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LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
1. Banogan v. Zerna
2. Ledesma v. Climaco
3. Cui v. Cui
4. Alawi v. Alauya
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal process.
5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho

6. Chua v. Mesina
7. Soriano v. Dizon
8. Stemmerik v. Mas
9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC
10. Cordon v. Balicanta
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient

and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.
CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
11. In re Tagorda
12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo
13. Canoy v. Ortiz
14.Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by

initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of
the administration of justice.
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate

in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
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CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in

the discharge of their official duties.
15. Suarez v. Platon

16.Ramos v. Imbang
17. Catu v. Rellosa
18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar.
19.In re Galang
20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas
21.Samaniego v. Ferrer
22. Arnobit v. Arnobit
23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz
24. Advincula v. Macabata
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and

candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
25. Reyes v. Chiong

26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro
27. Alcantara v. Pefianco
28. Camacho v. Pagulayan
29. Torres v. Javier
30. Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.
31.Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

32. Cayetano v. Monsod
33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio
34. Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR
35. Aguirre v. Rama
36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
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CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon

38. Rivera v. Corral
39. Johnny Ng v. Alar
40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land
41.Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
42. Berbano v. Barcelona

43. Sebastian v. Bajar
44. Hegna v. Paderanga
45. Plus Builders v. Revilla
46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio

48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao
CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients.
49. Hilado v. David

50. Nakpil v. Valdes
51. Hornilla v. Salunat
52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo
53. Quiambao v. Bamba
54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
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56. Licuanan v. Melo

57. Posidio v. Vitan
58. Lemoine v. Balon
59. Re: Atty. Maquera
60. Reddi v. Sersbio
61.De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag
62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya
63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
64. Hernandez v. Go
65. PANELCO v. Montemayor
66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut
67. Belleza v. Macasa
68. Overgaard v. Valdez
69. Angalan v. Delante
70. Santon-Tan v. Robino
71. Somosot v. Lara
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
of law.
72. Briones v. Jimenez

73. Pena v. Aparicio
AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER
74. Manalang v. Angeles

75. Garcia v. CA
76. Santiago v. De los Santos
CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
77.Sesbreno v. CA
78. Bautista v. Gonzales
79. Gamilla v. Marino
80. Pineda v. De Jesus
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81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui

82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA
CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his

client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan

84. Pfleider v. Palanca
85. Mercado v. Vitriolo
86. Genato v. Silapan
87. Hadjula v. Madianda
88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
Canon 22 A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA

90. Venterez v. Cosme
91.Santero v. Vance
92. Francisco v. Portugal
93. Metrobank v. CA
94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA
95. Sesbreno v. CA
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza

97. Santos v. Llamas
98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo
99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput
100. Barrientos v. Daarol
101. Berbano v. Beltran
102. Tabas v. Malicden
103. Sesbreno v. CA
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 1 Independence
104. Libarios v. Dablos

105. Go v. CA
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106. Sabitsana v. Villamor

107. Tan v. Rosete
108. Dimatulac v. Villon
CANON 2 Integrity
109. Fernandez v. Hamoy

110. Dawa v. De Asa
111. In re judge Marcos
112. Lachica v. Flordeliza
113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana
114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero
CANON 3 Impartiality
115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan

116. Pimentel v. Salanga
117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.
118. Oktubre v. Velasco
119. Sandoval v. CA
120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.
CANON 4 Propriety
121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas

122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon
123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante
124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr.
125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10
Malolos City
126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda
127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo
CANON 5 Equality
CANON 6 Competence and diligence
128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.

129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta
130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional
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132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez

133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag
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CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
BANOGAN V. ZERNA
Facts:
The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on
February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on
March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for
review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26,
1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was
filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for
reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us on
certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court
dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it
had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had
operated against the petitioners.
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and
executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private
respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration. If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private
respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in
their the pursuant thereto.
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9,
1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the
petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it
occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.
It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they
should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for
thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position
is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
Issue:
W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.
Held:
YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that
litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
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verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon
any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater awareness on the part of
litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be
wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a
decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and
manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of
them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their
purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen
popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not
to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of
them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and
intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. As officers of the
court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this,
should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing
litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the
sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge
denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases.
Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election
registrar, which was still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is no
real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The
appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact,
readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all
lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the
proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees.
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CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge,
of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to
the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such persons as they
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna
Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of
Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into between them that was embodied on
a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the convenio or
of his brothers assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother
Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not
complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about
two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying
one for the practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the
legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the
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requirements that an applicant to the examinations has successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of
the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the
office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was
disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that
he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is
recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.
ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
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Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
CANON 1
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case
against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found
that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored in
the courts safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him that he
should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho
complied with the directives.
Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his
common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employees
money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest
earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept
the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that its
report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty. Kho is liable.
HELD:
YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
RATIO:
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Dishonesty Conduct
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure to
remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It
diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if
committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless
liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds.
Unlawful conduct
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution
and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyers
responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in
unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential
in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
CHUA V. MESINA
Facts:
Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses legal counsel and adviser upon whom
they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building (Burgos
Property) owned by Mesinas family, and another property (Melencio Property), also
owned by Mesinas family where the Chua spouses constructed their house. These two
properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesinas mother, Mrs. Mesina, in
favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina
failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to
help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio
property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m.
The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs.
Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter
executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in
favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital
gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus
suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to
1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As
suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979
was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as Felicisima M.
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Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to
be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of
the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the
spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent
about it. Respondent, by Affidavit acknowledged such obligation to be his and
undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio property.
Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986,
one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina
Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public
Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit,
Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with
the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the
property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his
exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the
true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of capital
gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of
Absolute Sale was antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against
Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of
sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property
for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of Felicisima M.
Melencio, the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson
subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging that his
filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference
with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence
against them.
Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that he
would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he
would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio
property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written
undertaking dated May 2, 1990.
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991. Despite
respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name,
he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was
being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia
thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and
Reconveyance of Real Property.
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ISSUE
Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?
HELD
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to
promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the
government is aggravating.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document,
a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants
reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua
spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the
misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his
mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of
good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a
much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at
arms length.
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1,
Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02.
SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the
grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself
(treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver,
binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din
tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
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f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the
victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral
turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only
because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe
off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly
indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he
is bound to obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for
4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful
person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
STEMMERIK V. MAS
FACTS:
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty.
He consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he
could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that
he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the
necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went back to
Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of
the big piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerik
agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing up the necessary
paperwork.
When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his name,
Atty Mas cant be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another lawyer, and
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to his horror, was informed that aliens couldnt own Philippine Lands and that the
property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty
MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty
Mas abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be
disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.
HELD:
YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying
Philippine Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a
fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross
ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void
and illegal.
Deceitful Conduct
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real
estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable,
respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Illegal Conduct
By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the
purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in
nature.
DE YSASI III V. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in
April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of
daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other tasks
as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the
farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
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Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with
his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982,
he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.
His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of
his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in
April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary.
Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is
entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other
benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
Held:
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay

petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification
or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole
year.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement."
Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their
clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court.
It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation.
Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their
avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the
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contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the
situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable
case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating
that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor
dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought,
the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection
of the same.
CORDON V. BALICANTA
FACTS:
Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her husband
with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a
corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed, and the
properties were registered in the corp.s name. Atty Balicanta was the one who single-
handedly ran the corp.s affairs, by being its Chairman, President, General Manager,
and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a
voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3)
transferred title of some of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board
resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land
Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold the Corps right to redeem the
properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral home of the Cordons and
sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the
proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties
and to account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The
Cordons terminated Balicantas services and filed a complaint for disbarment against
the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report, recommended for Balicantas
disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended
for 5 years for such conduct.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.
HELD: YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Deceitful Conduct
1
By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this resolution is automatically elevated to the SC for final action.
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The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of
plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He
started his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board,
Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from
assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered
into dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors
reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own
personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Side Doctrine:
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
CANONS 2 & 3
IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the
last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing the
fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering
services as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.). He
also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home
municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to
make known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including his
services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is
unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating
circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. It is
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also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation
of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and integrity of the
members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting to strife
otherwise peaceful citizens).
ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:
Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme
Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that
her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of
property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also
published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for
1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the
advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not
be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the
prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary
duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while
duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should
subordinate their primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes
and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must
be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the
lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer
may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar.
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CANOY V. ORTIZ
Facts:
A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing him
for misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in
this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the
preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the
office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000, Canoy was
shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998 for failure
to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy alleged that
Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low-
income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the
period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his
failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of
Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month.
Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes fidelity
to his clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to
him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. His negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, the relationship of a
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in
the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire the
status about the case as this is one of the lawyers duties.
The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as councilor
does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer to withdraw
his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office since councilors
are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:
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Justice Hofilena
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,

Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino
with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation
by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce
them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his
allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan.
Also, he attached respondents calling card:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01

Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulating of said calling card.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
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Justice Hofilena
Held:
Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business.
Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To
allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of
law (degrading the profession in the publics estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose
of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which
proscribes ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or through an
agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a
lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial
distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity
of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.
CANONS 4, 5 & 6
SUAREZ V. PLATON
Facts:
Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in turn
filed a case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case was handed
to Judge Platon following several changes in trial judge and several refusals by fiscals
to prosecute the case.
Issue:
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Justice Hofilena
Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?
Held:
Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must
reinvestigate in order to properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept in
mind that a prosecutor is the representative of a sovereignty; he is interested only in
the fact that justice is served, and this also includes his refusing to prosecute if the
innocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and his two-fold aim
is not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer. He is not at liberty to strike
foul blows because it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as it is to use
legitimate methods of prosecution.
RAMOS V. IMBANG
FACTS
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.
Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued
a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always
told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that
the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each
appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She
personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San
Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against
the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).
HELD
Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of
their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the
bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service.
For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
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Justice Hofilena
the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official
function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a
receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's
admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the
presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still
a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO
was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent
litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free
legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other
quasi-judicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the
prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when
he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his
legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of
Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and
accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant.
Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place
he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really
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filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were
being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that
never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not
to do any falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in
public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money
for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held
the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a
specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless,
respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.
CATU V. RELLOSA
FACTS
Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units
in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored
demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to
settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the
conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner
brought the case to court.
Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This
prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of
impropriety.
IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated
Rule 6.032 and RA 67133. The committee recommended Rellosas suspension from
practice for 1 month.
ISSUE
W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03
2
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in service
3
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees
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Justice Hofilena
HELD
No.
Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service.
Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of.
As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71604, which actually
allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also
governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written
permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do.
SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyers oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule
1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold
integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession.
SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look
up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
__________
Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their

profession?
Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says if the constitution or law allows it Public officers
however are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in
private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from
their department head.
PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court
of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's
liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill
gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents
Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by
Mendoza.
4
Local Government Code of 1991
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Justice Hofilena
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for

respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General
and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza?
HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of
banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not
significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance
of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against
the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue.
For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more
than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the
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Justice Hofilena
Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries
the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar.
As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on
the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.
CANON 7
IN RE GALANG
Doctrine:
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a
ground for revocation of his license to practice law, is well settled.
IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS
FACTS
Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was
precluded from taking the lawyers 1996 oath, pending approval from the
Supreme Court
This stems from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the Lex
Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a
result of hazing.
Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May 1995
May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyers oath and attached to
his petition certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding
character.
ISSUE
May Cuevas take the lawyers oath, taking in consideration the certifications
attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character?
HELD
Yes.
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Justice Hofilena
Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of that
moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the
petitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that he
has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he has
taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan.
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER

(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an
illegitimate child)
Facts:
Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship
became intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They lived together
as "husband and wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. The affair ended in
2000 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter.
Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a
relationship but did not think he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear
during the hearing since he did not want to see Samaniego.
Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a position
paper. He also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10
children to cohabit with Samaniego.
IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months
suspension for his refusal to support his daughter.
Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will further
cause extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer
lacked the degree of morality required of a member of the bar, his prayer for reduced
penalty was denied.
Held:
SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for 6
months.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit relation
as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is true
that Samaniego was not entirely blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrers wife, it
does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether both are in pari
delicto.
Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND

STAFF V. ATTY. DELA CRUZ
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Justice Hofilena
Facts:
Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against
Atty. Dela Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds:
a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent:
criminal case for child abuse; admin case for unethical acts of misappropriating
money for teachers; and the labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal
deduction of salary.
Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. He was married in 1982 and they separated in-fact a
year after. 7 years after, he contracts another marriage, but this was annulled for being
bigamous.
Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite
the expiration of his notarial commission in 87.
Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, but admitted
his second marriage and its subsequent nullification. He also admitted having
notarized documents when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he
offered defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.
IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and
1 year also for notarizing without commission (2 years total)
Held:
SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the
practice of law for 2 years, and another 2 years for notarizing documents.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous
marriage. However, after his failed first marriage, he remained celibate until the 2 nd
marriage, showed his good intentions by marrying the 2nd wife, and he never
absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty of disbarment is too harsh.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the
necessary commission, SC stresses notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. For doing such constitutes not only malpractice but also the crime of
falsification of public documents. Respondent also violated the Notarial Law for so
doing, and this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.
The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums. At
such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT
FACTS
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Justice Hofilena
Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband, respondent
Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary power over him.
Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they bore 12
children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him
until he passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in 1968, respondent
left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe Navarro who later
bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a complaint
for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery.
Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having
cohabited with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation
alleging that she was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge and
consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were
conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who
identified a letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he caused
the family; and the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testified
about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of their
marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented
himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek postponement,
pleading illness, on the hearing dates.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report:
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for abandonment
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. It
averred that an indefinite suspension is not recommended because respondent
supports himself through the practice of law and that it would be cruel deny him
of this at this time when he is already advanced in age.
HELD
The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral
conduct was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on this
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It expresses
itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong.
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Justice Hofilena
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or

shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.
Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.
Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of
his profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of his license.
Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the
bar. This, he failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges against
him, irresistibly suggesting that they are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and
have children with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should
therefore be disbarred.
ADVINCULA V. MACABATA
FACTS
Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents,
Atty. Macabata turnedthe head of Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing
incidents occurred after meetings regarding a case that Advincula was involved in. in
both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula inside the car, just before dropping her
off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via text messages
immediately after the 2nd kissing incident.
Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of
grossly immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but
that this was due to his feelings toward Advincula.
ISSUE
Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment?
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral
character.
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Justice Hofilena
Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or

so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. To
merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral.
Atty. Macabatas act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was
not motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabatas immediate apology and
the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that Atty.
Macabata lured her or took advantage of her.
While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded
and given a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful.
(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)
CANON 8
REYES V. CHIONG
FACTS
Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business
venture to set up a factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu
discovered that Pan had not established the factory and asked for his money back. Pan
became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of Atty. Reyes, who filed a
complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The complaint was
assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for Pan
to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-
affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of
Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed
a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga a
civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the dissolution of
the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was
instituted to exact vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for
conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleaded because of the
supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The SC referred the case to the
IBP.
ISSUE
W/N the civil complaint was groundless
W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil
complaint
HELD
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Justice Hofilena
Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes
and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint.
IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa
case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were
not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and
highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In filing the civil suit,
Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension
SC: affirmed IBPs recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some
alternative remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true.
Chiong could have filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of
Salangas decision to file the information for estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case
was also available if it was indeed filed without basis.
Relevant Provisions:
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.
ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO
Facts:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a
private practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainants
office to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded
to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case.
Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified
true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted,
You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy? Complainant replied
that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents. Respondent
then replied that complainant shouldve notified him. Complainant explained that it is
not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled stuff in
Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and
shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)
Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she wont appear in the hearing of
the case in view of the respondents public apology, and that the latter was forgiven
already.
Held:
Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.
36 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation
that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted
to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right
to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act
of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.
His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was
not only ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the
complainants subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent
apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say,
however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards.
ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO
Facts:
Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a
complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper
and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This
happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his client in the PAO office when the
wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a settlement. Moved by the
plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and shouted at
Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would realize
his mistake. As head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this ended up
with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was an idiot for sending him out of the PAO. Also,
Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him, Gago ka!
The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8
Held:
Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Pefiancos meddling in a matter in which he
had no right to do so caused the incident. And although Pefianco was moved by the
womans plight, what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to scold
Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down. Whatever moral
righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
37 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN
FACTS
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling
some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school
paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a
complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he
should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact
that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their
parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they
may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty.
Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was
already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty.
Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Ethics
HELD
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for
having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.
In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by
Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in
the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full
knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the
students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer
even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a
duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands
required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also
in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that
38 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
"A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel."
TORRES V. JAVIER
Facts:
Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for malpractice, gross
misconduct in office as an attorney an/or violation of the lawyers oath. This stemmed
from the remarks made by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all
funds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc. (UEFA) as counsel: 1. Motion to
Expedite contained false statements with malicious imputation of robbery and theft of
UEFAs funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.s fees case, Javier in his Reply
used abusive and improper language, and made a statement demeaning to the integrity
of the profession (not uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notaries asking their family
members to sign for them).
Javier explained that he was angry because Torres had been spreading reports
and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. With respect to
the atty.s fess case, he alleged that Torres, in his Answer, did not confront the issues
but mocked and made malicious accusations against his wife.
The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code
Held:
Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutely
privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however
false or malicious they may be (must be material and relevant). This privilege does not
extend to those matters not related to the controversy.
The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall under this privilege, but not those
in the Reply. The SC does not countenance Torres incorporation of criticisms against
Javiers wife as past president of UEFA, but this does not justify Javiers retaliating
statements (What kind of lawyer is Torres? He lies through his teeth).
Canon 8 instructs that a lawyers arguments in his pleadings should be gracious
to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
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Justice Hofilena
FACTS
Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by
offering, in some instances, a 50K loan.
ISSUE
Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby violating
rule 8.02 which provides that, A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon
the professional employment of another lawyer,?
HELD
Yes.
Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced
fees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan.
CANON 9
MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire
about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says
that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar,
is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the
respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support
services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be
allowed based on certain US cases decided.
ISSUE:
W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
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Justice Hofilena
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The
practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And
applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the
practice of law.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only
exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple
professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication
of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
FACTS
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for the
position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed by petitioner
Cayetano on the ground that Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Apparently, the
Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of the Philippine
41 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite
Cayetanos opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination.
Thus, Cayetano filed an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, basically
challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsods nomination.
ISSUE
Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?
HELD
YES.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law
under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of
Monsods employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where he
was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica. His job involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic
and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive of an investment bank and a business
conglomerate. By 1986, he rendered his services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant and he also worked as a Chief Executive Officer. He was also the
Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His position in
NAMFREL required his knowledge in election law. Also, he sat as a member of the
Davide Commission in 1990.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
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Justice Hofilena
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

There are several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law."
1. Habituality
2. Compensation
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls or legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law.
4. Attorney-client relationship.
CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO
FACTS
Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a disbarment
complaint on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office.
Deceit: represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a
prior existing marriage
Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libellous affidavits against a Makati
City counselor.
Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him a
senior partner in her law office. This is evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead which
included the husband as a senior partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an atty, 3)
appearance in court as counsel.
HELD
Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01
Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized practice of law
Rule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified person the performance
of a task that may only be performed by members of the bar in good standing
Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed through
with the investigation because such is a disciplinary proceeding. There is no private
interest affected such that desistance of the complainant will terminate the
proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those unfit to practice law.
AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION V. CIR
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Justice Hofilena
FACTS
This case involves a controversy over Attorneys Fees for legal services in the
CIR.
On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged a
complaint agains Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM) for unfair labor
practices, as specified in the Industrial Peace Act.
On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers and it became
final on March 1963.
On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to compute
the backwages of the complainant workers
Atty. Fernandez filed a Notice of Atty.s lien amounting to 25% of their money
claim (PhP79, 755.22). He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio Reyes
requested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonells lien of 5%.
Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said that the verbal agreement
entered into by the UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.s Fees shall be divided
equally by him, Atty. Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNIONs president.
There are other matters in this case regarding Jurisdiction but the one related to
Legal Ethics is on the issue on Atty.s Fees
ISSUE
W/N IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY SHARE
IN THE ATTORNEYS FEES.
HELD
NO. The court struck down the alleged oral agreement that the UNION President
should share in the Atty.s Fees. The UNION President is not the attorney for the
laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a
UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.s Fees is immoral. Such a contract we
emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. Note Rule 9.02.
AGUIRRE V. RAMA
FACTS
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie
Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar,
charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of
law, and grave misrepresentation.
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Justice Hofilena
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for
Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed
with the MBEC a pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her petition to be declared the winning
mayoralty candidate.
On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal
government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate).
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath
on 22 May 2001. Respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to
be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law.
HELD
Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied
admission to the Philippine bar.
1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine
Bar.
- Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as counsel in the
pleadings
- was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and of
party REFORMA LM-PPC
*all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys
2. What constitutes the practice of law
- The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
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Justice Hofilena
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf

of clients before judges and courts
- all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
- any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
- perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
- render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
* respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so.
3. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege.
- limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified.
- A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations.
- although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer.
LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA
Facts:
Judge Laquindanum charged Atty. Quintana with the offense of notarizing
documents beyond the jurisdiction of his notarial license and with notarizing
documents not known to him to be based on actual facts. It was also found that his wife
sometimes notarized the documents herself.
Issue:
Is Atty. Quintana guilty of violating Canon 9?
Held:
Yes. He was found to have assisted in the unauthorized practice of law by
negligently letting his wife notarize documents herself in his absence. His contention
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that he rectified this error by slapping his wife is of no moment because he did not in
the first place take the necessary steps to prevent this. He was also charged with
violations of the notarial law.
CANONS 10 & 11
FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON
FACTS
This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty. Villalon.
It started from a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to nullify a
Deed of Donation. Atty. Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of the case
against Fernandez.
In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez to help
him in a case against a land-grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with the help of
Fernandez.
In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest in buying
Palacios Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who
allegedly had a Deed of Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. This Deed of
Donation was registered.
Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed
against Fernandez. However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name
was proper, citing a Deed of Absolute Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was
actually Palacios who forged the Deed of Donation to cheat in taxes.
In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon for
violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has
suppressed and excluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about the existence of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way, unregistered. He says that no
mention of it was made in the petition for the annulment of thee Deed of Donation.
Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of the case. Sustaining Atty.
Villalons argument that she, as counsel for Palacios, was under no duty to include the
fact that the Deed of Sale existed because only the clients operative facts, and not other
evidentiary facts, need to be included in the complaint. The Deed of Sale was a matter
of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely point out during the trial.
Fernandez appealed the case.
ISSUE
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
HELD
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Justice Hofilena
None. Case against Villalon is dismissed.

A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings.
However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on
behalf of his or her clients opponent. She (Villalon) is not duty bound to build the case
for her clients opponent, Fernandez.
The cause of action chosen by Palacios was for the annulment of the Deed of
Donation. Client Palacios informed her that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of
consideration. Also, it was not registered and was not the basis of the transfer of title of
Palacios property to Fernandez. Therefore, it is not a necessary evidence/fact to their
case.
RIVERA V. CORRAL
Facts:
Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with
malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for
an ejectment case was received by Atty. Corrals secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice
of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of
court and changed the date February 23 to February 29 without the courts prior
knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral later on filed a reply to plaintiffs manifestation
claiming that he received the decision on February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb
29).
Issue:
W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the
decision of the court without the courts prior knowledge of decision
Held:
No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral
was made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the
notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. Because if the decision was
received on Feb 22, the notice of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To
extricate himself from such predicament, Atty. Corral altered the date he received the
courts decision. By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of
Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty. Dishonesty
constitutes grave misconduct.
JOHNNY NG V. ALAR
FACTS
The case stemmed from a labor case filed by the employees of the Ng Company
against its employers. The employees alleged that they did not receive their service
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incentive leave pay from their employers due to the latters claim that the employees
conducted a strike at the Companys premises which hampered its ingress and egress.
The case was referred to the labor arbiter and the latter found that the employees have
been paid their service incentive leave pay. The employees appealed to NLRC but the
latter affirmed the labor arbiters decision.
In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Inhibit (MRMI) where respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages
to support his complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his
findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol acted in the same manner with malice
thrown in when he adopted the findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring
commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the money claim
involved in the case is substantial. According to respondent, such acts constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment case with IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent wherein it was alleged that the latter
violated certain codes and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically,
respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein a lawyer is prohibited from
using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language against an opposing
counsel and before the courts.
In his defense, respondent argues that he did not violate any of the canons found
in the Code because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts referred to in the rules; 2) the
Commissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainants in labor cases are
entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to respondents counter-
complaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the lawyers of
the complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
when they filed multiple suits arising from the same cause of action and when they
deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor case.
The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to conclude that
respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of the complainant
did not violate any canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case a
similar conduct will be committed again.
ISSUE
W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD
YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal profession. The
MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and
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Justice Hofilena
intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and

lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings
that does not admit any justification.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board
of Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount
of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers of complainant, the Court
finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to
substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND
FACTS
De La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
claiming that Justice Tinga, who was the ponente of the decision, received P10 Million
from Mr. Johnny Chan in exchange for a favorable decision. De la serna
alleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him that Chan already given out 10M to
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in the case
between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr. Chan is a representative of Cattleya land). Atty.
De La Serna said that Justice Tinga abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v, Jorge to
accommodate Mr. Chan. He also said that the case was prioritized for resolution and
that Mr. Chan had prior knowledge of the outcome of the case before the decision was
promulgated.
However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose of
amicably settling their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in
Bohol. However, he denied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent so
much money for the Supreme Court
ISSUE
W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD
Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
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Justice Hofilena
Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to

its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience
of the court's orders but such conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court and
the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the
presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court
and justice. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice has also been considered to constitute indirect
contempt.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary to his duty to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers is to support
the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is expected to
bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court which
tend to corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that
anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the
matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay
in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public's trust in, the judicial
system.
This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the
court. It is a long recognized and respected right of a lawyer, or any person, for that
matter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long as they are made in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels. But it is the cardinal condition
of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action.
In this case, Atty. De La Serna's statements bear the badges of falsehood while
the common version of the witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the
hallmarks of truth. De La Serna's declarations were maliciously and irresponsibly
made. They exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. The libelous attack on
the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court
and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it.
BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN
FACTS
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Justice Hofilena
There was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the private prosecutors
representing the government were repeatedly absent or unprepared.
This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/private prosecutor was unhappy
with the dismissal and accused the judge of favoritism and gross ignorance of the law.
The lawyer went to the congressman in their district and through him filed a case
against the judge. this subsequent reached the supreme court.
HELD
The supreme court found the judge innocent and the lawyer was found to be the
one behind the case (against the judge) not the congressman.
The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt and given a stern warning as
well as fined for 2500php by the court.
Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file it within the justice system (ie office
of the court administrator / IBP) not with your congressman or other non-judicial
people.
CANON 12
BERBANO V. BARCELONA
FACTS
Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-in-fact
for their pending casevwith the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was
subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to
secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a
certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail,
they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona.
Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will cause the release
of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano could only
produce P15,700 by asking from relatives who were with her.
There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona
regarding the grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made
another payment via a pay-to-cash check for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went
to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000. Another P15,000 was handed to
Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daens nephew while Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline
expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty. Daens
because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to Atty.
Barcelona reached P64,000.
For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance,
Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP.
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Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach
of the Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and
ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before
the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted
the Commissioners findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of
law for 6 years.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred
HELD
Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and
remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have
proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar.
Berbanos Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the
finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona
in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his
contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to
overturn the Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01).
Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously
demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of
having connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen).
Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of
conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and
Atty. Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.). Respondent
has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper
connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will
allegedly be given to such connections (related to Canon 12).
SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR
FACTS
Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the DAR who
represented Fernando Tanlioco in numerous cases which raised the same issues.
Tanlioco was an agricultural lessee of a land owned by Sebastians spouse and sister-in-
law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the
basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The RTC
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rendered judgment ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of

disturbance compensation. This was affirmed by the CA and SC. Bajar, as counsel, filed
another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. RTC dismissed
this due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Bajar again filed another case for
Maintenance of Possession with the DAR Adjudication Board which raised the same
issues of conversion and disturbance compensation.
Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily
A. Bajar (respondent) for obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding
final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable
Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and
reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory
tactics.
The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to comment on the complaint
lodged against her. After a 2nd Motion for Extension, Bajar finally submitted her
Comment which was alleged to not confront the issues raised against her. The Court
required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and was later ordered to show cause
why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for such failure. The Court
referred the case to the IBP for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled that Bajar be
SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and
attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets
and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to
continue in the practice of law. However, Bajar continued to practice law despite the
decision claiming that she did not receive a copy of the order.
ISSUE
Whether Bajar violated the Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
YES.
Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the
final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is
beyond the bounds of the law. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts.
Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and
Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case
which involves the same issues. The Court held that an important factor in
determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and
the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.[72] Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should
not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice. It is evident from the
records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment
in theEjectment case. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to
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disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an

officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal
profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE
YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
HEGNA V. PADERANGA
FACTS
Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the Baclayon spouses for 10
years but during this period the Panaguinip spouses by means of force, threat,
intimidation, stealth and strategy (FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot
and constructed a shop for which he filed a forcible entry case.
Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to vacate the leased
premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal occupation. When
the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties of
the spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for a possible amicable
settlement which he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint
alleging that he bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001
which caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff.
Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar confidant for
deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice. He
also filed criminal charges against Atty. Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public)
for falsification of public documents and the Panaguinip spouses for false testimony
and perjury. His grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register of
Deeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didnt reflect any change of ownership & (3)
the Notarial Register Book showed tampering and erasures.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of prima
facie evidence of guilt but referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Atty. Paderangas defense alleged that for
ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the
previous owner and that he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made to
correct mistakes so that entries will speak the truth.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was improper in light
of the letter handwritten by Respondents clients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy
and forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer
necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties. In
addition, there were several instances where Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna
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Justice Hofilena
offering settlement and it was only when he denied them that he received the Third
Party Complaint.
ISSUE
W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle to Atty.
Paderanga?
HELD
Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility so given 1 year suspension. His
non-registration of the sale transaction so it would not appear in the records of the
BIR, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office so that
he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he
decided to sell; or place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying
estate and inheritance taxes upon his death.
Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property
of his client which is in litigation.
violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the
Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of
any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that
he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The
act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be
illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an
exemplar for others to emulate.
PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA
FACTS
In the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs. ATTY.
ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009, the
respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine
Supreme Court, finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful
and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law.
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of
Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the
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tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondents clients were mere tenants
and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the
way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainants rights over the
land. Continuing to pursue his clients lost cause, respondent was found to have
committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to
delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for
temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of
the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The
courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB
Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and
experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him
by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were
valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo
de Guzman, et. al. He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The
lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very
well, refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel,
respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his
interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and
notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years.
Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine the
rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he merely exhausted
all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the law,
considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm
and summary eviction by the complainant. He posited that he was only being
protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his own
family, and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.
HELD
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not
only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the
client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the
latters cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On
the contrary, it is apparent that the respondents acts complained of were committed
out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients
who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction
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in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case
is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost
responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers
have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This
obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. This is
the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a
case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ
FACT
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in the CA for a
sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received the
denied resolution for Garcia as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for Extension the day
before the expiration of the period to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for a
mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the
canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the
limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion for Extension, this time,
because he fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file the appeal on time,
thus asking for 20 days extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand excuse that
because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus requiring him more time to
conclude on the work load he missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the
request for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later, he did actually file the appeal.
(Finally!)
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for Extensions
were denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of the resolution denying
the appeal all together. However, instead of informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides
to forward the resolution of denial of the appeal some 7 months later, which greatly
angered his client, pushing him to file for his disbarment.
ISSUE
Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct, tantamount to violation of
his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his disbarment?
HELD
Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
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The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that each motion
will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing himself of the
Court's action thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent
knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his
desperate attempt to salvage the appeal.
Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of work or some other
unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of time will be granted.
Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course
but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's
action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do
so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but
himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should inform the
client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to
engage the services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a
solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he received a
copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent humbly
admitted his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the case.
CANONS 13 & 14
FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO
FACTS
Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr. Cordero
bought canned goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver spread
canned good. When Mr. Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they found that it
tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the canned good was infested with a
colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration (BFAD) and a subsequent investigation confirmed the presence of the
parasites. BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and the Corderos, where the
latter demanded P150k. Foodsphere refused, resulting to the Corderos threatening to
bring up the matter to the media.
Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample front page of a tabloid he
was involved with, which contained articles discrediting the latter, and threatened to
publish it if they didnt pay the amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphere refused as
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well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a Kasunduan between the two, where Foodsphere
agreed to settle the matter for a lower amount, but added that Foodsphere advertise in
Mauricios tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint. The
Corderos withdrew their complaint and BFAD dismissed the complaint against
Foodsphere.
Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an Advertising Contract asking the latter
advertisements of various media (which were a lotand expensive!) owned by
Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill, Foodsphere offered to patronize some advertisements
only. Mauricio was disappointed with this and threatened to proceed with the
publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in his radio talk show (Batas ng Bayan)
held a guessing contest with questions that asked which company had worms in its
liver spread. He also wrote in his columns and aired in his tv shows about the same
topic.
Foodsphere filed criminal and civil complaints against Mauricio about the
discrediting remarks that he has been making against the company. Foodsphere also
filed the present administrative complaint against Mauricio to the IBP, where he was
ordered not to make any more statements on the matter. Notwithstanding the pending
cases against him, Mauricio continued to publish articles against Foodsphere and
discredit them in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered that Mauricio be
suspended for 2 years. Mauricio now challenges the validity of the suspension.
ISSUE/S
W/N Mauricios suspension was valid.
HELD
YES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years.
Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of Rule 13.02
Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and IBPs orders that he
discontinue with his actions, he still continued with his attacks against Foodsphere and
its products. This is a clear and conscious violation the Code of Professional
Responsibility which is an improper conduct of a member of the bar.
NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated.
SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGUBAYAO
FACTS
Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 5144: People v. Luis Plaza. Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman.
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Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser denied
the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that evidence presented was
sufficient to prove the crime of homicide but not murder.
Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of the case) objected thereto on the ground
that the original charge of murder was not subject to bail (Rules of Court).
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the harsh
insinuation of Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate
by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail.
Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40k.
Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.
In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when
the evidence of the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former judge found the
evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not afraid to be cited for contempt
because it was the only way for the public to know that there are judges displaying
judicial arrogance.
RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he should
not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which
degraded the court with its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentations.
Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court,
sentencing him to 30 days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released).
Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio
Station DXKS and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan.
In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and
that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law.
RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt and be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02).
Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he
was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order. He justified his
response to the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simple exercise of his
constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without malice.
RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the
practice of law for 1 year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was
transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which recommended the
implementation of the RTCs order of suspension.
ISSUE
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W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility YES
HELD
Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers.
Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judge
Tan was ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of the law.
Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the
proper authorities.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press conference
and submitted to a radio interview to air out his grievances against Judge Tan.
Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements in the article, which
were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in court.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney.
CANON 15
HILADO V. DAVID
FACTS
- Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the sale of several house & lot
between Assad and her now deceased husband, during the Japanese occupation
- Assads counsel is Atty. Francisco
- Mrs. Hilados counsels are the following: Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo
- Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue representing Assad because Mrs.
Hilado consulted her about the case and even turned over some documents to
Atty. Francisco
- Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letter addressed to Mrs. Hilado
regarding the same case, which states that Atty. Francisco will not represent Mrs.
Hilado in the case and he thinks that the action against Assad will not prosper
- Mrs. Hilados counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty. Francisco
- Atty. Franciscos version of the story:
o Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about the case, but he refused to
become her counsel because he thinks that the action will not prosper
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o Days later, Atty. Franciscos assistant, Atty. Agrava, informed him that Mrs.
Hilado left some expediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco instructed Atty.
Agrava to return the expediente because they will not handle the case of
Mrs. Hilado
o Later, the firms stenographer showed Atty. Francisco a letter allegedly
dictated by Atty. Agrava which explains to Mrs. Hilado why they refuse to
take the case
o Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letter without reading it
o Later on, Assad went to Atty. Franciscos office. Afterwards, Atty. Francisco
accepted the retainer fee
- Lower Court Held: no other information was transmitted to Atty. Francisco other
than those in plaintiffs complaint and there was no attorney-client relationship
between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado. Hence, motion to disqualify is denied.
ISSUE
W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs.
Hilado
HELD
Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado
was to obtain Atty. Franciscos personal service as a lawyer
- Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the purpose is to
obtain professional advice or assistance and the attorney permits, then an
attorney-client relationship is established
- Formality is not essential
- Even is no secret communication was given, as long as there is an attorney-client
relationship which precludes accepting opposite partys retainer in the same
litigation regardless of what type of information was received
- Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance to administration of justice
- Even if the information was only received by an assistant, it is still considered as
professional service, besides an information imparted to a member of a firm is
made available to the entire firm
- Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assads counsel
Ratio: Rule 15.02 a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication in
respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client
NAKPIL V. VALDES
FACTS
Valdes is Jose Nakpils accountant, consultant and lawyer.
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Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to
lack of funds, he asked Valdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust.
Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the title
issued in his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses
estate. And, Valdes law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate.
Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in Joses
inventory of estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were charged
under his name.
The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes
family realty corp.
Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also, handled
the claims of Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.
ISSUE
w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code
of professional ethics
HELD
Yes.
The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is.
Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure
of the facts among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and probable
adverse outcome.
The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously
improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against for
the other side.
The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not supported by
evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for
quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation of claims.
Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.
The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the
certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist.
Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an
accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct
committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character requirement is not only a
requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing requirement for the practice of law.
A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession.
HORNILLA V. SALUNAT
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FACTS
Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the
Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the real
properties of PPSTA corporation.
Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors.
Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest.
ISSUE
Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the
same corporation in a derivative suit?
HELD
No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting
interest and is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession.
The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where
corporation directors have committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence a
stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of
the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party in interest, while
the stockholder who files a suit for the corporations behalf is only the nominal party.
The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed
directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO
FACTS
Northwestern University filed an administrative case against Atty. Arquillo for
representing conflicting interests in a NLRC case. The complaint alleges that Atty.
Arquillo appeared as counsel for both the petitioner and the respondent (Castro) in the
labor case. Atty. Arquillo, as a defense, contended that the petitioners and respondent
he represented in the labor case belonged to the same side as the latter party was
absolved from liability. Hence, there was no conflict of interests.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Arquillo represented conflicting interests.
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HELD
YES. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict
of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in
representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is
also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new
retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first
client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge
acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance of that duty.
Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should
have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged
belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed
employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the
respondents.
QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA
Facts:
Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for representing conflicting
interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing
her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.
Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Allied Investigation Bureau (AIB) and its president and
managing director (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Quaimbao in an
ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. While the ejectment case was
still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as the counsel of AIB, filed a replevin case against
Quiambao.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Held:
Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year.
At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still the
counsel of record of Quiambao in the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03, a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. This is founded on the principles of
public policy because it is the only way that litigants can be encouraged to entrust their
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secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of

justice.
3 Tests of Conflict of Interests:

1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty
3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment
HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO
FACTS
Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in
which Lydio and his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty.
Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by
Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact;
and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh
stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case.
Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the
said case, Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and
counsel of his businesses until his death in 1996.
However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that
was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declaration of nullity
of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as a consequence
of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.
Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that
by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were
impleaded a defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney.
They contend that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former
client, Lydio.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving
Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this case.
ISSUE
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W/N Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD
Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility
provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client.
The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest that
which his duty another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such
situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will
be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in the
fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The
clients confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment. The protection given to a client is perpetual and does not
cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them. It even survives the death of the client.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and
Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation
between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it is immaterial
whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.
As defense counsel in the first civil case respondent advocated the stance that
Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving
the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the
inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio,
with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase
respondents rights as co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased
by reason of Lydios death or through the completion of the specific task for which
respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed
to the of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have never been respondents clients, they derive
their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained
in the first civil case.
PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ
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FACTS
Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation
(MCC). Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors
because of the failure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel
investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to
Precedent.
Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the
Couples for Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active
members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all
his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel.
Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that
time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt
push through.
After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez
asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients
in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded
investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured
Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the
persistent demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez
several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when
Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued sending
her money for the case.
Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was
advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to
complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your
friend and lawyer.
------------
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I
know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you
hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos
will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.
-----------
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Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you
hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will
stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ----
Candy
When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned
P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in
appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas
repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.
Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting
interests.
HELD
Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing
conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating
with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of
Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez
cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying
that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly
accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been
referred to her by the SEC.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have
done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was
already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of
Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do
both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on
conflict of interest.
Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by
giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him.
Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in
helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any
liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her
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clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim
the money they invested with Multitel.
CANON 16
LICUANAN V. MELO
Facts:
Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional ethics.
Atty. Melo was Licuanans counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty.
Melo failed to remit to her the rentals collected nor did the said lawyer report to her the
receipt of said amounts. It was only after a year from actual receipt that Atty. Melo
turned over his collections to Licuanan because a demand made by the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals
collected
Held:
Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred.
Ratio:
The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1 year
period, the mount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is
deprived of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by
her, I a breach of the Lawyers Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident
transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melos professional misconduct, he has breached
the trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melos unprofessional actuations
considered, the SC find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office.
He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character.
POSIDIO V. VITAN
FACTS
Posidio engaged the services of Vitan in a Testate Proceeding of the deceased
Nicolasa Arroyo to which she paid Php 20,000.00 as legal fees. However, Vitan
withdrew his appearance in the said case thus, Posidio had to engage the services of
another lawyer. Six years after, Vitan contacted Posidio and told her that he has with
some tax declarations and other documents purportedly forming part of the estate of
Nicolasa Arroyo, but was not included in the inventory of properties for distribution.
He convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged
undeclared properties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees. After several months,
however, respondent failed to institute any action. Complainant decided to forego the
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filing of the case and asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but respondent refused
despite repeated demands.
The lower court ruled in favor of Posidio and ordered Vitan to return the Php
100,000.00 and pay an additional Php 20,000.00 as interest and damages. In
compliance, Vitan issued a Prudential Bank check that was dishonored later on.
Despite being sent a notice of dishonor and the repeated demands to pay, Vitan refused
to honor his obligation.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report
finding Vitan guilty of violating the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to
cover the same. The IBP penalized Vitan with a reprimand with stern warning that a
similar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty.
ISSUE
Whether or not Vitan should be penalized?
HELD
The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP. However, they find that
the penalty of reprimand is not commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by
Vitan.
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees
for filing additional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo.
However, he failed to institute an action, thus it was imperative that he immediately
return the amount to complainant upon demand. Having received payment for services
which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in keeping complainants money.
His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to do so despite
complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges
not to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his
clients.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come
to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of
his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with
the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real
property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to
his client upon demand. The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon
demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in
violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to
him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.
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LEMOINE V. BALON
FACTS
Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with
Metropolitan Insurance.
His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balons services as
his counsel
Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being
recovered payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as
to the fee.
Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of
Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance
for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise,
encash and receive payments
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed
his acceptance of the offer
December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to
Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that
Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine
suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation
December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on
the status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check
given to Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the
check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee
equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine
that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble
to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies.
Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of
Lemoine, however, he gave no evidence to such turnover
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
YES.
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According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21.
Specifically, Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an
account upon receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount
to Lemoine.
It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when
demanded upon him. Balon violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to
Lemoine contending that he has a lien on the fund.
The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule
16.03, presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be
charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the
funds in his possession to the payment of his fees, but rather he can file the necessary
action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present case, Lemoine never
gave his consent on the proposal of Balon.
It must be noted as well that before receiving the check, Balon proposes a 25%
attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%.
SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and ordered
disbarred.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY

OF GUAM OF ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA
Facts:
Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward
Benavente who obtained judgment in a civil case. Castros propery was sold at public
auction to satisfy the obligation, but Castro retained the right to redemption over said
property.
In consideration for Maqueras legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered into
an oral agreement that he would assign his right of redemption to Maquera.
Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for
$320,000.
He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for
Obtaining an unreasonably high fee for his services
Did not comply with Guams Model Rules by entering into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the
lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client,
and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in
writing
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Issue:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an attorney be
meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction
committed in the foreign jurisdiction?
Ruling:
It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence only.
The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court:
[]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 of the civil code which prohibits a
lawyer from acquiring by assignment the clients property which is the subject of
litigation. It extends to legal redemption.
Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and be mindful of the trust and confidence In him; and rule 1.01, which
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has the right to explain why he
should and should not be suspended/disbarred on those grounds.
Suspension/disbarment is NOT automatic
NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should be suspended from the
practice of law for the non-payment of his IBP dues from 1977.
REDDI V. SERBIO, JR.
Facts:
Reddi, an Indian national, is a philanthropist. She decided to put up a hospital in
the Philippines and acquired, with the help of Atty. Serbio, some properties to help
speed up generation of funds. It was later found out that some of the properties did not
in fact belong to the owners she paid.
Issue:
Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16?
Held:
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Yes. Said canon requires that a lawyer should properly account for all amounts in
his custody which pertain to the client and return the same upon demand. This the
respondent plainly failed to do even after repeated demands made by Reddi.
DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,

ATTY. EUGENIA J. MUOZ V. ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant de
Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
Complainant and her husband was a resident of USA. They both owned parcels of
land in Quezon City, registered in complainants name. Complainant authorized
respondent Atty. Lumasag [being the 1st cousin of her husband] to sell the lands.
Complainant was informed by respondent that he had sold only one lot and
remitted the proceeds to complainant. Respondent further told complainant that the
other lots remained unsold due to the presence of squatters.
After few years, complainant discovered that more than one lot was sold.
Complainant then sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn
over to her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties. Complainant also averred
that the Special Power of Attorney, which respondent had used to sell the lots is a
forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures
of complainant and her spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr. is guilty of deceit, dishonesty and
gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all
times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof
provides:
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by
the complainant and her spouse. Records show that two lots had been sold by
respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent, however, taking
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advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their
complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter that he had sold only one.
They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for
a party to a case without authority to so do.
WILSON CHAM V. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against
respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. Complainant Cham alleges that Atty. Paita-Moya
committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the
same without paying the rentals due. Respondent stayed at the leased premises up
without paying her rentals. She also failed to settle her electric bills. Later on, a report
reached complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit,
bringing along with her the door keys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Paita-MOya is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for one month. A review of the records would reveal that respondent is,
indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate
that respondent has existing obligations that she failed to settle. Hence, when
respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a
ground for administrative sanction.
Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for
the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly
state:
"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote
respect for law and legal processes.
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"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
JERRY T. WONG V. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II
FACTS
Jerry Wong as owner of a business selling agricultural and veterinary products
retained the services of Atty. Moya for the purpose of collecting due and demandable
debts in favor of the company. Sometimes also, Atty. Moya handled personal cases of
Wong and his wife.
Later, Atty. Moya asked financial help from Wong for the construction of his
house and the purchase of a car. Wong purchased a car on installment basis for Atty.
Moya. Wong issued postdated checks to cover the payment of the car while Atty. Moya
issued checks in favor of Wong to reimburse him for purchasing the car. The checks
issued by Wong were encashed by Transfarm (car seller) however, the checks issued by
Atty. Moya in favor of Wong were dishonored for the reason account closed. Despite
repeated demands, Atty. Moya refused to replace the dishonored checks.
Atty. Moya also introduced Wong to Quirino Tomlin from whom the construction
materials for his house was obtained. He bought this on credit but Atty. Moya filed to
pay this indebtedness causing embarrassment to Wong. Atty. Moya also handled a case
of the Wong spouses against Berting Diwa. Judgment was rendered in favor of the
spouses and as satisfaction of the judgment, Diwa paid P15, 680.50. Atty. Moya as the
counsel of the spouses received the payment but did not inform them. The Wongs only
found out about the payment of money when they got hold of the Manifestation with
Prayer to Terminate Proceedings.
The IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Moya to file his answer to the complaint for
disbarment filed by Wong. Atty. Moya filed 3motions for extensions (after the 1 st
motion was granted and the time had elapsed, he filed another one and so on and so
forth). Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and required him to file an answer.
Atty. Moya filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He then filed for an
extension to file his answer which was granted but with a warning that no further
extension requests will be entertained. When the time to elapse was near he filed a Very
Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer but the IBP-CBD did not accept this hence
he was declared in default after failing to file his answer.
The IBP-CBD ordered both parties to file their position papers because a
complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in 2years
from the date of the professional misconduct which in this case occurred in 2002 and
that it was already 2005. Atty. Moya did not file any pleadings at all.
The IBP recommended that Atty. Moya be suspended for 1year. The IBP Board of
Governors modified this and suspended Atty. Moya for 2years.
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ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of 2years is justifiable?
HELD
Yes!
1) Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless
checks. He did not deny these allegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyers shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It has been held that the issuance of worthless checks
as a violation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct.
2) The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless
checks by his dire financial conditions. He should not have contracted debts which
are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered financial reverses he should
have explained this with particularity and not though generalized and
unsubstantiated allegations.
3) Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his client.
His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that the
same had already been transmitted to the complainant.
4) His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of
serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several
extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and belated
plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous disregard of
the lawful orders which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding. This conduct
runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates
the lawyer's oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no
man for money or malice.
5) It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal
Profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
6) As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance of worthless checks constitutes
gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with 1year suspension.
However, in this case, Atty. Moya is suspended for 2years because aside from
issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he also seriously breached his
client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton
disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings.
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CANONS 17 & 18
HERNANDEZ V. GO
FACTS
Sometime in 1961, Hernandezs husband abandoned her and her son
Shortly thereafter, creditors of Hernandez s husband demanded payment of his
loans
Hernandez, fearful of mortgage foreclosures and aware of a impending claim suit,
engaged the legal services of Atty. Go
Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in
Zamboanga City belonging to her, so that he may sell them to enable her to pay
the creditors
Also, Atty. Go persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor without
any monetary or valuable consideration
Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were mortgaged to
creditors. When the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and
persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the said lots
Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to Hernandez
In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as agreed
upon, but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles
registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth millions
Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP
IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years
ISSUE
W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED
HELD
YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17
Atty. Go violated Canon 16
His acts acquiring for himself Hernandezs lots entrusted to him are acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment
Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the honor
of the legal profession
Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence in
Atty. Go and when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and
allowed him to sell the same
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Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to
Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties
Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how much he
sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so
In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of
law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light
Atty. Go was ordered disbarred.
PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I
(PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence.
Some of the omissions of Atty Montemayor were:
Atty. Montemayor failed to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief despite
the lapse of the two extensions of time granted, hence the Court of Appeals considered
the appeal Abandoned
The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did not even
bother to answer the complaint nor present his defense
Hence, PANELCO I prays that the court impose sanctions on Atty. Montemayors
gross negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of
PANELCO I.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in
mishandling complainants cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to
the prejudice of the complainant.
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the
practice of law. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every
remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his
clients cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until
its final conclusion.He should undertake the task with dedication and care.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT
HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
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CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT

AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
ADECER V. AKUT
FACTS:
Originally, there was a Criminal Case in which complainants were charged with
committing a crime (Other deceits) punishable under the Revised Penal Code (Other
Deceits). Respondent, Atty. Akut was their legal counsel in the criminal case.
Complainant accuses Atty. Akut for being negligent.
First, despite Atty. Akuts receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent
running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went
out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper legal advice.
Furthermore, Atty. Akuts admission that complainants were [1] under the impression
that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation
and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsels receipt of a
copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that Atty. Akut failed to give
complainants timely legal advise.
Atty. Akut explained that he was out of his office most of the time because, he and
his wife were always out of town looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain
tumor of his wife, who eventually succumbed to the cancer. Allegedly, after attending
the "important" hearings, he immediately went out of town seeking faith healers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Akut is guilty of negligence.
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel A. Akut is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of his impression that one
case or hearing is more important than the other. We commiserate with respondent for
the loss of his wife, however, failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for
reconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for negligence.
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By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary

diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of
the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or
do all acts necessary
BELLEZA V. MACASA
FACTS
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their
mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in
connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to
respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an
additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both
payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue
any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son.
Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the
next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several
occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of
complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against
respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply brushed aside the
complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering
any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his
answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of
time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
HELD
Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client, Atty. Macasa
is disbarred
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Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son.

Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED
IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly
his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof.
Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning,
skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law legally applied.
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve
his client with competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty
arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he
impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of
learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his
best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he
will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application
of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to
adequately safeguard his clients interest.
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and
prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of
the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his
client is both unprofessional and unethical.
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his
client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending
the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an
accused in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this
right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his
lawyer:
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The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at
the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused,
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right.
Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is
through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective,
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving
his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and
efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause
of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was
compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents
lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not
only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right
to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the
latters constitutional right to bail.
OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ
FACTS
Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez. They
entered into a retainer agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would represent
Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him (Estafa and a mandamus case) and 2 cases
filed against him (Other Light threats and violation of the Anti-Violation against
women and their children act).
Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer. 4 months
after, Overgaard demanded for a report on the status of his cases. In spite of many
phone calls and emails, Valdez couldnt be reached. Hence, Overgaard inquired on his
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own, and discovered that Valdez didnt file his entry of appearance in any of the cases,
that a counter-affidavit was required from him, and that the criminal cases against him
have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest. He was
constrained to find a new lawyer.
Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the return of
documents entrusted to the latter, as well as the $16K payment. No word was heard
from Valdez. Overgaard filed a case with the IBP for Valdezs dismissal for gross
malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct.
The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He also failed
to attend the hearing and was declared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing was
set, but Valdez never showed. IBP found him guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16, 17, and
18 and his penalty was a 3-year suspension and he was ordered to return Overgaards
money.
HELD
SC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that Valdez be disbarred for
falling below the standards required of lawyers.
Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 requires a lawyer to not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence will make him liable. Valdez should indeed be liable because he was
not just incompetent, he was useless; not just negligent, he was indolent; and rather
than helping his client, he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client and left him
without any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also, his failure to act on the
disbarment case against him, without any explanation, is a clear evidence of negligence
on his part.
Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his client informed of the status of his case
and to respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information. Despite
Overgaards efforts, Valdez avoided his client and never bothered to reply. Clearly, the
rule was violated.
ANGALAN V. DELANTE
FACTS
This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the Samal
Tribe against Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility particularly
Canons 16 and 17.
The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971,
Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the
loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to
the Spouses Eustaquio.
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When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover the title from the Spouses
Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document
which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of
absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that Navarro R.
Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his name.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering
their property.
Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property.
Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the
amicable settlement, the complainants offered the spouses the sum of P30K as
repurchase price which the spouses accepted.
However, complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the
property. Respondent Delante advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants
allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid.
When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the
property from respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent
transferred the title of the property to his name.
Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale
prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared void,
(2) title issued in the name of Atty. Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent be
made to pay damages.
As defense, respondent alleges that:
1. The complainants only borrowed money from him without any intention to
pay him back or at least offer an explanation as to how they would be able to
repay him
2. That the couple did not really engage his services as counsel for an annulment
suit against Navarro Eustaquio
3. The sale between Eustaquio and the complainants was a valid sale and not a
mortgage
4. The actual buyer of the property was Atty. Delantes former client who is now
residing in New York. But after 11 years, the buyer did not return to the
Philippines anymore so he authorized Atty. Delante to have the property in his
name upon refund of the purchase price.
Complainants filed a complaint dated with the Court charging respondent with
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag of the IBP found that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Board of governors
approved but increased the penalty from a 6-month suspension to 1-year.
ISSUE
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Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of

Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their
knowledge, consent and against their will?
HELD
YES.
The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delantes defenses. Angalan and
complainants went to respondents office not to seek advice about borrowing money
but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property.
First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office, respondent
filed a complaint with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the
property to Angalan and complainants.
Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "by reason of unwarranted
refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the
latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of
counsel."
Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he "RECEIVED
from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of
professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No.
P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)."
Fourth, in respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio
captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of
complainants.
As to his claim regarding his former client purchasing the property

1. Amicable settlement there was an agreed repurchase price to which both
parties agreed to
2. Letter to the barrio captain the lawyer stated that complainants repurchased
the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. (This will inform you that the Heirs of
Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr.
Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978.)
3. Insufficient proof Respondent did not give any detail or proof to substantiate
his story the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old
passport of the alleged client showing immigration stamps, or any form of
correspondence between him and the alleged client. The Court agrees with the
observation of Commissioner Hababag that respondents "vain attempt to salvage
his malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance."
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence
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complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the
Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of
protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants
and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the
recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross
misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross
misconduct.
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is
incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from
the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
SANTOS-TAN V. ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO
FACTS
Complainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with malpractice for grossly
neglecting his duties and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a
bouncing check.
Complainant found out that her case had not progressed and that the only
pleading that respondent had filed was his notice of appearance.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case (NO); and
(2) Whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check
(YES).
RATIO:
On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in handling complainants
case, the Court agrees that based on the facts presented there was nothing that he could
have done to expedite the resolution of the motion for reconsideration then pending
before the RTC. The RTC had already ordered that the motion for reconsideration be
submitted for resolution. Respondent could not be faulted if the acting presiding judge
did not want to act on the motion until the regular presiding judge return.
Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law,
especially Bouncing Check Law. By issuing a check in violation of the provisions of this
law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check
which is drawn against insufficient funds constitutes deceitful conduct or conduct
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unbecoming an officer of the court. The Court has held that the issuance of checks
which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence. As such, we have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Respondent violated the
Attorneys Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws. The Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is ORDERED
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) month.
SOMOSOT V. LARA
FACTS
Atty Gerardo Lara represented Ofelia Somosot in a collections case against
Golden Collections Marketting Corp.
Golden Collections filed interrogatories and request for Admission
Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatories and admission should be
sent directly to Mrs. Somosot
At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara is already sensitive about the
P27,000 in unpaid attys fees
Nov. 2001, Atty Lara was appointed as a consultant in the Board of Investment, a
government position
Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in her office in Greenhills; office was
locked and according to the security guard, they had moved office without leaving
a forwarding address. Lara also attempted to call Mr and Mrs Somosot, but they
couldnt be reached
Lara filed his Withdrawal of Appearance in court, without the required
conformity of his client, Somosot, because she could be located. This was denied.
Dec. 2001, upon learning that Somosots new office was in Pasig, he called her
where he advised that she should find another Lawyer. She informed her that she
already did.
September, 2005. Lara receives a letter from Somosot giving him one last
chance to give her a reason not to instigate a disbarment suit against him.
ISSUE
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W/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed incompetent in his services to
Mrs. Ofelia Somosot.
HELD
Yes.
Atty Laras services were insufficient. His neglect (or refusal) to reply to the
Interrogatories and Request for Admissions himself eventually caused the court to rule
against Mrs. Somosot. Records do not show how exactly he tried to address the
Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed the case or not.
He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosot to inform her about the
Interrogatories and Request for Admission. He only took the initiative when he learned
that he had been appointed into a government position.
Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings, and this shouldnt be a
reason for him not to inform his client about the cases development
He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty. One, his appointment in a
government office; and two, Somosots refusal to pay his fees. He could have secured
her conformity to the withdrawal of appearance when they talked on December 2001,
but because he failed to do so, he remain as counsel of record.
CANON 19
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
FACTS:
The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is Atty.
Jimenez. Complainant Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, while
respondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs of Henson.
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order
(2002). The RTC Order directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the
estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones did not reply to
the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal complaint in behalf of his
clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of violation of
Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional responsibility by filing the unfounded criminal
complaint against complainant to obtain an improper advantage:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of
proceeding.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since no
evidence of malice or bad faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the proper motion
with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his
clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent
his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers performance of
his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the
same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to resort to
unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to
defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice. While lawyers
owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the
court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
PENA V. APARICIO
FACTS
Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case
before the NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that
his client be given separation pay. Pea rejected the claim. Thereafter, Pea sent
notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a letter reiterating the
claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the company stating that if
the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as, criminal
charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the
companys business license.
Pea filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the
defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Pea had
allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum shopping.
The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC.
Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages against
Pea in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit
against him. Pea likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging that he submitted his
position paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process.
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ISSUE
W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?
HELD
Yup!
First of all, the SC found that Pea actually submitted his position paper. In
addition, disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a
certification of forum shopping is not to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any
rate, Pea actually submitted a certification against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio
filed the motion to dismiss, curing the supposed defect in the original complaint.
Now to the merits
Canon 19, a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law, this shows that a lawyers duty to his client is subordinate to his duty in the
administration of justice.
Rule 19.01, a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding. Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file baseless
criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyers client. This is exactly what Atty.
Aparicio did in this case.
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail
extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints.
Blackmail and extortion would not only entail disbarment but also possible criminal
prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and even found it his
obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Pea. He also stated that
the writing of demand letters is standard practice.
SC ruled that Atty. Aparicios assertions are misleading because the fact of the
matter is, he used such threats to gain leverage against Pea and force the latter to
accede to his clients claims. The letter even implied a promise to keep silent about
the said violations if the claim is met.
While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession
of law, such letters must not contain threats such as those found in this case.
Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that
Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to protect his clients interests.
Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.
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POST MIDTERM CASES
AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER: CONDUCT OF LITIGATION
MANALANG V. ANGELES
FACTS:
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for
overtime and separation pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club
Restaurant, before the National Labor Relations. Respondent was their counsel.
Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,500. After the decision
became final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his clients,
respondent compromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only.
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to
them the amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent
(30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum of P2,650.
Respondent counsel stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but
they insisted that he "deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000,
representing the amount discounted by the counsel of the Philippine Racing Club
Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative expenses."
Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant that he "would not
be compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the
practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.
HELD
Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are
not meant solely to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned
is possessed of that good moral character, which is a condition precedent to the
privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice thereof.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or
compromise effected by counsel without the consent of the workers concerned . A client
has every right to expect from his counsel that nothing will be taken or withheld from
him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By compromising the judgment without
the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the stream of judicial dicta,
he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as
want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession. In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to
respondent's receipt of and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550
intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's
fees and other administrative expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is
unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly failed to comply with the Rules of Court in the
enforcement of an attorney's liens. The records of this case are barren of any statement
of respondent's claims for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor did
respondent present any showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the money
judgment to be served upon his clients and to the losing party
His act of holding on to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something which was
not his, and to which he had no right. He appears oblivious of the admonition that a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.
This is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into
account by way of mitigation. Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of
six (6) months suspension appears to us in order.
GARCIA V. CA
FACTS:
Guevara spouse seeks recovery of a lady's diamond ring which they bought from
Rebullida.
Guevara claims that while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakea
restaurant, she recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and asked where she
bought it, which Garcia answered from her comadre.
Guevarra told Garcia that a ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952.
Garcia handed the ring to Guevara and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at
the request of Guevarra, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay
PD, Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they
showed the ring in question.
Mr. Rebullida examined the ring and after consulting the stock card thereon,
concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was
returned to Garcia who despite a written request failed to deliver the ring to Guevara.
Garcia refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida,
claiming it was lost.
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Garciass defense was that they denied having made any admission before
Guevara or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring was
purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in
turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, who was boarding in her house; that the ring
she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr.
Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond was
never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts,
unlike the one claimed by Guevara spouse.
Apparently Garcias own counsel admitted through an answer that the ring in
question was the same ring, which is being claimed by the Guevara spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer needs an SPA to admit the truth of certain facts
HELD:
NO. Garcia is contradicted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made
by her counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act
such, has the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make
admission for the purpose of the litigation... Garcias proffered explanation that her
counsel misunderstood her is futile because the liability to error as to the identity of the
vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather
remote.
The rings identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose
testimony is entitled to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the
jewelry business
Indeed, Garcia made no comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the
ring and stock card told Guevara that that was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's
letter of demand,asserting ownership.
None of the people whom she mentioned, was able to corroborate the story of
how she bought the ring.
SANTIAGO V. DELOS SANTOS
Facts:
Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a parcel of land. In a motion to
set the case for hearing, he attached documents indicative of the land being public in
character, thus lending support to the opposition of the Director of Forestry, the
Director of Lands, and a certain Pacita V. de los Santos. The then Judge Cecilia Muoz
Palma, now an Associate Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. Its reversal is sought
in this appeal.
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Issue:
Was the counsel negligent in the preparation of the pleadings? Yes.
Held:
Attached to such pleading were the documents, which, in the language of the then
Judge Palma, "show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the
public domain ... ." Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's
case of such an admission. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of
plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the present, he
could not have succeeded any better. What was so categorically therein set forth as to
such parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although thereafter released by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is conclusive
and binding.
How did the present counsel for plaintiff, the law firm of Luna and Manalo, seek
to extricate him from a predicament of his own making? It would rely on certain
procedural doctrines; more specifically, it would insist on the motion to dismiss of
oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos as not being entitled to recognition as there was a
general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry,
not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the application of the
registration of her land, although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a
pasture lease agreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of dismissal being
set aside and plaintiff being allowed to present evidence. What purpose, it may
pertinently be asked, would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, it
would clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that there was such an open,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to be
forgotten that in the motion to dismiss of oppositor de los Santos, it was stated: "That
the son of applicant Luis Santiago, namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time the Lessee
of the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered by him under Pasture Lease
Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which Lease Agreement was cancelled by the
Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the
improvements and comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease
Contract; ... ." There was no denial of such allegation.
An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not.
CANON 20
SESBRENO V. CA
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Facts:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of Cebu for
reinstatement and back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the employees
agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as attorneys fees and 20% expenses to be taken from
their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision in favor the employees and fixed
Atty. Sesbrenos attorneys fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay and
retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the
employees. The court later on modified the attorneys fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno
appealed to the CA, which decided that the attorneys fees should be reduced to 20% of
the back salaries awarded to the employees. Atty. Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the
ground that attorneys fees amounting to 50% of all monies awarded to his clients as
contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with prevailing case law and the
contract of professional services between the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of
attorneys fees awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for
professional services signed by the client
Held:
Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of attorneys fees. A lawyer
may charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to judicial control. In the
case at bar, the parties entered into a contingent fee contract, wherein Atty. Sesbreno
will get 50% from the employees money claims if they will win the case. However, the
court finds the 50% fee as unconscionable. Stipulated attorneys fees are
unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the
value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client.
Contingent fee contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in
order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The court held that a fee of
20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement.
BAUTISTA V. GONZALES
Facts:
Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty.
Gonzales agreed to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of
the value of the property in litigation.
Issue:
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Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the
Forunados is valid
Held:
No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the
Fortunados. However, the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is
contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may
not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a
lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject
to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not
provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
clients rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy. The
execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and
his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
GAMILLA V. MARINO
Facts:
Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. Theres a
long history of collective bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union.
During the series of agreements between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino
was removed from his position but continued to serve as a lawyer for the UST Faculty
Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42 million pesos for back
wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the UST
Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the
monetary benefits (42M) for the faculty members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty.
Marino for failure to account for the balance of 42M ceded to them by UST and the
attorneys fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the benefits allotted to
faculty members.
Issue:
Whether or not the 4.2M attorneys fees is proportionate to the legal services
rendered by Atty. Marino
Held:
No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of
compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks
union president comprising in all probity the same duties for which he has collected a
hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was lack of notice
and transparency in Atty. Marinos dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty
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Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorneys fees. A simple accounting of the money
that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the
details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the
probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and guided them to look for
alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary case is
not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice
by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of
officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of
proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against
respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence,
Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY.

MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda.
Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of
properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court
and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they
still billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to
pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a
total of P2M.
Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of
the main action. RTC has jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the
properties awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was additional
payment for service rendered in the same case.
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The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed

by quantum meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by
respondents. It was an act of unconscionable greed!
ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR
Facts:
The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in the case. This was sealed by a Letter-
Agreement, wherein it was contained that the attorneys would endeavor to secure just
compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a price of 11pesos or
more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall not entitle them to any attys
fees. They also stipulated that in the event they get it for 11pesos per square meter, their
contingent fee shall be 30% of the just compensation. They also stipulated that their
lawyers fees shall be in proportion to the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation.
[]
A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA.
The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just
compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square meter
payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, approved the
Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that
the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation, although this amount is
bigger) in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property
of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total
amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00
is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel, Jose F.
Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the
Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10
days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Issue:
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Justice Hofilena
The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding that
the letter-agreement re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law between
the parties
Held:
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The Zuzuarreguis, in
entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was
them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the
purpose of confirming all the matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is
absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-
Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were admitted by the
Zuzuarreguis themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties
thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits
an exception that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy or public order.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent
fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not
per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fees is the
power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and
unconscionable.
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency
or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the
reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the
parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal
to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the
bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of
the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the
expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is,
undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is,
therefore, in order.
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It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must
be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the
percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation
paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore
be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on
the other. The division must be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this
Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually
earned attorneys fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for
there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as
we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary
that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done.
LAW FIRM OF TUNGOL & TIBAYAN V. CA AND SPOUSES INGCO
Facts:
Ingcos hired the petitioner law firm to enforce delivery of a land title. Complaint
was filed by the law firm in behalf of the Ingcos before the HLURB against Villa Crista
alleging that the Ingcos had paid P5.1M for a lot but Villa Crista failed to deliver the
title thereto. The Ingcos and Villa Crista entered into a compromise whereby the latter
was bound to refund P4.8M provided that in case of breach of such obligation, an
additional P200k would be paid by way of liquidated damages.
Villa Crista failed to pay. Writ of execution issued. Sheriff levied and auctioned 10 lots
belonging to Villa Crista. The Ingcos bought 3 lots, the payment of which includes
P5.1M contract price for the initial lot they primarily bought, P1.35M attorneys fees
and other expenses. The Ingcos then terminated the services of the law firm.
The law firm filed with the HLURB to recover 25% of the excess of the existing
prevailing selling price or the fair market value of the 3 lots. It also filed for damages in
the RTC.
The law firm argued that the spouses still owed P4.5M; that in their contract the
law firm was entitled to 25% of the excess of the total bid price.
HLURB arbiter ruled for the law firm. HLURHB Board reversed. The Office of the
President reversed, affirming the HLURB arbiters decision. CA reversed the OP.
Held:
SC ruled that the lawyers are not entitled to additional fees. The spouses acquired
the 3 lots as the highest bidder at the auction sale. It can be said that the lots had been
acquired not through the recovery efforts of the law firm.
Moreover, during the negotiations with Villa Crista, it was Renato Ingco who was
actually negotiating, not the lawyers.
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When the auction sale was made, the attorney-client relationship no longer
existed, hence the lawyers are not entitled to the additional fees.
CANON 21
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan
(SB), through the Presidential Commission on Good Govt (PCGG) against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC
No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein
private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the
client's equity holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm
acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of
the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended
Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
partydefendant, Roco having promised hell reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case # 33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of
coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20
other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares
& its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the
holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that
their participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering
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Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged
ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that
PCGG exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by
Roco of the same conditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didnt
refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client
involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the
client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply
w/ the conditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also
denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, assailing SBs resolution on
essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely:
SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application
of the law of agency.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly
situated &, thus, deserving equal treatment
SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case,
the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of
partydefendants be based on reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to
constitutional rts of petitioners
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.
RULING (pulled out only the pertinent sections ):
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WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS PETITIONERS FROM

REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION
REQUESTED BY THE PCGG
YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law
concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person
lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the
services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by
honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom
reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained
by the contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is
more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee
An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a
"quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court & exercises his judgment
in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct
and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is
of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of
fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based
on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice.
Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an
attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.)
Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation
which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. Thus, the
Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
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The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client.
Reasons advanced for the general rule:
Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established.
Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship
Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary.
Exceptions to the gen. rule:

Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice.
Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of the
relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege
actually attached to both.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt reveal name of his client as this would
expose the latter to civil litigation.
Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: We feel sure that under such conditions
no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to
w/c it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client.
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless,
by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's
name is privileged.
Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to govt voluntarily in settlement of undetermined
income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no govt audit or investigation into that client's income
tax liability pending
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could
qualify as exceptions to the general rule:
if the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject
matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance
where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed
& it is the identity w/c is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has
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Justice Hofilena
been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in

disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may

fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure
of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the
very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as
stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would
be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be
seen in the 3 specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners'
ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the
clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists.
While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a case
where a client takes on the services of an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be
invoked in a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something
illegal and consults his attorney. Whether or not the act for which the client sought
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure
leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible
action against him.
The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
attorneys must be eliminated. What is sought to be avoided then is the exploitation of
the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation
that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built
upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from
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compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information
which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of
the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the
termination of the relationship.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of
their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the
facts of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information. Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties.
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF

ATTORNEY PALANCA:
WILLIAM PFLEIDER VS. ATTORNEY PALANCA
Facts:
Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider leased an agricultural land to
Palanca known as Hacienda Asia. Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for rescission
of the lease contract for defaulting in rental payments. He also filed this administrative
complaint of gross misconduct against Palanca. Pfleider alleged that in a criminal case
for estafa filed against him in which Palanca was his counsel, the latter sought to
negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleider alleged that Palanca informed him
through letters that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the complaint and
that he had deposited P5k with the court.
Issue:
W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct?
W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission of the lease contract terminated
the attorney-client relationship?
Held:
Palanca was not guilty of gross misconduct. The letters relied upon by Pfleider
did not show that Palanca stated that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of
the criminal complaint against Pfleider.
The civil suit for rescission terminated the attorney-client relationship. While the
object of the suit was the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became
incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every attorney-client
relationship.
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MERCADO V. ATTY. VITRIOLO
Facts:
Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for annulment of marriage
filed by the latters husband. Vitriolo filed a criminal action for falsification of public
documents against Mercado alleging that the latter made false entries in the certificates
of live birth of her children which were presented in the annulment case.
Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminal case filed against her by
Vitriolo, information relating to her civil case for annulment was divulged. Hence,
Vitriolo breached the privilege and confidence reposed within a lawyer-client
relationship. Mercado prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.
Issue:
W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case against his former client?
Held:
SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the
communication privilege between an attorney and his client.
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
The client made the communication in confidence.
The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to
substantiate Mercados allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged
communication. all her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN
Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genatos building. Atty. Silapan handled
some of Genatos cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to
buy a car. Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to Genato. The
check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged
that Genato was in the business of buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars,
shark loans and other shady deals and that he was also involved in bribery cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential
lawyer-client relationship.
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Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him, especially with privileged communication the protection
is only limited to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope
of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation
of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapans rights
as they were not pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those
information as they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand. His professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case. A lawyer must
conduct himself with integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.
HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA
Facts:
Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She
disclosed confidential information during that period. However, after the confidential
information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the
lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda
filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents and
immorality using the disclosures as basis for the charges.
Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?
Held:
Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda
should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the attorney-client
privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court
feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty.
Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by the urge to retaliate
without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative sentiment, she
was violating the rule of confidentiality.
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PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN
Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained
counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-
client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed
that the stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have
yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications.
Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel
of Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.
Issue:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?
Held:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws
may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential
information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by
the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least
a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-
stock corporation.It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to
the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made,
copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and
by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority
of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the
information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure
made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a
violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad
in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa
case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records
that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential
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Justice Hofilena
information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained

counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does
not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated
CANON 22
WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL AND ANTONINO

BERNARDO
Facts:
Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of the case,
Wack-wack wanted to change their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law
Office of Juan Chudian.
During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed up, so
Arcangel was allowed to present his evidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded
judgment to Arcangel. The law firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to set aside the
judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. This petition was denied by the lower
court. Wack-wack assails the denial of the petition.
It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of counsel
because Chudian only entered his appearance after the judgment was rendered against
Wack-wack.
Issue:
Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment?
Held:
Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have known that,
its impending relief as counself for the defendant notwithstanding, it is still under
obligation to protect the clients interest until its final release from the professional
relationship with such client. The court could recognize no other representation on
behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney
is effected.
Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach
regarding the presentation of the clients case in court is purely their private concern.
Proceedings in court cannot be made to depend on them.
VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME
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Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The
court rule against Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for
reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez
was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he
was withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) already engaged another
lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the
records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any longer.
Issue:
Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?
Held:
Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery
who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination that is,
until the case becomes final and executory. Any dereliction of duty affects the client.
The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosmes defense that he had already withdrawn
from the case. A lawyer may retire at any time with the written consent of his client
fileed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client
refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The
application must be based on a good case.
What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22.
There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3 months.
SANTECO V. ATTY. AVANCE
Facts:
Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a civil suit. She paid her
P12,000 as acceptance money. Losing in the first instance, Atty. Avance made
representations that she was going to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.
She didnt.
She also didnt appear during scheduled hearings, causing the case to get
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Issue:
Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties?
Held:
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Justice Hofilena
Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she
abruptly stopped appearing as complainants counsel even as proceedings were still
pending with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This violated
Canon 22.
Suspended for 5 years.
FRANCISCO VS. PORTUGAL
Facts:
Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After
judgment was rendered convicting appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion
and Petition for review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty
disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed
out of time and for failure to pay the docket fees. The decision became final and
warrants of arrest were issued.
Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to one
of the complainants giving them instructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice
to Withdraw. But the complainant didnt file it with the court because they were aware
that it would be difficult to find another counsel.
Issue:
Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?
Held:
Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself
if he truly wanted to withdraw. At the very least, he should have informed the court.
For failure to do so, Atty was negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing the petition out
of time. eventually he would have known that the petition was denied but still he failed
to informe the convicts and return their calls.
One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is
not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from
a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from
a good cause.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause
and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship.
Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.
METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA
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Justice Hofilena
Facts:
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of
nullity of certain deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to
enter his charging lien equal to 25% of the market value of the litigated properties as
atty fees. The court granted and the attys lien was annotated on the TCTs. The cases
were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus the
Bank now had the TCTs in its name and the attys lien was carried over.
Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC granted
the motion and fixed the fees at 936K. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of
the lien?
Held:
Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper
proceedings. A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his
client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due
his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is no charging lien. And court
has no authority to fix a charging lien.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an
incident in the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein
established as any other money claim.
DORONILLA V. CA
Facts:
Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over his Atty Lien. The RTC
declared that Counsel was entitled to 10% of the shares of the heirs.
Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien on the title of parcels of land of
the estate which the heirs had inherited. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue:
Is the order of annotation proper?
Held:
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Justice Hofilena
No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the
litigation.
SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed that Atty would take
30% of whatever they may recover. The trial court ordered reinstatement and payment
of backwages. The employer appealed the decision.
Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromise agreement that they
waived their right to be reinstated with the agreement of payment of full backwages at
once. The court adopted the compromise and ordered the withholding of the payment
of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead of withholding, the employer directly paid
the workers in full. Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection against the employer and
employees.
Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees.
Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Is the employer liable for the Attys fees?
Held:
No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action against both his clients and
the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint
against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his differences with
them. He maintained the case against employers because, according to him, the
computation of the employees money claims should have been based on the national
and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should
be made liable for the difference.
Attys act in withdrawing the case against the employees and agreeing to settle
their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien.
Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he had waived his right to claim
against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those
who were primarily liable to him.
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA
Facts:
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Justice Hofilena
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked
from complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket fees and
that the court could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant corporation came
to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of nominal fees for such kind
of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an
alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for
$2.5K.
Issue:
Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?
Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldnt be dismissed. Administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly
preponderant evidence.
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case and vice versa. Neither will a
favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the
lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably
govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
SANTOS V. LLAMAS
Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership
dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman
M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has
not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in
his pleadings
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Justice Hofilena
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES
W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES
Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter
and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is
true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
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Justice Hofilena
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO

THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from
the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUTIES
FACTS:
Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be exempted from payment of
IBP duties amounting to P12,035 (unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was
admitted to the Bar in 1961. He was with the Philippine Civil Service from 1962 to 1986.
After that, he migrated and worked in the USA until 2003. His main contention was
that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the above amount because he was working with
the Civil Service then, and the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service. He also contends that he cannot be assessed
for the years he was working in the USA.
IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on
the actual practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of
the IBP, and one of his obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The
validity of such dues has been upheld by the SC in saying that it is necessary to defray
the cost of the Integrated Bar Program and no one is exempted from paying the dues.
What was allowed was the voluntary termination and reinstatement later on of
membership. If membership is terminated, dues wouldnt be assessed.
Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBPs policy of Non-
Exemption in payment of annual membership dues is invalid because it would be
oppressive for one who has been in an inactive status and is without income derived
from his law practice. Also, it is a deprivation of property right without due process.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time he was inactive in the practice of law, when he was in the Civil Service and
abroad?
HELD/RATIO:
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Justice Hofilena
NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers
are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The public
interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience
to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such
case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay
dues could have been discontinued.
VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT

Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer
(Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his revolver
on his lap when she refused to do so)
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs. Barrera) in
the estate proceedings of her late husband. Laput presented to her several papers or
pleadings for her signature. However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign the pleadings but
requested Laput to leave them so that she may ask somebody to translate the same for
her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry and drew his revolver from its holster and
placed it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers. Mrs.
Barrera was compelled to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the
disbarment of Laput.
Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct
Held:
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Justice Hofilena
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering that
they were performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is
compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offender
should have set an example of a man of peace and champion of the Rule of Law. Worse
still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender had
pledged to defend and protect his client. He was suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year.
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty.
Daarol went to her house because he was a friend of her sister, hence they also became
friends. She knew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic
cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos house and asked her to be one of the
usherettes in the Masons convention so the latter said he should ask for the permission
of her parents. They consented and so she served as an usherette, Daarol picking her up
and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioners house and invited her for a joy ride, with
the permission of her mother (who was Daarols former classmate). They went to the
beach and Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she would accept
him, he would marry her within 6 months from her acceptance. After a few days of
courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to get
married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a
joy ride to an airport in Sicayab where there were no houses around. There, he
pressured her into having sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that he
would marry her and that December was very near anyway they would marry soon. She
gave in after much hesitation because she loved him. She cried after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where
she consented because she loved him. Eventually, she became pregnant and informed
Daarol. He however suggested that she have the baby aborted. She refused. He told her
that she didnt have to worry because they were getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told
them that he could not marry her because he was already married. He reassured them
though that he has been separated from his wife for 16 years and that he would work
for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. So Barrientos waited
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and delivered the baby but eventually wasnt able to contact Daarol anymore (he went
MIA).
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the
complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being
eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a
marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first
marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to
annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the
expense of the gullible complainant. He is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong
with this relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert
and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of
marrying complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the
Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal
for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct is in order.
FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice
and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust
Enrichment.
Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang.
Said lot was being claimed by FIlinvest Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs
appointed a certain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was arrested in
Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the assistance of a law for his release.
Someone recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona
went to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for his
release. Atty. Barcelona told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000
at that time so that he could secure Daens release the following day. Berbano didnt
have enough money and time to immediately come up with such big amount but they
were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the money. He said
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that he would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that
they should just meet tomorrow.
The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth
P24,000. The day after, they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife
and daughter). There were other payments of money, the total amounting to P64,000.
After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of Daen, Atty.
Barcelona wasnt seen again and he didnt return their calls. Daen was still in jail.
Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found
Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of CPR. He recommended
disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings
but recommended only suspension.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and
for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of the administrative penalty.
Complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony
before the Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her
affidavit. The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by
the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal
proceedings.
Respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the
detained person in the total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the
detainee through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He
deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent has demonstrated a
penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure
the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such
connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get
the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice.
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In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt. He is

disbarred.
HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly
having committed forgery.
Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of
real property to secure a P48,000 loan. The deed of the REM was registered and
annotated. On October 2001 however, a certain Castillejos, falsely representing herself
as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin and asked him to prepare a discharge of the
said mortgage and then notarize it afterwards.
Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but he didnt ask Castillejos for any
other document other that a Community Tax Certificate. He later on notarized the said
deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan was able to mortgage the same property
again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabas learned of the cancellation, she
promptly informed Atty. Mangibin that her signature in the deed was forged. However,
he did not help her.
Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but denies liability for the
falsification under a claim of good faith. He says he did not know of Castillejos
fraudulent intent and so, he cannot be faulted. He claims it is beyond the realm of his
futy to investigate the identity of persons appearing before him. And that as a matter of
routine, he only requires the CTCs of persons appearing before him.
IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, to be more careful in the
preparation of legal documents so that such situations may me avoided in the future.
Bar Confidant however recommended suspension. He was found guilty of gross
negligence.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be
suspended from the practice of law.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, suspended for 2 years.
A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of public instruments would be undermined. A notary public should not
notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person
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who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
matters stated in the document. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and
to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.
The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent did not take
even ordinary precautions required in the premises. Respondents conduct showed
serious lack of due care in the performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of
his carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in the signature of
mortgagee in the deed of real estate mortgage from her purported signature in the
questioned discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, he breached Canon I of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law
and legal processes as well as to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
SESBRENO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner
to prosecute their cases. They had undertaken an an agreement wherein it was stated
that Sesbreno will get 30% of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. they may recover.
Atty. Sesbreno registered his charhing/retaining lien on the Agreement.
The camineros he was representing obtained a favorable judgment. RTC ordered
that they be reinstate with back salaries, with privileges and adjustments. The
respondent to that case DPWH appealed to the SC where Sesbreno still represented the
camineros. Later on, the Governor of Cebu proposed a compromise settlement of the
cases. The parties signed a Compromise Agreement wherein it is stated that camineros
will be paid full back wages. Also states that the camineros are subject to lawyers
charging and retaining liens as registered in the lower court.
Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality of judgment adopting the
compromise agreement. The camineros moved for execution however, only 45% of the
amount due them was released because the court retained the 55%, holding it was
payment of the lawyers fees pending determination of such amount. However, instead
of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu
directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.
Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorneys Fees against respondents and his
former clients. RTC ruled in favor of Sesbreno. The court further upheld the
petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging
lien. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract.
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HELD/RATIO:
NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the
respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment
rendered by this Court.
Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for
attorneys fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the
former thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might
recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed. Clearly,
no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a specified rate
agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word
whatever shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount that the
court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties agreed to a
compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them
in the compromise agreement approved by the court.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful
disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in
favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but
also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued
pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been
retained by the client.
A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer
for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular
suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the
services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law
advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a
job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which
enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.
Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and
considering further that he had settled his case as against his former clients, SC did not
sustain his right to damages for breach of contract. The attendant circumstances, in
fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to the petitioner and they
willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the
petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving
the agreed attorneys fees.
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
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CANON 1
LIBARIOS V. DABALOS
(Gross ignorance of the law; close association)
Facts:
Judge Dabalos without conducting any hearing directed the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against accused and at the same time fixed the bail for accused Calo and
Allocod.
Held:
Judge Dabalos is fined with a warning.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is
accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before
resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Irrespective of
respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not
strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before
bail was fixed. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving
the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to
disciplinary action.
Considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo,
Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as
judge demanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and
from concluding that the evidence against him was merely "circumstantial", in order to
avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited
for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to
resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not
only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be
free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
GO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Accused presented himself before the police to verify reports that he was being
hunted by the police. He was thereafter detained. The prosecutor then informed
accused of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of
the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accused refused to execute such waiver. The
prosecutor filed an information for murder with no recommended bail and a
certification that no preliminary investigation was conducted because accused did not
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sign a waiver of the provisions of Art.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however later
filed a motion for release and proper preliminary investigation. After the case was
raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo initially allowed the release of accused on a cash bond
and issued an order granting the leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Later on
however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recalling the granting of bail and
proceeded to trial. Accused and his counsel continuously opposed this.
Held:
(Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in the concurring opinion of
Justice Gutierrez)
I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding
to trial in a sensational murder case without a preliminary investigation despite
vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and
notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor that said rights be respected I
agree with Justice Isagani Cruz that the trial court has apparently been moved by a
desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of
justice. Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about
events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational publicity,
the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give
the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR
Facts:
It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by respondent judge beyond
the 90-day reglementary period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the respondent
judge which was described as bereft of any dignity as a court of law has been noted.
Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on his clerk of court, Atty. Jocobo who he
claims was inefficient in the management of the court records.
Also, in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao as acting
judge of the MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case was
being backed up by someone powerful. He did this by sending a letter to Pitao through
Lipangos wife. However, Pitao still convicted Lipango because the evidence of guilt
was strong. When Pitao was away for some conference, he found out that Villamor
revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of the MCTC. And finally,
when the case was elevated to the RTC where Villamor was assigned he acquitted
Lipango.
Held:
Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2
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A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that
his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel.
Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: A judge should
diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence
in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of
other judges and court personnel. Also, under Rule 3.09 is that: A judge should
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service
and fidelity.
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge
shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the
bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of
litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines
the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
TAN V. ROSETE
Facts:
Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his
staff to talk to complainant. The staff member told complainant Tan that Judge Rosete
was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was
shown copies of respondent judges decision in the criminal cases, both still unsigned,
dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge
would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed
that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were
eventually dismissed by respondent judge.
Held:
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of
judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because
the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of
legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the
judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore
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paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and
his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and
show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the
office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to
be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
DIMATULAC V. VILLON
Note: Ill skip the facts because its exhaustingly long and complicated (recall: Kenjies
40page case. Haha. Note, there are actually a lot of respondents but only Villon is
related to us). Basically, there was denial of due process.
Judge Villon --- Acting with deliberate dispatch, set the date of arraignment without
even perusing the records (otherwise he wouldve known among others, that there was
a motion to defer proceedings because of an appeal pending in the DOG, there was an
order giving petitioners 10days to file a petition with the CA, the filing of such petition,
order of the CA directing respondent accused to comment on the petition to show cause
why the application for a write of preliminary injunction should not be grantedetc.,).
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind a cautious attitude as these
were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should
arraignment be precipitately held. While it may be true that he was not bound to await
the DOJ's resolution of the appeal his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse
the documents to initially determine if indeed murder was the offense committed; or,
he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal
within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, judge Villon should not
have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
IMPORTANT: The judge "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer
justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a
religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of
the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with
impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him.
Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive
jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be
exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due
process of law.
CANON 2
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FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY
Facts:
Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge failed to render
judgment in the case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was
transferred, complainant learned he brought the records of the case to his new station.
Hamoys excuse was that his utility aid mixed the records up and because the dockets
were congested with so many family-cases his court being the only family court in the
area. He also failed to comply with the directives of the OCA. Also, he was able to
collect his salary when he claimed in his certification that he had no pending cases.
Held:
Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his
court personnel. Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of
organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the
reglementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It
must be stressed, however, that their application for extension must be filed before the
expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his transfer to another post, respondent
Judge should have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the
records of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of his
action with respect thereto.
Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey
directives from this Court and the Court Administrator. Needless to say, judges should
respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this Court from
which all other courts should take their bearings
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity.
Respondent Judge must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct
demanded of judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his
salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct
and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men. In view of the primordial role
of judges in the administration of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity and
probity must be entrusted with judicial powers.
DAWA V. DE ASA
Facts:
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Presiding judge Armando de Asa was charged with sexual harassment and/or
acts of lasciviousness by Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and Noraliz
Jorgensen. Dawa and Barreto were employed as stenographic reporters while
Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and
detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court. They charged de Asa for allegedly forcing
himself on them and kissing them on the lips.
Issue:
Whether de Asa violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling.
Yes.
Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. He should behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is therefore paramount
that a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
In the present case, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of
respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they
stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His
severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably
constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employees. Let it be remembered that
respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere
employees of the court of which he is an officer. The Court concludes with moral
certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him.
His gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.
IN RE JUDGE MARCOS
Facts:
Two complaints were filed by Romeo T. Zacarias and a concerned citizen of
Gerona, Tarlac. These Complaints identically charged Judge Martonino R. Marcos
(Formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) and Clerk of
Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with
immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants. Zacarias alleged that, on two
occasions, Judge Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money from him in exchange for a
favorable decision in a criminal case against Zacarias and for his provisional release.
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He further alleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that the respondent
Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and that the respondents are
engaged in an illicit love affair which is common knowledge to municipal and court
personnel and as well as to the people of Gerona.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Since appearance and reality
fuse in the performance of judicial functions, the judge -- like Caesars wife -- must not
only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion. the actions of respondent judge were not
free from all appearances of impropriety. His conduct lacked the meticulous care
expected of one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is the
kind of behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes public
confidence in the judicial system.
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally remiss in the performance of
her duties. By her own admission, she required complainant to post the cash bond,
even though she had not been instructed to do so by respondent judge. She thereby
arrogated judicial power unto herself. The determination of whether to require a cash
bond, like the approval of bail or the release of the accused, is purely a judicial function.
It was certainly not among the mandated duties of respondent clerk. It has been
stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensation of
justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women who work therein, from the judge to the lowliest clerk.
LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA
Facts:
Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao
del Sur, charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Jose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of judicial
position and intimidation, for allegedly compelling her to sign a death certificate even
though she was not the attending physician. According to Lachica, during a party,
Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened to file an administrative case
against her if she will refuse to sign the death certificate.
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Issue:
Whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position and
intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is convinced
that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been established by
substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
His undue interest in having complainant sign the Death Certificate is highly
questionable, to say the least. Further, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent
behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is reprehensible in a judge
and should be subjected to disciplinary action. Respondent was FINED in the amount
of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding
judge of the RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the
performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The complaint was
an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons
Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City RTC. Complainant averred
that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in the criminal case, the
decision, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only on the
tenth month after the case was submitted for decision. Respondent judge was also cited
for impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with Attorney Vic
Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent judge would even use at
times.
Issue:
Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling:
Yes.
The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent judge in
his close association with a counsel for a litigant.
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The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges,
indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing
before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is
not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any
social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time
and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile
endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble
aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before
them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend
to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence
their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they
must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants
and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence. The
respondent was ADMONISHED to constantly be circumspect in his conduct and
dealings with lawyers who have pending cases before him.
SAMSON V. CABALLERO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public
document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero. Complainant Olga M.
Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been
appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for
judgeship with a pending administrative case.
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews,
deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him.
She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc.,
she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised
Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain
improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a
reinvestigation he conducted.
Issue:
Whether respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling:
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Yes. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in

the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A
judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer.
In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of
the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to
continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice
of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. The first step towards the successful implementation of
the Courts relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials
and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges.
The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation
of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law.
The standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be higher than that of the
average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
Respondent was DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01
and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys.
CANON 3
DIMO REALTY V. DIMACULANGAN
Facts:
Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for specific performance against Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. (Dimo
Realty) and spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners. The complaint
alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitioners engaged the services of respondent
as geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision lots) 2 parcels of land situated in
Barrio Namuco, Rosario, Batangas. As payment for respondents services, petitioner
agreed to give him 1 subdivision lot at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay him P9,200.00 in
cash. After the completion of respondents work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00 in
installments and delivered to him possession of the lot. However, despite respondents
demands, petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with the
RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages. The trial court issued an
order dismissing the complaint for improper venue. Respondent then filed a motion for
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reconsideration with motion for inhibition alleging partiality on the part of the
presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA denied the motion for inhibition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in denying the motion for inhibition
Ruling:
No. Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case
rests on their own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of
voluntariness on the part of the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can
be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. In a catena of cases, we held that "bias
and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges,
must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against
the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice
without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich." Here,
petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order
without however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. In fact, the
Court of Appeals held that "such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily
warrant his inhibition in the case."
PIMENTEL V. SALANGA
Facts:
Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the
right of respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit
in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel.
Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an
administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against
respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office,
partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence."
Petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself
from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470
aforesaid. He there prayed that the records of those cases be transferred to another
sala.
Respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the
statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification
under the Rules of Court
Issue:
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Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one
of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against
him? NO.
Held:
Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge
upon being challenged and under which he should disqualify himself. The rule,
however, has never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting
himself, in the absence of any challenge by either party, due to his close blood
relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it
would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical
grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is
empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition.
The exercise of sound discretion mentioned in the rule has reference
exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward
with the case.7 For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated
yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been he has to continue
with the case.
A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those
specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly
aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or
prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of
justice.
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and
alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make
a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge
as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to
complain against him. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as
respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.
In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally
under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition,
prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned
MONTEMAYOR V. BERMEJO
(The RULING portion is kind of lengthy because I think the refutation of the Court for
every misconduct alleged is important. )
Facts:
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Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to decide the case
within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules of Court).
Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the
instant Administrative Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence
and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and/or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions for Execution and two
Motions to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a
Copy of the Judgment.
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the
appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it was
only after the respondent Judge received the defendants supersedeas bond that the
former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to
transmit the records of the case to the appellate court.
The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of
judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case submitted for
resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October
10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period.
Issue:
Is the respondent judge guilty of delaying rendition of judgment and violating the
Code of Judicial Ethics? YES.
Held:
The reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment
should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the
parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not
from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for resolution.
The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by himself choose
to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the law.
The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejos Order
requiring them to submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Assuming,
however, that the court received the defendants Position Paper on August 14, 2002, as
respondent Judge claims, judgment should have been rendered on September 13,
2002. Instead, the decision was dated October 10, 2002, or nearly a month after the
lapse of the mandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost two months from
the receipt of the defendants Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay
and, thus, administratively liable.
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Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The failure to
decide a case within the required period is not excusable, constitutes gross inefficiency
and is a ground for the imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting
judge.
The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on
the plaintiffs Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for Execution
prayed that hearing be set on a date that was not a motion day. Judge Bermejo forgets
that while the Rules of Court requires all motions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday
afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day,
the same Rules provides an exception for motions requiring immediate action.
Perhaps, as a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is
immediately executory, the plaintiffs believed that their motion came under the
exception. However, if the respondent Judge did not share this view, he could have
simply set the motion for hearing on the next motion day. Instead, he untenably
ignored the motion.
Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act on the motion on the ground
that there was no proof yet that the defendants counsel had received notice of the
Judgment.
The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution almost two months later on
December 12, 2002. The fact that the registry receipts of the service of judgment had
not yet returned at this point would have been cause for apprehension for any
responsible judge. Yet Judge Bermejo has not conveyed any semblance of anxiety. He
did not inquire from, nor inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of the receipts
two months after copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he found the
lack of registry receipts a convenient reason for tarrying on the motion.
These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two
things.
One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo
is denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that,
despite the seriousness of Dr. Montemayors allegations, the respondent Judge has not
offered in these administrative proceedings any evidence of the existence of the registry
receipts. An obvious disregard of keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack
of professionalism.
A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the
cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.
Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which
case, he is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but,
worse, bias in favor of the defendant.
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Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a flimsy
justification for his inaction on Dr. Montemayors Second Motion for Execution.
According to the respondent Judge, the court was undertaking its semestral inventory
when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were to admit the adequacy of this
obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, at the very least, should have set the motion for
hearing on the next motion day after the inventory. But again, he disregarded the
second motion.
Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file any
supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled
as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the inferior courts judgment. In such
a case the execution is mandatory.
However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in
obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears
reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the
appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of delay
in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is also
declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is fined the
amount of P10,000.00.
OKTUBRE V. VELASCO
FACTS:
Oktubre is the administrator of Paler Building, owned by Peggy DArcy. DArcy is
the aunt-in-law of Judge Velasco.
Shortly after Velascos appointment to the MTC of Maasin, he asked DArcy if he
could reside at the Paler Building. He was initially allowed by DArcy however when he
sought an extension to stay thereat he was denied by DArcy. Nevertheless, Judge
Velasco was able to stay in the building albeit in another room.
Judge Velasco then sent letters to the tenants of the building declaring that he
was the lawful owner of the building and all rentals should be deposited by them at his
office in the MTC. He also sent a strongly worded letter using the MTCs letterhead to
DArcy asserting possession over the building.
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Justice Hofilena
Judge Velasco caused the removal of the buildings service jeep from its garage.
DArcy then instructed Oktubre to replace the vehicle in the building and to take
measures to ensure that the removal would not be repeated. Oktubre successfully
replaced the vehicle and removed one of its wheels and put it inside the computer room
of the building.
Thereafter, Judge Velasco caused the destruction and replacement of the padlock
to Oktubres room and the access gate to the third floor of the building.
Oktubre then filed a complaint against the judge in the Punong Baranggay.
Conciliation proceedings failed.
After the hearing, Oktubre was asked by a police officer to come with him to the
station at the chiefs request. Upon arrival, he was confronted with an arrest warrant
signed under authority by Judge Velasco in connection with the alleged robbery of the
jeepneys wheel and he was put behind bars pursuant thereto.
After obtaining his release he was again filed suit for malicious mischief and
falsification of documents again by Judge Velasco. All the complaints were supported
by the sole affidavit of Judge Velasco which he prosecuted using his Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Velasco is guilty of grave misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority.
Note Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 3.12 of the same
code. For inappropriately using his Offices letterhead and for acting on his own
criminal complaints against complainant and DArcy, respondent Judge violated these
rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct [and grave abuse of authority.
On Respondent Judges failure to Recuse Himself from His Criminal Complaints.
Note the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he
might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to
preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe
and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act and behave in
such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed,
even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed.
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints,
respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a
warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of
complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication
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Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in
Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not
exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case
where he is related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge
from doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside
over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer
included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judges subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not detract
from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the first
place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party
of his right to due process. This became fait accompli when respondent Judge refused
to abide by such rule.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct,
Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for violation of Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of
the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government
owned or controlled corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due
him as of this date.
SANDOVAL V. CA
Facts:
It appears that an impostor succeeded in selling property lawfully titled in
anothers name by misrepresenting himself as the latter. The lower court ruled in favor
of the original owner and nullified the deed of sale in favor of the buyer who claims to
be a purchaser in good faith. CA affirmed.
[]
Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal of
the Court of Appeals decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First,
petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the ponente of the decision in
the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case
inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the
case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who
should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against private respondent
Tan, Jr.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Justice who penned the assailed decision in the Court of
Appeals should have inhibited himself from taking part in the case.
Held:
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
A judges conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial
duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual,
just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influence should
administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position
as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests to
interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.
From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit
himself from deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over
the case below, heard part of plaintiffs evidence and ruled on motions. The decision
itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took
over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevation to
the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.
The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the
disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his ruling in a lower court is the
subject of review or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review. Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the
case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision
therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to
review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally
bound to inhibit himself from the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and
declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court
has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly
or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve
and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is
not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view
that his active participation in the case below constitutes a just or valid reason, under
Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ V. JUSTICE DICDICAN
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Justice Dicdican filed by Ma.
Asparen, a party to a case involving St. Mary Mazzarello School. In that case, the school
imposed disciplinary sanctions on Ms. Asparen but the same was lifted by Hon.
Elumba, judge of the Trial Court. The respondent justice of the CA issued a TRO.
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So complainant here sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on the
ground that the latter had previously represented various religious organizations
during his practice in law and the petitioner in this case is run by a religious
organization.
Respondent denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the case
but he nevertheless inhibited himself.
Despite such inhibition, it was still alleged that Justice still appeared as one of the
signatories of a resolution dated Nov. 21, 2006 of the CA admitting the memorandum
of the petitioner school and which deemed the petition as submitted for resolution.
Complainant alleged that respondent justices actions showed his manifest bias
and prejudice against his client in the case. Respondent Justice however, was able to
show that no document was forwarded to him when he inhibited from the case. It was
also shown that another Justice took over the same. It was also shown that his
inclusion as a signatory was a mere mistake by the stenographer as shown by the letter
of apology.
Held:
Complaint was devoid of merit. In administrative proceedings, burden of proof is
upon complainant. If complainant fails to do so, respondent is under no obligation to
prove his defense.
In the present case, the complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of
impropriety and partiality against respondent justice. He failed to present any other
evidence to prove his charges.
A partys remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the proper
reviewing court, not with the office of the court administrator by means of an
administrative complaint. When some other judicial means is available, an
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed
aberrant or irregular.
CANON 4
J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS
Facts:
Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC
presided over by respondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application for
writ of preliminary attachment. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of
preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent and on the same
day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order
was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent approved defendants counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding
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companys Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of
the bonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked
Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5,
2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by
complainant. Respondents favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of
Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et
amore."
Held:
We agree with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift
attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.
Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the
motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering
the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day without
giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.
It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer
criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered
by him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it
has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
disciplinary action. The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that
respondents inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this
case, we believe that respondents actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we
find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice
rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard
on the matter
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to
exercise due care in examining the supporting papers. The respondent should know the
basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-
bond.
It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home
and to frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for
free. Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearing in his court.
Respondents defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of the karaoke
bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar are
quite clear that respondents wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever
given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially
considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. By
entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant,
respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.
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Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for

judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the
damage that can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption.
CENTRUM AGRI-BUSINESS REALTY CORP V. JUDGE BETHEL

KATALBAS-MOSCARDON
Facts:
Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for ejectment of several
stores leasing its building (JVLS Building). Centrum bought this property from JVLS
Co. Inc., but the tenants refused to pay rent to Centrum (These tenants on the other
hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of first option). MTCC ruled for Centrum,
ordered the tenants to pay rent covering 53 months + interests.
The tenants appealed this decision to RTC where respondent is the presiding
judge. In that appeal, Centrum moved for the execution of the MTCC decision, but
respondent refused. The tenants moved for 30 days within which to file their
supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, but limited the period to 10
days. Centrum urged for the early resolution of the case, but the judge said that
Centrums motion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to give the tenants a
chance to file their memorandum (meaning a ruling was already made).
The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour of Centrum, but with
different rental rates (higher, in favour of Centrum). This decision was dated June 15.
In the present administrative case against respondent judge, Centrum charged
her with 1. Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct; 2.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law.
Centrum states that not only were the amounts in the decision substantially
increased, it also disclosed that it had received a duplicate copy of the decision even
before it was promulgated, signed by the respondent. Judge claimed she was innocent
and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum also alleges that the judge unjustly
denied its motion for execution.
Held:
Respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and is dismissed from office.
Although there is no proof of how Centrum obtained a copy of the decision even
before its promulgation, the fact is that a copy was obtained by it and this is highly
irregular. Since the judge is ultimately responsible for the safekeeping of her papers,
the burden of accounting is on her.
(judge claims that her stenographer was at fault)
This was not merely a simple case of breach of confidentiality, but evidence
suggests a scheme to extort money from Centrum.
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There was a negotiation between the Judge and Centrum, as admitted by the
latters counsel. Why Centrum filed this case against the judge appears to be that the
decision, although it was completed as of June 15, was not promulgated until after
nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear that respondent judge would welsh on her
undertaking to increase the awards in its favour.
On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law, the
court finds the judges errors in this case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge violated
certain provisions in the rules of court applicable to ejectment proceedings.
RIZALINA CAPCO-UMALI V. PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE
Facts:
Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge Paulita Acosta-Villarante
(respondent) with violation of Canon 4.
The petitioner and other judges made a courtesy call to the Mayor of
Mandaluyong and they talked about local allowance of judges. The Mayor noticed the
disparity in the amounts received (respondent was receiving more, compared to
petitioner and other judges). So the Mayor ordered that the allowance received by
respondent be reverted to the previous rates.
During the first ever monthly meetingof RTC judges, what happened in the
courtesy call was reported. Angered, respondent yelled accusations of paninira at the
Executive judge (she was there during the courtesy call and was presiding over the
meeting). Petitioner, also present at the meeting, felt that she had to rescue the
executive judge and explained what happened. This time, respondent yelled at
petitioner, called her sinungaling and told petitioner to stop talking because
nakakahiwa boses mo. Petitioner yelled back, matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa
kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami, to which the respondent
answered that she was ready to die any moment because she did no wrong. Basically,
they had a screaming match until they were pacified.
Judge Villarante then wrote a Memorandum addressed to Executive Judge of the
Mandaluyong RTC, copies of which were furnished to the Justices of the SC, JBC, other
judges of Mandaluyong, its Congressman, and prosecutor. The memo suggested that
the holding of monthly meeting of judges be suspended, considering what transpired.
Petitioner filed a complaint for libel based on the memorandum. In causing the
circulation of the memorandum, respondent claimed that it was her obligation to bring
to the attention of concerned officials the personal demeanor of petitioner that would
put the judiciary in public scrutiny and disrespect.
Held:
Both judges are fined (11,000 for petitioner, 16,000 for respondent) and given a
stern warning for having violated Sec 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
149 | Block C 2012

Justice Hofilena
Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges
and employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding
is a disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the image of the Judiciary. By
fighting, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of members
of the Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere
allowance coming from the local government.
The behaviour of both parties was very unbecoming. Judge Capco-Umali failed to
live up to the standard of propriety required of judges. While she might have been
provoked by Judge Acosta-Villarantes referral to her as a liar, she should have
maintained her composure instead of shouting back at a fellow judge. She should have
exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriate manner.
Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for her failure to
observe the basic norm of propriety demanded from a judge. She provoked petitioner
by calling her sinungaling. She should have been more cautious in choosing her words.
She also repeated the uncalled for conduct when she wrote the memorandum and
caused its circulation. If indeed the memorandum was produced strictly to allow the
parties to cool off and avoid a repetition of the incident, there was no need to mention
the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the meeting. The memorandum
was thus written as a medium for retaliation against Judge Capco-Umali.
BINALAY V. LELINA, JR.
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Binalay filed this administrative case against Judge Lelina, Jr.
for violating Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct (both are with regard to prohibition on judges in the private practice of law).
Respondent judge is preventively suspended for being charged with rape,
abduction with rape and slight illegal detention. While still under suspension, the judge
filed a manifestation for the court to grant him the permission to practice law during
the remainder of his preventive suspension, or if such cannot be granted, to consider
him resigned from the judiciary.
It turned out, however, that even before he filed this manifestation, he had
already engaged in the private practice of law representing 2 persons in a criminal case,
and one in a civil case, all of which are still pending. All pleadings in those cases were
signed by him, as a partner of the Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law
Offices.
In the meantime, the office of court administrator directed respondent to desist
from engaging in the practice of law pending the courts resolution of his manifestation.
In his comment, the judge argues that the prohibition to engage in practice of law
applies only to judges who are in the active service and should not cover those under
150 | Block C 2012

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suspension. He also said he was forced to practice law due to his impoverished life and
because of the continuing sufferings of his wife and children.
Held:
Judge is suspended and sternly warned.
By being merely suspended, judge remains to bound by the prohibition to
practice law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos ditinguire debemos. Law does not make a
distinction between a suspended judge and an active judge. The fact that he tried to
secure an authorization to engage in the practice of law only shows that he is aware of
the prohibition.
Moreover, he should not permit the law firm to still carry his name. By allowing
the firm to do so, he held himself in public as a lawyer, in violation of the rules and
norms of judicial ethics.
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE

PORNILLOS
(Judge dismissed for borrowing money from lawyers with pending cases before her)
Facts:
Complainants charged Judge Pornillos for, among others, the violation of the
Canons of Judicial Conduct for borrowing money from her staff and lawyers in
amounts ranging from P500-P5k. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made
an investigation and found that such attaches no administrative liability (since they
were already paid or waived by the creditors and were obtained 19 years ago).
Issue:
W/N Judge Pornillos should be held administratively liable.
Held:
Yes. Judge Pornillos was dismissed from the service for gross misconduct
(aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions and violation of SC rules). Under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil service, borrowing money by
superior officers from subordinates is a violation punishable by reprimand, suspension,
and dismissal from service. At the very least, she should be admonished for dealing
with her subordinates in an improper manner.
More severely prohibited is borrowing money or property from lawyers and
litigants in case pending before the court (a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of
ROC). Under Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (the old one), a judge shall
refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
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Justice Hofilena
LIHAYLIHAY V. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CANDA
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Canda for the ff. acts:
Threatening her through text message that she would be in trouble (because he thought
she was supporting an applicant for sheriff which he opposed)
Filing admin. complaints and criminal cases to harass her
Describing her as a GRO, undignified, a whore, disgusting, repulsive,
pakialamera, offensive, etc. (in a letter he wrote to the Executive Judge after he found
out she ad him blotted with the police because of the text threat)
Publishing such remarks in a newspaper
Issue:
W/N Judge Canda is guilty of gross misconduct
Held:
Yes. Sec. 2, Canon 4: As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizenin
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity
of the judicial office.
Sec. 6, Canon 4: Judges are entitled to freedom of expression, but in exercising
such right, they shall always conduct themselves in a manner as to preserve the dignity
of the judicial office.
The acts committed by Judge Canda are unbecoming of a judge, and these
subjected the judiciary to embarrassment. He was fined and was given a stern warning.
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF LOUIS BIRAOGO
Facts:
The Supreme Court, en banc, continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice
Ruben Reyes in 3 consolidated cases (Limkaichong case). Since there was no further
objection, the En Banc approved it. Being printed on Gilbert paper, Justice Reyes
immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session. However, they decided
to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy because 9 justices wanted to concur
only in the result (if the majority concurred only in result, the ponencia would have no
doctrinal value). They decided to hold oral arguments.
Biraogo, a petitioner in one of the 3 cases, held a press conference and circulated
to the media an undated letter signed by him together with a photocopy of the
unpromulgated ponencia. He insinuated that the Court unlawfully and with improper
motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
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Justice Hofilena
Since the unauthorized release of the copy infringed on the confidential

deliberations of the SC and constituted contempt of court, the SC directed an
investigation. The Investigating Committee found that the leak came from Justice
Reyes himself. Hence, he must be liable for grave misconduct.
Issue:
W/N Justice Reyes is liable for gross misconduct
Held:
YES. He is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information* acquired by justices and
judges in their official capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purposes not
related to their judicial duties.
*Information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge
relating to pending cases.
CANONS 5 & 6
REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOA
Consolidation of 3 cases against respondent
FACTS
Case 1: Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Republic for the implementation of a law5 which required the payment of duties and
taxes to importers in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, who formerly had an exemption to
such taxes but was subsequently required by virtue of such law. He also granted various
ex-parte motions for interventions of different but similarly situated corporations, and
approved an injunction bond of P1M for all the petitioners. These orders were
immediately implemented despite the MRs filed by the OSG. The Republic filed
administrative cases against Caguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. This was acted upon by the
OCA and subsequently by the CA, stating that Caguioa gravely abused his discretion for
ordering the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Case 2: (Almost similar circumstances, different people involved) Judge Caguioa
issued a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO, to enjoin a person from acting as an
officer in a Govt agency. The agency filed administrative cases against Caguioa for
manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Case 3: Caguioa ordered a Writ of Execution, after his order of dismissal of a case
based on prescription. Private Petitioner filed a case for Grave Misconduct against
5
RA 9334
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Justice Hofilena
Caguioa. The CA saw this as invalid, because the Writ should conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision. The Order of dismissal did not adjudicate any rights of the
parties and resolved no other matter except the dismissal of the case.
The findings of the Investigative Justice of the CA:

Case 1: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law + conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Evidence on the Manifest Partiality was insufficient.
Case 2: Same as Case 1.
Case 3: Guilty of simple misconduct.
Penalty: 1-year suspension + Stern Warning.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Caguioa is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Simple Misconduct.
HELD:
YES! Adopt findings of the CA. Caguioa Dismissed from service + forfeiture of
retirement benefits except leave credits.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Judge Caguioa issued the Writs of Preliminary Injunction that did not satisfy the
legal requisites for its issuance, and which was enforced outside of his territorial
jurisdiction. In the former, the applicants of the Writ showed no clear and
unmistakable right that was material and substantial as would warrant the issuance of
such Writ, and the of its urgency and necessity. In short, he issued the Writs without
basis.
The requisites for the issuance of the Writ are basic and elementary, and should
have been known by Caguoia. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Where
the law is basic, lack of conversance with it, and for transgressing the elementary
jurisdictional limits of his court, a judge should be administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
Not Grave Misconduct

Even though Caguioa issued the Writs without basis, in this circumstance, it only
amounts to simple misconduct. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt, or with evident bad faith. Such conduct was not
evident in the case.
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS INC. V. PERALTA
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Justice Hofilena
FACTS:
Sept 13, 2002: Final order of an unlawful detainer case in favor of Dee C. Chuan
& Sons Inc. An appeal was filed with Peralta, an RTC Judge.
March 18, 2003: DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ
of execution" for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to pay the
rentals due in accordance with the decision of the MeTC.
March 21, 2003: Acting on the Motion, Peralta required appellants to file their
comment.
August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003: DCCSI filed a motion
to resolve. However, despite the lapse of more than one year, respondent failed and
refused to resolve the pending motions. Complaint thus filed.
When asked by the OCA about the case, Peralta said that it "ha (d) been resolved
by (his) Court and the same (was) already for mailing" and attached a copy of his
order dated May 5, 2004. In his order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the
appellants to file their memorandum and directed the issuance of a writ of execution in
favor of DCCSI. The OCA, in its report, found Peralta indeed failed to resolve several
motions for more than a year and showed indifference in his comment and
recommended that he be held liable for inefficiency in the performance of his official
duties and fined in the amount of P11, 000.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision or
order.
HELD:
YES! FINED + Sternly Warned.
RATIO:
Delivery of Decisions with Reasonable Promptness
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts
shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for
decision. Peralta ignored this mandate. Failure to comply within the mandated period
constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
For more than a year, Peralta failed to resolve several motions the motion to
dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of execution as well as the three motions to
resolve, and didnt offer any reason or justification on why it took him more than a year
to resolve the motions. He thus violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. A judges failure to resolve motions and incidents within the
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Justice Hofilena
prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency for it undermines the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
BACULI V. BELEN
FACTS:
Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a person-accused for
frustrated homicide. Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit evidence that the
notice of preliminary investigation was duly served and received by such person. After
a series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belen directed the former why he should not be
cited for tempt of court for making unfounded statements in his pleadings. No such
reason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt for making
scurrilous (vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in one of the latter's
Motions, and subsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that such order be set
aside, but was denied by Belen, stating that such Decisions are final and executory.
Therefore, Baculi filed a complaint against Belen, denying the claims against him, and
added that Belen was induced by revenge because it was Baculi who indicted him in a
previous libel case against him, and that Belen had a 'power complex'.
ISSUE:
W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in indirect
contempt.
HELD:
YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The scurrilous and
contumacious statements constitute direct contempt because it is equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. But such is not the reason for indirect contempt. And even if
such statements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did not follow the proper
procedure under the Rules of Court. This strengthens the OCA's findings that Belen is
grossly ignorant of basic procedure.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic procedural
rules must be at the palm of his hands. When the law is so elementary, such as the
provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the
same, and failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules
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Justice Hofilena
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a
judge like Belen.
MARIANO V. JUDGE NACIONAL
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the
law, dereliction of duty and violation of judicial conduct stemming from an action for
ejectment.
In the ejectment proceeding, Judge Nacional issued a pre-trial order dated Sep. 3,
2004 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers on Sep. 30, 2004 (w/c
the parties complied with). Nacional subsequently issued an order dated Dec. 28, 2004
requiring parties to submit their respective memoranda in the form of a court
decision which the parties complied with. The case was eventually decided by
Nacional on Feb. 14, 2005.
Complaint alleges that the issuance of the Dec. 28, 2004 order violated the
prohibition on memoranda by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and that
Nacional violated the Rules when he decided the case only on Feb. 14, 2005 (136 days
from the date required by law).
Judge Nacional admits that he exceeded the maximum period allowed under the
Revised Rules and offered the following excuses: (1) quality of decision had priority
over compliance w/ reglementary pd; (2) heavy caseload; and (3) documents were
voluminous.
Issue:
W/N Nacional violated basic procedure and code of judicial conduct?
Held:
Yes, he is fined P40K for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, P20K for
violation of Canons 3 & 6 (Code of Judicial Conduct) and P10K for violations of CPR
The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in settling
unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases. The necessity of promptly resolving
unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more imperative by express
provisions of the periods of rendition of judgment (30 days after receipt of the
affidavits and position period, or expiration of the period for the filing the same
ROC/Rules of Summary Procedure). Corollarily, Sec 5 of Canon 6 of Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. The justifications advanced by Nacional cannot be accepted
because doing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules & diminish
respect for the law. The judge (by himself) cannot choose to prolong the period for
157 | Block C 2012

Justice Hofilena
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. If a judge needs more time to decide a
case, he should formally request the SC for an extension of the deadline.
Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the
law and procedure. Lack of malice or good faith will not exonerate Nacional because
the rules violated were basic procedural law. All he had to do was apply them, but he
chose not to. It is settled that one who accepts the position of judge owes the public and
the court the ability o be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain the professional
competence at all times. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office. (Note: length of service does not mitigate administrative
penalty)
CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Caneda is counsel for defendant Virginia Guzman, in Civil
Case Roberto Borromeo v. Heirs of Juan Borromeo, for judicial partition pending with
Judge Mechanvezs sala.
During the Dec. 14, 2005 hearing of said partition case, the motion to segregate
the inheritance shares of one of the plaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo was due to be taken
up. During the hearing, the defendants agreed to a partition subject to plaintiffs
withdrawal of a motion for reconsideration it filed before the SC to clear one of the
areas (subject to partition) of squatters. Because the plaintiff could not withdraw the
MR before the SC, Atty. Caneda suggested mediation. Judge Menchavez blurted out
never mind mediation, walay hinundan na.
When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of the case, Atty. Caneda
remarked it was being delayed because no proper summons had been served on the
defendants who were residing outside the country. Menchavez reacted angrily and
banged his gavel & shouted I said no publication period. Afterwards, Menchavez
slammed the table with his hand and went inside his chambers. Afterwards, Judge
Menchavez came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on the table, as he
angrily shouted at Atty. Caneda Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!
Atty. Caneda filed a complaint against Judge Menchavez alleging that the Judges
act of challenging him inside the courtroom in the presence of many people was
improper
Issue:
W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable
Held:
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Justice Hofilena
Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety demanded of a

member of the bench by losing his cool and uttering intemperate language during the
hearing.
In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is to
hear and consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a
situation where two equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against each other.
Menchavez should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to respond to his ruling
instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. Atty. Caneda also
erred when he continued to argue despite Judge Menchavezs ruling. However,
Menchavez should have directed the complainant to wind up his arguments under pain
of direct contempt if he persisted in his arguments. Direct contempt is not enforced by
the judges act of bringing out of his weapon and asking counsel the direct question
what do you want? This confrontational manner has no place in our present justice
system. There are agents of the law, officers of the court & the police who can be called
upon to implement contempt orders & restore order as needed.
Judge Menchavezs overreacting by bringing out a gun for everyone present in
the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in court, is
inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the
court. While the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires a magistrate to maintain order
and decorum in the court, the Code itself sets its limits (as provided for by Sec. 6 of
Canon 6) wherein the judge himself must observe decorum by acting with dignity and
courtesy to all those present in the courtroom. Judges are demanded to be always
temperate, patient, and courteous both in conduct and in language.
SUAREZ V. DILAG
Facts:
Suarez filed administrative complaints of (a) graft and corruption against Judge
Dilag and Court Stenographer Pascua and (b) grave misconduct and ignorance of the
law against Judge Dilag allegedly for collecting P30K from litigants in consideration of
favorable judgments in cases for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage.
Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions rendered by Judge
Dilar (Pancho Case, Tomboc Case, del Rosario Case which were all previously
dismissed but subsequently reopened the case and granted the petition).
After referral to an investigation officer, the Investigating Justice found Judge Dilag
liable for (1) gross misconduct for singing conflicting decisions; (2) gross ignorance of
the law and procedure in handling Moreno and Perez cases; and (3) gross negligence
and inefficiency for failing to administer supervision over his staff when a fake registry
return receipt was effected in Cayabyab Case and entries of judgment were effected in
Moreno Case & Dinoso v. Corpuz. Pascua was found guilty of graft and corruption.
159 | Block C 2012

Justice Hofilena
Issue:
W/N Judge Dilag should be held liable?
Held:
Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office.
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence to uphold and
maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep
abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a
cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg. taking cognizance of a second petition
for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity when Dilag had
already dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties, issues,
and causes of action with that of the first petition). Not every error is indicative of
ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative sanction is imposed. Good
faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not
apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident and
basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at bench, Dilag failed to
follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure (During questioning, Dilag said that
re-filing is allowed in a dismissal with or without prejudice. Also, he deiced a case even
before the submission of the City Prosecutor relative to the investigation to determine
collusion between the parties as required under Sec. 9 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
Dilag was charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to warrant a finding
of gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption. For to hold a judge administratively accountable for ever erroneous order
or decision he renders would be intolerable. In the case at bar, there was no allegation
whatsoever that Dilag was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he issued
the premature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, the Court holds him
administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the rules on the conduct of prelim
investigations. Judges should be conversant with basic legal norms and precepts as well
as with the statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to follow developments in
the law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he
judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the
dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and be the embodiment of
professional competence.
160 | Block C 2012

Justice Hofilena
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho

CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient

CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate

CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in

15. Suarez v. Platon

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and

25. Reyes v. Chiong

CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the

31.Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon

42. Berbano v. Barcelona

CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio

49. Hilado v. David

56. Licuanan v. Melo

72. Briones v. Jimenez

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER

74. Manalang v. Angeles

CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui

CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his

83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan

89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

104. Libarios v. Dablos

106. Sabitsana v. Villamor

109. Fernandez v. Hamoy

115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan

121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas

CANON 6 Competence and diligence

128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.

132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO

DE YSASI III V. NLRC

The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01

Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?

Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their

PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for

SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or

Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or

ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION V. CIR

OBCs Report and Recommendation

special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf

None. Case against Villalon is dismissed.

intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and

FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND

Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to

BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN