest,
Appellant, in person

AND West Coast District Health Board

146 High Street, Greymouth 7805,
Respondent

DATED 17th November 2016

______________________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S FINAL MEMORANDUM RE-INFORCING AND

SUMMARISING THE MAIN JURISDICTIONAL LAW MATTERS
______________________________________________________________________

TO The Registrar, Supreme Court, 85 Lambton Quay, Wellington

AND TO West Coast District Health Board, 146 High Street, Greymouth 7805

AND TO The General Public

ALSO TO The German Embassy and German Media
APPELLANT’S FINAL MEMORANDUM RE-INFORCING AND
SUMMARISING THE MAIN JURISDICTIONAL LAW MATTERS

[0.] Chronological Summary of Proceedings for the Reading Public

[0.1.] On 16/12/14 a Primary Health Organisation enrolment form was

signed and filed, with an explicitly added data-matching limit. The PHO’s
Privacy Statement does not include info that the apparently anonymous
National Health Index number is generally provided to/by the Ministry of
Health together with all health data and the patients’ personal details!
[0.2.] On 17/2/15 an invitation for a free health screen was received,
proving the acceptance of the above enrolment.
[0.3.] On 8/6/15 a PHO letter informed of this enrolment’s termination
on 7/1/15, and of the consequent inability to obtain subsidized treatment;
This was obviously due to above data-matching limit, but was on pretense
of missing ID proof (which was provided personally in December 2014,
incl. WINZ printouts dated 15/12/15) -- and after official info was
requested on 1/4/15 whether MoH had both, the NHI for general health-
data access and personal details, which was admitted later by MoH…
[0.4.] An “assurance” by PHO’s Ms Tymons followed that computer data
are safe; But she was evasive about the personal-detail access by MoH, which
was then fully admitted by the Privacy Commissioner on 18/11/15 -- On
22/3/16, Radio NZ reported that he criticized the “open-slather” access to
all official data (also including health data) by the govt’s spy agency without
any need for permission or any checks & balances (it was generally headed
by a whitewashing High-Court judge, and follows the neither-confirm-nor-
deny royal practice); he also proposed himself as a check & balance, which
was proposed for health data by the plaintiff in a letter much earlier,
together with the Health & Disability Commissioner …
[0.5.] In the Statement of Reply (7/4/16, [18,19]) MoH admitted having
got the NHI already in 2005 (with personal details, but not informing the
plaintiff), despite that he already then added health-data-sharing limitations
to personal-data forms, and that the DHB had to inform the plaintiff, too!
[0.6.] A complaint to the Privacy Commissioner followed on 28/6/15,
resulting in an excessively evasive cover-up conjecture on 18/11/15, after an
Ombudsman complaint about his refusal to respond that gave the govt’s
MoH extra time for a usual cover-up practice: The relevant statutory
Privacy-Act Principles (part of law section 6) were “substituted” by 4
Health-Info-Privacy-Code rules (not mentioned in the above Privacy
Statement and Act), and then interpreted that the general health data
collected by the PHO/DHB had the perverse purpose of issuing an NHI
number instead of the publicly expected previously practiced primary
purpose of safe, speedy and efficient provision of health care! He thus failed
to act as above check & balance…
[0.7.] A malicious abuse-of-process strike-out application by the 2nd
defendant (DHB) followed, corruptly enacted by the HRRT on “reason”
that the Privacy Commissioner (PC) did not investigate the 2nd defendant,
who obviously in deed committed the action complained and investigated
against (albeit under pressure from the MoH)!
[0.8] On 15/9/16 judge Mander dismissed the form-correct truthful High-
Court appeal by refusing its filing, because it explicitly proved corruption!
[0.9] An application to remove SC judge O’Regan (he unlawfully
invalidated direct-appeal provision earlier) from this case was rejected.

Exceptional Circumstances per S.14 Supreme Court Act

[1] The public will notice that the defendant considers all of the
application’s 7 established pima-facie exceptional circumstances for the
direct appeal as being illegitimate and baseless criticisms of the judiciary:
[1.1] The monarch and its courts have been forced to prove to the public
that Parliament’s laws and Democracy are window-dressing
conjecture/rubbish, which are the exceptional circumstances (former
Appeal-Court judge and monarch’s Governor-General Hardie-Boys
unlawfully limited exceptional circumstances to a violent revolution only --
where the public would not ask monarch’s prostitutes for permission!).
[1.2] The Appeal Court’s previous invalidation of the Bill of Rights which
now disables its democracy protection and appeal provisions is another
exceptional circumstance: The Appeal-Court judges have declared the first-
ever definition of Natural Justice and the use of Parliament’s Bill-of-Rights
Act, esp. its SS.5,6,27 democracy, interpretation and natural justice/right-to-
appeal directions, as irrelevant & aberrant (not accepted [royal-fascistic]
standard), see point [1.3] below;
[1.3] The Appeal Court’s unlawful appeal-disabling practise of refusing
leave to appeal on unjustified and unlawful grounds should be regarded as
exceptional circumstance in a democracy, as this unlawfully raises appeal
requirements from public-interest level to exceptional circumstances level;
In the earlier case [2015] NZCA 428 it refused special leave to appeal on
the unlawful grounds that the appeal’s 15 Questions of Law (incl. this very
appeal’s 2 constitutional law questions) were questions of facts, which was
proven unlawful by Supreme Court decision [2015] NZSC 178 !; This is
now unlawfully used to prevent appeals even at the stage of filing to the
High Court!
[1.4] The Appeal Court’s previously announced disallowing of the
appellant’s appeal argumentations (“language”) is a further exceptional
circumstance; It announced that it would not accept filing of further
appeals due to the appellant’s language that describes the matters in an
unsanitised truthful way (an appeal against such refusal is unconstitutionally
disabled in S.7(b) Supreme Court Act, which should be declared
unjustifiable per ss5,6,27 Bill of Rights Act); This is now unlawfully used to
prevent appeals even at the stage of filing to the High Court!
[1.5] The grossly incompetent judge Mander was involved in the parallel
Supreme-Court appeal matter against the “pre”judicial decision of High-
Court judge Nation, who in an earlier case unlawfully prevented a lawful
appeal (see above point [1.3] and points [16.2,15.2] of the appeal);
[1.6] The appellant is now without health care provision, because he
cannot agree to give the fascistic NZ govt, an enemy of every democrat,
easy access to his very private health data.
[1.7] The above circumstances at least in this combined situation amount
to exceptional circumstances;
A further 13th exceptional circumstance must be added here:
[1.8] The Supreme Court’s un-statutory unlawful praxis of invalidating
SS.8,14 Supreme-Court Act’s direct (and general) appeal provision has been
exceptionally publicly uncovered by the plaintiff so that it can and must
be corrected. It is prima-facie established by S.14’s wording of
“exceptional” circumstances that its judge-made unlawful alteration to
“extreme compelling” circumstances can only be fulfilled by a (violent)
revolution against the monarch’s totalitarian rule not needing its appeal
provision, which is contravening the peace- and democracy- safeguarding
purpose of all laws in a constitutional democracy, and esp. that of the
constitutional Bill of Rights, which is the very essence of this claim/appeal.

Public Importance/Interest per S.13(1,2(a)) Supreme Court Act

[2] In addition, the public will notice that the defendant does not consider
privacy rights to be of any public importance/interest, so that official
invalidation of fundamental privacy-right protection and thus democracy
and its laws cannot be appealed in the monarch’s Appeal and Supreme
Courts! Hear, hear… Consequently, if democracy is not of public
importance/interest, then nothing can be for the monarch’s prostituting
serfs and slaves that it calls “the public”, and then there could not exist any
possible public importance/interest! This is obviously wrong in
constitutional Bill-of-Rights-Act law, as only those appellants who can
achieve huge publicity and allow the creation of unlawful law-invalidating
case law are arbitrarily accepted, in order to create an extreme natural-
justice hurdle against the general public who is not associated to the
monarch’s freemason fascists, commonly called “old boys’ network”!

Prima-Facie Lack of Possible Defence and Abuse of Process

[3] The public will notice that the defendant cannot provide any
reasonable defence to the Privacy-Act appeal, because this appeal’s prima-
facie proofs do not leave such option open -- therefore its lawyer denies
any obvious merit of this case and tries every procedural law-evading trick
to prevent a main hearing and therefore publicity, which is a literal abuse of
the process that should facilitate such main hearing. It is also general
government praxis…

Law is not “Clear and Settled”

[4.1] The very core nature of this proceeding is the unlawfulness of

hidden general provision of all identifiable health data to the govt’s MoH,
and the deliberate failure of the Privacy Commissioner to lawfully
investigate such official systemic privacy-principles breaches in order to
create and maintain unlawful Tribunal case examples and govt praxis, and
to unlawfully prevent their corrections directly and/or via appeals! The
(statutory) law is sufficiently clear, but its application is arbitrarily unclear
and unlawfully “settled” at lowest court level; However, similar parallel
Human-Rights-Act investigation praxis has recently been clarified and
settled in direction of the appellant’s favour by the High Court:
[4.2] SS.6,27 Bill of Rights Act (law-interpretations to be in line with
BORA, Natural Justice, right to appeal) are not sufficiently settled in court
praxis other than arbitrary hidden invalidation; Existing pro-BORA Appeal-
Court case law(s) are silently ignored, despite that the constitutional BORA
and Natural-Justice principles (eg. the judicial proclamation “where there is
a right, there is a remedy”) provide for corrections!
[4.3] Here again it is unlawful per S.15(2) Constitution Act 1986 to use
English case law as argument that an appeal has no public-interest merit
with regard to “clear and settled” (case) law, even though this has been
unlawfully built into NZ Supreme-Court case law without regard to the
democracy-safeguarding NZ BORA that could reveal unlawful/
unconstitutional inconsistencies of age-old “clear and settled” (case) law!...

2-Tier “Pre”judicial Dismissal of High-Court Appeal

[5] The reason for this Supreme-Court appeal consists of a 2-tier dismissal
of the appeal without any other appeal possibility:
The Supreme Court must consider the full appeal in order to read the
evidential proofs of deliberate gross incompetence by the Human Rights
Review Tribunal members that were “pre”judicially dismissed as “baseless”
by the High Court, and which are also the prima-facie law evidence of the
appeal; With the same strike it was also dismissed by refusal of filing.

Appeal is not on an Interlocutory Application

[6] This appeal is not brought against a decision on an interlocutory

application; It was brought against a “pre’judicial decision to dismiss the
High-Court appeal in a 2-tier final way (and therefore not ancillary inter-/
between; see S.4(a(ii)) Supreme-Court Act, Interpretation).

Costs

[7] The plaintiff will not pay any costs to the defendant, as this would
punish him for the prima-facie-proven unlawful removal of privacy rights
by the Tribunal and the defendant and thus indirectly of health-care
services to the appellant. It would also be a perversion of justice.

Conclusion

[8] The Supreme Court must consider the whole appeal in regard to the
application for leave, as this proves the public importance/interest and also
exceptional circumstances. The separation between application for leave and
the appeal is unnatural/illogical, artificial, inflexible and costly.
The monarch’s Supreme Court sits at the position of a democracy-
safeguarding Constitution Court in a constitutional democracy, but fails to
accept any of those fundamental functions, only asserting arbitrary
totalitarian power of the monarch over democracy. This will change.

Harihari, this 17th November 2016 ………....………………………….

(Fritz Fehling, Appellant)