Ch8 InteroperabilityStd&Cyber Security S

Interoperability Standards and Cyber
Security
Instructor
Walid Morsi Ibrahim
ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

1 Copyright 2016 Dr. W.G. Morsi Winter 2017
Interoperability
o Definition: is the ability of two or more
systems or components to exchange
information and to use the information that
has been exchanged.
o Benefits:
o Allows a network to seamlessly and
autonomously integrate all
components.
o Minimizes human intervention in the
processes.
o Challenges:
o Need for technical enhancement of
the network
o Adoption and adaptation of existing
technologies
o Development and implementation of
comprehensive standards.

Smart Grid Standards
Standard Body Description of Standard Application
Roles
International Electro Leading global IEC 61850 Substation automation
technical Commission organization IEC 61968 Distribution management and AMI
(IEC) which publishes IEC TC 13 and 57 AMI and communications for metering
standards
Institute of Electrical Standards in all IEEE 802.3 Ethernet
and Electronic areas of electrical, IEEE 802.11 WiFi
Engineers (IEEE) electronic and IEEE 802.15.1 Bluetooth
related IEEE 802.15.4 Zigbee
technologies IEEE 802.16 WiMax
Internet Engineering Responsible for RFC 791 Internet Protocol (IP)

Task Force (IETF) internet standards RFC 793 Transport Control Protocol (TCP)
RFC 1945 HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
Simple Network Management Protocol
RFC 2571 (SNMP)
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
RFC 3820 (PKI) for security

Smart Grid Standards (Cont.)
Standard Body Description of Roles Standard Application
American National Developed relevant standards ANSI C12.19 Metering tables internal to the meter
Standards Institute for interoperability of AMI ANSI C12.22 Communications for metering tables
(ANSI) systems
National Institute of Publications which provide NIST SP-800.53 Recommended Security Controls for
Standards and guidelines toward secured Federal Information Systems
Technology (NIST) interoperability NIST SP-800.82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Security
North American Electric Security standards for the NERC CIP Bulk Power Standards with regards to
Reliability Corporation bulk power system which 002-009 Critical Cyber Asset Identification,
(NERC) may be extended to the Security Management Controls, Personnel
distribution and AMI systems and Training, Electronic Security
Perimeters, Physical Security of Critical
Cyber Assets, Systems Security
Management, Incident Reporting and
Response Planning, and Recovery Plans
for Critical Cyber Assets.
World Wide Web Interoperable technologies HTML We page design
Consortium (W3C) (specifications, guidelines, XML Structuring documents
software, and tools) for the SOAP Web services for data transmission
world wide web

IEC 61850: Introduction
o IEC 61850 is a collection of
international standards defining [1]:
o How to describe the devices in an
electrical substation and
o How to exchange the information
about these devices.
o It simplifies considerably engineering
and testing, savings several Millions of
dollars
o It is the base for all developments in
substation automation

IEC 61850: Market Requirement
o Because of:
o Global, deregulated market
o Transnational business of utilities
o International business of
providers
o One and ONLY one global standard
for communication in substations and
beyond is needed [2]

IEC 61850: History
o Two Standards Emerge [3]:
o Utility Communications Architecture (UCA)
o IEC 61850
o In 1990s, EPRI and IEEE spear-headed an effort to define UCA to focus on inter Control Center communications and
Substation Control Center communications
o In 1994, EPRI/IEEE started working on the next phase of UCA namely UCA 2.0 to focus on the Station Bus.
o In 1996,Technical Committee 57 of the IEC began work on IEC 61850 with a similar charter-defining a Station Bus.
o In 1997, the two groups agreed to work together to define a common international standard that would combine the work of
both groups.The results of the harmonized efforts are the current IEC 61850 specification.
1994 EPRI
1996 IEC
& IEEE IEC 61850
TC 57
UCA 2.0

IEC 61850: Intra-Substation
Communications
o Typical architecture of Substation Automation
includes [3]:
o Apparatus (switchgear and associated
CTs and PTs)
o Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
o Substation Human Machine Interface
(HMI)
o Substation Controller
o Substation Controller tasks can include
collecting data from IEDs, performing system-
wide logic, system time synchronization,
filtering and pre-processing of data, and
presentation of substation data to remote
clients (network control center).
o The cloud represents the communications
infrastructure that integrates the IEDs into the
HMI and/or Substation Controller.

IEC 61850: Station Bus
o The goal for numerous years has been to
define a communications infrastructure
that will allow seamless integration of
IEDs into higher level devices.
o The infrastructure must be:
o Vendor independent and
o Allow devices from multiple

vendors to be integrated together

IEC 61850: Requirements
o Interoperability: The ability for IEDs from one or several manufacturer to EXCHANGE information and
USE the information for their own functions
o Free Configuration: The standard shall support different PHILOSOPHIES and allow a free allocation of
functions (e.g., it must work equally well for centralized or decentralized systems)
o Long term stability: The standard shall be FUTURE PROOF, i.e., it must be able to follow the progress in
COMMUNICATIONTECHNOLOGY as well as evolving SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS [2]

IEC 61850: Data Communication
o IEC 61850 divides data into
LOGICAL GROUPINGS
o In the figure shown:
o Protection data (relay has

picked up)
o Switchgear data (CB is
closed) and
o Measurement data (values
for voltage (V and current
(I))

IEC 61850: Logical Groupings
Logical Node Groupings Group Designator
o IEC 61850 defines a total of System Logical Nodes L

Protection functions P
13 different groupings of
Protection related functions R
data
Supervisory control C
o The intent is that all that
Generic References G
could originate in the
Interfacing and Archiving I
substation can be assigned to
Automatic Control A
one of these groups Metering and Measurement M
Switchgear X
Instrument Transformer T
Power Transformer Y
Further power system equipment Z
Sensors S

IEC 61850: Logical Nodes
Logical Node Groupings Group Designator Number PDIR Directional element
System Logical Nodes L 2 PHAR Harmonic restraint
PSCH Protection Scheme
Protection functions P 27 PTEF Transient Earth Fault
PDIS Distance protection
Protection related functions R 10 PVPH Volts per Hz relay
PDOP Directional over power
Supervisory control C 4
Generic References G 3 MMXU Measuring (Measurand unit)

Interfacing and Archiving I 4 MMTR Metering
MSQI Sequence and Imbalance
Automatic Control A 4 MHAI Harmonics and Inter-harmonics
MDIF Differential Measurements
Metering and Measurement M 7
Switchgear X 2
XCBR Circuit Breaker
Instrument Transformer T 2 XSWI Circuit Switch
Power Transformer Y 4
Further power system equipment Z 14
Sensors S 3

IEC 61850: Logical Nodes (Cont.)
o Each of the groups are further subdivided into Logical Nodes
o There are 86 different types of Logical Nodes defined
o Each of these are composed of data that represent some application specific meaning and are intended to provide
separate sub-categories of data
o Example:
o The Protection Function comprises of 27 different Logical Nodes.
o To map this to the real world, data from a protective relay with 21 and 51 elements would be mapped to PDIS and
PTOC logical nodes respectively.
PDIR Directional element

PHAR Harmonic restraint
Logical Node Groupings Group Designator Number
PSCH Protection Scheme
Protection functions P 27 PTEF Transient Earth Fault
PDIS Distance protection
PVPH Volts per Hz relay
PDOP Directional over power

IEC 61850: Data Classes
Data Classes Number
System information 13 A Phase to ground amperes for Phases 1, 2 and 3

Amps Current of a non three phase circuit
Physical device information 11 Ang Angle between phase voltage and current
CtlV Voltage on secondary of transformer as used for
Measurands 66 voltage control
Den Density of gas or other insulating Medium
Metered values 14 FDkm The distance to a fault in kilometers
HaTdA Current Total HarmonicDistortion
Controllable Data 36
HaTdV Voltage Total Harmonic Distortion
Status information 85
Settings 130
Total 355
o There are 355 different classes of data that are used to construct Logical Nodes. These data classes are
divided amongst the 7 categories detailed above.

IEC 61850: Logical Groupings
o The container is the Physical
Device, it contains:
o One or more Logical
Devices, each of which
contains
o One or more Logical
Nodes, each of which
contains
o A pre-defined set of Data
Classes, each of which
contains
o data

IEC 61850: Defining Devices
Physical Devices Breakdown into Logical Nodes
o IED1 is a multifunction IED and supports the following
o Protection (Time Over Current, 51) PTOC LN


o Protection related (Auto reclosing, 79) PREC LN

o Monitoring of CB XCBR LN
o Control of CB CSWI LN
o Monitoring of CB XCBR LN
o Control of CB CSWI LN
o Monitoring of Disconnect Switch XSWI LN
o Control of Disconnect Switch CSWI LN
o Measurement (V, A,W, etc.) MMXU LN
o Metering (Energy) MMTR LN

Logical Nodes are Grouped inside a Logical Device
o These eight Logical Nodes are grouped inside one Logical Device

IEC 61850: Accessing Data
o Accessing data in IEC 61850 network is analogous to accessing data across a conventional IT network using
Windows Explorer.
o By browsing the network until the data source is located
o Then drill-down into the data source until the data is located.
o Assume personnel responsible for the HMI wish to animate a CB symbol on a one-line diagram:
o CB1 is being controlled and monitored by IED1, so they would browse the network until this Logical
Device was located
o They would need enough 61850 nomenclature knowledge to know that the XCBR LN is associated
with the status of the CB, then drill down into that folder
o The XCBR LN consist of 14 folders. The Pos folder contains information about switch position, so this
would be drilled-down into.

o The Pos folder is of type Controllable Double Point (CDP) data class. The CDP data class consists of 14
data fields
o The StVal field contains the value of the CB
Data Context is Retained
o HMI personnel browse the devices directly and subscribe to the data they require
o There is no need for an intermediate cross-reference of data

Devices are Self-describing
o Data from the other IEDs are available to the HMI and Substation Controller for incorporation into one-
lines, historical archives, control sequences, logic programs, automation applications, etc.

Peer-to-peer communications
o GOOSE is an acronym for Generic Object Oriented System-wide Events.

o It aims to replace the conventional hardwired logic necessary for intra-relay coordination with station bus communications.
o Upon detecting an event, the IED(s) use a multi-cast transmission to notify those devices that have registered to receive the data.
o The performance requirements are stringent no more than 4 ms is allowed to elapse from the time an event occurs to the time
of message transmission

Sharing Configuration Data
o GOOSE requires peer-to-peer communications between relays, quite possibly from different vendors
o Configuring the requisite Publisher/Subscriber model could be a very daunting task, especially when each vendor will have their
own proprietary configuration program.

o IEC61850 has an elegant solution to that challenge. IED vendors are required to provide a descriptor file for their IEDs in
Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.
o XML defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format which is both human-readable and machine-readable
o Substation Configuration Language (SCL) is an XML-based language that allows a formal description of:
o Substation automation system and the switchyard and the relation between them
o IED configuration
o Support for private extensions
o XML provides many of the same features as HyperText Markup Language (HTML) with the important distinction that it not
only presents data, but also provides instructions on how the data should be interpreted.
o The eventual goal is for the devices to transmit their configuration in XML upon request
o The use of XML and SCL will provide visibility onto the data available from any vendor which will allow dynamic configuration
of the GOOSE communications
o This configuration tool of Vendor W is used to read the IED Data Set Definitions of IED2, IED3, and IED4 from vendors X, Y
and Z respectively.
o The subsets of data that IED1 require from the others (to be used in logic programs or for blocking) are identified and
downloaded into IED1
o The same procedure would be followed using the configuration tools of the other IEDs.
o Until the IEDs are themselves able to produce the XML data, it will be made available by each vendor and delivered along with
the IEDs in some electronic format.
o While not allowing dynamic configuration, this interim step will still minimize configuration effort considerably.

Downstream of IEDs
o Communications downstream of the IEDs with the apparatus has traditionally been accomplished by hardwired I/O used to
monitor CTs and PTs and control CBs and switches.
o IEC61850 details a Process Bus that aims to change that.

Downstream of IEDs
o The Process Bus replaces hard wired connections with communication lines.
o Smart CTs, PTs, and switchgear continuously transmit data over the process bus and any upstream devices that wish to use the
data for protection, measurements, metering or monitoring do so by monitoring the communications.

IEC 61850: Interoperability Example
o Two protective relays from different vendors, one with protection functions and the other with recloser functions, a test set
which is simulating CT and PT inputs, and a IEC 61850-enabled Switchgear simulator are as shown.
o Pertinent configuration information is shared between the two protective relays and the test set using XML data.
o Test set simulates a fault
o Relay with protection functions detect the fault and issues a trip message via GOOSE
IEC 61850: Interoperability Example
o Switchgear simulator trips the breaker and issues a GOOSE messages containing the new status of the breaker
o Relay with recloser function detects breaker has tripped and issues Reclose command visa GOOSE
o Switchgear closes breaker and issues a GOOSE messages containing the new status

IEC 61850 Structure
o IEC 61850-x (x = part number)
System Aspects Configuration
Part 1: Introduction and Overview Part 6: Configuration Language for

electrical Substation IEDs
Part 2: Glossary
Part 3: General Requirements
Part 4: System and Project

Management
Part 5: Comm. Requirement for
Functions and Device Models

IEC 61850 Structure (Cont.)
o IEC 61850-x (x = part number)
Abstract Communication Services Mapping to real Comm. Networks (SCSM)
Part 7-1: Principles and Models Part 8-1: Mapping to MMS and to ISO/IEC
8802-3
Part 7-2: Abstract Communication Part 9-1: Sampled Values over Serial
Services (ACSI) Unidirectional Multi-drop Point-to-point link
Data Models Part 9-2: Sampled Values over ISO 8802-3
Part 7-3: Common Data Classes

Testing
Part 7-4: Compatible Logical Node Classes Part 10: Conformance Testing
and Data Classes

IEC 61850: Benefits
o Eliminate Procurement Ambiguity.
o Not only can SCL be used to configure devices and power systems. SCL can also be used to precisely define user requirement
for substations and devices.
o Using SCL a user can specify exactly and unambiguously what is expected to be provided in each device that is not subject to
misinterpretation by suppliers.
o Lower Installation Costs.
o IEC 61850 enables devices to quickly exchange data and status using GOOSE over the station LAN without having to wire
spate links for each relay.
o This significantly reduces wiring costs by more fully utilizing the station Local Area Network (LAN) bandwidth for these
signals and construction costs by reducing the need for trenching, ducts, conduit, etc.
o LowerTransducer Costs.
o Rather than requiring separate transducers for each device needing a particular signal, a single merging unit supporting Sample
Measured Values (SMV) can deliver these signals to many devices using a single transducer lowering transducer, wiring,
calibration, and maintenance costs.
o Lower Commissioning Costs.
o The cost to configure and commission devices is drastically reduced because IEC61850 devices dont require as much manual
configuration as legacy devices.
o Client applications no longer need to manually configured for each point they need to access because they can retrieve the
points list directly from the device or import it via an SCL file.
o Many applications require nothing more than setting up a network address in order to establish communications
o Most manual configuration is eliminated drastically reducing errors and rework.
IEC 61850: Benefits (Cont.)
o Lower Equipment Migration Costs
o Because IEC 61850 defines more of the externally visible aspects of the devices besides just the encoding of data on
the wire, the cost for equipment migrations is minimized.
o Behavioral differences from one brand of device to another is minimized and, in some cases, completely eliminated.
o All devices share the same naming conventions minimizing the reconfiguration of client applications when those
devices are changed.
o Lower Extension Costs.
o Because IEC 61850 devices dont have to be configured to expose data, new extensions are easily added into the
substation without having to reconfigure devices to expose data that was previously not accessed.
o Adding devices and applications into an existing IEC 61850 system can be done with only a minimal impact, if any, on
any of the existing equipment
o Lower Integration Costs
o By utilizing the same networking technology that is being widely used across the utility enterprise the cost to
integrate substation data into the enterprise is substantially reduced.
o Rather than installing costly RTUs that have to be manually configured and maintained for each point of data needed
in control center and engineering office application, IEC 61850 networks are capable of delivering data without
separate communications front-ends or reconfiguring devices

IEC 61850: Benefits (Cont.)
o Implement New Capabilities [4].
o The advanced services and unique features of IEC 61850 enables new capabilities that are simply not possible with
most legacy protocols.
o Wide area protection schemes that would normally be cost prohibitive become much more feasible.
o Because devices are already connected to the substation LAN, the incremental cost for accessing or sharing more
device data becomes insignificant enabling new and innovative applications that would be too costly to produce
otherwise.

Information Security

Why Information Security of Smart Grid
is Important?
o Obtaining information about
customers loads could be of interest
to unauthorized persons and could
infringe the privacy of customers
o The ability to gain access to electricity
use data and account numbers of
customers opens up numerous avenues
for fraud.
o Breaching the security of power system
operating information by an
unauthorized party has obvious
dangers for system operation.

Why Information Security of Smart Grid
is a challenging task?
o In legacy grid:
o The use of private communication
Private
networks provide natural security Network
against external threats.
o SCADA and ICT systems for the
control of the power network are
Built-in
kept separate. Security
o In smart Grid:
Proprietary
o Millions of customers becoming Control
part of the smart grid System
o Unlimited access to ICT

infrastructure
Security in legacy electric grid
o The system becomes so extensive
and integrated with other
networks.
Smart Grid Cyber Security Drivers
Increasing New 2-way

Interconnection System (e.g.
and Integration AMI, DSM)
Control Systems Increasing

Not Designed Number of
with Security in Increased Systems and Size
Mind Attack Surface of Code Base
&Increased
Risk to
Operations
Source: Corporate Risk Solutions, Inc.

Smart Grid Cyber Security Risks
o May impact equipment and systems,
network management and integration,
communications, control and
operations, and system availability.
o Primary components at risk:
o IT applications,
o Communication network, and
o End points (e.g., meters, in-home

displays, and thermostats)

Cyber Security Concerns Associated with AMI
Systems

Mitigation to Cyber Security Risks
o Security measures should ensure the following:
o Privacy that only the sender and intended receiver(s) can understand the
content of a message.
o Integrity that the message arrives in time at the receiver in exactly the same way
it was sent.
o Message authentication that the receiver can be sure of the senders identity
and that the message does not come from an imposter
o Non-repudiation that a receiver is able to prove that a message came from a
specific sender and the sense is unable to deny sending the message.

Mitigation to Cyber Security Risks
o Encryption and decryption:
o Symmetric key encryption.
o Public key encryption.
o Authentication
o Authentication based on shared secret key
o Authentication based on key distribution center
o Digital signatures
o Secret key signature
o Public key signature
o Message digest

References
1. H. Kirrman, Introduction to the IEC 61850 Electrical Utility Communication
Standard, ABB Switzerland Ltd. Corporate Research, ABBCH-RD, Project C2-
012/12 HK.
2. K.-P. Brand, IEC 61850 Short Tutorial, Cigre, Mar. 2005.
3. D. Proudfoot, UCA and 61850 for Dummies, Siemens Power Transmission and
Distribution, 2002.
4. R.E. Mackiewicz, Overview of IEC 61850 and benefits, in Proc. IEEE Power
and Energy Society General Meeting, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2006.
5. J. Ekanayake and N. Jenkins, Smart Grid: Technology and applications,
Wiley & Sons, New Jersey, 2012.
6. J. Momoh, Smart Grid: Fundamentals of design and analysis, Wiley & Sons
Inc., New Jersey, 2012.


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Interoperability Standards and Cyber

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

Internet Engineering Responsible for RFC 791 Internet Protocol (IP)

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o Global, deregulated market

o Transnational business of utilities

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o Vendor independent and

o Allow devices from multiple

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o Protection data (relay has

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o IEC 61850 defines a total of System Logical Nodes L

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

Generic References G 3 MMXU Measuring (Measurand unit)

Further power system equipment Z 14

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

PDIR Directional element

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

System information 13 A Phase to ground amperes for Phases 1, 2 and 3

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o IED1 is a multifunction IED and supports the following

o Protection (Time Over Current, 51) PTOC LN

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o IED1 is a multifunction IED and supports the following

o Protection (Time Over Current, 51) PTOC LN

o IED1 is a multifunction IED and supports the following

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o GOOSE is an acronym for Generic Object Oriented System-wide Events.

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

System Aspects Configuration

Part 1: Introduction and Overview Part 6: Configuration Language for

Part 3: General Requirements

Part 4: System and Project

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

Abstract Communication Services Mapping to real Comm. Networks (SCSM)

Part 7-3: Common Data Classes

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o Unlimited access to ICT

Increasing New 2-way

Control Systems Increasing

Source: Corporate Risk Solutions, Inc.

ELEE 4115U Fundamentals of Smart Grid

o Communication network, and

Ch8 InteroperabilityStd&Cyber Security S

Ch8 InteroperabilityStd&Cyber Security S