CONCEPT OF RETAINER AND ITS NECESSITY

Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 21

Section 21.Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is

presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause
in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but
the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to
produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and
to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court
for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the
court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

CANON 14 - SERVICE TO THE NEEDY

A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

Rule 14.01 - AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES REGARDLES

OF STATUS

A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on

account of the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or
because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.

Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an

attorney: xxx
 FRANCISCO V. ATTY. PORTUGAL
A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and
CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint 1
on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal
(respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross
misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related
to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C.
Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v.
People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed
the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the
case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged
mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which
eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the
prejudice of petitioners therein.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato
F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in
G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the
accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted
in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of
another. As a result, Informations were filed against them
before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder.
The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due
trial, the Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two
counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein
respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was
denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the
denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second
Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the
Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May
2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again
despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office.
When respondent did not return their phone inquiries,
complainants went to respondents last known address only
to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding
address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants
were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad
cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent
about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were
shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a
Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late
filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had
attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been
issued against the accused because respondent, whose
whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the
reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from
lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital
significance that the Court notes that he was not the original
counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the
accused of two counts of homicide and one count of
attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the
original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be
present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement
undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere
effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the
Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly
irregular character, respondent also made informal but
urgent and personal representation with the members of the
Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision
of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put
into the case of the accused, his other professional
obligations were neglected and that all these were done
without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it
was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the
petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed
with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the
petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition
by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees.
Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary
period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean"
efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year
after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He
considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited
from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case
on his other equally important professional obligations; the
lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the
case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore
further professional opportunities. He then decided to
formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a
letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as
the contact person between respondent and complainants,
explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and
attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent
instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He
sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he
could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be
discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of
Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court.
Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly
aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who
would be as equally accommodating as respondent.
Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the
several calls complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland
R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of
hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only
complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory
conference held, the other two complainants were declared
as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP
proceedings.8
The parties were directed to file their respective position
papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid
submitted his Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of penalty
ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6)
months.1awph!l.net10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of
Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve
Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find
respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his
suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is,
considering all the facts presented, whether respondent
committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R.
No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam
petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the
Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of
the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect
in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the
accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their
right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v.
Sandiganbayan:11
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there
are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life
into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client
which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and
public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his
client that distinguishes him from any other profession
in society. x x x12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam
petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent
filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to
File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached
Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading13 and it rests on the sound discretion of the
Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion
did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed
to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal
long before respondent filed his motion for extension.
Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed the ad
cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the
allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied
the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated
7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and
complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of
assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the
rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner
Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his
dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes
that though respondent represented to the accused that he
had changed his office address, still, from the examination of
the pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the
pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to
complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office
would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the
petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation
was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution
since they had constantly called respondents office to check
the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants
had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls
of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3
Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of
the case. However, though aware of such likelihood,
respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he
and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved
matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance
for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in
court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice
of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very before its final adjudication arises only from the clients
least, he should have informed this Court through the written consent or from a good cause.16
appropriate manifestation that he had already given
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of
instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the
the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross
filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by
negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin
Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in
v. Boncavil17 that:
handling the case of the accused.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the
must serve the client with competence and diligence,
accused and gave them instructions on how to go about
and champion the latters cause with wholehearted
respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It
fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He
in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights,
should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such
and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability
was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants
by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition.
demanded from an attorney, it is because the
He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
first by securing the written conformity of the accused and
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
Rules of Court.15
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or maintain the respect of the community to the legal
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, profession.18
however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry
remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently
it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
disputed such claim when they attached in their position
reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case
paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in
the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings
account of one Jaime Portugal with account number
7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied
having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no
formal engagement between the parties and that he made all
his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban
(presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta: 20
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes
fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid
any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.21
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney
is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. x x x 22
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the
case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in
handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just
because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive
appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the
Rule 14.02 - PROVIDING COUNSEL DE OFICIO
accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus:
"the accused police officers who had been convicted of
[h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M.
Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato." 23 Rule
14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of
the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel
that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits
that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his
clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event
as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of
respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty
recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not
explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case
where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted
to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of
Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the
penalty of three (3) months suspension.25 The Court finds it
fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let
a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for
appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient
cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus
curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h); Sec. 31
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an
attorney: xxx
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court
may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of
charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears
that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney,
and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the
ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall
be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the
required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court
for sufficient cause shown.
Rules of Court, Rule 116, Sec. 6-8
Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right
to counsel. Before arraignment, the court shall inform the
accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to
have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed a counsel of his choice, the court
must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. (6a)
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. The
court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty
of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by
reason of their experience and ability, can competently
defend the accused. But in localities where such members of
the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and
ability, to defend the accused. (7a)
Section 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for
arraignment. Whenever a counsel de oficio is appointed
by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he
shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused
as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment. (8)
Rules of Court, Rule 124, Sec. 2
Section 2. Appointment of counsel de oficio for the
accused. If it appears from the record of the case as
transmitted that (a) the accused is confined in prison, (b) is
without counsel de parte on appeal, or (c) has signed the
notice of appeal himself, the clerk of court of the Court of
Appeals shall designate a counsel de oficio.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 543 August 21, 1974
AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNATION OF MUNICIPAL
JUDGES AND LAWYERS IN ANY BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO ACT AS COUNSEL DE OFICIO
FOR THE ACCUSED WHO ARE INDIGENT IN PLACES
WHERE THERE ARE NO AVAILABLE PRACTICING
ATTORNEYS
WHEREAS, under existing law, Municipal Judges and other
lawyers in the government service are prohibited from
practicing law;
WHEREAS, there are some places where there are no
available legal practitioners, as a result of which the trial of
cases in court is delayed to the prejudice particularly of
detention prisoners;
WHEREAS, for the protection of the rights of the accused who For purposes of this Decree an indigent person is anyone who
cannot afford to hire lawyers from other places and to has no visible means of support or whose income does not
prevent miscarriage of justice, it is necessary that they be exceed P300 per month or whose income even in excess of
provided with counsel; P300 is insufficient for the subsistence of his family, which
fact shall be determined by the Judge in whose court the case
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
is pending, taking into account the number of the members
Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
of his family dependent upon him for subsistence.
Constitution as commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, Section 2. Repealing Clause. All laws and decrees
dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed.
September 22, 1972, as amended, do hereby order and
Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect
decree as follows:
immediately.
Section 1. Designation of Municipal Judges and lawyers in
DONE in the City of Manila, this 21st day of August, in the
any branch of the government service, as counsel de oficio.
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
In places where there are no available practicing lawyers, the
District Judge or Circuit Criminal Court Judge shall designate a
municipal judge or a lawyer employed in any branch,
subdivision or instrumentality of the government within the ---
province, as counsel de oficio for an indigent person who is
Rule 14.04 SAME STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR
facing a criminal charge before his court, and the services of
PAYING AND NON-PAYING CLIENTS
such counsel de oficio shall be duly compensated by the
Government in accordance with Section thirty-two, Rule One A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
Hundred Thirty Eight of the Rules of Court. professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
If the criminal case wherein the services of a counsel de governing his relations with paying clients.
oficio are needed is pending before a City or municipal court,
the city or municipal judge concerned shall immediately
recommend to the nearest District Judge the appointment of
a counsel de oficio, and the District Judge shall forthwith
appoint one in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
 IN RE: ADRIANO
G.R. No. L-26868 February 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO
Member of the Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task
of ascertaining whether certain acts and conduct of a
member of the Bar deserve disciplinary action.
The problem arose because of facts that follow:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of
First Instance of Samar, 1 and sentenced to suffer the capital
punishment. His case came up before this Court on review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the
Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's counsel de
oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required
to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He
was advised that to enable him to examine the case, the
record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice
on December 20, 1966. On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought
for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in
mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved
for a 20-day extension (his second). This was followed by a
third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March
27, also for fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of
ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a special
extension of five days. All these motions for extension were
granted. The brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief
was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause
within ten days from notice thereof why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's
brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not
bother to give any explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution,
this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him
a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from
notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance with
the said resolution of September 25, 1967 within the same
period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be
taken against him." Still, counsel paid no heed.
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to
show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross
misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By
express order of this Court, the resolution was personally
served upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the
resolution.
Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment.
1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to
render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal
case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a
duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the
required service." 2 A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an
indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand,
"should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf.
3
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of
appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when
he received notice of his appointment, and December 5,
1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this
Court, more than sufficient time was afforded counsel to
prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death sentence below has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in
imposed was upon a plea of guilty. The record of the demanding high standards of duty of attorneys appointed to
proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists of defend indigent persons charged with crime." 4 For, indeed, a
but 31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967. lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected
In fact, in his third motion for extension of time, he to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of
manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than self interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever
half-way through" and that "additional time is needed to conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.
review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form
Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose
and print the said brief." In his motion for fourth extension,
Robles Lahesa. 5 He was counsel de oficio before the Supreme
he intimated that the preparation of the brief "is almost
Court in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and the other for
through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft and
homicide. He failed to take any action in behalf of the
rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the
defendants in both eases. This Court imposed upon him a
same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a
fine of P200. Significant is the pronouncement we there made
definitive text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time
that: "This court should exact from its officers and
came with the excuse that he "suddenly got sick (influenza)
subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their
in the course of redrafting and rehashing some significant
official duties, especially when negligence in the performance
portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and
of those duties necessarily result in delays in the prosecution
interrupted his work thereon for sometime." Finally, in his
of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons
"Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he
pending appeal." The validity of the foregoing observation
needed only five days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in
remains to the present day. 6 It applies to the present case.
final form and have the same stencilled and
mimeographed.lawphi1.nt Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966.
The effect of this long delay need not be essayed. We,
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed,
therefore, find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his
counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone
oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
down to the level of empty and meaningless words; at best,
best of his "knowledge and discretion".
have dubious claim to veracity.
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe
It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins
accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself.
a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The
importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer undertook to
accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
"obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox
constituted authorities." In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's
that responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. It
pointed observation was that as an officer of the court, it is a
lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty.
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There, as here, counsel failed to file
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." appellant's brief (in a criminal case) despite extensions of
time granted him by this Court. Likewise, this Court issued a
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit
show-cause order why disciplinary action should not be taken
willful dis-obedience of lawful orders of this Court. A cause
against him. The explanation was considered unsatisfactory.
sufficient is thus present for suspension or disbarment. 9
This Court imposed a fine of P50 payable in ten days from
Counsel has received no less than three resolutions of this
notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine. Came the
Court requiring compliance of its orders. To be recalled is that
subsequent resolution of this Court advising him to pay the
on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days
fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam.
from notice, to show cause why disciplinary action should not
This warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960, the
be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's brief
Court resolved to give him ten days from notice within which
despite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by
to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice
counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity
of law. Despite receipt of this notice, he did not care to
of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders, on October
explain his behaviour which this Court considered as
3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was
"consumacy and unwillingness to comply with the lawful
directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was in that order
orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conduct
also required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned
himself as a lawyer should, in violation of his oath of office."
that more drastic disciplinary action would be taken upon his
He was suspended from the practice of law for three months.
failure to do either. Still he remained unmoved. Then, this
Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would
commanding him to show cause within ten days from notice seem to us, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to
thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio
law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office. and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this
The Court made it certain that this order would reach him. He Court.
personally acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid the
For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E.
fine. He has done nothing.
Adriano from the practice of law throughout the Philippines
This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite for a period of one (1) year.
of the fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when he moved
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he
record, in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of the
represented to this Court that all that was needed was to
Bar. So ordered.
redraft and to rehash some significant portions of the brief
which was almost through and to have the same stencilled Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text. Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent.
Disciplinary action is in order.
Rule 14.03 VALID GROUND FOR REFUSAL
A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an
indigent client if:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client or between a present client and the
prospective client.
PEREZ V. ATTY. DELA TORRE
A.C. No. 6160 March 30, 2006
NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez
charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct
or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing
conflicting interests.
Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of
Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December
2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for
ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were
apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that
respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga
where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made
representations that he could secure their freedom if they
sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to
the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of
the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial
confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein
complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial
confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for
which they were being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He
explained that while being detained at the Calabanga
Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an
extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the
crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He
advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to
make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his
constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be
utilized as a state-witness.
Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in
executing his extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in
the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced
that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the
accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
2
recommendation. On August 16, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty.
Danilo de la Torre be suspended for one (1) year from
the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the
recommendation by increasing the period of suspension to
two years.
In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in
his complaint. The complainant was able to prove by
substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e.
The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were
retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at
the time that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two
accused, he was also representing the interest of the victims
family. This was declared by the victims daughter, Vicky de
Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services
of Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her
fathers killers. She even admitted that she was present
when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on
one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously
offered his services to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he
was already representing the family of the two accuseds
victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent
purposely offered to help the accused in order to further his
other clients interest. The respondent failed to deny these
facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said facts
despite the ample opportunity given him.
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain
from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a
controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without
any proof that he secured the written consent of both parties
after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest,
respondent should be sanctioned.
We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the
recommended penalty.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.3
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. 4
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all
the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak
and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship
is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 5
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did
not offer his legal services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was
the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their
extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their
request to act as counsel after apprising them of their
constitutional rights and after being convinced that the
accused were under no compulsion to give their confession.
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate
him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from
representing conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing
Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim
Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the
murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients
in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and
infidelity to his clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the
execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby
they admitted their participation in various serious criminal
offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously
by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who
CANOY V. ATTY. ORTIZ
A.C. No. 5485 March 16, 2005
ELMER CANOY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have
exercised his better judgment before conceding to accuseds
choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself
from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted
them in executing the extrajudicial confession.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction,
disbarment as sought by the complaint is deemed to be too
severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a
suspension from the practice of law for three years is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is
SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of
respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer
virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of
litigation without even informing the client of the fact or
cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice
on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling,
election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of
professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual
penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in
this case.
A Complaint1 dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of
the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose
Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was
alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines.
The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod
City.2 Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this
proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint
ordered the parties to submit their respective position
papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and
records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.
Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of
Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final
visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which
Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present,
Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC.
He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually
dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the
parties not having submitted their position papers. 3 The
dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty.
Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the
case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position
paper.
The Comment4 filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-
hagiography. He informs the Court that since commencing his
law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and
low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to
himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more than ten years, his
law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorney's Office
with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the "hundreds
or thousands."5 At the same time, he hosted a legal
assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung
municipalities and reaching "the people who need legal
advice and assistance."6 Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this
lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a
victory which he generously attributes to the help "of the
same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance
before."7
Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz
deigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently confident
that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved
by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the
position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the
same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order
dismissing the case.8 Atty. Ortiz admits though that the
period within which to file the position paper had already
lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position
paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of
Bacolod City, "he was frankly preoccupied with both his
functions as a local government official and as a practicing
lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical
limitations," and he withdrew from his other cases and his
"free legal services."9
According to Atty. Ortiz, "Mr. Canoy should have at least
understood that during all that time, he was free to visit or
call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he]
would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had
to attend to court trials and report to the Sanggunian
office."10 He states that it was his policy to inform clients that
they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his
office, as it would be "too difficult and a financial burden to
attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly
indigents" with only two office personnel.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoy's
complaint was without prejudice, thus the prescriptive period
had been tolled. He claims not being able to remember
whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of
the case, though as far as he could recall, Canoy had
conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle
the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same. 12
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 Canoy eventually submitted a motion
withdrawing the complaint, but this was not favorably acted
upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a
case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of
withdrawal of the charges.14 Eventually, the investigating
commissioner concluded that "clearly, the records show that
[Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and
diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients' (sic)
claim," and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. 15
The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the
recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz
be likewise warned that a repetition of the same negligence
shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal
representation for indigent or low-income litigants. Apart
from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the
Public Attorney's Office, groups such as the IBP National
Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of Legal Aid of the UP
College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the
quest to provide legal representation for those who could not
otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts of
private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially
commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources
beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary
reward.
Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-
income clients is just as grievous as that of non-
representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty.
Ortiz's legal practice may have been, his particular
representation of Canoy in the latter's illegal dismissal case
leaves much to be desired.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional
Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by
Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoy's case.
CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
...
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
...
CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES
ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
...
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged
shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over
all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the matter, including all information
necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing
to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter
entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of
the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it
is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with
it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest
of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession.16
If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical
condition was such that he would not be able to make a
timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact.
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence,
there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately
and fully informed of the developments of the case and
should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in
which his/her interests are being defended. 17
There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability
of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy
been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file
the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating
counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty.
Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either
filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the
paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of
having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could
not be avoided.
That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing
Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability
of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se
a violation of Rule 18.03.18
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty.
Ortiz's election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his
adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of
his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional
Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal
services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office.19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular
public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as
governors and mayors,20 and in such instance, the attorney-
client relationship is terminated.21 However, city councilors
are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation except during session hours, and in the case of
lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions
which are not relevant to this case. 22 In such case, the lawyer
nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services. 23
Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not
effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a
manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the
court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse
party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in
the case.24
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his
services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave
complainant in the cold unprotected. 25 Indeed, Rule 22.02
requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate
with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty.
Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on
the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired
the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true,
there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and
this new counsel.
In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned
that the position paper had not been filed and that the case
had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty.
Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the
indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his
favored clientele. It does not escape the Court's attention
that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up
the case with his office.26 He cannot now shift the blame to
complainant for failing to inquire about the status of the
case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to
inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him. 27
The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this
Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the
Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred
pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months,
and even disbarment in aggravated cases.28 Given the
circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by
the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the
practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of
CANON 15 - OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY
IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 30
suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a
reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz's undisputed
negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was
compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and
the successive dismissal of the complaint.
Lawyers who devote their professional practice in
representing litigants who could ill afford legal services
deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public
service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-
meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not
enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of
legal representation. They deserve quality representation as
well.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month from
notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same
negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens
of the United States of America. Citizens of the United
States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly
licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in
the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing
as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before
the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice
after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been AROMIN V. BONCAVIL
permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
A.C. No. 5135 September 22, 1999
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I (Formerly A.C. No. CBD 296)
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities ELSIE B. AROMIN, FE B. YABUT, TIBURCIO B.
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing BALLESTEROS, JR., and JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS,
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote complainants,
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give vs.
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for ATTY. VALENTIN O. BONCAVIL, respondent.
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of may knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my MENDOZA, J.:
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose This is a complaint 1 filed by Elsie B. Aromin, Fe B. Yabut,
of evasion. So help me God. Tiburcio B. Ballesteros, Jr., and Julian B. Ballesteros against
Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Complainants allege that their late father, Tiburcio

Ballesteros, engaged the services of respondent as counsel in
two cadastral cases then pending in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Pagadian City, to wit: Cadastral Case No. N-14,
LRC CAD. RMC No. N-475, Lot No. 6576, Pls-119, entitled "The
Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Faustina Calibo, Claimant, v.
Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant," and Cadastral Case No. N-14,
LRC CAD. REG. No. N-475, Lot No. 7098, Pls-119, entitled
"The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Belinda Tagailo-Bariuan,
Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant"; that despite
receipt of the adverse decision in the two cases on August 8,
1991, respondent did not inform herein complainants of the
same nor file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice
of appeal to prevent the decision from becoming final; that
respondent did not file either a written offer of evidence
despite the trial court's directive for him to do so; and that it
took respondent four years from the time complainants'
father died before he filed a motion to substitute herein
complainants in the trial court. The foregoing acts and
omissions of respondent are alleged to be in violation of the
following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Complainants pray that such "disciplinary sanctions as may
be appropriate be imposed against Atty. Valentin Boncavil."
In his answer, 2 respondent alleges that the day before the
cadastral court rendered its decision, he met by chance
herein complainant Julian Ballesteros, who, after inquiring as
to the status of the cadastral cases and learning that the
same had already been submitted for resolution, told him
"You are too busy to attend to our case, it would be better if
somebody else would take over," to which, according to
respondent, he replied, "It is all right with me, it is your
privilege"; that as a self-respecting legal practitioner, he did
not, want to continue rendering unwanted legal services to a
client who has lost faith in his counsel; that he thus
considered himself discharged as counsel in the two
cadastral cases and relieved of the obligation either to move
for a reconsideration of the decision or to file a notice of
appeal and to notify herein complainants of the decision
against them; that, contrary to complainants' assertion, he
did make an offer of evidence, although he reserved the right
to submit authenticated copies of the documentary evidence
from the Bureau of Lands in Manila; that the delay in the
substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros with his heirs was because
neither the heirs nor the administrator of the intestate estate
of Tiburcio Ballesteros informed him of the latter's death
despite the heirs' knowledge that he was the counsel in the
two cadastral cases.1wphi1.nt
On June 8, 1994, complainants moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, alleging that "the facts are not in dispute and the
respondent's answer admits the material allegations of the
complaint." 3
On June 13, 1994, IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose required
respondent to comment on the foregoing motion within five
(5) days from notice. 4 On October 12, 1995, he set the case
for hearing on November 17, 1995. 5
On November 17, 1995, however, only complainants Tiburcio
Ballesteros, Jr. and Fe Yabut and their counsel appeared. This
fact, together with respondent's failure to comment on
complainants' motion submitting the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings, prompted Commissioner Jose to
grant complainants' motion. 6
On June 21, 1996, Commissioner Jose submitted his report
recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months with warning that repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XII-97-16 approving Commissioner Jose's
report and recommendation.
After due consideration of the records of this case, the Court
finds the recommendation of the IBP to be well taken.
The facts clearly show that respondent violated Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence."
By abandoning complainants' cases, respondent violated
Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
As stated in Santiago v. Fojas: 7
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
Nor can we sustain respondent's claim that he did not file
either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal from
the decision in the two cases because he was under the
impression from the remark of Julian Ballesteros that
complainants no longer wanted to retrain his services. As a
member of the bar, he ought to know that the only way to be
relieved as counsel in a case is to have either the written
conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving
him as counsel. Thus, Rule 138, 26 of the Rules of Court
provides:
An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client
filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to
be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name
of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.
As a matter of fact, Julian Ballesteros, who allegedly made
the remarks which became the basis for respondent's
inaction, denied ever having made those statements, much
less having discharged respondent as counsel. 8 Moreover,
Julian Ballesteros is only one of the heirs of Tiburcio
Ballesteros, and it has not been shown that he was speaking
on behalf of the other heirs when he allegedly relieved
respondent of his services. In any case, if respondent had
really been discharged as counsel, although not in
accordance with the Rules of Court, he should have informed
the trial court and asked that he be allowed to withdraw from
the cases. 9 Until his dismissal or withdrawal is made of
record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his
clients even though as between them the professional
relationship may have been terminated. 10He cannot validly
claim that, in any case, the decision has not yet become final
for want of service on the Solicitor General, for the period
within which complainants can file a motion for
reconsideration or notice of appeal is counted from receipt of
the decision by their counsel of record.
Nor is this the first time that respondent is remiss in his
professional obligation toward complainants. In his answer,
he practically admits that he was late in moving for the
substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros by herein complainant
heirs. Respondent's excuse that he was not immediately
informed by complainants of their father's death is without
merit. Four years after the death of complainants' father is
simply too long a period for him not to have known of his
client's death, especially as it appears that he and
complainants live in close proximity with each other. During
those four years, surely occasions would have arisen where
respondent had to confer with Tiburcio Ballesteros regarding
the cases.
Respondent also, in effect, admits that he failed to file a
written offer of evidence as required by the court in its order,
dated June 21, 1983. What he actually filed was only "a
provisional written offer of evidence" because the documents
offered were not certified true copies. What the Court makes
of respondent's garbled explanation 11 for this lapse is that he
JARDIN V. VILLAR
A.C. No. 5474 August 28, 2003
REDENTOR S. JARDIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
could not bother to go to the Bureau of Lands in Manila to get
certified true copies because a check with the Bureau of
Lands in Pagadian City "showed the same documentary
evidence to be substantially the same true copies." If that
were the case, respondent did not explain why he did not
then go to the Pagadian City branch of the Bureau of Lands to
get the certified true copies of his documentary evidence.
The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for six months for respondent's gross negligence in the
handling of the two cadastral cases is in accordance with our
decisions. 12
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to suspend respondent
Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil from the practice of law for six (6)
months from notice with a warning that a repetition of a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to Atty. Boncavil's personal record
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to
all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
to all the courts in the land.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in
professionalism is a certain level of competence and
dedication. Far from measuring up to the standards of a
lawyer's conduct set in the Code of Professional
Responsibility which are also the hallmarks of
professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case virtually
abandoned his client's cause.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
Redentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar,
Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the latter's failure to
formally offer the documentary exhibits, which failure
resulted in the dismissal of the case.
The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
A building contractor, he engaged the services of the
respondent to represent him in the case which is for the
collection of the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand Seven
Hundred Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80),
representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the repair
of the house of the defendants in the case. 1 The case went its
course, but later despite several extensions of time given by
the trial court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of
exhibits.2 Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court
issued an Order the full text of which reads as follows:
When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty.
Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that
up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not
formally offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff
in writing as Order (sic) by the Court.
Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was
given an extension period of TEN (10) days within which to
formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing copy
furnished Atty. Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was
given a period of Five (5) days within which to comment
and/or oppose the admissibility of the said exhibits and set
the continuation of the hearing of this case for the
presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30,
2001.
On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing
records show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has
not complied yet with the formal offer of documentary
exhibits for the plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice,
the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10)
days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits
in writing and set the continuation of the hearing of this case
for today for the presentation of evidence for the defendant.
Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for
the plaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of
documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on
the part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute
this case, upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered
WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of
ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further
motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further
prosecute this case.
Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the
hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence on the
counter claim on the part of the defendant on June 15, 2001
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.3
The dismissal of the collection case prompted the
complainant to file a verified Affidavit-Complaint4 dated July
4, 2001 for the disbarment of the respondent with this Court,
wherein he also alleged the developments which transpired
after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already
terminated the services of the respondent as his counsel;
that the respondent failed to return the originals of the
documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the
respondent finally handed over the documents only as an
aftermath of a heated argument he had with the
complainant's wife.
In a Resolution5 dated September 10, 2001, this Court
required the respondent to comment on the complaint
against him. However, the respondent failed to file his
comment despite two (2) extensions of time granted to him.
Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the
respondent's comment and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.6
Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required
by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. 7 Hence, the
averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by the
complainant, are undisputed.
Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan,
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent
liable for negligence and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with the
warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely. The salient portions of the Report and
Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of the Investigating
Commissioner are as follows:
Complainant's contention that respondent Villar failed
to file plaintiff's Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February
2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9
and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001
(Annex 10 of complainant's Affidavit) reads:
....
It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the
failure of respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of respondent's
client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed
to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal
Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time
given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt
that it was part of respondent's obligation to
complainant as the latter's counsel of record in Civil
Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits, and respondent's dereliction of
this duty has prejudiced the interests of respondent's
client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was
respondent's obligation to take all measures to protect
the interests of his client in accordance with Canon
(sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
but it was respondent's negligence or omission which
has caused damage to such interests. 8
In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved said Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We are also in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondent's
disregard of the resolution of this Court directing him to file
his comment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar
attitude in failing to file his answer when required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct
belies impudence and lack of respect for the authority of this
Court.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been
languid in the performance of his duties as counsel for the
complainant. He was given by the trial court several
extensions of time: first, an extension of ten (10) days from
February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second,
another extension of ten (10) days from March 30, 2001,
when the case was called for hearing and the court noted
that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9,
2001. It must also be emphasized that there was an interim
period of twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001 and
March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27)
days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when the Order
dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore,
respondent had three (3) months and nine (9) days within
which to file the formal offer of exhibits.9 The respondent did
not bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or
extenuation of his inaction.
Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the
competence and diligence required of every member of the
Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT
AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY
AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
....
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
....
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT
WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
It is indeed dismaying to note the respondent's patent
violation of his duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious
transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and
ability and to give entire devotion to his client's cause. His
client had relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits
among other things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in
the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes inexcusable
default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the
respondent's mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and
needless prejudice to his client's interest, adversely affected
the confidence of the community in the legal profession and
eroded the public's trust in the judicial system. As an
attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level best and to
observe full fidelity to the courts and his clients. 10 This means
that in relation to his duty to his clients he should put his
maximum skills and full commitment to bear in
representation of their causes.
We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,11
to wit:
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence
required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135,
September 22, 1999:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
 entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.12
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the
attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his
clients, his profession, the courts and the public. 13 Every case
a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or free. 14 Certainly, a member of the
Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer's lethargy from
the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and
unethical.
The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find the
Rule 15.01. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
recommended penalty commensurate with the offense
committed.
In Aromin v. Boncavil,15 this Court suspended a lawyer for six
(6) months for his failure to file a written offer of evidence
despite the trial court's directive.
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia
with failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon 16 constitutes
inexcusable negligence. In the Saquilabon case, the
respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months. The Court likewise imposed the
same penalty upon the respondents in the cases of In Re:
Atty. David Briones,17Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan, 18Spouses
Rabanal v. Rabanal19 for their failure to file the briefs of their
respective clients.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months effective upon finality hereof, with the
WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be
dealt with even more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records
of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and
Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall
ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would
involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and
if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.03. -CONFLICT OF INTEREST
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
Rule 15.04. MEDIATOR, CONCILIATOR OR ARBITRATOR
A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act
as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
ATTY. JALANDONI V. ATTY. VILLAROSA
A.C. No. 5303 June 15, 2006
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS
CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A.
JALANDONI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Humberto C. Lim Jr. 1 filed a verified complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000. 2
On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the
consolidation of the said complaint with the following
substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First
Division of this Court:
1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v.
Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa;
2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v.
Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa.
In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court
considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and
terminated.3 On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings
filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:
(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated
September 27, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for
lack of merit; and
(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by
complainant praying that the resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant
case be reviewed and that proper sanctions be
imposed upon respondent.4
No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in
Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records. The
Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this
remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.
The complaint read:
AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
- II -
That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on
September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni,
Chairman/President of PRC was sued before RTC,
Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al.
vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal
services of herein respondent who formally entered his
appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the
defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles.
Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client
relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the
entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust and
confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence
delicate and confidential matters involving all the
personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to
the respondent. The latter was provided with all the
necessary information relative to the property in
question and likewise on legal matters affecting the
corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems
[which affect] Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel was privy
to all transactions and affairs of the
corporation/hotel.
- III -
That it was respondent who exclusively handled the
entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-
9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his
witness prior to formally resting his case. However, on
April 27, 1999 respondent, without due notice prior to
a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to
withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled
hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show
that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. No
doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to
(sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC,
Branch 52 proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et
al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and
unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused
irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni,
et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client
suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat.
- IV -
That the grounds alleged by respondent for his
withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was
that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena
and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G.
Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel of
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from
the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G.
Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being
married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.
The other directors/officers of PRC were comprised of
the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A.
Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with
the exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter
registered as one of the incorporators of PRC,
obviously, being the author of the registration itself
[sic]. Respondent further stated that he cannot
refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed
against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by
PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership
agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise
represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin
when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them.
On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior to
respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent
entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor
OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly
statingthat effective said date he was appearing as
counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J.
Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the "Estafa" case filed xxx xxx xxx
by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply
There is no dispute that respondent was able to
stated, as early as April 6, 1999 respondent already
acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate
appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and
information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil
Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently
Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his
representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No.
client which knowledge and information was
97-9865. However, despite being fully aware that the
acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship
interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an
between respondent and his clients. Using the said
equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares
classified information which should have been closely
of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the
guarded respondent did then and there, willfully,
same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni
unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated
was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862,
with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in
respondent opted to represent opposing clients at the
concocting the despicable and fabricated charges
same time. The corporations complaint for estafa
against his former clients denominated as PP vs.
(P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and
Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and
Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager
Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code
Vicente Delfin. Succeeding events will show that
due to a board resolution executed by the corporation
respondent instead of desisting from further violation
which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein
of his [lawyers] oath regarding fidelity to his client,
respondent, claimed to have been made without an
with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on
actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of
Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the
quorum, [among other things]. Were it not for said
Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases
fiduciary relation between client and lawyer,
filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized
respondent will not be in a position to furnish his
representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office,
conspirator spouses with confidential information on
Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J.
Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra Hotel.
Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183
RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, - II -
181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs.
Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to
2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases deliberately withhold the entire case file including the
against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena). marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than
three (3) months after his untimely unilateral
AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from
[his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his
xxx xxx xxx
knowledge of the indispensability of said documents
-I- particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline to file
the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed
 upon the new counsel by the court, respondent
suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or
simultaneous to the turnover of said documents.
[On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing
to the urgency of the situation, PRC issued Check No.
2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was
duly received by respondents office on the same
date. Such dilatory tactics employed by respondent
immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni
eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision
against [her].
Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the
notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest
which extended even beyond the family controversy was his
improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE:
Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring
the party opponent of defendant who is even outside the
family circle. During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May
5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the
entire case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865,
respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram
P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client
Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he
was privy to] as counsel of said client. Facts mentioned by
said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page
25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the
exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was
personally witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only
an arms length away from them during the hearing.
However, the particular portion showing the said irregular
acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court
stenographer from the transcript, despite her detailed
recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant.
This prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to
complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was
coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings. Said
corrections were only effected after repeated demands to
reflect the actual events which [transpired] on said pre-
trial.5 (emphasis ours)
In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also
pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated
the Rules of Court perpetration of falsehood and abuse of
his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly
affected the status of the cases that Lim filed against the
clients of respondent.6
In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent
claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000
because, in his verification, Lim stated:
3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same
are all true and correct to [his] own personal
knowledge and belief.7 (emphasis ours)
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains
verification based on "information and belief" or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
(As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)
While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces
no legal effect,8 the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was
due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. 9 We
find that Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the
pleading in violation of the Rules.
In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent,
reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint,
added:
[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated
the Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/is NOT duly
authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot
A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him]. Neither [was
Lim] a proper party to file this complaint. This fact is an
additional ground to have his case dismissed because
Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was
granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special
Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the
complainants.10
To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was
unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his
defense:
FACTS OF THE CASE
xxx xxx xxx
That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G.
Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and
Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her
daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely
the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost
ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta
Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to
Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as
above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through
the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now
claimed by the Cabiles family.
That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil
Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the
sisters.
That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis
and Carmen J. Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses
to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against them.
II.
That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for
Extension Of Time To File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed
an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of
Writ Of Preliminary Injunction.
That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the
sisters totally rest on public documents (the various titles
issued to the land in question because of the series [of
changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents
actual occupation and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-
facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant
for exaggeration and distortion of the truth. Since the
defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in
question is based on PUBLIC documents, what delicate and
confidential matters involving personal circumstances of the
sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim,
Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What
[privity] to all transactions and affairs of the
corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever transactions
the corporation may have been involved in or [may be
getting involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to
the defense of the sisters.
There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the
sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were]
discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he]
reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is that
the whole world knows about them.
That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted
allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in]
the entire proceedings of [the] case. [Lim] himself attested
that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated
April 26, 1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April
27, 1999. How then could [he] have represented Mrs.
Jalandoni for [the] entire proceedings of the case?
Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court
the important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw was
APPROVED by the trial court because of the possibility of a
conflict of interest. xxx xxx xxx. 11
Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately
withheld the records of the cited civil case. He insisted that it
took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the
records of the case to Lim.12 While he admitted an oversight
in addressing the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel
to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel
Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy
to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to
withdraw13 since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and
Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC which, in turn, actually
belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no
prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was
already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the
first hearing date.14 In fact, respondent contended, it was he
who was not notified of the substitution of counsels. 15
As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:
That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five
Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr.
conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property
together with its improvements, under litigation in that
Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of
THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and
more so now. [He] cannot find any law which prohibits a
counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the
services he rendered.16
In view of these developments, respondent was adamant
that:
the only real question to be answered in this complaint is
why Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the
Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to
block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging
litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the
RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the
members.17
On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and
recommendation:
xxx xxx xxx
After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the
parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC
had a case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later on,
complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the
parties were related to each other and the latter spouses
were represented by the respondent as their retained
counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as counsel
for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
Being the husband of one of the complainants which
respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent
upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to
representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the address some preliminary matters.
administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but
Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the
that of the [familys].
special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to
From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative
lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the complaint.21 Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:
latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena
[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the
when the latter were sued by complainants representative.
filing of the same, cannot be delegated by the alleged
We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some aggrieved party to any third person unless expressly
reason or another there existed some confidentiality and authorized by law.
trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the
We must note, however, the following:
successful defense of their cases.
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment,
Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Jalbuena when charged by respondents former client
Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
interests in violation of the Canon of Professional
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
Responsibility.
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons
As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon
receipt hereof.
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys. 22
Pasig City, June 20, 2002.18
(emphasis ours)
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the
Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to
recommendation of the investigating commissioner and
preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private
resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002. 19 Lumot A.
vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of
Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October
facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers
18, 2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had
may file a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP. 23
jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already
Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the
endorsed
following rule:
to this Court.20
SEC. 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice,
answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators
Report shall be considered as substantial unless the
Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record,
finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a
miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take
such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant,
including invalidation of the entire proceedings. 24 (emphasis
ours)
Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims
complaint was defective in form and substance, and that
entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the
same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the
onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an
answer or comment.25
The core issues before us now are:
1. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases
represented and handled by respondent, and
2. whether respondent properly withdrew his services as
counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
Conflict Of Interest
Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing
conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality
and deliberate withholding of records were committed by
respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of
interest, we must look into the cases involved.
In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A.
Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles. This was a case for the
recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra,
a hotel owned by PRC.
In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis
and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and
the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued
the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks
issued by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra. 26 The
corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ
Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet
Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against
PRC for an unpaid balance.27 In her complaint-affidavit,
Cristina averred:
11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took
advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos.
0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the
payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent
of any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she
caused the delivery of the same checks to her husband
Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge
and consent, and received the proceeds of the same
checks (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of
payment on the dorsal side of the said checks) with the
indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent
Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of
UCPB.28
Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:
There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this
time, or one month before[he] filed [his] Motion to
Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim,
through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty.
Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the
spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999
under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.29
Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-
2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself
against PRCs interests.
And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against
PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of
respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel. 30
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the
dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR
aptly provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full
disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his
client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.31 Conflict of interest may be determined in this
manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection.32 (emphasis ours)
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided but
alsothose in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used.33
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment.
The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing
parties are present clients either in the same action or in a
totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in
which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears
is his former client in a matter which is related, directly
or indirectly, to the present controversy.34 (emphasis ours)
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action
or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or
indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even if
neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as
party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After
being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he
cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client,
act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse
to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general
matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse
interest is very slight; neither is it material that the
intention and motive of the attorney may have been
honest.35 (emphasis ours)
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the
absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after
a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional
misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action. 36
Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing
controversy among the family members37 was improper
because the written consent of all concerned was still
required.38 A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute
cannot represent any of the parties to it.39
Withdrawal As Counsel In Civil Case No. 97-9865
The next bone of contention was the propriety of
respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in
Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership
agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC,
through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S.
No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent
stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of
Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he
withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A.
Jalandoni and with leave of court.
The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be
summarized as follows:
The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the
client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of
circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer.
The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails
certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer. 40
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient
cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good
cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after due
notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to
it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. 41
A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the
written consent of his client must file a petition for
withdrawal in court.42 He must serve a copy of his petition
upon his client and the adverse party at least three days
before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat
the application as a "mere scrap of paper."43 Respondent
made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as
counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly
approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of
Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because
of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in
his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or
without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who
may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a
client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and
thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That
manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of
the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of
the court.44
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to
substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. 45
Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did
not necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to
withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the
professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni
find no support in the records of this case.
Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to
withdraw as counsel46 would be granted by the court. Yet, he
stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning
April 28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court
was shown to have actually granted his motion for
withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a
semblance of granting his motion:
When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza
appeared for the defendants considering that Atty.
Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his
appearance in this case which the Court considered it
to be approved as it bears the conformity of the
defendants.47 (emphasis ours)
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas
professional engagement on her behalf despite respondents
withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of
his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting
interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated that
his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the
"possibility of a conflict of interest."48
Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that
respondent improperly collected P5,000 from petitioner.
Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to
Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately
withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a
clients documents, money or other property which may have
lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity,
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid,
is well-established.49
HORNILLA V. ATTY. SALUNAT
A.C. No. 5804 July 1, 2003
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D.
RICAFORT, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D.
Ricafort filed an administrative complaint 1 with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and
unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that
respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates,
Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use
of his wifes community tax certificate number in his
complaint for disbarment against respondent. 50 This is not,
however, the forum to discuss this lapse.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of violating
Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of
respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public
School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother,
Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which
approved respondents engagement as retained counsel of
PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-
corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors
for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case
No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for
unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property
of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases.
Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict
of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which
complainants were members, and was being paid out of its
corporate funds where complainants have contributed.
Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of
interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in
the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule
15.062 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its
members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,3 respondent stressed that he entered his
appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and
in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the
said law firm, he only filed a "Manifestation of Extreme
Urgency" in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. 4 On the other hand,
SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another partner of
the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it
was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated
and indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of
the PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S.
Salunat was immaterial; and that when he entered into the
retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his
individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law
Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA
Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the
Board that the truth will come out and that the case before
the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
considering that respondents therein are not public officials,
but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent
alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of
Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent
averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of
gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross
misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing
trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he
prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and,
instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and
referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After
investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted
Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration
of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client."5 This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.6 Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. 7 Another test representation permissible where no conflict of interest
of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual
a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge representation in all derivative actions. Outside
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on
performance thereof.8 whether there must be separate representation from
the outset or merely from the time the corporation
In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is
seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this
understood to be that body which (1) exercises all powers
restriction on dual representation should not be
provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all
waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation
business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all
should be presumptively incapable of giving valid
property of the corporation.9 Its members have been
consent.13 (underscoring ours)
characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary
character.10 It is clearly separate and distinct from the In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation
corporate entity itself. wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its
assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust
interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount
either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the
and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual
corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy
corporate officials.14 The rulings in these cases have
the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and
persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the
other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to
wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a
bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the
lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot
corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. 11 This is what
represent members of the same corporations board of
is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that
directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so
in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in
would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests,
interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporations
which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be
included as a party in the suit.12 In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-
5657, entitled "Philippine Public School Teachers Assn., Inc.,
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal
et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public
principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the
School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA
threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation
against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that
defend members of the board of the same corporation in a
the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was
derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is
the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of
enlightening:
record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case.
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he
recognized. Although early cases found joint
represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented
the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said
case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients,
the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he
necessarily entered his appearance therein. 15 Again, this
constituted conflict of interests, considering that the
complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the
individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of
and to protect the interest of the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Considering however, that this is his first offense,
GONZALES V ATTY. CABUCANA
A.C. No. 6836 January 23, 2006
LETICIA GONZALES, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales
(Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino Cabucana,
(respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting
interests.
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that: she was
the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she
was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE
we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP
Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too
harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to
observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found
GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is
ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar
Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an
associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was
rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay
Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and
P6,000.00 as attorneys fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed
to fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection
with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a
complaint against the said sheriff with this Court; in
September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the
house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to
execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint
before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the
Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave
oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation;
notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where
respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein
respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by
Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be
disbarred from the practice of law since respondents
acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-
client relationship between complainant and respondents
law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01, 1
13.01,2 15.02,3 15.03,4 21.015 and 21.02.6
On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to
the complaint.7
In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and
represented complainant in Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was
his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and
represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is
representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed
against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono
and that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel
was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in
good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than
leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his
assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against
them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking
official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to
testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first,
respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he
too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official,
but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty
to delay no man for money or malice, respondent entered his
appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any
charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted
against respondent which shows that respondent is now the
subject of a demolition job. The civil case filed by Gonzales
where respondents brother served as counsel is different
and distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant
against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any
canon on legal ethics. 8
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled
by respondents brother is closely connected with the cases
of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the
claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the
spouses pro bono is not true since he has his own agenda in
offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation
that she is filing the cases against the spouses because she
is being used by a powerful person is not true since she filed
the said cases out of her own free will. 9
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the
parties a Notice of Mandatory Conference dated March 1,
2004.10 On the scheduled conference, only a representative
of complainant appeared.11 Commissioner Demaree Raval of
the IBP-CBD then directed both parties to file their respective
verified position papers.12
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier
assertions and added that respondent prepared and
notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the
high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben
Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said
judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is
a violation of the CPR; and that respondent continues to use
the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that
said partner has already been appointed as Assistant
Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of the CPR. 13
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in
his Answer.14
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
issued an Order notifying both parties to appear before his
office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question
regarding said case.15 On the said date, only respondent
appeared16 presenting a sworn affidavit executed by
Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It
reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
 TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino,
may asawa, at nakatira sa Barangay Dubinan East,
Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay
nagsasabing:
Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No.
04-1186 na may pamagat na "Leticia Gonzales versus
Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr." na kasalukuyang
nahaharap sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa
di-pagkakaintindihan na namamagitan sa akin at nina
Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.
Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit
ko si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na
namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawang Gatcheco,
gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana
ay walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan.
Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng
demanda kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.,
nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking
pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang kinalalaman (sic) sa
di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang
Gatcheco.
Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging
abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago
City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.
Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kayat aking iniuurong
ang naturang kasong inihain ko kontra kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako
interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking
hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang naturang
kaso.
Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang
patotohanan sa lahat ng nakasaad dito.17
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004
requiring Gonzales to appear before him on November 25,
2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to
clarificatory questioning.18 However, none of the parties
appeared.19 On February 17, 2005, only respondent was
present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as
submitted for resolution.20
On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his
Report and Recommendation, portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the
respondent made a mistake in the acceptance of the
administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the
Commission (sic) believes that there was no malice
and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can be
shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally
withdraw the case which she filed against Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is
reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of
cases as conflict of interests might arise.
It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and reprimanded
andadvised to be more circumspect and careful in
accepting cases which might result in conflict of
interests.21
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
 CBD CASE NO. 03-1186
Leticia Gonzales vs. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that respondent made (a) mistake in the
acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo
Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby
WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised to be more
circumspect and careful in accepting cases which
might result in conflict of interests. 22
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to
the report of Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only
represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case
filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself
narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their
counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against
them.23
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. 24 Such
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. 25 Lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.26
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty.27
As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs.
Bamba,28
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that
which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or
that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of
the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyers respective
retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients.29
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests
in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm where
Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by
Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has
no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said
cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or,
at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which
this Court cannot allow.30
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who
represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus,
there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As
respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented
Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule
against representing conflicting interests applies.
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:31
[W]e can not sanction his taking up the cause of
the adversary of the party who had sought and
obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but
to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the
courts and of the bar. Without condemning the
respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or
fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts
it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring
the profession, of which he is a distinguished member,
"into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the
integrity of justice."32
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with
honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim
does not render the prohibition inoperative. 33
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down
the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case
cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be
instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they
cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a
present client and a prospective one. 34 Granting also that
there really was no other lawyer who could handle the
spouses case other than him, still he should have observed
the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with
the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict with another
client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a
full disclosure of the facts.35 These respondent failed to do
thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales.
However, we are not bound by such desistance as the
present case involves public interest. 36 Indeed, the Courts
exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative
cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil
remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the
public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his
profession.37
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one
to three years suspension was imposed.38
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the
fact that he is representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono
and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which
handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by
complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil
case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm
CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW
OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while
herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco
spouses only with his name, 39 without any mention of the law
firm. We also note the observation of the IBP Commissioner
Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondents
acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as shown by the move of
complainant to withdraw the case.
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and taking into consideration the
aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the
penalty of fine of P2,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is APPROVED with MODIFICATION that
respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the amount
of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING
that a commission of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS V. ROMANILLO When the request was denied, respondent applied for
clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
A.C. No. 5580 June 15, 2005
(HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioners Board of
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as Directors terminated respondents services as counsel and
represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant, engaged another lawyer to represent the association.
vs.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez
ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.
who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled "San
DECISION Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus,
PER CURIAM: SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for
representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative
This is a Petition1 for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B.
Case No. 4783.
Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting interests and
for using the title "Judge" despite having been found guilty of In her Report4 dated August 3, 1998, Investigating
grave and serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.2 Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made
The facts are as follows:
the following findings:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners
Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in
Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements
dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the
Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case 3 against Durano and
Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant
Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and
wherein he had previously been not only an active
Condominium Buyers Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI
board member but its corporate secretary having
alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in
access to all its documents confidential or otherwise
the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of
and its counsel in handling the implementation of the
Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and
writ of execution against its developer and owner,
Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
Durano and Co. Inc.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the
Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs
substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia
conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be
Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the
purchased from Durano.
 latter and the Complainant became so revealing and
yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as
the same wasnt controverted by the Complainant
which was his first offense; Respondent must be given
the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to
the condition that should he commit the same in the
future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him. 5
The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of
the complaint with the admonition that respondent should
observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his
profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond
reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued
representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of
Appeals6 and this Court7 and even moved for the execution of
the decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent
for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783
and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge"
although he was found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct.
Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead,
correspondences and billboards which was erected in several
areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October
2001.
In his Comment and Explanation, 8 respondent claimed that
he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against
petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it
was still pending when the second disbarment case was filed.
He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first
disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning
the title "Judge", respondent stated that since the filing of the
instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name.
On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.9
Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported
that respondent did not violate the admonition because it
referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C.
No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety
of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that
respondent was deceitful when he used the title "Judge", thus
creating a false impression that he was an incumbent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this
Commissioner respectfully recommends the following
penalty range to be deliberated upon by the Board for
imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of
reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4) months
suspension. It is further recommended that in addition
to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given
to Respondent in that should he violate his
undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the
future where the Complainant would be the adverse
party and/or should he again use the title of "Judge"
which would create an impression that he is still
 connected to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall
be imposed on him by the Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the
report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents violation of Rule 1.01 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING
that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more
severe penalty shall be imposed against him.
Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent
interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was
admonished yet he continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez
against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the
propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit
consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of
violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is
also misleading for respondent to insist that he was
exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the
title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading
statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services.
The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring
to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to
mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in
his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of
the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He
resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v.
Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct and would have been
dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal
solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant.
We ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto
B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty.
He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.
However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape
punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his resignation
during the pendency of this case. Consequently, we
are now precluded from dismissing respondent from
the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v.
Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the
respondent judge likewise resigned before the case
could be resolved, finds application in this case.
Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or
retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative
 case renders the case moot and academic, is not a pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to
hard and fast rule. retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned
members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to

those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary,
ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that such as respondent.
respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege
serious misconduct which would have warranted his
burdened with conditions.12 It is bestowed upon individuals
dismissal from the service had he not resigned during
who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess
the pendency of this case, and it appearing that
good moral character.13 Lawyers should act and comport
respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with
reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal
the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby
profession.14
orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which herein respondent To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the
Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and
instrumentality of government, including government- professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the
owned or controlled agencies or corporations. law," it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly,
lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful
SO ORDERED.10
conduct have no place in the legal profession. 15
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges
We are mindful that the power to disbar must always be
to which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement
exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative
and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
reasons,16 and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
government, including government-owned or controlled
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title
the court and as a member of the bar. 17
Judge is one of such privileges.
This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the
We have previously declared that the use of titles such as
court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped
"Justice" is reserved to incumbent and retired members of
of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v.
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Judge Romanillos.18 In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with
Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of
just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions,
the Republic, including those given the rank of "Justice". 11 By
respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his
analogy, the title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges,
profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the
incumbent and retired, and not to those who were
contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate
dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly
and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus
unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the personally or through paid agents or brokers,
trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the constitutes malpractice.
court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
all courts in the country.
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction SO ORDERED.
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
violation of the oath which he is required to take
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
before admission to practice, or for a wilful
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either

Rule 15.02. PRIVELEGED COMMUNICATION (TO Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the
PRESERVE THE SECRETS OF A CLIENT) Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein
A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty.
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a Roceles F. Madianda.
prospective client.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing
date September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F.
HADJULA V. ATTY. MADIANDA
Madianda with violation of Article 209 2 of the Revised Penal
A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007 Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant,
vs. In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and
ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent. respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the
DECISION Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the
GARCIA, J.: Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed
that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for
some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the
course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced
copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a
baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the
respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after she
had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with
respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of
criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per
complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when
respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's
promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the
filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT 3
with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, 4
falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two
charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier
made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same
disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case
was also instituted against her before the Professional
Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets
and confidential information she revealed in the course of
seeking respondent's legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the
complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, 5 respondent
denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed
any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship between them. Respondent also stated the
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive
documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer
read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA.
LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-
COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT
nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
that ever existed ever since and that never obtained
any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL
PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never
delivered to me legal documents much more told me
some confidential information or secrets. That is
because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or
CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I
know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that
I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might
also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of
fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS
referred to me, I just referred them to private law
practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen
to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA.
LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-
COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT
RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities
are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she
also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover
where she has a child .
 Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly
have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of
public records .
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing
the instant case just to get even with me or to force
me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST
HER since she knows that she will certainly be
DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC
ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT,
IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a Report
and Recommendation, stating that the information related by
complainant to the respondent is "protected under the
attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from
this postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the
respondent to have violated legal ethics when she
"[revealed] information given to her during a legal
consultation," and accordingly recommended that
respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda
be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the
complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the actuation of revealing information
given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty.
Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises
holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who
incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she
considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The
moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in
this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information
acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that
one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the
client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too,
is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows
the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no
contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,6
-
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the
very first moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advise regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on
any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised,
or charged; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward handle the case for which
his service had been sought.
 It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-
payment of the former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the
existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself
or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.7
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed
breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As
found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents
shown and the information revealed in confidence to the
respondent in the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect
the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a
consultation with a lawyer.
Rule 15.05. CANDID, HONEST ADVICE
A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the
The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding,
the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent
compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.
Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways,
what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-
charges against each other using whatever convenient tools
and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal
information respondent gathered from her conversation with
complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At
the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was
actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing
that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment,
she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is
hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect
in her handling of information acquired as a result of a
lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED
against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chief Justice), Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,J., on leave.
client's case, neither overstating nor understating the
prospects of the case.
 ROLLON V. ATTY. NARAVAL
A.C. No. 6424 March 4, 2005
CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money or
other property coming into the formers possession should be
deemed to be held in trust and should not under any
circumstance be commingled with the lawyers own; much
less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles
constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval,
filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29,
2001. The Affidavit1 submitted by complainant alleges the
following:
"Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty.
Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to
seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled
Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum
of Money with Prayer for Attachment;
"After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining
to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I
was required to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos
(Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which
amount was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the
Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex A to form part
hereof;
"As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie,
returned to his office the following week to make follow-up on
said case. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie
that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because
the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-ups were
made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action done on our
case;
"Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the
amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latters failure
to comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me
in the above-mentioned case;
"My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naravals office that
same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw
the amount I have paid and to retrieve my documents
pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several
follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return
the documents because they were in their house, and that he
could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php
8,000.00) because he has no money;
"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the
matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of
Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on
Bar D[i]scipline;
xxx xxx x x x."
In an Order dated March 12, 2002, 2 the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez,
directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint.
The same directive was reiterated in the CBDs May 31, 2002
Order3 issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe.
Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of the
Orders.4
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD
proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order 5 dated
November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe,
required complainant to submit her position paper within ten
days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be
deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Position Paper 6 on December
10, 2002.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003,
Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report
reads in part as follows:
"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard
renders him administratively liable x x x.
"In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent
in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will render
legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount from
the latter as payment for filing fee and service fee did
nothing in return, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the
bar. By his own conduct the respect of the community to the
legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been
tarnished.
xxx xxx xxx
"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by
the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her of
the status of her case which she later on found to have
become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit
between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been
decided against the latter and which judgment has long
become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge
by the respondent of such finality based on the documents
furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information
and did not properly appraise the complainant. Thus,
respondent violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x." 7
IBP Board of Governors Resolution
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted
Report. The Board recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for
violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the restitution of complainants P8,000.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or
as advocates of any person who may wish to become their
client.8 They may decline employment and refuse to accept
representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out
effectively or competently.9 But once they agree to handle a
case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional
Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and
utmost devotion.10
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
clients cause.11 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
importance.12 The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
states:
 CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as
they can efficiently handle.13 Otherwise, their clients would
be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they
should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they
do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath. 14
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after
receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service
fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation
to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite
repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and
appalling indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her
repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to
her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To
top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to
him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent
should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits
and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between
Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the
latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and
executory. But he withheld such vital information from
complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and
service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her case would
be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their
clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither
overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof.
Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of
success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the
part of lawyers.15 If they find that their clients cause is
defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter
to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the
incontrovertible.16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic
undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients."17
Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently
refused to return the money of complainant despite her
repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack
of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to
something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely
had no right to keep or use.18
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and
property that may come into their possession. 19 As
respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant,
the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee.
His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the
presumption that he had converted it to his own use and
thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him. 20 His
failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional
ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.21
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law,
legal processes and the courts, 22 but also mandates the
utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.23 Respondent clearly fell short of the demands
required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to
properly discharge his duty to his client makes him
answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal
profession, and to the general public. 24 Given the crucial
importance of his role in the administration of justice, his
misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the
integrity and dignity of the profession. 25
WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
YU V. BONDAL
A.C. No. 5534 January 17, 2005
JAYNE Y. YU, complainant,
vs.
RENATO LAZARO BONDAL, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal (respondent) stands charged in a
complaint1 filed by Jayne Y. Yu (complainant) for gross
negligence and violation of Canon 16 2 and Rule 16.033 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged
failure to attend to the five cases she referred to him and to
return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has
paid him.
By complainants allegation, the following spawned the filing
of the present administrative complaint:
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is
ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice
of this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos
(P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per
annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of
this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
On March 30, 2000, she engaged the services of respondent
as counsel in the following cases: (1) "Jayne Yu. v. Swire
Realty and Development Corp," for Rescission with Damages
filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, (2)
I.S. No. 00-22089-90, "Jayne Yu v. Lourdes Fresnoza Boon,"
for Estafa, (3) I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88, "Jayne Yu v. Julie
Teh," for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, (4) I.S. No.
2000-D-11826, "Jayne Yu v. Mona Lisa San Juan" for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and (5) I.S. No. 2000-D-11827,
"Jayne Yu v. Elizabeth Chan Ong," also for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.4
In the Retainer Agreement5 dated March 30, 2000,
complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of
P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an
Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the
event that damages are recovered, she would pay
respondent 10% thereof as success fee.
Complainant later issued two checks, BPI Family Bank No.
94944 and BPI Family Bank No. 94968, dated February 20,
2001 and April 5, 2001 in the amount of P30,000.00 and
P21,716.54, respectively.6
Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent failed to
file a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp; 7 due
to respondents negligence, the case for estafa against
Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was dismissed by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City and was not timely appealed to
the Department of Justice; 8 respondent negligently failed to
inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the
necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary
investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was
eventually dismissed by Resolution dated August 14, 2000; 9
and respondent compelled her to settle the two cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and
Elizabeth Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms. 10
Respondent thus demanded from respondent, by letter 11 of
June 14, 2001, for the return of all the records she had
entrusted him bearing on the subject cases.
Through complainants counsel (Chavez Laureta and
Associates Law Office) which sent a letter 12 to respondent,
she reiterated her demand for the return of the records of the
cases.
Respondent did return but only the records bearing on the
estafa case against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg.
22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan.
Complainant through counsel thus demanded, by letter 13 of
August 8, 2001, the return of the rest of the files, particularly
that dealing with Swire Realty and Development Corporation
and Julie Teh. In the same letter, complainant also demanded
the refund of the amounts covered by the above-said two BPI
Family Bank Checks amounting to P51,716.54, they being
intended to represent payment of filing fees for the case
against Swire Realty and Development Corporation which
respondent failed to file.
As respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply with
complainants valid demands in evident bad faith and to her
prejudice, she filed the present complaint charging him with
flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
By Resolution14 of February 4, 2002, this Court directed
respondent to file his Comment. Respondent, through his
counsel, the Escobido and Pulgar Law Offices, filed a motion
for extension for thirty days or up to April 9, 2002, which was
granted by Resolution of May 27, 2002. No copy was,
however, furnished respondents counsel. 15
As respondent failed to file his Comment on the present
complaint, this Court, by Resolution of July 21, 2003,
considered the filing of respondents comment deemed
waived and allowed complainant to present her evidence
before the Office of the Bar Confidant.16
At the hearing before the Officer of the Bar Confidant,
complainant echoed her allegations in the complaint.
As to the other cases referred by complainant to respondent,
complainant testified that the case against Julie Enriquez-Teh
was dismissed because respondent failed to present the
original checks subject of the case; 17 that the estafa case
against Ms. Lourdes Boon was dismissed and was never
appealed;18 and that she was prodded by respondent to settle
the two cases for B.P. Blg. 22 even if she was not satisfied
with the terms thereof, respondent having assured her that
he would waive his 10% "success fee" in the case against
Swire Development.19
And complainant submitted the following documentary
evidence: (1) Retainer Agreement between her and Atty.
Renato Lazaro Bondal;20 (2) BPI Family Bank Check No. 94944
dated February 20, 2001 for P30,000.00 payable to cash; 21
(3) BPI Family Bank Check No. 94968 dated April 5, 2001 for
P21,716.54 payable to cash;22 (4) Resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Makati dated August 18, 2000 on a case
between Jayne Yu and Lourdes Fresnoza Boon; 23 (5)
Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Makati on a case between
her and Julie Enriquez-Teh; 24 (5) her letter to respondent
dated June 14, 2001 requesting the return of pertinent
records of the cases referred to him; 25 (6) letter of Francisco I.
Chavez to respondent dated July 18, 2001 reiterating the
request for the return of the records and an accounting of the
amount of P51,716.54;26 (7) letter of Francisco I. Chavez to
respondent dated August 8, 2001 confirming the receipt of
two folders relative to the cases she filed against Lourdes
Fresnoza Boon and Mona Lisa San Juan, requesting Atty.
Bondal to return the files bearing on Swire Realty and
Development Corporation and Julie Teh, and demanding the
refund of the amount of P51,716.54. 27
The Office of the Bar Confidant, by Report and
Recommendation,28 recommends the dismissal of the
complaint for failure of complainant to substantiate it.
From the records of the case, it is culled that except for the
case against Swire Development Corporation, the other 4
cases referred by complainant to respondent were filed in
court but were dismissed or terminated for causes not
attributable to respondent.
The case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon in I.S. No.
00-22089-90 was dismissed by the Makati Prosecutors Office
by Resolution dated August 18, 2000 due to lack of probable
cause and, in any event, the issues raised therein were in the
nature of intra-corporate disputes which are properly
cognizable by another forum, viz:
Aftercarefulexaminationandevaluationoftheevidencead
ducedbothbycomplainantandrespondent,
undersignedInvestigatingProsecutorfindsnoprobableca
use to hold respondent for the offense charged of
Estafa. Apparently, there was no deceit and/or
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence employed by
respondent when complainant agreed to invest her
money in the restaurant business under the name and
style of La Gondola, Inc. which is owned by
respondent. xxx In the present case, though,
complainant alleged that respondent immediately
upon receipt of the P4,800,000.00 representing her
investment in the restaurant business, executed earlier
in favor of Philippine Commercial and International
Bank whereby La Gondola assumed the loans and
credit accommodations obtained by Lucre
Export/Import Inc., using the funds of La Gondola, Inc.;
respondent being the President and majority owner of
the latter corporation. However, outside of the mere
allegation of complainant that respondent allegedly
assumed the loans and credit accommodations
extended to the other company using the funds of La
Gondola, Inc., no concrete and real evidence were
presented and/or proven to this effect by complainant.
xxx
Moreover, it is apparent that the issues being raised by
complainant appears to be intra-corporate disputes
which could be very well settled in another forum. 29
(Underscoring supplied)
Notably, a similar complaint for the same offense, docketed
as I.S. No. 99-H-2780, had been previously filed by
complainant against Ms. Boon which case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.30 As thus observed by the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the filing of an appeal from the
prosecutors resolution would have been inutile since the
facts and issues raised in the estafa case had already been
twice passed upon by the Office of the City Prosecutor,
hence, it would likely be dismissed.31
No fault or negligence can also be attributed to respondent in
the dismissal of I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88 against Julie Teh.
By Resolution of August 14, 2000 of the Makati Prosecutors
Office, it is clear that it was dismissed, in the main, on the
ground that the offense charged did not actually exist and
complainant failed to appear and present the original checks,
viz:
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the
undersigned recommends for the dismissal of the present
complaints on the following grounds:
1. Despite reasonable opportunity given to her,
complainant failed to appear and present the original
copies of the subject checks and other documents
attached to the complaint.
2. The subject checks were presented after the 90-day
period hence there is no more presumption of
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. Accordingly,
the burden is shifted upon the complainant to prove
that at the time the checks were issued, the drawer
knew that he had insufficient funds. There is no
allegation much less proof to that effect. The result is
that the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds
or credit is not present, therefore the crime does not
exist.32
On the alleged failure of respondent to appear during the
hearing of I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88 and his failure to present
the original of the checks subject thereof, they being then in
the possession of complainant who was abroad at that time: 33
Such failure to present the original of the checks cannot
solely be attributed to respondent, for she herself was guilty
of neglect.34
As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two
complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with the
terms dictated by the therein respondents Mona Lisa San
Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong, upon the promise of
respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee in the
complaint to be filed against Swire Development: Assuming
the truthfulness of her allegation that respondent compelled
her to settle, what the terms were as alleged to have been
dictated by Ms. San Juan and Ms. Chan Ong, and the manner
and/or extent of prejudice she suffered, complainant did not
establish. Moreover, she failed to show that the promise by
respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee was for
the purpose of defrauding her or of such nature as to
constitute undue influence, thereby depriving her of
reasonable freedom of choice.
Subsequent to the amicable settlement, it appears that
complainant never raised any objection to the terms of the
compromise. As an accepted rule, when a client, upon
becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment
thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney,
he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it. 35
As for complainants claim that the amount of P51,716.54,
which was the only amount on record that complainant paid
for respondents legal services, was intended for the filing
fees in the complaint against Swire Development
Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact the
retainer agreement does not so confirm.
We would like to thank you for retaining our law firm in the
handling and representation of your case.
Inregardtothefivecasesyoureferredtous,
ouraggregateAcceptancefeeisP200,000PesoswithanAppearan
cefeeofP1,500.00Pesosperhearing. As regards the damages
to be recovered, we will get 10% thereof by way of Success
Fee.36 (Underscoring supplied)
If, admittedly, the only payment given to complainant by However, since respondent had been advised by complainant
respondent is the amount of P51,716.54, then complainant through counsel Chavez Laureta and Associates, by letter of
still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his services, as
services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a of said date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of
contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which Professional Responsibility, viz:
entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged
outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied
shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over
with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the
all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have
and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly
represented the interest of complainant. Litigants need to be
transfer of the matter, including all information
reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or "magicians" who
necessary for the proper handling of the matter, to
can always win their cases for their clients no matter the
immediately turn over all papers and property which
utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants
complainant entrusted to his successor.
may feel about their cause.37
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
In sum, this Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of
Respondent is, however, hereby directed to RETURN all the
the Bar Confidant that complainant failed to establish the
records in his possession relative to the cases he handled for
guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
complainant.
proof. The charges against him must thus be dismissed. 38
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.

Rule 15.06. NOT STATE OR IMPLY INFLUENCE Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian
descent and a practicing endodontist in New York, seeks the
A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for
any public official, tribunal or legislative body. allegedly deceiving her into giving him a total of US$
3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other things, purchasing
REDDI V. ATTY. SEBRIO JR.
several real estate properties for resale.
A.C. No. 7027 January 30, 2009
From the records of the case, the following facts are
TANU REDDI,Complainant, gathered:
vs.
Taking after her parents who had been involved in various
ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SEBRIO, JR.,Respondent.
charitable activities in India, complainant nurtured
DECISION philanthropic desires of her own consisting primarily in
opening a hospital with modern facilities in an
PER CURIAM: underdeveloped part of Asia.1
Together with Immaculada Luistro (Immaculada), a Filipino
citizen,2 who was her assistant of over 10 years, complainant
visited the Philippines for the first time in 2000. Noting the
level of poverty in the country and the lack of medical
services for the poor,3 she decided to put up a hospital.4
Immaculada suggested to complainant to consider engaging
in the real estate business in the Philippines in order to speed
up the generation of funds. 5 Heeding the suggestion,
complainant returned to the Philippines in 2003 to explore
opportunities in the real estate business. 6
Complainant was introduced to respondent who would help
her acquire real properties for development and/or resale.
Since she could not acquire ownership of lands in the
Philippines, respondent advised her to use corporate vehicles
to effect the purchases. Three corporations were thus formed
Tagaytay Twins, Inc., Manila Chic Twins, Inc., and Tanu, Inc. 7
By complainants account, respondent cajoled her into buying
several parcels of land located at Tagaytay City, Las Pias
City, Makati City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. She related
the details surrounding the intended acquisition of property
as follows:
Re the Tagaytay City Property
Respondent represented to complainant that his client
Teresita Monzon (Teresita) owned an untitled 27-hectare
property located at Tagaytay City. Through the Tagaytay
Twins, Inc., complainant and Teresita executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated March 21, 2003 (Tagaytay
MOA)8 prepared by respondent under which she agreed to
finance the titling of the property in the total amount of
P20,000,000, and that once titled, the property would be
offered for sale, the proceeds of which would be divided
equally between her and Teresita. Complainant thereupon
made staggered payments of US$1,000, P2,000,000, and
US$36,360 to Teresita.9
Complainant was later to discover that 996 square meters of
the 27-hectare property had been purchased by Aldio
Properties, Inc. in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, which sale
Teresita challenged in an action for annulment before the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. In said action,
respondent was Teresitas counsel of record. 10
Re the Las Pias City Property
Respondent offered to complainant the option to purchase a
house and lot located at Las Pias City, which were
encumbered by a mortgage, and which respondent
represented as owned and being sold by one Francisca
Parales (Francisca)11 to finance an urgently needed heart
surgery of her daughter.12
On respondents advice, complainant obtained a franchise to
operate a Jollibee food outlet, with the agreement that out of
the profits that its operation would generate, she would get
50% while respondent and Immaculada would share the
remaining 50%.13 Complainant thus sent respondent sums of
money for the acquisition of both the Las Pias property and
a franchise to operate a Jollibee outlet.14
Re the Makati City Property
Respondent introduced complainant to a certain Mario C.
Mangco (Mangco), alleged legal officer of the intestate estate
of one Faustino Ramos (Ramos), which estate was alleged to
be the owner of a real property located at the consular area
adjacent to Forbes Park in Makati City. 15 Complainant having
been interested in acquiring the property, respondent
prepared a Memorandum of Agreement (Makati MOA) which
she, together with Mangco, forged on March 20, 2004. 16
Under the Makati MOA, complainant agreed to, as she did,
release P10,000,000 representing the cost of development
and titling of the property, and payment of back taxes; and
an additional P2,000,000 for the execution of the Makati
MOA.
Complainant was later to learn that the property was neither
owned by the intestate estate of Ramos nor for sale.
Re the Quezon City Property
Respondent broached to complainant the idea of buying the
land on which SM North Mall in Quezon City stands, he
representing that it belongs to his client, purportedly a
retired US Navy employee who resides in Mindanao. 17
Complainant assented and transmitted large sums of money
to respondent for the purpose of, among other things, filing a
petition for injunction against SM North Mall, paying back
taxes, and titling of the land.18
Re the Pasay City Property
Complainant sent respondent hefty amounts of money for the
purchase of a vacant lot located along Roxas Boulevard in
Pasay City, alleged to belong to Florenda Estrada (Florenda)
and Alma Mallari (Alma), but which was mortgaged to one
Atty. Go to secure a loan of P5,000,000. 19 She also defrayed
expenses, on the strength of respondents representations, to
secure title to the lot, settle the mortgage obligation, relocate
squatters on the lot, and bribe a judge to "close the
transaction."20
Complainant subsequently discovered that there was no such
vacant lot along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City; instead, she
found out that the "vacant lot" referred to was titled in the
names of Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC) and
Banco De Oro Universal Bank (BDO).21
In light of the foregoing developments, complainants
counsel, by letter dated December 19, 2005, 22 demanded
from respondent the return of the amount of US$3,000,000,
claimed to be part of the total sum of money she had sent to
him for all the transactions that did not come about. No
amount has been returned to complainant.
Hence, spawned the filing on January 27, 2006 23 of the
present complaint for disbarment against respondent.
By his Comment, respondent admits receiving a total of
US$544,828 from complainant24 which amount he claims was
used not only for the purchase of the Las Pias property and
discharge of the mortgage thereon, but also for the setting
up of the earlier mentioned corporations, as well as for the
downpayment on the Makati property and related expenses.25
Respondent likewise admits having represented to
complainant that the Las Pias City property belonged to one
Francisca,26 certificate of title to which and the corresponding
deed of sale signed by Francisca, by his claim, are in his
possession; but the title has not been transferred to Tanu,
Inc., as agreed, in view of complainants failure to provide the
money needed therefor, he adding that he is also exercising
his retaining lien over the Las Pias documents. 27
Specifically with respect to the Makati property, respondent
claims having paid P500,000 to Mangco representing initial
payment28 thereof.
Regarding the Tagaytay City property, respondent admits
that the Tagaytay MOA exists, and avers that it is
complainant who wants to get out of a perfected sale in order
to recover her partial payment amounting to approximately
P4,000,000.29
With respect to the Quezon City property, respondent states
that he is willing to surrender all the documents pertaining
thereto, but would do so only if complainant is first ordered to
pay him his professional fees.30
As for the Pasay City property, respondent denies
complainants claims thereon as mere "preposterous
allegations."
Following the filing by complainant of her Reply, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation/decision by
Resolution of January 22, 2007.31
At the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline on September 13, 2007 before
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing (the Commissioner), 32
respondent failed to appear despite notice. He instead sent a
representative who sought a resetting as, allegedly,
respondent was in Ilocos attending to an important family
matter.33 The Commissioner, finding respondents absence
inexcusable, given that he had ample time to file a motion for
resetting but he did not, considered respondent to have
waived his right to participate in the proceedings. 34
Complainant thereupon presented evidence ex-parte and
submitted her position paper.35
In her Report and Recommendation 36 submitted to the IBP
Board of Governors on December 14, 2007, the
Commissioner found respondent to have committed
fraudulent acts which constitute violations of the lawyers
oath and numerous provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), viz:
1. Respondent violated CANON 1 which states: "A
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and for legal
processes."
Respondent committed estafa punishable under Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. With unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, he misappropriated millions of
pesos which was [sic] given to him on his
misrepresentation that such were needed for the
acquisition of the aforementioned properties.
Respondent also committed an unlawful act (i.e.,
falsification as part of his fraudulent scheme) when he
tampered with the Articles of Incorporation of Tanu,
Inc.. A perusal of the Articles of Incorporation given by
respondent to complainant shows that the
incorporators are Tanu Reddi, Michael Lee, Prasuna
Reddy, Ahalya Devi, and Robert Juntilla. When
complainant obtained a copy of the same in
September 2005, she discovered that other names
were inserted. The names of respondent, Clarito D.
Cardozo, Brian Pellazar, and Michael Angelo Lopez
were intercalated. (Exhibit "W")
2. He likewise violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
He engaged in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful
conduct when he offered properties for sale to
complainant on the misrepresentation that
complainant was dealing with the true owners thereof.
This is very clear from the documents he asked
complainant to sign; namely, the Memorandum of
Agreement (Exhibit "D") for the Tagaytay property,
Deed of Conditional Sale (Exhibit "U") for the Pasay
City property, and Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit
"M") for the Makati City property. The certificates of
title, tax declaration and other documents obtained by
complainant from the various government agencies
reveal that all these properties aforementioned were
either fictitious, not susceptible to sale, simulated, or
inexistent.
3. Respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the
CPR which state:
"CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client."
He failed to account for the sums of money he
received from complainant and failed to return the
same upon demand. (Copy of demand letter dated 19
December 2005, Exhibit "T")
4. Respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the CPR which
provides:
"A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body."
He convinced complainant to pay bribe money to our
judges since, he claims, that it is a common practice in
the Philippines.37 (Underscoring supplied)
The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be
disbarred; that his name be ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys; and that he be ordered to return the total amount
of US$3,000,000 to complainant.
By Resolution of January 17, 2008,38 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commissioner, with the modification
that respondent was ordered to return only the admitted
amount he received from complainant (US$544,828), without
prejudice to complainants recovery of the other amounts
claimed in the appropriate forum.
The Court sustains the IBP Board of Governors, except its
findings/conclusion that respondent committed estafa and
falsification. This is not the proper forum to determine
whether he committed these offenses.
The Court finds, however, that respondents dishonest and
deceitful conduct with respect to the intended transactions,
real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is
sufficiently established.
It bears emphasis that respondent admits having received
from complainant at least US$544,828. He claims, however,
that the amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias
property and the discharge of the mortgage thereon, the
setting up of the corporations earlier mentioned, and the
downpayment on the Makati property and related
representation expenses therefor. The Court finds that the
claim does not lie.
All that respondent presented to account for the money is a
handwritten acknowledgment of a supposed partial payment
of P500,000 for the Makati property, purportedly executed by
one Mangco.39 By any standard, this document is a mere
piece of paper, Mangco not having been presented, if he
exists at all, to confirm that he indeed issued the receipt.
Since respondent failed to credibly account, upon demand,
for the money held by him in trust an element of
misappropriation40 complainants claim that respondent
employed deceit on her is established.
Respondents culpability is further highlighted by his utter
lack of regard for the seriousness of the charges against him.
His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare
denials. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.41 He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him. 42 This, respondent miserably failed
to do.
Respondents justification for his non-presentation of any
documents to substantiate the so-called property acquisitions
that he is exercising his retaining lien over them as,
allegedly, his professional fees have not been paid is
incredible.
If those documents actually exist, and considering that his
license to practice law is on the line, respondent could have
readily attached even photocopies thereof to his Comment in
order to lend a semblance of credibility to his claim. His
"retaining lien" claim remains just that. Worse, it only
amounts to an admission that he acted as counsel for
complainant; yet, he completely failed to show that in his
dealings on her behalf, he put her interests before his.
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, the Court
finds the same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
To reiterate, byhisownadmission, respondent received a total
of US$544,828 from complainant, which he could not
properly account for. The orchestrated manner in which he
carried out his fraudulent scheme, in connivance with other
persons, and by taking advantage of complainants naivete in
the workings of the real estate business in the Philippines,
depict a man whose character falls way, way short of the
exacting standards required of him as a member of the bar
and an officer of the court. Thus, respondent is no longer fit
to remain as such.
The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form
of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar
must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. 43 If the
practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. 44
The requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.45
The Court also sustains the order of the IBP for respondent to
return only the amount of US$544,828. While complainant
submitted documents showing her bank remittances
involving different sums of money, some of these
remittances were not made in the name of respondent. 46 And
as complainant herself declares, the amount of US$3,000,000
is a mere estimate of her total claim.47 Thus, only the return
of the admitted amount of US$544,828 is in order. As
reflected above, complainant is not precluded from litigating
her claim for any balance due her in the proper forum.
Rule 15.07. IMPRESS COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS
A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness.
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE INC. V. ATTY. FLORIDO
A.C. No. 5736 June 18, 2010
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of
the Board of Directors1 of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc.
(RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido
(respondent) for "acts constituting grave coercion and threats
when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI,
led his clients in physically taking over the management and
operation of the bank through force, violence and
intimidation."
WHEREFORE, respondent Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. is
DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED TO RETURN to complainant
the amount of US$544,828. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment
against respondent.2 RBCI alleged that respondent violated
his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his
clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos,
Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-
Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the
use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and
the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A.
Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks
vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.
In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations.
Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the
authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos
group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of
RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and
valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a
termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to
comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of
managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-
Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step
down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with
the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed
the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises
of individuals who had no transaction with the bank.
Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos
group, also changed the locks of the banks vault.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious
mischief filed against him by RBCI was already dismissed;
while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered
suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed
against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed
against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any
evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that
the affidavits attached to the complaint were never
identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that
none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified
true copies.
The Ruling of the IBP
On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his
report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the
exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice.3 Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that
the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a
more severe penalty.
According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or
ought to have known that his clients could not just forcibly
take over the management and premises of RBCI without a
valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the
right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one
of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No.
6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had
no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it
was a "naked power grab without any semblance of legality
whatsoever."
Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative
complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent
of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against
respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI
complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a
verified complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits.
Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with
the mandatory conference hearing and, instead,
simultaneously submit their position papers.
On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent
dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law
profession and suspended respondent from the practice of
law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar
conduct will warrant a more severe penalty. 4
On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied
respondents motion.5
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. 6 Likewise, it is the
lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of
the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. 7
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this
reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress
upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client. 8 It is his duty to
counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in
seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to
their adversaries.9
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and
peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily,
when they appear before a tribunal, they act not
merely as representatives of a party but, first and
foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to
protect their clients interests is secondary to their
obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. While they are obliged to
present every available legal remedy or defense, their
fidelity to their clients must always be made within the
parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of
truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice. 10
Rule 15.08. DUAL PROFESSION
A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
DR. GAMILLA ET. AL. V. ATTY. MARIO JR.
A.C. No. 4763 March 20, 2003
DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E.
POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO, LUZ DE GUZMAN,
GLICERIA BALDRES, FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES
C. MEDINA, HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. 11 Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in
the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is
condemnable and unethical.12
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict
Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one
year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record
as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS TADLE, LAURA
ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA,
LEONCIO CASAL, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA
FAMORCA, CELSO NIERA, CESAR REYES, NATIVIDAD
SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIO JR., respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THIS DISBARMENT CASE EMANATED from an intra-union
leadership dispute some seventeen (17) years ago that
spilled over to the instant complaint alleging impropriety and
double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money
entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent Atty.
Eduardo J. Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union
and his core of officers and directors for distribution among
faculty members of the university. 1
For a sense of history, sometime in 1986 respondent Atty.
Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other
union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the management of UST for the provision of economic
benefits amounting to P35 million. Instead of creating a
harmonious relationship between the contracting parties, the
collective bargaining agreement regrettably engendered
disputes arising from the interpretation and implementation
thereof one of which even reached this Court. 2
The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988
but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989
the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-
measure UST terminated the employment of sixteen (16)
officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including
respondent. The dismissal precipitated anew bitter legal
battles which were resolved by this Court in favor of the
dismissed employees by ordering their reinstatement with
back wages.3
In 1990 Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres prescribed the
terms and conditions of a five (5)-year collective bargaining
agreement between UST and the UST Faculty Union
retroactive to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of
UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a
compromise agreement for the payment of P7,000,000.00
from which P5,000,000.00 was intended to settle the back
wages and other claims of the sixteen (16) union officers and
directors of the UST Faculty Union, including herein
respondent, who were earlier ordered reinstated by this
Court, and the sum of P2,000,000.00 to satisfy the remaining
obligations of UST under the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement. It appears from the record that only
P5,000,000.00 for the back wages and other claims of
respondent Atty. Mario and other concerned union officers
and directors was paid immediately by UST while the
satisfaction of the balance of P2,000,000.00 was apparently
deferred to some unspecified time.
In 1992 UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a
memorandum of agreement to settle the salary increases
and other benefits under the collective bargaining agreement
effective 1988 for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for
a total of P42,000,000.00. It was agreed that the benefits
accruing from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 were to be
taken from the sum of P42,000,000.00 which UST would
release directly to the faculty members, while the remainder
of the P42,000,000.00 package would be ceded by UST to the
UST Faculty Union which would then disburse the balance to
cover the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993.
The memorandum of agreement also charged the amount of
P2,000,000.00 agreed upon in the 1990 compromise
agreement as well as the attorney's fees of Atty. Mario
worth P4,200,000.00 against the P42,000,000.00 outlay.
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, UST took
care of the disbursement of P20,226,221.60 from the total
commitment of P42,000,000.00 to pay for the following
expenses: (a) P2,000,000.00 as payment for unpaid
obligations to faculty members under the 1986 collective
bargaining agreement; (b) P13,833,597.96 for the salary
increases of faculty members from 1 June 1991 to 31 October
1992; (c) P192,623.64 for telephone, electricity and water
billings; and, (d) P4,200,000.00 paid to the UST Faculty Union
as attorney's fees. The expenses left a collectible sum of
P21,773,778.40 from the obligation of P42,000,000.00. The
university however relinquished only P18,038,939.37 to the
UST Faculty Union which was P3,734,839.03 short of the
balance of P21,773,778.40. In the meantime, the UST Faculty
Union placed P9,766,570.01 of the amount received from UST
in the money market to earn as it did make P1,146,381.27 in
interest.
For benefits corresponding to 1 November 1992 to 31 May
1993, the UST Faculty Union charged against the short-
changed amount of P18,038,939.37 a total of P16,723,638.27
consisting of the following expenses: (a) P10,521,800.64 as
the amount paid for salary increases beginning 1 November
1992 to 31 May 1993; (b) P578,296.31 which was refunded to
the faculty members whose salaries were reduced as a result
of their participation in the 1989 strike; (c) P2,045,192.97 as
amount paid to the faculty members representing their
December 1992 bonus; and, (d) P3,578,348.35 for
reimbursements to the University of Santo Tomas. The
expenses left a balance of P5,050,140.13, i.e., the remainder
of P1,315,301.10 out of the P18,038,939.37 earlier turned
over by UST to the UST Faculty Union, plus the deficit amount
of P3,734,839.03 which UST later turned over to the UST
Faculty Union after previously failing to deliver the amount.
To the sum of P5,050,140.13, the UST Faculty Union added
the interest earnings of P1,146,381.27 from money market
investments as well as the amount of P192,632.64
representing the disallowed amount of expenses earlier
deducted by UST from the P42,000,000.00 package. All in all,
the money left in the possession of the UST Faculty Union
was P6,389,154.04 which it distributed among the faculty
members in 1994.
Complainants as members of the UST Faculty Union
questioned the alleged lack of transparency among the
officers and directors of the union in the management and
disbursement of the monetary benefits for the faculty
members. They initiated two (2) complaints with the Office of
the Regional Director, National Capital Region, Department of
Labor and Employment, one on 18 October 1995, docketed
as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022, and another, on 16
November 1996, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028.
In both pleadings, they prayed for the expulsion of the
officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty.
Mario because of their alleged failure to account for the
balance of the P42,000,000.00 ceded to them by UST and the
attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00 which they
deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members. 4
On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Mario accusing him of (a)
compromising their entitlements under the 1986 collective
bargaining agreement without the knowledge, consent or
ratification of the union members, and worse, for only
P2,000,000.00 when they could have received more than
P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00
received by him and other officers and directors in the UST
Faculty Union under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c)
lack of transparency in the administration and distribution of
the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under
the 1992 memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal to remit
and account for the P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty
members although the amount was denominated as
attorney's fees. Complainants asserted that respondent
violated Rules 1.015 and 1.026 of Canon 1; Rule 15.087 of
Canon 15; Rules 16.01,8 16.029 and 16.0310 of Canon 16; and
Rule 20.0411 of Canon 20, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
On 4 November 1997, after several extensions Atty. Mario
filed his comment on the complaint. He alleged that the
issues raised therein were the same issues involved in the
two (2) complaints before the Bureau of Labor Relations and
therefore constituted forum-shopping, and further explained
that he had adequately accounted for the disbursement of
the money demanded by complainants.
On 18 March 1998 we referred the disbarment complaint and
the comment thereon to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety
(90) days from notice thereof.
On 18 May 1999 we received the Report of IBP Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro as well as the Resolution of 30 March 1999
of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the
Report which found the complaint meritorious and suspended
respondent Atty. Mario from the practice of law "until such
time that the required detailed accounting of the questioned
remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty Union] during
his incumbency as President and Legal Counsel has been
officially submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union]
and to the IBP."
On 7 September 1999 respondent filed his comment on the
IBP Report and Resolution and alleged the same contentions
he previously asserted. On 27 October 1999 we referred the
case back to the IBP for a more detailed investigation and
submission of report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from notice.
In the meantime, or on 27 May 1999, the Regional Director
found merit in the two (2) complaints docketed as Case No.
NCR-OD-M-9412-022 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028 and
ordered the expulsion of respondent and the other officers
and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario
because of their failure to account for the balance of the
P42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by the
management of UST, and their collection of exorbitant and
illegal attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00. 12
On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal
docketed as BLR-A-TR-52-25-10-99 set aside the Order of the
Regional Director. It found that the balance of the
P42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union
had been fully and adequately accounted for by respondent
and the other officers and directors of the union. 13
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered
respondent and the other officers and directors of the union
to distribute the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 among the
faculty members and to immediately hold the elections for
union officers and directors in view of the expiration of their
respective terms of office.
On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60657.14 The Decision of the Court of Appeals was
elevated to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763, where the
case is allegedly still pending resolution.
On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed Report and
Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and
the IBP Resolution of 3 August 2002 of the Board of
Governors adopting and approving the Report which
recommended the lifting of Atty. Mario's suspension from
law practice since he had sufficiently accounted for the funds
in question.
For a start, it appears that complainants did not file a petition
with this Court to review the IBP Resolution exonerating
respondent from the accusations against him and lifting his
suspension from the practice of law, an action otherwise
required under Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court if the
case against respondent could still proceed in this Court.
Nevertheless since the IBP Resolution is merely
recommendatory, and considering further the instructional
value of this case to members of the Bench, many of whom
are engaged simultaneously in other businesses or
professions, we find it prudent and judicious to decide the
instant case once and for all.
In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent
Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. in the manner by which he secured
the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement
and the P4,200,000.00 attorney's fees under the obligation to refrain from placing oneself in positions that
memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity.
the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in
adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds
an action or any proceeding against a party even with the
which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of
client's consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf
agreements with the management of UST, this Court believes
against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the
that Atty. Mario failed to avoid conflict of interests, first,
defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments. 17 No doubt,
when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein
a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the
he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney
subject matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client. 18
and interested party being one of the dismissed employees
seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained In the instant case, quite apart from the issue of validity of
the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior the 1990 compromise agreement, this Court finds fault in
disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the respondent's omission of that basic sense of fidelity to steer
members of the UST Faculty Union. clear of situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his
client, the faculty members of UST, open to question. Atty.
As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors
Mario both as lawyer and president of the union was duty
seeking compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for
bound to protect and advance the interest of union members
their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious
and the bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was
conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as
jeopardized when his personal interest as one of the
concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in
dismissed employees of UST complicated the negotiation
forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of
process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise
interest among lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new
agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him and
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
the other dismissed union officers and directors, seemingly or
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof."15 In the same manner, it is The facts would affirm this observation. In brokering the
undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put compromise agreement, respondent received P5,000,000.00
himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, as compensation for the dismissed union officials while only
actually impels him to do less than his best for his client. P2,000,000.00 apparently settled UST's obligations in favor of
the faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining
Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person
agreement when their original claim amounted to at least
occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons
P9,000,000.00. Worse, the P2,000,000.00 concession for
is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the
accountabilities demandable long ago in 1986 was paid only
property committed to his custody for management. 16 This
in 1992 under the memorandum of agreement, or a period of
rule is entirely independent of whether fraud has intervened
more than two (2) years after the execution of the
as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard
compromise agreement, in contrast to the immediate
from an attorney because the rule stands on the moral
payment of the P5,000,000.00 to Atty. Mario and the other
union officers and directors.
Respondent Atty. Mario ought to have disclosed to the
members of the UST Faculty Union, if not the entire
bargaining unit of faculty members, his interest in the
compromise agreement as one of the dismissed union
officers seeking compensation for the claim of back wages
and other forms of damages, and also the reasons for
reducing the claim of the faculty members from more than
P9,000,000.00 to only P2,000,000.00. As the record shows,
the explanations for respondent's actions were disclosed only
years after the consummation of the compromise agreement,
particularly only after the instant complaint for disbarment
was filed against him, when the accounting should have been
forthcoming either before or during the settlement of the
labor case against the management of UST.
Equally important, since respondent and the other union
officers and directors were to get for themselves a lion's
share of the compromise as they ultimately did, Atty. Mario
should have unambiguously divulged and made clear to his
client the compelling probability of conflict of interests. He
should have voluntarily turned over the reins of legal
representation to another lawyer who could have acted on
the matter with a deep sense of impartiality over the several
claims against UST and an unfettered commitment to the
cause of the faculty members.
Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in
respondent's dual role as lawyer and president of the UST
Faculty Union when he obtained P4,200,000.00 as attorney's
fees. Without ruling on the validity of the collection of
attorney's fees so as not to pre-empt the decision in G.R. No.
149763 on this issue, the record does not show any
justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any
clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks
as union president comprising in all probability the same
duties for which he had collected a hefty compensation as
attorney for the union.
The situation of Atty. Mario is not any different from that of
an executor or administrator of an estate who may not
charge against the estate any professional fee for legal
services rendered by him because his efforts as such are
already paid for in his capacity as executor or administrator. 19
Indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of
self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorney's fees by
spelling out the terms and bases for the claim of
P4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as
president of the union should have otherwise covered his
legal services as well.
Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the
compromise agreement or demanding the inexplicable
attorney's fees, his actions were not transparent enough to
allow the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely
and intelligently. Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer to
"observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients." Lawyers are vanguards in the
bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have
a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less
of self-interest.
As indispensable part of the system of administering justice,
attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics - a duty more than imperative
during these critical times when strong and disturbing
criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of
imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of
openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would
progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyer's vocation
is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but
a serious matter of public interest.
The evidence on record proves that Atty. Mario failed to Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and
disclose at crucial moments significant information about the acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict
manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection
the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney's and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially
fees under the memorandum of agreement. A simple observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with
accounting of the money that he and others concerned his client.22
received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. is
the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty
REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with a warning that a more
members about the probability of conflict of interests on
drastic punishment will be imposed on him upon a repetition
respondent's part and guided them to look for alternative
of the same act.
actions to protect their own interests.
SO ORDERED.
In light of the irrefragable fact of respondent's misdemeanor,
a possible mitigation of his actionable conduct was that the Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
attorney's fees and the compromise agreement were concur.
negotiated and finalized under the most strenuous
circumstances where his leadership and that of his core
officers and directors were incessantly challenged by
complainants allegedly aided by factions within UST itself. He
might also have believed that the settlement achieved
immense benefits for his constituents which would not have
been otherwise obtained if he had chosen to relinquish the
rein of legal representation to some other lawyer. Finally, it
was not improbable for him to suppose though wrongly that
he could represent and in some manner serve the interests of
all of them, including his own, by pushing for and seeking the
approval of the agreements himself. 20

We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so

much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the
dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the
public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the
court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this
type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more
stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a
warning would be sufficient disciplinary action in accordance
with our ruling in Sumangil v. Sta. Romana. 21 Hence, Atty.
 CANON 16 HOLD IN TRUST CLIENTS MONEY AND
PROPERTIES
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 ACCOUNT
A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Art. 1491, Civil Code

Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by

purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons

who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may
have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of
the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the
estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the
State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or
institution, the administration of which has been
intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges
and government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.
 ATTY. SOLOMON JR. V. ATTY FRIAL
A.C. No. 7820 September 12, 2008
ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO C. FRIAL, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on December 22, 2006, complainant Atty.
Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. charged respondent Atty. Joselito C.
Frial with violating his Lawyers Oath and/or gross misconduct
arising from his actuations with respect to two attached
vehicles. Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question,
asked that Atty. Frial be disbarred.
The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo
v. Ricardo Salomon et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 05-
111825 before the Regional Trial Court in Manila, in which a
writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favor of Lucy Lo,
Atty. Frials client. The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of
complainant-a black 1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan
Sentra.
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila,
instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises,
turned them over to Atty. Frial, Los counsel. Atty. Salomon
claimed that on several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was
spotted being used by unauthorized individuals. For instance,
on December 26, 2005, barangay captain Andrew Abundo
saw the Nissan Sentra in front of a battery shop on Anonas
St., Quezon City. On February 18, 2006, Architect Roberto S.
Perez and three others saw and took video and photo shots of
the same car while in the Manresa Shell station at P. Tuazon
Blvd. corner 20th Avenue, Quezon City. Also sometime in June
2006, Robert M. Perez, complainants driver, saw the said car
in another Shell station near Kamias Street. On December 16,
2006, Arlene Carmela M. Salomon spotted it driven by
bondsman Ferdinand Liquigan allegedly with Atty. Frials
consent. As Atty. Salomon further alleged, when the misuse
of the car was reported, paving for Liquigans apprehension,
Atty. Frial, in a letter, acknowledged having authorized
Liquigan to bring the car in custodia legis to a mechanic.
As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation,
Atty. Frial deliberately withheld information as to its
whereabouts. As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally
destroyed by fire, but the court was not immediately put on
notice of this development.
In his Answer,2 Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars
thru his own undertaking, without authority and knowledge of
the court. The subject vehicles, according to him, were first
parked near the YMCA building in front of the Manila City Hall
where they remained for four months. He said that when he
went to check on the vehicles condition sometime in
December 2005, he found them to have been infested and
the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats. He denied
personally using or allowing others the use of the cars,
stating in this regard that if indeed the Nissan Sentra was
spotted on Anonas St., Quezon City on December 26, 2005, it
could have been the time when the car was being transferred
from the YMCA. The February 18, 2006 and June 2006
sightings, so Atty. Frial claimed, possibly occurred when the
Nissan Sentra was brought to the gas station to be filled up.
He said that the car could not have plausibly been spotted in
Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in
front of Liquigans house for mechanical check-up.
During the mandatory conference/hearing before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, the parties agreed on the
following key issues to be resolved: (1) whether or not Atty.
Frial used the cars for his personal benefit; and (2) whether
or not Atty. Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the
attached properties.
Thereafter and after the submission by the parties of their
respective position papers, the Commission submitted a
Report dated October 9, 2007 which the IBP Board of
Governors forthwith adopted and then transmitted to this
Court. In the Report, the following were deduced from the
affidavits of Andrew Abundo, Roberto Perez, Robert Perez,
and Dante Batingan: (1) at no time was Atty. Frial seen
driving the Sentra; (2) Abundo learned that at that time the
car was spotted at the battery shop, the unnamed driver
bought a new battery for the car which was not inappropriate
since a battery was for the preservation of the car; (3) Atty.
Frial admitted that the Nissan Sentra was seen gassed up on
February 18, 2006 and in June 2006 and there was no reason
to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those times unless it was
being used; (4) Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was
used to buy goats meat; and (5) photos of the Nissan Sentra
in different places obviously showed it was being used by
others.
In the same Report, the Commission observed that while
there is perhaps no direct evidence tying up Atty. Frial with
the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact remains that
it was being used by other persons during the time he was
supposed to have custody of it. In addition, whoever drove
the Nissan Sentra on those occasions must have received the
car key from Atty. Frial. When Atty. Frial took custody of the
Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars, he was duty bound to keep and
preserve these in the same condition he received them so as
to fetch a good price should the vehicles be auctioned.
As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in
excellent condition and that there was no court order
authorizing him to remove the car from the YMCA premises.
Admitted too was the fact that he secured the release of the
Volvo on the strength alone of his own written undertaking; 3
and that the car was almost totally destroyed by fire on
February 4, 2006 at 1:45 a.m. 4 while parked in his residence.
He could not, however, explain the circumstances behind the
destruction, but admitted not reporting the burning to the
court or the sheriff. While the burning of the car happened
before the mediation hearing, Atty. Frial, upon inquiry of Atty.
Salomon, did not give information as to the whereabouts of
the cars.
The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frials residence was not
an ordinary occurrence; it was an event that could have not
easily escaped his attention. Accordingly, there is a strong
reason to believe that Atty. Frial deliberately concealed the
destruction of said vehicle from the court during the hearings
in Civil Case No. 05-111828, which were the opportune times
to reveal the condition of the Volvo car.
On the basis of the foregoing premises, the Commission
concluded that Atty. Frial committed acts clearly bearing on
his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to observe the
diligence required of him as custodian of the cars. The
Commission thus recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
The findings and the recommendation of the Commission are
well-taken.
A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from
disposing of the attached property, thus securing the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the
plaintiff or any proper party.5 When the objects of the
attachment are destroyed, then the attached properties
would necessarily be of no value and the attachment would
be for naught.
From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is
no question that Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct
arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics that states:
11. Dealing with trust property
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for
his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
(Emphasis ours.)
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such,
he is expected to respect the courts order and processes.
Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He
trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.
Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking
good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of
the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using
it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the
destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took
custody of them without so much as informing the court, let
alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars,
we find Atty. Frial guilty of infidelity in the custody of the
attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at
this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not
without legal recourse in recovering the Volvos value from
Atty. Frial should they desire to do so.
The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as
complainant urges, the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral
character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar.6 With the view we take of the case, there is no
compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended
to pervert the administration of justice for some dishonest
purpose.
Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand,
suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. 7 This
is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment
on the economic life and honor of the erring person. In the
case of Atty. Frial, the Court finds that a years suspension
from the practice of his legal profession will provide him with
enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Frial is adjudged guilty of
grave misconduct and infidelity in the custody of properties
in custodia legis. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. Let notice of this Decision be entered
in his personal record as an attorney with the Office of the
Bar Confidant and notice of the same served on the IBP and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Brion, JJ.,
concur.
 ALMANDAREZ JR. V. ATTY. LANGIT
A.C. No. 7057 July 25, 2006
DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On 5 May 2004, David L. Almendarez, Jr. ("complainant") filed
this complaint-affidavit1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Minervo T.
Langit ("respondent") for acts unbecoming a lawyer.
The facts are undisputed:
Complainant, as attorney-in-fact of his mother Pura Lioanag
Vda. de Almendarez, was the plaintiff in an ejectment case
before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2
("trial court"). Respondent served as complainant's counsel.
While the case was pending, defendant Roger Bumanlag
("Bumanlag") deposited monthly rentals for the property in
dispute to the Branch Clerk of Court.
On 3 February 1994, the trial court rendered a decision in the
ejectment case based on a compromise agreement executed
by complainant and Bumanlag. On 18 December 1995, the
trial court issued an alias writ of execution for the satisfaction
of the decision. A court order2 dated 2 March 2000 granted
the Omnibus Motion for Execution and Withdrawal of
Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as complainant's
counsel. Respondent filed a second motion for withdrawal of
deposited rentals, which the trial court also granted on 16
March 2000.
Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned that respondent
was able to withdraw the rentals deposited by Bumanlag.
Felicidad Daroy ("Daroy"), Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court,
confirmed this to complainant who received from Daroy
copies of the two withdrawal slips drawn from the trial court's
savings account. One slip dated 10 March 2000 was for
P28,000,3 and another slip dated 19 April 2000 was for
P227,000.4 Thus, respondent received a total of P255,000, as
evidenced by two receipts5 signed by him. The withdrawals
were made through Daroy's authorized representative
Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy personally delivered the money
to respondent. Respondent did not inform complainant of
these transactions.
Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida,
sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for
the accounting and return of the P255,000.6 Respondent
failed to reply.
Hence, complainant filed this case for disbarment against
respondent for failing to account for complainant's funds.
Complainant further accuses respondent of neglecting to
pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in
the ejectment case.
On 12 May 2004, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A.
Vinluan ("IBP Director Vinluan") ordered respondent to submit
his Answer to the complaint. Respondent did not file an
answer despite receipt of the notice.7
On 4 October 2004, IBP Investigating Commissioner Caesar
R. Dulay ("IBP Commissioner Dulay") notified the parties to
appear before him for a mandatory conference on 15
November 2004, later reset to 17 January 2005. Only
complainant appeared at the conference, prompting IBP
Commissioner Dulay to order the conference terminated and
to declare that respondent had waived his right to participate
in the proceedings. IBP Commissioner Dulay directed the
parties to file their respective position papers. Complainant
submitted his position paper on 22 March 2005. Again,
respondent took no action.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
On 8 June 2005, IBP Commissioner Dulay submitted his
Report and Recommendation ("Report")8 with the finding that
respondent failed to account for money he held in trust for
complainant. The Report considered complainant's evidence
"clear and convincing" enough to justify disciplinary action
against respondent for violation of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. IBP Commissioner Dulay
recommended that respondent be declared guilty of gross
misconduct and suspended for one year, aside from being
ordered to render an accounting of the money he had
received.
In a Resolution9 dated 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors approved the Report, with the modification that
the penalty of suspension be increased to two years.
The Court's Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP.
Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when
he received the sum of money representing the monthly
rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and
returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received
the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant.
Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for
complainant. The Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code")
states:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property to his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of
the trial court's approval of the motion to withdraw the
deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him,
respondent could have collected any lien which he had over
them in connection with his legal services, provided he gave
prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the
mere fact that the client owes him attorney's fees.10 In this
case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of
any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money.
Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant
despite the latter's demands gives rise to the presumption
that he had converted the money for his personal use and
benefit. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the legal
profession.11 More specifically, it renders respondent liable
not only for violating the Code but also for contempt, as
stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
 SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded he may
be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.
Additionally, respondent failed to observe Canon 17 12 of the
Code, which obligates the lawyer to take up the cause of his
client with entire zeal and devotion. It seems that after
respondent received the withdrawn deposits, he never
contacted complainant again. He did not pursue the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in the
ejectment case, to the prejudice of complainant. By his
inaction, respondent violated the trust and confidence
reposed in him. For in agreeing to be complainant's counsel,
respondent undertook to take all steps necessary to
safeguard complainant's interest in the case.
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his
unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him
to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards,
to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent
did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another
chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still,
respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant
disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to
uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. 13
Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only
to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities,14 including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to
conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary,
requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part
of the attorney. Respondent miserably failed in this regard.
Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and
devotion required by the legal profession from its members.
Whenever a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, this Court has the right and duty to
withdraw his privilege as officer of the Court and member of
the Bar.15
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Minervo T. Langit GUILTY of
violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision. We
ORDER respondent to RESTITUTE, within 30 days from
finality of this Decision, complainant's P255,000, with interest
at 12% per annum from 30 June 2003 until fully paid. We
DIRECT respondent to submit to the Court proof of payment
within 15 days from payment of the full amount. x x x SO
ORDERED.
CHUA AND HSIA V. ATTY. MESINA JR.
A.C. No. 4904 August 12, 2004
ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
By a verified complaint 1 received by the Office of the Bar
Confidant on May 5, 1998,2 Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina
Hsia administratively charged Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for
breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct,
and culpable malpractice.
As related by complainants, the following facts gave rise to
the filing of the complaint.
Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now
deceased husband Chua Yap Ans legal counsel and adviser
upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in
fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street,
Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondents
family, and another property containing an area of 854 sq.
m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City (Melencio
property), also owned by respondents family whereon they
(spouses Chua) constructed their house. These two
properties were mortgaged by the registered owner,
respondents mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina
(Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to
secure a loan she obtained.
As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank,
respondent convinced complainant Ana Chua and her
husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her obligation
in consideration for which the Melencio property would be
sold to them at P850.00/sq. m.
Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and
their business partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia,
settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of
P983,125.40.
A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 3 conveying
the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter
executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as
"Felicisima M. Melencio," in favor of complainants.
As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital
gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about
it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of
Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before
the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital
gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of
Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 19794 was executed by
Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as
"Felicisima M. Melencio," in favor of complainants wherein
the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses "in
the redemption of the MESINA properties," Mrs. Mesina was
found to have "an existing balance" due the spouses in the
amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised
respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit of February 18,
1986, "acknowledged such obligation" to be his and
undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986
a title over the Melencio property.
Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of
Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Juanito Tecson
(Tecson) filed an Affidavit5 dated February 20, 1986 before
the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office charging
respondents mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and
the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for
Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal
Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that
he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along
with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that
contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to
complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson
went on to relate that the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute
Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property
and was antedated "to evade payment of capital gains tax."
Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9,
1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the
falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to
complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the
Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to
Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 6 conveying to
"Felicisima M. Melencio" the Melencio property for
P85,400.00.
A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the
name of "Felicisima M. Melencio," the owners copy of which
was entrusted to complainants.
Tecson subsequently filed before the Cabanatuan City
Prosecutors Office an Affidavit of Desistance dated
September 5, 19867 alleging that his filing of the criminal
complaint "arose out of mere misunderstanding and
difference" with herein complainants and their co-
respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them.
Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached
complainants and told them that he would borrow the
owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that
he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of
sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In
fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking 8
dated May 2, 1990 reading:
Received the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 4383
issued by the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City
registered in the name of Felicisima Mesina, widow,
consisting of about 854 square meters more or less
located at calle Melencio, Cabanatuan City from Mrs.
Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia.
I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of
the above-mentioned property in favor of Ana Chua
and Marcelina Hsia to be signed by Mrs. Felicisima
Mesina, within four (4) months from date hereof so
that the above-mentioned property and title maybe
transferred in the name of Ana Chua and Macelina
Hsia. (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died "in the early part of
1991."
Despite respondents repeated promises "to effect" the
transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so.
Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property
was being offered for sale to the public.
The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed
on August 24, 1992 a Complaint 9 against respondent and his
two siblings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva
Ecija in Cabanatuan City, for "Declaration of Nullity of Sale
and Reconveyance of Real Property."
As of the time of the filing of the present administrative
complaint in 1998, the civil case against the Mesina siblings
was still pending.
This Court, by Resolution of July 13, 1998, 10 directed
respondent to file Comment on the complaint within ten
days.
By Resolution of December 2, 1998,11 this Court, noting that
the copy of the Resolution of July 13, 1998 requiring
respondent to comment on the complaint sent to him at his
office address at S. M. Mesina Law Office, 30 Jupiter St.,
Paseo de Roxas, Bel-Air Subd., Makati City was returned
unserved with the notation "Moved," considered the
Resolution of July 13, 1998 served on respondent by
substituted service pursuant to Rule 13, Section 8 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent was accordingly
deemed to have waived the filing of the required comment.
By the same Resolution of December 2, 1998, the case was
61 Jr.
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days.
2) Affidavit dated February 18, 198617 of respondent
The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing acknowledging a debt of P400,000.00 to complainant Ana
on September 14, 2001,12 copy of which was sent to Alvaran Chua and promising to pay interest thereon within 2
respondent at his office address via registered mail, covered years to commence upon the signing thereof [February 16,
by Registry Receipt No. 2605 of the Meralco Post Office. 13 On 1998] and, in the event no partial or full payment of the
the scheduled date of hearing, complainants personally principal is made within 2 years, Ana Alvaran Chua "is under
appeared with their counsel. Respondent failed to show up. no obligation to pay any lease rentals over the lot situated in
Burgos Avenue, Cabanatuan City where the Oceanic
Given the length of time that the case remained pending Hardware Bldg. is erected;" 3) Deed of Absolute Sale dated
from its filing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, by Order January 19, 198518 and 4) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 9,
of October 12, 2001,14 directed complainants to just file their 1979,19 both executed by "Felicisima M. Melencio" in favor of
position paper with affidavits and supporting documents in complainant; 5) TCT No. T-4811420 issued by the Cabanatuan
lieu of actual presentation of witnesses and to serve a copy City in the name of complainants on January 21, 1986; 6)
thereof to respondent at his last known address. Affidavit of Juanito C. Tecson21 dated January 20, 1986
In compliance with the IBP Order, complainants filed on April charging complainants et al. for Falsification of Public
1, 2002 their position paper, 15 annexed to which were Documents; 7) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986
photocopies of: 1) a May 5, 1993 Certification 16 issued by the executed by complainants in favor of Mrs. Mesina; 22 and 8)
Metrobank Cabanatuan Branch certifying that "it issued the TCT No. T-48383issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of
demand drafts to the payees enumerated below, which were "Felicisima M. Melencio;" 23 and 9) Complaint of spouses Chua
debited from the account of Mr. Chua Yap An under Savings Yap An and Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia, for
Account No. 760: Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of
Real Property against respondent and his two siblings. 24
D/D Payee Amount Date of A copy of complainants position paper was sent on March
No. Issue 18, 2002 to respondent at his office address by registered
mail covered by Registry Receipt No. 5278. 25 There is no
2145 Planters Dev. Bank P 12-19-85 showing if respondent received this mail matter.
97 805,299.54
The IBP once more scheduled, by notice of December 13,
2002,26 a hearing of the administrative case to January 15,
2147 Planters Dev. Bank 100,000.00 01-14-86 2003, copy of which notice was sent to respondent at his
60 office address by registered mail covered by Registry Receipt
No. 2953 issued by the Meralco Post Office.27
2147 Atty. Simeon Mesina, 77,826.10 01-14-86";
On the scheduled hearing on January 15, 2003, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, by Order of even date, 28 noted
the presence of complainants, and the absence of
respondent, copy of the notice of hearing to whom was
returned unserved with the notation "RTS-Moved." The case
was thereupon deemed submitted for report and
recommendation.
On June 21, 2003, the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2003-
34229 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the
Investigating Commissioner of the case.
In her March 3, 2003 Report and Recommendation,30
Investigation Commissioner Maala observed as follows:
A lawyer should not engage or participate on any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
moral character he displayed when he applied for
admission at the Bar must be maintained incessantly.
Otherwise, his privilege to practice the legal profession
may be withdrawn from him (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility). On the basis of the
uncontroverted facts and evidence presented,
respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina has committed
gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privilege which his license
and law confer upon him,
and recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of One (1) Year.
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct.
First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of
Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital
gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law
and legal processes,31 and not to abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law;32 That respondent intended to, as he did
defraud not a private party but the government is
aggravating.33
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute
another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale
wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed
the Melencio property to his mother, he committed
dishonesty.34
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own
clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the
owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation
that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed
by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise
committed dishonesty.
That the signature of "Felicisima M. Melencio" in the 1985
document35 and that in the 1979 document 36 are markedly
different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979
or the 1985 document or even both.
A propos is this Courts following pronouncement in Nakpil v.
Valdez37
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to
exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher
standard that is required in business dealings where
the parties trade at "arms length." Business
transactions between an attorney and his client are
disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to
assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to
 take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or
improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorneys favor.38 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the
reconveyance of the Melencio property to complainants,
consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such
promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the
purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while that in
the case at bar is moral fitness.39
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more
specifically, the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is,
for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
 VIRAY V. ATTY. SANICAS (Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of
this Office, wjthin ten (10) days from receipt hereof
A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant,
vs. SO ORDERED.3
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative
to aforesaid decision. During the implementation of said writ,
however, complainant discovered that respondent had
RESOLUTION
already collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from
DEL CASTILLO, J.: spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the
following manner:
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral
Conduct1 filed with this Court on September 18, 2006 by Voucher
Date Amount Purpose
complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against respondent No.
Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).

Factual Antecedents 0210512 7802 P20,000. Attorney's fees

004 00
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of
respondent relative to a labor case 2 he filed against Ester 02/13/20 7833 10,000.0 Partial payment for
Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 04 0 judgment
2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and
disposed of the case as follows:
0212612 7848 10,000.0 Partial payment for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby 004 0 judgment
rendered ordering respondents Ester Lopez and
Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of 03/12/20 7894 20,000.0 Partial payment for
the following, to wit: 04 0 judgment

1. Backwages ........................... P146,726.67

0410212 7932 5,000.00 Partial payment for
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00 004 judgment

3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46

0410612 7941 5,000.00 Partial payment for
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51 004 judgment

or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine 04/13/20 7944 5,000.00 Partial payment for
Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100
04 judgment balance of P72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for
his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all
expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after
04/16/20 7954 10,000.0 Partial payment for
receiving the amount of P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom
04 0 judgment
the amounts of P20,000.007 attorney's fees, P17,000.00
earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the
0413012 7977 10,000.0 Partial payment for sheriff, what was left to respondent was only P56,000.00.
004 0 judgment Respondent whines that this amount is way below the
promised 25o/o attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the
total amount of P72,275.13.
Total Amount: P95,000. Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still
00 be receiving a sum greater than what he expects to receive.
He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented spouses Lopez the sum of P93,491.60. Adding the Pl 7,000.00
to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to receive payments respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will
on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. get a total amount of P110,491.60. This amount, according to
Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands to respondent, exceeds the amount of P100,000.00 complainant
the respondent to remit to him the amount of P95,000.00, agreed to and expected to receive.
less his attorney's fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did not
budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the IBP's Report and Recommendation
Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City.
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the
Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation 9 with
P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but denies the following recommendation:
that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees
the respondent be meted the penalty of two (2) years
equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of
suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in
the attorney's fees that may be awarded by the labor
restitution all the amounts in his possession which are due to
tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred
complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees.10 On October
relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of
28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No.
P189,491.60, the sum of P17,226.57 representing
XX-2011-139,11 which approved the Report and
respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving a
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
balance of P172,275.13.6 Then from said amount,
suspending respondent from the practice of law for two
complainant proposed that he will get P100,000.00 and the
years, but with the modification that respondent should
restitute the sum of P85,500.0012 to the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is
guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly account
to his client the funds received in the course of his
professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys
entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to "account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client." Rule
16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a] lawyer
shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon
demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from
February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004 received payments for
attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on
behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the
number of times over close to three months he had been
receiving payment, respondent neither informed the
complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting
thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was
issued and being implemented when complainant discovered
that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total
amount of P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary
awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to
deliver to the complainant said amount, which he merely
received on behalf of his client, even after demand.
Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but
respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and
inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an
accounting and return the money after demand raises the
presumption that he converted it to his own use. 14 His
unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action against him.15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant
authorized him to receive payment. He implies that he is also
authorized to apply the sum of money he received from
spouses Lopez to his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in
the total amount of P72,275.13. However, after deducting
from the amount of P95,000.00 the amounts of P20,000.00,
P17,000.00, and P2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to
his dismay was only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, other than his self-serving
statements, there is nothing in the records which would
support respondent's claim that he was authorized to receive
the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed
to pay him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse him
for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the
case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer's
agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be
reimbursed to support his claim.1wphi1 In any event, even
assuming that respondent was authorized to receive
payments, the same does not exempt him from his duty of
promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in
the course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary
nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from the client. He is
obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and
money he has collected for his client." 16 "The fact that a
lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his
hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the
obligation to make a prompt accounting." 17 Moreover, a
lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his client's
money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes
him attorney's fees."18
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and noted in Atty. Sanicas' record as a member of
the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for

and return the money when due and upon demand violated
the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity
and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action."19

The Penalty

"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or

refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account for and to
return money or property belonging to a client has been
suspension from the practice of law for two years." 20 Thus,
the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the
imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is
respondent's first offense and he is already a nonagenarian, 21
the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial
discretion, finds that a penalty of one year suspension is
sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T.

Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year
upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt
with more severly.

Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90

days from finality of this Resolution, the net amount of
P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Rule 16.02 KEEP CLIENTS FUNDS SEPARATE
A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
HERNZANDEZ V. GO
A.C. No. 1526 January 31, 2005
NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED
BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
1
For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed
by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both parties are
from Zamboanga City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her
and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her
husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his
loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving
her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending
suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged
the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness,
fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her
to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and
849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her
to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds
of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable
consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he
would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A,
likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged
to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent
redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds
of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result,
respondent became the registered owner of all the lots
belonging to complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that
respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he
paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles
registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties
worth millions.
In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was
required to file his comment on the complaint.
Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature
since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 2 for recovery of
ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by
complainant against him involving the subject lots.
On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying
respondents motion and requiring him to submit his answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied
the allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he
sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers,
including himself, for valuable consideration. On several
occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant
and even invited her to live with his family. His children used
to call her "Lola" due to her frequent visits to his residence.
He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and
26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case
to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainants
witnesses and the submission of its report and
recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to
the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty.
Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, is quoted as follows:
"A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of the
complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue
of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor
of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot
849-D situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the
respondent to the complainant on September 5, 1974.
It is evident from the records that respondent was the one
who notarized the documents involving the said properties
redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her
creditors which ended up in respondents name like in the
deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of
Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B;
deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3,
1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale
executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on
November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage
executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the
Tomas Claudio properties.
The foregoing legal activities and operations of the
respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised and
gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities
to her creditors and even requested her creditors for
extension of time to pay complainants accounts constitute
practice of law as legal counsel for consultation aside from
representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a
lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by
the respondent.
It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a
detailed report to the complainant on how he paid
complainants creditors without selling her properties.
Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out
of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of
the purchasers of complainants properties in utter disregard
of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the
respondent concerning the value of the said sale of
complainants properties.
As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in
his obligation and duty as complainants legal adviser and
counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting
complainants properties in his name and possession in
violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is
a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for
implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the
Honorable Members of the Board of Governors."
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the
Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the
sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3)
years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
finding that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.l^vvphi1.net However, we have to modify its
recommended penalty.1a\^/phi1.net
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction,
provides:
"A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession."
Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for
himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any
standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous
wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment.3 Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades
not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal
profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers
must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 4
Canon 17 of the same Code states:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
The records show that complainant reposed such high degree
of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she
engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and
allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds
thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent,
however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not
sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own
money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by
Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is
duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on
how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to
her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers,
complainant could have earned more. Records show that she
did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly,
respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty
as complainants counsel.
Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit to
remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below
the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest,
unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in
our demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession 5 and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. 6 Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.7 And whenever it is made to appear
that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only
the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one
of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within
its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. 8 Respondent, by his
conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the
Bar, but also the legal profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus,
efforts and ability to protect the interests of his clients. A for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of
lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross
only protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the
justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the
respect of the community to the legal profession. public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the
ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only
brotherhood of lawyers.
a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross
legal profession.9 misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His
name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court
for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the
gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) the country.
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any
SO ORDERED.
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 10 Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos ,11 we ordered the disbarment of
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and
lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting
Garcia, JJ., concur.
him with all her money and later refused to return the same
despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III ,12 we disbarred a Callejo, Sr., J., on official leave.
member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the
P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In
Docena vs. Limson ,13 we expelled from the brotherhood of
lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client
through deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs.
Ricafort ,14 an attorney was stripped of his license to practice
law for misappropriating his clients money.

Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find

the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears
reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients
financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own
benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the
 TAROG V. ATTY. RICAFORT
A.C. No. 8253 March 15, 2011(Formerly CBD
Case No. 03-1067)
ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave
misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his
failure to account for and to return the sums of money
received from his clients for purposes of the civil action to
recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution
he was handling for them. The original complainant was
Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, substituted
him upon his intervening death.
Antecedents
In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L.
Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in
the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a
Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to see
Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who
was a brother of Atty. Miralles. 1 They ultimately engaged Atty.
Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being well-known
in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of
Law of Aquinas University where their son was then studying.
Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort
required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they
gave to him.2 He explained the importance of depositing
P65,000.00 in court to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by
Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they
informed him that they had only P60,000.00, he required
them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti).3
To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal
solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his
brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in
the name of Arnulfo.4
On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office
of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said
that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty.
Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to him instead
so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and
then deposit the amount in court. On that representation,
Arnulfo handed the check to Atty. Ricafort. 5
After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the
status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that
he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own
account. He promised to return the money, plus interest.
Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be
returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances
from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands.
The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for
annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties
to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they delivered
P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not
file the memorandum.6
When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort
would not make good his promise of returning the
P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter
dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the
P65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the
filing of the memorandum.7 Yet, they did not receive any
reply from Atty. Ricafort.
In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was
intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount
was payment for his legal services under a "package deal,"
that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys
fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for
annulment of sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He
claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the
value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer,
the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional
character and social standing; that at the time he delivered
the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the
contents of the complaint, which did not mention anything
about any consignation;8 and that Arnulfo, being a retired
school principal, was a learned person who would not have
easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted
against him.
Findings of the IBP Commissioner
Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.
Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation
dated October 7, 2004,9 in which he concluded that:
It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty.
Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to
return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he
got from his client.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and
Vidal more credible than the testimony of Atty. Ricafort,
observing:
Based on the said testimony, statements and
actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his
collaborating witness, we find their statements to be
credible.
Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that
the amount of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the
complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal
basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee,
attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to the
time the judgment is rendered. He presented a
transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was stated
that complainant himself did not consign the money in
court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that
he did not have any retainer agreement nor any
memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove
that the amount of P65,000.00 was received as an
acceptance fee for the handling of the case.
Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer
agreement and that he issued only receipt because the
late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is
issued.
The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent
"Basically you describe that thing that will happen in
the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when
you received that P65,000.00 did you not put anything
there that you will describe the nature of legal work
which you will undertake considering that you have
considered this P65,000.00 as your attorneys fees?
And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not know why
they were not showing the receipt. That is a big
amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me the
receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with that
P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that
P65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why
During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned
Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did not
answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and
the proof of service of the said letter was presented by
the complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated
that he did not receive the letter and it was received
by their helper who did not forward the letter to him.
He also adopted the position that the complainant was
demanding the P65,000.00 wherefore this case was
filed. When confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal
Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the
allegation that he received the P65,000.00 for deposit
to the court. He also denied that Mr. Miralles has
visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement.
The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent
if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog,
Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any
reason why this case was filed against him. In his
answer the respondent stated that we have been very
good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said
that in fact he was surprised when the complaint was
filed against him and they even attached the decision
of the Supreme Court for his suspension and maybe
they are using this case to be able to collect from him.
The main defense of the respondent is that the
complainant in this case testified that the total amount
to redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked
whether he consigned the money to the court to
redeem the property he answered in the negative.
The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to
the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it was
stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7,
1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given him the
sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to
the Regional Trial Court representing redemption
money of the Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of
P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the
principal obligation of the complainant and it is not
surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that
with the filing of the case for annulment of foreclosure
his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in
court hence, the motivation to produce the deposit
was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is
concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court
that the bank needed P240,000.00 for the redemption
of the property will have no bearing on the actuation of
the complainant who has been required to deposit
P65,000.00 by his lawyer. The Undersigned
Commission has no alternative but to believe in the
credibility and truthfulness of complainants narration
that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles. 10
Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated
Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage
of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his
dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of
P65,000.00 to them.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
Resolution No. XVI-2004-473,11 resolving to return the matter
to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not
there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00
had been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses.
On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second
Report and Recommendation,12 in which he declared that
Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or
receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had been
part of his attorneys fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully
ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand
letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the
househelp who had received the demand letter had not given
it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence,
Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he
would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good
his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle
his obligation.
 Action of IBP Board of Governors
Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569,13 therefore, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended
the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to
return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda,
viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Respondent has taken advantage of
his client [sic] vulnerability and has been dishonest
with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort
is hereby DISBARRED and Ordered to Return the
amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant.
Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration,14 maintaining that a
retainer agreement was immaterial because he had affirmed
having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt
for the amount; that he had not kept the receipt because "the
practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued
without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand
for a receipt;"15 that considering that the Tarogs had
produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the
P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a
similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made at the time
when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the
testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with
Arnulfos affidavit; and that he did not receive Arnulfos
demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote
(the name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not
at all know.
Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP
Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from disbarment
to indefinite suspension,16 thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the
Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
with modification of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of
the Board of Governors dated 18 November 2006, that
in lieu of the Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is
INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law and
Ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000
to complainant.
Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration, 17
assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for
violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in
writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and
reasons on which the decision was based.
Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for
resolution.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because
they were supported by substantial evidence. However, we
impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the
recommended penalty of indefinite suspension, considering
that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was
aggravated by his having been previously administratively
sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he
was warned against committing a similar offense.
A.Version of the complainants was more credible than
version of Atty. Ricafort
Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the
Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about the transaction.
On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the amount was to
be consigned in court for purposes of their civil case; on the
other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his
fees under a "package deal" arrangement.
Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs version more
credible.
We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts
was correct and in accord with human experience.
Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the
Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited in court
for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had
no idea about the requirement for them to consign any
amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural
implications of such requirement being ordinarily known only
to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts
representations about the requirement to consign that
amount in court was entirely understandable in view of their
awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal community
of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it
was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount
close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be
deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their
property.
Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos
demand letter was incredible. He already initially admitted
receiving the letter through a househelp.18 His denial came
only subsequently and for the first time through his motion
for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006, 19 in which he
completely turned about to declare that the Gemma Agnote
who had received the letter was unknown to him. 20
Expectedly, Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial,
because not only was the denial an apparently belated
afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier
admission of receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma
Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty. Ricafort had
adverted to becomes very plausible under the established
circumstances.
Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the
receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to the
Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is
that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon
the client to demand for a receipt." 21 But such explanation
does not persuade us. Ethical and practical considerations
made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts,
even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for
his own records. He was all too aware that he was
accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients,
and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by
issuing and keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such
accountability, viz:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and
confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was
burdened with the legal duty to promptly account for all the
funds received from or held by him for them.22
And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was
not intended for deposit in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted that
Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in
the civil action of any mention of consignation. However, the
complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs
contradicted his insistence, specifically in its paragraph 16,
which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs) readiness and
willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of
the redemption price and interest) in court, thus:
16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the
plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the
amount of P69,345.00 as redemption price plus
reasonable accrued , if there are any; 23
Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for
consignation. The consignation was a notion that could have
emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda
recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty.
Ricafort only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty.
Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The
excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows:
Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you
stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles
went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter
that we already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the form
of check, how did you come to know this fact?
Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng
P65,000.00 tapos may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya
dagdagan niyo ng konti.
Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo?
Witness: Nandoon po ako.
Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was
given?
Witness: Yes.
Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay
yong P65,000.00 na tseke?
Witness: Opo.
Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari
doon sa tseke na idiniposit?
Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit
niya sa court.
Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala
idiniposit sa court?
Witness: Opo.
Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman?
Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong
interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi
naming salamat.24
B.Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted
serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney
The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys
entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. 25
In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any
money and property of his clients that came into his
possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the trust
and confidence his clients reposed in him. 27 Thus, having
obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his
professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver
such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b)
upon demand.28
Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation
to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own
and from those of others kept by him, to wit:
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00
from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the
amount would be deposited in court and that he would
prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a
responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in
accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to
deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account
without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon
demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet
not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand
constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their
attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to
his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the
particular purposes intended.29 He was thereby presumed to
have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the
prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust
reposed in him.30 He could not escape liability, for upon
failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he
should have immediately returned the moneys to his
clients.31
Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him
by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16, 32
particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17, 33 all of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations
constituted a gross violation of general morality and of
professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the
legal profession and deserved punishment. 34
Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts
and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious charge under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
xxx
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct;
xxx
That this offense was not the first charged and decided
against Atty. Ricafort aggravated his liability. In Nuez v.
Ricafort,35 decided in 2002, the Court found him to have
violated Rules 1.0136 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.03 37 and Rule
12.0438 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
in relation to his failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell
the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds
compelled the complainant to commence in the RTC a civil
action to recover the proceeds against him and his wife. The
Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and
warned him against the commission of similar acts, stating:
We concur with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board
of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo
Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings
with complainant. Indeed, the record shows
respondents grave misconduct and notorious
dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive
at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely
abused the confidence that complainant reposed in
him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn
over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse,
with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant
to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the
sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and
energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to
answer the complaint resulting in his having been
declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to
the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a
step because he did not pay the docket fee despite
notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to
prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and
to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the
latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly
and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued
checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But,
remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in
continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay
complainant of what had been validly and lawfully
adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed
the account against which the checks were drawn.
There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the
intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact
that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22, he did not pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross
misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account
because he thought complainant has already encashed
all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on
or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were
still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15
March 1996 which could not be encashed before their
maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished
public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios
v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon,337
SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such
confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up
to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v.
Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction
of the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to
defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the
checks despite demands and the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance
of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the
court, was under continuing duty to uphold. 39
Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering
that the penalty for violation of Canon 16 ranges from
suspension for six months,40 to suspension for one year, 41 to
suspension for two years,42 depending on the amount
involved and the severity of the lawyers misconduct, we rule
that disbarment is the commensurate punishment for Atty.
Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of
trust funds for his clients.
WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort
guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly,
disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums
of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent
per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3,
2002, within twenty days from notice.

This decision is effective immediately.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the

Court Administrator for circulation to all courts, and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference.

SO ORDERED.
Rule 16.03 DELIVERY OF FUNDS; LAWYERS LIEN
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
BUSIOS V. RICAFORT
A.C. No. 4349 December 22, 1997
LOURDES R. BUSIOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994
but received by us on 21 November 1994, complainant
Lourdes R. Busios charged respondent Atty. Francisco
Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay with having
committed the crime of estafa under Article 315(1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the sum of
P32,000.00. Of this amount, P30,000.00 was entrusted to
respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainant's
husband, while P2,000.00 represented the amount
respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a
bond in Civil Case No. 5814, when no such bond was
required.
In the resolution of 18 January 1995, we required respondent
to comment on the complaint. Despite his receipt of a copy of
the resolution, respondent did not comply, compelling us in
the resolution of 17 July 1995 to require him to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure.
Again respondent failed to comply. Hence in the resolution of
25 September 1996, we ordered him once more to file his
comment within ten (10) days from notice, and within the
same period, to pay a fine of P1,000.00 or suffer
imprisonment of ten (10) days should he fail to so pay. In a
Compliance and Motion dated 24 October 1996, respondent
transmitted the fine of P1,000.00 by way of postal money
order, but asked for five (5) days from date to file his
comment. As respondent still failed to so file, we then
declared, in the resolution of 2 December 1996, that
respondent was deemed to have waived his right to file his
comment, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for reception of complainant's evidence and
submission of a report and recommendation thereon.
On 16 October 1997, the Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda C.
Verzosa, submitted her Report and Recommendation,
material portions of which read as follows:
Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged
with having misappropriated the sum of P30,000.00
intended for his clients as well as having deceived his
clients into giving him the sum of P2,000.00
purportedly to be deposited as a bond in the case he
was handling.
Complainant Lourdes R. Businos is one of the heirs of
Pedro Rodrigo who are the defendants in Civil Case No.
1584, apparently a case involving the properties of the
late Pedro Rodrigo, father of herein complainant.
Respondent was the counsel of record for the
defendants in the said case. On July 10, 1994,
complainant, representing her co-heirs, executed a
special power of attorney, appointing and constituting
respondent and/or Pedro Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and
lawful attorney-in-fact with the following powers:
1. To attend to and represent me, testify, or
otherwise enter into compromise during the pre-
trial stage or other proceedings in Civil Case No.
1584, entitled "Heirs of Rosario Rodrigo-
Reantaso, vs. Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo Sr., et. al."
now pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Ligao, Albay;
2. To demand, collect and receipt for any and all
sums of money that may now be deposited in
said court by the defendant Oas Standard High
School or hereafter be deposited by said
defendant, due and owing to me or said Heirs of
Pedro Rodrigo, Sr., representing the rentals of
said defendant for the lease of the property
involved in said case; and
3. To sign, authenticate, issue and deliver any
and all deeds, instruments, papers and other
records necessary and pertinent to the above
stated transactions.
On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Ligao,
Albay, Br. 12 issued an order, directing the Clerk of
Court "to release any and all deposits of rentals made
in connection with this case (Civil Case No. 1584) to
the defendants Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo through Lourdes
Rodrigo Businos who were receiving the rentals from
Oas Standard High School prior to the institution of this
case."
In a letter dated August 10, 1994, the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Ligao informed herein complainant that
respondent had already received the rental deposit of
P25,000.00 on even date (see Annex "C" to the
complaint). Respondent also received from Oas
Standard High School on August 17, 1994 the sum of
P5,000.00 as payment for rental of school site for the
month of July 1994 (See Annex "D" to the complaint).
The said sum was entrusted to respondent with an
obligation on his part to deposit the same in the
account of complainant's husband at PNB, Ligao
Branch. Instead, however, of depositing the money,
respondent converted the money to his own personal
use, and despite several demands, he failed to return
the same to complainant. She was thus constrained to
file a criminal case for estafa and an administrative
case for disbarment against him. Thus, on November
21, 1994, complainant filed the instant administrative
case against respondent.
Complainant further accuses respondent for
demanding and receiving P2,000.00 from her which he
said will be used for the bond in Civil Case No. 1584,
but said amount was never used as intended since no
bond was required in the said case. Thus, respondent
merely pocketed the said amount.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned,
testified that: She authorized respondent to withdraw
the money amounting P35,000.00 representing the
rental fee paid of Oas Standard High School from the
Clerk of Court, with the instruction to deposit the same
in her savings account at the PNB. After she was
informed by the court that respondent had already
withdrawn the money, she expected in vain to receive
the money a week later in Tarlac as respondent failed
to effect the deposit of the said sum in her account.
She demanded from him to give her the money, but he
informed her that he had already spent the same. He
promised, though, to pay her the said amount. (pp. 7-
8, TSN, Reception of Evidence, April 18, 1997). She
clarified that respondent withdrew only the sum of
P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court, while the
P5,000.00 was withdrawn by respondent from Oas
Standard High School (TSN, p. 8). Despite several
demands, both from her and her lawyer, respondent
failed to make good his promise to give her the money
he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard
High School (TSN, pp. 11-13). She was then
constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and an
administrative case against respondent sometime in
November of 1994 to recover the money in question
(TSN, pp. 14-16). On their third hearing of the estafa
case sometime in 1995, respondent came with the
money and paid complainant inside the courtroom
(TSN, pp. 15, 19-20). Because of this development, she
did not anymore pursue the estafa case against
respondent (TSN, p. 17). She has no intention,
however, of withdrawing the instant complaint (TSN, p.
18).
She further testified that respondent demanded from
her the sum of P2,000.00 for the bond required in the
civil case. (TSN, p. 18). Respondent did not give her a
receipt for the said amount. (TSN, p. 19). Respondent
gave back the P2,000.00 to complainant. He paid
complainant a total of P60,000.00 representing the
money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas
Standard High School, the P2,000.00 he got from
complainant and attorney's fees, which he undertook
to foot as a way of settlement. (TSN, p. 19).
Although complainant failed to submit the original or
certified true copies of the documents in support of her
complaint against respondent, respondent's repeated
failure to comply with several resolutions of the Court
requiring him to comment on the complaint lends
credence to the allegations of the complainant. It
manifests his tacit admission thereto. We have no
other alternative, therefore, but to accept the said
documents at their [sic] face value.
There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having
used the money of his clients without their consent. As
the evidentiary value of the documents should be
given more weight than the oral testimony of
complainant, we place the amount illegally used by
respondent at P30,000.00 and not P35,000.00 as
claimed by complainant. Respondent's illegal use of his
client's money is made more manifest [by] his letters
to complainant, all promising the latter to make good
his promise to pay the money he withdrew from the
Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (See
Annex "E" to the complaint).
It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath,
pledges himself not to delay any man for money or
malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly
the money of his clients that has come into his
possession. He should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal purposes
without his client's [sic] consent. He should maintain a
reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust
(Daroy vs. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a
judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and
must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs.
Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8).
 Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to
his own personal use without their consent, and by
deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount
of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a bond which
was not required is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he
betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients.
Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful
lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an
honorable profession.
His belated payment of the amount he illegally used
and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any
liability if only to impress upon him that the relation
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary
in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity
and good faith. In view of that special relationship,
lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients
and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi, supra).
Moreover, his repeated failure to comply with the
resolutions of the Court, requiring him to comment on
the complaint indicate the high degree of
irresponsibility of respondent.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR.
While the findings are in order, the penalty recommended is
not commensurate to respondent's infractions.
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02
and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded he may
be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of
each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and
 executions he has secured for his client as Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as
provided for in the Rules of Court. demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is
Respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and
specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberately
amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical
defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his
behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent,
comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11
but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a
be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is
lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays
their trust and confidence. WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly
unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand
138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules
for integrity and good moral character from members of the
16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier (A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992,
Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of
214 SCRA 1, 12-13), reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C.
Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with the urgent need to
No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court
maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the
declared:
legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to
dignity of the legal profession. The trust and DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of
the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his Attorneys.
duty to his client, his profession, the courts and the
This resolution shall take effect immediately and copies
public. The bar should maintain a high standard of
thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
appended to respondent's personal record; the National
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
Office and the Albay Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
profession by faithfully performing his duties to
Philippines; the Philippine Judges Association; and all courts
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To
of the land for their information and guidance.
this end, nothing should be done by any member of
the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any SO ORDERED.
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
honesty and integrity of the profession.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and
Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the Martinez, JJ., concur.
lawyer's oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of
law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair an impartial
administration of justice a vital function of democracy a
failure of which is disastrous to society.
 QUILBAN V. ROBINOL

A.M. No. 2144 April 10, 1989

CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN,

FORTUNATO RAMIREZ AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS
AGAWAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent.

A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989

ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32)

squatter families to own the land of approximately 50 square
meters each on which their respective homes were built. To
vindicate their rights they have aired their plight before this
Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence shown by the
original owner of the land which parted with its property at a
giveaway price thinking that it was accommodating the
landless squatters.

The antecedent facts follow:

The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for

short) used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road,
Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father
Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City
Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital
but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible
development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area
since 1965 or 1966.
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave
permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the
reserved site a house for his residence and a training center
for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded
shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father
Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the
squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to
form an organization and choose a leader authorized to
negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the
squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio
Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as
President (Exhibit "24", Robinol), who was entrusted with the
task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to
them.
But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin
went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he
connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other
Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total
consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land
in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It
was evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe
that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. On the
same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662
to the property in his name alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed
Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled
"Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al.,
Defendants." with the principal prayer that said defendants
be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said
plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the
corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed
the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R.
Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's
fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also to
be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter
of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of
them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land
sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit
"2").
On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI
Decision by:
(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-
defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the
land in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the
payment of the corresponding amount paid by the
defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in
case of refusal or failure on their part to do so,
ordering the Clerk of Court to execute the same in
favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex
E) null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel said certificate and issue a new
one in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiffs-appellants,
upon presentation of the deed of conveyance to be
executed in favor of appellants and (2) ordering
appellees jointly and severally to pay appellants the
sum of P 2,000.00 as attomey's fees, plus costs." (p.
30, Report and Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court
of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs
occupying the property, conveyance, documentation,
transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan
collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each head of family.
The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts
prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P
68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on
31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00
respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P 2,500.00, or a
total of P 75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no
payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty.
Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil
case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been issued by
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned
out that the motion for intervention had already been
dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the
latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to
have no basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first
consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit
"3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel,
after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing
the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty.
Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the
officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980
informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services
and demanding the return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with
him (Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the
demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor, dated 31
March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly disregarded by Atty.
Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his
appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the
plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of
the authority dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in
said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty.
Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for
Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of
Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion for
Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he
had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by
Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first
consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled
the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21
plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24
November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to
change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in their favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this
Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the
invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P 75,000.00
and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline
over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The
details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint
Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had
transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by
Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of appeals
after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement
as to attomey's fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a
reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig give him a
portion of the property subject matter of the litigation equal
to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not receive P 70,000.00
from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00;
that he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979
showing that he received P 70,000.00 only to save
complainants from embarrassment and shame should their Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a
co-plaintiff ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R.
their shares, which they have not; that the correct amount in Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming
his possession is only P 62,470.00-it would really be P of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the
75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity
amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one Fortunate and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the
Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had the right to plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
hold the money in his possession as guarantee for the
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees
payment of his attomey's fees of get a portion of the
agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a
property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants
contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's fees
his portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his
were payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as
portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32
evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "I"),
plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff,
plus whatever amount is adjudicated as attomey's fees by
multiplied by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering
the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by
that P 50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of
Atty. Robinol was the result of his insistent demand after the
the total value of the property, which is more than a million
Court of Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q-16433 was
pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to
already final, as shown by the date of the agreement (Annex
give back the amount of P 12,470.00, representing the
"2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the
difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount of P
Samahan signed the agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol
62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot make
and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex "3", which is
this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has
a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid
the exclusive disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it
consensus; that he agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest
is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on
the growing belief of the Samahan that most members of the
Complainants' plea that the amount deposited by respondent
Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no
be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an
formal Motion for substitution, there was substantial
ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention
compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as
to appropriate the money in his possession (P 62,470.00) for
shown by the formal entry of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-
himself, but he is holding it until his attomey's fees are
1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex
satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because
"9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution
of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him; that there was
(Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his
no previous notice to him of his discharge; and that Atty.
appearance as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of
Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal
the Court to the substitution as shown by its Order of 29 May
withdrawal and conformity.
1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his professional and personal
Administrative Case No. 2180 actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-
16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to
himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the Complaint
against him should be dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court
referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180,
respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 15 December
1988, the Solicitor General submitted his compliance and
recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for
three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the
plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a
more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of
the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to
return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in
Adm. Case No. 2134, the sum of P 75,000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor,
Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not
committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty.
Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty.
Robinol, we concur with the recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and
grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the
practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had
rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had
received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of
mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a
portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P
50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that
area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally
appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound
by a written agreement but also because, under the
circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so.
His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an
existence They had painstakingly raised their respective
quotas of P 2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land
only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having
seen the color of money, heart lessly took advantage of
them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly
dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground
for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in
him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the
detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to
protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is
bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended
for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged
to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is
employed without a price agreed upon for his services in
which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for
his services, as much as he has earned. In this case,
however, there was an express contract and a stipulated
mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum
meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had
received only the sum of P 62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00
claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not yet
paid their shares to P 12,500.00.
We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants'
evidence on this score is the more credible and that he had,
in fact, received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the
share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Somalian
For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil
case below, namely, the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1979;
the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the
Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March
1980, he made mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of that
time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which
list, however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the
Samahan.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has
rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He
has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for
money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with
people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the
fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they
could call their own.
Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the
findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed
himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the
exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel
for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433.
Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one
(21) had signed the first consensus of 6 March 1980
expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much as
Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out
of 32) for non-payment of their shares, only twenty five (25)
of them should be considered in determining the majority.
Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is
sufficient to make the said consensus binding. It is more than
a simple majority.
Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol
from questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17 March 1980
he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of
his services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by another letter
of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his
Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and during the
proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had
stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's
appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter
his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after
assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been
formally terminated. He had in no way encroached upon the
professional employment of a colleague.
There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their
counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who
may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in
the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty.
Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well
within their prerogative.
In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol
against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we find the
same absolutely without merit.
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty.
Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated
his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the
fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven
himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason
of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have
forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered to return
the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned
Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective
personal records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R.
Montemayor.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Rule 16.04 NOR BORROWING; LENDING
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money
to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
BARNACHEA V. QUIOCHO
A.C. No. 5925 March 11, 2003
(Formerly CBD No. 01-912)
RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN T. QUIOCHO, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On January 3, 2002, Ruby Mae Barnachea filed a verified
complaint for breach of lawyer-client relations against
respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho.
It appears that respondent had not been in the private
practice of the law for quite some time. However, in
September 2001, he decided to revive his legal practice with
some associates. Complainant engaged the legal services of
respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under her
name of the title over a property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 334411 previously owned by her sister,
Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. The latter sold said property to
complainant under an unnotarized deed of absolute sale.
Complainant drew and issued BPI Family Bank Check No.
0052304 in the amount of P11,280.00 and BPI Family Bank
Check No. 0052305 in the amount of P30,000.00, both dated
September 5, 2001, or the total amount of P41,280.00 for the
expenses for said transfer and in payment for respondents
legal services. Respondent enchased the checks.
However, despite the lapse of almost two months,
respondent failed to secure title over the property in favor of
complainant. The latter demanded that respondent refund to
her the amount of P41,280.00 and return the documents
which she earlier entrusted to him. However, respondent
failed to comply with said demands. On November 1, 2001,
complainant received a letter from respondent informing her
that he had failed to cause the transfer of the property under
her name and that he was returning the documents and title
she had entrusted to him and refunding to her the amount of
P41,280.00 through his personal check No. DIL 0317787. Said
check was drawn against his account with the Bank of
Commerce (Diliman Branch) in the amount of P41,280.00 and
was postdated December 1, 2001. Respondent told
complainant that he needed more time to fund the check.
However, respondent failed to fund the check despite the
demands of complainant.
In his Answer to the complaint, respondent denied that
complainant contracted his legal services. Although
respondent admitted having received the two checks from
complainant, he claimed that said checks were intended to
cover actual and incidental expenses for transportation,
communication, representation, necessary services, taxes
and fees for the cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411
under the name of complainant and not for legal services. He
asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by the fact of
his return of complainants documents with an explanatory
letter and his issuance of a personal check for P41,280.00
dated December 1, 2001. He insisted that he would not
compromise for such meager amount his personal standing
as well as his membership in the legal profession. His failure
to transfer the title of the property under the name of the
complainant was caused by his difficulty in making good the
claimed amount, compounded by his affliction with diabetes
and the consequent loss of sight of his right eye.
Respondent further alleged that he was a licensed real estate
and insurance broker and had been a freelance business
management consultant. At the same time he engaged in
real estate brokering, pre-need products marketing for
Prudential Life, and life insurance underwriting for Insular
Life. In 1999, he gave up the practice of his profession as a
lawyer and subsequently managed to put up a business
center with fellow insurance underwriters for their common
insurance underwriting practice. He further claimed that
sometime in August, 2001, an insurance client introduced
complainant as an insurance prospect to him. In the course of
their dealing, complainant intimated to respondent her
willingness to consider respondents insurance proposal
provided the latter would help her facilitate the cancellation
and eventual transfer to her name the property covered by
TCT No. 334411 in the name of complainants sister,
Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. Respondent agreed to help
complainant in the transfer of the title to her name, with the
condition that no diligent study or verification of
complainants documents, nor preparation of any additional
document or any application or petition whatsoever, will be
made by respondent. He explained to complainant that his
task was merely to go through the regular process of
presenting the available documents, paying the taxes and
fees, and following up the processing for the cancellation and
issuance of the certificate of title. In other words, respondent
offered to complainant services which a non-lawyer familiar
with the procedure and the related offices can perform and
provide to the complainant with respect to the transfer of the
title of the property in her name.
Respondent asserted that in the latter part of September
2001, he discovered and became aware for the first time that
the original copy of TCT No. 334411 with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City was destroyed in a fire in Quezon City
Hall several years earlier and that complainants copy of the
title needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled
and transferred. At about the same time, the working
relations of respondent in the business center with his non-
lawyer associates had become difficult and strained,
impelling him to sever his business relations with them and
cease from to going to the business center. Consequently,
telephone communications between respondent and
complainant at the business center was cut. Communications
became much more limited when, apart from the fact that
respondent did not have a landline at his residence,
respondents mobile phone was stolen sometime in October
2001.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) designated Atty.
Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal
investigation of the complaint. Despite several settings,
respondent failed to appear and adduce evidence.
On April 26, 2002, Investigating Commissioner Dennis B.
Funa submitted his report and recommendation stating in
part that:
1. Respondent is not able to meet his financial obligations
due to financial difficulties, and that respondent is in good
faith in his failure to meet this obligation.
2. It is recommended that respondent be ORDERED TO REPAY
HIS CLIENT within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Decision. The principal amount being P41,280.00. Failure to
comply with the Order shall be considered as proof of evident
bad faith, and shall be considered in the continuing
evaluation of the case in view of the continued failure to
repay his client.
3. Respondent should also be given a WARNING that a
repetition shall be dealt with more severely. 1
The Investigating Commissioner gave credence to the claim
of complainant that she engaged the legal services of
respondent and paid him for his services and that respondent
failed in his undertaking and refund the amount of
P41,280.00 to complainant despite her demands and that
respondent appeared to be evading the complainant.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-550 adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation with the
additional sanction of reprimand for respondent:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification. Respondent is hereby reprimanded and
ordered to return the Forty One Thousand Two Hundred
Eighty (P41,280.00) Pesos to complainant within ninety
(90) days from receipt of notice.2
While the Court agrees with the Board of Governors that
respondent should be meted a disciplinary sanction, it finds
that the penalty of reprimand recommended by the Board of
Governors is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong
committed by respondent. As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, the complainant engaged the legal services of
the respondent. As admitted in his letter to the complainant,
respondent had just resumed his private practice of law two
months before complainant contracted his services for the
notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the registration
thereof with the Register of Deeds and the transfer of the
title over the property to the complainant:
NOVEMBER 1, 2002
DEAR RUBY,
I AM SORRY I AM RETURNING YOUR DOCUMENTS
WITHOUT CHANGES.
I HAD A SERIES OF MONEY PROBLEMS RIGHT AFTER
YOU GAVE ME THE TWO CHECKS AND COMING WITH
THE AMOUNTS WITH PERSONAL FUNDS.
I WAS REVIVING MY LEGAL PRACTICE ONLY FOR TWO
MONTHS WHICH WE MET AND HAD JUST SET UP THE
OFFICE WITH TWO ASSOCIATES WHICH A FEW WEEKS
LATER WE HAD DISAGREEMENTS AND DECIDED TO
DISBAND. I WILL HAVE TO REFURBISH MY OFFICE. I AM
ISSUING MY PERSONAL CHECK TO GUARANTEE THE
AMOUNT I TOOK. I NEED A LITTLE TIME TO COVER THE
AMOUNT. THANKS FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING.
(Sgd.) EDWIN.3
Respondents claim that complainant did not retain his legal
services flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it
were true that no attorney-client relationship existed
between them, case law has it that an attorney may be
removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. 4
In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking
for almost two months. Worse, despite demands of
complainant, he failed to refund the amount of P41,280.00
and to return to complainant the deed of absolute sale and
title over the property. Respondents claim that complainant
could not contact him because he did not have any landline
at his residence and that his mobile phone was stolen in
October 2001, is hard to believe. He failed to adduce a
morsel of evidence to prove that his telephone at the
business center was cut or that his mobile phone had been
stolen. Even then, respondent could have easily contacted
the complainant at her residence or could have written her a
letter informing her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411
in the custody of the Register of Deeds was burned when the
Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire and that there was a
need for the reconstitution of said title. Neither did
respondent adduce evidence that he was a life insurance
underwriter for Insular Life or that he had been sick with
diabetes and had lost his sight in his right eye. Respondent
simply refused to adduce evidence to prove his allegations in
his Answer to the complaint.
The Court is led to believe that respondents failure to cause
the transfer of the title of the property under the name of
complainant was due to a financial problem that beset him
shortly after he received the checks from complainant. It can
easily be inferred from respondents letter that he used
complainants money to alleviate if not solve his financial
woes. What compounded respondents unethical conduct was
his drawing of a personal check and delivering the same to
complainant without sufficient funds in his bank account to
cover the check. Even as he promised to fund his account
with the drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the
check became due.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his
client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to
said funds and property.5 He is to keep the funds of his client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such
as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds
and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real
property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be
returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The
lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon
demand gave rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed
on him.6 The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him
by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 7
In this case, respondent intransigeantly refused to return to
the complainant the amount of P41,280.00 which he received
for the expenses for the transfer to her of the title of the
property and for his professional fees. His dishonest conduct
was compounded by his interjection of flimsy excuses for his
obstinate refusal to refund the amount to complainant.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature
and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. 8
A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. 9
The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an
absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting
in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his
client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure
up to the exacting standard expected of him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T.
Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for One (1) Year with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to the
complainant the full amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10)
days from notice hereof. Respondent is further DIRECTED to
submit to the Court proof of payment of said amount within
ten (10) days from said payment. If Respondent fails to
restitute the said amount within the aforesaid period, he shall
be meted an additional suspension of three (3) months for
every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have
paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of
suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be
necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of
his one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty. This is
without prejudice to the right of the complainant to institute
the appropriate action for the collection of said amount.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Austria-

Martinez, JJ., concur
 RUBIAS V. BATILLER the Court of Appeals' 1958 judgment affirming the lower
court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration)
G.R. No. L-35702 May 29, 1973
was properly declared inexistent and void by the lower court,
DOMINGO D. RUBIAS, plaintiff-appellant, as decreed by Article 1409 in relation to Article 1491 of the
vs. Civil Code.
ISAIAS BATILLER, defendant-appellee.
The appellate court, in its resolution of certification of 25 July
1972, gave the following backgrounder of the appeal at bar:

TEEHANKEE, J.: On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer,

filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of
In this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court certain portions of lot under Psu-99791 located in Barrio
as involving purely legal questions, we affirm the dismissal General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his
order rendered by the Iloilo court of first instance after pre- father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present
trial and submittal of the pertinent documentary exhibits. occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said
portions of the lot on two occasions in 1945 and in 1959.
Such dismissal was proper, plaintiff having no cause of
Plaintiff prayed also for damages and attorneys fees. (pp. 1-
action, since it was duly established in the record that the
7, Record on Appeal). In his answer with counter-claim
application for registration of the land in question filed by
defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state
Francisco Militante, plaintiff's vendor and predecessor
a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and
interest, had been dismissed by decision of 1952 of the land
his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open
registration court as affirmed by final judgment in 1958 of
and continuous possession since time immemorial under
the Court of Appeals and hence, there was no title or right to
claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question and
the land that could be transmitted by the purported sale to
for the alleged malicious institution of the complaint he
plaintiff.
claims he has suffered moral damages in the amount of P
As late as 1964, the Iloilo court of first instance had in 2,000.00, as well as the sum of P500.00 for attorney's
another case of ejectment likewise upheld by final judgment fees. ...
defendant's "better right to possess the land in question .
On December 9, 1964, the trial court issued a pre-trial order,
having been in the actual possession thereof under a claim of
after a pre-trial conference between the parties and their
title many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to
counsel which order reads as follows..
the plaintiff."
'When this case was called for a pre-trial conference today,
Furthermore, even assuming that Militante had anything to
the plaintiff appeared assisted by himself and Atty. Gregorio
sell, the deed of sale executed in 1956 by him in favor of
M. Rubias. The defendant also appeared, assisted by his
plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was concededly his counsel
counsel Atty. Vicente R. Acsay.
of record in the land registration case involving the very land
in dispute (ultimately decided adversely against Militante by
A. During the pre-trial conference, the parties have agreed
that the following facts are attendant in this case and that
they will no longer introduced any evidence, testimonial or
documentary to prove them:
1. That Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of
land located in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of
Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he caused to be
surveyed on July 18-31, 1934, whereby he was issued a plan
Psu-99791 (Exhibit "B"). (The land claimed contained an area
of 171:3561 hectares.)
2. Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for the
registration of the title of the land technically described in
psu-99791 (Exh. "B") opposed by the Director of Lands, the
Director of Forestry and other oppositors. However, during
the war with Japan, the record of the case was lost before it
was heard, so after the war Francisco Militante petitioned this
court to reconstitute the record of the case. The record was
reconstituted on the Court of the First Instance of Iloilo and
docketed as Land Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852. The
Court of First Instance heard the land registration case on
November 14, 1952, and after the trial this court dismissed
the application for registration. The appellant, Francisco
Militante, appealed from the decision of this Court to the
Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-GR No.
13497-R..
3. Pending the disposal of the appeal in CA-GR No. 13497-R
and more particularly on June 18, 1956, Francisco Militante
sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias the land technically
described in psu-99791 (Exh. "A"). The sale was duly
recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
province of Iloilo as Entry No. 13609 on July 11, 1960 (Exh.
"A-1").
(NOTE: As per deed of sale, Exh. A, what Militante
purportedly sold to plaintiff-appellant, his son-in-law, for the
sum of P2,000.00 was "a parcel of untitled land having an
area Of 144.9072 hectares ... surveyed under Psu 99791 ...
(and) subject to the exclusions made by me, under (case)
CA-i3497, Land Registration Case No. R-695, G.L.R.O. No.
54852, Court of First Instance of the province of Iloilo. These
exclusions referred to portions of the original area of over
171 hectares originally claimed by Militante as applicant, but
which he expressly recognized during the trial to pertain to
some oppositors, such as the Bureau of Public Works and
Bureau of Forestry and several other individual occupants
and accordingly withdrew his application over the same. This
is expressly made of record in Exh. A, which is the Court of
Appeals' decision of 22 September 1958 confirming the land
registration court's dismissal of Militante's application for
registration.)
4. On September 22,1958 the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. No.
13497-R promulgated its judgment confirming the decision of
this Court in Land Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852
which dismissed the application for Registration filed by
Francisco Militante (Exh. "I").
5. Domingo Rubias declared the land described in Exh. 'B' for
taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 8585 (Exh. "C") for
1957; Tax Dec. Nos. 9533 (Exh. "C-1") and 10019 (Exh. "C-
3")for the year 1961; Tax Dec. No. 9868 (Exh. "C-2") for the
year 1964, paying the land taxes under Tax Dec. No. 8585
and 9533 (Exh. "D", "D-1", "G-6").
6. Francisco Militante immediate predecessor-in-interest of
the plaintiff, has also declared the land for taxation purposes
under Tax Dec. No. 5172 in 1940 (Exh. "E") for 1945; under
Tax Dec. No. T-86 (Exh. "E-1") for 1948; under Tax Dec. No.
7122 (Exh. "2"), and paid the land taxes for 1940 (Exhs. "G"
and "G-7"), for 1945 46 (Exh. "G-1") for 1947 (Exh. "G-2"), for
1947 & 1948 (Exh. "G-3"), for 1948 (Exh. "G-4"), and for 1948
and 1949 (Exh. "G-5").
7. Tax Declaration No. 2434 in the name of Liberato
Demontao for the land described therein (Exh. "F") was
cancelled by Tax. Dec. No. 5172 of Francisco Militante (Exh.
"E"). Liberato Demontao paid the land tax under Tax Dec.
No. 2434 on Dec. 20, 1939 for the years 1938 (50%) and
1959 (Exh. "H").
8. The defendant had declared for taxation purposes Lot No.
2 of the Psu-155241 under Tax Dec. Not. 8583 for 1957 and a
portion of Lot No. 2, Psu-155241, for 1945 under Tax Dec. No.
8584 (Exh. "2-A" Tax No. 8583 (Exh. "2") was revised by Tax
Dec. No. 9498 in the name of the defendant (Exh. "2-B") and
Tax Dec. No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A") was cancelled by Tax Dec. No.
9584 also in the name of the defendant (Exh. "2-C"). The
defendant paid the land taxes for Lot 2, Psu-155241, on Nov.
9, 1960 for the years 1945 and 1946, for the year 1950, and
for the year 1960 as shown by the certificate of the treasurer
(Exh. "3"). The defendant may present to the Court other
land taxes receipts for the payment of taxes for this lot.
9. The land claimed by the defendant as his own was
surveyed on June 6 and 7,1956, and a plan approved by
Director of Land on November 15, 1956 was issued, identified
as Psu 155241 (Exh. "5").
10. On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and
Detainer case against Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Barotac Viejo Province of Iloilo (Exh. "4") to
which the defendant Isaias Batiller riled his answer on August
29, 1960 (Exh. "4-A"). The Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo
after trial, decided the case on May 10, 1961 in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff (Exh. "4-B"). The plaintiff
appealed from the decision of the Municipal Court of Barotac
Viejo which was docketed in this Court as Civil Case No. 5750
on June 3, 1961, to which the defendant, Isaias Batiller, on
June 13, 1961 filed his answer (Exh. "4-C"). And this Court
after the trial. decided the case on November 26, 1964, in
favor of the defendant, Isaias Batiller and against the plaintiff
(Exh. "4-D").
(NOTE: As per Exh. 4-B, which is the Iloilo court of first
instance decision of 26 November 1964 dismissing plaintiff's
therein complaint for ejectment against defendant, the iloilo
court expressly found "that plaintiff's complaint is unjustified,
intended to harass the defendant" and "that the defendant,
Isaias Batiller, has a better right to possess the land in
question described in Psu 155241 (Exh. "3"), Isaias Batiller
having been in the actual physical possession thereof under
a claim of title many years before Francisco Militante sold the
land to the plaintiff-hereby dismissing plaintiff's complaint
and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant attorney's
fees ....")
B. During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will
prove by competent evidence the following:
1. That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under
Exh. "A" was formerly owned and possessed by Liberato
Demontao but that on September 6, 1919 the land was sold
at public auction by virtue of a judgment in a Civil Case
entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato Demontao
Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of
which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale
was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
on August 4, 1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"),
and a definite Deed of Sale was executed by Constantino A.
Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan. 19, 1934 in favor of
Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10, 1934
(Exh. "1-1").
2. On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to
Francisco Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J")
which was registered in the Registry of Deeds on May 13,
1940 (Exh. "J-1").
3. That plaintiff suffered damages alleged in his complaint.
C. Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent
evidence during the trial of this case the following facts:
1. That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally
owned and possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the
defendant Basilio Batiller, on the death of the former in 1920,
as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller succeeded his father , Basilio
Batiller, in the ownership and possession of the land in the
year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land
remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession
being actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous in the
concept of an owner, exclusive of any other rights and
adverse to all other claimants.
2. That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff
have never been in the actual possession of the land and that
they never had any title thereto.
3. That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent
application of the defendant has been approved.
4. The damages suffered by the defendant, as alleged in his
counterclaim."' 1
The appellate court further related the developments of the
case, as follows:
On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open
court that before any trial on the merit of the case could
proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of
action against him because the property in dispute which he
(plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco
Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the
CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court
and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case
plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law,
Francisco Militante. Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil
Code which reads:
'Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and
void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited by law.
'ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any
purchase, even at a public auction, either in person of
through the mediation of another: .
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights of in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
an assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession.'
defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any
interest in the property in dispute as the contract he
(plaintiff) had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and
void. (See pp. 22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly
opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that
defendant can not invoke Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil
Code as Article 1422 of the same Code provides that 'The
defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third
persons whose interests are not directly affected' (See pp.
32-35 Record on Appeal).
On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order
disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on
Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court
practically agreed with defendant's contention that the
contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante
was null and void. In due season plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 50-56 Record on Appeal) which was
denied by the lower court on January 14, 1966 (p. 57, Record
on Appeal).
Hence, this appeal by plaintiff from the orders of October 18,
1965 and January 14, 1966.
Plaintiff-appellant imputes to the lower court the following
errors:
'1. The lower court erred in holding that the contract of sale
between the plaintiff-appellant and his father-in-law,
Francisco Militante, Sr., now deceased, of the property
covered by Plan Psu-99791, (Exh. "A") was void, not voidable
because it was made when plaintiff-appellant was the
counsel of the latter in the Land Registration case.
'2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant-
appellee is an interested person to question the validity of
the contract of sale between plaintiff-appellant and the
deceased, Francisco Militante, Sr.
'3. The lower court erred in entertaining the motion to
dismiss of the defendant-appellee after he had already filed
his answer, and after the termination of the pre-trial, when
the said motion to dismiss raised a collateral question.
'4. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of the
plaintiff-appellant.'
The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs "assignment of
errors gives rise to two (2) legal posers (1) whether or not
the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law,
the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan
Psu-99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was
counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case
involving the property in dispute; and (2) whether or not the
lower court was correct in entertaining defendant-appellee's
motion to dismiss after the latter had already filed his answer
and after he (defendant) and plaintiff-appellant had agreed
on some matters in a pre-trial conference. Hence, its
elevation of the appeal to this Court as involving pure
questions of law.
It is at once evident from the foregoing narration that the
pre-trial conference held by the trial court at which the
parties with their counsel agreed and stipulated on the
material and relevant facts and submitted their respective
documentary exhibits as referred to in the pre-trial order,
supra, 2practically amounted to a fulldress trial which placed
on record all the facts and exhibits necessary for adjudication
of the case.
The three points on which plaintiff reserved the presentation
of evidence at the-trial dealing with the source of the alleged
right and title of Francisco Militante's predecessors, supra,
3
actually are already made of record in the stipulated facts
and admitted exhibits. The chain of Militante's alleged title
and right to the land as supposedly traced back to Liberato
Demontao was actually asserted by Militante (and his
vendee, lawyer and son-in-law, herein plaintiff) in the land
registration case and rejected by the Iloilo land registration
court which dismissed Militante's application for registration
of the land. Such dismissal, as already stated, was affirmed
by the final judgment in 1958 of the Court of Appeals. 4
The four points on which defendant on his part reserved the
presentation of evidence at the trial dealing with his and his
ancestors' continuous, open, public and peaceful possession
in the concept of owner of the land and the Director of Lands'
approval of his survey plan thereof, supra, 5are likewise
already duly established facts of record, in the land
registration case as well as in the ejectment case wherein the
Iloilo court of first instance recognized the superiority of
defendant's right to the land as against plaintiff.
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in
dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon defendant's motion after
the pre-trial.
1. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably
established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the
outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of
ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale
thereof for P2,000.00 made in 1956 by his father-in- law,
Francisco Militante, in his favor, at a time when Militante's
application for registration thereof had already been
dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the
dismissal of Militante's application for registration, the lack of
any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land was
conclusively and decisively judicially determined. Hence,
there was no right or title to the land that could be
transferred or sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in
favor of plaintiff.
Manifestly, then plaintiff's complaint against defendant, to be
declared absolute owner of the land and to be restored to
possession thereof with damages was bereft of any factual or
legal basis.
2. No error could be attributed either to the lower court's
holding that the purchase by a lawyer of the property in
litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article
1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced
supra; 6and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the
property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client
could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's
claim to the property was defeated and rejected) was void
and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409,
paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts
"expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent
and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can
the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived."
The 1911 case of Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez 7relied upon
by plaintiff as holding that a sale of property in litigation to
the party litigant's lawyer "is not void but voidable at the
election of the vendor" was correctly held by the lower court
to have been superseded by the later 1929 case of Director
of Lands vs. Abagat. 8In this later case of Abagat, the Court
expressly cited two antecedent cases involving the same
transaction of purchase of property in litigation by the lawyer
which was expressly declared invalid under Article 1459 of
the Civil Code of Spain (of which Article 1491 of our Civil
Code of the Philippines is the counterpart) upon challenge
thereof not by the vendor-client but by the adverse parties
against whom the lawyer was to enforce his rights as vendee
thus acquired.
These two antecedent cases thus cited in Abagat clearly
superseded (without so expressly stating the previous ruling
in Wolfson:
The spouses, Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, were
the owners of twelve parcels of land. Vicenta Macaraeg
died in November, 1909, leaving a large number of
collateral heirs but no descendants. Litigation between
the surviving husband, Juan Soriano, and the heirs of
Vicenta immediately arose, and the herein appellant
Sisenando Palarca acted as Soriano's lawyer. On May
2, 1918, Soriano executed a deed for the aforesaid
 twelve parcels of land in favor of Sisenando Palarca
and on the following day, May 3, 1918, Palarca filed an
application for the registration of the land in the deed.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance declared that
the deed was invalid by virtue of the provisions of
article 1459 of the Civil Code, which prohibits lawyers
and solicitors from purchasing property rights involved
in any litigation in which they take part by virtue of
their profession. The application for registration was
consequently denied, and upon appeal by Palarca to
the Supreme Court, the judgement of the lower court
was affirmed by a decision promulgated November
16,1925. (G.R. No. 24329, Palarca vs. Director of
Lands, not reported.)
In the meantime cadastral case No. 30 of the Province
of Tarlac was instituted, and on August 21, 1923,
Eleuteria Macaraeg, as administratrix of the estate of
Vicente Macaraeg, filed claims for the parcels in
question. Buenaventura Lavitoria administrator of the
estate of Juan Soriano, did likewise and so did
Sisenando Palarca. In a decision dated June 21, 1927,
the Court of First Instance, Judge Carballo presiding,
rendered judgment in favor of Palarea and ordered the
registration of the land in his name. Upon appeal to
this court by the administration of the estates of Juan
Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, the judgment of the
court below was reversed and the land adjudicated to
the two estates as conjugal property of the deceased
spouses. (G.R. No. 28226, Director of Lands vs. Abagat,
promulgated May 21, 1928, not reported.) 9
In the very case of Abagat itself, the Court, again affirming
the invalidity and nullity of the lawyer's purchase of the land
in litigation from his client, ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the
adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by
him and other expenses, and ruled that "the appellant
Palarca is a lawyer and is presumed to know the law. He
must, therefore, from the beginning, have been well aware of
the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad
faith."
As already stated, Wolfson and Abagat were decided with
relation to Article 1459 of the Civil Code of Spain then
adopted here, until it was superseded on August 30, 1950 by
the Civil Code of the Philippines whose counterpart provision
is Article 1491.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish
Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by
reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over
the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or
control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or
judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3)
administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial
officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers;
and (6) others especially disqualified by law.
In Wolfson which involved the sale and assignment of a
money judgment by the client to the lawyer, Wolfson, whose
right to so purchase the judgment was being challenged by
the judgment debtor, the Court, through Justice Moreland,
then expressly reserved decision on "whether or not the
judgment in question actually falls within the prohibition of
the article" and held only that the sale's "voidability can not
be asserted by one not a party to the transaction or his
representative," citing from Manresa 10that "(C)onsidering the
question from the point of view of the civil law, the view
taken by the code, we must limit ourselves to classifying as
void all acts done contrary to the express prohibition of the
statute. Now then: As the code does not recognize such
nullity by the mere operation of law, the nullity of the acts
hereinbefore referred to must be asserted by the person
having the necessary legal capacity to do so and decreed by
a competent court." 11
The reason thus given by Manresa in considering such
prohibited acquisitions under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil
Code as merely voidable at the instance and option of the
vendor and not void "that the Code does not recognize
such nullity de pleno derecho" is no longer true and
applicable to our own Philippine Civil Code which does
recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause,
object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy" or which are "expressly
prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such
contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning." 12
The Supreme Court of Spain and modern authors have
likewise veered from Manresa's view of the Spanish codal
provision itself. In its sentencia of 11 June 1966, the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled that the prohibition of Article 1459 of the
Spanish Civil Code is based on public policy, that violation of
the prohibition contract cannot be validated by confirmation
or ratification, holding that:
... la prohibicion que el articulo 1459 del C.C. establece
respecto a los administradores y apoderados, la cual
tiene conforme a la doctrina de esta Sala, contendia
entre otras, en S. de 27-5-1959, un fundamento de
orden moral lugar la violacion de esta a la nulidad de
pleno derecho del acto o negocio celebrado, ... y
prohibicion legal, afectante orden publico, no cabe con
efecto alguno la aludida retification ... 13
The criterion of nullity of such prohibited contracts under
Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our
Civil Code) as a matter of public order and policy as applied
by the Supreme Court of Spain to administrators and agents
in its above cited decision should certainly apply with greater
reason to judges, judicial officers, fiscals and lawyers under
paragraph 5 of the codal article.
Citing the same decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
Gullon Ballesteros, his "Curso de Derecho Civil, (Contratos
Especiales)" (Madrid, 1968) p. 18, affirms that, with respect
to Article 1459, Spanish Civil Code:.
Que caracter tendra la compra que se realice por estas
personas? Porsupuesto no cabe duda de que el caso
(art.) 1459, 40 y 50, la nulidad esabsoluta porque el
motivo de la prohibicion es de orden publico. 14
Perez Gonzales in such view, stating that "Dado el caracter
prohibitivo delprecepto, la consequencia de la infraccion es la
nulidad radical y ex lege." 15
Castan, quoting Manresa's own observation that.
"El fundamento do esta prohibicion es clarisimo. No sa
trata con este precepto tan solo de guitar la ocasion al
fraude; persiguese, ademasel proposito de rodear a las
personas que intervienen en la administrcionde
justicia de todos los retigios que necesitan pora
ejercer su ministerio librandolos de toda suspecha,
que aunque fuere in fundada, redundura endescredito
de la institucion." 16arrives at the contrary and now
accepted view that "Puede considerace en nuestro
derecho inexistente 'o radicalmente nulo el contrato
en los siguentes cases: a) ...; b) cuando el contrato se
ha celebrado en violacion de una prescripcion 'o
prohibicion legal, fundada sobre motivos de orden
publico (hipotesis del art. 4 del codigo) ..." 17
It is noteworthy that Caltan's rationale for his conclusion that
fundamental consideration of public policy render void and
inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public
officers and employees of government property intrusted to
them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property
and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them,
under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code)
has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz,
Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as
"inexistent and void from the beginning." 18
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and
permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public
interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the
permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and
lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three
cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491,
Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that
they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new
contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only
by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new
contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist
cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the
object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may
have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or
second contract; or the service which was impossible may
have become possible; or the intention which could not be
ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The
ratification or second contract would then be valid from its
execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the
first contract." 19
As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore
properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss
on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the
land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of
action founded thereon were being asserted against
defendant-appellant. The principles governing the nullity of
such prohibited contracts and judicial declaration of their
nullity have been well restated by Tolentino in his treatise on
our Civil Code, as follows:
Parties Affected. Any person may invoke the in
existence of the contract whenever juridical effects
founded thereon are asserted against him. Thus, if
there has been a void transfer of property, the
transferor can recover it by the accion reinvindicatoria;
and any prossessor may refuse to deliver it to the
transferee, who cannot enforce the contract. Creditors
may attach property of the debtor which has been
alienated by the latter under a void contract; a
mortgagee can allege the inexistence of a prior
encumbrance; a debtor can assert the nullity of an
assignment of credit as a defense to an action by the
assignee.
Action On Contract. Even when the contract is void
or inexistent, an action is necessary to declare its
inexistence, when it has already been fulfilled. Nobody
can take the law into his own hands; hence, the
intervention of the competent court is necessary to
declare the absolute nullity of the contract and to
decree the restitution of what has been given under it.
The judgment, however, will retroact to the very day
when the contract was entered into.
If the void contract is still fully executory, no party
need bring an action to declare its nullity; but if any
party should bring an action to enforce it, the other
party can simply set up the nullity as a defense. 20
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs in all instances against plaintiff-
appellant. So ordered.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,. Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
 CANON 17 TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
ZABALAJAUREGI V. ATTY. GAGATE
A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed
by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher (complainant) against
Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), . charging him for gross
ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher
(David),2 a British national who passed away on June 18,
2004.3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in
the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the
shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. 4 (Consulting Edge), a
domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her
deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of
respondent.5
On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with
Katherine Moscoso Bantegui Bantegui),6 a major stockholder
of Consulting Edge,7 in order to discuss the settlement of
Davids interest in the company. 8 They agreed to another
meeting which was, however, postponed by Bantegui.
Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in
order to hide something, respondent insisted that the
appointment proceed as scheduled.9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company
premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to the scheduled
meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to
put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring
her that the same was legal.10
On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed
disappointment over the actions of complainant and
respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for
the court to settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the
office and refused to give them a duplicate key. 11
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of
Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the Consulting
Edge office door,12 which prevented the employees thereof
from entering and carrying on the operations of the
company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutors Office) a
complaint for grave coercion against complainant and
respondent.13 In turn, respondent advised complainant that
criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui
for the recovery of David's personal records/business
interests in Consulting Edge.14 Thus, on January 17, 2005, the
two entered in Memorandum of Agreement, 15 whereby
respondent undertook the filing of the cases against
Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of
P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay
respondent P1,000.00 for every court hearing. 16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutors Office issued a
Resolution17 dated October 13, 2004, finding probable cause
to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion.
The corresponding Information was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a
matter of course, warrants of arrest were issued against
them.18 Due to the foregoing, respondent advised
complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary
motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent
abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped
communicating with complainant.19 Failing to reach
respondent despite diligent efforts, 20 complainant filed the
instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1689.
Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to
file his answer to the complaint. The case was set for
mandatory conference on November 24, 2006, 22 which was
reset twice,23 on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due
to the absence of respondent. The last notice sent to
respondent, however, was returned unserved for the reason
"moved out."24 In view thereof, Investigating Commissioner
Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference
terminated and required the parties to submit their position
papers, supporting documents, and affidavits. 25
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A.
Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) issued a Report and
Recommendation,26 observing that respondent failed to
safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned
her in the grave coercion case. Commissioner Magpayo
pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor
complainant as subrogee of David because complainant has
yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her
interest in Consulting Edge.27 Hence, the actions taken by
respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the door of
the company premises and the changing of its lock, were all
uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter legal
measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause.28
Commissioner Magpayo found that respondents acts evinced
a lack of adequate preparation and mastery of the applicable
laws on his part, in violation of Canon 529 of the Code of
Professional Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six months. 30
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforementioned Report and Recommendation in Resolution
No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19,
2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. 31
In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the
Notice of the IBPs November 19, 2011 Resolution, and
referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.33
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and
Recommendation34 dated February 6, 2013, concluding that
respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and
failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton
disregard of his duties as a lawyer.35 It deemed that the six-
month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by
the IBP was an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof,
recommended that respondent be suspended for three
years.36 Likewise, it ordered respondent to return the
P150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance
fee.37
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with
and adopts the findings and conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship
between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect
that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and
accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and
to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair
and honest means to attain lawful objectives. 39 These
principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18,
and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively
state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with
zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
xxxx
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that
respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainants cause since he: first, failed to
represent her competently and diligently by acting and
proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of
law; and, second, abandoned his clients cause while the
grave coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that
complainant's right over the properties of her deceased
husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As
such, the high-handed action taken by respondent to enforce
complainant's claim of ownership over the latters interest in
Consulting Edge i.e., causing the change of the office door
lock which thereby prevented the free ingress and egress of
the employees of the said company was highly improper.
Verily, a person cannot take the law into his own hands,
regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light,
respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in
order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be
maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes
transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of
the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his
client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, 40
in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code as above-
quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not
only improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed
to serve his client with competence and diligence in violation
of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard, he also
remained unmindful of his clients trust in him in particular,
her trust that respondent would only provide her with the
proper legal advice in pursuing her interests thereby
violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively
bear out that respondent completely abandoned complainant
during the pendency of the grave coercion case against
them; this notwithstanding petitioners efforts to reach him
as well as his receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is
hornbook principle that a lawyers duty of competence and
diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted
to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and
filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even
without prodding from the client or the court. 41 Hence,
considering respondents gross and inexcusable neglect by
leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it
cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to
file his answer to the complaint despite due notice.1wphi1
This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also
his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law
directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges
leveled against him.42 In fine, respondent should be held
administratively liable for his infractions as herein discussed.
That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed against respondent.
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable
for gross negligence for infractions similar to those
committed by respondent were suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz, 43 a lawyer who
neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds
and disobeyed the IBPs directives to submit his pleadings
and attend the hearings was suspended from the practice of
law for two years. In Small v. Banares, 44 the Court meted a
similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any
legal service even after receiving money from the
complainant; to return the money and documents he
received despite demand; to update his client on the status
of her case and respond to her requests for information; and
to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference
before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, 45 a lawyer who
neglected complainants cause; refused to immediately
account for his clients money and to return the documents
received; failed to update his client on the status of her case
and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to
submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference
before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for
two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present
case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she
was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to
the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not
for respondents imprudent counseling, not to mention his
act of abandoning his client during the proceedings,
complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a
criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree
of the prejudice caused to complainant, the Court finds it apt
to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three years as
recommended by the OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBCs
recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00
acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant
since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. While the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyers administrative and
not his civil liability,46 it must be clarified that this rule
remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely
civil in nature for instance, when the claim involves moneys
received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this
case). Hence, considering further that the fact of
respondents receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from
complainant remains undisputed,47 the Court finds the return
of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.

WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found

guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 and Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of three 3) years, effective upon the finality
of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant

Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the P150,000.00
acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with
the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.

SO ORDERED.
 CANTILLER V. POTENCIANO
A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989
MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM
Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts
and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause.
A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains
the public concern for the maintenance of an untarnished
standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client. 1
Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V.
Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the
Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with
deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross
misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer
of the court.
2 In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was
The essential facts are as follows:
Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller,
defendant in an action for "ejectment" docketed as Civil Case
No. 6046 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as
plaintiff, was then pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No.
54117 for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions
involve the apartment unit being rented by complainant and
her sister.
When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the
losing party. Civil Case No. 54117 for reconveyance was
ordered dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987
while Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment was decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Court against her.
On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued
in Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment, complainant and
Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises
within four (4) days from receipt of notice.
Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a
certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn,
introduced them to herein respondent. After such
introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent
would handle their case. Forthwith, a petition entitled
"Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo
Order, etc." was prepared by respondent to forestall the
execution of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.
made to sign by respondent what she described as a
"[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly
composed 3 petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant
alleges that respondent promised her that the necessary
restraining order would be secured if only because the judge
who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close
friend).
Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed as Civil
Case No. 55118. Respondent demanded from the
complainant one thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's
fee which the latter paid that same afternoon.
However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch
153, the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as
counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship.
On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of
complainant and asked her to be ready with two thousand
pesos (P 2,000.00) to be given to another judge who will
issue the restraining order in the ejectment case (Civil Case
No. 6046). Complainant and her sister were only able to raise
the amount of one thousand pesos which they immediately
gave to respondent.
Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister
that he could not locate the judge who would issue the
restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's
Restaurant where respondent ordered some food - including
two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge
who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture,
respondent asked for the remaining balance of the two
thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) which he earlier demanded.
Complainant gave her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent
informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to
file another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them
to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose,
respondent told complainant to prepare the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with
the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the
apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to
cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the
complainant the need and urgency of filing the new
complaint.
Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through
the kindness of some friends and relatives. On October
26,1987, the money was handed over to the respondent.
On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance,
Annulment of Simulated or Spurious Sale with Damages,"
later docketed as Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by
respondent with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig,
Metro Manila.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No.
55118 on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his
promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew
his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was
not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no
restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a
consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was
eventually enforced and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge
that there was really no need to make a deposit of ten
thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210.
After further inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no
such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987,
complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for
the return of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P
11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter.
However, this letter was never answered and the money was
never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this
administrative complaint against herein respondent.
Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, dismissed Civil Case No. 55118 for failure to
state a cause of action. 4 On January 20,1988, Civil Case No.
5521 0 was likewise dismissed for being identical with Civil
Case No. 55118. 5
Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil
Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that
the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative
charge against him are all lies, product of one's imagination
and only intended to harrass him. 6
This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118
and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. having
represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the
apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have
carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the
justness of his representation. The little time involved is no
excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty
was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently
respondent was more interested in getting the most out of
the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged
about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and
talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the
other. Worse still he got P 10,000.00 as alleged deposit in
court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the
same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious.
When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants
that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final
conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer
unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him.
The acts of respondent in this case violate the most
elementary principles of professional ethics . 7
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due
diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent had
knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the
presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his
appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite
such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a
replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.
Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge
that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear
that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 respondent already filed a
motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel
interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain
due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent failed to
find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire
another lawyer in his stead. 8
His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect
with utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the
fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. 9 More
so in this case, where by reason of his gross negligence
complainant thereby suffered by losing all her cases.
The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the
same day that he had already filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his
lack of good faith as an advocate. He also failed to appear for
the complainant in said case. It was all a show to get more
money from her. This adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law. When confronted with this evident irregularity,
he lamely stated that while he did not physically appear for
complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted the
pleadings.
His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the
property subject of the ejectment proceeding would be
returned to her. In fact, it was respondent who persuaded
complainant that the filing of these two cases simultaneously
were the means by which this objective can be achieved. His
duty was not only to prepare the pleadings but to represent Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to
complainant until the termination of the cases. This he failed complainant herein the sum of eleven thousand pesos
to do. (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this
resolution until it is actually returned.
His representation that there was an immediate need to file
Civil Case No. 55210 when he already knew that he could no SO ORDERED.
longer physically handle the same is an act of deception of
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz,
his client. 10 It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
member of the Philippine bar.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P
10,000.00) was given to him as fee for his services, is simply
incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate
with the service he actually rendered. 11 And his failure to
return even a portion of the amount upon demand of
complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of
complainant that respondent does not deserve to remain as
an officer of the court.

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of

administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when
strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal
profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion

and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the

circumstances present in this case, this Court finds Atty.
Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against
him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that
he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the
practice of law.
 ALISBO V. JALANDOON
A.M. No. 1311 July 18, 1991
RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and NORBERTO S. ALISBO,
petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then
Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on January 2,
1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and Norberto S. Alisbo
against their former counsel, Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr.,
charging him with deceit, malpractice, and professional
infidelity. The complaint was referred to this Court on
February 5, 1974.
After the complainants had submitted the required number of
copies of their complaint, the respondent was ordered to file
his answer thereto which he did on June 5, 1974.
On August 20, 1974, the complainants filed a reply.
On August 28, 1974, the Court referred the complaint to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On February 2, 1990, or after sixteen (16)
years, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court,
together with the transcripts of stenographic notes taken at
the investigation and folders of exhibits submitted by the
parties.
The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General, are
the following:
On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent
Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., as his counsel to commence
an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased
spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had
been adjudicated to him under the judgment dated April 29,
1961 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in Civil
Case No. 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a motion for
execution of the judgment in his favor within the
reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules of
Court). The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional
Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon
were the following:
1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a
suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share or claim;
2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of
litigation; and
3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid fifty per
cent (50%) of the value of the property recovered.
On April 18, 1970, respondent prepared a complaint for
revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 but filed it only
on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months later. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9559, entitled: "Ramon S. Alisbo,
Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo vs. Carlito Sales, in his
own capacity and as Judicial Administrator of the deceased
Pedro Sales." The complaint was signed by respondent alone.
However, no sooner had he filed the complaint than he
withdrew it and filed in its stead (on the same day and in the
same case) a second complaint dated August 31, 1970, with
Ramon S. Alisbo as the lone plaintiff, praying for the same
relief. Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo were excluded
as plaintiffs and were impleaded as defendants instead.
Attorneys Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito Jalandoon, Sr. (herein
respondent) signed as counsel.
On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was filed
wherein the plaintiffs were: Ramon S. Alisbo, assisted by his
judicial guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and eight (8) others,
namely: Pacifico S. Alisbo, Ramona Vda. de Alisbo and
Ildefonso, Evangeline, Teotimo, Jr., Reynaldo, Elizabeth and
Teresita, all surnamed Alisbo. The amended complaint was
signed by Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo alone as counsel of the
plaintiffs.
On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for
revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 had already
prescribed (Exh. 21). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss (Exh. 22).
On October 3, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became
final on May 30, 1961 yet, and, although a complaint for
revival of said judgment was filed by Ramon Alisbo on
September 12, 1970, before the ten-year prescriptive period
expired, that complaint was null and void for Ramon Alisbo
was insane, hence, incompetent and without legal capacity to
sue when he instituted the action. The subsequent filing of an
Amended Complaint on December 8, 1972, after the
statutory limitation period had expired, was too late to save
the plaintiffs right of action. Thereafter, nothing more was
done by any of the parties in the case.
On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent
Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. with having deliberately
caused the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 and with having
concealed from them the material fact that he had been the
former legal counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary in the
probate proceedings. The respondent filed a general denial of
the charges against him.
When Ramon S. Alisbo engaged the services of Attorney
Jalandoon to enforce the decision in Civil Case No. 4963, that
decision was already nine (9) years old, hence, it could no
longer be executed by mere motion (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of
Court). Complainants had only about a year left within which
to enforce the judgment by an independent action.
Ramon Alisbo was already insane or incompetent when he
hired Attorney Jalandoon to file Civil Case No. 9559 for him.
Attorney Jalandoon concealed from Alisbo the fact that he
(Atty. Jalandoon) had been the former counsel of Carlito Sales
in the probate proceedings where Alisbo and Sales had
litigated over their shares of the inheritance.
However, according to Attorney Jalandoon, it was only on
October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was called for pre-
trial, that he discovered his previous professional relationship
with Sales. At that time, the ten-year prescriptive period for
revival of the judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired.
He thereupon asked Alisbo's permission to allow him
(Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He also informed the
court about his untenable position and requested that he be
allowed to retire therefrom. His request was granted.
In his report to the Court, the Solicitor General made the
following observations:
Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling
the case for Ramon S. Alisbo which eventually led to
its dismissal, respondent committed several errors,
among which are:
1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo
before filing the case. Otherwise, his lack of capacity to
sue would not have been at issue.
2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and
gave way instead to a motion to resolve pending
incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered
away precious time.
 3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and
impleaded them as defendants. Otherwise, the
complaint would have been defective only in part.
Had not respondent committed the above mistakes,
Civil Case No. 9559 in all probability would not have
been dismissed on the ground of prescription. (pp. 9-
10, Solicitor General's Report.)
While the Solicitor General does not believe that Attorney
Jalandoon's mistakes in handling Alisbo's case were
deliberate or made with malice aforethought because there is
no "proof of collusion or conspiracy between respondent and
those who would benefit from the dismissal of Civil Case No.
9559 . . . and that, on the other hand, respondent stood to
gain substantially (50% of the amount recovered) if he had
succeeded in having the judgment revived and executed"
(pp. 10-11, Solicitor General's Report), still those errors are so
gross and glaring that they could not have resulted from
mere negligence or lack of due care.
Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before
the pre-trial that the Sales defendants had been his clients in
the past, is unbelievable because:
1. Before he filed the complaint for revival of
judgment, he had had several interviews with Ramon
S. Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No.
4963.
2. He must have done some research on the court
records of Civil Case No. 4963, so he could not have
overlooked his own participation in that case as
counsel for Carlito Sales, et al.
3. To prepare the complaint for revival of judgment
(Civil Case No. 9559), he had to inform himself about
the personal circumstances of the defendants-Carlito
Sales, et al. The fact that they had been his clients
could not have eluded him.
In view of his former association with the Saleses, Attorney
Jalandoon, as a dutiful lawyer, should have declined the
employment proffered by Alisbo on the ground of conflict of
interest. Had he done that soon enough, the Alisbos (herein
complainants) would have had enough time to engage the
services of another lawyer and they would not have lost their
case through prescription of the action.
The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1
and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provide:
6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to
disclose to the client all the circumstances of his
relations to the parties, and any interest in or
connection with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
(pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.)
The impression we gather from the facts is that Attorney
Jalandoon used his position as Alisbo's counsel precisely to
favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo's
action to revive the judgment in his favor and thereby
deprive him of the fruits of his judgment which Attorney
Jalandoon, as Sales' counsel, had vigorously opposed. Thus,
although Atty. Jalandoon prepared Alisbo's complaint for
revival of judgment on April 18, 1970, he delayed its filing
until September 12, 1970. He postponed filing the action by IT IS SO ORDERED.
asking the Court instead to resolve pending incidents in said
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla,
Civil Case No. 4963. By doing that, he frittered away what
Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
little time was left before the action would prescribe. The
concur.
original complaint which he filed in the names of Ramon
Alisbo and his brothers was only partially defective because Gancayco, J., is on leave.
of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping the other plaintiffs,
leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the
action, respondent made the second complaint wholly
defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the
prescriptive period.

After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case.

While he allegedly found out about Ramon Alisbo's insanity
on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the complaint to implead
Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8, 1971 only,
or almost five (5) months later. By that time the prescriptive
period had run out.

The surrounding circumstances leave us with no other

conclusion than that Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his client
Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with
that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a lawyer is
obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client.
There is more than simple negligence resulting in the
extinguishment and loss of his client's right of action; there is
a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in his dealings with his
client, which call for the exercise of this Court's disciplinary
power.

The Honorable Solicitor General who conducted the

investigation of this case found respondent Attorney Benito
Jalandoon, Sr. guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity.
Although the Solicitor General recommended the suspension
of respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon Sr. from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court, after due
deliberation, decided to suspend him for a period of two (2)
years from the finality of this decision.
 NGAYAN V. TUGADE
A.M. No. 2490 February 7, 1991
FULGENCIO A. NGAYAN, TOMASA K. NGAYAN and BELLA
AURORA NGAYAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This case refers to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the
herein complainants Fulgencio A. Ngayan, Tomasa K. Ngayan
and Bella Aurora Ngayan in a letter-complaint dated
November 16, 1982 against respondent lawyer for violation
of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines.
It appears that respondent lawyer was formerly a counsel for
complainants either as defense counsel or private prosecutor
in the following cases:
(a) People v. Fulgencio A. Ngayan, City Court of Manila,
Branch Criminal Case No. 053773-CR for light threat;
(b) People v. Tomasa Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan,
City Court of Manila, Branch VIII, Criminal Case No.
053594-CR, for unjust vexation;
(c) People v. Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila,
Branch II, Criminal Case No. 053599-CR, for grave
threats;
(d) People v. Roberto Leonido, City Court of Manila, Branch
XIV, Criminal Case No. 053649-CR, for trespass to
dwelling; and People v. Nestor Campo, Branch XIV,
Criminal Case No. 053650-CR, for threats;
(e) Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena
Soriano and Robert Leonido for grave threats and
trespass; Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan
v. Rowena Soriano, for grave defamation, Office of the
City Fiscal of Manila before Assistant City Fiscal Elmer
K. Calledo, I.S. No. 82-8564. (pp. 1-2, Rollo)
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare
an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be filed
against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a
consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into
complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the
same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she
was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted
a paragraph which did not mention that Robert Leonido was
with Rowena Soriano when both suddenly barged into
complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told
respondent about his omission and in front of her, respondent
crossed out the paragraph she complained about and
promised to make another affidavit. In the meantime,
complainants filed motions to discharge the respondent as
their counsel.
Complainants allegedly made a follow up after discharging
respondent and found that the name of Robert Leonido was
not included in the charge. Since the omission was remedied
by their new counsel and the case was subsequently filed in
court, the adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation
and attached thereto the first affidavit of complainants which
was crossed out. Complainants averred that the motion was
filed by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of
respondent. They further said that respondent was also a
lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance
company. Complainants further alleged that the motion for
reinvestigation was set for hearing before Assistant City
Fiscal Milagros F. Garcia-Beza where respondent himself
executed and submitted an affidavit as exhibit for Robert
Leonido and Rowena Soriano controverting the affidavit of
complainants notwithstanding the fact that he prepared the
latter's affidavit when he was still their counsel.
They further alleged that before he executed and submitted
his affidavit, respondent sent a personal letter to Fiscal Beza
denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing criminal
and civil cases against them.
Complainants charged respondent for violation of paragraphs
(e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court, which
provide:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client,
and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged;
Complainants claim that paragraph (e) above was violated by
respondent when the affidavit he prepared for complainants
but subsequently crossed-out was submitted as evidence
against complainants in the motion for reinvestigation. As to
paragraph (f), complainants averred that respondent violated
it when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying that his name was
being adversely affected by the false affidavits of
complainants and for that reason, respondent was
contemplating to file a criminal and civil action for damages
against them.
In a resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated
January 19, 1983, respondent was required to answer the
complaint against him but respondent failed. Thus, on May
25, 1983, for failure of the respondent to file an answer, this
Court resolved to refer this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereupon, the
Solicitor General set the complaint for hearing on September
26, 1983, October 17 and 18,1983 and November 24,1983,
all of which dates, respondent was duly notified. However,
respondent never appeared on any date. Accordingly, the
Solicitor General made findings of facts based on the
aforesaid claims of complainants and said:
Consistent with respondent's failure to file an answer
to the complaint herein filed against him, he also did
not appear, despite due notice on the four occasions
when the hearing of the present complaint was set at
the Office of the Solicitor General. Neither has
respondent shown concern or interest about the status
of the complaint filed against him. The inaction of
respondent to the resolutions of this Honorable Court
requiring him to file his Answer to the Complaint filed
against him and his subsequent failure to attend the
hearings on the said complaint indicate that
respondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities and he has not conducted
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to his clients (Sec. 3, Rule 138, Rules
of Court). Further, lawyers are particularly called upon
to obey court orders and processes. They should stand
foremost in complying with the court's directives or
instructions being themselves officers of the court (p.
75, Legal Ethics, Ruben Agpalo, 2nd Ed.). This lack of
concern shown by respondent regarding the matter
that involved the very foundation of his right to
engage in the practice of law would show how much
less he would regard the interest of Ms clients. 1
He thus recommended that the respondent lawyer be
disbarred and his name dropped from attorney's roll.1wphi1
In this report, he averred that the conduct of respondent as
above-shown constitutes unprofessional conduct and an
outright violation of the provisions of Section 3 and
paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof (Santos v.
Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22, 1978, 84 SCRA
622).
In the case at bar, complainants claim that respondent
furnished the adverse parties in a certain criminal case with a
copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it
as evidence against complainants. This actuation constitutes
betrayal of trust and confidence of his former clients in
violation of paragraph (e), Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Inasmuch as respondent failed to answer the
complaint filed against him and despite due notice on four
occasions, he consistently did not appear on the scheduled
hearing set by the Office of the Solicitor General, this claim
remained uncontroverted. Besides, We tend to believe the
said claim of complainants when it is taken together with
their other claim that respondent's actuations from the
beginning tend to show that he was partial to the adverse
parties as he even tried to dissuade complainants from filing
charges against Robert Leonido. This partiality could be
explained by the fact that respondent is the former classmate
of Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, the adverse parties' counsel and
the fact that respondent is the lawyer of the brother of Robert
Leonido in an insurance company.
Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as
exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano advancing
facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients such as the
fact that the crime charged in complainants' affidavit had
prescribed and that he was asked to prepare an affidavit to
make the offense more grave so as to prevent the offense
from prescribing demonstrates clearly an act of offensive
personality against complainants, violative of the first part of
paragraph (f), Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Likewise,
respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating
their victory over the dismissal of the case against them
shows not only his bias against the complainants but also
constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer. It was
meant only to titillate the anger of complainants.
Additionally, respondent's failure to answer the complaint
against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are
evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the
court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in
violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
We have fully scrutinized and evaluated the records of this
case and We cannot but find that strong and unassailable
reasons exist to render it Our irremissible duty to impose a
disciplinary sanction on respondent. But We feel that
disbarment is too harsh considering the circumstances of the
case. We hold that suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year should be imposed on respondent for
the aforestated misconduct.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Faustino F. Tugade is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the
personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
IN RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. MAQUERA FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW
B.M. No. 793 July 30, 2004
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN
THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted
the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the
same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There
is a Rule of Court provision covering this case's central issue.
Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone
the test of an unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,1 the District Court of
Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two
(2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior
Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case
No. SP0075-94,2 a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar
Ethics Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maquera's suspension in
Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its Resolution
dated November 19, 1996.3 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where
he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground
for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the
foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar
Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the
Court obtain copies of the record of Maquera's case since the
documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not
contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera's suspension
and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether
Maquera's acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension
in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.4
Pursuant to this Court's directive in its Resolution dated
March 18, 1997,5 the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated
November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting
for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case
against Maquera and of the rules violated by him. 6
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera's
case from the District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997. 7
Thereafter, Maquera's case was referred by the Court to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report
and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBP's
receipt of the case records.8
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to
appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline on July
28, 1998.9 However, the notice was returned unserved
because Maquera had already moved from his last known
address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding
address.10
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report
and Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110,
indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law
within the Philippines until and unless he updates and pays
his IBP membership dues in full.11
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine
Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was
admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He
was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment
for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's
case.12
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on
August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain
Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case.
Maquera served as Castro's counsel in said case. Castro's
property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold
at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to
Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption
over the property for one year. The right of redemption could
be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt
within the aforesaid period.13
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro's property
for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which
Castro was adjudged to pay him.14
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera's
legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered
into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right
of redemption in favor of the latter.15
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of
redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction
of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to
the property transferred in his name.16
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S.
Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand
U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).17
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee
(Committee) conducted hearings regarding Maquera's
alleged misconduct.18
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior
Court of Guam praying that Maquera be sanctioned for
violations of Rules 1.519 and 1.8(a)20 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its
Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee
further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to
comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model
Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair
and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in writing. 21
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1)
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of
two 2 years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the
period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro
the difference between the sale price of the property to the
Changs and the amount due him for legal services rendered
to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also
recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that
Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the
Superior Court of Guam.22
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed
to the property in his favor as compensation for past legal
services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself,
was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written
agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was
made three days following the alleged termination of the
attorney-client relationship between them, and that the
property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal
services to Castro.23
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its
Decision24 suspending Maquera from the practice of law in
Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take
the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination
(MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-
client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet
completely terminated when they entered into the oral
agreement to transfer Castro's right of redemption to
Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera
profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castro's
property to him since he was able to sell the same to the
Changs with more than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his
legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE
upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he
was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding
business transactions between an attorney and his client "in
a very general sort of way."25
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam,
the IBP concluded that although the said court found
Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to
establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines."26 However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member
of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised
Rules of Court.27
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts
or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,
1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if
the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign
court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera's acts,
namely: acquiring by assignment Castro's right of redemption
over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera
appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of
redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a
huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical
behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus
constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this
jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his
client's property by exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his
legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article
1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 28 prohibits the
lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property
which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer.
Under Article 1492,29 the prohibition extends to sales in legal
redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and
Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of
his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client30 and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste31 illustrates the significance of the
aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the attorney
acquired his clients' property subject of a case where he was
acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his
clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at
the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay
him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyer's
acquisition of the property of his clients under the
circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for
malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed
at the instance of the spouses driven by financial
necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the
latter's behest, as contended by the complainant, is of
no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a
vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to
a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply
protective of the confidential relations, which must
necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of
the rights of both".32
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's
acquisition of Castro's right of redemption, his subsequent
exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed
property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad
faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an
exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since
the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in
payment for his legal services, and since the property
redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of
December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption
was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for
accepting payment for his legal services way beyond his
actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year
suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are
also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law
in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn
duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the
trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession. 33
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment
ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in
Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, 34 Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his
suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. 35 Likewise, the
judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes
prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a
lawyer.36 More fundamentally, due process demands that he
be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present
testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an
investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the
charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and
failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during
the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be
conducted ex parte.37
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to
adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of
unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain
that he did receive the Noticeof Hearing earlier sent by the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to
ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in
order that another notice, this time specifically informing him
of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why
he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds
(through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings
against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his
subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and
correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve upon
him a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid
his membership dues, whichever comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera's
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera

should be suspended from the practice of law for non-
payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the
present.38 Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules
of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6)
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP,
and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys.39

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW

CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for
 CANON 18 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment. 1 Parias
gave Paguinto a diskette containing a narration of what
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND happened between her and her estranged husband Danilo
DILIGENCE. Soriano. Parias also furnished Paguinto with a copy of her
marriage contract with Soriano. Before the end of December
2001, Parias gave Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee.
PARIAS V. ATTY. PAGUINTO
Sometime between January and April 2002, Parias inquired
A.C. NO. 6297 July 13, 2004 from Paguinto on the progress of her annulment case.
Paguinto informed her that the case was filed with the
DOLORES D. PARIAS, complainant, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 64 ("RTC-Manila,
vs. Branch 64"), before Judge Ricaforte and that the hearing was
ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO, respondent. scheduled on 25 April 2002. Before the hearing, Parias
requested for a meeting with Paguinto but the secretary
informed her that the hearing was cancelled. The secretary
DECISION further informed Parias that the judge reset the succeeding
hearings originally scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26 June
CARPIO, J.:
2002 because the judge was sick or out of town.
The Case
On the first week of July 2002, Parias went to the trial court
A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to to inquire about her case but the court personnel in RTC-
every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly warrants that he Manila, Branch 64 informed her that there was no such case
possesses the necessary diligence, learning and skill to filed in their court. Parias asked Paguinto for the case
handle each case. He should exert his best judgment and number, date of filing, copy of the petition and the court
exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the where the annulment case was pending. Paguinto told
pursuit or defense of his client's cause. Parias that the records were at his office and that he was in
Malolos, Bulacan attending to a case. It turned out that there
The Facts was no annulment case filed in RTC-Manila, Branch 64.
Paguinto promised to return the money that Parias paid as
Sometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden
down payment. However, Paguinto returned the P10,000
Parias ("Parias") engaged the services of respondent Atty.
only after Parias filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
Oscar P. Paguinto ("Paguinto") to annul her marriage to Danilo
("CBD") of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") the
Soriano. They agreed that for the legal services, Parias
present complaint for disbarment.
would pay Paguinto an acceptance fee of P25,000, the filing
fee of P2,500 and other incidental expenses. In the Order dated 14 February 2003,2 the CBD directed
Paguinto to answer the complaint. Paguinto asked for an
On 2 December 2001, Parias paid Paguinto P10,000 in cash
extension of 15 days to file his Answer. The CBD granted the
as partial payment of the acceptance fee. An
extension in the Order dated 19 March 2003. 3 However,
Paguinto failed to file his Answer within the extended period
and thus the CBD declared him in default in the Order dated
15 July 2003.4 After the hearing, Parias submitted her
Position Paper praying that the CBD declare Paguinto guilty of
violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On 10 September 2003, Parias filed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal5 of the complaint. Parias stated that Paguinto
"personally explained exhaustively the reasons why he failed
to comply with his obligations" and she realized that the
complaint arose due to a "misapprehension of facts,
misunderstanding and miscommunication." Parias
manifested that she was withdrawing the complaint, as she
was no longer interested in pursuing the case.
On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and Motion 6
explaining that he failed to attend the hearing on 30 July
2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga attending a hearing in
a criminal case for frustrated homicide. He apologized to
Parias for his actuations claiming "himself solely to be
blamed." He further declared that he failed to timely prepare
and file the petition for annulment because he spends his
time mostly in Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Cavite where he
practices law catering to those "clients who have less in life."
Commissioner's Report & Recommendation
The IBP designated Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
("Commissioner") as Commissioner to conduct a formal
investigation of the case. The Commissioner found Paguinto
negligent in performing his duties as a lawyer and as an
officer of the court. The Commissioner declared that a
lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention, care and
time to his cases, accepting only as many cases as he can
handle. Paguinto failed to comply with this duty. The
Commissioner recommended the suspension of Paguinto
from the practice of law for six months.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commissioner.
Parias gave Paguinto P10,000 cash as partial payment of
the acceptance fee. Parias also gave Paguinto P2,500 for
the filing fee. Paguinto led Parias to believe that he had
filed the annulment case. Paguinto informed Parias that the
case was filed with the RTC-Manila, Branch 64, before Judge
Ricaforte. However, Parias later found out that Paguinto
never filed the annulment case in court.
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("the
Code") provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause.7 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file
the case must immediately be returned to the client on
demand.8 Paguinto returned the money only after Parias
filed this administrative case for disbarment.
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to
the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses
the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the
case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in is expected to take such reasonable steps and such
the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and ordinary care as his client's interests may require.
to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the
And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. 12
pursuit or defense of the case.
Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not undertake
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his
a legal service that he is not qualified to render. Rule 18.02 of
case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he
matter without adequate preparation. He has the duty to
is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must
prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. Rule
accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle,
18.03 of the Code also provides that a lawyer shall not
otherwise his clients' interests will suffer. 9 It is not enough
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal
shall render him liable.
matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal
work. One last point. Parias executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal 13
of the complaint stating that she was withdrawing the
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost
administrative complaint against Paguinto after realizing that
learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to
"said complaint against the respondent arose due to
practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that
misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and
the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and
miscommunication." Paguinto, on the other hand, submitted
diligence to manage their cases.10 The legal profession
a Manifestation and Motion apologizing to Parias for his
demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected
actuations and admitting that he was "solely to be
of a good father of a family.
blamed." A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not
In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara,11 we ruled: terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer, 14
especially in this case where the lawyer admitted his
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
misconduct.
must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He shall serve his client with competence and Parias's affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does
diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his client's not exonerate Paguinto in any way. We reiterate our ruling in
cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos15 that
every honorable means to secure for the client what is
[A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
justly due him or to present every defense provided by
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. An
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
commences from his retainer until his effective release
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
from the case or the final disposition of the whole
undertaken solely for the public welfare. x x x The
subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he
attorney is called upon to answer to the court for his
 conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto

GUILTY of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we penalize Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto with
SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law
effective upon receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago,

andAzcuna, JJ., concur.
Rules 18.01 Client Consent with Collaborating
Counsel
A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows
or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he
may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he
can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
DE JUAN V. ATTY. BARIA III
A.C. No. 5817 May 27, 2004
EMMA V. DE JUAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In her Salaysay filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on
August 29, 2002, complainant, former client of respondent,
charged respondent with negligence in handling her labor
case and threats against her person.
The complainant alleged that respondent Atty. Oscar R. Baria
III, as her counsel in NLRC NCR CA No. 022654-00/NLRC RAB
IV-7-11287-99-R, Emma De Juan v. Triple AAA Antique/Mr.
Yappe and Mr. Godofredo Nadia, negligently failed to file
motion for reconsideration of the decision dated September
24, 2001 of the NLRC in her behalf.1
The complainant avers that she was hired by Triple AAA on or
about December 15, 1998 as packer on probation status for
six months in its Packing Department.2 Based on a
performance evaluation citing her irregular attendance and
inefficiency, the company terminated her services on June
11, 1999,3 after waiting for two weeks for her to report. She
claims that she was terminated without notice nor
explanation4 so she filed a complaint before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the company for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday,
rest day, and 13th month pay. She also claimed moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.5
In search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance of Banahaw
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which assigned respondent
to handle her labor case. Respondent represented
complainant on a contingency fee agreement.
On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
in favor of complainant.6 Triple AAA appealed to the NLRC. In
a decision promulgated on September 24, 2001, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared there was no illegal
dismissal.7
Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said
that she came to know of the reversal of the Labor Arbiters
decision when she called respondent in October 2001. When
she asked the respondent what they should do, respondent
answered, "Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako marunong gumawa
ng Motion for Reconsideration." Sometime in November
2001, her husband called respondent to ask if he did
anything in connection with the NLRCs Decision and he was
advised by respondents secretary that, "Sabi ni Attyhuwag
na kayong magpakita sa kanya dahil galit na galit sa inyo si
Attorney at baka kung ano pa ang magawa niya sa inyo." 8
The Court required respondent to comment and referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.9
In his Comment, respondent explained that soon after
passing the bar in 1999, he was employed as a broadcaster
in DWANs radio program offering free legal services to the
poor. He gave free legal services to indigent clients one of
whom was complainant. As a practice, he said he forewarned
his clients that he was just a new lawyer and that they should
not expect too much from him because of his limited legal
experience. According to respondent he tried to explain to
complainant the legal remedies available to her as well as
the time her case may take. It appeared to him that
complainant did not fully grasp the usual delays that may be
involved in her case. He recalled that when he told
complainant that the Labor Arbiters decision was in her
favor, she was so jubilant at the money judgment. Later
however, the complainant became furious when he told her
that Triple AAA Antique had appealed. Respondent filed a
Motion for Writ of Execution of the Labor Arbiters Decision
but this Motion was ruled premature. Respondent then filed
an opposition to the appeal filed by Triple AAA but the NLRC
still gave due course to the appeal. While Triple AAAs appeal
was pending resolution he told complainant to call him every
week so that she could be advised of any developments in
her case. He generously suggested that complainant call
"collect" to lessen her expenses. He even allowed
complainant and her husband to stay in his home when they
came to Manila from the province. He said he even fed them
when they were in Manila.
In October 2001, the NLRC rendered its decision reversing
the Labor Arbiter. By this time, according to respondent, he
confronted complainant for lying to him about her
employment with Triple AAA and told her that because of her
lies there was a possibility she could lose the appeal. He
advised complainant to get a more experienced lawyer for
her appeal because as a new lawyer he was not confident he
could handle her appeal. Thereafter, complainant no longer
contacted him and at some time, he even had to ask her
whereabouts from her relatives.
On December 2001, respondent received calls from the staff
of Raffy Tulfo, a radio commentator. In one of these calls, his
wife talked to one of Tulfos employees and she was told that
complainant told Tulfo that the respondent received money
from Triple AAA Antique. As a result Tulfo lambasted him on
his radio program. Respondent thereafter called Tulfo,
explained his side, and demanded that the latter apologize
on air otherwise he would file a libel case against Tulfo.
Sometime in January 2002, respondents secretary received a
call from the complainants husband. When respondents
secretary confronted the husband regarding the Tulfo
incident, complainants husband retorted, "Sabihin mo sa
kanya mag ingat siya at baka may mangyari sa kanya."
Shortly thereafter, respondent began receiving death threats
over the phone and also noticed armed men casing his office.
He reported these calls and presence of suspicious armed
men to the police.
Respondent surmises that complainant believed Triple AAA
paid him off and he pocketed money supposedly for her.
Respondent vehemently denied he did. He asks that Triple
AAA be summoned to bear witness to his story. Respondent
asserts that he has not committed any breach of his oath and
that he has vigorously pursued his clients cause to the end.
He avers that it was his clients own negligence and folly that
caused her to lose her case. He asks that the complaint be
dismissed.
In a Resolution dated March 15, 2003, this Court referred the
case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
In turn, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required
complainant to reply. In her reply written in Filipino,
complainant denied that she accepted money from
respondent during the pendency of her labor case, except on
one occasion when she borrowed P100 from respondents
secretary for travel fare back to the province. She reiterated
that she filed her Salaysay because of respondents failure to
file a motion for reconsideration. She further insists that she
does not believe that respondent did not know how to file a
motion for reconsideration as he claims since she was aware
that even a law student would know how to.
In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, the IBP approved the
recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The
IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of negligence
in handling the aforecited labor case and recommended that
respondent be suspended from practicing law for three
months. The charge of grave threats was dismissed for
complainants failure to substantiate the same.10
The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to
file for the complainant a motion for reconsideration from the
decision of the NLRC.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the
cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 11
Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case
becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to
abandon his client and withdraw his services without
reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.12 Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects
the client.13 This means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense.14
The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the NLRC such that the said
decision eventually had become final and executory.
Respondent does not refute this. His excuse that he did not
know how to file a motion for reconsideration is lame and
unacceptable. After complainant had expressed an interest to
file a motion for reconsideration, it was incumbent upon
counsel to diligently return to his books and re-familiarize
himself with the procedural rules for a motion for
reconsideration. Filing a motion for reconsideration is not a
complicated legal task.
We are however, not unaware that respondent had been
forthright and candid with his client when he warned her of
his lack of experience as a new lawyer. We are also not
unaware that he had advised complainant to get a new
lawyer. However, his candor cannot absolve him. As already
stressed by this Court:
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these
rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who
acquires his service is entitled to not just competent
service but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients
cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should exert his best
efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest
of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in
fulfilling his duty will render him liable for disciplinary
action.15
Again, the Court held in the case of Santos v. Lazaro,16 that
"Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 17
explicitly provides that negligence of lawyers in connection
with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall
render them liable.
Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal
as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record and
whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from the
case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold.
An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after due
notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to
it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. 18
Respondent did not comply with these obligations.

WHEREFORE, respondent lawyer Oscar R. Baria III is hereby

FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that
a repetition of this or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.Puno,

(Chairman), J., on official leave.
Rule 18.02 Adequate Preparation
A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
FERNANDEZ V. ATTY. NOVERO JR.
A.C. No. 5394 December 2, 2002*
RIZALINO FERNANDEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR. respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Reynaldo
Novero, Jr. for alleged patent and gross neglect in the
handling of Civil Case No. 7500 which complainant Rizalino
Fernandez and others had filed against the Bacolod City
Water District before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Bacolod City.
In his letter,1 dated October 16, 1996, to the Court
Administrator, complainant imputed the following negligent
acts to respondent which led to the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 7500:
1. Respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing on
January 11, 1996 nor seek a postponement thereof, for which
reason the trial court considered respondent to have waived
further presentation of his evidence and directed him to
formally offer his exhibits for admission on January 30, 1996;
2. Notwithstanding receipt of the order dated January 11,
1996, respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits on
January 30, 1996, prompting the trial court to order the
dismissal of the case;
3. While respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, he did not file his motion within the
reglementary period, as a result of which the said motion,
actually filed on May 7, 1996, was denied by the trial court on
May 14, 1996 for having been filed out of time;
4. When asked for an explanation regarding the dismissal of
the case, respondent informed complainant through a letter,
dated July 30, 1996, that he had filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but the motion,
which had been filed a long time ago, had not yet been
resolved by the trial court;
5. Respondent tried to shift the blame on complainant by
claiming that the latter insisted on presenting his sister from
Manila as their last witness. The truth was that complainants
sister had already testified and there was no more witness to
present; and
6. Respondent only attended one (1) hearing in the civil case.
In his answer,2 dated September 3, 1997, respondent averred
that the complaint filed against him was baseless and was
purely malicious and speculative considering the fact that it
was not made under oath. He alleged that complainant
engaged his legal services after the first counsel had
withdrawn from the case because of a misunderstanding with
complainant. He stated that he had no knowledge of what
had happened in the case before he handled it because
complainant did not furnish him the records and stenographic
notes of the previous proceedings despite his repeated
requests. Respondent further claimed that he failed to
formally offer the exhibits as evidence because complainant
could not be reached when he was needed for conference
and the latter even tried to take over the handling of the case
by insisting on presenting more witnesses who nevertheless alleged water tapping. When he refused to go along with the
failed to appear during trial despite several postponements. scheme, complainant allegedly threatened to change
counsel. Respondent further alleged that complainants
The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant
attitude is apparent from the fact that the latter caused to be
(OBC), which submitted a report, 3 dated February 3, 2001,
disseminated several copies of the IBP Resolution
finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of
recommending his (respondents) suspension and distributed
Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension
them to radio stations in Bacolod City. For these reasons,
from the practice of law for one (1) month.
respondent sought the reversal of the IBP Resolution. 6
Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
After review of the records of this case, the Court finds the
of the Philippines (IBP), which in its report and
report of the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP to be well
recommendation, dated October 15, 2001, found respondent
taken. The records clearly show that respondent has been
remiss in observing the standard care, diligence and
negligent in the performance of his duties as complainants
competence prescribed for members of the bar in the
counsel. His failure to file his formal offer of exhibits
performance of their professional duties. The IBP
constitutes inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent
cause of his client since it led to the dismissal of the case. To
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
compound his inefficiency, respondent filed a motion for
months with warning that the commission of the same or
reconsideration outside the reglementary period, which was
similar offenses will be dealt with more severely in the
thus accordingly denied by the trial court for being filed out
future.4 The report and recommendation of the Investigating
of time. Hence, the order issued by the trial court dismissing
Commissioner was approved on June 29, 2002 by the IBP
the case became final. Respondents acts and omission
Board of Governors.5
clearly constitute violation of the Code of Professional
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, dated Responsibility which provides in pertinent parts:
September 17, 2002, alleging that the Court should not have
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
taken cognizance of the complaint because it was not
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
verified. According to him, the complaint was a mere political
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
ploy to discredit him because he was aspiring for a
congressional seat in the 1998 elections. He denied CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
complainants claim that he attended only one hearing. He COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
explained that he was not able to terminate his presentation
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
of evidence because complainant insisted on presenting as
without adequate preparation.
witness his sister who was residing in Manila, even though
the latter repeatedly failed to appear in court despite several Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
postponements. He claimed that complainant had told him entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
that his intention was really to delay the case as he was therewith shall render him liable.
using the same as his leverage in a criminal case filed or to
be filed against him by the Bacolod City Water District for his As this Court has held:
A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or
omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be
binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the
exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with
the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who
deals with them has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a
whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause. 7
Respondents attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the
blame on complainant is apparent. His averment that
complainant failed to turn over to him the records and
stenographic notes of the case only highlights his
incompetence and inadequacy in handling complainants
case. Considering that respondent has been practicing law
for almost 15 years, he should have known that he could
easily obtain a copy of the records and stenographic notes
from the court where the case was docketed.
Respondent likewise refers to the alleged obnoxious attitude
of complainant in trying to manipulate the manner in which
he was handling the case as the main reason for his failure to
formally offer his exhibits in contravention of the order of the
court. But respondent should bear in mind that while a lawyer
owes utmost zeal and devotion to the interest of his client, he
also has the responsibility of employing only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and he
should not allow the latter to dictate the procedure in
handling the case.8 As this Court said in another case:
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the
interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of
his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to
the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law. He must
present every remedy or defense within the authority
of the law in support of his clients cause, regardless of
his own personal views. In the full discharge of his
duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of
the possibility that he may displease the judge or the
general public.9
As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not
have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-
complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, 1 of
the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys,10 suffice it to say that such constitutes only a
formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court
over the subject matter of the complaint. "The verification is
merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance
with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served."11
However, instead of suspension for six (6) months as
recommended by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, we
hold that the suspension of respondent Atty. Reynaldo
Novero, Jr. for one (1) month, as recommended by the Office
of the Bar Confidant, would be commensurate considering
that this is the first time Atty. Novero is found guilty of
neglect of his clients case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Reynaldo
Novero, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
month effective upon finality hereof with WARNING that a
repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint
will be dealt with even more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and
Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Rule 18.03 Not to Neglect Legal Matters
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
BARBUCO V. ATTY. BELTRAN
A.C. No. 5092 August 11, 2004
LUCILA S. BARBUCO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, respondent6.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.1 While a lawyer may decline to render services for
a person for valid reasons, once he agrees to take up the
cause of a client, he begins to owe fidelity to that cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. He must serve his client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion.2
On July 9, 1999, Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint 3
against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for malpractice of law,
negligence and dishonesty.
It appears that on March 31, 1998, complainant, through her
son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 21,
in the case entitled, "Alexander Bermido, Plaintiff versus
Lucila Barbuco, Defendant." On August 6, 1998, complainant,
through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of
P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.
Complainant's appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58180,
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 4 dated
September 25, 1998 for failure to file Appellant's Brief,
pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Complainant found out that her appeal had been dismissed
only on June 4, 1999, when her son went to the Court of
Appeals to verify the status of the case.
When asked to comment on the charges filed against him, 5
respondent Beltran averred that the docket fees were paid on
time and that on September 22, 1998, he filed the
Appellant's Brief6 with the Court of Appeals. However, the
appeal was dismissed. On October 19, 1998, respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration,7 on the ground that he received
the notice to file brief on June 25, 1998; however, on June 26,
1998, he met a vehicular accident which physically
incapacitated him for several days; and that as a result of the
accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose
track of deadlines for the filing of pleadings.
On March 9, 1999, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied
on the ground that the brief for defendant-appellant was filed
forty-three (43) days late.8
On November 22, 1999, the complaint against respondent
Beltran was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.9
After hearing, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, submitted on October 6,
2003 her findings and recommendation that respondent
Beltran be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
five (5) years.
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2003-234 affirming the recommendation
of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but modified the
recommended period of suspension from five (5) years to six
(6) months only.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent's
conduct relative to the belated filing of the Appellant's Brief
falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication
and commitment to their client's cause.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file
brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY THREE
(43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident
and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve
to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering
that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one
lawyer. This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant
and the pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of the
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent
could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file
the Appellant's Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for
Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
In B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,10we
ruled that the confusion in the office of the law firm following
the death of one of its partners is not a valid justification for
failing to file the brief. We further ruled in the said case that
upon receipt of the notice to file the brief, the law firm should
have re-assigned the case to another associate.
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable
negligence on the part of respondent. Complainant's liability
is further compounded by his failure to maintain an open line
of communication with his client, in violation of the provisions
of Rule 18.04, which reads:
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.
Clearly, respondent's series of inadvertence prejudiced the
case of the complainant. We can not overstress the duty of a
lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 11
Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that
every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer's
fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever
mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of
him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the
interest of his client within the bounds of the law. The Code of
Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence and he should not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.12
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of
negligence and malpractice and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective
immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to all the
courts.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna,

JJ., concur.
 ENDAYA V. OCA
A.C. No. 3967 September 3, 2003
ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke
Justice Holmes. He must have made the statement because
invariably the legal system is encountered in human form,
notably through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the
lawyers not only represent the law; they are the law. 1 With
their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to
be responsible. The problems they create in lawyering
become public difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible
underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal
ethics is simply the aesthetic term for professional
responsibility.
The case before us demonstrates once again that when a
lawyer violates his duties to his client, the courts, the legal
profession and the public, he engages in conduct which is
both unethical and unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a verified Complaint 2 filed on January
12, 1993 by complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent
Atty. Wifredo Oca for violation of the lawyers oath and what
complainant termed as professional delinquency or infidelity.
3
The antecedents are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer
docketed as Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by
Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez
and Dominador Hernandez against complainant and his
spouse Patrosenia Endaya. 4
On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as
defendants in the case filed their answer which was prepared
by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was
conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his
wife attended without counsel. During the conference,
complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the
declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in
the case. Continuation of the preliminary conference was set
on January 31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant sought the
services of the Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City and
respondent was assigned to handle the case for the
complainant and his wife. 5
At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent
appeared as counsel for complainant and his spouse. He
moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by
complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied. 6
Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting Trial Court Judge
Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their
affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt of
the order. The court also decreed that thirty days after
receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon
expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment shall be
rendered on the case. 7
Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and
position paper, as may be gleaned from the Decision dated
March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted that only the
plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position papers. 8
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not
the real parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue
as they are not the real party (sic)in interest, in
addition to the fact that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the
verbal lease agreement.
SO ORDERED. 9
Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 1, where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC
directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. 10
Once again, respondent failed the complainant and his wife.
As observed by the RTC in its Decision 11 dated September 7,
1992, respondent did not file the memorandum for his
clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as
submitted for decision. 12
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from
as it held that plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property in
dispute and as such are parties-in-interest. 13 It also found
that the verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month
basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of
any given month upon proper notice to the defendants. 14 It
also made a finding that defendants incurred rentals in
arrears. 15 The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo dated
March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new
one entered, to wit:
Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA
ENDAYA and all persons claiming under them are
hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on
the land subject of the verbal lease agreement at their
own expense. The defendants are likewise ordered to
pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of
January 1991 to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from December 1991 until
the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession
of the subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay
attorneys fee in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS.
No pronouncement as to cost. 16
Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7,
1992. Two days later, or on October 9, 1992, complainant
confronted respondent with the adverse decision but the
latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the
Branch Clerk of Court, however, complainant found out that
respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992. 17
Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993
complainant filed the present administrative complaint
against the respondent for professional delinquency
consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf
of the complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends
that due to respondents inaction he lost the opportunity to
present his cause and ultimately the case itself. 18
In his Comment 19 dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies
that he committed professional misconduct in violation of his
oath, stressing that he was not the original counsel of
complainant and his spouse. 20 He further avers that when he
agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of the
preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole
purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended answer
because he was made to believe by the complainant that the
answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering that
the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he
asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but
he was denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position
paper for the complainant upon the latters undertaking to
provide him with the documents which support the position
that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute.
As complainant had reneged on his promise, he claims that
he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it
would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same
reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal with the
RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he fully explained his
stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the
complainant. 21
Pursuant to our Resolution 22 dated May 10, 1993,
complainant filed his Reply 23 to respondents Comment
wherein he merely reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.
On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his
rejoinder within ten days from notice of our Resolution. 24 But
he failed to do so despite the lapse of a considerable period
of time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10)
days from notice. 25
26
In his Explanation dated February 28, 1997, respondent
admits having received a copy of the resolution requiring him
to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts that he purposely did
not file a rejoinder for he believed in good faith that a
rejoinder to complainants reply is no longer necessary. 27 He
professes that in electing not to file a rejoinderhe did not
intend to cast disrespect upon the Court. 28
On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. 29
In its Report 30 dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar
Confidant found respondent negligent in handling the case of
complainant and his wife and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for one month. The
However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely
pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:
faultless. She observed, viz:
It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary
conference before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
respondent was never heard from again. Respondents
seeming indifference to the cause of his client,
specially when the case was on appeal, caused the
defeat of herein complainant. Respondent practically
abandoned complainant in the midst of a storm. This is
even more made serious of the fact that respondent,
at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorneys
Office- a government entity mandated to provide free
and competent legal assistance.
A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only
requires but also entitles him to deploy every
honorable means to secure for the client what is justly
due him or to present every defense provided by law
to enable the latters cause to succeed. (Miraflor vs.
Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)
....
The facts, however, do not show that respondent
employed every legal and honorable means to
advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried
his best, he could have found some other defenses
available to his client; but respondent was either too
lazy or too convinced that his client had a losing case.
....
For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings
required by the court, respondent practically closed
the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for
his client. As the Court once held, A client is bound by
the negligence of his lawyer. (Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298
SCRA 388) 31
 Respondents allegation that complainant failed in his
promise to submit the documents to support his claim
was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed
admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for
misrepresenting that he could prove his claim through
supporting documents, respondent was made to
believe that he had a strong leg to stand on. A party
cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he
himself was guilty of neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of
Appeals, 271 SCRA 491) 32
On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not
appear even once. Respondent attended five hearings, but
he failed to present evidence in support of his defense, as
required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez.
This compelled the latter to make his report on the basis of
the pleadings and evidence forwarded by the Office of the
Bar Confidant.
On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his
Report 33 wherein he concurred with the findings and
recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In a Resolution 34 dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.
The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyers
oath not only once but a number of times in regard to the
handling of his clients cause. The repeated violations also
involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his
failure to file the required pleadings for the complainant and
his wife invariably to his strong personal belief that it was
unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with
respect to the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC level,
the appeal memorandum at the RTC level and the rejoinder
at this Courts level. In the last instance, it took respondent as
long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause order
at that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file a
rejoinder after all. In other words, at the root of respondents
transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the
acts required of him by the courts. This intransigent attitude
not only belies lack of diligence and commitment but evinces
absence of respect for the authority of this Court and the
other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that
guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs
the lawyers duties and responsibilities that any infringement
thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other
disciplinary action. 35
Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and
safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a
lawyer to conduct himself to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients. 36 This duty is further stressed in Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A)
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to
demonstrate the required diligence in handling the case of
complainant and his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, 37 after appearing at the second preliminary
conference before the MCTC, respondent had not been heard
of again until he commented on the complaint in this case.
Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his
appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of
obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that
when he failed to obtain it because of complainants fault he
asked the court that he be relieved as counsel. 38 The
explanation has undertones of dishonesty for complainant
had engaged respondent for the entire case and not for just
one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent
did not know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary
Procedure 39 the amended answer is a prohibited pleading.
Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this
could not mean that less was expected from him. Once a
lawyer takes the cudgels for a clients case, he owes it to his
client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in
Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 40 thus:
It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer
takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exert
all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A
lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons
his clients cause make him unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by the latter. 41
Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas, 42 every case a lawyer
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts if for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the
lawyers reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do
his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.
Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until
the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act
of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until
such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the
interest of his client 43
Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and
position paper by the MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the
RTC, he had no choice but to comply. However, respondent
did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders.
This constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates that (A) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Respondents failure to file the affidavits and position paper at
the MCTC did not actually prejudice his clients, for the court
nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them.
However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.
It was respondents failure to file appeal memorandum before
the RTC which made complainant and his wife suffer as it
resulted in their loss of the case. As found by the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the
appeal memorandum respondent denied complainant and his
spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute.
Canon 19 prescribes that (A) lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law. He should exert all
efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the law.
Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to naught
the advantage which his clients apparently gained by
prevailing at the MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not even
bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his conduct
fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust
reposed in him by his clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not filing the
affidavits and position paper with the MCTC and the appeal
memorandum with the RTC. He claims that he did not file the
required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him
with evidence that would substantiate complainants
allegations in the answer. He argues that absent the
supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed
would just be a repetition of the answer. However,
respondent admits in his comment that complainant
furnished him with the affidavit of persons purporting to be
barangay officials attesting to an alleged admission by
Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the plaintiffs in the
unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the
disputed property. 44 This did not precipitate respondent into
action despite the evidentiary value of the affidavit, which
was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could
have somehow bolstered the claim of complainant and his
wife which was upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs are not the
real parties-in-interest. While respondent could have thought
this affidavit to be without probative value, he should have
left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine
whether the affidavit supports the assertions of his clients.
That could have happened had he filed the required position
paper and annexed the affidavit thereto.
Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the
supporting documents filing the required pleadings would be
a futile exercise, still respondent should have formally and
promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the
pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. 45
Specifically, the RTC would not have waited as it did for the
lapse of three months from June 5,1992, the date when
plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal memorandum,
before it rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent
would not file the appeal memorandum, the court could have
decided the case much earlier.
For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon
12, to wit:
Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he
owed his client. Canon 17 provides that (A) lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. When complainant
received the RTC decision, he talked to respondent about it. 46
However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision
despite his receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992.
Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence.
In doing so, respondent was untruthful to complainant and
effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.
On top of all these is respondents employment as a lawyer of
the Public Attorneys Office which is tasked to provide free
legal assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as
to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of
the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of
justice. 47 Against this backdrop, respondent should have
been more judicious in the performance of his professional
obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig 48 lawyers in the
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the
government is not exempt from observing the degree of
diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 6 of the Code provides that the canons shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded
from those who engage in the practice of law because they
have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to
the bar, and to the public. The lawyers diligence and
dedication to his work and profession not only promote the
interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice
by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of
cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the
legal profession. 49
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed
on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the facts of the case. 50 In cases of
similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of
reprimand, 51 fine of five hundred pesos with warning, 52
suspension of three months, 53 six months, 54 and even
disbarment in aggravated cases. 55
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show the answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the
respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in property in dispute. However, all that he could provide
consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the respondent was the affidavit of the barangay officials. Last
Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public
suspension from the practice of law. At various stages of the Attorneys Office is burdened with a heavy caseload.
unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in the
All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two
performance of his duty as counsel.
(2) months from the practice of law is the proper and just
To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and penalty.
position paper when required by the MCTC. With his
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered
resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he did
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months from
not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of
notice, with the warning that a similar misconduct will be
the authority of the court. His stubbornness continued at the
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be
RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum,
attached to respondents personal record in the Office of the
respondent did not file any. Neither did he manifest before
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in
further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about
the land.
his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the
adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients SO ORDERED.
accordingly. Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision
when confronted by the complainant about it. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and
Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
At this Courts level, respondents stubborn and uncaring
demeanor surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to
complainants reply.

Respondents story projects in vivid detail his appalling

indifference to his clients cause, deplorable lack of respect
for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a
lawyer.

However, we are not unmindful of some facts which

extenuate respondents misconduct. First, when complainant
sought the assistance of respondent as a PAO lawyer, he
misrepresented that his answer was prepared by someone
who is not a lawyer. Second, when complainant showed
respondent a copy of their answer with the MCTC, he assured
him that he had strong evidence to support the defense in
 DALISAY V. MAURICIO
A.C. No. 5655 January 23, 2006
VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated
April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr.,
respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:
On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant,
engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No.
00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v.
Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent," pending before the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees
in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant,
respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result,
she terminated the attorney-client relationship and
demanded the return of her money and documents, but
respondent refused.
On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount
of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action
had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the
respondent except his alleged conferences and
opinions rendered when complainant frequented his
law office." She recommended that respondent be required
to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and
surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto
Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation.
On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.
Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went
to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of
Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts
Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that "the tax
declarations and title" submitted by complainant "are not
official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of
Deed." Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit
Complaint1 against complainant charging her with violations
of Article 1712 and 172,3 and/or Article 1824 of the Revised
Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered
evidence.
In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the
following arguments:
First, complainant did not engage his services as
counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the
purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for
declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of
a decree.
Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered
submitted for decision" as early as August 6, 2001, or
more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the
date he was engaged as counsel, hence, "he could not
have done anything anymore" about it.
 Third, complainant refused to provide him with With ingenuity, respondent now claims that "complainant
documents related to the case, preventing him from did not engage his services for Civil Case No. 00-044"
doing his job. but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new
petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade
And fourth,complainant offered tampered evidence in
culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can
Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file
successfully disassociate himself as complainants counsel in
falsification cases against her.
Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any
In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: dereliction of duties.
(1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality
But respondents current assertion came too late in the day.
between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification
He is already bound by his previous statements. In his
charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned
Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint, 7 he
her money; (3) respondent should have verified the
categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in
authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed
Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver
that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her
Lozano, thus:
money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt.
4.a. Complainant was referred to the
We deny respondents motion for reconsideration.
Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end,
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright
become his client. He has the right to decline employment.
lawyer and is very much capable of handling
But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client
Civil Case No. 00-044.
relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to
the clients cause.5 From then on, he is expected to be 4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must Lozano did not inquire the reason for the
serve the client with competence and diligence, and referral. But he was made to understand that he
champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion. 6 was being referred because Atty. Oliver Lozano
believed that Respondent would be in a better
Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the
position to prosecute and/or defend the
amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to
Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.
handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been
remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled xxxxxx
earlier, "there is nothing in the records to show that he
5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent
(respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of
on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he provides
record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044."
her with free legal service.
Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show
that he initiated new petitions. xxxxxx
5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that
the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not
entitle her to a free legal service and advised
her to just re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver
Lozano.
5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to
assess her case and how she and her lawyer should go
prosecuting and/or defending her position therein.
5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no
longer represented by counsel in Civil Case No.
00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his
professional opinion on the factual and legal
matters surrounding the said case.
5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of
the Respondent, Complainant became even
more adamant in asking the former to represent
her in Civil Case No. 00-044.
5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would
be charged as a regular client is she insists in retaining
his services.
5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked
Respondent about his fees.
5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044,
Respondent told Complainant that he will have
to charge her with an acceptance fee of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside
form being charged for papers/pleadings that
may have to be prepared and filed in court in
connection with the aforesaid case.
xxxxxx
5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty.
Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded
for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the
acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the
Complainant be reduced.
xxxxxx
5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the
Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then
informed the former of his conversation with Atty.
Oliver Lozano and his (respondents) decision to
reduce the acceptance fee.
5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time,
even shedding a tear or two simply because
Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a
greatly reduced acceptance fee.
Statements of similar tenor can also be found in
respondents Memorandum8 filed with the IBP.
Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant
departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be
countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is
going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of
the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict
application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to
the rules of fair play, justice and due process. 9 The present
administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of
respondents previous admission that complainant engaged
his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now
unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In
fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents
inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.
At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed
engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new
petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is
unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he
filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that,
in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to
complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,10 we held that "a lawyer
shall account for all money or property collected from
the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure
to file the case must immediately be returned to the
client on demand." Per records, complainant made
repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the
money.
Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument.
The fact thatCivil Case No. 00-044 was already "submitted for
decision" does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to
handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost,
to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple
task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely,
he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing.
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade
responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims
that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the
case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without
adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer
accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation
that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and
ability to handle the case. 11 As a lawyer, respondent knew
where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter
of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed
to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears
reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the
case despite having been paid for his services. This is
tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and
taking undue advantage of his client.
Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the
accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent
accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in
Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification
cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render
legal services to complainant.
Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be
sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First,
Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who
perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding.
Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule
19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information
that his clients has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same,
and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule.
Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant
and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If
complainant refuses, then he should terminate his
relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited
Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did
not render legal service to complainant because she falsified
the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This
brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his
fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the
alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated
their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active
search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No.
00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the
authenticity of complainants title only after the "news of
his suspension spread in the legal community." To our
mind, there is absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of
a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait
accompli.

Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant,

respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.

In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney

begins with his or her retainer. 12 It gives rise to a relationship
between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in
nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential
character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. 13
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.14 Indeed, law is an exacting goddess
demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral
discipline.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for

reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is
immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report
immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance
with our Decision.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal

record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.
Rule 18.04 Inform Client on Status of Case
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
RUIZ V. SANTOS
G.R. No. 166386 January 27, 2009
DOMINGA RUIZ, APOLONIA RUIZ, FLORENCIO RUIZ,
CORNELIA RUIZ, OLIMPIO RUIZ, and HEIRS OF TOMASA
RUIZ, Petitioners,
vs.
CIRILA DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.****
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus
seeking that the Resolutions dated September 21, 2004 1 and
December 21, 20042 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85872 be reversed and set aside; and that the CA be
directed to give due course to the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus filed before it by herein
petitioners.
A brief factual background is necessary for a proper
perspective in the resolution of herein petition.
Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio, Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio,
all surnamed Ruiz (petitioners), were the original owners of
seven parcels of land with a total area of 194,284 square
meters located in Barangay Kaytinga, Alfonso, Cavite,
covered by OCT No. P-4017 in the name of Tomasa, covering
46,235 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4018 in the name of Cornelia,
49,803 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4288 in the name of Dominga,
19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4289 in the name of Apolonia,
19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4290 in the name of Olimpio,
19,650 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4291 in the name of Florencio,
19,650 sq. meters; and OCT No. P-4292 in the name of
Cornelia, 19,648 sq. meters (collectively referred to as
"subject property").
Cirila delos Santos (respondent) is a duly licensed real estate
broker.
Sometime in 1995, Olimpio gave respondent the plan of the
subject property and verbally authorized her to sell the same.
Thereafter, respondent referred in writing the subject
property to Odessa Antiporda (Antiporda), a realtor and a
fellow estate broker, who had earlier informed respondent
that she had a prospective buyer interested to buy a land
with an area of about 15 to 20 hectares to be used as a
retirement village. Antiporda in turn referred the subject
property to one Alfred Tantiansu (Tantiansu). Olimpio then
gave respondent a written authority to sell the same. 3
In May 1996, respondent introduced Olimpio to Tantiansu and
they all went together to the location of the properties.
Tantiansu showed interest in the properties and asked for the
lowering of price, which Olimpio pegged at P315.00 per
square meter. Respondent asked Olimpio for the renewal of
her authority, to sell to which the former obliged. In the
authority to sell, it was specified that she would still be paid
her commission even after the said authority expired,
provided she registered in writing her prospective buyer with
whom she negotiated during the period of authority.
Accordingly, respondent notified petitioners in writing that
Tantiansu was her buyer. 4
A meeting was subsequently held among Olimpio,
respondent and Tantiansu in Tantiansu's office where the
prospective buyer showed interest in buying the properties. A
few weeks later, a meeting was held between Olimpio and
Tantiansu only, without respondent. Olimpio asked
respondent to lower her commission from 5% to 2.5%;
otherwise, the sale would not push through. But respondent,
through a letter sent to Olimpio, answered that she was
amenable to a commission of 4%.5
Respondent later learned that the properties were sold to
different corporations at P60.00 per square meter, as
indicated in the deeds of sale. Upon her verification of the
articles of incorporation of the corporation-buyers with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that the
corporations were owned by Tantiansu. Respondent then
demanded the payment of her broker's commission, but was
unheeded.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
275, Las Pias City, a complaint6 for collection of sum of
money and damages against all petitioners, alleging that it
was through her effort as a real estate broker that she was
able to bring about the consummation of the sale of the
subject property, to petitioners' immense gain and benefits;
that despite the sale and her repeated demands, petitioners
refused to pay her broker's fee.
Petitioners "Domingo Ruiz, et al." filed their Answer with
counterclaim and alleged as affirmative defense that at the
time of the consummation of the sale of the subject
properties, there was no longer any existing broker's
agreement between them; that respondent had no more
authority from them to sell the properties or, assuming there
was such authority, the same had already lapsed or expired;
that it was petitioners' understanding at the time of the sale
of the subject properties that Tantiansu, the buyer, would be
responsible for the payment of the broker's commission,
whoever the broker may be; that petitioners knew that
respondent had initially claimed her broker's commission
from Tantiansu; but after Tantiansu's death, and failing to
collect any broker's commission from said buyer, respondent
commenced the present action against them.
Issues having been joined, a full-blown trial on the merits
ensued.
On September 22, 2003, the RTC7 rendered its judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff
[respondent] and against the defendants [petitioners],
ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally the sum of P2,447,524.80 plus legal interest
thereon from the filing of the complaint and moral
damages of P500,000.00 as well as exemplary
damages of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 and P2,000.00 per court appearance and
to pay the cost.8
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal. 9 On November 6,
2003, respondent filed her Comment and/or opposition
thereto, alleging that the appeal was not perfected for failure
of petitioners to file the docket/appeal fee within the
reglementary period to appeal.
In an Order10 dated January 16, 2004, the RTC denied
petitioners' appeal and considered the appeal barred for
failure of petitioners to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. It ruled that the decision had
already become final and executory, and there was nothing
more to be appealed to the CA.
With the denial of their appeal, petitioners filed a petition for
relief11 alleging that they were prevented from awaiting
themselves of an appeal due to mistake and excusable
negligence of their counsel on record, and that they had a
good and substantial defense. Attached to the petition was
the Affidavit of Merit of Atty. Mark Edsel Ang (Atty. Ang),
petitioners' former counsel, wherein he stated that when he
received the decision on September 30, 2003, he
immediately sent copies thereof to petitioners by registered
mail, as four of the six petitioners live abroad while the other
two live in Cavite; that he communicated with the RTC Clerk
of Court the fact that a notice of appeal was already filed and
the fees would be paid as soon as he got the confirmation of
petitioners' desire to appeal, to which the clerk of court gave
her assurance on the acceptance of the late payment of
docket fees; that he received a long distance call from
petitioner Cornelia on October 15, 2003 confirming
petitioners' desire to appeal the decision; thus, he paid the
appellate fees on October 24, 2003. Atty. Ang admitted that it
was through his negligence that the appeal was belatedly
filed.
In its Decision12 dated June 18, 2004, the RTC denied the
petition for relief for lack of merit. The RTC found no merit in
petitioners' contention that the error of counsel to pay the
appellate fees in due time was a mistake constituting
excusable negligence and ruled that the mistake of counsel
binds his client. The RTC held that petitioners' claim of a good
and valid defense was belied by the court's findings and
conclusions contained in its Decision dated September 22,
2003.
In an Order13 dated June 24, 2004, the RTC granted the
motion for execution filed by respondent on the ground that
the decision dated September 22, 2003 had already become
final and executory.
On July 5, 2004, notices of garnishment 14 were issued to the
different banks by sheriff Josefino Ortiz. Notice 15 of sale on
execution of the subject property was scheduled on
September 3, 2004.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction with the CA,
verified and certified by Dominga, seeking to set aside the
following: (1) Order dated January 16, 2004, which denied
petitioners' notice of appeal; (2) Decision dated June 18,
2004 denying petitioners' petition for relief; (3) Order dated
June 24, 2004 declaring the Decision as final and executory
and granting the motion for execution filed by respondent;
(4) notice of garnishment issued on July 5, 2004; and notice
of sale.
On September 21, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for being procedurally flawed, at the very
least, this petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and
consequently DISMISSED. And since the temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is
merely an adjunct to the main case, the same must be
pro tanto denied. 16
The reasons given by the CA dismissing the petition outright
are as follows:
(1) No motion for reconsideration was filed against the
challenged Order issued by the respondent judge on
January 16, 2004. Well settled is the rule that a filing of
a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the
institution of a special civil action for certiorari.
(2) The names of the heirs of the petitioner Tomasa
Ruiz are not indicated, in violation of the first par.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules, which requires
that the "petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all petitioners and respondents, a
concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
 background of the case, and the grounds relied upon
for the relief prayed for."
(3) There is no special power of attorney executed by
the said heirs authorizing Dominga to sign the
verification and certification in their own behalf. 17
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in the
assailed Resolution dated December 21, 2004, as the CA
found that the arguments put forward in the motion were a
virtual rehash of those alleged in support of the petition.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
REQUIRED BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE THE CA;
2. WHETHER THE NAMES OF THE HEIRS OF THE
PETITIONER TOMASA RUIZ ARE INDICATED IN THE
PETITION;
3. WHETHER THERE IS NO SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY EXECUTED BY SAID HEIRS AUTHORIZING
PETITIONER TO SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN BEHALF.
4. WHETHER THE CA ACTED WITH HASTE ON ITS
BASESLESS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A VIRTUAL REHASH OF
THOSE ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF ITS PETITION. 18
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
Anent the first issue, petitioners assert that the CA erred in
finding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite for the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, we
agree with petitioners. There is no question that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie
is intended to afford the court an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. 19
However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availing of the remedy of certiorari is not always a sine qua
non20 requirement, as there are recognized exceptions: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly, or are the same
as those, raised and passed upon by the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the government or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law, or public interest is involved. 21 We find this
case falling under exceptions b, c and d.
Petitioners' notice of appeal was earlier denied by the RTC
due to the late payment of docket fees, and it ruled that its
decision dated September 22, 2003 had already become final
and executory and there was nothing more to be appealed to
the CA. Clearly then, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless in the light of such declaration by the RTC.
Petitioners' subsequent petition for relief from the denial of
appeal was denied by the RTC in its Decision dated June 18,
2004. The court reiterated its disquisition found in its main
decision dated September 22, 2003. In fact, just after the
petition for relief was denied on June 18, 2004, the RTC
issued an Order dated June 24, 2004 granting the motion for
execution filed by respondent. Thereafter, on July 5, 2004,
notices of garnishment of petitioners' goods, stocks, interest
on stocks, shares and any other personal properties in their
control and possession were already served by the sheriff on
the different banks. Thus, petitioners sufficiently showed that
there was an urgent necessity for the filing of the petition
with the CA to rule on the issue of the denial of appeal and
the petition for relief.
Anent the second issue, the CA erred in finding that the
names of the heirs of petitioner Tomasa Ruiz were not
indicated in the petition. In the petition filed before the CA, it
was alleged that the petitioners are as follows:
Dominga Ruiz, resident of Kaytinga, Alfonso Cavite;
Apolonia Ruiz, resident of 105 Eagle Head Drive, Fort
Washington, Maryland, USA;
Cornelia Ruiz, resident of 12903 Turnberry Circle, Fort
Washington, Maryland, USA;
Olimpio Ruiz, resident of 4510 N. Troy, Chicago, Illinois,
USA;
Florencio Ruiz, resident of Detecon Al Saudia Co. Ltd.,
PO Box 31443, Jeddah, 21497;
Heirs of Tomasa Ruiz, all the above residents of the
above-mentioned addresses.22
In their motion for reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated
September 21, 2004, petitioners alleged that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement that the full
names and actual residents of all petitioners must be stated,
since all the petitioners are the only children of the late
Tomasa Ruiz, a fact that they had sufficiently alleged in their
petition. We find such explanation plausible, considering that
the phrase "heirs of Tomasa Ruiz" was followed by the words
"all the above," which means that the heirs of Tomasa are the
persons whose names are immediately preceding.
As to the third issue, we also find that the CA erred in finding
that there were no special powers of attorney (SPAs)
executed by the heirs of Tomasa authorizing petitioner
Dominga to sign the verification and certification on their
behalf. However, an examination of the CA rollo shows that
when the petition was filed with the CA, attached were
separate SPAs23 of petitioners Apolonia, Cornelia, Olimpio,
Florencio, the heirs of Tomasa, executed in favor of their co-
petitioner Dominga, giving her the authority to sign the
required verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Anent the fourth issue, we rule that the CA hastily concluded
that the allegations in petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution dated September 21, 2000, were a mere
rehash of those in support of their petition for certiorari.
Notably, the motion had sufficiently stated the circumstances
which would excuse petitioners for their non-filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the RTC decision dated June 24, 2004
before resorting to a petition for certiorari in the CA, to wit:
the RTC's declaration that its decision had already become
final and executory and that there was nothing more to be
appealed to the CA; and the granting of respondent's motion
for execution as well as the sheriff's implementation of such
writ by the issuance of notices of garnishment. Petitioners
also pointed out to the CA that it had overlooked the fact that
the names of the heirs of Tomasa Ruiz were alleged in the
petition and clarified that they were the only heirs of
petitioner Tomasa and that they had executed separate SPAs
in favor of petitioner Dominga.
Thus, the CA committed a reversible error in outrightly
dismissing the petition and not giving due course to it as well
as in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners further claim that the RTC should have given due
course to their notice of appeal of the RTC Decision dated
September 22, 2003 to the CA since the late payment of
appellate docket fees was due to the mistake and excusable
negligence of their counsel and they had a good and
substantial defense.
Instead of remanding the case to the CA which would only
unduly prolong the disposition of the case between the
parties, we shall resolve24 the substantive issue raised in the
petition for certiorari filed with the CA, to wit: Whether the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' petition for relief from denial of appeal.
To begin with, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy
of the RTC decision dated September 22, 2003 on September
30 2003. Thus, petitioners had until October 15, 2003 within
which to perfect their appeal by filing the notice of appeal 25
and paying the appellate docket and other legal fees. 26 On
October 14, 2003, petitioners filed their notice of appeal
through registered mail without paying the appeal fees.
It is a well-settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of
appeal is not enough, for it must be accompanied by the
payment of the correct appellate docket fees. 27 Payment in
full of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.28 It is an essential requirement without which the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as
if no appeal has been filed. Failure to perfect an appeal within
the prescribed period is not a mere technicality but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal renders the
judgment final and executory.29
Hence, there is no question that the RTC correctly dismissed
petitioners' appeal pursuant to Section 13, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal
of the original record or the record on appeal to the
appellate court, the trial court may, motuproprio or on
motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of
time, or for non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period.
However, petitioners filed a petition for relief from the RTC
Order that did not giving due course to their notice of appeal
on the grounds of mistake and excusable negligence
committed by their counsel. They contend that their counsel
mistakenly erred when he relied in good faith on the
affirmation made by the trial court's clerk of court that the
appeal fees would be accepted even after the period for the
filing of the notice of appeal; that counsel also mistakenly
relied on jurisprudence that technical rules of procedure
would be relaxed provided that the same were substantially
complied with; that counsel's negligence should not be
binding on them; that they have good and substantial
defenses which would result in the dismissal of the complaint
or a reduction of the monetary awards set forth in the
decision.
Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal.
When a judgment or final order is rendered by any
court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented
from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the appeal be
given due course.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. 30
Petitioners' counsel filed a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period for filing the same without, however,
paying the appellate docket fees. Counsel very well knew
that under the Rules of Court, the full amount of appellate
docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same
period that the notice of appeal was filed, as he even
allegedly communicated to the clerk of court his request for
additional time in order to consolidate the confirmation of
petitioners' desire to appeal.
The failure of counsel to pay the appellate docket fees on
time constitutes negligence. Despite receiving an overseas
call on October 15, 2003, i.e., the last day to file the appeal,
from petitioner Cornelia, who then lived in Japan and
expressed in behalf of the other petitioners their desire to
appeal the RTC decision, he paid the fees only on October 24,
2003.
It bears stressing that the Rules of Court explicitly provides
for the procedure for the perfection of appeal. The counsel of
petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance
by the clerk of court of the acceptance of the late payment of
docket fees. As an officer of the court, he should know that
the affirmation of the clerk of court could not prevail over the
specific requirement of the rules. The rules of procedure are
meant to be followed and not to be subjected to the whims
and convenience of the parties and their counsels or by mere
opinions of the clerk of court.
Atty. Ang should not have presumed that the rules of
procedure would be relaxed in favor of his clients. His
reliance on jurisprudence that the application of the technical
rules of procedure would be relaxed if the same was
subsequently complied with is not justified. The liberal
application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still
the exception, and not the rule; and it is only allowed in
exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice.31 Atty. Ang's negligence in not paying the docket fees
on time cannot be considered as excusable. The
circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the
relaxation of the rules.
Petitioners insist that they are not bound by the mistake of
their counsel, citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan 32 and
Samala v. Court of Appeals.33
In DeGuzman, petitioner was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of anti-graft and corrupt practices act for his
failure to account for the P200,000.00 he received for certain
training programs of the Department of Agriculture based on
the testimony of the lone prosecution witness that no such
training program was held at the designated places.
Petitioner sought to be relieved from what he considered as
the serious and costly mistake of his former lawyers in
demurring to the prosecution evidence after leave was
denied, the effect of which deprived him of presenting the
pieces of documentary evidence showing due disbursement
of the P200,000 received for the training program which was
actually conducted. The original documents were all along
kept in the records section of the Bureau of Plant Industry;
and these original copies were readily available, which if
presented would have completely belied the accusation
against him. We ruled that since no less than petitioner's
liberty was at stake, the higher interests of justice and equity
demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly
mistake of his previous counsel.
In contrast, the present case does not involve the life or
liberty of petitioners, and they were adequately heard with all
the issues fully ventilated and evidence presented before the
decision was rendered.
In Samala, the last day for filing the notice of appeal fell on a
Friday, October 13, 1995. The person to whom the filing of
the notice was entrusted suffered stomach pains and was
able to file it only on the next business day which was
October 16, a Monday. We held that the delay was only for
one day, as Saturday and Sunday were excluded and,
considering the facts of the case, found the delay to be
excusable.
In the case of herein petitioners, the payment of the docket
fees was done nine days after the lapse of the period to
appeal. In fact, in the affidavit of merit of petitioners' counsel
attached to the petition for relief, he stated that on October
15, 2003, which was the last day to appeal, he received a
long distance call from petitioner Cornelia who confirmed
their desire to appeal the decision. However counsel, instead
of immediately paying the appeal fee, waited for nine days
before doing so.
Petitioners also allege that subsequent and substantial
compliance with the rule may call for the relaxation of the
rules of procedure, citing our ruling in Jaro v. Court of
Appeals.34
We are not persuaded.
In Jaro, the CA dismissed the petition filed before it for being
defective, as it was not in the form of a petition for review
and the annexes thereto attached were certified as true
xerox copies by counsel, not by the proper public official who
had custody of the records. Petitioner subsequently filed an
amended petition in the proper form accompanied by
annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the
Department of Agriculture Regional Adjudication Board. This
Court ruled that there was more than substantial compliance,
and the hard stance taken by the CA was unjustified under
the circumstances. Notably, petitioner therein committed a
lapse in the formal requirement which was curable by
amendment. In the present case, however, petitioners failed
to pay the appellate docket fees on time, which is
jurisdictional and which divests the trial court of jurisdiction
to act on the appeal. The payment of the appellate docket
and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure.35 It is an essential requirement, without which the
decision or final order appealed from would become final and
executory, as if no appeal was filed at all. 36
The failure of petitioners' counsel to perfect the appeal binds
petitioners. It is settled that clients are bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 37 While,
exceptionally, the client may be excused from the failure of
counsel, the factual circumstances in the present case do not
give us sufficient reason to suspend the rules of the most
mandatory character. Petitioners themselves may not be said
to be entirely faultless.
Atty. Ang, petitioners' counsel, claims that as soon as he
received the decision, he sent copies to petitioners. Records
show that at that time, while some of the petitioners were
already abroad, Dominga and Tomasa were still living in
Cavite. Cornelia who lives abroad was able to receive a copy
of the decision and was able to make an overseas call to Atty.
Ang to express her desire to appeal the decision. However,
neither Dominga nor Tomasa who only live in Cavite, took
steps to call Atty. Ang at the earliest possible time to protect
their interest. No prudent party would leave the fate of his
case completely to his lawyer.38 It is the duty of the client to
be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted
about the case.39Thus, we find that there was matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
participatory negligence on the part of petitioners, reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost,
which would not relieve them of the consequence of because of either inexcusable negligence or counsels
the negligence of their counsel. mistake in procedure.42

The Court may deign to veer away from the general rule only It bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a mere
if, in its assessment, the appeal on its face appears statutory privilege.43 Corollary to this principle is that the
absolutely meritorious.40 Indeed, the Court has, in a number appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance with the
of instances, relaxed procedural rules in order to serve and provisions set by law.44
achieve substantial justice.41 However, the instant case does
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
not warrant the desired relaxation.
Cost against petitioners.
Respondent has sufficiently shown that she was authorized in
writing by petitioners to sell the subject property; that SO ORDERED.
respondent was instrumental in bringing about the meeting
of petitioner Olimpio and Tantiansu and the transaction
concerning the sale of subject property; and that it was
proven by evidence that the buyer of the subject property
was Tantiansu. Thus, respondent is entitled to the broker's
commission as agreed upon between her and the petitioners.
Petitioners' claim that Tantiansu had explicitly bound himself
to pay the broker's commission after the consummation of
the sale would not relieve petitioners of their liability to
respondent since, as correctly held by RTC, whatever
Tantiansu and petitioners agreed relative to the payment of
broker's commission is binding only upon themselves and not
binding on respondent who does not appear to have
consented thereto.

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the

RTC in denying petitioners' petition for relief, since they were
not prevented from filing their notice of appeal and payment
of docket fees by mistake or excusable negligence that would
have deprived them of their day in court. Such relief under
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court will not be granted to
a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his
own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that
 SPS. SORIANO V. ATTY. REYES
A.C. No. 4676 May 4, 2006
SPS. ANTONIO and NORMA SORIANO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO P. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For alleged gross negligence in handling two civil cases, a
complaint1 for disbarment was filed by complainant spouses
Antonio and Norma Soriano against Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes.
Complainants alleged that sometime in the latter part of
1990, they engaged the services of respondent in a case they
filed against Peninsula Development Bank entitled, "Norton
Resources and Development Corporation, et al. v. Peninsula
Development Bank." The case was for Declaration of Nullity
with Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Br. 13, docketed as Civil Case
No. 20-465-90.2 While the case was pending, respondent
reassured complainants that he was diligently attending to
the case and will inform them of the status of their case.
In 1994, complainants again engaged the services of
respondent in a case they filed against the Technology and
Livelihood Resource Center entitled, "Spouses Antonio M.
Soriano and Norma Soriano v. Technology and Livelihood
Resource Center" for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC of Davao
City, Br. 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-674-94. 3 During
the pendency of the second case, complainants inquired from
respondent the status of the earlier Civil Case No. 20-465-90,
the latter informed them that the same was still pending
and/or ongoing.
Later, complainants learned that Civil Case No. 20-465-90
was dismissed4 on 16 December 1991 for failure of the
respondent to file a pre-trial brief. The dismissal reads:
On record is a pre-trial brief filed by defendant, thru
counsel, Atty. Marlon B. Llauder, and this morning a
supplemental pre-trial brief was submitted by
defendants counsel. Atty. Reynaldo Reyes, counsel for
the plaintiffs is present in Court but he moved for a
suspension of the pre-trial conference this morning for
the reason that plaintiffs are proposing to amicably
settle this case. Defendants counsel vehemently
objected to the postponement of the pre-trial
conference and instead moved for a declaration of
plaintiffs as non-suited for the reason that up to this
time, plaintiffs have not submitted their pre-trial brief
in violation of the Order of the Court, dated October
11, 1991, wherein plaintiffs counsel was afforded five
(5) days from said date within which to submit to Court
plaintiffs pre-trial brief.
The said motion is well-taken for the reason that the
records failed to show that plaintiffs filed pre-trial brief.
They are thus, declared as non-suited.
 This case is hereby ordered dismissed.5 (Underscoring
supplied.)
A motion6 for reconsideration was filed but the same was
denied in an Order dated 27 April 1992.
As to Civil Case No. 22-674-94, complainants likewise found
out that the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The
order reads:
The records show that summons with a copy of the
complaint have been served upon the defendant on
May 11, 1994, but plaintiffs did not file the necessary
pleadings in order to prosecute the same.
IN VIEW HEREOF, for failure to prosecute this case is
ordered DISMISSED.
Furnish copy of this order, Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes,
plaintiffs counsel and defendants counsel, Atty.
Francisco Figura.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Upon filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, though, the case
was reconsidered and reinstated8 on 15 August 1995.
Claiming that the acts of respondent greatly prejudiced and
damaged them, complainants filed a Complaint for
disbarment against respondent before this Court.
On 20 October 1997, the Supreme Court referred 9 the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision.
In his Comment,10 respondent admitted that he was hired by
the complainants in the case against the Peninsula
Development Bank in the latter part of 1990. He averred that
Peninsula Development Bank foreclosed the property of the
complainants for failure to pay monetary obligations
amounting to several millions of pesos. He said that some of
the properties of the complainants were foreclosed in 1989,
and the one-year redemption period was to expire in the
latter part of 1990. About one week before the expiration of
the redemption period, the complainants, through the
respondent, filed a case against the Peninsula Development
Bank before the RTC of Davao City, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 20-465-90. From the time of the filing of the
complaint up to the present, herein complainants are in
continuous possession of the already foreclosed properties,
consisting of a Ford Econovan and farm tractors. According to
respondent, complainants are still holding office in the real
properties subject of the foreclosure and a portion thereof is
being rented by a big taxi company. He disclosed that at the
time he was hired in 1990, the agreement was that he would
be paid the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) as attorneys fees in five years. Respondent
claimed that he assisted complainants in applying for a loan
to pay off their obligations with Peninsula Development Bank
but because of the numerous estafa cases filed against
complainants, said loans did not materialize. Respondent
further claimed that their agreed strategy was to arrange a
settlement with regard to Civil Case No. 20-465-90.
Respondent said he later realized that the complainants had
no interest in paying their obligations to Peninsula
Development Bank, and his attorneys fees. Respondent
added that they differed in opinion with regard to the
handling of the case and that complainants did not
understand that the filing of the case had already helped
them gain time to negotiate with the bank especially on the
matter of interest incurred by their loans. Finally, respondent
concluded by saying that his attorneys fees, paid in meager
installments, remain outstanding and unpaid.
In their reply,11 complainants refuted respondents allegation
of the alleged "numerous estafa cases" filed against them.
Complainants averred that the certification attached by
respondent showing that there were estafa cases filed
against them has no bearing insofar as the disbarment case
is concerned. They likewise denied that respondent assisted
them in their loan application. They engaged the services of
the respondent to prevent them from losing their properties
to the Peninsula Development Bank and for no other reason.
Finally, complainants maintained that respondent was paid
his attorneys fees.
As early as 27 June 2000, the case had already been
scheduled for hearing by Commissioner Agustine V. Gonzaga
of the Commission on Bar Discipline. On 18 January 2002,
after several hearings, the Commission admitted the
documentary evidence offered as part of the testimony of
complainants. On 1 March 2002, the day respondent was
ordered to present his defense evidence, he failed to appear.
Counsel for the complainants moved that the respondent be
deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence for
failure to appear on scheduled hearing despite due notice. In
the interest of substantial justice, respondent was given a
period of 10 days to comment on the complainants motion
and scheduled the case for hearing on 19 April 2002. Despite
due notice, however, respondent again failed to appear, thus,
the Hearing Commissioner declared that respondent was
considered to have waived his right to present his defense
evidence. The parties were given 20 days from 19 April 2002
to file their respective memoranda, after which the case will
be deemed submitted for resolution.
Only complainants filed a memorandum.
On 28 May 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan found respondent negligent in handling the cases of
complainants; hence, said Investigating Commissioner
recommended that he be disbarred. The pertinent portions of
the report read:
There is no question that the respondent was engaged
by the complainants as their counsel in two cases,
namely Civil Case No. 20-465-90 and Civil Case No. 22-
674-94. The respondent accepted both cases by filing
a case of Nullity with Injunction and/or Restraining
Order before the Regional Trial Court Br. 13, Davao
City, against Peninsula Development Bank and against
Livelihood Resource Center for Declaration of Nullity
with Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
docketed as 22-674-94, Br. 16 RTC Davao City. The
failure and negligence of respondent in handling the
aforementioned cases is fully reflected in the Order of
the Court re: Civil Case No. 20-465-90 which reads:
On record is a pretrial brief filed by defendant thru
counsel, Atty. Marlon B. Llander and this morning a
supplemental pretrial brief was submitted by
defendants counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Reyes, counsel for
the plaintiff is present in court but he moved for a
suspension of the pretrial conference this morning for
the reason that plaintiffs are proposing to amicably
settle this case. Defendants counsel vehemently
objected to the postponement of the pretrial
conference and instead moved for a declaration of
plaintiffs as nonsuited for the reason that up to this
time, plaintiff have not submitted their pretrial brief in
violation of the Order of the Court, dated October 11,
1991 wherein plaintiffs counsel was afforded five (5)
days time from date within which to submit to court
plaintiffs pretrial brief.
The motion is well taken for the reason that the
records failed to show that plaintiffs filed pretrial brief.
They are thus declared as nonsuited.
This case is hereby ordered dismissed. "x x x
Regarding Civil Case No. 22-674-94, Regional Trial
Court Br. 16, Davao City in the case filed against
Technology and Livelihood Resource Center the court
issued an Order dated May 5, 1995 which reads:
 "The record show that summons with a copy of the
Complaint have been served upon the defendant on
May 11, 1994, but plaintiffs did not file the necessary
pleadings in order to prosecute the same."
In view hereof, for failure to prosecute this case is
ordered Dismissed. "x x x The records show that the
real status of the cases were kept from the
complainants by respondent. Despite the dismissal of
both cases due to respondents negligence and
irresponsibility he continued receiving compensation
from complainants are evidenced by the receipts and
vouchers which respondent acknowledged with his
signatures. (Exhibits "F", "G", "H", "H-1" and "I").
Likewise, the respondent deceived the complainant by
giving them false hopes that everything was alright
and there was no problem regarding the cases.
All the foregoing show that there is clear violation of
his oath as a lawyer particularly Canon 17 and Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, it is
submitted that Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes be meted the
penalty of Disbarment.12
On 21 June 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved13 the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
In the interregnum, a Motion to Withdraw Testimony and
Evidence14 was filed by complainant Norma B. Soriano before
this Court, stating that:
1. That although the complainant in this case names
the spouses Antonio Soriano and Norma B. Soriano as
the complainants, it is only complainant Norma B.
Soriano who has testified and presented evidence
during the hearing of this case due to the untimely
demise of her husband, complainant Antonio Soriano;
2. That subsequently to the undersigned complainants
testimony and presentation of evidence, she has come
upon information and facts that need to be reviewed
and re-examine[d] in the highest interests of justice;
3. That before going into those information and facts
that she came to learn after she gave her testimony
before this Honorable Board, it is important to stress
the following antecedent circumstances:
(a) That it was undersigned complainants late
husband who conferred constantly with respondent
Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes;
(b) That herein complainant was not present in a
conference with Atty. Reyes at the time his
professional services were hired. So, it was only the
deceased complainant Antonio Soriano who was
familiar with the scope of professional engagement;
(c) That undersigned complainant did not participate in
the conference between her late husband and
respondent counsel on the agreed strategy because
the late husband was the one actively managing the
affairs of the family. Moreover, herein complainant was
not really knowledgeable of the facts and details
involved in the cases handled by respondent counsel;
(d) That for example, it was only later after her
testimony that she learned that respondent was also
attending to and handling the other cases of the late
complainant Antonio Soriano, especially those cases
filed in Makati, Complainant herein had the mistaken
impression that the complainant-decedent had availed
of the services of lawyers in Makati. Hence, the fees
that respondent Atty. Reyes received after the cases
below were for those cases in Makati;
 (e) That it was a surprise for herein undersigned
complainant to also learn that respondent Atty. Reyes
went out of his way to accompany her late husband to
a financier, who was an intimate friend of respondent,
in Quezon City for the purpose (sic) sourcing the
necessary funds to pay off our obligations to some
creditors as the agreed strategy at the very start.
Thus, it appears that respondent counsel went out of
his way to help the late complainant Antonio Soriano
solve his problems; and
(f) That I likewise subsequently learned that when
respondent counsel became a city councilor of Davao
City, he did what he can to help the late complainant
Antonio Soriano have a council clearance over a parcel
of land that he was selling for a memorial park.
4. That the foregoing facts and information that herein
undersigned complainant learned after she gave her
testimony seriously prompts her to seek the
withdrawal of her testimony and her evidence in order
that she can re-evaluate the same; and
5. That complainant herein is filing the instant motion
in the interests of truth and justice as it is farthest
from her intention to have this case resolved through
an inadvertent presentation of facts that do not
exactly reflect the entirety of the story and the truth,
no matter how innocently and in good faith they were
presented.15
The above quoted motion is tantamount to a withdrawal or
desistance of the complaint.
As we have previously ruled, the affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case executed by a complainant does not
automatically exonerate the respondent.
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. 16 What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense
a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. 17
Accordingly, notwithstanding the motion to withdraw
evidence and testimony, the disbarment proceeding should
proceed.
Looking into the merits of the complaint against respondent,
we decide to modify the findings of the IBP.
As to Civil Case No. 20-465-90, records show that it was
dismissed for failure of respondent to file the pre-trial brief.
Respondents failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes
inexcusable negligence.18 The importance of filing a pre-trial
brief cannot be gainsaid. For one, the lawyers are compelled
to prepare their cases in advance. They eliminate haphazard
preparation. Since pre-trial is a serious business of the court,
preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both
questions of fact and of law cannot be overemphasized as an
essential requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable
both parties to view the documentary evidence of the other
even before they are presented in court. They enable the
parties to know the testimonies of each others witnesses.
Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts of the additional points
the parties are willing to stipulate upon, or the additional
points which could be inquired into for the purpose of
additional stipulations. They also apprise the court of the
respective demands of the parties, thus, enabling the court
to discuss more intelligently an amicable settlement between
or among the parties.19 The failure to submit a pre-trial brief
could very well, then, be fatal to the case of the client as in
fact it is a ground for dismissal of the case. 20 For this reason,
respondents failure to submit the pre-trial brief to the court
within the given period constitutes negligence which entails
disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his
client but to the court as well. Hence, this Court, in Spouses
Galen v. Atty. Paguirigan,21 explained:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to
the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A
failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent
has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed
by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice.
In this case, respondent did not only fail to file the pre-trial
brief within the given period. Worse, he had not submitted
the required pre-trial brief even at the time he filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal several months
later. Expectedly, the motion for reconsideration was denied
by the court. Respondents negligence is apparent in the trial
courts denial of the motion for reconsideration, to wit:
The court, in the exercise of sound discretion, afforded
the plaintiffs who were then present, five (5) days from
October 11, 1991, within which to submit to the Court
plaintiff pre-trial brief, but despite the order, and until
December 16, 1991, a period of more than two (2)
months has elapsed, yet herein plaintiffs still failed to
file or submit the required pre-trial brief, which to the
mind of this Court, is an obstinate refusal on the part
of the plaintiffs to file said pre-trial brief, despite
counsels knowledge of the importance of the same.
The plaintiffs, even in the filing of their Motion for
reconsideration did not even care to attach pre-trial
brief if indeed they are sincere in their intention to do
so.
Clearly, respondent was not able to protect his clients
interest through his own fault.
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law
and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is
entitled to, not just competent service, but also whole-
hearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the duty of a
lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and
he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds
of law, the interest of his client. A lawyer should never
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his
negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for
disciplinary action.22
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by reason of
Atty. Reyess negligence, complainant suffered actual loss. He
should have given adequate attention, care and time to his
cases. This is why a practicing lawyer may accept only so
many cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his
clients will be prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case,
he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he
should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyers oath. 23
Respondents excuse that complainants, from the time of
filing of the complaint up to the time of filing his comment,
were in continuous possession of the foreclosed property is
flimsy. It only shows the cavalier attitude which respondent
took towards his clients cause.
Anent Civil Case No. 22-624-94, the case was indeed
dismissed for failure to prosecute although the said dismissal
was later on reconsidered. However, this does not detract to
the conclusion that, truly, respondent failed to demonstrate
the required diligence in handling the case of complainants. 24
Quite apart from the above, respondent also lacked candor in
dealing with his clients as he omitted to apprise complainants
of the status of the two cases and even assured the
complainants that he was diligently attending to said cases. 25
In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,26 this Court found therein
respondent lawyer in bad faith for failing to inform his client
of the status of the case. In said decision, the court has
adamantly stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is
highly fiduciary.27 There is always a need for the client to
receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on
developments affecting the case. The lawyer should apprise
the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing
to defend the clients interests. 28
In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases,
respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as
men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise
in such manners of professional employment. 29
Time and again we have stated that disbarment is the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power
to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for
only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension,
or fine would accomplish the end desired. 30
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file the required
brief or pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and in grave cases, disbarment. In one case, 31 the
penalty for a lawyers failure to file a pre-trial brief and other
pleadings such as position papers leading to the dismissal of
the case, is suspension of six months. Therefore, we find the
penalty of disbarment as recommended by the IBP to be
unduly harsh and we deem it appropriate to impose the
penalty of one (1) year suspension, taking into account that
this appears to be his first offense.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Reynaldo Reyes is found GUILTY of violating Canons 17 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective upon finality hereof with WARNING that a
repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal records
as attorney; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts of the country
for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
 SOMOSOT V. ATTY. LARA
A.C. No. 7024 January 30, 2009
OFELIA R. SOMOSOT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Once again, we are faced in this complaint for disbarment
with the problem of a client-lawyer relationship developing
into a legal action between the lawyer and the client. 1 The
complaining client is Ofelia R. Somosot (complainant), a
defendant in a collection case before the trial court; her
defense was handled by Atty. Gerardo F. Lara (respondent).2
The Factual Background
In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant
alleged that she retained the services of the respondent as
her counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544, entitled "Golden
Collection Marketing Corporation v. Ofelia Somosot, et al.,"
filed against her and her co-defendants for the collection of a
sum of money amounting to P1.3 Million. Her defense was
that it was the plaintiff who actually owed her P800,000.00.
She claimed that she had the evidence to prove this defense
at the trial. The respondent agreed to handle the case and
duly entered his appearance as counsel after securing his
acceptance fee.
The complainant expected the respondent to perform his
duty as counsel and to defend her interests to the utmost.
She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the
Complaint, the respondent failed to fully inform her of further
developments in the case. She only heard about the case
when there was already a decision against her and her co-
defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent
had sought his discharge as counsel without her knowledge
and consent. Contrary to the respondent's claim that he
could no longer locate her, she claimed that the respondent
knew all along where she lived and could have easily
contacted her had he been in good faith.
After the court denied the respondent's motion to withdraw
from the case, the complainant claimed that the respondent
represented her interests in a half-hearted manner, resulting
in the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Allegedly, the respondent failed to properly
oppose the motion and she was thereafter deprived of the
chance to present her evidence. Execution of the court's
decision followed, resulting in the sale of her house and lot at
public auction despite her efforts to reverse the judgment
with the help of another lawyer. Thereafter, a third party to
whom her property had been mortgaged sued her.
The complainant bewailed the respondent's evasive attitude
when she confronted him about her problem with his
representation. She found the respondent's excuse - that he
could not contact her because she had changed her office
address - to be unsatisfactory. She accused the respondent of
miserably failing to comply with his oath as a lawyer and to
discharge his duty of ably representing her.
In his comment,3 the respondent denied that he failed to
exercise the diligence required of him as counsel in Civil Case
No. Q01-43544. He argued that pursuant to his oath as
counsel, he pursued the complainant's case "according to his
own ability and knowledge." He alleged that: 4
1. He filed the complainant's Answer with Counterclaim on
July 16, 2001. He presented all the complainant's defenses
and claims, but the plaintiff, Golden Collection Marketing
Corporation, filed for "interrogatories and request for
admission." He filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion on
the ground that the interrogatories and request for admission
are, by law, properly addressed to the complainant herself
and not to him as counsel.
2. He filed a reply to the plaintiff's comment (on his
objection) and the case proceeded despite the complainant's
failure to pay his billing from May 3, 2001 to August 2, 2001
amounting to P27,000.00
3. On November 1, 2001, he joined the government service
as consultant in the Board of Investments and full-time
counsel to BOI Gov. J. Antonio Leviste. He tried to inform the
complainant of his appointment and to collect his billings at
her office in Greenhills, but the office was locked. A security
guard told him that the complainant had moved without
leaving any forwarding address. He even tried to contact
complainant and her husband's cellular phones, to no avail.
4. Desperate, he filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance
with the explanation that the conformity of the complainant
could not be obtained since the complainant's corporation
had moved its office without informing him of its new
location, and the complainant had not been communicating
with him.5 He later learned that the complainant had moved
to Pasig City.
5. In late December 2001, he was able to talk with the
complainant by phone and he informed her that he could no
longer handle cases for the complainant's company, thereby
terminating his relationship with complainant. He advised the
complainant to look for another lawyer; the complainant
replied that she already had another lawyer.
6. Despite his situation and aware that the court had denied
his motion to withdraw from the case, the respondent
continued rendering legal services as the complainant's
counsel. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's
decision dated June 3, 2002. He likewise filed an urgent
opposition to the winning party's motion for execution.
7. On September 2, 2005, he received a letter from the
complainant giving him "one final opportunity to convince
me, why she should not pursue disbarment proceedings." He
promptly prepared a reply which, upon her suggestion, he
delivered at the complainant's residence.
8. He thought that he had given the complainant a
satisfactory explanation only to learn later that she filed a
complaint for disbarment against him.
f9. The respondent expressed his regret for what happened
to the case, but stressed that he did not abandon the
complainant and the cases he had been handling for her
company. He did not likewise neglect to perform his duties as
counsel. On the insinuation that he may have been "bought,"
he emphasized he that cannot and will never abandon a
client as a Christian lawyer and a family man.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 2006, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) "for
investigation, report and recommendation." The complainant
filed a Position Paper (dated January 12, 2007) before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline through her counsel Honorato
V. Reyes, Jr.6 She reiterated in this position paper the
allegations in her complaint. She could not understand how a
simple collection case against her where she felt she had a
good defense and which she expected to go through a full-
blown litigation could be lost virtually through a mere
technicality, i.e., through a judgment on the pleadings for her
failure to answer the plaintiff's interrogatories and request for
admission. She insisted she had not been informed by the
respondent of the plaintiff's motion for written interrogatories
and request for admission. Had he informed her, she could
have responded.
The complainant was even more surprised to learn that the
respondent tried to withdraw from the case because she (the
complainant) could not be contacted. She maintained that
she had never transferred her residence where she could be
reached had the respondent exerted a meaningful effort to
contact her. She claimed that the respondent was able to do
so later when he was collecting the balance of his legal fees.
She denied that she had not paid respondent his retainer
fees.
The complainant stressed that the respondent violated his
oath as a lawyer by mishandling her case, resulting in the
loss of her house and lot and other damages.
The respondent's Position Paper (dated January 3, 2007)
essentially reflected the arguments presented in his
Comment before this Court.7 He clarified that the
complainant did not incur extra expenses in defending
herself in the collection case since its handling was part of
the services covered by his retainer. He insisted that he
vigorously pursued the case and defended the complainant
to the utmost despite the complainant's unpaid billings of
P27,000.00.
The respondent contended that he had good reasons not to
continue as the complainant's counsel. He reasoned out that
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may
withdraw from a case upon a good cause such as when the
client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyer's
services, or fails to comply with the terms of the retainer
agreement, or when the lawyer is elected or appointed to
public office.8 Two of these possible causes applied to his
situation; he was appointed legal consultant at the BOI
requiring full-time work and the complainant had failed to
pay his legal fees to him amounting to P27,000.00. He filed
the formal notice of withdrawal without the conformity of the
complainant because he could not locate her.
The respondent insinuated that that the complainant's real
intent was merely to harass him and his family as indicated
by her non-appearance, despite due notice, at the
preliminary conference before the IBP. He argued that he
could not be disbarred considering that it was the
complainant who was negligent in informing him of her
whereabouts. While he expressed regret for what happened
in the case, he insisted that he exerted every effort to locate
her, filed the necessary pleadings, protected her and her
company's interest as best as he could.
The IBP Recommendation
In a letter to the Chief Justice dated January 28, 2007, the IBP
Board of Governors, through the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, transmitted to the Court a Notice of Resolution 9
and the records of the case. The resolution was for the
adoption and approval of the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco who had investigated the
case. 10
Commissioner Limpingco recommended that respondent be
reprimanded for lack of reasonable diligence in representing
the complainant.
His recommendation was based on the following evaluation:
It appears that the respondent was to some degree, remiss in
fulfilling his duties to complainant Somosot. While it may be
true that he had filed an answer in Civil Case No. Q01-43544,
objected to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for
admission, asked for reconsideration of the decision rendered
by the court and opposed the adverse party's efforts to have
the same executed, it can nevertheless be seen that the
remedial measures taken by the respondent were
inadequate, especially in view of the direction which the
proceedings were taking.
The respondent is not incorrect in saying that a lawyer may
be relieved of his duties even without the conformity of his
client when he lost all contact with the latter, and the
complainant's failure to settle his unpaid fees is not received
without sympathy. The fact remains,however, that the
respondent's efforts to be discharged as counsel were
disallowed by the court, under the circumstances, he was
bound by his oath to represent complainant Somosot and to
advocate her cause to the best of his ability.
The respondent claims that in late December 2001, he was
finally able to talk to complainant Somosot and was told that
she already had another lawyer by the name of Atty. Tomas
Dulay. Considering his stated desire to withdraw from the
case and his own declaration that he had again come into the
means of contacting the complainant, it is thus entirely
puzzling why he did not at this point, revive his efforts to be
relieved of his responsibilities in Civil Case No. Q02-43544
given complainant Somosot's alleged engagement of Atty.
Tomas Dulay and her presumed willingness to give her
consent to such discharge. As it is, respondent Atty. Lara
remained as counsel of record and for some undisclosed
reason did not appeal the decision against his client.
This is not to say that the client is entirely without fault.
While complainant Ofelia Somosot's narrative is in many
respects at odds with that of the respondent, it is
nevertheless clear from her submissions that she never made
any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of
the case, but instead expected the latter to take complete
initiative in this regard.
It has been held that it is the duty of a party-litigant to
remain in contact with his lawyer in order to be informed of
the progress of his case. "True enough, the party-litigant
should not rely totally on his counsel to litigate his case even
if the latter expressly assures that the former's presence in
court will no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave
the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or
two hearings may be negligible but want of inquiry or update
on the status of his case for several months (four, in this
case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in
contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress of his case." Thus the complainant
did not do, and such circumstance can only mitigate in
respondent's favor.
The Court's Ruling
As the IBP did, we find that the respondent deserves to be
sanctioned for having fallen short of the standards required
of him as defense counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He
violated the basic rule, expressed under Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, 11 that "a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence." 12
While it may be said that the respondent did not completely
abandon the case, his handing of the complainant's defense
left much to be desired.
The records show that the plaintiff in the collection case filed
interrogatories and a request for admission. The respondent
duly filed his objection to the plaintiff's move, but the court
apparently allowed the interrogatories and request for
admission and directed the complainant (as the defendant in
the civil case) to respond. The complainant was never
informed of this development and the omission eventually
led to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, which in turn led to the decision against the
defendants.13
In his submissions before this Court and before the IBP, the
respondent alleged that he objected to the interrogatories
and request for admission and did all he could, even filing a
reply to the defendant's comment to his objection. He
likewise alleged that from May 3, 2001 to August 2, 2001, the
complainant had not paid the billings sent to her; that the Third. The respondent failed to provide details on the
complainant could not be contacted because she had closed developments that led to the adverse rulings on the
her office without any forwarding address; 14 that as of interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the
November 1, 2001, he had been appointed as a consultant in pleadings. We gather under Annex "G" of the respondent's
the office of BOI Governor J. Antonio Leviste; and that he Comment filed with this Court that the trial court ruled in
continued to represent the complainant even after the trial open court on March 8, 2002 that a judgment on the
court's decision by filing a motion for reconsideration and pleadings was appropriate. This was confirmed by an Order
opposing the plaintiff's motion for execution.15 of the same date (attached as Annex "B" to the
complainant's Position Paper before the IBP) which partly
After examining the whole record of the case, we find the
states;
respondent's positions to be very revealing with respect to
what they say and do not say. The Court NOTES the manifestation of Atty. Honorato
M. Guttierez, counsel for the plaintiff that the
First, the respondent failed to precisely allege in his
defendants have not been appearing in the case for
submissions how he tried to contact the defendant on or
one (1) year as per December 14, 2001 Order of this
about the time the interrogatories and request for admission
Court. The Court even denied the Notice of Withdrawal
were pending. It appears that he really had not; by his own
of Appearance of Atty. Lara, counsel for the
admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in
defendants, with the end purpose of obviating the
December 2001 and only to inform her of his government
further delays of the proceedings of this case.
appointment and to collect his billings. It was only after the
Moreover, in the said Order, this Court ruled that the
discovery of the closure of the defendant's office did the
Rule on judgment on the pleading under Rule 34 of the
respondent try to contact the complainant and her husband
Rules of Court will now obtain.
by cellular phone, but they could not be reached.
The respondent never bothered to explain this court order
Second. The interrogatories/admission issue happened in
whose highlighted portions give hints on the reasons for the
August 2001, which tells us that the respondent at about that
adverse developments for the defendants. While the records
time was already very sensitive about his billing issue against
do not explicitly state what remedies the respondent took to
his client as he had not been paid from May to August 2001.
react to the Order and to the trial court ruling on the
Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should
interrogatories/admission issue, we feel it safe to assume
not be a reason not to inform the client of an important
that the respondent did not move at all to question the trial
development, or worse, to withhold vital information from
court's rulings; nowhere in the records, both from the
her. As the court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty. Edgardo
complainant's and the respondent's end, is there any
Arias,16 a client must never be left in the dark for to do so
allegation that the respondent sought to review the trial
would destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed in the
court's rulings. What intrigues us is that the respondent could
retained lawyer in particular and the legal profession in
have reacted to the trial court's ruling on the
general.
interrogatories/request for admission; he was aware of the
recourses open to him under the ruling in Briboneria v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. 101682, December 4, 1992, that he cited in
his objection to the interrogatories and request for admission.
Fourth, on the matter of the respondent's withdrawal from
the case, the respondent might have had valid reasons to
withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the
respondent now states, he could withdraw under paragraphs
(e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility 17 - i.e.,
deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the
services, or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or
appointment or election to public office. However, he does
not appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court.
Instead, he merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of
Appearance, citing his client's unknown location and failure
to communicate as reasons for his client's lack of express
consent to his withdrawal.18 It is undisputed that the trial
court denied the respondent's notice of withdrawal; thus, he
remained as counsel of record burdened with all the
responsibilities that his representation carried.
By his own admission, the respondent succeeded in
contacting the complainant in late December, 2001, i.e., soon
after he filed his notice of withdrawal with the trial court. As
Commissioner Limpingco observed, it was quite puzzling that
he did not then revive his efforts to be relieved of his
responsibilities in the case, given the complainant's reported
engagement of a new counsel. He could have then secured
his client's consent to his withdrawal but did not.
Fifth. As Commissioner Limpingco did, we wonder why the
respondent did not appeal the decision against his client. It
even appears from one of the annexes (Annex "I" of the
respondent's comment) that he did not immediately inform
the complainant of the decision against her. To quote the
complainant's letter (Annex "I"):
"However, for reasons you have not fully explained,
you virtually
abandoned the case and interest therein after having
initially filed an answer in my behalf.
You never informed me of any further developments in
the case. As a result, I lost the said case by reason of
default and technicality.
You never informed me of this loss, thus denying me
the opportunity to appeal the adverse decision. . . "
The respondent never bothered to refuse this very damaging
allegation; neither in his Position Paper before the IBP nor in
the Comment filed with us did he offer an explanation. Thus,
it appears that the respondent could not have really taken
any instructions from his client on how to handle the trial
court's adverse decision. He simply took it upon himself to
decide not to appeal the trial court's decision and the denial
of his motion for reconsideration.
While the respondent expressed regret for the reverses the
complainant suffered, regret is a belated response that will
not bring back the complainant's lost case. It cannot erase
the fact that he mishandled the complainant's defense. By
the exacting standards of the legal profession, he has been
weighed and found wanting.
What lightens the impact of the respondent's mishandling of
the case is the complainant's own failings as a client. The
non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply
disregard. As a rule, law practice is not a pro bono
proposition and a lawyer's sensitivity and concern for unpaid
fees are understandable; lawyers incur expenses in running
their practice and generally depend, too, on their law
practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the
respondent's appointment as a consultant should be
considered although it is a matter that none of the parties
have fully examined. Both the non-payment of fees and the
appoint to a public office, however, were not reasons
properly presented before the trial court through a motion
that informed the court of all the surrounding circumstances
of the desired withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given
by way of a mere notice lacking the client's express consent.
Thus, the court's denial of the desired withdrawal was not
totally unexpected.
More than these reasons and as Commissioner Limpingco
correctly noted, the complainant never made any effort to
contact the respondent to follow up the status of her case,
expecting instead the respondent to take full and complete
initiative in this regard. While the respondent, as counsel, has
the obligation to inform his client of the material
developments in the case, particularly of the aspects of the
case that would require the client's instructions or
participation, this obligation is balanced by a complementary
duty on the part of a party-litigant to remain in contact with
his lawyer in order to be informed of the progress of the case.
The complainant's failing in this regard is her failure to inform
her counsel of her change of business address, a serious
lapse but one that a resourceful counsel could have easily
handled. In a balancing, the greater fault still lies with the
respondent as he did not appear, based on the records of the
case, to be a lawyer whose practice routine included regular
reporting to clients on matters other than billings. We note
that he did not bother to report (or even allege that he
bothered to report) on the interrogatories and request for
admission - incidents that can make or break a case as it did
break the defendant's case before the trial court. Despite
knowledge of his client's location gained in late December
2001, he did not likewise bother to inform the complainant of
the adverse decision against her in June 2002, taking it upon
himself to simply file a motion for reconsideration and to
accept the court's ruling when his motion was denied. In our
view, these are law practice mortal sins that we cannot allow
to simply be glossed over or be penalized by a simple
reprimand.
However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the
complainant demands in light of the complainant's own
contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the
professional world, no less serious and weighty as the power
to impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both,
recovery from the penalty - although not totally impossible -
is extremely difficult to attain. Thus, we must at all times act
with caution and due consideration, taking into account not
only the interests of the immediate parties, but the interest
of the public, the bar and the administration of justice as
well.
The general public must know that the legal profession is a
closely regulated profession where transgressions merit swift
but commensurate penalties; it is a profession that they can
trust because we guard our ranks and our standards well.
The Bar must sit up and take notice of what happened in this
case to be able to guard against any repetition of the
respondent's transgressions, particularly his failure to report
the developments of an ongoing case to his clients. Unless
the Bar takes a pro-active stance, we cannot really blame
members of the public who are not very well disposed
towards, and who may even distrust, the legal profession
after hearing experiences similar to what the complainant
suffered. The administration of justice is served well when we
demonstrate that effective remedies exist to address the
injustice and inequities that may result from transgressions
by those acting in the dispensation of justice process.
In these lights, we hold that while the respondent is liable for
a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects his standing
and character as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the Bar, this liability ought to be tempered by the mitigating
circumstances we pointed out above. We therefore cannot
impose disbarment as penalty. Given the mitigating
circumstances and the extent of their effects on the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, effective
respondent's culpability, we hold that a three-month upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
suspension from the practice of law is the penalty that is
SO ORDERED.
more in keeping with the damage the complainant suffered
and the interests that the public, the bar and the
administration of justice have to protect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY.

GERARDO F. LARA is hereby SUSPENDED from the