FRANCO ESGUERRA, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO MANANTAN, DANILO MANANTAN, ARIANG
ANTONIO, AQUILINO CONCEPCION, and FORTUNATO
MIGUEL, Respondents.
This case stemmed from the complaint for ejectment filed by
petitioner Franco Esguerra against respondents before the RTC.
Franco claims he is the registered owner of a parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 661, Cad. No. 699, covering an area of
7,786 square meters, and situated in Barangay San Cristobal,
Licab, Nueva Ecija. Franco avers that he inherited it from his
father, Pio Esguerra, who had inherited it from his father, Lorenzo
Esguerra. However, Pio allowed Gaudencio Miguel4 to occupy his
property and later mortgaged the land to Gaudencio as evidenced
by a document entitled "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
dated June 6, 1960. In 1979, Gaudencio executed an instrument
denominated as Kasunduan to cancel said deed of sale with the
right to repurchase.
Ruling:
We agree with the appellate court that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. Lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties or be cured
by their silence, acquiescence, or express consent. A party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of
the proceedings and even on appeal.8 However, participation in
all stages of the proceedings before the trial court, including
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively
bars a party by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction.9
Moreover, petitioner never raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
in his pleadings before the RTC. It was only in the Court of
Appeals where he asserted for the first time that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the ejectment case. This Court therefore cannot
countenance petitioners adopting inconsistent postures by
attacking the jurisdiction of the regular courts to which he had
voluntarily submitted. Estoppel bars him from doing so.

Before the repurchase of the property, respondents Alfonso

Manantan, Danilo Manantan, Ariang Antonio, Aquilino
Concepcion and Fortunato Miguel constructed their houses on
the lot without the knowledge and consent of Pio.

RTC dismissed the complaint for ejectment and declared null and
void.
appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial courts
decision.

Issue: WON COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT THE PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE
ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. vs SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTWGO
FACTS: respondent was the sole bargaining agent of all
the monthly paid employees of petitioner (SMFI). some
employees of SMFIs Finance Department, through the
Union represented by Edgar Moraleda, brought a
grievance against Finance Manager Gideon Montesa, for
"discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices.," before
George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of the grievance
machinery adopted in the CBA forged by SMFI and the
Union.
Almost nine months after the grievance meeting was
held, SMFI rendered a "Decision on Step 1 Grievance"
stating that it was still in the process of completing the
"work management review," hence, the Unions requests
could not be granted.
The Union thereupon filed a complaint before the NLRC,
against SMFI, its President Amadeo P. Veloso, and its
Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor practice, and
unjust discrimination in matters of promotion."
Instead of filing a position paper as required by the
Labor Arbiter, SMFI et al. filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that the issues raised in the complaint were
grievance issues and, therefore, "should be resolved in
the grievance machinery provided in the CBA of the
parties or in the mandated provision of voluntary
arbitration which is also provided in the CBA." The Union
opposed the motion to dismiss.
SMFI concludes that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction
over its complaint.
The Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al.s petition for
certiorari, it holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
over the complaint of the Union, they having violated the
seniority rule under the CBA by appointing and promoting
certain employees which amounted to a ULP.
ISSUE: W/N labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case?
In the case of Silva v. NLRC for a ULP case to be
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the
complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of
two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA;
AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic
provisions of the CBA.
Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that "All doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, including implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor." Since the seniority
rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on
salary and benefits, it may, following a liberal construction
of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be considered an
"economic provision" of the CBA.
As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have
promoted less senior employees, thus bypassing others
who were more senior and equally or more qualified. It
may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross
or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a
ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION v.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
G.R. No. 189496
FACTS:
Petitioner and University of Santo Tomas Hospital, Inc.
(USTHI) entered into a Project Management Contract for the
renovation of the 4th and 5th floors of the Clinical Division
Building, Nurse Call Room and Medical Records, Medical Arts
Tower, Diagnostic Treatment Building and Pay Division
Building. On various dates, petitioner demanded from USTHI
the payment of the construction costs amounting to
P17,558,479.39. However, on 16 April 2008, the University of
Santo Tomas (UST), through its rector, Fr. Rolando V. Dela
Rosa, wrote a letter informing petitioner that its claim for
payment had been denied.
Petitioner posited in part that UST may be impleaded in the
case under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,
wherein respondent UST and USTHI would be considered to
be acting as one corporate entity, and UST may be held liable
for the alleged obligations due to petitioner.
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition[7] on
the ground that Judge Fernandez was an alumnus of respondent
UST.
Judge Fernandez issued an Order[8] inhibiting himself from the
case, which was consequently re-raffled to Branch 76 presided
by Judge Alexander S. Balut. Judge Balut dismissed the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner,[9] upholding the
initial findings of Judge Fernandez declaring that respondent
UST was not a real party-in-interest.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA. wherein it was dismissed on the ground that a petition
under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy to question the RTCs
Order that completely disposes of the case. Instead, petitioner
should have availed itself of an appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at hand falls as an exception in Sec.
1(g) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes.
In Jan-Dec Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held
that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
to question the dismissal of an action against one of the parties
while the main case is still pending. This is the general rule in
accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 1(g). In that case, ruled thus:
Evidently, the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for
certiorari from the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint
against respondent. While Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from
a final order that completely disposes of the case, it also
provides several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) an order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order
denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order
disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a
motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any
other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a
judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom; and (h) an order
dismissing an action without prejudice. In the foregoing
instances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the
complaint against respondent is a final order because it
terminates the proceedings against respondent but it falls
within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves two
defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the
complaint against Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the
remedy of a special civil action for certiorari availed of by
petitioner before the CA was proper and the CA erred in
dismissing the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
While it is admitted that respondent UST was not a party to the
contract, petitioner posits that the former is nevertheless liable
for the construction costs. In support of its position, petitioner
alleged that (1) UST and USTHI are one and the same
corporation; (2) UST stands to benefit from the assets of
USTHI by virtue of the latters Articles of Incorporation; (3)
respondent controls the business of USTHI; and (4) USTs
officials have performed acts that may be construed as an
acknowledgement of respondents liability to petitioner.
Goyanko vs. UCPB (g.r no 179096)
(Wag mo muna isulat)
FACTS:
In 1995, the late Joseph Goyanko Sr.
invested 2 million pesoseosess with Philippine Asia
Lending investors Inc. (PALII). After his death,
represented by his son, Goyanko Jr., filed a claim
over his estate and at the same time Sr.s
illegitimate family filed a claim as well, over the
investment to PALII. Due to the proceedings, PALII,
deposited the proceeds with UCPB under the
name Phil Asia: ATF (in trust for) the heirs of the late
investor. Thereafter, UCPB allowed PALII to
withdraw P1.5M under that account. When the
heirs were about to claim the proceeds of the
investment, UCPB refused to restore the amount to
the petitioner. On litigation, the trial court
disregarded the statement (ITF) to charge UCPB
 with any trust relationship with PALII and the
decedents heirs.
On appeal, despite the arguments of the
petitioners that a trust was created, the appellate
court found against the heirs. In their argument,
the CAs iteration was that the transaction was a
mere deposit between UCPB and PALII.
The ITF addition has no effect.
ISSUE:
WON a trust agreement occurred?
HELD:
No. in order for a trust to come into being,
Article 1444 of the CC must be satisfied. From the
facts at hand, the high court found insufficiency. In
fine, the following elements must exist:
1. a competent trustor and trustee;
2. an ascertainable trust res; and
3. sufficiently certain beneficiaries.
The lack of one is fatal to the existence of a trust.
Furthermore, there must be a present and complete
disposition of the trust property, notwithstanding
that the enjoyment in the beneficiary will take place
in the future. It is essential, too, that the purpose
be an active one to prevent trust from being
executed into a legal estate or interest, and one that
is not in contravention of some prohibition of
statute or rule of public policy. There must also be
some power of administration other than a mere
duty to perform a contract although the contract is
for a third party beneficiary. A declaration of terms
is essential, and these must be stated with
reasonable certainty in order that the trustee may
administer, and that the court, if called upon so to
do, may enforce, the trust.
ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (FORMERLY ANCHOR FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION), Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY H. FURIGAY, GELINDA C. FURIGAY, HERRIETTE C.
FURIGAY and HEGEM C. FURIGAY
On April 21, 1999, ASB filed a verified complaint for sum of
money and damages with application for replevin against Ciudad
Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, respondent Henry
H. Furigay; his wife, respondent Gelinda C. Furigay; and a "John
Doe." The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-865 and
raffled to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(RTC).4
On November 7, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision5 in favor of
ASB.
While Civil Case No. 99-865 was pending, respondent spouses
donated their registered properties in Alaminos, Pangasinan, to
their minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette
C. Furigay. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
21743,7 21742,8 21741,9 and 2174010 were issued in the names of
Hegem and Herriette Furigay.
Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in fraud
of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed of
Donation, Title and Damages11 against the respondent spouses
and their children.
Instead of filing an answer, respondents sought the dismissal of
the complaint, principally arguing that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons as well as over the subject matter
in view of the failure of the ASB to serve the summons properly
and to pay the necessary legal fees.
RTC Resolutions
On September 29, 2006, the RTC issued an Order13 denying the
motion to dismiss.
RTC explained that the service of summons by publication made
by ASB was valid because respondents whereabouts could not
have been ascertained with exactitude and because Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court did not distinguish what kind of
action it would apply.
On appeal, the CA agreed with ASB that its complaint should not
have been dismissed on the ground that it failed to pay the
correct docket fees. It stated that the lack of specific amount of
actual damages and attorneys fees in ASBs complaint did not,
by itself, amount to evident bad faith.
Ruling
The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that
every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2 of the same rule defines a cause of action as an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. In order
that one may claim to have a cause of action, the following
elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.19 In other words, "a cause of
action arises when that should have been done is not done, or
that which should not have been done is done."20
Moreover, it is not enough that a party has, in effect, a cause of
action.
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must contain a
concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action. "The test of the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff."22 The focus is on
the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Failure
to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the
complaint warrants its dismissal.