CYBERCRIME LAW: Case Summary and Outcome
It ruled that the prohibition on
The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12,
and 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as
unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to
freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic transmission of
unsolicited commercial communications. It found Section 12 in
violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. It
struck down Section 19 of the Act for giving the government the
authority to restrict or block access to computer data without any
judicial warrant.
Facts
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court
of the Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the
governments platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities,
21 separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights,
particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
inforamtion.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a
temporary restraining order against the government to halt
enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.
Decision Overview
Justice Abad delivered the Courts opinion.
The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012 for the purpose of regulating access to and use of
cyberspace. Several sections of the law define relevant cyber
crimes and enable the government to track down and penalize
violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)
(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial
electronic communications, commonly known as spams, that seek
to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services unless
the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the
communication is for service or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, or when the following
conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial
electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source
of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information
in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read
the message.
The government argued that unsolicited commercial
communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because
they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services
and that they enter the recipients domain without prior permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial
speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as
other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.
transmitting unsolicited communications would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3)
as unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a
court warrant to collect or record traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of
a computer system. Traffic data under this Section includes the
origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the
communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their
civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the
government. They also claimed that this provision violates the
right to privacy and protection from the governments intrusion into
online communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of
private communications, it must survive the rational basis standard
of whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a governments
compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have
a compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-
time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court
first recognized that the right at stake concerned informational
privacy, defined as the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion. In determining whether a communication is entitled to
the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether
the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of
privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his expectation of
privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.
The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable
expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted
online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively
reasonable because traffic data sent through internet does not
disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of
the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses.
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under
Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of
privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal
information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section
fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage
in fishing expedition, choosing whatever specified communication
they want.
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity
and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to a computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The
Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to
freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a
personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines Constitution requires
the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to
seize a personal property or to block a form of expression.
Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court
found it unconstitutional.