01 Garcillano Vs House of Representatives

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT
THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondent.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B.
LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking ocial of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line,
and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. 1 cCSDTI
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor

Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes", and
set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees
on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
Information and Communications Technology, and Surage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of
the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer
of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour
taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the
hearings indenitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports
based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. 3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) led
with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4 docketed as
G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be
restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further
implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken
o the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to
desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. 5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the
"Garci tapes" abruptly stopped. AECacS
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panlo Lacson roused the
slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse that Brought
Darkness". In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the
whole unvarnished truth the what's, when's, where's, who's and why's" of the
alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's speech was referred to
the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously led two bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7
In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when
Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on
the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a
privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of
the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation
into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine
National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of
public ocials. 9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,
retired justices of the Court of Appeals, led before this Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main
that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article
III of the Constitution. 11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public
hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7, 12 17 13 and October 1, 14
2007.
Intervening as respondents, 15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno
Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panlo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A.
Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes led their Comment 16 on the
petition on September 25, 2007. aAIcEH
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of
the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its
hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. 18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and
179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings,
they have dierent objectives the rst is poised at preventing the playing of
the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports,
and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on
the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the rst petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second,
G.R. No. 179275.
I
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall rst resolve the issue
on the parties' standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 20 we explained that "'[l]egal standing' or locus standi
refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act
. . .," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that
he has personally suered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. 21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of dicult constitutional questions". 22 HTcDEa
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the

Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo 23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings". 24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales 25 even permitted a non-
member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and
the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case,
echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently
refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them". 26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justies his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Further, his was publicly identied by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees'
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP.
They are of the rm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes
will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public
funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are
worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of
legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. 28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he
is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of
his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing
the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of
the questioned hearings. 29 CAaSHI
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of
the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process, 30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 31
we nd sucient petitioners Ranada's and Agcaoili's and intervenor Sagge's
allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned
legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. 32 It
should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as
in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights as
taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and
members of the bar and of the legal profession which were also supposedly
violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts. 33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners
and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The
issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.
34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge. cHATSI
II
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual
cases and controversies. 35 By actual cases, we mean existing conicts
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for
otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A
case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. 37 It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal eect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced. 38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same
in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken o
the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings
were already played in the House and heard by its members. 39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry
were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees. 40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition
has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 41
III
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process. 42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. 43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take eect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Ocial Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." 44 EScaIT
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no eort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they rst
opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Ocers and Investigations, 46 we
said:
Fourth, we nd merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published
rules of procedure". We quote the OSG's explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate
of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every
three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term.
Each Senate may thus enact a dierent set of rules as it may deem
t. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th
Senate, are therefore, procedurally inrm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this
ruling with the following rationalization: CcSEIH
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing

legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of
whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus,
the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than
a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The
1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business". Applying the same
reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution
is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators
continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of
Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the
term of twelve Senators. 47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution 48 (On the
Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees t to
issue a clarication. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However,
in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before
it. The Rules of the Senate itself conrms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unnished business at the end of the session shall be
taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon
the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the
succeeding Congress as if present for the rst time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of
that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unnished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the rst time. The logic and practicality of such
a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding
Congress (which will typically have a dierent composition as that of the
previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of
the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters
will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same
status. HSCAIT
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the

opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reected in its Rules. The
Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate's main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of oce,
the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee
for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which

should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and
the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall
be required for its approval. DCTSEA
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take eect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which
the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are
amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the
Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take eect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The
latter does not explicitly provide for the continued eectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the dierence in the
language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the
Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The
Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt dierent rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unnished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that
the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules
of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish
the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make
the published rules clearly state that the same shall be eective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
suciently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be eective even in the next Congress, it could have easily
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
eectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate's internet web page. 49 HIESTA
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate's deance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision.
The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom,
practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or
in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sucient under the
Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Ocial
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure
even provide that the rules "shall take eect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation", precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the
Rules of Procedure put a person's liberty at risk. A person who violates
the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50

otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim
of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. 51 In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being
the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. 52 It does
not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not,
in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure". ECaSIT
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues
o f Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the
recent publication does not cure the inrmity of the inquiry sought to be
prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court nds it unnecessary to discuss the
other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in
G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and
Brion, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., pls. see dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., join the
dissent of Chief Justice Puno.
Corona, J., is on leave.
Reyes, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, C.J., dissenting:
The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing between what is apparent and
what is real, what is central and what is peripheral, to get to the core of the
issues that will decide the controversy at bar. SCcHIE
The facts pertaining to both G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No 17925 as narrated in
the ponencia are undisputed. Hence, I will go direct to the issues.
First, the issues in G.R. No. 179275. These were delineated in the Oral Argument
held on October 2, 2007 as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
have been published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional

requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes"

violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act
No. 4200. 1
As I agree with the disquisition of the ponencia on the rst issue, I shall limit my
discussion to the second and third issues. CDHSac
Publication of Senate Rules Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Let me hark back to the ruling of the Court on the publication of the "Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation" (Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries) of the Senate in its March 25, 2008 Decision 2 (March 25
Neri Decision) and September 4, 2008 Resolution 3 (September 4 Neri
Resolution). I respectfully submit that the ponencia is not in accord with the
ruling of the Court in these Neri cases (Neri Ruling). The proper application of
t h e Neri Ruling to the case at bar will yield the conclusion that the subject
Senate investigation should be allowed to proceed even if the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries were not published in the 14th Congress prior to the subject
investigation. Still, I maintain my dissent to the Neri Ruling and arrive at this
same conclusion through a dierent track.
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court ruled, viz.:
rules of procedure". We quote the OSG's explanation: AECDHS
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate

t. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th
Senate, are therefore, procedurally inrm. 4
Subsequently, the Court claried the above ruling in the September 4 Neri
Resolution. I quote the ruling at length, viz.:
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent
Committees' fourth argument. Respondent Committees argue that the
Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was
published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a
continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, unless the
same is repealed or amended. SaTAED
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees t to

issue a clarication. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However,
in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before
it. The Rules of the Senate itself conrms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

succeeding Congress as if present for the rst time. (emphasis
supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of
that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unnished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the rst time. The logic and practicality of such
a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding
Congress (which will typically have a dierent composition as that of the
previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of
the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters
will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same
status. TCIEcH

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the

Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin
their term of oce, the President may endorse the Rules to
the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which
should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and
the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall
be required for its approval. (emphasis supplied)DSHTaC
RULE LII
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended
or repealed. (emphasis supplied)
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are
amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the
Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take eect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation."
(Section 24, Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation)
The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued eectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the dierence in the
language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the
Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The
Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt dierent rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unnished business.
suciently put public on notice.
eectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed
that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to
the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and eective. 5 (emphasis
supplied)
The ponencia quotes the foregoing ruling in the September 4 Neri Resolution
in holding, viz.:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "[l]aws shall take eect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Ocial Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." EDISTc
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no eort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they rst opened their session.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation
of the Constitution, use its rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure".
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31,
2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of
the fact, the recent publication does not cure the inrmity of the inquiry
sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. In so far as the
consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent
Senate Committees, because no published rules govern it, in
clear contravention of the Constitution. 6 (emphasis supplied) cHTCaI
While the ponencia cites the Neri Ruling to support its conclusion that the
subject investigation cannot be conducted without published rules, I submit that
it fails to adhere to the Neri Ruling, as the latter emphasizes that " not all orders
issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and
void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should
be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication
is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and eective".
It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court struck down
not the entire proceedings of the Senate investigation on the NBN-ZTE
deal for want of published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but
only the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in
contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention
(January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in the dispositive portion of the Decision.
7 A faithful adherence of the case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the
conclusion that the "Garci tapes" investigation may be conducted even without
the published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that only those orders
and proceedings that result in the violation of the rights of the witnesses may be
considered null and void. The ponencia did not, however, show which orders or
proceedings resulted in this violation and, instead, made a blanket prohibition of
the conduct of the "Garci tapes" investigation for want of published Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries.
In line with my position in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decision and the
September 4 Neri Resolution, it is my considered view that the subject "Garci
tapes" investigation is not constitutionally inrm for being conducted without the
publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in the 14th Congress
prior to said investigation. In addition to the points raised in my two Dissents, I
respectfully submit that the following inconsistencies and erroneous assumptions
in the March 25 Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution merit a
review of the Neri Ruling and a consequent conclusion that the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment since its publication in two
newspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995, need not be published by
the Senate of every Congress. HAICcD
1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure Governing

Inquiries but invalidity of the entire Rules
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court recognized the validity and eectivity
of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, even without publication in the
14th Congress, by citing Section 18 of said rules and holding that the January 30
Contempt Order against therein petitioner Romulo Neri was invalid for failing to
comply with the majority voting requirement under Section 18. In the same
breath, however, the Court held that the subject investigation on the NBN-ZTE
deal was procedurally inrm for being conducted without valid Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, as these were not published in the 14th Congress.
The inconsistency is apparent in the Court's explanation of the third and the
fourth of the ve reasons for holding that the therein respondent Senate
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the January 30
Contempt Order, viz.:
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees' January 30,
2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation.
Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order
of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer
proper questions by the Committee or any of its members." cTIESD
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the

Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud
of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
..
xxx xxx xxx

rules of procedure". We quote the OSG's explanation: DISHEA
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate

t. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th
Senate, are therefore, procedurally inrm. 8 (emphasis
supplied) (footnote omitted)
In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court reiterated its recognition of

the validity and eectivity of Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, viz.:
In the present case, the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review is
warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of
contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the
Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may

punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order
of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer
proper questions by the Committee or any of its members."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the

validity of the contempt order because during the deliberation of the
three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present.
This number could hardly fulll the majority requirement needed by
respondent Committee on Accountability of Public Ocers and
Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators and
respondent Committee on National Defense and Security which has a
membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to respondent
Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9)
Senators, only three (3) members were present. These facts prompted
us to quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter
Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue
of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt
order. 9 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted) HCSEcI
But in the same breath, it assailed the validity of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries and held that orders issued and proceedings conducted
pursuant to said rules, which result in the violation of rights of witnesses were
null and void, viz.:
suciently put the public on notice.
eectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules
are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such
violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and eective. 10AHSaTI
In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September 4 Neri
Resolution, the Court did not invalidate the entire Senate investigation
proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, which were not published in the 14th Congress. In fact, the Court ruled
on the issue of executive privilege raised in said proceedings. It struck down only
the January 30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner Neri for failure to
comply with Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, while at
the same time holding these rules as constitutionally inrm for want of
publication.
Let us proceed to the second set of inconsistencies.
2. The continuing nature of the Senate as an institution and the
discontinuing nature of its business vis-a-vis the continuing
nature of the Rules of the Senate
In attempting to harmonize the above inconsistency in the March 25 Neri
Decision, the Court, in its September 4 Neri Resolution, saw t to "issue a
clarication . . . (o)n the nature of the Senate as a 'continuing body'" and
dichotomized this nature into the "continuity of the Senate as an institution" and
the "opposite nature of the conduct of its business". This approach, however,
spawned its own inconsistencies. DHcESI
In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries could not be given continuing eect from one Congress to the next
unless expressly so provided in said rules, the Court interpreted Section 136 on
the "unnished business" in conjunction with Section 137 on the "date of taking
eect" of the Rules of the Senate, viz.:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

succeeding Congress as if presented for the rst time.
RULE LII
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended
or repealed. (emphasis supplied)ACIDSc
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main
rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption
until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take eect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued eectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the dierence in the
language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next
Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
dierent rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the
rule on unnished business. 11 (emphasis supplied) (footnote
omitted)
There is no quarrel and my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution in

fact acknowledges that the Rules of the Senate (Senate Rules) provide in
Section 136 that all unnished business or pending matters and proceedings of
the Senate terminate with the expiration of a Congress. This provision, in
conjunction with Section 137, does not, however, lend support to the Court's
ruling that absent a provision in the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
explicitly stating the "continued eectivity of such rules until they are amended
or repealed", it "cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries)
would continue into the next Congress" for the following reasons: AIDSTE
First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court interpreted "pending

matters" in Section 136 of the Senate Rules to include the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries that "may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
presented for the rst time". This posture, however, comes also with the
interpretation that the Senate may choose not to take up the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, thereby leaving it without rules to conduct
legislative inquiries as the eectivity of the rules had terminated with the
previous Congress. This is an absurd interpretation considering that the Senate is
fully aware that Article VI, Section 21 requires legislative investigations to be
conducted in accordance with duly published Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries.
T h e September 4 Neri Resolution recognizes that the Senate Rules have
continuing eect from one Congress to the next, because it provides in Section
137 that the Senate Rules "shall take eect on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed". The Senate Rules
unmistakably state that their eectivity can be interrupted only by amendment
or repeal as provided in Section 137 and not by termination of one Congress as
provided in Section 136. The Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries have the
same character as the Senate Rules. Both are not "pending matters and
proceedings" that terminate with the expiration of the Congress.
Pending matters and proceedings include investigations that have not been
terminated or bills that have not completed the legislative process in the Senate
of one Congress. ADCEcI
The continuing eectivity of the Senate Rules from one Congress to the
next, which the Court acknowledged in its September 4 Neri Resolution,
evinces the nature of the Senate as a continuing body governed by its
continuing Senate Rules. If the Senate were not a continuing body, there
would be no reason for the Senate Rules to likewise have a continuing eect. In
contradistinction, the eectivity of the Rules of Proceedings of the House of
Representatives (House Rules) which is admittedly not a continuing body, as
the terms of all congressmen end at the same time terminates upon the
expiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1, Section 1 of the 14th Congress House
Rules adopted on November 20, 2007 reects the practice of the House of
Representatives of adopting rules of proceedings on its rst meeting and
organization upon the opening of a succeeding Congress, viz.:
RULE I
Convening and Organizing the House
xxx xxx xxx

After the oath-taking of the newly-elected Speaker, the body shall
proceed to the adoption of the rules of the immediately preceding
Congress to govern its proceedings until the approval and adoption of
the rules of the current Congress. (emphasis supplied)
On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the 14th Congress,

pending the adoption of its own House Rules, adopted the House Rules of the
13th Congress as its provisional rules. 12 The House of Representatives of
each Congress adopts its own rules. 13 HTcDEa
Second, the above-quoted Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate Rules, adopted
under the regime of the 1987 Constitution, do not depart from the provisions of
the Senate Rules adopted under the 1935 Constitution, viz.:
Chapter XLVI
Unnished Business in the Senate
Sec. 108. Unnished business at the end of one session shall not be
aected by the closing of same, but shall be taken up again at the next
session in the same status in which it was.
Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraph, matters

pending at the expiration of one Congress shall no longer be acted on.
Chapter LIII
Sec. 122. These Rules shall take eect on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed. 14
Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution, as I have

consistently maintained in my Dissents), it was well-settled that the Senate
was a continuing body as held in Arnault v. Nazareno, citing the U.S. case
McGrain v. Daugherty. 15 The 1935 Constitution provided that two-thirds, or
a majority of the Senate, continued into the next Congress. 16 SIDTCa
Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer a continuing body under the
1987 Constitution as less than a majority continue into the Senate of the
succeeding Congress 17 the termination of the unnished business of the
Senate at the expiration of a Congress and the eectivity of the Senate Rules
until amended or repealed as provided in Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate
Rules under the 1987 Constitution, do not lend support to a departure from the
Arnault ruling that the Senate is a continuing body. Under both the 1935 and the
1987 Constitutions, the Senate Rules show that a continuing Senate's unnished
business terminates at the expiration of one Congress, and its rules remain in
eect from one Congress to the next.
As expounded in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution, the
Philippine Senate is patterned after the U.S. Senate, which is a continuing body
as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain. The continuing nature of the
U.S. Senate is also reected in the Standing Rules of the Senate under Rule V
(2), viz.:
Rule V
SUSPENSION AND AMENDMENT OF THE RULES
xxx xxx xxx
2. The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the
next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these
rules. 18 (emphasis supplied)

In sum, the Philippine Senate Rules under both the 1935 and the 1987
Constitutions and the Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, after which the
Philippine Senate was patterned, reect the nature of the Senate as a
continuing body. That the Senate is a continuing body proceeds from its nature
as created by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and adopted by the 1935 and
the 1987 Philippine Constitutions. The Senate Rules are not the bases for the
continuing nature of the Senate, but they embody and reect this nature.
Third, the recognition that the Senate is a continuing body as reected in the
continuing eect of the Senate Rules from one Congress to the next is not
consistent with the holding of the ponencia that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries must explicitly provide for this continuing eectivity if such
were the intent of the Senate, viz.:
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take eect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued eectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the dierence in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on
legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. 19
(emphasis supplied) DHcTaE
I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution that

the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries on August 24, 1995
has satised the requirement under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that inquiries in aid of legislation be conducted in accordance with
the Senate's "duly published rules of procedure." Interpreting Article 2 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that "(l)aws shall take eect after
fteen days following completion of their publication in the Ocial Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided . . .," the Court ruled in the landmark Taada v.
Tuvera, 20 viz.:
". . . all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their eectivity, which shall begin fteen
days after publication unless a dierent eectivity date is xed by the
legislature. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation." 21
Publication must be made in the Ocial Gazette 22 or a newspaper of general

circulation. 23
As a general rule, one-time publication suces to satisfy the due process
requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern it and aect its
rights. It is not uncommon for laws and rules to provide that they shall take
eect upon a certain date following publication in a newspaper of general
circulation without having to state that they "shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed" for them to have continuing eect. These laws and rules
are published only once, and yet they continue to be in force. The Court itself
employs this language in its rules as shown in the recently promulgated Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data and Rule on the Writ of Amparo, respectively, viz.:
Section 25. Eectivity. This Rule shall take eect on February 2, 2008
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
Section 27. Eectivity. This Rule shall take eect on October 24, 2007
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
HScaCT
The exception to the general rule that one-time publication suces for a law or
rule to have continuing eect is when there are circumstances or factors that
interrupt this continuity. An example is the discontinuation of the existence of
the House of Representatives as a legislative body, which terminates the
eectivity of its published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and requires
the publication of these rules in the succeeding Congress for them to take eect.
As discussed above and in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decision and
September 4 Neri Resolution, the Senate, unlike the House of
Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus, contrary to the holding of the
ponencia, the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment,
need not be published by the Senate of every Congress and need not also state
that they shall "remain in force until they are amended or repealed" for them to
be eective from one Congress to the next. Quite the opposite of the ponencia's
ruling, in the absence of language stating that the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries shall not continue in eect from one Congress to the next, these rules
shall have continuing eect.
In sum, the above discussion shows that the March 25 Neri Decision and
September 4 Neri Resolution themselves provide bases for concluding that
the Senate is a continuing body and that one-time publication of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, suces to satisfy the
publication requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. I
respectfully submit that the Court ought to so conclude in order to uphold
internal consistency in its ruling with respect to the constitutional requirement of
publication of the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries. In line with
my position in my Dissents to the Neri Ruling, I submit that the publication of
the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to the
conduct of the subject "Garci tapes" investigation is not a requirement for
conducting such investigation. AIDTHC
Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement of publication

of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, let us now proceed to the third
issue.
The "Garci tapes" in relation to Article III,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 4200
Let me begin the disquisition on the issue of "whether the inquiry, which is
centered on the so-called 'Garci tapes' violates Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200" by stating what the disposition of the
case at bar is not about and proceed forthwith to what the disposition of this
case is about. To avoid clutter, let us excise the fat to get to the lean meat of the
controversy before the Court.
While the 1987 Constitution aords paramount importance to the policy of
transparency, public accountability, and informed participation of the citizenry in
a democracy, the case at bar is not about balancing between the right to privacy
of communication under Article III, Section 3 24 of the 1987 Constitution and
the right to information under Article III, Section 7 25 of the charter. The
petitioners in this case are not suing as citizens demanding information from the
government. aHTCIc
While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the indispensable role of

legislative investigations in crafting sound law and also gives prime recognition
to the right to privacy of communication, the case at bar is not about balancing
an asserted right to privacy of communication against the Senate's
exercise of its power of legislative investigation. This case does not
involve a situation in which a witness in a legislative inquiry invokes the right to
privacy of communication, but the Senate compels him, under pain of contempt,
to disclose the communication on account of an overriding public interest.
The bone of contention in the case at bar is whether the Senate can
use, in its legislative investigation, in admissible evidence of a
surreptitiously and illegally recorded private communication.
The law decisive of the case at bar is R.A. No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping
Law enacted in 1965. Introduced by Senator Lorenzo Taada, the explanatory
note of the bill provides the background and rationale for the law, viz.:
The privacy of communication and correspondence is among the
fundamental rights of an individual secured and guaranteed by our
Constitution. Thus, section 1(5) of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
provides that, "The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety
and order require otherwise." aEHAIS
xxx xxx xxx

At present, the laws penalizing the violation of the privacy of
communication are inadequate to cope with modern developments. As
we are all aware of, technology today has so far advanced, and will
inexorably continue to advance, that there is now an ever-growing array
of devices or arrangements for eavesdropping . . . There could, indeed,
be no doubt that these modern devices or arrangements, if availed of by
any or ocers of the government, to spy on another, could be the most
obnoxious instruments of oppression or arbitrary power. Sooner or later
we will have to deal with the danger that these increasingly sensitive
electronic ears, which are as fantastic as they are alarming, may
annihilate completely the privacy of communication. An additional and
potent deterrent is obviously called for if we are to guard against what
might well be subversive of one of our cherished personal freedoms
which makes life worth living.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among others on

our high regard for the individual's rights and freedoms, the proposed
measure will be but in accord with the principles of law and government
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution which are designed to
protect the feelings and sensibilities of every individual as a
human being against the incursions of unwelcome intruders.
Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdropping or unwelcome

intrusions into private communications. Section 1 of the law provides that
these acts are unlawful: SECIcT
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized

by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the

act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken
word secured either before or after the eective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of oenses mentioned
in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions
of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or
aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or
more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualication from public oce if the oender be a public ocial at the
time of the commission of the oense, and, if the oender is an alien he
shall be subject to deportation proceedings. (emphases supplied)
A private communication is characterized as such based not on the content of the

communication, but on the context that it was said in private and not for
public consumption. That the content or nature of the communication is
immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 26 viz.:
. . . the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suce to constitute an oense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law,) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be professed." (emphasis
supplied)(footnote omitted) HIAESC
The Senate deliberations on R.A. No. 4200 evince the meaning of private,
as opposed to public, communication, viz.:
Senator DIOKNO.
Do I Understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now

worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator TAADA.
Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person
not between a speaker and a public.
Senator DIOKNO.
The wording of the law is "communication or spoken word."
Senator TAADA.
Yes.
Senator DIOKNO.
The term "spoken word" would automatically include speeches, including,

Mr. Senator, what we are doing here this morning. HcACTE
Senator TAADA.
As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this bill is to prevent the tape
recording or interception of a communication between one person
and an another not between a speaker and a public. Because
precisely, the speaker speaks so that the public may know what he
has in mind, what he wants to communicate to the people, and
there should be no objection to tape recording that speech. . . . 27
(emphases supplied)
R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions when wiretapping is allowed by
written order of the court under Section 3, viz.:
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it
unlawful or punishable for any peace ocer, who is authorized by a
written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared
to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving
the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty
in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to
sedition, kidnapping as dened by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage
and other oenses against national security: Provided, That such
written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and
the examination under oath or armation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has
been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed:
Provided, however, That in cases involving the oenses of rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority
shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition,
as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to
the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining such evidence. (emphasis supplied)
CIaHDc
To further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200 makes illegally
wiretapped communications inadmissible in any proceeding, viz.:
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, eect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation. (emphasis supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at bar, the wiretapping of the

communication recorded in the "Garci tapes" may be held legal only if it was
recorded with consent of the parties to the conversation or upon written court
order. As the wiretapping was done in the course of duty by the witness,
Technical Sergeant Vidal Doble, he may be presumed to have been acting
regularly in the performance of his ocial duties. 28 Doble testied that he
presumed that the order of his superior to him to conduct a wiretap was legal,
viz.:
Sen. Cayetano (P). . . Ngayon itong noong sinabi sa iyo ito, anong
pakiramdam mo? Nagulat ka ba o parang normal lang sa iyo na, "Okay,
bagong assignment", may naisip ka bang baka violation ito ng isang
batas? May naisip ka bang ganon?
Mr. Ooble. Ang nasa isip po kasi naming noon since na galing sa military
hierarchy ang order, we assume that is a legal order, Your Honor. 29
The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed to proceed to

establish the circumstances surrounding the wiretapping and determine
whether or not the wiretap was legally done with the consent of the parties or
lawful court order. AHDcCT
Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the "Garci tapes"

were illegally wiretapped, the question that comes to the fore is whether the
"communication or spoken word (in the tapes), their existence, contents,
substance, purport, eect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained" may be used in the subject Senate investigations.
I n Ramirez, in which the Court found that petitioner Ramirez violated R.A. No.
4200 for secretly recording her private conversation with therein respondent
Garcia, the Court published in its decision the transcript of the illegally
wiretapped conversation as part of the narration of the facts of the case. A
mechanical and literal reading of Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200 would yield
the absurd conclusion that the Court violated these provisions for
"communicat(ing) the contents thereof (the illegally wiretapped conversation),
either verbally or in writing" and using the inadmissible transcription in its
judicial proceedings. It is clear to the eye that this was not the intent of the
lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 4200. "Legislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible (Pacic Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank, 37 SCRA
685, [1971]) or absurd or would lead to an injustice. (12 Casela v. Court of
Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). 30 (emphasis supplied) There is thus a need to
interpret Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200. CITcSH
Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an exception to the

prohibition on the "use of such record (of wiretapped conversation) or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of oenses
mentioned in section 3. . ." The oenses under Section 3 which allows
wiretapping upon written order of the court are as follows: "treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as dened
by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other oenses against national security."
The exception under Section 1 in t relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 4200 does not
include the use of illegally wiretapped communication for purposes of
prosecuting violations of R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did in Ramirez. Not
reading this exception into the law would impede the prosecution of the acts it
prohibits and contradict the very purpose for adopting the law as clearly stated in
its title, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for Other Purposes." Well-settled
is the rule in statutory construction that "where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. 31
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et
absurdum. R.A. No. 4200 should be given a sensible construction, so as to give
eect to its rationale and intent and thus avoid an unjust or absurd
interpretation. The ineluctable conclusion is that the use of illegally wiretapped
communication must be allowed in a prosecution under R.A. 4200 precisely to
deter the commission of illegal wiretapping.
Corollary to this conclusion is that such evidence should be an exception to
inadmissible evidence under Section 4 of the law. Judges and prosecutors who
possess and use illegally wiretapped communications in prosecutions for
violations of R.A. No. 4200 are thus not liable for violating this law in the same
manner that, by way of exception, they are not liable for illegal possession of
rearms where the rearm is presented in evidence in a case involving the
prosecution of a violation of R.A. No. 8294. 32 This is true despite the absence of
such an exception to illegal possession, in contradistinction to the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, which explicitly provides the following
exception to infringement of copyright under Section 184 (l)(k): "Any use made
of a work for the purpose of any judicial proceedings or for the giving of
professional advice by a legal practitioner."
TCacIE
For similar reasons, another exception that ought to be read into Sections 1 and 4
of R.A. No 4200 is the use and admissibility of illegally wiretapped
communication in legislative investigations whose particular purpose is
precisely to craft or improve laws that will address the evil of illegal
wiretapping. Without this exception, the absurd result would be that legislators
cannot at all investigate illegal wiretaps as they happen on the ground and plug
loopholes in the law, because Section 4 of R.A. No. 4200 provides that even the
fact of existence of an illegally wiretapped communication is inadmissible in
evidence. To be sure, this could not have been the intent of the law.
Lest the herein recognized exceptions be misconstrued and open the oodgates
to violations of R.A. No. 4200, it must be emphasized that as a general rule,
illegally wiretapped material is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,
including legislative investigations, in accordance with R.A. No. 4200. 33 As a very
narrow exception, however, the wiretapped material may be used and is
admitted in a judicial proceeding for prosecution of violations of R.A. No. 4200
and, akin to this, in a legislative investigation in aid of legislation whose purpose
is precisely to address the problem of illegal wiretap. IASEca
In the case at bar, the focus of the Senate investigation as shown by the
transcripts of its hearings 34 has been the illegal wiretapping of several
personalities including the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Philippines,
the possible involvement of telecommunication providers in the illegal wiretap,
the use of scarce intelligence resources for wiretapping in connection with the
conduct of the 2004 Presidential elections, and electoral fraud. The purpose of
the investigation may also be gleaned from two bills previously led in relation
thereto by the Chairperson of the National Defense and Security Committee,
seeking to (1) control and regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment; and (2) prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines from performing
electoral duties. 35
Prescinding from the very narrow contours of the exception in using illegally
wiretapped communications, the Senate may proceed with the use of the "Garci
tapes" in a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation whose purpose is to craft or
improve legislation on wiretapping. On the other hand, the "Garci tapes" are not
admissible in evidence in legislative investigations for a dierent purpose such as
the punishment of electoral fraud. While electoral fraud is a serious anomaly
that erodes the foundation of democracy and should not go unpunished, evidence
obtained not through illegal wiretap should be presented in proceedings
investigating this matter. Resort to illegal wiretapping to catch perpetrators of
electoral fraud will only further erode our democracy. As Senator Taada exhorted
in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 9, which became the Anti-Wiretapping
Law: CAHTIS
Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among

others on our high regard for the individual's rights and
freedoms, the proposed measure will be but in accord with the
principles of law and government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution which are designed to protect the feelings and
sensibilities of every individual as a human being against the
incursions of unwelcome intruders.
In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation for the purpose of crafting

or improving laws on wiretapping, the legislature ought to abide by the
constitutional command under Article VI, Section 21 that in conducting such
inquiries, "(t)he rights of persons appearing in or aected by such inquiries shall
be respected." The legislature should thus use mechanisms and procedures
available to it, such as executive sessions, in avoiding any further and
unnecessary incursion into the right to privacy of communication. THaAEC
With respect to the question of whether the use of the "Garci tapes" violates
Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights, the above disquisition on R.A. No. 4200
suciently addresses this issue. Under this constitutional provision, the privacy
of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except (1) upon lawful
order of the court, or (2) when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law. There is ostensibly no lawful order of the court under the rst
exception, and any argument anchored on the second exception will lead to R.A.
No. 4200, being the only Philippine law on wiretapping.
Anent G.R. No. 170338, it is my considered view that the petition is moot and
academic. 36 The petition prays that the Court issue a Resolution:
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing the House
of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information Communications
Technology, and Surage and Electoral Reforms from making use of the
sound recording of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their
Report for the inquiries conducted relative thereto, or from otherwise
making use of said recordings for any other purpose. TAcSaC
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the

Respondent Committees to strike o the record of the proceedings any
and all references to the illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and to
desist from further using the sound recordings of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in any of its proceedings. 37
The rst prayer is moot and academic, as the "Garci tapes" were already
played in the session oor of the House of Representatives on July 5, 2005. 38
The second prayer is also moot and academic, as the subject records of
proceedings and reports belong to the House of Representatives of the
Thirteenth Congress, which has already been terminated. The House of
Representatives not being a continuous body, the current House of
Representatives of the Fourteenth Congress is dierent from the House of
Representatives of the Thirteenth Congress. Thus, petitioner Garcillano ought
to rst seekk recourse to the current House of Representatives with respect to
his second prayer.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No. 179275.
REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it dismisses the petition in G.R. No. 170338
but dissent insofar as it grants the petition in G.R. No. 179275.
I. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 should be dismissed for being moot.
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Virgilio D. Garcillano, via a petition for prohibition
and injunction, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, implores the Court to issue a Resolution as follows: TaHDAS
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing the House
of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information Communications
Technology, and Surage and Electoral Reforms from making use of the
sound recording of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their
Report for the inquiries relative thereto, or from otherwise making use of
said recordings for any other purpose.
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the
Respondent Committees to strike o the record of the proceedings any
and all references to the illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and to
desist from further using the sound recordings of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in any of its proceedings. 1
The Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner Garcillano because it has been
mooted. It is of public knowledge, a t subject of judicial notice, 2 that the "Hello
Garci" tapes were already played in the House of Representatives and heard by
its members. 3 Then, separate committee reports on the "Hello Garci" tapes were
submitted to then House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. 4
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is the presence of an actual

controversy. Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical, conjectural or
anticipatory questions despite their vast judicial power. Otherwise, a decision
rendered would amount to nothing but an advisory opinion, which would not
augur well with the function of courts as arbiters of controversies. In La Bugal-
B'laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, 5 the Court held: TSIDaH
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 6
While it is true that the Court is not absolutely precluded from resolving issues
that are otherwise moot, 7 no compelling circumstance is present here that
would warrant the exercise of judicial review.
Too, the function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the execution of an act
which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. 8 The oce of prohibition is to arrest proceedings rather than to
undo them. 9 A preventive remedy, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that
is already fait accompli. 10
II. The petition in G.R. No. 179275 should likewise be dismissed because
the Senate need not republish its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
The issues in G.R. No. 179275 are as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have
been published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Corollarily:
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
requirement?
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes"
violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No.
4200. 11
Anent the rst issue, I agree with the ponencia and the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Reynato Puno that petitioners Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo
D. Agcaoili, plus intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, possess the requisite locus
standi to bring the suit.
Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest
injustice. Rules of procedure are tools crafted to facilitate, not to frustrate, the
attainment of justice. Thus, their strict and rigid application, if they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
be eschewed. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical
application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with
public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. 12 Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. 13 CSEHIa
There is no question that the issues raised by petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili
and intervenor Sagge are of paramount importance. Thus, any procedural barrier
to their suit should be put aside.
Now to the second issue the meat of the second petition.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or aected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The ponencia holds that the Senate investigation on the "Hello Garci" tapes is
inrm because the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had not been duly published at the time of the legislative inquiry in
question.
I hold otherwise. On this score, I reiterate my separate opinion on the motion for
reconsideration in Senate v. Ermita, 14 thus:
True it is that, as the Constitution mandates, the Senate may only
conduct an investigation in aid of legislation pursuant to its duly
published rules of procedure. Without publication, the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is ineective. Thus,
unless and until said publication is done, the Senate cannot enforce its
own rules of procedure, including its power to cite a witness in contempt
under Section 18.
But the Court can take judicial notice that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was published on August 20 and
21, 1992 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star during the 9th
Congress.
The Senate again published its said rules on December 1, 2006 in the
Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the 13th Congress. That
the Senate published its rules of procedure twice more than complied
with the Constitutional requirement. aCHDST
I submit that the Senate remains a continuing body under the 1987
Constitution. That the Senate is a continuing body is premised on the
staggered terms of its members, the idea being to ensure stability of
governmental policies. This is evident from the deliberations of the
framers of the Constitution, thus:
"MR. RODRIGO. . . .
I would like to state that in the United States Federal Congress, the term
of the members of the Lower House is only two years. We have
been used to a term of four years here but I think three years is
long enough. But they will be allowed to run for reelection any
number of times. In this way, we remedy the too frequent elections
every two years. We will have elections every three years
under the scheme and we will have a continuing Senate.
Every election, 12 of 24 Senators will be elected, so that
12 Senators will remain in the Senate. In other words, we
will have a continuing Senate. 15
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE.
This is just a paragraph of that section that will follow what has earlier
been approved. It reads: "OF THE SENATORS ELECTED IN THE
ELECTION IN 1992, THE FIRST TWELVE OBTAINING THE HIGHEST
NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARS AND THE
REMAINING TWELVE FOR THREE YEARS."
This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform to the
idea of a continuing Senate.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo).
What does the Committee say?
MR. SUAREZ.
The Committee accepts the Davide proposal, Mr. Presiding Ocer. 16
The Senate does not cease to be a continuing body merely because only
half of its members continue to the next Congress. To my mind, even a
lesser number of Senators continuing into the next Congress will still
make the Senate a continuing body. The Senate must be viewed as a
collective body. It is an institution quite apart from the Senators
composing it. The Senate as an institution cannot be equated to its
present occupants. It is indivisible. It is not the sum total of all sitting
Senators at any given time. Senators come and go but the very
institution of the Senate remains. It is this indivisible institution which
should be viewed as continuing. HDTISa
The argument that the Senate is not a continuing body because it lacks
quorum to do business after every midterm or presidential elections is
awed. It does not take into account that the term of oce of a Senator
is xed by the Constitution. There is no vacancy in the oce of outgoing
Senators during midterm or presidential elections. Article VI, Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
The term of oce of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
The term of a Senator starts at noon of June 30 next following their
election and shall end before noon of June 30 six years after. The
constitutional provision aims to prevent a vacuum in the oce of an
outgoing Senator during elections, which is xed under the Constitution
unless changed by law on the second Monday of May, 17 until June 30
when the Senators-elect assume their oce. There is no vacuum created
because at the time an outgoing Senator's term ends, the term of a
Senator-elect begins.
The same principle holds true for the oce of the President. A president-
elect does not assume oce until noon of June 30 next following a
presidential election. An outgoing President does not cease to perform
the duties and responsibilities of a President merely because the people
had chosen his/her new successor. Until her term expires, an outgoing
President has the constitutional duty to discharge the powers and
functions of a President unless restricted 18 by the Constitution.
In ne, the Senate is a continuing body as it continues to have a full or at
least majority membership 19 even during elections until the assumption
of oce of the Senators-elect. The Senate as an institution does not
cease to have a quorum to do business even during elections. It is to be
noted that the Senate is not in session during an election until the opening
of a new Congress for practical reasons. This does not mean, however,
that outgoing Senators cease to perform their duties as Senators of the
Republic during such elections. When the President proclaims martial law
or suspends the writ of habeas corpus, for example, the Congress
including the outgoing Senators are required to convene if not in session
within 24 hours in accordance with its rules without need of call. 20 aSTAcH
The Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senate rules is

contained in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or aected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The above provision only requires a "duly published" rule of procedure

for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on republication. There is
nothing in the constitutional provision that commands that every new
Congress must publish its rules of procedure. Implicitly, republication is
necessary only when there is an amendment or revision to the rules. This
is required under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Senate in the 13th Congress caused the publication of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. The present Senate
(14th Congress) adopted the same rules of procedure in the NBN-ZTE
investigation. It does not need to republish said rules of procedure
because it is not shown that a substantial amendment or revision was
made since its last publication that would aect the rights of persons
appearing before it.
On a more practical note, there is little to be gained in requiring a new

Congress to cause the republication of the rules of procedure which has
not been amended or revised. The exercise is simply a waste of
government funds. Worse, it unduly burdens and hinders the Senate
from discharging its constitutional duties. Publication takes time and
during the interregnum, it cannot be gainsaid that the Senate is barred or
restricted from conducting an investigation in aid of legislation.
I agree with the Chief Justice that this Court must be wary of the far-
reaching consequences of a case law invalidating the Senate rules of
procedure for lack of republication. Our ruling in this petition will not only
aect the NBN-ZTE investigation, but all other Senate investigations
conducted under the 10th, 11th, 12th, and the present 14th Congress,
for which no republication of the rules has been done. These
investigations have been the basis of several bills and laws passed in the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Putting a doubt on the
authority, eectivity and validity of these proceedings is imprudent and
unwise. This Court should really be cautious in making a jurisprudential
ruling that will unduly strangle the internal workings of a co-equal branch
and needlessly burden the discharge of its constitutional duty. 21 SHADEC
In addition, let me point out the Philippine Constitution, past and present, were
largely inuenced by the United States Constitution. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 22
the United States Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the American Senate is a
continuing body. In Arnault v. Nazareno, 23 the Philippine Supreme Court, relying
on McGrain, held that the Philippine Senate is a continuing body. There is no
plausible reason why the rule should be dierent today.

In view of the foregoing, I nd it unnecessary to delve on the third issue which
the ponencia does not also address.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS both petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No.
179275.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.

2. Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Id. at 1-38.
5. Id. at 36-38.
6. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
7. Id. at 169. CIAHDT
8. An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
9. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
10. Id. at 3-17.

11. Id. at 7-13.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 44.
14. Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.

15. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
16. Id. at 71-90. DcICEa
17. Id. at 62. The Court identied the following issues for discussion in the October 2,
2007 Oral Argument:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in
accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
ECDaAc
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes", violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at
66.)

18. Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention led on October 26,
2007.
19. Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
20. 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).

21. Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
22. Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736,
755. SAcaDE
23. G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May
3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
24. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.

25. G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26. Id.
27. Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.

28. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4. DTaAHS
29. Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
30. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.

31. 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.
33. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
34. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110,
139.
35. Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
36. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004).
AcTHCE
37. Runo v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46.
38. Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
39. Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.

40. See news article "Separate ndings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac published
in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5 House
committees in 'Garci' probe le report on Monday" published in The Manila
Bulletin on March 25, 2006. TASCDI
41. Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994,
229 SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.
679.
43. Taada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).

44. As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing for
the Publication of Laws Either in the Ocial Gazette or in a Newspaper of
General Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Eectivity".
45. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-
10.
46. G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47. Id. at 297-298.

48. Dated September 4, 2008.
49. TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
50. Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commercial
and Non-Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use
Thereof and For Other Purposes", approved on June 14, 2000.
51. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633,
October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52. Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read: HEASaC
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages . Information shall not be denied

legal eect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data
message purporting to give rise to such legal eect, or that it is merely referred
to in that electronic data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents . Electronic documents
shall have the legal eect, validity or enforceability as any other document or
legal writing, and
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by
an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity
and reliability, and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent
reference, in that
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the
addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which
arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was
generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document
not being presented or retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original
form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if

(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time
when it was rst generated in its nal form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be

presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all
requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the execution of
documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of

a written document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic
data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to
authentication and best evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents. (1) Where the law requires information to be
presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an
electronic data message or electronic document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was rst generated in its
nal form, as an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by
evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information is
capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information
not being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained
complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any
change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and
display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose
for which the information was generated and in the light of all relevant
circumstances.
PUNO, C.J., dissenting:
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94. ESaITA
2. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Ocers and Investigations,

Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180641, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008. HTSIEa

Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-
136.

Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 42-25.
6. Ponencia.
Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 139.
The dispositive portion reads, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30,
2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees
and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullied.
SO ORDERED.
Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 459 SCRA 77, 132-
136. ScHAIT

10. Id. at 44-45.

12. 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, July 23, 2007.
13. See 13th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted October
27, 2004; 12th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted
October 22, 2002; 11th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
adopted August 31, 1999; 10th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, adopted July 24, 1995.
14. RULES OF THE SENATE approved on January 25, 1950, and revised as of 1966.
15. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

16. 1935 PHIL. CONST., Art. VIII, 3 provides, viz.:
Section 3. The term of oce of Senators shall be six years and shall begin on the
thirtieth day of December next following their election. The rst Senators
elected under this Constitution shall, in the manner provided by law, be divided
equally into three groups, the Senators of the rst group to serve for a term of
six years; those of the second group, for four years; and those of the third
group, for two years.
17. 1987 PHIL. CONST., Art. VI, 4 in relation to Art. XVIII, 2 provides, viz.:
Art. VI, Sec. 4. The term of oce of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
Art, XVIII, Sec. 2. . . .
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the rst twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three
years.
18. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, revised to September 14, 2007.

Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, p. 44.
20. 220 Phil. 422 (1985); Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration, 230 Phil. 528
(1986).
21. Taada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 533-535 (1986); See also The Veterans Federation
of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526;
Umali v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992, 209 SCRA 446. IDTcHa
22. Taada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

23. Executive OrderNo. 200, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.
24. Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
25. Article III, Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to ocial records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to ocial acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be aorded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
26. G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA 590. SHAcID
27. III RECORDS OF THE SENATE, March 12, 1964, p. 625.
28. People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 350,
381.
29. Transcript of Senate hearing held by the Joint Committees on National Defense
and Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public Ocers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, September 7, 2007, p. 95.
30. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA
590.
31. Lanot, et al. v, Comelec, G.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
32. An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, As Amended,
Enlitled "Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing
in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or
Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives,
and Imposing Stier Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and for Relevant
Purposes."
33. Salcedo-Ortanez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA
111 and People of the Philippines v. Olivarez, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 77865
December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 635.
34. Transcripts of Senate hearings held by the Joint Committees on National Defense
and Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public Ocers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, September 7 and 17, 2007.
35. Rollo, pp. 216, 218; Comment of respondent Senate of the Philippines, p. 2.
36. Philippine Airlines v. Joselito Pascua, et al., G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003, 409
SCRA 195. STcaDI
37. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
38. Id. at 56.

REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
2. Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2. Judicial Notice, when discretionary. A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. aSCHIT
3. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, p. 9.

4. "Separate ndings, no closure on 'Hello Garci' scandal" dated March 29, 2006 by
Michael Lim Ubac in http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/hellogarci/view.php?
db =0&article=20060329-70909. The report partly states:
THE HOUSE of Representatives inquiry has resulted in two "Hello Garci" reports,
separate ndings, no closure.
At dusk yesterday, the majority and minority blocs came up with separate committee
reports on the wiretapping scandal that nearly unseated President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo last year. ATICcS
It was the majority bloc represented by the chairs of the ve House committees that
rst handed its report to Speaker Jose de Venecia.
De Venecia congratulated the chairs led by North Cotabato Representative Emmylou

Talio-Santos for "their wisdom and dedication to duty."
The minority report penned by Cavite Representative Gilbert Remulla highlighted the
futility of the search for truth behind an opposition allegation that the
recordings showed that Ms Arroyo phoned Election Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to boost her chances of winning the 2004 presidential race.
"It's likewise undeniable that the Arroyo government, in general, has shown utter
disregard, if not disrespect, towards the inquiry. Though members of the
administration appeared during the public hearings, nothing substantial was
presented to help ferret out the truth", said the minority report.
Lost opportunity
The report said that the 14 public hearings could have "nally be the moment for
Congress to address the lingering problem of election cheating, but with the
way the witnesses conducted themselves the opportunity was lost."
The minority report would be "appended" to the main report, said Santos.
As expected, there was nothing new in the majority's ndings and recommendations.
The main report did not deviate from the revised draft report it routed to committee
members on March 13, which admitted the failure of the joint congressional
inquiry to unravel the mystery of the political controversy.
The report said that the hearings "only raised more issues and answered none", thus
Congress should "continue to seek the answers . . . and in particular subpoena
phone records to establish the likelihood or unlikelihood that alleged wiretapping
conversations could have taken place."
5. 465 Phil. 860 (2004).

6. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, id. at 889-890.
7. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a gave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest involved demand; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, &
171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May
10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756; Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774,
May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98, Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855,
July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004, 277 SCRA 409. CAScIH
8. Heirs of Eugenia v. Roxas, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 67195,
78618 & 78619-20, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84
Phil. 515 (1949); Calbanero v. Torrens, 61 Phil. 522 (1935).
9. Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Remedies, p. 418.
10. Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 432.
11. Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94. AcSHCD
12. Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 68.
13. Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, September 24, 1990, 190 SCRA
31, 38.
14. G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008.
15. Constitutional Commission Record (1986), p. 208.

16. Id. at 434.
17. CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 8.
18. Id., Secs. 14 and 15 provides:
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain eective,

unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his
assumption or reassumption of oce.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
19. The Oce of a Senator may be vacant for causes such as death or permanent
disability.
20. CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. VII, Sec. 18 provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need
of a call. cEAIHa
21. Senate v. Ermita, supra note 14, at 30-35.

22. 273 US 135 (1927).
23. Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil, 29 (1950). AIDTHC

01 Garcillano Vs House of Representatives

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional

3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes"

Publication of Senate Rules Governing

The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees t to

SEC. 123. Unnished business at the end of the session shall be

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the

xxx xxx xxx

1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure Governing

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the

Fourth, we nd merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent

The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate

In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court reiterated its recognition of

"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon

There is no quarrel and my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution in

First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court interpreted "pending

xxx xxx xxx

On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the 14th Congress,

Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraph, matters

Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution, as I have

xxx xxx xxx

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution that

Publication must be made in the Ocial Gazette 22 or a newspaper of general

Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement of publication

While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the indispensable role of

xxx xxx xxx

Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among others on

Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdropping or unwelcome

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the

A private communication is characterized as such based not on the content of the

Do I Understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now

The term "spoken word" would automatically include speeches, including,

Applying these provisions to the case at bar, the wiretapping of the

The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed to proceed to

Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the "Garci tapes"

Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an exception to the

Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among

In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation for the purpose of crafting

b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the

REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:

a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is the presence of an actual