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037 Municipality of Kananga vs.

Madrona

GR No. 141375 | April 30, 2003 |

PanganibanParties:

Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M.


NAPARIRespondent: Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City
(Branch 35), the CITY OF ORMOC,Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR

Facts:

1.

There was a boundary dispute between the Municipality of Kananga and Ormoc City. Both parties agreed to
amicablesettlement though a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and Sangguniang
Bayan of Kananga.2.

Since no amicable settlement was reached, members of the joint session agreed
to elevate the case t
o the proper court for
settlement
which was reflected in the
Resolution No. 97-01
3.

The City of Ormoc filed a case before the RTC of Ormoc City to settle the boundary dispute
The Petitioners Case

4.

Municipality of Kananga filed a Motion to Dismiss before the RTC based on the following grounds:a.

RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.b.

There is no cause of actionc.

That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been complied withd.

Ormoc is an independent chartered city5.

RTC Ruling:
DENIED the motion of Municipality of Kananga

Reason:
Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code has been complied with when both parties decided to an
amicablesettlement through a joint session. That being said, RTC has jurisdiction over the case under BP Blg.
1296.

Hence this petition by the Municipality of Kananga


Issue:
WON RTC of Ormoc City may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between
a municipalityand an independent component city.
Held: Yes

Ratio:
1.

Under Sec. 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code,


boundary disputes between and among local government units shall,as much as possible, be settled
amicably.
This means that the parties concerned shall refer the issue for settlement in the
sanggunians
concerned.2.

In other words, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one
hand and ahighly urbanized city on the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly
referred forsettlement to the respective
sanggunians
of the local government units involved.3.

Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a
boundary disputewith a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a
municipality, Ormoc is anindependent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them4.

Even if the said provision is not applicable, both parties still decided to enter into an amicable settlement but to
no avail.They also issued a resolution agreeing to elevate the case and bring the issue to the RTC for
adjudication.5.

This means that the general rules governing jurisdiction, which is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by theparties, as provided for by BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 will
be applied.6.

Sec. 19 of BP Blg 129 states that RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
7.

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of
boundarydisputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, RTC
committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the municipalitys Motion to Dismiss.
8.

RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their
plenary powers.They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action
for the first time, but also todo so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage
As to whether Ormoc is an independent component or highly urbanized city
9.

Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. Further, Ormoc is an independent
component, citycreated under Republic Act No. 179

10.
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independentcomponent city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
is a cityindependent of the province.
There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by theparties that it is highly
urbanized
Case Law / Doctrine
The territorial boundaries define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercisepowers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these
limits, its acts are
ultra vires.
Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE
, the Petition is
DENIED
and the challenged Order
A F F I R M E D
.

G.R. No. 169435

Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos

FACTS:

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden,
Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as

rancherias,each of which was under the independentcontrol of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton
Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these
rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66

[5] datedSeptember 30, 1916.The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos inthe Province of
Ilocos Norte. There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named
onlyDingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos
boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in thephrase: on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary.

ISSUE:

whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion ofNueva Era

.HELD:

No part of Nueva Eras territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A .No. 3753. Only the barrios
(now barangays ) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since
only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos source of territory, Nueva Eras territory is,
therefore, excluded. Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said
description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingrasas a compact and
contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the easternboundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted inlight of the legislative intent.

G.R. NO. 116801, APRIL 06, 1995

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, FIRST ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF CEBU,


PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ,HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, AND HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, AND UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, RESPONDENTS.

[MENDOZA]

Facts:

On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts,
abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The
graft investigation officer assigned to the case found, after investigation, no prima facie evidence and
accordingly recommended for the dismissal of the case. However, upon review of the matter, Ombudsman,
Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Illustrisimo be
charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. The case was then referred by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas, Arturo Mojica, to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the filing of
appropriate information with the RTC of Danao City. The same was eventually assigned to herein petition, First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

On preliminary investigation, petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the
approval of the Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, an information for act of lasciviousness against Mayor
Ilustrisimo on July 4, 1994 with the MTC of Santa Fe.

Deputy Ombudsman Mojica wrote two letters to the Provincial Prosecutor inquiring on any action taken on the
referred case. And since no case for attempted rape had been filed, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt
for refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. For this purpose,
hearings were duly conducted. As a result, Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Gloria Lastimosa were
placed under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months.

Issue/s:

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime was
not committed in relation to a public office and whether it has authority to place petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.

Ruling:

The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act of omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. This power has been held to include the
investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from the performance of his official duty. It
is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when
committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute.

In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance as provided in
Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be
subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under Section 31 of the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision.

Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held
liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline
petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor
of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. Sections 21 & 24 of the
same Act provides for this power.

Under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act, preventive suspension is warranted if evidence against the public
official is strong. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a
criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial
Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified
to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. In addition, because the charges
against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges,
if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive
suspension. Under the same provision of the law, it provides that the preventive suspension shall continue until
the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay. Their
preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.

\
TEODULO M. PALMA, SR., petitioner,vs.HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, as Governor of Bukidnon, and THE
SANGGUNIANGPANLALAWIGAN OF BUKIDNON, respondents.G.R. No. L-59679January 29, 1987
This is a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction seeking: (a)to prohibit the
respondents from continuing with the hearing and investigation of AdministrativeCase No. 2 filed by respondent
Governor of Bukidnon against petitioner Mayor Teodulo M. PalmaSr. of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon and (b)
to nullify Resolution No. 82-87 passed by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bukidnon, suspending him from office.
FACTS:
On March 30, 1981, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vivencio P. Estrada of Bukidnon, at
theinstance of the offended parties Nelia Arandel Clerk-typist and Susan Palamine, Clerical
Aide, both of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon, filedwith the
Court of First Instance of the same province, Criminal Cases Nos. 2795, 2796 and
2797a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r T eo d u l o M . P a l m a , S r . , t h e d u l y e l e c t e d a n d q u a l i f i e d M a y o r
o f s a i d Municipality. By virtue of the aforesaid three (3) separate cases, said offended parties in a
sworn joint letter
complaint requested respondent Provincial Governor for an immediate administrativeinvestigation for the purpose of
suspending Mayor Palma from office pending final determinationof these cases. (Rollo, p. 6). Attached to said letter are: three (3)
copies of the Information for Actsof Lasciviousness against the Mayor (Annexes "B", "C" and "D"; Petition, Rollo, pp.
7-9); thestatements of the offended parties. The Mayor accepted his preventive suspension from office
asshown in his Office Order dated February 15, 1982.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING AND PENDENCY OF THE AFORESAID THREE (3) SEPARATE
INFORMATION FOR "ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS" AGAINST AN
ELECTIVELOCAL OFFICIAL WOULD CONSTITUTE "MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE" WITHIN THEME
ANING OF SECTION 5 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5185 WHICH MAY WARRANT
THEF I L I N G O F A N A D M I N I S T R A T I V E C O M P L A I N T A G A I N S T H I M A N D / O R H I
S SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE.

HELD:
There appears to be no controversy as to the filing of the criminal cases against the petitioner.
The principal issue centers on the filing of the administrative case and consequent preventivesuspension of
petitioner based solely on the filing of the above-mentioned criminal cases.Petitioner contends
that "Acts of Lasciviousness" although how numerous, do not fall within thecategory of "malfeasance and
misfeasance" or "conduct in the office" contemplated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 5185, and therefore cannot be
the basis of the filing of a separate administrative caseagainst an elective official and the preventive
suspension of the latter. Respondents, alleging otherwise, maintain that the lascivious acts of the
petitioner constitute misconduct under ArticleXIII, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution, re: "Accountability of
Public Officers."As a general rule, dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily follow the dismissal
of acriminal case, the former requiring as it does, only preponderance of evidence while the latter requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt Misconduct has been defined as "such as affects his performance of his duties
as an officer and not only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all
times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. "
(Lacson v.Roque, et al., 92 Phil. 456). Now, as to whether or not, such misconduct of petitioner affects
his performance of his duties asan officer and not only his character as a private individual, has been laid to
rest by the ruling of the Supreme Court in an analogous case where it was held that while "it is true that the
charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a municipal official may be proceeded
against . . . but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against
themunicipal official, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincialgov
ernor of the charges and trial by the provincial board."The replacement of petitioner Mayor by the Officer-in-
Charge Fabian Gardones has rendered theissues of re=======-moval and suspension from office, moot and
academic.
G.R. No. 112386 Case Digest
G.R. No. 112386 June 14, 1994
Marcelino Libanan, petitioner
vs Sandiganbayan and Agustin Docena, respondents
Ponente: Vitug

Facts:

Libanan is the incumbent Vice Governor of Eastern Samar and was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 May elections. He was charged and suspended for preventing and excluding
Docena, a duly appointed and qualified replacement of deceased Panlalawigan member Capito. Libanan filed
a motion for reconsideration but denied by Sandiganbayan.

Libanan presents 3 grounds: (1) order of suspension if executed would constitute an affront on Libanan's
constitutional right to due process (2) order of suspension once implemented would amount to assault on the
sacred covenant reposed on the Vice Governor by the people of Samar (3) the reason sought to be prevented
by the suspension order pendente lite no longer exist.

Held:

Petition was held without merit.

(1) Suspension order cannot amount to deprivation of property without due process of law because public
office is a public agency or trust.

(2) Libanan's so-called "covenant" is far from being synonymous of equivalent of license. He cannot used it as
a defense from the law.

(3) The statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly no room for any extended court rationalization of the law. RA
No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution
against him.

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