2/3/2017 G.R.No.

L18727

TodayisFriday,February03,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L18727August31,1964

JESUSMA.CUI,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ANTONIOMA.CUI,defendantappellant,
ROMULOCUI,Intervenorappellant.

JoseW.Dioknoforplaintiffappellee.
JaimeR.NuevasandHectorL.Hofileafordefendantappellant.
RomuloCuiinhisownbehalfasintervenorappellants.

MAKALINTAL,J.:

ThisisaprovinginquowarrantooriginallyfiledintheCourtofFirstInstanceofCebu.Theofficeincontentionis
thatofAdministratoroftheHospiciodeSanJosedeBarili.Judgmentwasrenderedon27April1961infavorof
theplaintiff,JesusMa.Cui,andappealedtousbythedefendant,AntonioMa.Cui,andbytheintervenor,Romulo
Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now
deceased,"forthecareandsupport,freeofcharge,ofindigentinvalids,andincapacitatedandhelplesspersons."
It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November
1925)andendowedwithextensivepropertiesbythesaidspousesthroughaseriesofdonations,principallythe
deedofdonationexecutedon2January1926.

Section2ofActNo.3239gavetheinitialmanagementtothefoundersjointlyand,incaseoftheirincapacityor
death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the
deedofdonationprovidesasfollows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime
sobrinoMarianoCui,sialtiempodenuestramuerteoincapacidadsehallareresidiendoenlacaudadde
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime
MauricioCui.AmbossobrinosadministraranconjuntamenteelHOSPICIODESANJOSEDEBARILI.Ala
muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de
cualquieradenuestrossobrinoslegitimosMarianoCui,MauricioCui,VicenteCuiyVictorCui,yqueposea
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al
Estadomayorimpuestoocontribution.Enigualdaddecircumstancias,serapreferidaelvarondemasedad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de
estascualificaciones,laadministraciondelHOSPICIODESANJOSEDEBARILIpasaraalsenorObispode
CebuoquienseaelmayordignatariodelaIglesiaCatolica,apostolica,Romana,quetuviereasientoenla
cabeceradeestaProvinciadeCebu,yensudefecto,alGobiernoProvincialdeCebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
ThereupontheadministrationpassedtoMauricioCuiandDionisioJakosalem.Thefirstdiedon8May1931and
thesecondon1July1931.On2July1931Dr.TeodoroCui,onlysonofMauricioCui,becametheadministrator.
Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this
decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into
betweenthemandembodiedinanotarialdocument.Thenextday,28February,AntonioMa.Cuitookhisoathof
office.JesusMa.Cui,however,hadnopriornoticeofeitherthe"convenio"orofhisbrother'sassumptionofthe
position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960 on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant
demanding that the office be turned over to him and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been
compliedwiththeplaintifffiledthecomplaintinthiscase.RomuloCuilateronintervened,claimingarighttothe
same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the
Hospiciointheirdeedofdonation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator.Jesusistheolderofthetwoandthereforeunderequalcircumstanceswouldbepreferredpursuant
tosection2ofthedeedofdonation.However,beforethetestofagemaybe,appliedthedeedgivespreference
to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o
contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of
Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passedtheexaminationstoqualifyhimasone.AntonioMa.Cui,ontheotherhand,isamemberoftheBarand
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although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
HospiciodeBarili.

The Court aquo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken
alone,meansthatofafullfledgedlawyer,butthathasusedinthedeedofdonationandconsideringthefunction
or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore
meansalawdegreeordiplomaofBachelorofLaws.Thisrulingisassailedaserroneousbothbythedefendant
andbytheintervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possessionoftheacademicdegreeofBachelorofLawsbutmembershipintheBarafterdueadmissionthereto,
qualifyingoneforthepracticeoflaw.InSpanishtheword"titulo"isdefinedas"testimoniesoinstrumentodado
para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola,
1947ed.,p.1224)andtheword"abogado,"asfollows:"Peritoenelderechopositivoquesededicaadefender
enjuicio,porescritoodepalabra,losderechosointeresesdeloslitigantes,ytambienadardictmensobrelas
cuestionesopuntoslegalesqueseleconsultan(Id.,p.5)ABachelor'sdegreealone,conferredbyalawschool
upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession.
TheEnglishequivalentof"abogado"islawyerorattorneyatlaw.Thistermhasafixedandgeneralsignification,
and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose,however,possessionofthedegreeitselfisnotindispensable:completionoftheprescribedcoursesmay
beshowninsomeotherway.Indeedthereareinstances,particularlyundertheformerCodeofCivilProcedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualificationsoflearningability.")Yetcertainlyitwouldbeincorrecttosaythatsuchpersonsdonotpossessthe
"titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or
university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and
providedinthedeedofdonationthatifnotalawyer,theadministratorshouldbeadoctororacivilengineerora
pharmacist, in that order or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those
otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio
shall"makeregulationsforthegovernmentofsaidinstitution(Sec.3,b)shall"prescribetheconditionssubjectto
whichinvalidsandincapacitatedanddestitutepersonsmaybeadmittedtotheinstitute"(Sec.3,d)shallseetoit
thattherulesandconditionspromulgatedforadmissionarenotinconflictwiththeprovisionsoftheActandshall
administerpropertiesofconsiderablevalueforallofwhichwork,itistobepresumed,aworkingknowledgeof
thelawandalicensetopracticetheprofessionwouldbeadistinctasset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of
administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by
virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the
ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality
and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he
assumedtheofficeofadministrator.Hisreinstatementisarecognitionofhismoralrehabilitation,uponproofno
lessthanthatrequiredforhisadmissiontotheBarinthefirstplace.

Wherefore,thepartiesrespectfullypraythattheforegoingstipulationoffactsbeadmittedandapprovedbythis
HonorableCourt,withoutprejudicetothepartiesadducingotherevidencetoprovetheircasenotcoveredbythis
stipulationoffacts. 1 w p h 1 . t

Whetherornottheapplicantshallbereinstatedreststoagreatextentinthesounddiscretionofthecourt.
Thecourtactionwilldepend,generallyspeaking,onwhetherornotitdecidesthatthepublicinterestinthe
orderlyandimpartialadministrationofjusticewillbeconservedbytheapplicant'sparticipationthereininthe
capacityofanattorneyandcounseloratlaw.Theapplicantmust,likeacandidateforadmissiontothebar,
satisfythecourtthatheisapersonofgoodmoralcharacterafitandproperpersontopracticelaw.The
courtwilltakeintoconsiderationtheapplicant'scharacterandstandingpriortothedisbarment,thenature
andcharacterofthechargeforwhichhewasdisbarred,hisconductsubsequenttothedisbarment,andthe
timethathaselapsedbetweenthedisbarmentandtheapplicationforreinstatement.(5Am.Jur.,Sec.301,
p.443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the

attorneyhasreceivedapardonfollowinghisconviction,andtherequirementsforreinstatementhavebeen
heldtobethesameasfororiginaladmissiontothebar,exceptthatthecourtmayrequireagreaterdegree
ofproofthaninanoriginaladmission.(7C.J.S.,Attorney&Client,Sec.41,p.815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral
character"inthesenseinwhichthatphraseisusedwhenappliedtoattorneysatlawandisafitandproper
persontobeentrustedwiththeprivilegesoftheofficeofanattorney,andwhetherhismentalqualifications
aresuchastoenablehimtodischargeefficientlyhisdutytothepublic,andthemoralattributesaretobe
regardedasaseparateanddistinctfromhismentalqualifications.(7C.J.S.,Attorney&Client,Sec.41,p.
816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of
attorneycannotbelessexactingthanthatimpliedinparagraph3ofthedeedofdonationasarequisiteforthe
officewhichisdisputedinthiscase.Whenthedefendantwasrestoredtotherolloflawyerstherestrictionsand
disabilitiesresultingfromhispreviousdisbarmentwerewipedout.

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This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or
laches.UnderSection16ofRule66(formerlysec.16,Rule68,takenfromsection216ofAct190),thiskindof
actionmustbefiledwithinone(1)yearaftertherightofplaintifftoholdtheofficearose.

PlaintiffJesusMa.Cuibelievedhimselfentitledtotheofficeinquestionaslongagoas1932.OnJanuary26of
that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the
Hospicioon2July1931.MarianoCui,theplaintiff'sfatherandAntonioMa.Cuicameinasintervenors.Thecase
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and
complaintinintervention.UponappealtotheSupremeCourtfromtheorderofdismissal,thecasewasremanded
forfurtherproceedings(Cuiv.Cui,60Phil.37,48).Theplaintiff,however,didnotprosecutethecaseasindicated
in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator,
MarianoCuiwasnamed"legaladviser"andplaintiffJesusMa.Cuiacceptedapositionasassistantadministrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extrajudicial maneuvers. First he informed the
SocialWelfareCommissioner,byletterdated1February1950,thatasoftheprevious1Januaryhehad"made
clear"hisintentionofoccupyingtheofficeofadministratoroftheHospicio."Hefollowedthatupwithanotherletter
dated4February,announcingthathehadtakenovertheadministrationasof1January1950.Actually,however,
hetookhisoathofofficebeforeanotarypubliconlyon4March1950,afterreceivingareplyofacknowledgment,
dated2March,fromtheSocialWelfareCommissioner,whothoughtthathehadalreadyassumedthepositionas
statedinhiscommunicationof4February1950.TherathermuddledsituationwasreferredbytheCommissioner
totheSecretaryofJustice,who,inanopiniondated3April1950(op.No.45,S.1950),correctinganotheropinion
previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the
Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio
commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R
1216)becausetheBankhadfrozentheHospicio'sdepositstherein.TheBankthenfiledathirdpartycomplaint
against herein plaintiffappellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19
October1950,havingbeendeprivedofrecognitionbytheopinionoftheSecretaryofJusticehemovedtodismiss
thethirdpartycomplaintonthegroundthathewasrelinquishing"temporarily"hisclaimtotheadministrationof
theHospicio.Themotionwasdeniedinanorderdated2October1953.On6February1954hewasabletotake
anotheroathofofficeasadministratorbeforePresidentMagsaysay,andsoonafterwardfiledasecondmotionto
dismiss in Civil case No. R1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in
Court,statedinatelegramtohisExecutiveSecretarythat"asfaras(he)wasconcernedthecourtmaydisregard
theoath"thustaken.Themotiontodismisswasgrantedneverthelessandtheotherpartiesinthecasefiledtheir
noticeofappealfromtheorderofdismissal.Theplaintiffthenfiledanexpartemotiontobeexcludedaspartyin
theappealandthetrialCourtagaingrantedthemotion.Thiswason24November1954.Appellantsthereupon
institutedamandamusproceedingintheSupremeCourt(G.R.No.L8540),whichwasdecidedon28May1956,
totheeffectthatJesusMa.Cuishouldbeincludedintheappeal.Thatappeal,however,afteritreachedthisCourt
wasdismissuponmotionoftheparties,whoagreedthat"theofficeofadministratorandtrusteeoftheHospicio...
should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not
occupyingtheofficebutbelieveshehasarighttoit"(G.R.No.L9103).Theresolutionofdismissalwasissued31
July1956.AtthattimetheincumbentadministratorwasDr.TeodoroCui,butnoactioninquowarrantowasfiled
againsthimbyplaintiffJesusMa.Cuiasindicatedintheaforesaidmotionfordismissal.

On10February1960,defendantAntonioMa.CuiwasreinstatedbythisCourtasmemberoftheBar,andonthe
following27FebruaryDr.TeodoroCuiresignedasadministratorinhisfavor,pursuanttothe"convenio"between
themexecutedonthesamedate.ThenextdayAntonioMa.Cuitookhisoathofoffice.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in
1934(60Phil.3769),remandingittothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedingshisacceptanceinsteadoftheposition
ofassistantadministrator,allowingDr.TeodoroCuitocontinueasadministratorandhisfailuretofileanactionin
quowarrantoagainstsaidDr.Cuiafter31July1956,whentheappealinCivilCaseNo.R1216oftheCebuCourt
wasdismisseduponmotionofthepartiespreciselysothattheconflictingclaimsofthepartiescouldbeventilated
insuchanactionallthesecircumstancesmilitateagainsttheplaintiff'spresentclaiminviewoftherulethatan
action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The
excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's
illnessdidnotinterrupttherunningofthestatutoryperiod.Andthefactthatthisactionwasfiledwithinoneyearof
thedefendant'sassumptionofofficeinSeptember1960doesnotmaketheplaintiff'spositionanybetter,forthe
basisoftheactionishisownrighttotheofficeanditisfromthetimesuchrightarosethattheoneyearlimitation
must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo,38Phil.624Limvs.Yulo,62Phil.161.

NowfortheclaimofintervenorandappellantRomuloCui.Thispartyisalsoalawyer,grandsonofVicenteCui,
oneofthenephewsofthefoundersoftheHospiciomentionedbytheminthedeedofdonation.Heisfurther,in
the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said
nephews.Thedeedofdonationprovides:"alamuerteoincapacidaddeestosadministradores(thoseappointed
inthedeeditself)pasaraaunasolapersonaqueseraelvaron,mayordeedad,quedesciendalegitimamentede
cualquieradenuestrossobrinoslegitimosMarianoCui,MauricioCui,VicenteCui,VictorCui,yqueposeatitulode
abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older
thanheandthereforeispreferredwhenthecircumstancesareotherwiseequal.Theintervenorcontendsthatthe
intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the
nephewsnamedinthedeed,intheordertheyarenamed.Thus,heargues,sincethelastadministratorwasDr.
Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente
Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of
donation.

INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOINGCONSIDERATIONS,thejudgmentappealedfromisreversedandsetaside,and
thecomplaintaswellasthecomplaintininterventionaredismissed,withcostsequallyagainstplaintiffappellee
andintervenorappellant.

Bengzon,C.J.,BautistaAngelo,Concepcion,Reyes,J.B.L.,ParedesandRegala,JJ.,concur.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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