Transactional Analysis Journal

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The Legacy of Milton H. Erickson: Implications for Transactional Analysis

Reese Price
Transactional Analysis Journal 1987 17: 11
DOI: 10.1177/036215378701700203

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TA and Other Modalities
The Legacy of Milton H. Erickson:
Implications for Transactional Analysis
Reese Price
Abstract
This article examines certain central as-
sumptions inherent in the work of Milton
Erickson, including his emphasis on the in-
dividual's uniqueness, his rejection of
theory, and his belief that the clinician must
accept and join the client's reality in order
to utilize that reality to bring about change.
The implications of Erickson's views for
transactional analysis are also examined with
an emphasis on the relativity of any theory
as a representation of "reality."
The significance of Milton Erickson's work
for the field of psychotherapy has continued to
grow since his death in 1980. His pioneering
work in strategic brief therapy and his undis-
puted eminence in the use of hypnosis to ad-
dress therapeutic problems has made under-
standing his work increasingly important to
clinicians. Many authors have advanced models
for explaining the nature and power of
Erickson's therapeutic genius (Bandler &
Grinder, 1975a, 1975b, 1976; Beahrs, 1971,
1977; Feldman, 1985; Gordon & Meyers-
Anderson, 1981; Haley, 1967, 1973; Lankton
& Lankton, 1983; Orner, 1982). This article
describes certain central themes found in
Erickson's work and suggeststheir implications
for the transactional analytic perspective.
Uniqueness of the Individual
A young man wanted clear
statements about Erickson's method.
Erickson interrupted the discussion
and took the man outside. He pointed
up the street and asked what he saw.
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Puzzled, he replied that he saw a
street. Erickson pointed to the trees
that lined the street. "Do you notice
anything about those trees?" The
young man eventually noted that they
were all leaning in an easterly direc-
tion. "That's right, all except one.
That second one from the end is lean-
ing in a westerly direction. There's
always an exception.
(Haley, 1967, p. 549)
One central assumption found in Erickson's
approach is that each individual and/or system
is unique (Carter, 1982; Gilligan, 1984; Gor-
don, 1984; Rosen, 1982). The therapist who
accepts this assumption faces the challenge of
formulating a new theory to fit each individual
rather than attempting to alter a person to fit
a theoretical preconception (Gindhart, 1984),
Erickson emphasized arriving inductivelyat the
client's reality via careful observation, and he
based what he did solely on information from
such observation (Havens, 1984). This leads
to the examination of the consequences of in-
ductively tailoring one's understanding of the
client's reality based on the client's idiosyn-
cratic model of the world.
Rejection of Theory
Each person is a unique individual.
Hence, psychotherapy should be for-
mulated to meet the individual's needs
rather than tailoring the person to fit
the Procrustean bed of hypothetical
theory of human behavior.
(Erickson quoted in Zeig, 1982, p. vi)
As a result of this emphasis, Erickson's ap-
proach is fundamentally atheoretical (Hanley,
11
REESE PRICE
1982; Moore, 1982; Stern, 1984; Yapko,
1984), since "the explanation theory or
metaphor used to relate the facts about the per-
son is not the person (Lankton, 1984, p. 50).
Theories viewed from this framework are
seen as fictional, "as if' realities created by
the therapist and introduced into the situation
as if they represent concrete fact, thereby pro-
ducing a nonfictional solution (Watzlawick,
1984). The implication of this view is that all
schools of pyschotherapy are myths. ''They are
all descriptive approaches (metaphors) designed
to help us do something with our clients so that
they can do something with themselves"
(Rossi, 1984, p. 16).
This assumption is not new; certain
philosophers of science have long held that
structured theoretical models are metaphorical
(Black, 1962; Kuhn, 1962; Toulmin, 1962;
Turner, 1968). Models viewed from this per-
spective are representative of reality, but only
when viewed as similies, since models are in-
terpreted as assertions that "X behaves as if
it were Y" (Reese & Overton, 1970, p. 119).
Theoretical models contribute to our under-
standing by acting as lenses that allow the
observer to view phenomena in a new way
(Black, 1962). This shifts the emphasis from
whether a theoretical construct is true or false
to whether it is useful for viewing a given
phenomena from a particular theoretical
perspective (Lachman, 1960). The danger in
such models is that they can become reified and
then viewed as true, thus limiting the way the
individual sees the world, resulting in tunnel
vision (Reese & Overton, 1970).
If TA constructs are to be used within an
atheoretical framework (Price, 1986), they can
be viewed as more or less useful constructs in
response to the pragmatic question, "How well
will the use of these constructs function to pro-
duce the change desired given the current
clinical picture?" Following this line of reason-
ing, TA constructs can be held to be "as if"
workable fictions that have heuristic value;
when used within strategic guidelines (Price,
1985) they can lead to meaningful change due
to a reframing of the problem.
Gilligan (1984) noted that the structure of
therapy should be determined by the structure
of the client's reality, not by some a priori
framework held by the therapist. By recogniz-
ing the relativity of perspective in relation to
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categorizing behavior and viewing the categor-
ization as a help to understanding reality rather
than reality itself, one can avoid the fallacy of
accident. This is a form of fallacious reason-
ing in which the client's reality may be lost
because the therapist adheres to theoretical gen-
eralizations deductively derived from viewing
the client in relation to a particular theory.
Rather, the emphasis should be on inductively
determining the client's reality and then using
constructs such as those found in TA if it ap-
pears that doing so will serve a useful thera-
peutic purpose.
This inductive perspective also allows more
flexibility in approaching clinical situations.
Since systems are usually self-limiting and bias-
ed, adopting a single theoretical perspective
leads one inevitably to become limited in the
same ways the model is (Cornell & Zalcman,
1984; de Shazier, 1984; Feyerabend, 1968).
The Ericksonian approach avoids this because
it represents "a shift from a descriptive
metaphor for-all-situations approach to an in-
junctive doing -what's-best-in-each-individual-
situation approach" (Rossi, 1984, p. 16). By
choosing to operate from this perspective,
rather than reifying its entities as Berne did,
TA theory can be a powerful tool when applied
in an inductively derived, pragmatically con-
sidered, "as if" manner.
Joining the Client's Reality
We cannot change anything unless
we accept it. Condemnation does not
liberate, it oppresses ... if a doctor
wishes to help a human being he must
be able to accept him as he is."
(lung, 1958, p. 339)
As Gilligan (1984) notes, the client is first
and foremost a person to be valued and appre-
ciated; it is up to the clinican to join the system
the client represents, be it individual, couple,
or family. The idea that everything in the sys-
tem is basically OK (Beahrs, 1982), and that
all parts of the system are valuable and must
necessarily be included in any change (Carter,
1982), echoes Carl Roger's (1961) concern that
the therapist have unconditional positive regard
for the client.
By both validating the client's reality and
avoiding confronting the client's model of the
world, the therapist avoids the distrust and/or
resentment toward the therapist or the client
Transactional Analysis Journal
 THE LEGACY OF MILTON H. ERICKSON: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS
that often results from confrontation. Resist-
ance is interpreted as a failure to stay adequate-
ly in pace with the client's reality (Bandler &
Grinder, 1976; Gilligan, 1982), thus highlight-
ing the importance of becoming completely ori-
ented to the client and his or her particular
theory about the world (Gilligan, 1984).
Using the Client's Reality
Symptoms are like the handle of a
pot. If you have a good grip on the
handle, you can do a lot with the pot.
(Erickson, quoted in
Haley, 1982, p. 19)
After one has accepted and joined the client's
model of the world (pacing), one is faced with
the challenge of using that model to bring abut
change (leading). Using the client's presenting
difficulties to elicit change (Erickson, 1959,
1965; Erickson, Rossi, & Rossi, 1976; Erick-
son & Rossi, 1979, 1981) requires that the
therapist be flexible enough to accept and adapt
to all dimensions of the client's behavior (Zeig,
1980). The most important goal is to get the
client to do something different. It is the
therapist's responsibility to generate a task
and/or learning situation in or out of trance that
will result in the client experiencing the prob-
lem in a new way. The therapist and client set
a goal, and the therapist assumes responsibili-
ty for establishing a learning context consistent
with the client's reality.
Erickson emphasized using the symptom to
bring about change because' 'the symptomatic
area is the most important and intense to the
person with a problem, and therefore it is in
this area that the therapist has the greatest
leverage" (Haley, 1973, p. 179). The symp-
tom is useful in fostering change when it is
framed positively as the way the client chooses
to communicate. The primary concern thus be-
comes, not eliminating the symptom, but us-
ing it to modify the client's underlying rigid
frame of reference. By emphasizing choice
(Lankton, 1984), the therapist works to adjust
the system's course rather than to correct er-
rors with the negative connotations that usual-
ly suggests (Gilligan, S., personal communica-
tion, January 11, 1986).
In following this approach, the therapist must
address two questions: How do the behaviors
of concern persist, and what is required to
change them? (Price, 1985) As Erickson em-
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phasized, people's behaviors are rigidly pat-
terned (Gordon, 1984; Samko, 1983), and thus
answering these questions entails understanding
the underlying patterns that give rise to and
maintain the symptom.
There are markedly different views on how
such patterns are maintained. Haley (1976) em-
phasizes the current social context, while Berne
(1961, 1972) suggested a model of epigenetic
social determinism in which early learning pro-
vides "scripts" for later behavior patterns.
However, since Erickson was primarily con-
cerned with modifying symptoms, he chose not
to address this question. He believed that the
presenting symptomatology was maintained by
reciprocal interaction between the individual,
with his or her unique learning history, and the
environment. Problematic behavior is
perpetuated by the environmental feedback it
generates, while the choice of which environ-
ment to enter and how to react to it becomes
a function of the individual's learning history .
Thus the Ericksonian therapist attempts to
alter a person's internally generated frame of
reference by using hypnotic communication or
by prescribing direct or paradoxical homework
related to the person and/or family's behavior.
The hope is that the learning experience will
lead to the desired modification of the person's
world view and resulting symptoms.
With this approach, insight is not viewed as
necessary because the goal of therapy is
change, not insight (Beahrs, 1982; Haley,
1967; O'Hanlon, 1982). Discovering the roots
of the problem and the solution to the problem
are not the same (Watzlawick, Weakland, &
Fisch, 1974). Instead, the solution is generated
by a detailed analysis of the habit pattern
(symptom), its function, and the client's
underlying frame of reference (world view)
resulting in a strategy that will result in the
desired change.
More often than not, Erickson himself struc-
tured his intervention to operate outside the
client's conscious awareness on the belief that,
if the person's rigid, conscious mind-set could
be disrupted, his or her unconscious mind could
generate the necessary resources for change.
Thus, "the therapist must depend on the pa-
tient's unconscious as a source of creativity for
problem solving" (Erickson & Rossi, 1979, p.
10), and "it is very important for a person to
know their unconscious mind is smarter than
13
REESE PRICE
they are" (Erickson, Rossi, & Rossi, 1976, p.
9).
Erickson often sought to block the ways an
individual typically behaves while simultane-
ously providing anew, more successful and
satisfying experience (Haley, 1967). This was
usually done in a noninterpretive manner us-
ing analogic rather than digital communication
(Watzlawick, 1978) and/or by using paradox-
ical behavioral prescriptions. He used these
methods because they more effectively dis-
rupted the conscious mind's rigid adherence to
a self-defeating behavior pattern by introduc-
ing just enough difference in the pattern to pro-
duce a meaningful change.
This approach is in marked contrast to the
therapeutic task emphasized by many TA prac-
titioners. For example, consistent with Berne's
(1961) belief that the client must be made aware
of feelings and behavior patterns in order to
change them, Widdifield (1975) emphasizes
that' 'the goal of any therapy is to bring the pa-
tient to a point where he can deal with the
cause-effect and curative readjustment of his
illness or problem. Analytic therapy seeks to
uncover repressed original transactions, which
prevent this integration" (p. 131). This
developmental orientation (Mellor, 1980) can
be found in many articles on TA therapy that
emphasize insight into and understanding of
past early learning experiences as a way to
create change in current behavior (Cameron,
1976; Erskine, 1974; Gellert, 1974, 1976;
Kupfer & Haimowitz, 1971). Additional ex-
amples of adherence to this idea include
reparenting (Schiff, et al., 1975), where the
emphasis is on identifying and regressing the
client to early childhood experiences that led
to the developmental arrest underlying present
problems, and redecision work (Goulding &
Goulding, 1978, 1979), in which impasses are
resolved through the client experiencing the
early scenes that were the context for the im-
passe formation. Both of these approaches are
based on the belief that insight and conscious
awareness of the epigenetic underpinnings of
current problems are necessary for change to
occur.
However, it should be noted that Berne once
stated (1971) that the therapist should first seek
to change what needs changing because the
therapist's primary responsibility is to cure pa-
tients. In addition, in examining the work of
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master TA therapists, one is struck with their
pragmatic approach to change. Take, for ex-
ample, the list of possibleapproaches to treating
phobias outlined by M. Goulding (1977, p. 44):
1. TA/Gestalt reworking of old scenes
(Goulding, 1972)
2. Desensitization (Wolpe, 1974)
3. Gestalt technique of being feared object and
claiming projections.
4. Any combination of the above.
5. Any of the above plus teaching new skills.
Apparently using TA constructs does not
necessarily require the "uncovering of repres-
sed original transactions" (Widdifield, 1975,
p. 131) in order to elicit change. Nor is it ac-
curate to say that developinginsightand/or con-
scious awareness, althoughnot a necessarycon-
dition for change, cannot be a sufficient con-
dition for change if the therapist provides for
an experience in which the client can exercise
a new skill in resolving an old impasse while
experiencing in their guts the scenes involved
in the impasse's creation (Goulding &
Goulding, 1979). Once again, however, the cri-
teria for tailoring such an interaction is based
on the individual's idiosyncracies rather than
on the dictates of a given theory.
Conclusion
People always suppose that they
have lost their way when they come
up against the depths of experiences.
But if they do not know how to go on,
the only answer, the only advice, that
makes any sense is "Wait for what the
unconscioushas to say about the situa-
tion." A way is only the way when
one finds it and follows it oneself.
There is no general prescription for
"how one should do it."
(lung, 1939, p. 31-32)
Erickson, the consummate pragmatist, at-
tempted to generate a unique solution for each
client who came to him. His creative genius in
the use of both verbal and nonverbal indirect
analogic communication is unparalleled; it is
humbling to closely examine the subtlety of his
therapeutic successes. However, beyond the
microdynamics of Erickson's work is a man
who cared deeply about those who came to him
for help. He believed that each individual had
within the ability and resources to generate
Transactional Analysis Journal
 THE LEGACY OF MILTON H. ERICKSON: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS
meaningful change. This optimism and affir-
mation of the individual's ability to change
while still respecting the individual's
uniqueness reflected Erickson's own struggle
to overcome marked physical disabilities.
The aim of this paper has been to help gen-
erate a pragmatic, "as if" attitude toward the
use of theoretical constructs such as those found
in transactional analysis. In order to do more
than pay lip service to the idea that each in-
dividual is unique, we as therapists must reject
determining the meaning of the individual's be-
havior deductively from any given theory. This
is not to say that theoretical constructs cannot
be useful when viewed as an "as if' workable
fiction. The key is in recognizing that, as
Erickson suggests, to be optimally effective
with the widest array of clients, we must often
leave the sanctuary of theory behind in order
to join a client's reality and use it to bring about
change in the patterns and resulting problems
that cause someone to seek our help in the first
place.
Reese Price, Ph.D., an ITAA Regular
Member, is currently on staff at the Parkside
Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA, where he
specializes in hypnosis and works with highly
disturbed clients. Send reprint requests to Dr.
Price at 1620 E. 12th, Tulsa, OK, USA 74120.
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