Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, is Decision No. 2010-1461 dated December
30,2010 of the Commission on Audit (COA).
We have received orders from the Main Office to require you to refund
in full the unexpired portion of the money value of the retirement or lay-
off gratuity you received as called for in Office Memorandum No. 4,
series of 1977, dated December 5, 1977, in view of your reinstatement
in the service.
xxxx
On May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 18, series of 1986 was
issued wherein the Sugar Regulatory Administration (petitioner SRA)
replaced PHILSUCOM. PHILSUCOM's assets and records were all
transferred to petitioner SRA which also retained some of the former's
personnel which included the private respondents.
On July 29, 2004, E.O. No. 339 was issued, otherwise known as
Mandating the Rationalization of the Operations and Organization of the
SRA, for the purpose of strengthening its vital services and refocusing
its resources to priority programs and activities, and reducing its
personnel with the payment of retirement gratuity and incentives for
those who opted to retire from the service. Among those separated from
the service were private respondents. Under the SRA Rationalization
Program, petitioner computed its employees' incentives and terminal
leave benefits based on their creditable years of service contained in
their respective service records on file with petitioner and validated by
the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS). The
computation was then submitted to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for approval and request of funds. The DBM
approved the same and released the disbursement vouchers for
processing of the incentive benefits.
However, in the course of the implementation of its rationalization plan,
petitioner found out that there was no showing that private respondents
had refunded their gratuity benefits received from PHILSUGIN or SQA.
Hence, petitioner considered private respondents' length of service as
having been interrupted which commenced only at the time they were
re-employed by PHILSUCOM in 1977. Petitioner then recomputed
private respondents' retirement and incentive benefits and paid only the
75% equivalent of the originally computed benefits and withheld the
remaining 25% in view of the latter's inability to prove the refund.
Petitioner filed its Answer8 thereto contending among others that since
private respondents alleged payment, they were duty-bound to present
evidence substantiating the said refund; that no records of payments
existed to clearly establish their claim, thus, their resort to secondary
evidence which were the sworn affidavits of petitioner's former officials
were insufficient to prove the fact of the alleged payment.
On October 14, 2009, the COA rendered Decision No. 2009 -100,9 with
the following dispositive portion, to wit:
In its decision, the COA observed that private respondents had filed a
separate but related complaint with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). It found that while their complaint with the CSC was
denominated as illegal termination/backwages and entitlements, the
main thrust of their complaint was to compel the payment of the 25%
balance of their total incentives and terminal leave benefits withheld by
petitioner, which was the same demand made in their letter to Chairman
Carague whose decision is the subject of the motion for
reconsideration, thus, forum shopping existed. The COA also noted that
in their Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration/Manifestation filed on
November 24, 2009, private respondents mentioned the ruling of the
CSC12 in their favor and they now disputed the COAs jurisdiction to
rule on their demand contending that it is the CSC which has
jurisdiction over cases involving government reorganization; and that
the CSC had issued a Resolution granting private respondents' motion
for execution of the CSC resolution. Notwithstanding, however, the COA
found that it did not lose jurisdiction over the present case and went on
to decide the claim on the merits and disregarded the CSC Resolution.
The COA ruled that the affidavits submitted were not secondary
evidence within the context of Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
hence, admissible in evidence, since technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The
COA found in the records certain significant circumstances which,
when taken together with the affidavits, established that indeed private
respondents had refunded the incentives in question. Since private
respondents had discharged their burden of proof, it was incumbent on
petitioner to discharge the burden of evidence that respondents had
not paid the said incentives; that it was the PHILSUCOM, then
petitioner, being the successor of PHILSUGIN and SQA, that had been
tasked with the official custody of all the records and books of their
predecessors, as mandated under Section 10 of Presidential Decree
No. 388; that if petitioner's Accounting Division cannot issue a
certification because it has no records, it is never an excuse to shift the
burden to the employees.
The issue for resolution is whether the COA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in directing petitioner to pay
the 25% balance of private respondents' incentive and terminal leave
benefits withheld from the submitted computation of petitioner and duly
funded by the DBM.
That I later became Division Chief I of [the] Budget Division in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration in 1988 and retired as Manager of the
Administrative and Finance Department on July 31, 2003;
The general rule is that administrative agencies are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence. It can accept documents which cannot be
admitted in a judicial proceeding where the Rules of Court are strictly
observed. It can choose to give weight or disregard such evidence,
depending on its trustworthiness.21 Here, we find no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the COA when it admitted the affidavits of
Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. and gave weight to them in the light
of the other circumstances established by the records which will be
shown later in the decision.
Second, a certain Mr. Henry Doble, one of the movants, was promoted
from Emergency Employee, a temporary status, to senior machine
cutting operator with permanent status. If Mr. Doble had not refunded
his gratuity, it was more reasonable to suppose that SRA would not
have promoted him.
Petitioner's claim that the COA made its own assumptions which were
not even based on the allegations made by private respondents in any
of their pleadings is devoid of merit. In their Reply to petitioner's
Supplemental Comment/Opposition to private respondents' motion for
reconsideration, private respondents had alleged some of these above-
mentioned circumstances to support their claim that refunds had
already been made. We also find that the records of the case support
the above-quoted circumstances enumerated by the COA.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the January 14, 2011
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 111981
which reversed and set aside the dispositions of the NLRC, as well as
the CAs March 16, 2011 Resolution3 denying reconsideration thereof.
Factual Antecedents
Individual petitioners Venus B. Castillo (Castillo), Leah J. Evangelista
(Evangelista), Ditas M. Dolendo (Dolendo), and Dawn Karen S. Sy (Sy)
were regular employees of respondent Prudentialife Plans, Inc.
(Prudentialife), to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Employee Name
Position
Date Employed
Venus B. Castillo
CFP Clerk
November 27, 1995
Leah J. Evangelista
Data Encoder
October 16, 2000
Ditas M. Dolendo
Data Control Clerk
February 2002
Dawn Karen S. Sy
Data Control Clerk
October 1999
In her written explanation, Castillo claimed that she acted in good faith
in availing of the optical benefit allowance; that she did not conspire
with Alavera Optical in the overpricing of her eyeglasses; that she was
made to believe that her transaction with Alavera Optical whereby the
latter would issue an official receipt for the eyeglasses even without
actual payment thereof, which Castillo would then claim from
Prudentialife was regular; that she was unaware that Alavera Optical
was using a fictitious address and telephone number; and that she had
no intention to defraud Prudentialife.7
For her part, Dolendo stated that she met Dr. Simeona Alavera through
her colleague at work; that she heard that the doctor was conducting
eye examinations at the third floor of their building, thus she had her
eyes examined as well; that on January 30, 2006, she received the
official receipt for her eyeglasses in the amount of P2,500.00 and the
doctors prescription therefor, which she forwarded to Prudentialife; and
that she had no knowledge of any dishonesty or overpricing of the
eyeglasses relative to the optical benefit allowance.9
You and the other employees were examined by Mrs. Alavera in the
presence of one another and you were apprised of the scheme during
the examination/checkup.
During the investigation, we confirmed that there was never any actual
delivery of the eyeglasses to you, yet you submitted a reimbursement
request. You therefore submitted an O.R. for an item which you have not
actually received.
Your failure and refusal to divulge the whole truth shows your lack of
any effort to come clean and help in the investigation of the case. In
fact, it displays an attempt on your part to mislead the investigation and
further confirms our findings of your dishonesty.
After careful and thorough evaluation, we find you culpable of
DISHONESTY which, under Section 2.6 (i) of the Personnel Manual is
punishable by Dismissal, to wit:
2.6 DISHONESTY
xxxx
On the issue of due process, respondents argued that the twin notice
requirements were satisfied: the notices to explain apprised the
recipients thereof of their supposed acts and the rule violated, as well
as the penalty prescribed for such violations. Moreover, notices of
termination were duly sent to petitioners. All in all, petitioners were
afforded due process and given the opportunity to defend themselves.
Finally, respondents took exception to the inclusion of Prudentialife
officers as respondents to the Complaint, claiming that their acts were
done pursuant to their duties and in furtherance of the corporate
objective, which should thus exempt them from personal liability.
SO ORDERED.20
The Labor Arbiter held that there was ground to dismiss petitioners,
finding that there was a concerted and premeditated scheme to
defraud Prudentialife, using the optical benefit provision in the CBA to
enrich the availing employees by declaring overpriced eyeglasses,
obtaining reimbursement therefor, and pocketing the difference
between the amount reimbursed and the actual cost or selling price of
the spectacles. This constituted dishonesty.
The Labor Arbiter added that respondents took pains to investigate and
substantiate the charges against the guilty employees, submitting the
subject eyeglasses to other optical shops for examination and
comparison instead of merely relying upon the written explanations of
the employees and the admissions obtained from some of them.
Having established breach of trust through a scheme perpetrated to
defraud Prudentialife, the Labor Arbiter held that the company
possessed the right to dismiss the guilty employees as a measure of
selfprotection.
The Labor Arbiter held further that the dismissal of an estafa charge21
against the guilty employees does not necessarily result in a finding of
illegal dismissal. Conversely, the filing of a subsequently dismissed
estafa charge cannot constitute unfair labor practice, as this is a right
granted to Prudentialife as a party injured by the fraudulent scheme; the
filing of criminal charges could not have the effect of preventing
petitioners from filing the illegal dismissal case, nor were the latter
cowed into fear as a result of the filing of the charges.
SO ORDERED.23
In sum, the NLRC held that petitioners liability has not been
substantiated, it not having been shown that petitioners were privy to
the fraudulent scheme. The NLRC believed that the admissions of the
other employees do not prove petitioners complicity and participation
in the scheme. It declared that respondents failed to submit
independent evidence to show the petitioners guilt, and that petitioners
were not given the opportunity to meet and crossexamine
respondents witnesses or those employees who submitted written
explanations admitting the presence of an illegal scheme to profit by
the optical benefit provision in the CBA, namely Roselle Marquez,
Edgardo Cayanan, Jennifer Garcia, Nerissa Rivera, Orlando Labicane,
Michael Arceo, Jennifer Fronda and Leopoldo Padlan; thus, their
statements are inadmissible.
SO ORDERED.26
In reversing the NLRC, the CA found that there was indeed cause to
dismiss petitioners, the evidence indicating that petitioners and the
other employees knew, assented and took part in the scheme to profit
by pocketing the difference between the declared cost and actual cost
of the eyeglasses; that based on the written statements of the other
participants to the scheme, petitioners are guilty of serious misconduct,
dishonesty, fraud and breach of trust, which rendered them unfit to
continue working for Prudentialife. The appellate court cited
particularly the fact that the eyeglasses purchased by petitioners from
Alavera Optical did not have any grade.
The CA added that since the instant case is a labor case, only
substantial evidence and not guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required in establishing petitioners liability; that due process was
observed by respondents, as petitioners were furnished with the
requisite twin notices before their services were terminated; and that
petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be heard on their defense
through their respective written explanations, and no hearing was
required before a decision on their case could be properly arrived at.
Issues
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AS ALREADY
DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT;
II
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners further cite that while Prudentialife supposedly found that the
eyeglasses they purchased had no grade, they were not afforded the
opportunity to meet and contest this finding; that this finding was not
included in the written notice to explain which they received, and thus
could not be a valid basis for their dismissal since they were unable to
explain their side on such issue. Petitioners reiterate the NLRC findings
that the other employees who admitted to the illegal scheme did not
implicate them, nor can these employees statements be used to show
petitioners guilt or privity to the illegal scheme since these written
statements are inadmissible in evidence as they were not given the
opportunity to contest them, nor were they allowed to crossexamine
the employees who prepared and submitted them; that in Garcia v.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,30 it was held that the statement of a co
employee may not be used to prove the guilt of an employee accused
of theft of company property; and that there can be no other conclusion
than that their dismissal was based on mere conjecture and suspicion,
and for this reason, the burden of proof which falls on Prudentialife
has not been properly discharged.
Additionally, petitioners claim that they did not unduly profit from
availing of the optical benefit provision under the CBA, since they did
not claim or receive anything other than the eyeglasses; that no
evidence was shown to support respondents claim that their
eyeglasses were overpriced, and any variation in prices of eyeglasses
between the various optical shops merely shows that free market forces
were in operation not that the particular eyeglasses they obtained
from Alavera Optical were overpriced; and that their categorical denial
was sufficient to negate any accusation or suspicion of involvement in
the scheme or conspiracy surrounding the optical benefit provision in
the CBA.
Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the assailed dispositions and the
reinstatement of the December 8, 2008 NLRC Decision. In addition,
they seek an award of damages and attorneys fees.
Respondents Arguments
Our Ruling
The evidence on record suggests that, with the aim in view of availing
the optical benefit provision under the CBA, Prudentialife employee
Elvie Villaviaje initiated a companywide scheme with Alavera Optical
whereby the latter, through its optometrists, conducted eye
examinations within company premises and issued prescriptions on
January 27, 2006, and subsequently prepared and released
eyeglasses to the participating Prudentialife employees. In turn, these
employees claimed reimbursement for the cost of their eyeglasses
through the optical benefit provision, to the allowable extent of
P2,500.00. The evidence shows that even before they could pay for the
cost of their eyeglasses, Alavera Optical offered to issue, as it did
issue, official receipts in advance to the availing employees, which they
used to secure reimbursements from Prudentialife ahead of the actual
payment of the eyeglasses; the petitioners acknowledged this fact in
their individual and respective written explanations. Likewise, some of
the availing employees33 except petitioners admitted that they
knew that the true cost of their respective eyeglasses ranged from only
P1,200.00 P1,800.00; that Alavera Optical deliberately issued official
receipts for a greater amount ranging from P2,500.00 P2,600.00 with
their full knowledge and consent; that they used these official receipts
to claim reimbursement; and that Prudentialife actually reimbursed
them to the extent of P2,500.00.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
Present:
NACHURA,
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,
DEL CASTILLO,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,** and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 9, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in
1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III
of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained,
however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.
Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated
January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually
likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-
affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant
with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy
of the document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise dated January
30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit
dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4,
2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May
20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final
report of the same examination which is the document appended as
Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr.
Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In
the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as
Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the
document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both documents
are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that
which are written on Exhibit D.
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception
of the evidence of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which
admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY
WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06
DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65
OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY
2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the
BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that the BOM did not
exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of
whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM.
[6] Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of
the rules of evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may appear
to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have
held that:
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did
not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate,
the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha
were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated
on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
xxxx
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BRION, JJ.
TRISTAN C. COLANGGO,**
Respondent.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the February
22, 2006 decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
79047 and its resolution denying reconsideration.[3]
On October 25, 1992, respondent Tristan C. Colanggo took the
Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) and obtained a
passing rate of 75.98%. On October 1, 1993, he was appointed
Teacher I and was assigned to Don Ruben E. Ecleo, Sr. Memorial
National High School in San Jose, Surigao del Norte.
The CSC concluded that respondent did not apply for and take the
PBET exam. Thus, in Resolution No. 021412, the CSC found respondent
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service and ordered his dismissal. [6]
On February 22, 2006, the CA granted the petition.[9] It ruled that the
photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS
should have been authenticated.[10] Only documents or public records
duly acknowledged or certified as such in accordance with law could
be presented in evidence without further proof.[11] Consequently, the
CA annulled and set aside Resolution No. 021412 and ordered the
dismissal of charges against respondent.[12]
The CSC moved for reconsideration[13] but was denied.[14] Hence,
this petition.
The CSC essentially avers that the CA erred in finding that it committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering Resolution No. 021412.[15] The
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[16] (Uniform
Rules) does not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence.
Thus, it validly considered the photocopies of the PBET application
form, picture seat plan and PDS in resolving the formal charge against
respondent in spite of the fact that they were not duly authenticated.
Section 39. The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent
consist of the sworn statement and documents submitted in support of
the complaint or answer as the case may be, without prejudice to the
presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary but was
unavailable at the time of the filing of the complaint and the answer
upon which the cross-examination, by the respondent and the
complainant respectively, shall be based. Following the cross-
examination, there may be re-direct or re-cross examination.
Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may
require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary
evidence in his favor through the compulsory process of subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum.
Resolution No. 021412 reveals that the CSC carefully evaluated the
allegations against respondent and thoroughly examined and weighed
the evidence submitted for its consideration. The penalty (of dismissal)
imposed on respondent was therefore fully in accord with law[20] and
jurisprudence.[21] We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CSC.
Resolution No. 021412 dated October 22, 2002 and the May 19, 2003
resolution of the Civil Service Commission finding respondent Tristan C.
Colanggo GUILTY of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service and dismissing him from the service with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualifying him from
reemployment in the government service are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast
with the negative declarations of respondent companys witnesses who,
as district sales supervisors of respondent company denied knowing
the complainants personally, the testimonies of the complainants were
more credible as they sufficiently supplied every detail of their
employment, specifically identifying who their salesmen/drivers were,
their places of assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and
dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that
there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between the
complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the
latters decision.
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of
Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of the NLRC be
reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have
given weight to respondents claim of failure to cross-examine them.
They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based
merely on the parties position papers and affidavits in support of their
allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed thereto. As
such, according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly
applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to
be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure
which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in
their favor.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is
not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v.
NLRC[9] squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety
of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-
examination. In that case, we held that the argument that the affidavit is
hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination
is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC
where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in
courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy
or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent,
citing People v. Sorrel,[12] that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is
mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find
relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution
requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative
proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is
given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases
may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting
documents and their affidavits.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
Present:
Promulgated:
June 6, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
The present case presents the primordial issue of whether the Secretary
of Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his
authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.
Ineluctably, the issue involves a determination and application of
existing law, the provisions of the Labor Code, and prevailing
jurisprudence. Intertwined with the issue, however, is the question of
validity of the MOA and its ratification which, as movant correctly points
out, is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule, however, is not without
exceptions, viz:
This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law,
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not
duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and
considered by the tribunals below. When supported by substantial
evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the
appellate court on whether the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting,
the former giving scant consideration thereon, and the latter affording it
more weight.
The appellate court, held, however, that the Secretary did not have the
authority to give an arbitral award higher than what was stated in the
MOA. The conflicting views drew the Court to re-evaluate the facts as
borne by the records, an exception to the rule that only questions of law
may be dealt with in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the
minutes of the meeting which were not verified and notarized would
violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule,
like other rules on evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor
cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil
Laboratories, Inc. [8] teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases
pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Rules
of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical
sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from
accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to,
what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence
because it was validly entered into by the parties, the Court notes that
even those who signed it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA
(assuming in this case that the MOA can be treated as one) is a
contract imbued with public interest. It must thus be given a liberal,
practical and realistic, rather than a narrow and technical construction,
with due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the
purpose for which it is intended.[9]
As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the
FFW during the pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing its
personality to represent the Union, the same does not affect the Courts
upholding of the authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral
awards higher than what was supposedly agreed upon in the MOA.
Contrary to respondents assertion, the unavoidable issue of
disaffiliation bears no significant legal repercussions to warrant the
reversal of the Courts Decision.
En passant, whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue.
Besides, the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW was by
virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23, 2010 and submitted to the
DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5, 2010 two months after the
present petition was filed on December 22, 2009, hence, it did not
affect FFW and its Legal Centers standing to file the petition nor this
Courts jurisdiction to resolve the same.
At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which
must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of
either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor organization, not
the employer.
Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW went against the will and
wishes of its principal (the member-employees) by pursuing the case
despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor for respondent
to determine, but for the Union and FFW to resolve on their own
pursuant to their principal-agent relationship.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of
November 15, 2010 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
DECISION
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner Rodolfo M. Agdeppa (Agdeppa) assailing the Resolution1
dated July 31, 2000 and Order2 dated September 28, 2000 of
respondent Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the administrative complaint
initiated by Agdeppa against respondents Marydel B. Jarlos-Martin
(Jarlos-Martin), Emmanuel M. Laurezo (Laurezo), and Iluminado L.
Junia, Jr. (Junia).
Junia, then Group Manager for the Project Technical Services Group of
the National Housing Authority (NHA), filed on May 25, 1999 a
Complaint3 before the Office of the Ombudsman against several NHA
officials, together with Agdeppa and Ricardo Castillo (Castillo), resident
auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) at the NHA. Junias
Complaint was docketed as OMB-0-99-1015. Junia alleged that Supra
Construction (SupraCon), the contractor for the NHA project
denominated as Phase IX, Packages 7 and 7-A in Tala, Caloocan City
(NHA Project), was overpaid in the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The
overpayment was allegedly facilitated through the dubious and
confusing audit reports prepared by Agdeppa and endorsed by
Castillo, to the detriment, damage, and prejudice of the Government.
At around the same time the foregoing events were unfolding, Agdeppa
wrote a letter11 dated March 3, 1999 addressed to Senator Renato S.
Cayetano (Sen. Cayetano), who was then the Chairperson of the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Agdeppa requested Sen.
Cayetano to conduct an investigation of incumbent officials of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) and COA who purportedly committed
irregularities in the resolution of the administrative case against the
government officials and employees involved in the reconsideration of
the disallowed money claims of SupraCon in the NHA Project. Agdeppa
attached to said letter his Sworn Statement12 dated March 3, 1999,
detailing under oath his accusations against the COA and CSC officials.
In a 1st Indorsement13 dated April 23, 1999, Atty. Raul M. Luna, Sen.
Cayetanos Chief of Staff, referred Agdeppas letter dated March 3,
1999 to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Desierto) for appropriate
action.
This is to inform you Sir, that I have not yet receive[d] any kind of
communication from you or from your good office concerning my letter
dated July 12, 1999 (Annex A hereof) which was received by your
Dibisyon ng Rekords Sentral on July 14, 1999 inquiring on the status of
my letter with its accompanying Sworn Statement, dated March 3, 1999,
to Senator Renato L. Cayetano, which was instead endorsed to you by
his Chief of Staff, Atty. Raul M. Luna, in a 1st Indorsement dated April
23, 1999 for appropriate action.cralawred
xxxx
One of the reasons why I am writing to you again, Sir, is to be sure that I
will not be remiss in reminding you that your good office has still to act
on my letter of July 12, 1999.
I also want you to know, Sir, that I am now being harassed by certain
elements in your honorable office. This is manifest in the hasty
evaluation of the counter-complaint (Annex E hereof) (now
OMB-0-99-1015) filed by one of the respondents in OMB-0-94-2543
(now Criminal Case No. Q-99-81636 before QC RTC Branch 86), which
complaint was received by your Dibisyon ng Rekords Sentral on May
23, 1999, and which was given due course by MARYDEL B. JARLOS-
MARTIN, Graft Investigation Officer II, through her ORDER dated 10
June 1999 (Annex F hereof) directing me to answer OMB-0-99-1015.
Please note, Sir, that the ORDER of June 10, 1999 was served only on
July 15, 1999 or the day after your office had received my letter of July
12, 1999, giving the impression that the said order was issued as an
after-thought and meant as a leverage, if not a veiled warning, to stop
me from pursuing the endorsement of my letter of March 3, 1999 to you.
xxxx
The fact, therefore, that there was great haste in the commencement of
the preliminary investigation of OMB-0-99-1015 while my letter of July
12, 1999 remains un-answered until now could not but evoke my
suspicion that your honorable office is being used for other
purposes.cralawred
xxxx
Realizing from Agdeppas letter dated August 19, 1999 that Junias
Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 was not under oath, Jarlos-Martin issued
an Order16 on September 23, 1999 with the following directive for
Junia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
You are hereby ordered to appear before the undersigned at the Office
of the Ombudsman, Room 210, located at the 2nd Floor, Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau, immediately upon receipt hereof, in
order to swear to your complaint dated May 18, 1999, pursuant to
Section 4(a), Rule II, Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
25. With due respect, [Agdeppa] finds the order of October 6, 1999
directing him to answer OMB-0-99-1015 anew and for [Junia] to reply if
he so desires as a blatant disregarding of Section 4, Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Annex 18 hereof) or of
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court (Annex 18-A hereof);
xxxx
27. With due respect, the new order is no longer a means to carry out
the so-called due process of law in the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case, which is a criminal case falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and/or Regional Trial Court;
28. Rather, the new order became a tool to enhance or modify the
substantive rights of [Junia] to the injury of [Agdeppa] for giving the
former unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
32. What will happen to the priceless effort and money that went with
the preparation and submission of the aforementioned pleadings vis--
vis the service of the order dated October 6, 1999 to [Agdeppa] only?
33. It appears that it was only [Agdeppa] who was targeted by the
Order dated October 6, 1999 because [Castillo], who lives a block from
[Agdeppas] residence at Roque Drive, declared in his Affidavit
executed on November 4, 1999 (Annex 20 hereof) that he had
received only one order relative to OMB-0-99-1015 and that was the
Order dated June 10, 1999 and nothing more;
34. For another, was the reply of [Junia] not enough to find probable
cause to warrant the filing of a criminal information against [Agdeppa]
that is why he was given another chance, through the Order dated
October 6, 1999, to do a clinching one;
xxxx
44. It is not difficult to see that the actual primary purpose of [Junia] in
filing OMB-0-99-1015 is for him to get a relief from this honorable office
in order that he could stop his arraignment in Crim. Case No.
Q-99-81636 before Judge Teodoro A. Bay of the QC RTC Branch 86
arising from OMB-0-94-2543 by spicing Crim. Case No. 16240, which is
still pending with the Sandiganbayans Second Division, with [Junias]
so-called evidence against [Agdeppa and Castillo] in their alleged
participation in, and/or allowing, the illegal payment of
PHP1,861,945.28[.]
20. That the act of respondent Jarlos-Martin in issuing the Order dated
6 October 1999 when she was supposed to have already resolved
OMB-0-99-1015 a long time ago, thus giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to respondent Junia to the damage and injury
of [petitioner Agdeppa], constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act 3019, as amended causing any undue injury to any party xxx, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
function through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
unexcusable negligence.
25. That respondent Laurezo could have not escaped noticing that the
complaint dated May 17, 1999 he was about to subscribe on 6 October
1999 was already docketed as OMB-0-99-1015 as indicated by the big
bold letters at the bottom of the first page of the said complaint.
31. That this is so, and will remain to be so, because the resolution of
the above-mentioned Motion for Reinvestigation filed by respondent
Junia, who is one of the accused in Crim. Case No. Q-81636, is waiting
for the resolution of OMB-0-99-1015.26
Acting on Agdeppas Affidavit-Complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470,
Director Rudiger G. Falcis II (Falcis) of the Criminal Investigation,
Prosecution & Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the
Ombudsman, issued an Order27 dated June 6, 2000, directing only
Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and other
evidence within 10 days from notice.
8. It is clear from the aforestated facts and provisions of law, rules and
regulations that my official action in administering oath and subscribing
the complaint of Iluminado Junia on October 6, 1999, is in accordance
with law, done in good faith and without any unlawful motive.
11. I did not persuade, induce nor influence any public officer to violate
any rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or
an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter. When the
provision speaks of persuading, inducing, or influencing, it means
that there must be an active persuasion, inducement, or influence on
the part of the public official sought to be held liable. Active persuasion,
inducement, or influence cannot be presumed, much less established,
by the mere subscribing of an affidavit which is required by law. It must
be noted that there has been no evidence whatsoever presented by
[Agdeppa] to show that I actually and personally persuaded, induced
or influenced other public officers, specifically [Atty. Jarlos-Martin] to
disobey any law.
xxxx
16. That Par. no. 9, in so far as it relates to the claim of [Laurezo] that
there must first be a showing of an intent of deriving personal gain or
benefit in order that Section 3(a) of Rep. Act No. 3019 applies, is
denied as the said provision of the said law (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) merely states
Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated
by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
Nothing more. Nothing less. Hence, [Laurezo] should not add anything
to it.
xxxx
4. I vehemently deny the said accusations, the truth of the matter being
as follows:
a. On June 7, 1999, OMB Case No. 0-99-1015 entitled Iluminado L.
Junia, Jr. vs. Rodolfo M. Agdeppa and Ricardo Castillo, For: Violation of
R.A. No. 3019, was assigned to me.
5.3. I did not set aside the records of the case. I was evidently inspired
by utmost good faith to comply with procedural matters, of which I was
authorized.
5.5. Even assuming, arguendo, that the parties have already submitted
their respective pleadings, this cannot be made as basis to terminate
the preliminary investigation and jump into the conclusion that the
records [were] already complete. It bears emphasis that, during the
study of the case, if the investigating officer finds that there are matters
which need to be clarified, he/she may set a clarificatory hearing, or if
there are documents which need to be produced, subpoena duces
tecum will issue.
5.7. The said order was intended to both parties and not only to Junia.
Granting that the preliminary investigation restarted by reason of
compliance with A.O. No. 7, this will not put into waste the efforts
already exerted by the parties. The complaint that was attached to the
second order to file answer is the very same complaint that was
attached to the first order, only that it was put under oath. This means
there is nothing new in the subject matter of the complaint, which the
respondent therein had already studied. Needless to say, respondents
must adopt their previous answers and the complainant, his reply
thereto, which is exactly what Ricardo Castillo and Iluminado Junia, Jr.
did, copies of their respective Manifestations dated November 24, 1999
and December 6, 1999 are hereto attached as Annexes 3 and 4.
5.8. The allegation that the order dated October 6, 1999 will give me
basis to resolve the case in favor of Junia in case of non-compliance of
Agdeppa to the said Order (see par. 22, Complaint) is totally absurd
and malicious.
5.9. It is significant to note that in any case, it does not follow that if
there is failure on the part of [Agdeppa] to file his answer, the case will
be resolved in favor of [Junia]. The resolution of the case is based on
the evidence on record. Thus, in the subject case, OMB 0-9-1015,
though Agdeppa did not submit a responsive pleading to the Order
dated October 6, 1999 and instead filed a Motion to Resolve, his
counter-affidavit which had already form[ed] part of the records of the
case, will be treated as his answer. 33
xxxx
12. That Par. no. 4(g), in so far as it concerns the claim of [Jarlos-
Martin] that she resorted to the issuance of her aforesaid Order dated
September 23, 1999 to put things in order, is denied because, to
reiterate, she no longer has the authority to issue such an Order after
September 20, 1999 as there was already a last pleading filed to
OMB-0-99-1015 on the basis of her Order dated 10 June 1999 and,
thusly, she was already mandated, by her very own Order dated 10
June 1999, to resolve the said case pursuant to Section 4(g) of A.O. No.
07.
13. That the first Par. no. 5 (as there are two) is admitted but with the
qualification that the appearance of Mr. Junia before the Office (EPIB)
was on the basis of [Jarlos-Martins] Order dated September 23, 1999.
If this is the case, then [Jarlos-Martin] should have been the one who
should have administered the oath on the complaint dated May 18,
1999 as she is also authorized to do so pursuant to Section 31 of RA
No. 6770 x x x.cralawred
xxxx
14. That the second Par. no. 5 is denied as the record of OMB-
0-99-1015 indicates to the contrary the claim of [Jarlos-Martin] that
there is absolutely no basis for the filing of the above-entitled case. It is
to be noted that no less than Director Rudiger G. Falcis II, of the
Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau, this Honorable Office, had declared in his Order dated June 6,
2000 requiring [Jarlos-Martin] to file [her] counter-affidavit to the above-
entitled case because The Affidavit-Complaint filed by [Junia] dated
April 6, 2000 xxx is sufficient in form and substance, thus, entirely
belying [Jarlos-Martins] claim of absolute want of basis in the filing of
the instant case.cralawred
xxxx
17. That Par. no. 5.2 is denied because it is precisely the Order dated
October 6, 1999 which gave [Jarlos-Martin] a veiled legal basis in
postponing, albeit illegally, the resolution of OMB-0-99-1015. This is so
because the said Order changed the proceedings already put and held
in place by the Order dated 10 June 1999. Thusly, the preliminary
investigation of OMB-0-99-1015 went beyond the ambit of the Order
dated 10 June 1999. x x x.35
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated July 31, 2000
dismissing Agdeppas complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 for the
following reasons:
We find for [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia].
(D)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION
DISMISSING OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 BY TOLERATING THE
POSTPONEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF OMB-0-99-1015 WHICH
TOLERANCE WAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.
(E)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED AS GOSPEL
TRUTH THE ALLEGATION IN THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF
RESPONDENT LAUREZO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT JUNIA
APPEARED BEFORE HIM ON OCTOBER 6, 1999 TO HAVE HIS
AFFIDAVIT COMPLAINT PLACED UNDER OATH EVEN IF THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF SUCH AN ALLEGATION COMING
FROM THE SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HIMSELF.38
After an exhaustive review of the records, the Court finds no merit in the
Petition at bar.
At the outset, the Court makes it clear that its review herein shall be
strictly limited to OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. To recall, OMB-MIL-
CRIM-00-0470 involves Agdeppas complaint against Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia before the Office of the Ombudsman for corrupt
practices under Section 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019,
allegedly committed by the latter three in the course of the preliminary
investigation in OMB-0-99-1015. The Office of the Ombudsman, in the
Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000,
dismissed Agdeppas charges for lack of basis in fact and in law.
The Court underscores that it cannot touch upon the merits of the other
cases which, although related and/or arising from the same set of facts,
are proceeding independently from and simultaneously with OMB-MIL-
CRIM-00-0470. The present Petition is not the proper remedy and, thus,
the Court is without jurisdiction to review and annul the Resolution
dated June 14, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-0-99-1015, which recommended the filing of an Information
against Agdeppa and Castillo for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019; or enjoin and dismiss the resultant criminal case, Crim.
Case No. 01-100552, against Agdeppa and Castillo, which is now
pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 91; or reopen a COA case
decided long before in 1993.
The Court will also not rule upon issues which were raised by Agdeppa
only in his Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum, specifically,
issues [B], [C], [E], [G], and [H] thereof. These are issues which the
Office of the Ombudsman, Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia did not
have an opportunity to address or argue. The parties were properly
instructed by the Court in the Resolution dated October 22, 2001 that
[n]o new issues may be raised by a party in his/its Memorandum and
the issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included in the
Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned.41 Relevant
herein is the ruling of the Court in Heirs of Ramon Garayes v. Pacific
Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.42:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This is not only unfair to the respondents who were deprived of the
opportunity to propound their arguments on the issue. It is likewise not
allowed by the rules. In the June 23, 2008 Resolution, the Court
reminded the parties that [n]o new issues may be raised by a party in
the memorandum. The rationale for this was explained by the Court in
Heirs of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court significantly notes that the first three issues, alleging lack of
jurisdiction and cause of action, are raised by petitioners for the first
time in their Memorandum. No amount of interpretation or
argumentation can place them within the scope of the assignment of
errors they raised in their Petition.
The parties were duly informed by the Court in its Resolution dated
September 17, 2003 that no new issues may be raised by a party in his/
its Memorandum and the issues raised in his/its pleadings but not
included in the Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned.
The raising of additional issues in a memorandum before the Supreme
Court is irregular, because said memorandum is supposed to be in
support merely of the position taken by the party concerned in his
petition, and the raising of new issues amounts to the filing of a petition
beyond the reglementary period. The purpose of this rule is to provide
all parties to a case a fair opportunity to be heard. No new points of law,
theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the
Memorandum for the reason that to permit these would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
Taking away Agdeppas conspiracy theory, the grounds for his Petition
no longer have a leg to stand on. As the succeeding discussion will
show, the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated September
28, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 were rendered by the Office of the
Ombudsman in the valid exercise of its discretion.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the Office of
the Ombudsman, Jarlos-Martin, and Laurezo explains that the
allegations in Agdeppas Affidavit-Complaint basically focused on the
purported violations of the provisions of RA 3019 by public respondents
MARTIN and LAUREZO as graft investigating officers and [a] reading
of the complaint shows that JUNIAs alleged participation, if ever, was
peripheral and secondary[,] thus, the investigating officer, after
evaluation, considered the complaint against [Junia] as not warranting
further proceedings.51 In effect, the exclusion of Junia from the Order
dated June 6, 2000 was an outright dismissal by the Office of the
Ombudsman of Agdeppas Affidavit-Complaint insofar as said Affidavit-
Complaint involved Junia.
Agdeppa questions the fact that it was Director Falcis who issued the
Order dated June 6, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 requiring Jarlos-
Martin and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and evidence, but the
preliminary investigation was actually conducted and the Resolution
dated July 31, 2000 was penned by Investigator Caares. According to
Agdeppa, this violates the same-investigating-officer rule under Rule II,
Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting
evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating
officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory
hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness
being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is
impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in
writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating
officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the
witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing
and under oath.
[I]t is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the
evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied
on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or
irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity
to weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court
generally will not find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly
assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of
public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were
thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
Similarly, the fact alone that the investigating officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman who issued the resolution was not the one who conducted
the preliminary investigation does not render said investigating officers
resolution erroneous or irregular. The investigating officer may rely on
the pleadings and evidence on record and enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duties as a public officer, unless
disputed by evidence to the contrary.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxxx
It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify
conviction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
Agdeppa faults the Office of the Ombudsman for giving full faith and
credence to Laurezos allegation in his Counter-Affidavit in OMB-MIL-
CRIM-00-0470 that Junia personally appeared before him on October
6, 1999 to verify and swear to the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015.
Agdeppa further challenges the authority of Laurezo to administer the
oath to Junia, when it was Jarlos-Martin, the investigating officer in
OMB-0-99-1015, who issued the Order dated September 23, 1999
directing Junia to appear before her at her office to swear to the
Complaint.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
x--x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in
the amount of P200,000.00, which was later reduced to P160,000.00, to
facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She further
alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her
favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of
the case. For a clear and complete picture of the accusations against
the respondent, we quote verbatim the pertinent portions of the
complainants narration of the incidents that gave rise to the filing of the
present administrative complaint
xxxx
The Court, in a 1st Indorsement6 dated March 19, 2010, required the
respondent to comment onthe complaint against her.
In her Comment dated May 27, 2010,7 the respondent denied the
accusations against her. She alleged her belief that Bartolome is a
fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint does not indicate the
complainants exact address. She asserted that her detention at Imus
Police Station does not prove her culpability since no actual criminal
charges were filed against her. She claimed that the lapse of six (6)
months from the time of the alleged incident indicates that the
complaint is pure and simple harassment orchestrated by a lawyer or
litigant who has a grudge against her and who wants to
publiclybesmirch her reputation. In support of her defense, the
respondent mentioned that even Judge Fernando L. Felicen (Judge
Felicen), Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite interceded
for her release from detention.
On July 29, 2010, the complainant sent a letter to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA),8 without indicating her address, alleging that she
has to constantly change residence because unidentified persons had
been seen in their neighborhood asking questions about her. She has
also been receiving text messages from the respondent telling her that
her complaint would only be dismissed because she knows people in
the Supreme Court. The respondent also threatened retaliation against
her after the case is terminated. The complainant further claimed that
the pieces of evidence she submitted are sufficient to prove the
respondents anomalous activities, and prayed for the immediate
resolution of her complaint.
21/19/09 8:40pm
Sino po to
21/10/09 8:53pm
21/10/09 8:54pm
San mo nakuha # ko
21/10/09 9:05pm
21/10/09 9:13pm
21/10/09 9:18pm
21/10/09 9:24pm
21/10/09 9:49pm
Natitiwala ako sayo ha dahil hindi lahat pinagbibigyan namin. Sally n
lang tawag mo sakin nagtataka lng kc ako kanina kc buong buong buo
yung txt ng name ko e.
21/10/09 9:51pm
22/10/09 10:05am
22/10/09 10:25am
22/10/09 10:51am
22/10/09 10:56am
Sana kung makakagawa ka daw paraan bukas kahit 40k n lng muna
down tapos 3pm bukas
22/10/09 11:04am
Ok pero d kita pilipilit ha nasayopa din and decision yan ang sakin lng
kc nagmamadali k at tsaka yun ang free time ng lawyer ha
22/10/09 11:11am
22/10/09 1:09pm
The complainant described the respondent as an influence peddler in
the courts of Imus, Cavite who acts as a conduit to judges, prosecutors
and private law practitioners.
Atty. Bihasa further narrated thaton the next day at about five oclock in
the afternoon, he went backto Imus Police Station to wait for the
complainant. After a few hours, the respondents co-workers, including
Judge Felicen arrived. They waited for the complainant until seven
oclock in the evening but she failed to come. Only the complainants
lawyer arrived who informed the police investigator that the
complainant cannot come out of fear because of the death threats she
received.18
The concern that Atty. Bihasa and Judge Felicen showed to the
respondent while under detention at Imus PNP Station gives rise to the
suspicion that they have knowledge and tolerate the respondents
anomalous activities. The respondents text messages to the
complainant support this suspicion:19
7/11/09 3:13pm
7/11/09 3:15pm
Try ko lng
7/11/09 3:25pm
Hanggang Tuesday na lg tayo after nun nxt year na. Yan ang sabi
7/11/09 3:28pm
7/11/09 3:59pm
Ok po mit po tayo bukas 10 am sinabi ko napo kay atty. Tnx po. See
you po
Sally:
Lalaki:
Ibigay ko sa kanya?
Sally:
We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment
operation. The complainant herself certified that the video and text
messages are evidence of her complaint against the respondent,
"Sapat at malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na kasama ng aking reklamo
na nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang nakasaad sa aking reklamo.
Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text messages niya ang kanyang modus
operandi at paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang
makapanghingi ng malaking pera sa mga inosenteng tao." It is also well
to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied.25 A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC
specifically provides that these rules shall be liberally construed to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases.
The Court totally agrees with the OCAs finding that the respondent is
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. The respondents assertion that Bartolome is a fictitious
name because the complainant has not stated in her complaint her
exact address is preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal
and text message contacts between them. In the absence of
supporting evidence, the claim that the complaint against her is pure
and simple harassment orchestrated by persons with grudge against
her, is mere conjectural allegation.
As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and
integrity is expected of the respondent at all times.26 She should be the
personification of the principle that public office is a public trust.27 The
respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that
should have governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting money
from the complainant, she committed a crimeand an act of serious
impropriety that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and
deeply affected the peoples confidence in it. She committed an
ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the
impression that decision can be bought and sold.28 The Court has
never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the socalled "bad-eggs" in
the judiciary.29 We have been resolute in our drive to discipline and, if
warranted, to remove from the service errant magistrates, employees
and even Justices of higher collegiate appellate courts for any
infraction that gives the Judiciary a bad name. To stress our
earnestness in this pursuit, we have, in fact, been unflinching in
imposing discipline on errant personnel or in purging the ranks of those
undeserving to remain in the service.30
The Office of the Chief Attorney shall analyze the submitted data,
including the records of and the proceedings in the listed cases, and
recommend to the Court the actions it should take in the event a pattern
of corruption involving annulment of marriage cases emerges. The
Office of the Chief Attorney is given ninety (90) days from receipt of the
Office of the Court Administrator's list, within which to submit its
recommendations to the Court.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
THIRD DIVISION
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2011, in the Municipality of Sto.
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without authority of
law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, for and in
consideration of the amount of Three Hundred (Php 300.00) Pesos, sell,
convey, deliver and give away to a PO3 Ardic Oayo Palabay one (1)
heat sealed plastic sachet containing shabu with a weight of zero point
zero nine hundred forty six (0.0946) gram, a dangerous and prohibited
drug.
Contrary to ihe provision of Section 5, Art. 2 of R.A.
9165.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
At the crossing, at half past five o'clock in the afternoon when PO3
Palabay noticed accused-appellant coming his way, he disembarked
from the tricycle in which lie had been waiting. He approached
accused-appellant who immediately handed to him a heat-sealed
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance; and PO3
Palabay, in exchange, gave accused-appellant the marked money.
Accused-appellant then counted the money while PO3 Palabay placed
the sachet in his pocket and removed his cap to signal the arrest to the
other police officers. Accused-appellant attempted to flee but was
subsequently overcome and handcuffed by the other officers. PO3
Palabay informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights; took a
photograph of the latter as well as the area and the plastic sachet
which he marked "AJP-1-11." He also made an inventory of the marked
money and the seized plastic sachet in the presence of the Barangay
Captain and another witness.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The penalty is harsh but that is the law on the matter. Less than one
gram of "shabu" and wham! One has to spend one's life in prison.
The Court agrees with the CA finding that, contrary to the accused-
appellant's assertion, the trial court sufficiently stated the factual and
legal bases for its disposition of the case. In convicting accused-
appellant, the trial court explained that it gave credence to the
testimonies of the police officers pursuant to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duties and absent any
showing of ill-motive to plant evidence against accused-appellant.14
The trial court also stated that it found accused-appellant's testimony
partly incredulous.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court, however, upholds the CA's ruling that the crime of sale of a
dangerous drug, in this case shabu, was consummated; different from
the trial court's ruling that the crime had been committed only at its
attempted stage. In so holding, the trial court stated that "[w]hen he
realized the trap he was about: to backout in the sale. Nevertheless, the
penalty is the same."16 This Court disagrees.
The Court finds that all elements for illegal sale were duly established
with accused-appellant having been caught inflagrante delicto selling
shabu through a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust team of
PO3 Palabay.
PO3 Palabay, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that accused-
appellant handed to him the plastic sachet containing the prohibited
drug in exchange for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00),
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q:
And at about what time was that when you wailed at that waiting shed?
A:
Around 5:30 in the afternoon, sir.
Q:
And what happened after that?
A:
While waiting I noticed the suspect approaching, sir.
Q:
So from where did he come home (sic)?
A:
From the road leading to barangay Pongpong, sir.
Q:
And when you saw him approaching what did you do if any?
A:
I immediately disembark from the tricycle, sir.
xxxx
Q:
When you alighted from the tricycle where did you go?
A:
I immediately approached him also, sir.
Q:
And what happened when you approached him, what did you tell him
or what happened?
A:
He immediately handed to me the heat sealed plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance and then afterwards I in hand also the
marked money, sir.
Q:
He did not ask how much are you buying?
A:
He asked already through text, sir.
Q:
And where did you put the sachet that was handed to you'?
A:
I put in my pocket, sir.
Q:
You mentioned you handed the money to the subject, what did the
subject do if any?
A:
After he received the money, he counted the money, sir.
Q:
And while he was counting the money what did you do next?
A:
After counting the money, I frisked him, I said stop and I showed my
badge as an identification that I am a police but then he tried to run
towards east direction, sir.
Q:
By the way was there any a pre-arranged signal made by you with your
Chief of Police?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
What is your pre-arranged signal?
A:
When I removed my bull cup, sir.
Q:
What does that indicate?
A:
As a sign that the arrest shall be made bv the arresting officers, sir.
18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This testimony was corroborated by PSI Gagaoin who was strategically
posted within the perimeter of the target area.19 The result of the
laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu on the white crystalline substance inside the
plastic sachet received from the accused-appellant. The delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court has, time and again, deferred to the trial court's factual
findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. The trial
court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude
under grilling examination; the trial court is in a unique position to
assess the witnesses' Credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor.22 And in the instant case, accused-appellant has
not projected any strong and compelling reasons to sway the Court into
rejecting or revising such factual findings and evaluation in his favor.
The Court has ruled in People v. Enriquez,25 that the links that must be
established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
In the case at bar, PO3 Palabay, the poseur buyer, positively testified
that he placed in his pocket the plastic sachet of shabu handed to him
by accused-appellant. At the time of arrest, he photographed accused-
appellant, the area and the sachet of shabu, marked the same and
conducted the inventory before the Barangay Chairman and another
witness. PO3 Palabay further testified that he brought accused-
appellant and the sachet of shabu to the police station, and there,
executed affidavits of arrest and of the poseur buyer and made a
request for laboratory examination. PO3 Palabay then took accused-
appellant and the sachet of shabu to the crime laboratory and the latter
was received by PSI Antonio. Chemistry Report No. D-030-2011 signed
by PI Manuel as Forensic Chemist and PSI Antonio as Administering
Officer confirmed that the sachet is positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 And finally, in open court, PO3
Palabay opened the envelope from the Forensic Chemist and identified
its contents as the same sachet of shabu he had purchased from
accused-appellant.27 The same was offered in evidence and marked
as Exhibit "A."28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
All told, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant sold shabu. Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
states that the penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Thus, the CA correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and the line of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
1)
Finding accused Ronaldo Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165
otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
in Criminal Case No. 5485-SPL, hereby sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years as minimum to four (4) years
as maximum, to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.
2)
Finding accused Ronaldo Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of violation of Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165 otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5486-SPL, hereby sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum and to pay a fine in the
amount of P300,000.00.
3)
Finding accused Ronaldo Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
in Criminal Case No. 5487-SPL, and hereby sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the costs.
The drugs paraphernalia such as one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip and
one (1) improvised "tooter", the 0.19 and 0.06 grams (sic) of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" which constitutes the
instrument in the commission of the crime is confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government. The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is
hereby directed to immediately transmit the drugs paraphernalia such
as one (1) rolled aluminum strip and one (1) improvised "tooter", the
0.19 and 0.06 grams (sic) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu"
to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.11chanrobleslaw
Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, adopting the same
arguments in his Brief12 before the Court of Appeals.
Appellant asserts that the chain of custody of the object evidence was
never established. Moreover, appellant claims that Section 21 (a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 was not
complied with.
For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the
following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were
established. POl Signap, the poseur-buyer, positively identified
appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline substance in
one plastic sachet which was later proven to be positive for shabu. In
exchange for this plastic sachet; PO1 Signap handed the marked
money a.s payment. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under R.A.
No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely
be shown to have been preserved.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Records show that PO1 Signap recovered from appellant three (3)
plastic sachets of shabu, a glass tooter and aluminum foil. These items
were marked and inventoried in the house of appellant and in his
presence. Thereafter, these seized items were brought to the police
station where a request for qualitative examination was made. SPO4
Dela Pea signed the request and it was sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P.
Huelgas conducted the examination. Thus, the chain of custody was
clearly accounted for.
All told, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant sold and possessed shabu and shabu paraphernalia. Under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade,. administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity. and purity
involved. For the crime of illegal sale of shabu, appellant was properly
sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and a fine ranging from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who
unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other paraphernalia fit
or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting,
or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
We sustain the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the crime of illegal possession of shabu.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibra
x--x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Case
Antecedents
The information in Criminal Case No. 05-568 charged the appellant with
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2005, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without the necessary license or
prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away P200.00
worth of Methyl amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing zero
point zero three (0.03) gram, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2005, in the City of Makati
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess and/or use regulated drugs and without any license or proper
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in her possession, custody and control Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing zero point fifteen (0.15) gram, which is
a dangerous drug, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
At the trial, the State presented as witnesses poseur buyer PO1 Percival
Mendoza, and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Operative
Miguel Castillo.
POl Mendoza required the appellant to board the Toyota Revo. It was
inside the vehicle where he marked the plastic sachets with his initials
PCM for the sachet subject of the sale, and PCM-1 for the sachet
recovered from her right hand.22cralawred
The buy-bust team brought the appellant and the confiscated items to
the office of the SAID-SOTF for documentation and investigation.23 The
team later brought her and the confiscated items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for testing and examination.24 Her urine sample and the
white crystalline substances contained in the two plastic sachets tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu.25cralawred
The appellant denied the charges, and insisted that she had been the
victim of a frame-up. According to her, she was cleaning the house of
Gona Gonzales at No. 94 Guiho Street, Barangay Cembo, Makati City,
for whom she worked as househelper.26 She later on went out to buy
rice and on her way to the store, two men approached and announced
her that they were able to buy shabu from her.27 One of the men poked
his gun at her. They then brought her to the basketball court, where
they frisked and ordered her to bring out the shabu.28 They recovered
money amounting to P180.00 from her.29 They asked if she knew
anyone selling shabu, but she answered them in the negative.30 They
brought her to the MADAC office where she remained for a day.31 She
was later taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug testing. She
admitted using shabu only once, a year prior to her arrest.32cralawred
Judgment of the RTC
On September 15, 2006, the RTC convicted the appellant of the two
offenses charged, ruling:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. In Criminal Case No. 05-569, the Court finds the accused BEVERLY
ALAGARME y CITOY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of Violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentences her to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment of Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum to Fourteen (14) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P300,000.00) PESOS.
The period during which the accused was under detention shall be
considered in her favor pursuant to existing rules.
SO ORDERED.33cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
Decision of the CA
Issue
Did the CA err in finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the violations of Section 2 and Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 charged?
Ruling
Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be
followed in the seizure and ensuing custody of the seized dangerous
drugs, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x xcralawlawlibrary
xxxx
x x x xcralawlawlibrary
With this concern for the due recording of the authorized movement
and custody of the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the presentation
as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale
is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
39 This materiality derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves
the corpus delicti. Indeed, proof of the corpus delicti is essential in
every judgment of conviction.40 Without proof of the corpus delicti,
there is uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not. To
eliminate the uncertainty, the Prosecution should account for every link
in the chain of custody; otherwise, the crime is not established beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, the Prosecution does not comply with
the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 either when the dangerous drugs are missing or
when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized
dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the
evidence presented in court.41cralawred
A reading of the record indicates that the buy-bust team did not
observe the procedures laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its
IRR. The marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of
custody because it is the starting point in the custodial link. The
marking upon seizure serves a two-fold function, the first being to give
to succeeding handlers of the specimens a reference, and the second
being to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused
until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.42 This
requirement of marking as laid down by the law was not complied with.
Firstly, PO1 Mendoza simply stated that he did the marking of the
confiscated items with his initials inside the Toyota Revo. Although the
appellant was also inside the Toyota Revo at that time,43 he did not
state if his marking was done within the view of the appellant, or within
the view of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or
any elected public official. Secondly, both he and MADAC Operative
Castillo did not indicate if any media or DOJ representative or elected
public official had been present during the buy-bust operation and
when the drugs were recovered from the appellant at the scene of the
apprehension. The law unequivocally required such presence. Thirdly,
there was also no showing of any inventory of the confiscated items
being undertaken or prepared. The lack of the inventory was confirmed
by the absence of any certificate of inventory being formally offered as
evidence by the Prosecution.44 Lastly, the Prosecution did not produce
any photographs taken of the sachets of shabu immediately following
their seizure.
Where the State did not establish a preserved chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs according to the statutory procedure for doing so, we
have no need to review the claim of the appellant about her being
framed up on trumped-up charges. In view of the presumption of her
innocence, she did not need to explain her arrest for the crimes
charged against her. The presumption should be overcome only by
strong evidence of her guilt.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawl
x--x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
SO ORDERED.[1]
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate
court dated February 27, 1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's
motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, is as follows:
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of
money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta,
and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner
contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its
cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure
of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet
out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement
was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1 Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and
the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this
case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each
the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2
3 Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant
SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a
statement of account of even date which were both received by
the herein defendant; and
4
5 Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC
Chemical Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo
E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last
December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity
date on January 12, 1984.[2]
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the
defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the
liability.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of
SIHI.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which
the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF
ACTION AND OVERCAME IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
(2)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of
attorney's fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced
documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose
competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the
truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that
the same was in violation of Sections 36[3] and 48,[4] Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to
have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness
of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in
evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness
was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2,[5] Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of
private documents before the same can be received as evidence.
Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the
documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It
vehemently argues that such was in violation of the requirement of
Section 34,[6] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law
on the part of the appellate court to consider the same. Finally,
petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the
documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of
suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),[7] Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, to come into play.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear
several times on scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and
counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was
supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its
case. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an
error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said
testimony pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly
found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified
to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"[12] advance its
cause. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the
documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at
pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the
demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their
authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was
sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus
committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than
the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact
and law, which would bring the case within the exception and justify the
grant of the award.[13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial
court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorney's fees, the
same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records
shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorney's fees.
We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
BRION, J.:
The Facts
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
(Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed
by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.6 The
Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT
N o . 3 2 5 6 8 w a s i s s u e d i n t h e n a m e o f To m a s .
8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and
for value.11 Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas
claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the
title of the subject lot was authentic and in order.12 Furthermore, he
alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property was
annotated at the back of the title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to
Jose's complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.15 On the other hand, it
dismissed Tomas' complaint against the Register of Deeds since it was
only a nominal party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the
Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of Deeds and
discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been
transferred to Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged.21
Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose for
comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original
of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax
certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten
letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a
partial payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed
that the consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only
P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than
the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to
save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed
money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped
sending her money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in favor
of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The RTC
held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly
appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.
The CA Ruling
In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modified
the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate
damages; and second, by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse
Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the
principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid
P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no
convincing evidence that established this claim.
28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the
ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the
purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not supported
by the evidence formally offered before and admitted by the RTC.
Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration for
the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the
RTC.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Petition
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the
CA ruling which ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00 only,
instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of
P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale,
including the consideration stated, cannot be used as evidence since it
was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not
specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale;32third,
his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of P700,000.00
paid was uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full
amount actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.
34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from
questioning the purchase price indicated in the deed of dale for failing
to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of an
agreement reduced into writing are deemed to include all the terms
agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than the
terms of the agreement itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the
basis for the amount of consideration paid; and (2) whether the
testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of
the sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OUR RULING
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule
on "the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,"37 except in the following
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros
the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof of payment,
without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas'
bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to
be given weight and credence.
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by
positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property
without the spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the
possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The
admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal
policy of the court to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant
in resolving an issue before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for
the court to determine the presence of the essential elements of the
sale, including the consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to
prove the actual consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be
considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both
parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the purpose
of proving its execution and the regularity of the sale.
58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed
the; lower courts to consider the terms written therein to determine
whether all the essential elements59 for a valid contract of sale are
present, including the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale
was declared null and void does not prevent the court from relying on
consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount
paid by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual
consideration of the sale is not necessary since it is necessarily
included in determining the regular execution of the sale.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of
law requiring the consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal
property. There is, however, no question on the presence of the
consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount
paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it
remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid
to Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of
P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial
evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart
from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is self-
serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received
P700,000.00 for the subject property.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
x--x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL
GALLENO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
Let this DECISION serve as clear signal warning the perverts, the
misguided elements of our society, especially their lackadaisical
parents in their innate moral obligation and responsibility in educating
their children that in this corner of the world the wheels of justice is not
asleep and its unforgiving hands and watchful eyes are as vigilant as
ever.
Less than kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-
appellant, 19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well Evelyn's family due to
his frequent visits at the Obligars' abode as he was paying court to
Emetario's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work
at sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three
children had all ealier left for school. The only persons left in the house
were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the
sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his
attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn
Garganera, January 10, 1995; pp. 6-7, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The spouses
were laborers in a sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from
their house. They arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that
there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against
her genital organ. (pp. 11-12, tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9,
tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer.
Emetario spread the child's legs and saw that her vagina had been
lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom. He summoned a "quack"
doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyns's vagina but did not
stop the bleeding. (pp.12-14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the
clinic of Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon,
Capiz. Dr. Orosco reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1)
clotted blood, about 1 centimeter in diameter, in her vaginal opening,
and (2) a vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0 centimeter x o.5 centimeter,
between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock position. He also affirmed
that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument
inserted into the vigina, that it was possible that a human penis in full
erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and that a human
penis in full errection is considered a blunt intrument (pp. 4-7, tsn,
Orosco, November 28, 1994; p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat
Evelyn, Dr. Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which continued
to bleed, advised Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the
hospital for further medical treatment. (p.8, tsn, Orosco, November 28,
1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995)
10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Laada
opined that "a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the
vagina." (p. 9, tsn, Laada, January 4, 1995). According to Dr. Laada,
the vaginal laceration may be caused (1) by trauma to the area, when a
girl falls and hits her genital area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical
instrumentation, like the insertion of a speculum into the vagina; or (3)
by the insertion of blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger or a
penis of a man in full erection. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Laada, January 4, 1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emetario brought Evelyn back to the Roxas
Memorial General Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machael
Toledo, the resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and
minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo " pack(ed) the area to
prevent further bleeding and (he) admitted the patient for possible
repair of the laceration and blood transfusion because she has anaemia
2ndary to bleeding." Two hundred fifty five (255) cc of blood was
transfused to Evelyn and she was given antibiotics to prevent infection.
However, she was no longer operated on because the laceration had
healed. Five days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home with
medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo
disclosed that the child suffered severe compound laceration which
could have been caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a
man in a state of erection that was forcibly inserted into her vagina and
that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage which thus required
the transfusion of 255 cc of blood (pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn, Toledo,
December 2, 1994.
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense,
pointing out in its decision that accused-appellant's defense of denial
hinged on the argument that the statement of Evelyn as to how she
sustained her vaginal laceration was mere concoction and a plain
distortion of facts by her guardian. The trial court called this a
"desperate attempt of the defense to becloud the charge of rape."
The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police Officer
Paulino Durana that during the interrogation of Evelyn which he
conducted at the PNP Station of Maayon, Emeterio and Penicola
Obligar did not interfere with the responses of Evelyn, although, true
enough, it was difficult to obtain answer from her because of her tender
age.
The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in finding
accused-appellant culpable:
2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with her 3-
year old brother, in pain and bleeding.
One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape
victim, and more especially so for a 5-year old statutory rape victim.
However, in our consideration of the matter before us, we set aside
emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in drawing conclusions.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions
or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the
evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved (Francisco,
Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I. 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However,
conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and
are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either
because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or
because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, of for
other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
(Ibid., p.886).
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with
the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to
the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of
the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other
words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert
witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts
enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not
mean the trial court's interference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the
conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's
vagina (People vs. Caada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]). In rape, the
important consideration is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ (People vs.
Dadles, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is entirely probable that climax
on the part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of
pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.
Q Now, Doctor, at the time that you conducted your examination, you
were aware that this child was only five years old?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that tender age, Doctor, is it possible that the child may not
know the difference of distinction between fingers of the hands and a
finger protruding between the legs of a person?
WITNESS
PROSECUTOR OBIENDA
Yes.
WITNESS
It is possible.
(pp.42-43, Rollo.)
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or nor-existence." This simply means that relevancy is
determinable by the rules of logic and human experience (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p.434). There is no
precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the
determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at
the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the
teachings of logic and everyday experience (Sibal and Salazar,
Compendium on Evidence, 1995 ed., citing Alfred Asmore Pope
Foundation vs. New York, 138 A. 444, 106 Conn. 432).
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with long
fingernail) of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a
depth of one fourth of an inch. Admittedly, accused-appellant's right
hand held the child while his left hand supposedly held her in the
vagina area. Why would the hold the child's vagina if his only intention
was to frolic and kid around with her?
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work
against the credibility of accused-appellant's story on which his
defense is based.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q You said that Joeral Galleno the accused in this case hurt you while
you were in the farm, can you tell in the farm, can you tell the Honorable
Court which part of your body was hurt by Joeral Galleno?
WITNESS
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
COURT
Make the translation of "Pitoy" into Penis. Do you agree that the
translation of Pitoy is Penis in English?
ATTY. DISTURA
Agreeable, Your Honor.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q What did Joeral Galleno do with his Pitoy (Penis) to your vagina
(Putay)?
Q When Joeral Galleno inserted his penis (Pitoy) to your vagina (Putay),
that was the reason why it bleed?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q And you were brought to the Doctor and admitted to the hospital
because of that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now according to you, you were paid in the amount of Four Hundred
Pesos (P400.00) then you expected your Comareng Pening as financial
assistance to Evelyn Garganera, isn't it?
Q How long after August 19, 1994, that your Comareng Pening returned
to you the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A A week after when Evelyn had already checked up from the hospital.
Q It was given by you or as voluntary financial assistance, why did you
receive the amount or the payment returned to that amount of Four
Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A That was telling me that they refused already for the settlement of the
case.
Q And that is why they returned the amount of Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00).
The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year old Evelyn
Obligar Garganera may fortunately haunt her all her life. Justice may
not be able to save from this nightmare but it can calm and assure her
that her tormentor and abuser shall undoubtedly face retribution.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year following
that in which the tax credit arises. Hence, excess income taxes paid in
1995 that have not been applied to or used in 1996 may still be the
subject of a tax refund in 1997, provided that the claim for such refund
is filed with the internal revenue commissioner within two years after
payment of said taxes. As a caveat, the Court stresses that the
recognition of the entitlement to a tax refund does not necessarily mean
the automatic payment of the sum claimed in the final adjustment return
of the taxpayer. The amount of the claim must still be proven in the
normal course.
The Case
The Facts
Quoting the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the CA narrated the
antecedents as follows:
Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and third
quarters of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00,
respectively.
It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the year 1995, several of
its clients withheld taxes from their income payments to [p]etitioner and
remitted the same to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in the sum of
P3,159,687.00. Petitioner further alleged that due to its income/loss
positions for the three quarters of 1996, it was unable to use the excess
tax paid for and in its behalf by the withholding agents.
The Issue
Sec. 69. Final adjustment return. -- Every corporation liable to tax under
Section 24 shall file a final adjustment return covering the total taxable
income for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. If the sum of the
quarterly tax payments made during the said taxable year is not equal
to the total tax due on the entire taxable net income of that year the
corporation shall either:
(b) Be refunded the excess amount paid, as the case may be.
Tax Refund
Allowed by NIRC
First, a tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year
following that in which the tax credit arises.
No provision in our tax law limits the entitlement to such a refund, other
than the requirement that the filing of the administrative claim for it be
made by the taxpayer within a two-year prescriptive period. Section
204(3) of the NIRC states that no refund of taxes shall be allowed
unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner [the] claim for
x x x refund within two years after the payment of the tax.
(a) Claims for Tax Credit or Refund of income tax deducted and
withheld on income payments shall be given due course only when it is
shown on the return that the income payment received has been
declared as part of the gross income and the fact of withholding is
established by a copy of the Withholding Tax Statement duly issued by
the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax
withheld therefrom.
That petitioner filed its amended 1995 income tax return in 1996 is
uncontested. In addition, the resulting investigation by the BIR on
August 15, 1997, reveals that the income accounts were correctly
declared based on the existing supporting documents.[9] Therefore,
there is no need for petitioner to show again the income payments it
received in 1995 as part of its gross income in 1996.
That petitioner filed its 1996 final adjustment return in 1997 is the crux of
the controversy. However, as will be demonstrated shortly, the lack of
such a return will not defeat its entitlement to a refund.
Liberal Construction
of Rules
In the present case, the 1996 final adjustment return was attached as
Annex A to the Reply to Comment filed by petitioner with the CA.[22]
The return shows a negative amount for its taxable income that year.
Therefore, it could not have applied or used the excess tax credits of
1995 against its tax liabilities in 1996.
Judicial Notice
of Attached Return
Fifth, the CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final
adjustment return which had been attached in CTA Case No. 5799.
Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force.[23]
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the same court,
even when those cases were heard or are actually pending before the
same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference
to such records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing
parties:
Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was
already well-aware of the existence of another case pending before it,
involving the same subject matter, parties and causes of action.[25]
Because of the close connection of that case with the matter in
controversy, the CTA could have easily taken judicial notice[26] of the
contested document attached in that other case.
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of
matters x x x ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.[29] If the lower courts really believed that petitioner was not
entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily required respondent to
ascertain its veracity and accuracy[30] and to prove that petitioner did
not suffer any net loss in 1996.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a written claim for a tax
refund, and likewise failed to present its 1990 corporate annual income
tax return, it nonetheless offered in evidence its top-ranking officials
testimony and certification pertaining to only two taxable years (1989
and 1990). The said return was attached only to its Motion for
Reconsideration before the CTA.
In addition, the BIR in BPI-Family Savings Bank did not controvert the
veracity of the return or file an opposition to the Motion and the return.
Despite the fact that the return was ignored by both the CA and the
CTA, the latter even declared in another case (CTA Case No. 4897) that
petitioner had suffered a net loss for taxable year 1990. When attached
to the Petition for Review filed before this Court, that Decision was not at
all claimed by the BIR to be fraudulent or nonexistent. The Bureau
merely contended that this Court should not take judicial notice of the
said Decision.
In this case, however, the BIR has not been given the chance to
challenge the veracity of petitioners final adjustment return. Neither has
the CTA decided any other case categorically declaring a net loss for
petitioner in taxable year 1996. After this return was attached to
petitioners Reply to Comment before the CA, the appellate court should
have required the filing of other responsive pleadings from respondent,
as was necessary and proper for it to rule upon the return.
Finally, even in the absence of a final adjustment return or any claim for
a tax refund, respondent is authorized by law to examine any book,
paper, record or other data that may be relevant or material to such
inquiry.[42] Failure to make an assessment of petitioners proper tax
liability or to contest the return could be errors or omissions of
administrative officers that should never be allowed to jeopardize the
governments financial position.
Verily, the officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue should receive the
support of the courts when these officers attempt to perform in a
conscientious and lawful manner the duties imposed upon them by law.
[43] Only after it is shown that if something is received when there is no
right to demand it, and it was duly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises.[44]
SO ORDERED.
x--x
-versus-
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
y BELLO,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 173476
Present:
Promulgated:
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or
parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of
Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying
declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for
the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of
the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on
September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on November
24, 2005.[1]
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon
was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that
after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still
able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek
help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was
Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed
at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that
the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the
time.[2]
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two
(2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his
left arm encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use
of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons
death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but
corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who brought Bolanon
to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided
Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was
suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was
Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.[3]
SO ORDERED.[6]
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts
properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza
considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that
could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon
the truth.[14]
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A Yes, Sir.
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore
because he will just suffer more.
A He kept silent.
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the
residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by
Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to
the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the
hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter
had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of
the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing,
causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital,
Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such
circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying
declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court
has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death
and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a
dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.[18]
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-
mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who
had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious
of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest
and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in
breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few
minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the
stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief
in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his
wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician.[20] Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration
was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon
was the victim.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which
are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act.[22] In a general way, res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow
out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication.[23] The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.[24] The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected
with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.[25]
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only
the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs
of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because
the damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which
was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral
damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.[26]
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral
damages which were different from the death indemnity.[27] The death
indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate
and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.
[28] Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving
heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of
Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the
amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,[29] we are bound to award
despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental
anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on
human nature and experience having shown that:
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law
not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for
the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike
the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party
when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when
it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
RESOLUTION
Factual Antecedents
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto
Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of
the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the
body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors
who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one
Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing
to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI
Agent Dave Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on
February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby
Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and
Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45
caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told
Paredes that ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.12
Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14,
1997. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI
Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his
Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the
head and body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot
wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense.
Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence13 without leave of court. As
no action whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just
moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision.
In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged
petitioner guilty of murder, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.15
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision of
RTC as the latter erred:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on
the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay25 of Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that
the said sworn statement should not have been given probative value
because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the
affiant. Thus, all circumstances emanating from or included in the sworn
statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and
probative value. Petitioner emphasizes that as found by the courts
below, there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime; therefore,
he wants this Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence upon which his conviction was based as he believes that the
same failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent People of the Philippines, concurs with the petitioner and
recommends his acquittal.26 It is also of the view that the prosecution
failed to discharge its burden of proving petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Truly, direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis
from which a court may draw its finding of guilt.27 The rules of
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support
its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-
finder draws from the evidence established.28 Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict the offender if i) there is more than one circumstance; ii) the
facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.29 All the circumstances must be
consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
30cralawred
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15,
1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a
red car; and
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of
Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of
conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4,
Rule 13332 of the Rules of Court. The central issue now confronting
this Court is whether the prosecution has amply proved by
circumstantial evidence petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case
in the light of the standards discussed above and finds the foregoing
circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction.
Several reasons deserve our acceptance of the circumstances upon
which petitioners conviction was based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and
reduced the latters statement into writing declaring, among others, that
in the morning of December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner
telling Sotero Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon and
saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively,
before boarding a red car. The CA gave weight to Reyes sworn
statement in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he
was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes)
heard petitioner telling Sotero Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang
si Berbon and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a
.45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that
NBI Agent Segunials testimony was not presented to prove the truth of
such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on
February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such
narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness oral
testimony.36 Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted
that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes statement.
37 Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact
that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent
Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where
what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the
truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of
the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not
apply.38 Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized
document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of
this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,39 a
notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did
not err in its appreciation of Reyes sworn statement as testified to by
NBI Agent Segunial.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the
gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was
identified as the same car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-
mortem examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the
victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were
caused by high-powered guns, served as corroborative evidence and
contributed in a significant way in establishing the level of proof that the
law requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioners escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the
case was pending can also be considered as another circumstance
since it is a strong indication of his guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative
effect of the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were
the same circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate
court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken
together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the
conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of
homicide in view of the prosecutions failure to prove any of the alleged
attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime.
As aptly observed by the appellate court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of earning
capacity and rightly so. Though Sabina testified as to the monthly
salary of the deceased, the same remains unsubstantiated. Such
indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence
except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.44 The exceptions find no application in this case.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
PEREZ, J.:
That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or prior thereto, in the
City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with and abetting one another, with intent to
gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a
Isuzu Highlander car, colored Forest Green, with Plate No. UUT-838 of
one MARIO MAGDATO, valued at FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) Philippine Currency, owned by and belonging to said
MARIO MAGDATO, against his will and consent and to his damage and
prejudice in the aforestated amount of P500,000.00, and on the
occasion of the carnapping, did assault and use personal violence
upon the person of one MARIO MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the
latter with an unlicensed firearm, a Norinco cal. 9mm Pistol with Serial
No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the head
which caused his death.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial
proceeded against him. His two co-accused remain at large.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley),
Senior Police Officer 2 Fernando Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and Dr. Jun
Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion).
Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the
cause of his death. He stated that the victim sustained one (1) gunshot
wound in the head, the entrance of which is at the right temporal area
exiting at the opposite side. The victim also had several abrasions on
the right upper eyelid, the tip of the nose and around the right eye. He
also had blisters on his cheek area which could have been caused by a
lighted cigarette.7
In the service of the sentence, accused shall be credited with the full
time of his preventive detention if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to
abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners
pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Mario Magdato
the sum of Php50,000.00 as death indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral
damages, and Php672,000.00 as loss of earning capacity.
14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2010.15
The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the
fact of the victim's disappearance, the discovery of his death and the
details surrounding accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the
vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres is absolutely no
evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle
had been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the
author of the same.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not
be treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the
provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the
Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule
provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of
the accused.30
The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that
the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of
accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution
and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the
defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation
or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish
the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even
to a reasonable probability.31
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity
and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of
the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet
this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its
mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent
man for the rest of his life.32 The constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.33
SO ORDERED.
x--x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Contrary to law.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 5, 2005, Franco, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had
indeed lost his cell phone at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses
could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym,
having left only at around 2:45 p.m.11 He also admitted to have taken a
cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.
12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In its Decision dated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of
theft, the dispositive portion of which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds [Franco], GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft penalized in paragraph I
of Article 309 in relation to Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to seven (7) years and four
(4) months as maximum and to pay the complainant Php 18,500.00.
SO ORDERED.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC did not find Franco's defense credible and ruled that his
denial cannot be given evidentiary value over the positive testimony of
Rosario.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the CA
In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to
have been duly established. It relied heavily on the "positive testimony"
of Rosario who declared to have seen Franco take a cap and a cell
phone from the altar. The CA likewise gave credence to the testimony of
Ramos who confirmed that it was only Franco who left the gym
immediately before Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was
missing. Ramos also presented the logbook and affirmed having put an
asterisk opposite the name "ELMER," which was entered by the
accused upon logging in. The CA stated that taken together, the
foregoing circumstances are sufficient to support a moral conviction
that Franco is guilty, and at the same time, inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent.16 The CA further ruled that the RTC
cannot be faulted for giving more weight to the testimony of
Nakamoto17 and Rosario,18 considering that Franco failed to show that
they were impelled by an ill or improper motive to falsely testify against
him.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his petition for review, Franco presented the following issues for
resolution, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.
II.
III.
The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on
the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the
defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy
the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
o v e rc o m e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p re s u m p t i o n o f i n n o c e n c e .
23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of
the crime of theft are: (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent to
gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation
against person or force upon things.25cralawred
The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (1) that the property
was lost by the owner; and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.26 In
this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution has presented
proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the corpus delicti of the
crime. In affirming Franco's conviction, the CA ruled that the elements
were established. Moreover, the RTC and the CA apparently relied
heavily on circumstantial evidence.
For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell
phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot be
considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.
33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and time out
at the gym was based was not identified during the trial and was only
produced after Ramos testified.47 Ramos testified that when Nakamoto
announced that his cell phone was missing and asked that nobody
leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the
logbook to indicate that he was the only one who left the gym after the
cell phone was declared lost.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony of
Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and
authenticated during the course of Ramos' testimony. At the time when
Ramos was testifying, he merely referred to the log in and log out time
and the name of the person at page 104 of the logbook that appears on
line 22 of the entries for November 3, 2004. This was photocopied and
marked as Exhibit "C-1."51 Meanwhile, when Nakamoto was presented
as rebuttal witness, a page from the logbook was again marked as
Exhibit "D."52 The logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos
was neither identified nor confirmed by him as the same logbook which
he used to log the ins and outs of the gym users, or that the writing and
notations on said logbook was his.
The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not
rely on the weakness of the defense.59 In this case, Franco did not
deny that he was at the Body Shape Gym on November 3, 2004, at
around 1:00 p.m. and left the place at around 2:45 p.m.60 He did not
even deny that he took a cell phone from the altar together with his cap.
What he denied is that he took Nakamoto's cell phone and instead,
claimed that what he took is his own cell phone.61 Denial may be weak
but courts should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are
situations where an accused may really have no other defenses but
denial, which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice
in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak.
62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While it is true that denial partakes of the nature of negative and self-
serving evidence and is seldom given weight in law,63 the Court admits
an exception established by jurisprudence that the defense of denial
assumes: significance when the prosecution's evidence is such that it
does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.64 The exception
applies in the case at hand. The prosecution failed to produce sufficient
evidence to overturn the constitutional guarantee that Franco is
presumed to be innocent.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is also argued by Franco that the value of the cell phone must be duly
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. On the other hand, the
people contended that there has been a judicial admission of the same.
65 This issue, however, is now moot and academic considering
Franco's acquittal.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conclusion
No costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
x--x
- versus -
Present:
Promulgated:
DECISION
Quantities given above are only approximate and payments of the work
shall be based on the quantities actually accomplished and completed
which shall be measured and determine[d] accurately and shall be
accepted by the Municipal Mayor.[1]
That all the above works were awarded to Mr. Leon Acapen for P112,
600.00;
That for Item 105-1 there was no accomplishment and for Item 105-11
there was only 365 cu.m. actually accomplished;
That the contract was certified 100% accomplished and was fully paid
for P112,600.00, the full amount of the contract.[3]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
All the accused in both cases were arraigned a second time on August
9, 1993, except accused Wandag who took flight to the United States.
All pleaded not guilty.
All the accused were acquitted in Crim. Case No. 17007 but
convicted in Crim. Case No. 17008 excluding Leon
SO ORDERED.[7]
Our Ruling
xxxx
xxxx
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastic minister.The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The elements of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 of the RPC
are: (1) the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations
as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business, or imaginary transactions; (2) such false pretenses or
fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud; (3) such false pretenses or fraudulent
representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended
party to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.[17]
Based on our earlier discussion, the facts and the circumstances earlier
mentioned when strung together duly prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Mangangey did not inspect the road project. He could not say
where the starting point of the subject project was when he was
supposed to have inspected it. He certified that the subject project was
completed exactly to the approximate volume of excavated earth
without making any measurements of the earthworks accomplished.
Forayo and Wanason willfully signed the Certificate of Inspection and
Acceptance, and certified that they personally inspected the road when
in fact they did not as admitted in their counter-affidavits during the
preliminary investigation. Wandag took flighta sign of guilt.
In addition, it has not been shown that Forayo and Wanason were under
duress when they signed the falsified documents nor that any of their
constitutional rights have been violated when they made their
declarations in their counter-affidavits. Both Forayo and Wanason did
not dispute the finding that Mangangey did not inspect the road
project. They instead only gave separate excuses on why they signed
the certificate. Also, the non-presentation of the investigating officer
who conducted the preliminary investigation to testify on the admissions
is insignificant as this would only be corroborative. Although petitioners
vehemently deny receiving money from Wandag as their share in the
loot, this information is of no moment. The concerted acts of the co-
conspirators resulted in the processing and release of the payment for
an unfinished road to the disadvantage and damage to the
government. All these circumstances are based on facts proven by the
prosecution, pointing to Wandag and petitioners as conspiring to
defraud the Government. Finally, we do not agree with petitioners that
as lowly employees, they were only prevailed upon by Wandag. As
succinctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, if indeed there was duress,
this duress is not the exempting circumstance of irresistible force in Art.
12, par. 5 of the RPC sufficient to exculpate petitioners. A moral choice
was available to them.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated October 25, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00638-MIN, which affirmed the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch
16, finding Zaldy Salahuddin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 20664.
Use of motorcycle to facilitate not only the commission of the crime but
also the escape of the accused from the scene of the crime.
Appellant was also charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No.
20665 for having fatally wounded Liezel Mae Java, the niece of the
victim, during the same shooting incident. Since Java was alleged in
the Information to be a minor, the said case was transferred to Branch
15 of the RTC of Zamboanga City, which is the only designated family
court in the city.
While Liezel's head was touching the abdomen of her uncle, she was
crying and calling out his name. A few minutes later, rescuers arrived.
Liezel and Alty. Segundo, with the use of tricycles, were brought to
Western Mindanao Medical Center (WMMC).
After the motorcycle left, Delos Reyes called two tricycles in the
highway to bring (he wounded victims to the hospital. After the tricycles
left, three (3) policemen from Sta. Maria Police Station arrived. Delos
Reyes right away contacted the manager of WW Security Agency, Mr.
Will redo Manlangit and told him about the incident. When the police
officers were already in the crime scene, Delos Reyes told them that he
still cannot relay everything that happened for he was still in a state of
shock. It was his first time to see such an incident.
Atty. Wendell Sotto, the son of the victim, on the dale of the incident,
came from the law office and went home to their house at farmer's Drive
ten (10) minutes after the victim and his niece left the office. When Atty.
Wendell was about to turn right to farmer's Drive, he saw his lather's
jeep stalled at the left side of the said street. Upon seeing his father's
jeep, he stopped his car and saw his father already slouching on the
steering wheel of the jeep and his cousin slouching on his father's side.
He noticed that his father was already full of blood. He went to the left
side of the jeep, tried to pull his father out and shouted for help. Atty.
Wendell brought his lather to the Operating Room of WMMC. Dr. Lim
and Dr. Melvin Talaver attended to the victim, but they pronounced the
victim to be dead on arrival.
Dr. Melvin Sotto Talaver, the one who assisted Dr. Lim in the examination
of the cadaver testified that on February 10, 2004, at around 5:30 in the
afternoon, he was at home, taking a rest from his duty. At around 6
o'clock, he was called by a staff of the Emergency Room of WMMC
informing him about what happened to his relative, Atty. Segundo.
Immediately thereafter, he went to the hospital. When he arrived there,
Dr. Lim already declared the patient to be dead. After that
announcement, the deceased was transferred to a smaller room. Dr.
"Palaver and Dr. Lim examined the body and made the recording of the
entry and exit wounds. Dr. Talaver witnessed how Dr. Lim used a sketch
of the human body, front and back, to document her findings.
On April 1, 2004, NBI agents, about ten (10) of them, together with
Delos Reyes, disguised themselves as campaigners of the late
Fernando Poe Jr. During that time, accused was spotted in a shop
talking to two (2) women agents. Agent Minguez asked confirmation
from Delos Reyes if the person in the sketch was the same person that
they saw in the shop. Thereafter, the agents backed out, Minguez went
to the NBI Office and prepared into writing the surveillance that was
conducted.
On April 22, 2004, NBI filed the case with the Office of the City
Prosecutor. Thereafter, a warrant of arrest was issued. On July 22, 2004,
Minguez. and some of the NBI agents served the warrant at Barangay
Vitali and arrested the accused. Upon his arrest, the agents recovered
a .45 caliber firearm from the accused.
On the next day, Agent Minguez invited Delos Reyes and Liezel Mae to
identify if the person that they arrested was the same person whom they
saw kill the victim. Both [eyewitnesses] positively identified the person
to be the gunman.
Mrs. Gloria Sotto, the wife of the deceased, testified that at the time of
the incident, she was at home. She came to know about what
happened to her husband when her neighbors came shouting that Atty.
Segundo was shot outside. She trembled and her children cried, but
still she managed to go to the crime scene, and found that her husband
was no longer there. She immediately went to the hospital and saw her
husband already dead. The body of the victim was released at around
7:30 to 8 o'clock on that same night. The body of her husband was
made to lie at La Merced Memorial Homes for nine (9) days and was
buried at Forest Lake.
As summarized by the CA, the facts established by the evidence for the
defense are as follows:
The accused, on the other hand, interposed the defense of denial, lie
averred that on February 10, 2004, he was on duty as a Barangay
Tanod, together with Jauhari Hussin, a Barangay Kagawad. On that
day, he reported for duty at 7 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in
the afternoon, and stayed, during the whole day, in the barangay hall,
and in some instances at the nearby elementary school. Alter 5 o'clock
P.M. of that day, he passed by the house of Barangay Chairman, Sarabi
Hussin, the brother of the above-named Kagawad. Fie stayed there and
had a long conversation with the Barangay Chief and went home at
around 9 o'clock in the evening. He claimed that he does not know
about any participation in the killing of Atty. Segundo. During the time of
the incident, accused insisted that he was at the house of the Barangay
Captain for the latter did not go to the Barangay Hall.
SO ORDERED.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court found that two (2) eyewitnesses positively and
categorically identified appellant as the gunman who shot Atty.
Segundo and Java at around 6:00 p.m. on February 1.0, 2004 at
Farmer's Drive, Sta. Maria, Zamboanga City. The trial court stressed
that Java could not have been mistaken in identifying appellant as the
gunman as he was just a meter away when he shot Atty. Segundo,
while Juanchito Delos Reyes, a security guard on-duty at an
establishment near the crime scene, also positively identified appellant
as the gunman, and could not be mistaken as to the latter's identity
because they had an eye-to-cye contact for about 5 seconds at a
distance of 6 meters. The trial court added that the testimonies of the
defense witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions, and were incredible when ranged against the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have
any improper motive to falsely testify against appellant.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA found that Java, Atty. Segundo's niece, positively identified
appellant as the gunman, as it was not yet dark and she was just about
1 meter away from him, while Delos Reyes, a security guard at a nearby
establishment, was about 4 to 6 meters away from the crime scene
when he aimed his service firearm at the appellant who, in turn, made a
hand sign at him not to interfere. The CA ruled that appellant failed to
present convincing evidence that he was indeed at the barangay hall
the whole day of February 10, 2004, and that his defenses were
anchored on the testimonies of the Barangay Chairman, Kagawad and
Secretary, which were all inconsistent from his very own testimony. Even
if appellant's denial and alibi were corroborated by said defense
witnesses, the CA rejected such defenses as unworthy of belief and
credence, as they were established mainly by appellant himself, his
friends and comrades-in-arms. The CA also found that it was not
physically impossible for appellant to be present at the crime scene
because the barangay hall where he supposedly stayed the whole day
was just about 44 kilometers away and can be reached within a travel
time of about 1 hour and 30 minutes.
Prosecution witnesses Java and Delos Reyes were clear and consistent
in the identification of appellant as the one who fatally shot Atty.
Segundo several times. As aptly held by the CA:
In the case at bar, eyewitnesses Liezel Mae Java and Juanchito Delos
Reyes positively and categorically identified the accused-appellant to
be the assailant of the murder (sic). Liezel Mae Java, in her testimony,
stated that she was one hundred percent (100%) sure that the
accused-appellant was the man who shot her uncle. She could not
forget the man because even if it was around 6 o'clock in the evening it
was not yet totally dark and she was only about one meter from the
accused. Juanchito Delos Reyes also declared that he was about lour
(4) to six (6) meters away from the scene of the crime and he saw the
accused making a sign at him, by the time he aimed his gun at die
assailant. These direct, straightforward and positive testimonies of the
aforesaid witnesses pointing to the accused appellant as the gunman
created strong and credible evidence against him, thus no weight can
be given to the alibi of the accused.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Murder is defined under Article 24810 of the Revised Penal Code as the
unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.
11 The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.12 Two conditions
must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of
means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.13 In People v. Biglete,14 the
Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, the victim had no inkling of any harm that would befall him
that fateful night of August 27, 2001. He was merely plying his regular
[jeepney] route. He was unarmed. The attack was swift and
unexpected. The victim's arms were on the steering wheel; his focus
and attention on the traffic before him. All these showed that the victim
was not forewarned of any danger; he also had no opportunity to offer
any resistance or to defend himself from any attack.
15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty.
Segundo was attended by treachery because appellant shot the said
victim suddenly and without any warning with a deadly weapon, thus:
x x x Atty. Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who was driving his jeep with his
teenage niece as passenger sitting on his right side on the front seat,
was totally unaware that he will be treacherously shot just 200 meters
away from his residence. He was unarmed and was not given any
opportunity to defend himself or to escape from the deadly assault.
After he was hit when the gunman fired the first two shots at him and his
niece and after he lost control of his jeep which bumped an interlink
wire fence and stopped, he was again shot three times by the gunman.
x x x16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.17 For it to be
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.18
As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court
conceded that the specific time when the accused determined to
commit the crime, and the interval between such determination and
execution, cannot be determined.19 After a careful review of the
records, the Court agrees with the CA's finding that no evidence was
adduced to prove the first and third elements of evident premeditation.
On the one hand, Barangay Chairman Sarabi Hussin testified that he,
together with appellant, reported for work at the Barangay Hall of Dita
on February 10, 2004 at 7 o'clock in the morning and left at 5 o'clock in
the afternoon, and that he let appellant drive his motorcycle from his
home, to the barangay hall, and back.24 Despite his insistence that he
signed the attendance logbook on February 10, 2004, Sarabi later
admitted that his signature does not appear thereon.25 On the other
hand, appellant testified that Sarabi did not report for work that day,
and that aside from himself, the two (2) other persons at the Barangay
Hall that day were Barangay Kagawad Jauhari Hussin and Barangay
Secretary Sairaya Temong.26 Appellant added that after 5 o'clock in the
afternoon of February 10, 2004, his companion in going home was
Barangay Kagawad Jauhari, and not Sarabi.
hi People v. Dulay,31 the Court ruled that the existence of the firearm
can be established by testimony even without the presentation of the
firearm. In the said case, it was established that the victims sustained
and died from gunshot wounds, and the ballistic examinations of the
slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were
fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution
witnesses positively identified appellant therein as one of those who
were holding a long firearm, and it was also proven that he was not a
licensed firearm holder. Hence, the trial court and the CA correctly
appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating
circumstance.
Despite the result of the ballistic examination that the slugs test-fired
from the gun recovered from appellant when he was arrested, were
different from the 2 slugs recovered from the body of the victim, the
prosecution was still able to establish the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of the
crime. Given that the actual firearm used by appellant in shooting the
victim was not presented in court, the prosecution has nonetheless
proven through the testimony of Delos Reyes that the firearm used by
appellant was a "short gun."34 It has also established through the
testimony of SPO3 Ronnie Eleuterio and the Certification35 from the
FESAGS of the PNP that appellant was not issued a firearms license, a
permit to carry or permit to transport firearms outside of residence.
Since the fatal shooting of the victim was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the Court upholds the trial court in
convicting appellant of the crime of murder. The penalty for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is
attended by one aggravating circumstance. Although evident
premeditation was not established, the other aggravating
circumstances of use of unlicensed firearm and use of motor vehicle in
the commission thereof, were alleged in the Information and proven
during the trial. The presence of such aggravating circumstances
warrants the imposition of the death penalty. However, in view of the
enactment of RA No. 9346,42 the death penalty should be reduced to
reclusion perpetua "without eligibility for parole1' pursuant to A.M. No.
15-08-02-SC.43
Anent the civil liability of appellant, the award of actual damages in the
amount of P197,548.25 is in order because the victim's spouse, Gloria
Sotto, had testified that funeral expenses were incurred and they were
duly supported by official receipts.44
Even if the testimony of Gloria Sotto, the victim's spouse, was not
disputed by the defense, the prosecution failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove the victim's monthly income. Thus, the
Court disagrees with the trial court in awarding P4,398,000.00 as
compensation for loss of earning capacity based on the
unsubstantiated testimony of Gloria that her husband had a good law
practice and earned at least P50,000.00 a month or P600,000.00, as
one of the prominent law practitioners in Zamboanga City with almost
daily appearance in court. Be that as it may, in light of settled
jurisprudence and of Gloria's undisputed testimony, the Court finds it
reasonable to award P1,000,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages for loss of earning capacity. As held in Tan, el al. v.
OMC Carrier, Inc., et al.:52
In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly
established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of
the injured party's actual income.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Case
Antecedents
This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe (Lino) between
9:00 and 10:00 oclock in the evening of April 3, 1997 at Jabson Street
in Acacia, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. The stabbing was preceded by a
fight during a basketball game between Ross Mulinyawe, Linos son,
and Ronald Medina, the younger brother of Ricardo and Randolf. In that
fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone. Hearing about the
involvement of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to the scene and
sent Ronald home. Ross was brought to the hospital for treatment.
Once Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by
one of the Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas
accompanied by his drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet Menes. He
had a bread knife tucked in the back, but his companions were
unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf whom he
confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument.
Although Randolf tried to explain what had really happened between
Ross and Ronald, Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latters
hand. Tapan almost simultaneously punched Randolf in the face. Lino,
already holding the knife in his right hand, swung the knife at Randolf
who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards the store and took two
empty bottles of beer, broke the bottles and attacked Lino with them.
Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was happening, and
confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered
their house to get a kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at
Ricardo but failed to hit the latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left side
of his chest, near the region of the heart. Lino fell face down on the
ground. After that, Ricardo walked away, while Randolf threw the
broken bottles at the fallen Lino.
(2) Abrasion, left parietal region, measuring 1.2 by 0.6 cm, 8 cm from
the anterior midline.
(3) Abrasion left maxillary region, measuring 2 by 0.3, 4.5 cm, from the
anterior midline.
(4) Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm
from the anterior line, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards,
downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space,
piercing the pericardial sac and left ventricle.
On April 4, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City charged
Randolf with homicide.4 The information was amended with leave of
court to include Ricardo as a coconspirator, alleging thusly:
On or about April 3, 1997 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together
and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and employ personal violence upon the person of Lino M.
Mulinyawe, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wound, which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
The Defense claimed that it was Lino who had attacked Ricardo with a
knife, and that Lino had accidentally stabbed himself by falling
frontward and into his own knife.
The fatal wound of the deceased is: stab wound, left mamary [sic]
region, measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm from the anterior midline, 12
cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards, and medialwards, thru
the 4th left intercostal space, piercing the pericardial sac and left
ventricle. (See Exh. J).
Randolf Medina testified that Lino Mulinyawe attacked him with a knife
held with his right hand. The trajectory of the stab wound sustained by
Lino Mulinyawe at his left mammary region as shown by the Medico
Legal Report and Medico Legal Examination on the cadaver of the
deceased (Exhs. J and L) is incompatible and inconsistent with the
defense of the accused that when Mulinyawe was making a thrust, he
fell frontward and accidentally stabbed himself. If the knife was held
with the right hand of Lino Mulinyawe, the stab wound would not have
been from the anterior midline, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards,
downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space,
piercing the pericardial sac and left ventricle. The trajectory of the stab
wound would have been leftward and upward the body of the
deceased if he really fell frontward upon it.7 (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Decision of the CA
SO ORDERED.
After his motion for reconsideration was denied on November 21,
2003,10 Ricardo appealed to the Court.
Issues
II
IV
First of all, Ricardo argues that his stabbing and inflicting of the fatal
wound on Lino were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial courts factual
findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation.12 This is
because the trial courts determination proceeds from its firsthand
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct
and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in
the unique position to assess the witnesses credibility and to
appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.13 But here Ricardo
has not projected any strong and compelling reasons to sway the Court
into rejecting or revising such factual findings and evaluation in his
favor.
Secondly, Ricardo contends that the State did not present as evidence
in court the two knives wielded by him and Lino despite repeated
demands for their presentation; that had the knives been presented, it
could have been demonstrated to the trial court that the smaller knife
used by Lino had more blood stains than the knife held by him and
would fit the size of the mortal wound; that his assertion that Lino had
stabbed himself when he stumbled and lost his balance while swinging
his knife at Randolf would have been thereby validated; and that in his
testimony, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
Southern Police District, did not rule out the possibility that the wounds
sustained by Lino were selfinflicted.
To start with, the following findings of the CA indicate that the evidence
supporting the conviction for homicide was already overwhelming even
without the presentation of the knife held by the victim, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review for its lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 7, 2003 in all
respects, subject to the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity is
increased to P75,000.00; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
x--x
CRUZ, J.:
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the
accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but
carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a
secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered
when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of
the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the
watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full
name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently
proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's
conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up
because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible
Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under
detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free
since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been
allowed for his release.
A Yes, sir.
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have
already reports of the particular operation which was being participated
by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence
report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before
June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities
of Idel Aminnudin
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin
was coming?
COURT:
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do
not need a search warrant anymore?
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest
of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that
they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called
"buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the
act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so
or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when
the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the
free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself.
x--x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a
bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU
contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing
approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine
and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the necessary
license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine
and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa St.,
Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date which is covered by
an election period, without first securing the written permission or
authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the
COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the
Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus,
the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5
Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu
to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as
talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that
they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a
scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May
1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria
Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to
look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men
then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under
surveillance.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion,
accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file
his intended Demurrer to Evidence.9 On 19 December 1996, the
prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its
case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards
the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No.
96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No.
96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
SO ORDERED.
X X X I N H O L D I N G T H AT T H E U N D I S P U T E D FA C T S A N D
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND
THEREIN.
ll
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED
AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course
to the petition, required the public and private respondents to comment
thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent Wang filed his
comment17on 18 August 1997.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may
appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs demurrer to evidence
and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether
there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in
this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed
directly with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court
raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a
notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this
Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory
privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by
law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule 122 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the
right of the People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly
made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double
jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole
records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is
why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the
accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule
122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People
from judgments of acquittal.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its
aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics
and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the
world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial
system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal
Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due
process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign
people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of
law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the
non-trial of the century and that the predetermined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis
for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds
demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People v. Uy,
23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the two
separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both
with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges
of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for
certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By
way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal
orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This
may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal
is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated.
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that
the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than
sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period
shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil
action of certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do,
when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed
by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits
as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the
warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that
warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.26
However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure
which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a
crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto27
without need for a warrant of arrest.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to
another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused
was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa
Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused
was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither
was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he
had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm
Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was
concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun
was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication
of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done
by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and
knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor
did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal.
9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car. The
contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of
shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was
underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no
information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car,
or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers
searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected
the arrest of the accused?
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that
time?
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you
do with that?
A. Yes, Sir.
A. Yes, Sir.
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is
an employee of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence
Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence Wang to
shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
A. Yes, Sir.
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was
searched, is it not?
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search
were made, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search
warrant, is it not?
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the
accused, please tell us the antecedent circumstances which led you to
recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3)
persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio
Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the name of the source.
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio. We let them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the
cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu.
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble
and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to
the source of the shabu?
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that
morning.
COURT: When?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead
us to Maria Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake out which
lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him
opening his car together with his driver.
A. Probably, Sir.
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was
a shabu inside the compartment of the car.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did
you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car,
what did you do with that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while
I was the one who inspected and opened the compartment of the car
and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996).
A: Yes, Sir.
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu
were confiscated from them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were
able to discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source
of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men that you
have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also
investigated by your team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you
confiscated from them at the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that
they were working for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another
delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17?
The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know
whether he was carrying a gun?
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in
possession of the gun is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt.
Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing
anything else?
A: None, Sir.
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent
your team from searching his car?
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the
arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a
lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any
and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now
posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the
seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms
in the accuseds possession had been validly made upon probable
cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of
the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been
made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante
delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and
lawful."28 In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless
search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an
exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid
search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the
private respondent to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was
carrying illegal drugs.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not
manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police.
He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about
to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him,
frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his
friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information"
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.30
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c)
of Section 5.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are
supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights
of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the
loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to
enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.34
SO ORDERED.
x--x
G.R. No. 196784
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
That in or about and sometime during the period from September, 2005
up to February 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
representing herself to have capacity to contract, enlist, transport and
refer workers for employment abroad, did then and there, without any
license or authority, recruit for overseas employment and for a fee, the
following complainants, to wit:
MONICA B. HIMAN
GLADYSZ. REMORENTO
JOEY P. BACOLOD
LEYNARD B. TUTANES
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
CONTRARYTOLAW.3
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
6) That in or about and sometime during the month of February, 2006, in
the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenarned accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, defraud complainant AUGUSTO
CEZAR GARCES y ALIMAGNO in the following manners, to wit: the said
accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations made prior and simultaneously with the commission of
fraud, to the effect that she have the capacity to deploy complainant for
overseas employment and could facilitate the necessary papers, in
connection therewith if given the necessary amount and by means of
other deceit of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing
complainant to give and deliver and, in fact, the complainant gave and
delivered to said accused the total amount of Php20,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestation and representation which turned out to
be false, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" and after trial on the merits, the
RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged except for one charge of estafa which was provisionally
dismissed by the RTC, upon motion of accused-appellant, without
prejudice to reinstatement considering that the subpoena sent to
complainant Monica B. Himan had not been duly served upon her
person. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the case is now before this Court after accused-appellant filed
her Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2010.12
I.
II
All the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are
present, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; (2) the offender undertakes any of the activities
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13
(b)14 of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and (3)
the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group. More importantly, all the said elements have
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, as ruled by the CA:
In like manner, the second and third elements also obtain in this case.
On separate occasions and under different premises, appellant met
with and herself recruited the private complainants, six (6) in number,
giving them the impression that she had the capability to facilitate
applications for employment as factory workers in Japan. All these
complainants testified that appellant had promised them employment
for a lee amounting to P20,000.00. Their testimonies corroborate each
other on material points, such as the amount exacted by appellant as
placement fee, the country of destination, the training that they had to
undergo to qualify for employment and the submission of documentary
requirements needed for the same. The private complainants were
positive and categorical in testifying that they personally met the
appellant and that she asked for, among others, the payment of
placement fees in consideration for the promised employment in Japan.
15
Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.1avvphi1 As
is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the
accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the
crime.16 Based on the factual findings of the RTC, the combined and
corroborative testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show that
it was appellant herself who informed them of the existence of the job
vacancies in Japan and of the requirements needed for the processing
of their applications. It was properly established that it was accused-
appellant who accompanied the private complainants to undergo
training and seminar conducted by a person who represented himself
as connected with the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA). Evidence was also presented that the private
complainants, relying completely on accused-appellant's
representations, entrusted their money to her. Finally, since there were
six (6) victims, the RTC therefore did not commit any error in convicting
accused-appellant of the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.
This Court is also in agreement with the ruling of the CA that accused-
appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a)
or the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is settled that a person may
be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under R.A.
8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)
of the Revised Penal Code.17 The elements of estqfa are: (a) that the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.18 As aptly
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, accused-appellant
defrauded the private complainants into believing that she had the
authority and capability to send them for overseas employment in
Japan and because of such assurances, private complainants each
parted with P20,000.00 in exchange for said promise of future work
abroad. Still, accused--appellant's promise never materialized, thus,
private complainants suffered damages to the extent of the sum of
money that they had delivered to accused-appellant.
To reiterate, settled is the rule that the findings and conclusion or the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
because the trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor
of witnesses as they testify.19 The determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this
case, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect.20
Anent the CA's modification as to the penalty imposed, this Court finds
no reason for its correction. The trial court imposed the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years,
as maximum, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, whereas
the proper penalty should have been life imprisonment, as provided
under Section 7 (b) of R.A. 8042. As ruled by the CA:
Be that as it may, this Court finds reversible error on the part of the trial
court respecting the penalty imposed on the appellant for the crime or
large scale illegal recruitment. Under the last paragraph of Section 6 or
R.A. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz., committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group. In the present case,
six (6) private complainants testified against appellant's acts of illegal
recruitment, thereby rendering her acts tantamount to economic
sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. 8042, the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than
P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The eldest of six (6) children, AAA,3 was born on February 17, 1988, as
evidenced by her certificate of live birth.4 She was 12 years old when
her father, accused-appellant, first raped her.
One afternoon in October 2000, AAA was washing dishes inside their
house. She was alone with her father, as her mother was at the
marketplace selling vegetables while her siblings were playing outside
the house. All of a sudden, accused-appellant grabbed her and forcibly
removed her short pants and her panty. After removing his short pants,
accused appellant pushed AAA and made her lie down on their
"papag". Thereafter, he boxed AAA's face twice and threatened to kill
her mother and siblings. He then placed himself on top of AAA and
made pumping motions while covering her mouth and pulling her hair.
AAA felt pain and cried as accused-appellant's sex organ penetrated
hers. After gratifying himself, accused-appellant put on his clothes, sat
beside AAA and told her to stop crying. AAA did not relate this incident
to her mother for fear that accused-appellant would make good his
threat to harm her mother and siblings.
AAA was finally able to report her rape to the police when her mother
filed a complaint against accused-appellant, on April 3, 2003, for
allegedly mauling her. Taking advantage of this opportunity, AAA
related her misfortune to the authorities.
SO ORDERED.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of AAA and held
that accused-appellant's mere denial without any corroborative
evidence leaves the court without any option but to convict him.
SO ORDERED.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On July 5, 2012, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal11 manifesting his intention to appeal the CA Decision to this
Court.
In its Resolution12 dated August 16, 2012, the CA gave due course to
accused-appellant's Notice of Appeal and directed its Judicial Records
Division to elevate the records of the case to this Court.
xxxx
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has
alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
qualified rape. This court sees no reason to depart from the findings of
the lower courts. As correctly held by the CA, AAA's recollection of the
heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward. She was able
to positively identify the accused-appellant as her sexual assailant.
While there are minor inconsistencies, her testimony was given in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded respect if not conclusive effect.17 This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court.18 When the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First, the Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that
AAA's inconsistent testimony with respect to the places where she was
raped in 2000 and 2002 bears heavily against her credibility. With
respect to the first rape, accused-appellant argues that AAA's
testimony that the crime was committed in 2000 in their house in Bacog,
Navotas could not be true because, during that time, they were still
residing somewhere in Kadiwa, Navotas, a place which is far from
Bacog. In a similar manner, accused-appellant contends that AAA's
claim that she was raped on February 14, 2002 inside their house in
Kadiwa, Navotas is also not true because at that time, they were
already residing in Bacog, Navotas.
This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to
the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never
been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.20
Moreover, the Court considers AAA's alleged inconsistency in testifying,
with respect to the place where the first and third rapes were
committed, as a minor inconsistency which should generally be given
liberal appreciation considering that the place of the commission of the
crime in rape cases is alter all not an essential element thereof. What is
decisive is that accused-appellant's commission of the crime charged
has been sufficiently proved.21 The alleged disparity in the victim's
testimony may also be attributed to the feet that, during her direct
examination, AAA was first questioned regarding her third rape in 2002,
while questions with respect to her first rape in 2000 were the last to be
asked. In any case, Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-
victim narrates the details of a harrowing experience like rape.22 Such
inconsistencies on minor details are in fact badges of truth, candidness
and the fact that the witness is unrehearsed.23 These discrepancies as
to minor matters, irrelevant to the elements of the crime, cannot, thus,
be considered a ground for acquittal.24 In this case, the alleged
inconsistency in AAA's testimony regarding the exact place of the
commission of rape does not make her otherwise straightforward and
coherent testimony, on material points, less worthy of belief.
However, this Court has held that it takes much more for a young lass to
fabricate a story of rape, have her private parts examined, subject
herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule.
25 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman, like AAA, to concoct a
story which would put her own father for the most of his remaining life to
jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.
26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The settled rule is that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony
of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.37
Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on
one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.38 In the case at bar, the Court finds no
compelling reason to depart from the findings of the trial court that, in
light of the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that accused-
appellant raped her, the mere denial of accused-appellant, without any
corroborative evidence leaves the court with no option but to
pronounce a judgment of conviction.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
Present:
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
ADRIANO CABRILLAS,
BENNY CABTALAN,
Promulgated:
Appellant.
DECISION
Factual Antecedents
For our review is the August 29, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00039 which affirmed with
modifications the August 29, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar, in Criminal Case No. CC-2000-1310,
finding appellant Benny Cabtalan (Benny) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder.
The Information[3] against Benny and his co-accused Adriano Cabrillas
(Adriano) contains the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 11th day of July 1999, at nighttime which was
purposely sought, in Barangay Laygayon, Municipality of Pinabacdao,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and stab one Jesus
Cabujat with the use of long bolos (sundang), with which both accused
have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the
victim multiple stab wounds, which wounds resulted to his
instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Two years after the incident, Benny was arrested in Las Pias City[5]
while to date, Adriano remains at large. During his arraignment, Benny
entered a plea of not guilty.[6] Trial thereafter ensued.
Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano
circling the house of Jesus Cabujats (Jesus) daughter, Elena Raypan
(Elena), which is just about two arms length away from his house.[9]
Thereafter, the duo stood on a dark portion of the road.[10] Later on, he
saw Jesus and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn C. Raypan
(Jonalyn) walking towards the house of Jonalyns mother, Elena. Jesus
stopped and turned towards a grassy area to urinate when suddenly,
Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus
by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus
shouted I am wounded, please help me because I was stabbed by
Benny and Adriano.[11] Jesus then fell to the ground while Benny and
Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.[12]
For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the night of
the incident, she fetched her grandfather Jesus from her Ate Susans
house.[13] She and her grandfather walked side by side in going back
to their house.[14] However, upon reaching the vicinity of their house,
her grandfather went across the street to urinate. It was then that she
saw Benny and Adriano on the same street.[15] She knew the two
because Benny and her father are cousins while Adriano and her
mother are also cousins.[16] She saw the two men take hold of her
grandfathers arms, after which Benny stabbed her grandfather with a
long bolo. She heard her grandfather say Donie, help me, I am
wounded.[17] After that, Jonalyn saw Benny go home.[18]
Elena also testified that when she heard her father shouting for help,
she immediately went outside the house and saw Benny releasing her
father. As she got nearer to Jesus, Benny and Adriano ran away.[19]
When Elena asked her father as to who stabbed him, the latter replied
that it was Benny and Adriano.[20]
A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and Adriano
and a warrant was issued for their arrest which was, however, returned
unserved since they could no longer be located. It appears that on July
13, 1999, at around noontime, Benny and Adriano escaped by
ferryboat to Catbalogan, Samar.[22] Two years later, or on July 31,
2001, Benny was arrested in Las Pias City by virtue of an alias warrant
of arrest.[23]
Benny testified that he was in his mothers house in the morning of July
11, 1999 until lunchtime. He then proceeded to the store of Susan in
Barangay Laygayon and saw Adriano and a certain Manuel Cabigayan
drinking tuba. He accepted their invitation to join in their drinking spree
and stayed there until 6:00 p.m. Thereafter, he went home to Barangay
Pilaon which was about three kilometers away. He reached his
destination after walking for nearly an hour and no longer went out. He
learned from his neighbors of the death of Jesus only the following day.
[24]
In the succeeding days, Benny went to Paraaque City after receiving a
letter from his brother informing him of a job opportunity in the city as
gardener.[25]
Bennys mother, Gertrudes, testified that on July 11, 1999, she was in
her farm in Barangay Laygayon, Pinabacdao, Samar, together with her
husband and Adrianos mother, Pacita Ocenar. At around 9:00 p.m.,
Adriano arrived and confided to her that he attacked and injured a
person in said barangay. The following day Adriano departed and was
never seen again.[26]
[SO ORDERED.][30]
The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review, but same
was later referred to the CA in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Mateo.[31]
Assignment of Errors
X X X X[35]
Our Ruling
There is no dispute that the killing of the victim in this case is neither
parricide nor infanticide. The issue that must therefore be resolved is
whether treachery attended the killing as to qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
the offender arising from the defense which the victim might make.[37]
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning
and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.[38]
Q. What else did you observe while the dogs were barking?
A. While the dogs were barking, I saw two (2) persons who were
[circling] the house of Elena Raypan, they were walking back and forth
in front of the house of Elena Raypan.
Q. Were you able to recognize these two (2) persons walking back and
forth near the house of Elena Raypan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After they were going back and forth in front of the house of Elena
Raypan, where did these persons go?
A. They went to the dark portion of the road.
xxxx
Q. After they went to the dark portion of the road, what did you observe
next?
A. They just stood by [there].
Q. Was he alone?
A. He was accompanied by a child.
xxxx
Q. When you saw Jesus Cabujat walking towards the house of Elena
Raypan, what did Jesus Cabujat do before going to the house of Elena
Raypan?
A. When Jesus Cabujat reached the place where the two persons
Benny [Cabtalan] and Adriano Cabrillas were standing, Jesus Cabujat
urinated.
xxxx
Q. To what direction was he facing?
A. He was facing towards the grassy area.
xxxx
INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated that it was more or less 14 inches.
xxxx
Q. From the first blow of Benny Cabtalan to the first blow of Adriano
Cabrillas, how long did it take?
A. It just happened so quickly; as the first one delivered his stab blow
the other one also delivered his stab blow, alternately stabbing the
victim.
Q. How about Benny Cabtalan and Adriano Cabrillas, what did they do
when Jesus Cabujat fell down?
A. When Jesus Cabujat shouted for help, that was the time the two (2)
culprits [fled].
Q. To what direction?
A. To the route going to a farm.[39]
Q. When you x x x [reached] your house, what did your lolo do?
A. He went across the street and urinated there and saw Benny also on
the street.
Q. Who?
A. It was Adriano.
xxxx
Q. You saw them also in the street while your lolo was urinating so, what
did Benny and Adriano do at that time?
A. They held both arms of my grandfather.
xxxx
Q. With what?
A. It was a long bolo.[40]
All told, Jesus was unaware of the imminent peril to his life and was
rendered incapable of defending himself. From the suddenness of the
attack upon Jesus and the manner it was committed, there is no doubt
that treachery indeed attended his killing.
The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that the
testimonies of eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve credence as
both narrated in a straightforward manner the details of Benny and
Adrianos attack upon Jesus. Benny, however, still disputes the
credibility of these witnesses by pointing out that Wilfredos testimony
that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from that of
Jonalyn who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in
unison, it was only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. The Court,
however, finds this inconsistency to pertain merely to the manner the
fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. The materiality of the
assailants exact position during their attack on the victim is a trivial and
insignificant detail which cannot defeat the witnesses positive
identification of Benny as one of the assailants. Besides, [i]t is perfectly
natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to
give varying details as there may be some details which one witness
may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,
jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by
different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were
[fabricated] and rehearsed.[41]
Bennys assertion that Wilfredo is not a credible witness since he
surfaced three years after the incident to testify for the prosecution also
fails to impress. It is worthy to mention that the proceedings in this case
was suspended for two years because Benny and Adriano left
Pinabacdao, Samar and the warrant for their arrest could not be served
on them. Also, deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. Delay in
reporting a crime or an unusual incident in a rural area is well-known.
[42] It is common for a witness to prefer momentary silence for fear of
reprisal from the accused.[43] The fact remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his
duty as a good member of society by aiding the family of Jesus when
they were seeking justice. In the absence of other circumstances that
would show that the charge was a mere concoction and that Wilfredo
was impelled by some evil motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to
discredit his testimony.
The fact that Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related to the victim also does
not diminish their credibility. While admittedly, Wilfredo is a relative of
the husband of Julita, who is the daughter of Jesus, and Jonalyn is
Jesuss granddaughter, relationship per se does not evince ulterior
motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the credibility of witnesses.[44]
Mere relationship to a party cannot militate against the credibility of
witnesses or be taken as destructive of the witnesses credibility.[45]
What matters is that Wilfredo and Jonalyn positively identified Benny
and Adriano as the assailants of Jesus and that they testified in a
straightforward manner. These indicate that the two are telling the truth.
All told, the Court finds no reason to depart from the judgment of
conviction rendered against Benny by the trial court and affirmed by the
CA.
The trial court and the appellate court are unanimous in not awarding
loss of earning capacity to the heirs of Jesus for lack of basis. There
was no error on their part since there was no documentary evidence to
substantiate this claim. The testimony that Jesus earned P1,000.00 a
week can be used as basis for granting such an award only if he is
either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
[his] line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.[68] Here, the prosecution did not offer proof
that would determine whether Jesus was self-employed or a daily-wage
earner. Thus, the exceptions to the rule cannot be applied in this case.
[69]
The heirs of Jesus are also entitled to an interest on all the awards of
damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.[70]
SO ORDERED.
x--x
Factual Antecedents
Contrary to law.4
Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large
to date. During arraignment, appellantentered a plea of "not guilty".5
After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.6
At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car
along C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly
blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached
Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled
with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latters brothers,
Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly
appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and
his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body
while the unidentified companion held him by the neck. When Espino
was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and
jewelries and immediately fled.
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing
jokes with other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters
from their stall. The driver alighted and asked why they were laughing.
Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with him. The driver seemed
drunk since he walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner.
Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with
a knife. Jay saw the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo
which he used to hack the driver repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay
fled.12 Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a vegetable vendor in Divisoria,
corroborated Jornas version of the incident in her testimony.13
In its December 5, 2006 Decision,14 the RTC held that appellant could
not have committed robbery. It ratiocinated, viz:
xxxx
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing
of Espino. It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the
Information and duly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC
ruled that conspiracy among the accused attended the crime.
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity,
actual and moral damages to the heirs of Espino,but denied the claim
for loss of earning capacity for lack of documentary evidence.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay
Torres and Ronnie Torres.
SO ORDERED.16
SO ORDERED.21
Assignment of Errors
The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire
case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his
conviction for murder.24
Our Ruling
We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses
and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and
positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only
axiomatic thatpositive testimony prevails over negative testimony.37
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the
presence of abuse of superior strength. In the samemanner, appellant
claims that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not the
criterion for the appreciation of this circumstance.
"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage
of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense."38
Here, appellant and his four companions not only took advantage of
their numerical superiority, they were also armed with knives. Espino, on
the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was
wrestling with Espino, appellant and his coaccused simultaneously
assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion locked his arm around
the neck of Espino while appellant and his co-accused stabbed and
hacked him several times. While Espino was lying defenseless on the
ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime.39 It is clear that they executed
the criminal act by employing physical superiorityover Espino.
Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of
earning capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that
he earned P3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not
awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the
victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was
neither alleged nor proved that the victim was either selfemployed or
was a daily wage earner, indemnity for loss of earning capacity cannot
be awarded to the heirs of the victim."49
SO ORDERED.
x--x
G.R. No. 148423 December 6, 2006
DECISION
The Case
This petition for review seeks to overturn the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61335 which sustained the Olongapo
City Regional Trial Courts dismissal of the forcible entry complaint
originally filed by petitioners Frondarina spouses against the
respondent Malazarte spouses in Civil Case No. 2853 before the
Olongapo City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC).
The Facts
Evidence culled from the records of the Olongapo City MTCC2 shows
that on July 22, 1970, Lot 5, Block 15-B, Gordon Heights Subdivision,
Olongapo City (disputed lot), with an area of 450 square meters, was
acquired by Flordelina Santos from Iluminado Amar. On June 17, 1971,
Cirila Gongora, petitioner Esperanza Frondarinas sister, in turn,
acquired the disputed lot from Santos, as shown in the Deed of Transfer
of Possessory Right over a Lot (Exhibit "B"). On the same date,
Gongora, as Esperanza Frondarinas predecessor-in-interest, filed a
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) (Exhibit "D") with the Bureau of
Lands.
The disputed lot was also declared in Gongoras name for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 32821 in 1970 (Exhibit "E"), under
Tax Declaration No. 16-0611 in 1974 (Exhibit "F"), and under Tax
Declaration No. 16-0431 in 1980 (Exhibit "G"). She also paid the real
estate taxes due on said property as shown by the April 12, 1985
Official Receipt No. 7841503, representing real estate taxes on the
property for the years 1980 to 1985 (Exhibit "H").
In the meantime, the records reveal that on March 18, 1988, after they
allegedly bought the said lot, respondents threatened petitioners
caretaker, Lorenza Andrada. More so, according to petitioner
Esperanza Frondarina, in her testimony, the respondents dug holes to
put up posts, riprapped the rear of the lot, and deposited hollow blocks
to construct a house. On March 28, 1988, when confronted by
petitioners Frondarinas on why they entered petitioners lot,
respondents replied that they got permission to enter the land from Mr.
Valencia, as they had bought it from him. Petitioners then reported the
matter to the City Engineers Office; and Mr. Malik of said office went to
the said place and told the respondents to stop the construction of the
house as they had no building permit.
1. ordering the defendants and all and any other persons claiming
under them to vacate the parcel of land located at No. 5 Latires Street,
Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, also identified as Lot 5, Block 15-B,
Gordon Heights Subdivision, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, with an
area of 450 square meters, declared in the name of plaintiff Esperanza
G. Frondarina under Tax Declaration No. 004-3574 and more
particularly described under paragraph 2 of the complaint, and to
deliver its possession to the plaintiffs;
2. ordering the defendants to remove from the subject premises all
constructions that they built thereat;
4. ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally, unto the plaintiffs
the sum of P15,000.00, as attorneys fees, plus costs.6
Q Did you occupy the property after it was sold to you by your sister?
A Andrada sir.
The plaintiffs have only hearsay knowledge of who planted the two
mango trees and one coconut tree.
Q Mrs. Frondarina, do you know who planted this two mango trees
and one (1) coconut tree?
xxx
Q You were there present when these trees were planted Mrs.
Witness?
Q You said that you a have a caretaker of this lot on or about March
18, 1988, how was it possible for the Malazarte to enter your lot if you a
have a "bantay" there?
A She told that she was threatened by the Malazarte and certain Mr.
Valencia.
Finding no reversible error in the Olongapo City RTCs ruling, the Court
of Appeals (CA) on March 13, 2001 rendered a Decision affirming in
toto11 the September 13, 2000 Decision of the trial court.
A close perusal of the three issues presented for review before the
Court readily reveals a lone issuewho between petitioners Frondarina
spouses and respondents Malazarte spouses have prior possession of
the disputed lot. Undeniably, this is a question of fact which is
proscribed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The records manifest that the conclusions of facts of the CA and the
Olongapo City RTC are both contradictory or conflicting with those of
the Olongapo City MTCC. For this reason alone and so as to dispense
equitable justice to those deserving, a departure from the "factual issue
bar rule" is timely and in order.
However, the Court finds that the threats on caretaker Lorenza Andrada
to prevent her from testifying were substantiated by petitioner
Esperanza Frondarina and policeman Eduardo Labrador; and the Court
is convinced that Ms. Andrada was intimidated by respondents to
prevent her from testifying, the latter knowing the importance of such
parol evidence. Thus, the presumption that "evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced" would not apply to the case
at bar because it was not petitioners who restrained Ms. Andrada from
testifying but respondents themselves; hence, petitioners had every
reason to have the caretakers testimony adduced as evidence.
On the other hand, the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim (Exhibit "5"),
executed by Romeo Valencia on March 1, 1988 in favor of the spouses
Malazartes, pales in comparison with the three (3) successive
transferswhich started on July 22, 1970that eventually resulted in
the transfer of said rights in favor of petitioner Esperanza Frondarina.
The first in time is the first in right. Thus, the much earlier conveyance
by Iluminado Amar on July 22, 1970, without doubt, prevails over the
Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim executed on March 1, 1988 in
favor of the Malazartes.
The following tax declarations over the said lot support petitioners
position, thus:
a. Tax Declaration No. 32821 (Exhibit "E") in the name of Cirila Gongora,
predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. This declaration became effective
in 1970;
b. Tax Declaration No. 16-0611 (Exhibit "F") also in the name of Cirila
Gongora which became effective in 1974;
In the light of the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that petitioners
have established their right to physical possession over the subject lot.
No costs.
SO ORDERED
x--x
In Criminal Case No. 918, the Information filed against the appellant
reads:
That on or about June 28, 1997 at 9:00 oclock in the morning more or
less, at their residence, in Bura, Catarman, Camiguin, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, stepfather of the victim and resident of Bura, Catarman,
Camiguin, employing force and intimidation upon the victim, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one Gretchen Castao, who was ten years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
The said appellant was charged with the same felony in Criminal Case
No. 919 under an Information which reads:
Thereafter, Cenilda met the appellant who himself was also separated
from his erstwhile wife, Tonia Gok-ong, with whom he had four children
namely, Levy, 19; Sammy, 18; Ruel, 16; and Sheila, 13.[6] Sometime in
1992, Cenilda and the appellant decided to live together in Bura,
Catarman, Camiguin. Cenilda entrusted Gretchen to the care of her
parents who also resided in Bura, Catarman, Camiguin.[7] In 1996,
Gretchen eventually joined her mother and the appellant.[8] Gretchen
was then enrolled in Grade IV at the Bura Elementary School. In the
meantime, Cenilda gave birth to a son, Ronel (Dodong), fathered by the
appellant.
When school year 1997-1998 started, Gretchen went to live with her
mothers sister, Elsita Rabongue, in Lawigan, Catarman, Camiguin. She
enrolled in Grade V at the Lawigan Elementary School, but went home
every Saturday in Bura to visit her mother.[9]
June 28, 1997, a Saturday,[10] was the eve of the fiesta in Sitio Lumad,
Bura, Catarman. Cenilda went to Catarman to buy some items to sell
during the fiesta the next day. Gretchen and the appellant were left in
the house. He asked Gretchen to get some liniment for him and
Gretchen did as she was told. When Gretchen was about to hand over
the liniment to the appellant, he suddenly held her hand, pulled her
towards himself and made her lie down on the floor. The appellant
pulled down and removed her shorts and panties, after which, he also
removed his shorts and underwear. Placing himself on top of Gretchen,
Roberto inserted his aroused phallus into her vagina. Gretchen felt
excruciating pain but was too afraid to cry for help, for fear that the
appellant would harm her, as he used to whenever he was angry at her.
[11] The appellant pulled out his penis after having ejaculated.
Gretchen felt a sticky substance flowing on the periphery of her vagina
which the appellant wiped off. He warned Gretchen not to tell her
mother what he had done to her.[12] Gretchen kept the harrowing
experience to herself because she was afraid that her mother would
side with the appellant if she found out what happened. Every now and
then the appellant abused her sexually but she did not tell her mother
about it. However, she revealed her ordeal to some of her close friends
in school, like Germalin Bacorro, Rogelyn Madale, Recheney Pole,
Corazon Apal, Mary Ann Ihong and Greta Bacorro.[13]
The following school year, 1998-1999, Gretchen went back to Bura and
lived with the appellant and her mother Cenilda. She was enrolled as a
Grade VI pupil at the Bura Elementary School.[14] Gretchen decided to
record her ordeal at the hands of the appellant in the pages of a
notebook. Recalling the sexual abuse she suffered on June 28, 1997,
Gretchen wrote on September 2, 1998, thus:
Gretchen Castao
My Secrets
My mother got married to another man and my father was the second
partner of mom and they resided and brought me to Bura. My mother
again left for Bukidnon. I was still very young and do not know my father
and mother and I stayed with nanay (mother) and they let me study until
I reached third grade. During the fiesta of Bura my mother returned
home. I was still young and not familiar with her and she again left;
thereafter she again came back, this time bringing with her a male
partner named Oben. Later they were able to buy a house and we
transferred there. A few days later during the fiesta of Lumad, a
Saturday 1997, my mother went to Catarman to buy some stuff to be
sold during the fiesta of Lumad and the only ones left in our house was
Oben and myself; and he asked me to get a liniment (haplas). When it
was handed to him, he immediately held my hand and let me lie down
and he rape me. After that he warned me not to tell anyone and I never
told my mother.[16]
because of fear; after that he repeatedly molested knowing that I did
not tell my mother although I told some of my female classmates.
Others I did not tell.
Friday 10:30 date: 4th day, he sucked my breast and fondled it and he
abused me slightly after that he slapped me. I came from Catarman
because I bought poultry feeds and my mother was searching for
coconuts.[17]
Gretchen tore off the pages and hid them. She inserted her diary in a
notebook and placed it with her things.
When Gretchen returned from the store, Josilyn confronted her about
the notes, and asked whether the entries therein were all true. Gretchen
admitted the veracity of what she had written. Josilyn immediately
informed her parents, brothers and sisters about Gretchens revelation.
They decided not to tell Cenilda what had happened to her daughter as
she might get angry and cause trouble in their house. Without Cenildas
knowledge, they brought Gretchen to a doctor for physical examination.
[21]
Dr. Wilfredo T.E. Dublin, Jr. examined Gretchen at the Catarman District
Hospital on September 14, 1998. He forthwith issued a Certificate of
Treatment/ Confinement[22] quoted as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF TREATMENT/CONFINEMENT
00019
Record Number
Gretchens mother Cenilda testified for the appellant. She testified that
she was at home on June 28, 1997. Gretchen did not go to their house
in Bura. At 8:00 a.m., the appellant left and went to the house of Tado
Calustre. He returned home at 1:00 p.m. On September 4, 1998,
Cenilda was at home washing their dirty laundry and had not noticed
anything unusual that had happened between Gretchen and the
appellant. Gretchen was taking care of her younger brother Ronel, while
the appellant was taking care of his fighting cocks in front of their yard.
However, Cenilda admitted that the appellant asked for her forgiveness
for attempting to rape Gretchen on September 4, 1998. [28] He told her
that it was the devils act (sic) that I chose (sic). He told her that he
desisted because he remembered God.
SO ORDERED.[29]
The appellant did not file any notice of appeal from the decision of the
trial court in Criminal Case No. 919.
In his brief, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court
contending that:
II
III
Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant asserts that
Gretchens testimony is incredible; hence, has no probative weight. She
never divulged the sexual assault by the appellant to her mother, or to
her aunts Elsita Rabongue and Josilyn Estaciones for that matter.
Although Gretchen told some of her classmates of her harrowing
experience, it was unnatural for her to keep it from her mother and her
aunts, who were in a better position to help her. He contends that the
victims failure to report the rape incident would have been
understandable if he had threatened to inflict bodily harm on her.
However, there is no evidence on record that he had so threatened the
victim. There is likewise no evidence that the victim attempted to resist
the appellants alleged sexual advances.
The trial court also erred when it relied on the victims account of events
as contained in her diary. The victims notes were entered only on
September 2, 1998, more than a year after the appellant had allegedly
abused her on June 28, 1997.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that "the workings of the human mind
placed under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are
unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic experience -some may
shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility."[33]
Some may choose to keep to themselves the harrowing and debilitating
experience rather than suffer the embarrassment, humiliation and
ostracization from relatives after divulging the terrible secret. In this
case, the evidence on record shows that the victim was the secretive
and silent type, who chose not to confide in her relatives.[34]
First. Gretchen testified that she was afraid to resist or to shout because
on prior occasions, the appellant intimidated her by stepping on her
feet:
Q At about 10:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, of June 28, 1997,
can you inform us if there were unusual incidents that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you inform this Honorable Court how did your stepfather, the
accused in this case, rape you?
Q What did you do next after he removed your short pants and panties?
Q What did he do next after removing his short pants and brief?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q How did he harm you?
Q When you, according to you, his penis was inserted into your vagina,
did he succeed inserting his penis?
A Yes, sir.[35]
Second. In her diary, Gretchen wrote that the appellant warned her not
to tell her mother that he had raped her. This Court ruled that it is not
uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence
by the mildest threat against her life.[36]
Furthermore, the fact that Gretchen started making entries in her diary
only on September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape
incident occurred (June 28, 1997), does not lessen the probative
weight of the said entries.
Third. Even assuming that the appellant did not threaten nor intimidate
the victim, this, and the fact that the latter agreed to live with her mother
and her abuser, are purely inconsequential matters. This does not affect
the veracity of the victims testimony.
It bears stressing that when the appellant raped the victim, she was
only eleven years old, and under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
appellant is guilty of statutory rape. In statutory rape, the under twelve-
year-old victim is conclusively presumed incapable of giving consent to
sexual intercourse with another.[37]
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of
evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible
one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more
flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and
partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented
at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently
corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from
innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth,
the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor
mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject
portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on
the corroborative evidence in the case.[39]
In this case, the trial court believed Gretchens testimony that the
appellant inserted his penis through the side of his short pants and the
side of her loose shorts, but disbelieved that part of her testimony that a
small part of his penis was able to penetrate her vagina.[40]
Thus, the appellant is guilty only of simple statutory rape for which the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.
The trial court directed the appellant to pay the victim the amount of
P50,000. The court did not award moral damages. The decision of the
trial court shall, thus, be modified. The appellant is directed to pay the
victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the amount of
P50,000 as moral damages, conformably to current jurisprudence.[43]
SO ORDERED.
x--x
G.R. No.190798
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Facts
"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Pias,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting
in common accord and mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade and
stab with bladed weapons one RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby inflicting
upon him physical injuries, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and
Emilio were released on bail.4 Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was
held on May 9, 2002. Emilio was, in turn, arraigned on December 10,
2002. All the petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged.5 After termination of pre-trial on April 23, 2003,6 trial on the
merits immediately followed. In the course of trial, two versions of what
transpired on the early morning of July 15, 2001 surfaced. These
conflicting versions of the incident, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio,
Bobot, Boyet and David were his neighbors in CAA, Las Pias City.
Rodolfo recalled that he had visitors on the day of the incident. When
his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001, Rodolfo
accompanied them outside his house. After about thirty minutes and as
he was about to go inside, Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of his
house. Addressing nobody in particular, Rodolfo uttered in the
vernacular "bakit dito tinambak ang basura sa harap ng aking bahay na
malawak naman ang pagtataponan ng basura?"7 Emilio and Boyet,
who was then present and angered by what they heard, threw stones at
the private complainant hitting him twice on the forehead. With blood
oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his house to cleanse his
face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x
2" (dos por dos) piece of wood. Rodolfo was caught off guard when he
was hit on the head with a shovel by another accused, David.8 Then,
Ronald held Rodolfo, rendering him helpless, as Boyet and Bobot
simultaneously stabbed him in the abdomen.9 At this point, Rodolfo fell
to the ground, lying flat and eventually lost consciousness. When he
regained consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las Pias District
Hospital (LPDH) but was later on transferred to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) for the much-needed surgical procedure. At the PGH,
Rodolfo was operated on, confined for nine days and incurred hospital
expenses amounting to P30,000.00.10
PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took
the statements of Rodolfos daughter Ruth Ann Lebria (Ruth) and
Rodolfos wife, Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion) when they went to the
police station to complain about the incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that
when he asked Ruth and Salvacion why Rodolfo was not with them, he
was informed that Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and
treatment for the injuries suffered from the petitioners. PO2 Sulit also
testified that he endorsed the complaint against the petitioners to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias for proper disposition.11
Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she
admitted was preceded by the utterance made by his father.12 Her
testimony on how Ronald, Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David ganged up
on her father and who among them stoned, hit, held and stabbed
Rodolfo perfectly matched the latters sworn declarations.13
Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the
beating and stabbing her husband endured in the hands of the
petitioners and their co-accused. Salvacion also submitted receipts in
the total amount of P2,174.80, representing the medical expenses
incurred for the treatment of Rodolfos injuries resulting from the
incident.14
Not only did he deny the allegations against him but Ronald even
claimed that he was the one who was stabbed by Rodolfo. Ronald
averred that the incident happened within the vicinity of his home,
which was about four meters away from the house of Rodolfo.17 When
Ronald heard Rodolfo shouting at around 2:00 a.m., he tried pacifying
Rodolfo by telling him that they would just talk later in the day.
Unappeased, Rodolfo allegedly destroyed the bicycle belonging to
Ronalds son-in-law. Rodolfo then attacked Ronald by stabbing him on
his right arm. It was during this time that Ronalds son, Bobot, came to
his rescue but was prevented from doing so as Bobot was also struck
with a knife by Rodolfo. Ronald and his son instituted a criminal
complaint against Rodolfo for attempted homicide but nothing came out
of it. In support of his testimony, Ronald presented a picture taken the
day after the incident showing a slipper purportedly belonging to
Rodolfo and a balisong. Ronald further insisted that all the other
accused were not around as they were residing elsewhere at that
crucial time.
Accused Emilio, for his part, interposed denial and alibi as his
defenses. He emphatically denied that he threw a stone at Rodolfo. On
the date and time of the incident, Emilio claimed that he was working
overtime as a laborer in Moonwalk, Las Pias City, which is one
kilometer away from the crime scene. He argued that he was just
unfortunately dragged into this case which had nothing to do with him
at all.19
The defense likewise proffered two medical certificates to support the
petitioners claims. The July 15, 2001 medical certificate issued by Dr.
Ma. Cecilia Leyson (Dr. Leyson), of the Ospital ng Maynila, declared
that Ronalds body bore lacerations and hematoma at the time she
attended to him. Nevertheless, Dr. Leyson acknowledged that she had
no idea how the injuries were sustained by Ronald. The other medical
certificate dated March 20, 2006 was issued by Dr. Renato Borja (Dr.
Borja), a physician affiliated with the Paraaque Community Hospital
where Bobot was taken after getting injured. Based on the hospital
records, Dr. Borja testified that Bobot had sustained wounds on the
head and chest, possibly caused by a sharp instrument.20
Per the trial courts Order23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita
C. Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the Public Attorneys Office, was designated
as the petitioners counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantuas
designation was recalled upon her manifestation that she had
previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the present case. In her stead,
the trial court appointed the petitioners current counsel de oficio, Atty.
Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).
Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With
his help, all three petitioners finally appeared before the trial court on
May 5, 2005. Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of another
prosecution witness, Salvacion, as well as the presentation of evidence
for the defense.
After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit
their respective memoranda in thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan
submitted the Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum
was ever filed by the prosecution. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
Also, accused Ronald Ibaez, Emilio Ibaez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibaez
are ordered to pay to private complainant or victim Rodolfo Lebria the
sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual medical expenses.
SO ORDERED.24
The CA agreed with the trial courts judgment of conviction but modified
the penalty imposed. The appellate court sentenced the petitioners to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. The CA also found it proper to award P15,000.00 as
temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to Rodolfo. The
petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CAs decision. Still, their
motion was denied in the Resolution26 of December 28, 2009.
The Issue
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue
of whether the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally
guaranteed right to counsel.
The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section
14 of the Constitution which states that:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
xxxx
xxxx
Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to
designate a counsel de oficio for the accused in the absence of private
representation. It provides:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the
petitioners claim that they were deprived of their constitutional right to
counsel. In their May 5, 2010 Comment31 on the instant petition, the
OSG pointed out that since the beginning of the proceedings in the trial
court until the filing of the present petition before this Court, three (3)
counsel de oficio were appointed and represented the petitioners32
and to which designation the latter did not raise any protest.33 The
OSG opined that the trial court judge made sure that the petitioners
were adequately assisted by a counsel de oficio when they failed to
engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, the OSG
recommended the dismissal of the petition.
There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the
petitioners were not only assisted by a counsel de oficio during
arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de oficio actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court including the
direct and cross-examination of the witnesses.34 As aptly found by the
CA, the petitioners were duly represented by a counsel de oficio all
throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court
appointed lawyer was absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented
their testimonies.35 As previously stated, it was during said hearing
when the trial court declared that the cross-examination of the said two
prosecution witnesses was deemed waived.
Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo
and PO2 Sulit were not subjected to cross-examination was not
because the petitioners were not given opportunity to do so. Noticeably,
the petitioners counsel de oficio omitted to mention that in the June 18,
2003 hearing, Ronald, one of the accused, did not show up despite
prior notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty was
ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Ironically, Ronald
comes to this Court asserting the very right he seemingly waived and
abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing without justifiable
cause. Moreover, neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to
the presentation of testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the
June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de oficio subsequently
seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.
Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order,
was merely exercising a judicial prerogative. No proof was presented
by the defense showing that the exercise of such discretion was either
despotic or arbitrary.
At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which
are backed up by substantial evidence on record, led this Court to no
other conclusion than that the petitioners are guilty of frustrated
homicide.
Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was
attacked, by the concerted actions of the accused, the weapon used
and the nature of wounds sustained by Rodolfo.
Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of
conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity of
action towards the realization of an unlawful objective among the
accused.41 Its existence can be inferred from the individual acts of the
accused, which if taken as a whole are in fact related, and indicative of
a concurrence of sentiment.42 In this case, conspiracy was manifested
in the spontaneous and coordinated acts of the accused, where two of
them delivered the initial attack on Rodolfo by stoning, while another
struck him with a shovel and the third held him so that the other two can
simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when Rodolfo laid helpless on
the ground and had lost consciousness that the accused hurriedly left
the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission of the crime
adequately established a conspiracy among them.
Plainly, the kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and
the vital parts of Rodolfos body at which he was undeniably stabbed
demonstrated petitioners intent to kill. The medico-legal certificate
revealed that Rodolfo sustained multiple stab wounds in the
epigastrium, left upper quadrant of the abdomen resulting to internal
injuries in the transverse colon (serosal), mesentery and left kidney.43
Given these injuries, Rodolfo would have succumbed to death if not for
the emergency surgical intervention.
With respect to the petitioners defenses of denial and alibi, the Court
concurs with the lower courts rejection of these defenses. An
assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi necessitates looking into
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. Well-settled is the rule
that in determining who between the prosecution and defense
witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation of the trial court is
accorded much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a
better position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver
their testimonies.44 As such, the findings of the trial court is accorded
finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts which if properly
considered, could alter the result of the case.45
In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from
this rule considering the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to
petitioners denial. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further
crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive identification and
straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.46 Between an
affirmative assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial,
the former generally prevails.47 The prosecution witnesses recounted
the details of the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent manner,
without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could
not have done unless they genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides,
the prosecution witnesses could not have mistakenly identified the
petitioners as Rodolfos perpetrators considering there is so much
familiarity among them. The records are also bereft of any indication
that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives when they
testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled to
full faith and credit.
The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than
themselves, who had actually seen the incident and could validate their
story. Additionally, aside from the medical certificates of Ronald and
that of Bobot which was issued almost five (5) years since the incident
occurred, the defense have not submitted any credible proof that could
efficiently rebut the prosecutions evidence.
Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that
Ronald, would just leave his son Bobot, while the latter was being
stabbed and struggling for the possession of the knife with Rodolfo, to
go to a police station for assistance. Logic dictates that a father would
not abandon a son in the presence of actual harm.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the
time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.48 Emilio himself
admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene
when the incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July
15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his
being at the crime scene on the date and time in question. Just like
denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the
positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the
perpetrators of the crime.49 In the present case, Emilio was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants.
Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself
and his immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations
in his favor,50 as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother
insisted that the former was somewhere else when the incident
occurred. For these reasons, Emilios defense of alibi will not hold.
Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate
courts' conviction of the petitioners for frustrated homicide.1wphi1
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the same Code
states that the imposable penalty upon principals of a frustrated crime
shall be the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony. Hence, frustrated homicide is punishable by
prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the
minimum penalty to be meted on the petitioners should be anywhere
within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of
prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
proper.
As regards the civil liability of the petitioners, the Court sustains the
award of moral and temperate damages with modification as to the
latter's amount.
Pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
of which cannot be proven with certainty. In People v. Villanueva52 and
Serrano v. People,53 the Court ruled that in case the amount of actual
damages, as proven by receipts during trial is less than P25,000.00, the
victim shall be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages, in lieu of
actual damages of a lesser amount. In the instant case, only the
amount of P2,174.80 was supported by receipts. Following the
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it necessary to increase the
temperate damages from P15,000.00 to P25,000.00.
The award of moral damages is justified under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code as Rodolfo sustained physical injuries which were the proximate
effect of the petitioners' criminal offense. As the amount is left to the
discretion of the court, moral damages should be reasonably
proportional and approximate to the degree of the injury caused and
the gravity of the wrong done.54 In light of the attendant circumstances
in the case, the Court affirms that P30,000.00 is a fair and reasonable
grant of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
The Case
Ernie Baro appeals the Decision[1] dated October 30, 2000 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 86), finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each count. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
On January 5, 1995, around 5:00 a.m., Roda had just awakened and
was still lying down when appellant entered her room. Appellant
immediately covered her mouth with a handkerchief and threatened to
kill her if she shouted. Using his left hand, appellant poked a knife
(balisong) at her. Appellant was then wearing a white shirt and black
short pants while Roda was wearing an orange-colored short pants and
a pink dress. Appellant took off his short pants and removed Rodas
short pants and underwear. He forcibly spread her legs and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Roda could not remember how long was
appellants penis remained inserted in her vagina. After raping her,
appellant dressed up and left her room.
On March 5, 1995, Roda went to bed around 8:00 p.m. Around 5:00
a.m. the following day, Roda was awakened by the presence of
appellant inside her bedroom. Upon seeing appellant, Roda asked him
what he wanted from her. Appellant told her to be quiet and
immediately covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Appellant wound
the handkerchief around Rodas head. Appellant then told her that
should she shout or report what was happening to anyone, he would kill
her. Thereupon, appellant raised her duster. Roda resisted, but her
strength was no match for appellants. Appellant told her not to resist
and to make her immobile, appellant poked a knife (balisong) at the left
side of her neck. Roda started to cry when she realized the futility of her
resistance to appellants lustful intention. Thereupon, appellant removed
her underwear. When this was removed, appellant lowered his maong
pants and underwear. Then, using his knees which were placed
between Rodas legs, appellant forced her legs apart. Appellant
inserted his penis into Rodas vagina. Roda could not do anything but
cry as she felt weak. When appellant inserted his penis into her vagina,
Roda felt pain. She could not remember how long appellants penis
stayed inside her vagina. When appellant was finished with her, he
dressed up and removed the handkerchief around her head. When
morning came, Roda did not tell her mother of the incident out of fear of
appellant.
On April 16, 1996, around midnight, Roda was at the kitchen preparing
the food to be brought by her parents and five (5) siblings on their trip
to the province. After she had prepared their baon, her parents, four (4)
brothers and one (1) sister left the house. Only Roda, Rochelle, Rodel
and appellant were left in the house. Thereafter, she put to sleep
Rochelle and Rodel who slept at their parents bedroom. Roda did not
sleep because she was afraid of appellant who was with them in the
house. Before her parents left, Roda had pleaded with them not to
leave. She could not tell them the reason out of fear of appellant. She
could not ask them either to bring them all because no one would be
left at the house. Neither could she go with them because no one would
look after her young brother and sister.
Thereupon, Roda saw appellant already inside her room and appellant,
upon seeing her immediately covered her mouth to prevent her from
making any noise. Appellant used a handkerchief to cover her mouth
and poked a knife at her neck. Roda resisted but appellant was
stronger. As they were still standing, appellant ordered her to lie down.
Appellant told her not to report the incident to anyone. Thereupon,
appellant took off his short pants, and followed that by removing Rodas
short pants and underwear. When this was done, appellant forced her
legs open and inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda could not do
anything but cry. She could not remember how long appellant inserted
his penis into her vagina. After appellant raped her, he ordered her to
dress up and threatened her that should she report what had happened
to anyone, he would kill her.
On the other hand, appellant narrates in his Brief[8] his version of the
facts as follows:
In Manila, accused-appellant Ernie Baro and his wife, with their three
(3) children, the eldest being 3 years old and the youngest at 1 year
old, stayed at the place located at Orocoy St., Montessorie, Manila.
Later on, they transferred to the house of his niece, Leticia Ongotan at
104 Scout Zuzuarigue St., Old Balara, Quezon City, where they stayed
for about 1 year. Th[e]reat, accused, Ernie Baro met herein complainant
Roda Ongot[a]n, who later on charged him of three (3) counts of rape
on December 17, 1997, allegedly committed by him on January 5;
March 5, 1995 and April 16, 1996. The herein accused vehemently
denied the charges despite his denial, the trial court nonetheless found
him guilty of the charge.[9] (Citations omitted)
The RTC did not give credence to the alibi and the denial interposed by
the accused. It ruled that neither would prevail over the positive
testimony of complainant and that, as between a positive identification
of the accused by the victim herself and an alibi, the former is to be
given greater weight, especially when the victim has no motive to testify
falsely against the accused.[11]
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged
errors:
The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony
of complainant, Roda Ongotan y Padora, despite its inherent
incredibility, contradictions and implausibility.
II
The appeal is meritorious. This Court believes that the guilt of appellant
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First Issue:
Credibility of Complainants Testimony
Appellant submits that the RTC erred in according full faith and
credence to complainants testimony despite its inherent incredibility,
contradictions and implausibility.
We agree. While it is true that it may be the sole basis for convicting the
accused in a rape case,[14] the complaining witness testimony must be
credible.[15] In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been
guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility -- while it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove,
it is usually more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits -- it cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
[16]
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, this Court finds
several circumstances creating reasonable doubt as to appellants guilt.
These are: (1) delay in filing the Complaint, (2) failure of the prosecution
to prove appellants moral ascendancy over complainant, (3) lack of
support from the records for the RTCs finding of violent sexual
intercourse between appellant and complainant, and (4) discrepancies
in the complainants testimony.
Delay in Filing the Complaint
In the present case, the first rape was allegedly committed by appellant
on January 5, 1995. After two months, on March 5, 1995, he
purportedly raped complainant again. More than a year after the
second rape, on April 16, 1996, the third rape supposedly occurred.
Complainant reported the alleged crimes only on December 17, 1997,
or more than two years after the first rape and more than a year after
the third one allegedly occurred.
Her explanation for the delay was the threat of appellant to kill her if she
reported the incident to anyone. Note that at the time she reported the
incident, he was still residing with her family. She herself testified that he
left their residence only on December 16, 1997,[19] after she had
confided the alleged rapes to her aunt and had herself examined by a
doctor. Hence, the threat of death, if any, was still hanging precariously
over her at the time. She merely said that she no longer wanted to ruin
her life, so she decided to reveal the rapes to her aunt. The relevant
portion of her testimony reads thus:
Q: What prompted you to tell the story to your auntie despite the fact
that one year has lapsed already?
The above quote does not, however, explain the gaps between the
dates of the three instances of the alleged rapes. The prosecution failed
to show satisfactorily what finally prompted complainant to report the
purported crime after a period of two long years from the time first rape
supposedly took place and to disregard the threats allegedly made by
appellant.
The trial court likewise erred when it held that the Medico-legal Report
and the testimony of Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime
Laboratory indicated that the lacerations in the vagina of complainant
showed that she had experienced violent sexual intercourse during her
younger years, and that such experience caused those lacerations. The
Report merely indicated that healed lacerations were found in her
hymen at the 5, the 3, and the 9 oclock positions. We reproduce
pertinent portions of the Report as follows:
FINDINGS:
GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex
and coadapted with pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between.
On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow, sealed laceration at 5 and deep-healed lacerations at 3 and 9
oclock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to
the introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow
with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and
consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Q: Could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the
laceration?
Atty Venturanza:
The question of the prosecutor is quite misleading. What was stated by
the witness is any hard blunt object and she just mentioned as one of
the objects is an erect male organ and now he [is] asking the size.
Court:
Fiscal Jamolin:
If you said that one of the causes of the laceration is an erect male
organ. On the basis of this possibility, could you tell us the size of that
male organ that caused the lacerations?
Second, the house where the rapes allegedly took place was described
during the trial as not bigger than one half of the courtroom.[30] It was
occupied by at least twelve people, most of whom were members of
her immediate family. At any given night, at least ten people would be
asleep there. We cannot help but wonder why she allowed appellant to
commit such dastardly act three times, with her parents and four fully
grown brothers within shouting distance. Considering the cramped
space and the quietness of the night, the faintest cry from her would
have been heard by one or more of her family members who were in
that same house.
Second Issue:
Alibi as a Defense
Alibi, the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, is a plausible excuse for the
accused. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is not always a weak
defense. Sometimes, the fact that the accused was somewhere else
may just be the plain and unvarnished truth.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases that where the accused was
only thirty minutes[33] or just a few kilometers from the place where the
crime was committed,[34] the defense of alibi will not prosper.
Truly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits. It cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of that
for the defense. In the present case, the testimony of appellant that he
was in Catubig, Northern Samar, on the dates when the alleged rapes
were committed remain uncontradicted by the prosecution. Moreover,
he testified that it was upon the invitation of complainants mother, his
niece, that he moved his family to Manila in November 1996 or seven
months after the last rape allegedly occurred.
The prosecution should take an active and direct part in the trial of the
case, since it has the onus probandi of showing the guilt of the
accused.[40] Even if it is, perhaps, the inadequacy of details in the
prosecutions evidence rather than the actual facts themselves that
makes it difficult for this Court to arrive at definite conclusions, still we
cannot pin responsibility on appellant. The moral conviction that may
serve as basis for a finding of guilt in a criminal case should be that
which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record,
exclusive of any other consideration. Short of this minimum
requirement, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is, even
more, this Courts constitutional duty to acquit them. Only then may
there be fealty to the constitutional presumption of innocence.[41]
SO ORDERED.
x--x
THIRD DIVISION
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
While Rosario was at the kitchen reheating more food, she heard three
gunshots. She then went to the sala and there found Victor and Charlie;
her other visitors had left. Rosario saw Charlie still holding a glass of
tuba, while Victor's head was bowed down, like he was drunk. She saw
blood on Victor, Charlie, and the floor. She shouted, "Hay Sangre" (Oh,
blood), collapsed and lost her consciousness. She later learned that
both Victor and Charlie had died.8 In their death certificates, it was
stated that the victims died due to hemorrhage secondary to gunshot
wounds.9
The victims' deaths were reported to the Sta. Maria Police Station by
their sister at about 11:00 p.m. on October 31, 2001. Among the
policemen who proceeded to the crime scene was Senior Police Officer
3 Fernando Gregorio, who claimed to have seen the victims with
gunshot wounds on their faces. Victor had a gunshot wound on his right
nostril, while Charlie had gunshot wounds on both eyeballs.11 Prior to
their demise, Victor and Charlie worked as carpenters. Victor was
married to one Rowena and had one child, while Charlie was married to
one Gigi, with whom he had two children.12
On March 28, 2011, the RTC rendered its joint Decision,17 with
dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused GILBERT MERCADO y
CABUCOS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the
crimes of Murder charged in Criminal Case No. 18497 and Criminal
Case No. 18498, with the aggravating circumstance in both cases of
use of an unlicensed firearm, and SENTENCES said accused as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's judgment.
The CA affirmed Mercado's conviction for two counts of murder;
however, it ruled that the ciggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm was wrongly considered by the RTC. It explained:
The aggravating circumstance must be proved with equal certainty as
the commission of the crime charged. The prosecution is burdened to
prove that [Mercado] used an unlicensed firearm to perpetrate the
crime of murder. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to discharge such
burden. It has offered no documents which would prove such allegation
when it could have easily secured a certification from the Philippine
National Police to the effect that no firearm license was issued to
[Mereado] to possess and carry the gun used in the killing.19 (Citation
omitted)
Given the prosecution's failure to establish the aggravating
circumstance, the CA likewise modified the amount of damages due
the victims' heirs, through the deletion of the award of exemplary
damages. Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision dated November
29, 2013 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
appealed joint Decision dated March 28, 2011 of the [RTC], Branch 16
of Zamboanga City, in Criminal Case Nos. 18497 and 18498 is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification as to the damages awarded, such that
[Mercadoj is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Victor Dulap y Vargas, in
Criminal Case No. 18497, the following: 1) Moral damages of
P75,000.00; 2) Civil indemnity of P75,000.00[;] and 3) Temperate
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Moreover, he is ORDERED to
pay the heirs of Charlie Dulap y Vargas, in Criminal Case No. 18498,
the following: 1) Moral damages of P75,000.00; 2) Civil indemnity of
P75,000.00[;] and 3) Temperate damages of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this appeal.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x--x
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 12, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, convicting accused-
appellant Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed
against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment from 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal minimum,
as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum,
and to indemnify Aira Velasquez in the amount of P30,000.00; and (2)
rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify Mary Joy Ocampo in the
amount of P50,000.00.
Mary Joy ran to the bathroom and examined herself. Her underwear
had bloodstains, and her vagina was bleeding. She felt pain when she
washed herself. Her mother returned as she was about to go to school,
but because of fear of accused-appellant she said nothing.[19]
Two weeks later, still in the month of October, while Mary Joy was
watching television alone in the living room, accused-appellant
approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he succeeded in
forcing her to their room. He lowered her shorts and underwear, raised
her shirt and bra, and started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle
finger into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with her. Mary
Joy cried out in pain, prompting him to stop, although he continued
kissing and fondling her.[20]
Up to April 1997, accused-appellant continuously molested Mary Joy,
sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and at other times licking her
vagina.[21]
Regail did not want to believe her daughter and thought that her father
was just joking with the latter. However, Aira started to cry. In the days
that followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her vagina
while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why her vagina hurt, Aira
said it was because of the things her grandfather had been doing to her
vagina, showing her mother what had been done to her.[23]
On April 28, 1997, Regail noticed pus coming out of Airas vagina. She
also noticed that her daughter was running a fever, and that her vagina
was red and swollen. She took Aira to Dr. Lydia Buyboy, a private
physician, who told her that her daughter had lacerations in her vaginal
area and that she had probably been fingered. However, the doctor
declined to give a medical certificate as she did not want to get
involved in any case.[24]
Regail went home and told her stepmother everything. Angelina cried
as she could not believe what she had been told. Remembering that a
similar thing had happened to her sister-in-laws daughter, Regail talked
to Mary Grace.
That evening, Mary Grace told her husband Ranold about the doctors
examination and findings. But they did not know what to do. They could
not talk to accused-appellant as he was always drunk and they were
afraid of him.[27]
On April 30, 1997, a despedida was held for Angelinas sister Loida
Kellow, who was leaving for the United States. On that occasion, Regail
told her aunt about Airas and Kimberlys ordeal. Angelina was brought
in. They also called Mary Joy who, after drinking beer, began to tell
everything. Mary Grace and Regail were summoned, and eventually
they pieced together accused-appellants pattern of abuse. They
decided to file a case against him.
Early the next morning, Angelina and Loida went to the police station to
make a report. They then went back to the house, fetched the children,
and brought them to Dr. Lydia Buyboy for medical examination.
However, Dr. Buyboy refused to examine the children. They next went to
the Mabalacat District Hospital. Meeting the same rejection, they went
to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), where
they obtained the assistance of a certain Mrs. Dimabuyu. They
proceeded to the Ospital ng Angeles where, with Mrs. Dimabuyus help,
they were able to prevail on Dr. Edwin Manson to conduct a physical
examination of Aira, Kimberly, and Mary Joy. However, Dr. Manson told
them that Sige, titingnan ko sila pero walang magandang resulta akong
maibibigay sa inyo.[28]
COURT:
How about this Aira, the daughter of Regale Velasquez, did you take
care of your granddaughter Aira?
A Yes, sir. Si Aira ay nagpunta sa amin noong galing siya sa mga auntie
niya sa Mabalacat at ang nanay niya sometimes in January dahil
pakakasal nga siya sa Amerikano. Noong napunta sa amin si Aira, si
Aira ay isang maldita at lumalaban ng bata. Madaldal ang batang iyan.
Ano man ang gawin mo sa kanya marunong nang magsinungaling.
Kunin niya o mo ang pera at tanungin mo kung sino ang kumuha ng
pera, ang sasabihin niyan si Tatay. Paluin mo maski hindi ikaw ang
kumuha ng pera, ang sasabihin si tatay. Paluin mo maski hindi ikaw ang
pumalo sasabihin niyan si Tatay. Pero may insidenteng nangyari diyan
noong nagdumi siya sa labas, wala siyang panty. Sabi ko, pumasok ka
sa loob at mag-panty ka dahil maraming sasakyang dumadaan diyan.
Umasta siyang paganoon. Pinalo ko siya ng flies wiper (sic).
COURT:
Q And Aira was then only less than two (2) years old?
The following day, he went to Manila. He pawned his watch and ring
and bought a ticket on the Super Ferry 10. At 9 oclock that evening, he
sailed for Cebu and stayed with his eldest son, Rolando Velasquez.[45]
Three weeks later, he learned of the cases filed against him from the
newspapers and television. However, because he had no job and no
money, he was unable to return to Pampanga to clear his name. He was
found in Cebu and arrested in July.[46]
She said that her sister Regail had told her what accused-appellant had
done to Aira. Her brother Ranold Velasquez and sister-in-law Mary
Grace Velasquez also told her that Kimberly had been molested by
their father. Angelina and Loida then suggested that their father should
be killed. As her brothers Ranold, Renel, and Roberto did not agree,
Angelina and Loida decided to leave the house and escape from
Lamberto Velasquez. [49]
Renato Cruz, Rochelles husband, testified that, from the window in their
house, he saw accused-appellant being given a drink containing a
sleeping pill. He also testified that Loida and Angelina wanted accused-
appellants children to cover their fathers mouth with a pillow while he
was asleep, but they did not have the courage to do so.[50]
2. Criminal Cases No. 97-308 and Criminal Case No. 97-309 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;
I The trial court erred in denying the accused of his right to preliminary
investigation.
II. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Regail Velasquez
even if it is hearsay evidence and polluted testimony.
III. The trial court erred in holding there was rape on October, 1994 and
erred in giving credibility to Mary Joy Ocampos testimony despite her
unbeli[e]vable and inconsistent testimonies.
IV. The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimonies of
Lamberto Velasquez, Adelaido Velasquez, Sonia Velasquez, Mario
Manarang, Roselle Velasquez-Cruz, Renato Cruz and Roberto
Velasquez.
[I]t appearing that the accused was indeed aware of the filing of the
charges against him several months ago before the Office of the City
Prosecutor and that instead of participating in the said preliminary
investigation, he went into hiding and [was] arrested only recently after
the cases were filed against him several months ago, the accuseds
motion for reinvestigation and to defer arraignment was denied in open
court.
A Opo.
Q While you were doing all those things, do you recall of any unusual
incident that came into your personal knowledge?
Q What exactly did you notice when Aira went up to your room and
reported this matter to you?
A Sinabi niya sa akin kung paano inaano ng tatay ko. Binukaka niya
iyong isa niyang paa tapos inaano ang daliri sa ari niya.
Q What do you mean by inaano?
PROS. PORNILLOS:
You mean to tell us, she demonstrated how the act was done?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness demonstrating by raising her right foot with the right finger
pointing to her sex organ doing to and from movement towards her
vagina)
Q Did you come to know from her who was doing that?
A Opo.
Q What did you receive from Aira was the one who was doing that?
....
WITNESS:
COURT:
WITNESS:
A Opo.
A Opo.
A Mama, Mama sabi niya tapos umiiyak po siya, tapos sabi ko, ninano
ka? I-tatang, i-tatang. Bakit ninanu na kang tatang sabi ko.
A Opo.
COURT:
WITNESS:
Tinanong ko siya kung ano ang ginawa sa kanya, Binukaka ang paa.
(Witness demonstrating that she slightly opened her foot and her finger
pointing to her vagina making to and fro movement)
COURT:
WITNESS:
COURT:
WITNESS:
Iyon nga po. Inaano daw po ng tatay ko, masakit daw ang ari niya.
A Hindi ko gaanong pinansin dahil baka binibiro lang siya ng tatay ko.
PROS. PORNILLOS:
After that you said you did not mind the same because you said he was
just joked upon or teased. After that April 16, 1997, what did you find
out next?
WITNESS:
COURT:
WITNESS:
Sabi niya. I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya.
WITNESS (Interpretation)
COURT:
Did you ask her what her tatang did to her vagina?
WITNESS:
A Opo.
Q How?
A Binuka iyong isang paa. Ginanon o.
A My lumalabas na nana.
Q When you notice this nana on the vagina of your daughter, what
action did you take, if any?
WITNESS:
Q: Like what?
1. If this Robertson is a family name, she knew (him) as the person who
will marry her sister (p. 41, tsn, December 31, 1997).
2. As to Jesus Mendoza alias Tootsie, Mary Joy claims that she does
not know Jesus Mendoza although her mother declared that Mary Joy
knew Tootsie Mendoza. It is apparent that Mary Joy knew of a Tootsie
Mendoza, but not a Jesus Mendoza.
ATTY. CLEMENTE:
You mentioned about this conclusion that the above description genital
findings were compatible on sexual intercourse with a man on or about
the alleged date of commission. When you said date or commission
when was that?
A As I stated earlier, the types of laceration were old and healed and it
[is] possible that those laceration[s] were made on the victim at the time
of the commission of the crime. As relayed to me it started on October
1994 up to April 1997, it is possible.
Q You mentioned that the described findings were possible with sexual
intercourse with a man and you confirmed to this Honorable court that
the most logical object that entered the female organ of Mary Jane was
the penis of a man?
A 80%, sir.
....
A Yes, sir.[74]
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender being a special qualifying circumstance, which increases the
penalty (distinguished from a generic aggravating circumstance which
only affects the period of the penalty), should be alleged in the
information, consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In this case, the information in the Criminal Case No. 97-311 alleged
that accused-appellant, who is the stepfather of the complainant,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the latter, who was then 13
years old. However, while it appears that accused-appellant married
Angelina Dungca on November 8, 1989 (Exh. F), the Court has serious
doubts about the validity of their marriage, considering that Angelinas
previous marriage to Roberto Ocampo, the father of Mary Joy Ocampo,
was still subsisting at that time. In fact, Mary Joy admitted that her
father Roberto Ocampo was still alive when her mother contracted her
second marriage.
In Criminal Case No. 97-311, the decision of the same court finding
accused-appellant Lamberto Velasquez guilty of rape and sentencing
him to death is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Lamberto
Velasquez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay P50,000.00 in
moral damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ordered by the trial court to be paid by him.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
In rejecting this appeal, the Court reiterates the following doctrines: (1)
a retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier credible testimony;
(2) the testimony of a single witness, if positive and clear, is sufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge for murder; (3) the
rule on res gestae relates to the admissibility of evidence, not to its
weight and sufficiency; (4) alleged violations of the rights against illegal
arrest and seizure are deemed waived by the appellant's failure to
assert them prior to arraignment; (5) where the killing is qualified by
treachery, which is alleged in the information, the crime committed is
murder; and (6) where the existence of the unlicensed firearm allegedly
used in the killing has not been clearly established, the charge of illegal
possession of firearm cannot be considered an aggravating
circumstance in murder.
The Case
On January 6, 1994, two Informations, one for murder[1] and the other
for violation of Presidential Decree 1866,[2] were filed at the Regional
Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan against Noel Navarro. On January
19, 1994, Navarro, through Counsel Romeo L. Gutierrez, filed two
motions, one to remand the case to the provincial prosecutor for
preliminary investigation and the other to suspend the proceedings
before the court.[3] Judge Segundo B. Paz granted the motions.[4]
Thereafter, on March 3, 1994, filed against the appellant was this
amended Information for murder:[5]
xxxxxxxxx
"SO ORDERED."[10]
"On January 5, 1991, around 9:00 in the evening, Jose Rabago went to
Enoc Theater located at Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan to view some
stationary pictures exhibited outside the theater (p. 11, TSN, May 20,
1994). When he was about to go home on board his motorcycle, he was
invited by Ferdinand Rabadon, who was drinking beer inside Adela's
Restaurant, to join him. Rabago obliged (p.12, id.).
"During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did not
divulge the identities of the assailants for fear of his life (p. 37, TSN,
May 20, 1994). He claimed that some policemen in Alaminos,
Pangasinan [were] members of the Aguila Gang which kill[ed] people
(pp. 41-42, TSN, June 13, 1994). The gang [was] allegedly led by one
Ramon Navarro, appellant's brother.
"Dr. Francisco Viray, who autopsied Rabadon's cadaver, found five (5)
gunshot wounds and concluded that the immediate cause of death
[was] "cardio-respiratory arrest; antecedent cause: brain injury and
underlying cause: gunshot wounds" (p. 11, TSN, August 8, 1994)."[12]
"On January 5, 1991, in the evening, one Ferdinand Rabadon was shot
to death near the Enoc Theater at Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
Almost immediately after the shooting incident, Jose Rabago reported
the incident to one policeman, Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, was inside a
restaurant near the Victory Liner Terminal that his (Jose Rabago)
companion was shot without him telling the policeman Virgilio "Itlog"
Rabadon who shot his companion. Policeman Rabadon responded by
going to the place pointed to by Jose Rabago, but the victim was no
longer at the place of the incident as he was brought to the hospital.
Later, Jose Rabago was investigated by policeman Rolando "Lando"
Rabadon regarding the shooting incident, but Jose Rabago, when
asked, told policeman Rolando[14] Lando Rabadon that he did not see
anything. Considering the negative result of the police investigation, no
case was filed by the police against anybody for the shooting to death
of Ferdinand Rabadon.
"Three (3) years later, on January 5, 1994, at about 8:00 o' clock in the
evening, a composite team of the National Bureau of Investigation led
by Atty. Teofilo Gallang served a search warrant and warrant of arrest to
one Ramon Navarro, brother of accused-appellant in his residence and
failing to find Ramon Navarro, the composite team of the NBI went to
the house where accused-appellant was staying where they saw him
(Noel Navarro). Accused-appellant was searched, but [nothing was
found] in his body. Accused-appellant was arrested right then and there
without any warrant of arrest shown to him by the NBI. In fact, it was
admitted that the NBI composite team at the time [had] no warrant of
arrest against accused-appellant.
"Jose Rabago was positive about the identity of the killers of the victim.
He was just one (1) meter away from Ming Basila and he was facing
Ming Basila when he fell down. He saw the gun firing when it was Noel
Navarro's turn to [shoot] the victim, and he [had] already taken three
steps to [run] away towards the Philippine Rabbit Bus Station, but he
claim[ed] that he looked back.
"x x x the Court cannot find any evidence or any indications that Jose
Rabago [had] a sinister scheme to prevaricate and therefore this Court
must respect as trustworthy, and with full faith and credence, his
testimony as eyewitness for the prosecution."[17]
In all, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder, after finding that
the killing was qualified by treachery and merely aggravated by illegal
possession of firearms.[19]
The Assigned Errors
The appellant contends that the lower court committed the following
errors:
In sum, the defense disputes the trial court's ruling identifying appellant
as one of the authors of the crime. To resolve the appeal fully, the
following issues will be discussed: (1) credibility and sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, (2) res gestae, (3) the defenses of denial and
illegality of arrest and (4) the characterization of the killing. In addition,
the Court will discuss the validity of the lower court's ruling that illegal
possession of firearms should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the killing.
In the present controversy, the judge who penned the assailed Decision
did not hear all the evidence presented by the parties. In fact, three
judges handled the case: Judge Segundo B. Paz, in whose court the
Informations were filed and the evidence of the parties was heard until
August 17, 1994; Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, who took over on December
7, 1994 and resolved the petition for bail; and Judge Jules A. Mejia,
who presided over the case from February 26, 1997 onwards. Hence,
the rule granting finality to the factual findings of trial courts is
inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the Court meticulously pored
over the records, especially the transcript of stenographic notes, but
after a careful study and deliberation, the Court finds no reason to
disturb the factual findings of Judge Mejia.
The argument does not persuade. True, Rabago did not mention the
name of the appellant when he reported the killing to both SPO2 Virgilio
Rabadon and Patrolman Rolando Rabadon;[22] however, he explained
that he was apprehensive about talking to the police, as he suspected
that some of them were members of the dreaded Aguila Gang, viz.:
"x x x x x x x x x
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
x x x x x x x x x"[23]
"x x x x x x x x x
Q In your affidavit, Mr. Witness, you mentioned that there were other
witnesses [to] the killing. [A]ccording to you, on January 5, 1994, there
were other witnesses x x x, and your answer was "yes", but nobody
there talked anymore due to fear for their lives.
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what about your statement that these other witnesses fear for
their lives, was that not your statement in your sworn statement?
Q And what about you, are you not afraid of the Navarros?
A I am afraid, sir.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Witness, that a lot of people here in Alaminos are
afraid of the Navarros?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x"[24]
"x x x x x x x x x
Q What did Noel Navarro do after Ming Basila shot Rabadon from
behind?
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that Noel Navarro shot Ferdinand Rabadon, how many times
did Noel Navarro shoot Boyet Rabadon?
A Thrice, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Witness, considering that it was about nine o' clock in the evening
when Ming Basila and Noel Navarro shot Boyet Rabadon, how were
you able to see Basila and Noel Navarro shoot Boyet Rabadon?
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
A About three.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How far were you from Boyet Rabadon when Ming Basila and Noel
Navarro shot him?
x x x x x x x x x"[25]
"The Court wonders why of all things, Rabago will apply for witness
protection program of the government, if it [was] not true that he had
witnessed the occurrence of the events as he related them when he
was presented as [a] prosecution witness.
"And later on, after giving his version of the incident that happened as a
witness for the prosecution, why of all things, will he come to know the
date of the trial or hearing for [the] defense when according to him, not
even the accused, not even the lawyer of the accused, not even the
subpoena had reached him, and yet, surprisingly, he was present on
June 16, 1995 to given again his testimony in favor of the accused.
"His only reason why he [had] to testify for the defense [was] that his
conscience bothered him, but this Court cannot buy that kind of
explanation and believe it."[28]
It is a legal truism that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To sustain conviction, the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw
strength from the weakness of that of the defense.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
Appellant Noel Navarro with moral certainty. Indeed, the Court has held
that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge for
murder.[33]
The appellant seems to imply that when Rabago reported the incident
to SPO2 Rabadon, Rabago's silence regarding the identity of the killers
created doubt as to the appellant's culpability for such killing and, thus,
should have been likewise considered by the lower court in appellant's
favor as part of the res gestae.[38] This proposition deserves scant
consideration. Such omission cannot be taken to mean that appellant
was not the culprit. The witness was simply silent as to the identity of
the assailant. Such omission, as has been discussed, can be attributed
to Rabago's fear of the Navarros.
Witnesses' delayed reporting of what they know about a crime does not
render their testimonies false or incredible, for the delay may be
explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence
to get involved in a criminal case. But more than this, there is always
the inherent fear of reprisal, which is quite understandable, especially if
the accused is a man of power and influence in the community.[39] In
People v. Vias,[40] it was held that "[t]he natural reluctance of a witness
to get involved in a criminal case, as well as to give information to the
authorities is a matter of judicial notice."
The crime committed was murder. As alleged in the Information, the trial
court correctly concluded that the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon was
qualified by treachery.
While we affirm the trial court's conviction of the appellant for murder,
we do not agree with its disquisition finding the charge of illegal
possession of firearms to have aggravated the killing.
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5, 1991, the
appellant had in his possession an unlicensed firearm which he used in
killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was allegedly recovered on
January 5, 1994, when appellant was arrested. However, said firearm
was not presented in court or offered as evidence against the
appellant. Although Rabago testified that he saw the appellant with a
"short" firearm when the latter shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991, no
other proof was presented to show that such gun, allegedly used on
January 5, 1991, was the same one recovered on January 5, 1994. The
prosecution was not able to establish sufficiently the existence of the
subject firearm, and this fact was not offset by SPO1 Edmund Garcia of
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who testified that appellant was
not a licensed firearm holder in Pangasinan. Since the charge of illegal
possession of firearms was not proven, the same could not be
considered to have aggravated the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon.
In any case, since the killing was qualified by treachery, the crime
committed was murder. Whether with or without this alleged generic
aggravating circumstance, the penalty, reclusion perpetua, would still
be the same, because the killing was committed in January 1991, when
the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed by the
Constitution, and RA 7659 had not yet been enacted.
Damages
SO ORDERED.
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DECISION
This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and
Alfemio Malogsi, which affirmed with modifications the Decision2 dated
January 31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants Marcelino Dadao,
Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi for
the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in Criminal Case No. 93-1272.
The genesis of this court case can be traced to the charge of murder
against the appellants in the trial court via an Information3 dated July
16, 1993. The accusatory portion of said indictment reads:
That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more
or less at barangay Salucot, municipality of Talakag, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill, by means of
treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and sho[o]t PIONIO YACAPIN,
hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that cause[d] his death
thereafter.
To the damage and prejudice [of] the heirs of the deceased PIONIO
YACAPIN in such sum they are entitled under the law.
On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All four (4)
accused pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge leveled against them.4
The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion,
a 12-year old stepson of the victim, corroborates the testimony of his
older brother Ronie Dacion.
Prosecutions fifth witness, SPO2 Nestor Aznar, testified that he was the
one who prepared the sketch of the hut where the incident happened
and further testified that the four accused were in the custody of the
government and in the following morning of the incident, he was at the
scene of the crime and found in the yard of the hut eight (8) garand
empty shells caliber 30m[m].
After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial
court finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering
Pionio Yacapin. The assailed January 31, 2005 Decision disposed of
the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused, EDDIE
MALOGSI, [A]LFEMIO MALOGSI, ANTONIO SULINDAO and
MARCELINO DADAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the said four accused are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim, the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as moral damages and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay the cost of the suit.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated
January 20, 1992, the bailbonds of all four accused are hereby ordered
cancelled and the latter are ordered detained, pending resolution of
any Appeal that may be pursued in this case.6
Hence, appellants, through counsel, seek final recourse with the Court
and reiterate the following assignment of errors from their Appellants
Brief filed with the Court of Appeals:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
III
Appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt because the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
were afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making
them of doubtful veracity. Furthermore, appellants faulted the trial court
for disbelieving their alibis and for disregarding the fact that the paraffin
test which all of them were subjected to produced a negative result.
Appellants also underscored the fact that they did not take flight
despite the knowledge that they were made suspects in the murder of
Pionio Yacapin. Lastly, appellants maintain that the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not have been
appreciated as it was not alleged in the criminal information filed
against them.
Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.20 Furthermore, we have also
held that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.21 In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was
killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. We quote with
approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter,
to wit:
Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the
prosecution.1wphi1 The Court notes, in particular, the testimony of
Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making a fire in
the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted
on the bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical
chart certified by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, shows
the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The
chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind. Clearly, the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.22 (Citations omitted.)
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect
of the death of Eddie Malogsi during the pendency of this case.
Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him at
the time of his death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged
had become irrelevant because even assuming that he did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally
extinguished by his death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code and, by analogy, our ruling in People v. Bayotas.30 Therefore, the
present criminal case should be dismissed with respect only to the
deceased Eddie Malogsi.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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