Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Justice Santos State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire
Rule 77. Section 4. Estate, how administered. estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati
1. Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon property should be given to respondent.
G.R. No. 139868 - The trial court found merit in the opposition, disapproved the project of
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON partition and adjudicated the entire undivided interest to respondent.
June 8, 2006
- October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an
I. Relevant Facts: amended complaint for the annulment of the trial courts Orders dated
- Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens residing in February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
the Philippines with an adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
- Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
- Audrey died leaving a will which bequeathed her entire estate to Richard when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
and designated him as executor. The will was probated in the Orphans Court Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Ancheta Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should
(Petitioner) as ancillary executor. be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely thereof, and since Richard
left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
- Richard later married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) in 1981. Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
- October 12, 1982, Audreys will was admitted for probate in then CFI of
Rizal in a special proceeding No. 9625. Petitioner then made an inventory Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner
on Audreys properties. contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
- July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will wherein he bequeathed his entire knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive
the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A. their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
- Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. II. Issues:
- October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion 1. WON the orders can no longer be set aside.
to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed on 2. WON the project of partition should be allowed.
October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, apportioning them
between Richard and Kyle. III. Rulings:
- The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial 1. The orders may be set aside.
court. The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard Generally, a decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest). erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through states:
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants
terms of her will. of another state or country.
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Records bear the fact that the filing of the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
project of partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto, and the order evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991. Since the action for annulment was filed in Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed. of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
2. The project of partition should be disallowed. fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the
resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law
of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
Question as to title to property should not be passed upon in testate or Whether or not the CA properly determine that the RTC committed
intestate proceeding. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
2. Aranas v. Mercado that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.
ISSUE:
3. Lebin v. Mirasol g. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
5. Hence this appeal for review on certiorari.
Lebin v Mirasol
GR No. 164255 Issue:
07 September 2011 1. WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal for their
failure to timely file a record on appeal
Under heading: Question as to title to property should not be passed upon in 2. WON the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that Lot 18 be
testate or intestate proceedings. sold to both petitioners and respondents in equal portions.
Doctrine: Ruling:
1. Implicit in the power of the probate court to approve disposition of 1. RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners appeal for their failure to
property of an estate is the power to rescind, nullify, or modify the timely file a record on appeal. Such appeal is mandatory and
disposition of the sale to conform to law or the standing policies set jurisdictional, because failure to perfect the appeal within the time
and fixed for the purpose. prescribed by the Rules of court causes the judgment or final order to
2. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid become final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. [NOTE: This issue is not jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order.
included under the heading of Justices outline, but was consistently 2. According to Section 39 of BP 129, the rule stating that filing of a
stressed out in the case.] record on appeal is no longer required does not include special
proceedings.
Facts:
1. Elbe and Erlinda Lebin (Petitioners) offered to purchase from the
Estate of Hodges the lot where their house stands, Lot 18, located in
Iloilo City. The administrator sought approval of the court, stating that 1. RTC committed no reversible error in allocating Lot 18 to both
petitioner was the actual occupant of the lot, and the same was petitioners and respondent. The approval of the offer to purchase
granted. would be conditioned upon whether the petitioners were the only
2. Vilma Mirasol (Respondent) also wanted to purchase the lot where actual occupants.
their house stood, which was initially stated as Lot 4, but after a 2. Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale,
survey revealed her house was actually built on Lot 18 and not Lot 4, mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate, which requires
filed a petition for relief from the order. Pending resolution of the judicial approval before it could be executed. Implicit in the
petition for relief, petitioners paid the last installment and moved for requirement for judicial approval was that the probate court could (a)
the execution of deed of sale, which was apparently not acted upon rescind or nullify disposition made without its authority or (b) modify
by the RTC. such disposition to conform to law or standing policies set and fixed
3. RTC ruled that the petitioners and respondents are to be the owners for the purpose, where the same was invalidated based on falsity of
of the lands where their respective houses stand. Petitioners filed a factual basis, mistake, or concealment of material fact (i.e. the claim
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. that petitioners were the only occupants of Lot 18).
4. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and an alleged record on appeal. 3. Hence, the probate courts modification of approval of petitioners
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the record on offer to purchase was within the power of the RTC to nullify or modify
appeal was filed late. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. after it was found to be contrary to the condition of approval.
a. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the RTC.
b. Petitioners allegedly filed a record on appeal. Authors Note:
c. Petitioners presented an ex-parte motion to approve the I included an issue sa case which is not related sa outine (or at least wala
record on appeal. pa nato naabtan) kay gi.balik-balik man gud siya and taas-taas ang
d. Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. discussion on its importance so gi.apil nalang nako. Basin diay diha ka i.ask
e. RTC granted the motion to dismiss stating that the record on ni Justice. Feel free to omit the irrelevant issue (highlighted parts) when
appeal was filed late. writing.
f. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
4. Romero v. CA being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and
established in the intestate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO VS. HON. COURT The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO AND VITTORIO C. ROMERO Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. CA
dismissed the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition
be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6
be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance.
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience. Petitioners assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just
because the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners,
FACTS: as heirs, are purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a
separate civil action in order to protect their interests. Petitioners
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death, their mother, assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
held several real and personal properties in trust for her children. estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are arise during the proceedings.
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners claim that, their brother Vittorio through fraud, ISSUE:
misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the
properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their Whether or not the probate court may rule on issues pertaining to
mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon title over property only in a provisional capacity.
her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and
vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or RULING:
knowing their contents.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of The probate court has jurisdiction to
Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private determine the issues in the present case
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to
question were acquired long after the death of their father, Judge provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the only
Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal. interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the
They allege that some of the lots were paraphernal properties of proceeding, viz:
Aurora which she had mortgaged.
RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners complaint. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate
pending in that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
late Dante Y. Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of
his compulsory heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs practice "which may be waived."
and defendants in this case could not be adjudicated nor passed
upon by this Court without first getting a definitive As a general rule, the question as to title to property should
pronouncement from the intestate court as to the share of each not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding.
of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate. Even the That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That
claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same expediency and convenience.
included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an listed the properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or of their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be the same
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the
all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to decide the question of xxx In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the
ownership. question of ownership of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
exception to the general rule that questions of title should be probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
ventilated in a separate action.Here, the probate court had partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve- to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its proceedings xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties
are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are
proceeding. already subject of an intestate proceeding, the judgment of CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over is AFFIRMED.
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and
strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated
thus:
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the
case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated
in a separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title
or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be
Exception: General Rule: A probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership.
5. Coca v. Borromeo Exception: Parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of 3rd parties are not impaired, the probate
COCA vs BORROMEO court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
171 Phil 246 Why? It is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one which may
be waived.
DOCTRINE: The probate court had already received evidence on the ownership the
"As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed 12-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from
upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated title inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who have all
in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions appeared in the intestate proceedings.
justified by expediency and convenience."
FACTS:
Pangilinan spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate. They
were in possession of a homestead consisting of 2 parcels of land
located at Calamba, Mis. Occ.
Lot 1927- OCT under the name of Juan Pangilinan
Lot 1112- OCT under the name of Heirs of Juan Pangilinan
3rd lot (Lot 1920) also forms part of estate of Pangilinan Spouses
Special proceedings was constituted in CFI-Mis. Occ. for the settlement
of the estate of Pangilinan spouses
CFI- deferred action on the project of partition until ownership of 12
hectares which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and 6
hectares which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (all 18 hectares were
excluded from the inventory) is determined in an ordinary action.
CFI- noting no separate action had been filed to determine ownership of
the 12 hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but
excluding the 12 hectares claimed by Francisco Pangilinan
-did not bother to decide how remainder should be partitioned and
whether Prima Pangilinan had share on the remainder
CONTENTIONS in Appellate Court:
Appellants(petitioners):
-the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of 12-hectare portion of Lot 1112
Appellees(respondents):
-the lower court did not decide the ownership of the 12 hectares when
it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition
ISSUE:
How the title to the 12 hectares should be decided, whether in a separate
action or intestate proceedings?
HELD: We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Rule 78, Section 1. Who are incompetenets to serve as executors or SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators
administrators No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who
Later on Edward died so Jose Jr. moved for his appointment as new regular Plainly, the RTC found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator,
administrator. However this was opposed by MIMCO, heirs of Edward and more competent than Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of
George and they nominated Atty. Reyes as regular administrator. RTC Preference, manifesting none of the disqualifications set by law.
appointed Jose Jr. on the ground that Jose Jr. is not previously declared as Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and
unfit, there is a necessity to appoint a new regular administrator and as a unsuitable to administer his fathers estate.
legitimate child of the decedent, he has higher interest than Atty. Reyes.
Petiotioners then filed motion for reconsideration and moved for the
appointment instead of George as administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate but it as
denied. CA affirmed stating that RTC appointing Edward as regular
administrator instead of Jose Jr. did not make a finding of Jose Jr.s fitness
and suitableness to serve as regular administrator. Jose Jr. is competent and
not wanting in understanding and integrity to act as regular administration.
HELD: NO
The decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the Administrator of the
Estate of Jose, Sr., which decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by
this Court, was not merely a comparison of the qualifications of Edward and
Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the
unfitness of Jose, Jr.
June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on cognizance of it at the first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason
Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the RTC order why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper remedy was
granting letters testamentary to respondents.
still available. The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner should
Mar 13, 1997, CA dismissed the petition for having taken the wrong mode of have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
appeal.
Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly which states:
provides that:
The resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed and RTC Pasig ordered to
issue letters testamentary to Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand
Marcos II.
Authors Note:
Guys akong g-include dha ang tanan assignment of errors and below it ang
chika sa Supreme Court. Pued nana dli isulat ang kay for me isa ra ang main
issue. For reference lng na basin i-ask nya sa recits and to fully understand
the case. Relax lang..hehe.. #iwillneverforget(char lang!)
Order of Preference: Rule 73 Sec. 1 : in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death
8. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen Resides means actual residence which is different from legal
residence or domicile
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER Under Rule 73 , residence rather domicile is the significant factor
QUIAZON, Petitioners, Even if the word domicile is used, it means residence
vs. This rule is applicable in statutes fixing venues
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE RESIDENCE : the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
QUIAZON, Respondent. actual residence or place of abode
HENCE, RTC LAS PINA is the proper venue
This is where the deceased stayed in his lifetime
ORDER OF PREFERENCE Death Certificate is a proof of residence
DOCTRINE : A VOID MARRIAGE MAY BE ATTACKED BOTH But it is not binding to the court
DIRECTLY OR COLLATERALLY
There were sufficient evidences that the deceased resided in Las
pinas
One major factor is that ELESIO went to the court upon discovering
FACTS
that AMELIA had a subsisting marriage with another man
Elesio died intestate on December 2, 1992
Hence, it is impossible that Elesio still lived with Amelia in Tarlac
On 1994, ELISE Quiazon represented by her mother Lourdes filed a
upon his death
petition for letters of administration for the estate of Elesio at RTC
Las Pinas
Lourdes is the common law wife of Elesio and Elise is there child ON the marriage of Elesio and Amelia
Elise claims that she is the natural child A marriage that is void ab initio may be attacked directly and
Elise also claims that Elesios marriage with AMELIA (WIFE) was collaterally
bigamous since Amelia had a subsisting marriage with another man The applicable rule if the Civil code and not the family code
Amelia opposed the petition for the administration by elise Void marriage may be questioned even after death.
Amelia claims that Elesio was a resident of Tarlac , as stated in the There is not prescription
DeaTH CERTIFICATE and Las Pinas
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters
of Administration must be filed by an interested person
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY Ill, v ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTA Y, 7. Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Then Emilio II
G. R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012 filed and Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his
grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
RESOLUTION was betterequipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the decedent, Cristina
*This case is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision dated 16 June 2010, 8. On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent 9. The trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator
Facts: 10. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
1.The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June appointed respondent as administratrix (Isabel)
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein 11. On appeal by certiorari, The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner appellate court. decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas
Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos estate based on the
I), who predeceased his parents. grounds that Emilio III, as raised by Federico and Cristina (decedent) was
acknowledged by them as a grandchild, and that Emilio III is a legally
2. Isabels parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters
domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was Eventually acquitted which in Turn representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
Emilio I filed a case of legal separation against his wife(Isabel) which the
court ruled that the marriage is null and void. 12. In this MR, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
3. On 27 September 1993 Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Emilio III and Nenita Additionally she avers that Emilio III actions since his appointment as
administrator has caused damaged and prejudiced to the estate of Cristina,
4. On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial hence she (Isabel) should be made the sole administrator of the Estate.
Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristinas estate ISSUE: Whether Isabel is better Qualified to be an administrator of the
Estate?
5. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that as thesurviving spouse of
the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedents estate; Held: Yes. Isabel is Better Qualified to be an administrator of the Estate .
and file a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on
the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. This order
parents marriage being declared null and void. of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of
kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
6. However, in the original Decision, it was declared that Isabel and her reinforced in jurisprudence.
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in Thus, the paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
the estate of their legitimate grandmother over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the
estate and that the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate. In a number of cases, the SC have evidenced by the following: 1. He did not give a complete inventory as
sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of ordered by the probate court, 2. Emilio did not take action on certain orders
the estate and those interested therein. of the Probate court.
The court recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a Although Emilio was able to refute in court, some of the accusations of
decedent or rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court Isabel against him, as acting prejudicial to the estate, The SC has Not found
exercising the power of appointment. any clarification on Isabels accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted
properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and
In this Motion for Reconsideration the SC zeroed in on Emilio IIIs which he claims to be knowledgeable about. The general denial made by
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure
set forth in the Rules. to make and return x x x a true and complete inventory which became
proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court
The collected Jurisprudential teaching enunciates that mere demonstration and by his inaction on two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas
of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
person to coadministration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference Thus from foregoing circumstances , established by evidence, of Emilio IIIs
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator omission and inaction It speaks volumes of his unsuitability as administrator
of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest next of kin, the In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Isabel have a deep aversion for each other Moreover as the facts of the case
Court and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. prove that it is impractical, nay, improbable for Emilio III and Isabel to work
together, it would then be detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a
In the case at bar, based on evidence, the court took note of the following co-administrator (Emilio III) who has show an adverse interest of some kind
considerations of the case: 1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing of hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, Immediately interested
animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, in the said estate.
traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive 2.
Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III RULING:
working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof 3. Emilio III, for all Therefore the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not Previous Decision is Modified that the Letters of Administration over the
looked after the estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to
thereof. respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan,.
In addition, the court said that there considerations do not warrant the setting
aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Authors Note:
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other case #9. Suntay Resolution. To better understand the case read case No.
between Emilio III and Isabel Thus, Contrary to the assumption made in the 10
Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a
suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Isabel was able to prove that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator
of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as
10. Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded
Aguinaldo-Suntay V. Conjuangco-Suntay G.R. No. 183053 legal preference in the administration.
June 16,2010
I. Relevent Facts: 8) After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
1) On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999,
(Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedents estate on his behalf.
intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
9) The trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the
2) At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel died. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001,
Cojuangco-Suntay. appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
3) Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot decedent Cristinas intestate estate.
three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; 10) Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
and Emilio II. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA stated
that the respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin"
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Ta edo (Nenita),
referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Also
by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel
that jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the
Santos, respectively.
4) Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato
since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child mother.
of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I
II. Issues relevant to the topic
and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and
1) In the appointment of an administrator of the estate under Sec.
Cristina.
6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, whether Art. 992 of The
5) Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and
Civil Code applies.
Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City,
2) Under the undisputed facts where herein petitioner was
separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
reared by the decedent and her spouse since infancy,
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a
whether Art. 992 of The New Civil Code applies so as to bar
petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was
him from being appointed administrator of the decedents
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
estate.
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted
visits of her grandparents. III. Rulings of Supreme Court per issue
6) Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on 1) The SC stated that it is patently clear that the CA erred in
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents
Emilio III and Nenita estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
7) On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
in the conjugal partnership." The reasoning that Emilio IIIs humanity.
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and
rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
inapplicable to the case at bar. intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither
The order of preference is under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III
of Court is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts
from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
and circumstances of each case.19 Jurisprudence has long
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code
discretion of the trial court. 20 In the main, the attendant facts
that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a
descendants of a deceased.
joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship
principal consideration is the interest in the estate and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
of the one to be appointed. The order of estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question
preference does not rule out the appointment of on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
co-administrators, specially in cases where justice couple has yet to be settled.
and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here. Authors Note:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision of First issue lang yata relevant sa topic. Just included second issue for
the CA is reversed and set aside. Letters of reference
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio III
and respondent Isabel.
Authors Note:
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