Ayala de Roxas v.

Case
8 Phil. 197

Topic: Vested Right in a Rule of Evidence

Facts:

Appellant Edwin Case filed a petition claiming a right of way through a

passage along the westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas.
Case owns the two adjoining properties lying in the rear of appellees
premises, and being the dominant tenement, he claims the benefit of
easement. Appellant claims that the right of way exists not by necessity but
simply that it arises by prescription, founded not on any written instrument
but on immemorial use alone. The appellant makes the additional point that
since the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure, an immemorial prescription
does not call for the same proof as under the Spanish procedure. The third
Partida says that discontinuous servitudes have no fixed periods, but must
be proved by usage or a term so long that men cannot remember its
commencement.

Issue:

Whether or not immemorial use or vested right over a servitude can be

established by mere evidence like the testimony of witnesses over 60 years
of age who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives and who
also had heard it spoken of in the same way by their elders, as required
under the Spanish Code.

Ruling:

No. The Court held that there is no vested right in a mere rule of
evidence. (Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500) But the point would be
whether this requirement of the Spanish law is not substantive rather than
evidential in its nature, so as to survive the repeal. If substantive, then the
appellant has failed to comply with it; if not substantive, but merely a matter
of procedure, then it must be taken to be replaced by the corresponding
provisions of our new code. We find therein no equivalent provision, other
than subsection 11 of section 334, establishing as a disputable presumption
that a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership
over it or from common reputation of his ownership. The use of the passage
proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership for the
reason that it is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its
origin and revocable in its nature. It seems, however, that under the clause
quoted, common reputation of ownership of the right of way was open to
proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available, should have
been offered. The Court is of the opinion that in order to establish a right or
prescription something more is required than the memory of living witnesses.
Whether this something should be the declaration of persons long dead,
repeated by those who testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or should be
the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it
is unnecessary for the court to decide.

01
 Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Aying
G.R. No. 144773

Topic: Burden of Proof

Facts:

Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in

her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral
Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of
Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children. The certificate of title was, however,
lost during the war. All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company.
Aznar, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out
notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property. Unheeded,
petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before
the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Issue:

Who has the burden of proof?

Ruling:

The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period

commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinogs (heir
of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they already
learned of the existence of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with
Deed of Absolute Sale; and Laurencio Ayings (heir of Emiliano Aying)
admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time
ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial law. Paulino Aying
(heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the
children of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existence of the document
of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any other evidence to
prove the date when respondents were notified of the execution of the
subject document.

In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of

Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document
of sale, it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to
establish such fact. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is
to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence
competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to
obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of
proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains
the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his
cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to
all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiffs claim or
cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he
has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that
matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a
verdict or decision in his favor.

02
 Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc.
403 SCRA 699

Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence

Facts:

Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero et al., who are former employees

of Coca Cola, filed a case against the latter for illegal dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees, and ordered their reinstatement and
the payment of backwages. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that despite the
negative declarations of Coca Cola as to its relationship with the
complainants, the complainants testimonies are more credible to prove the
existence of employer-employee relationship. The NLRC affirmed such
decision but the Court of Appeals modified such ruling because the
complainants affidavits should not be given probative value since they were
not subjected to cross- examination, they were not affirmed and therefore,
they are hearsay evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not administrative bodies like the NLRC should be strictly

bound by the rules of evidence.

Ruling:

No. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants
were not presented for cross examination is not persuasive because the rules
of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative
bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers only. It is not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify
and be cross-examined by counsel of the adverse party. To require otherwise
would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings in the NLRC. The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do
not control proceedings before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. They are
authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively without regard to technicalities of law and procedure
all in the interest of due process.

03

Bautista v. Sarmiento
 138 SCRA 587

Topic: Quantum of Proof in Criminal Cases

Facts:

Complainant Dr. Leticia C. Yap filed a case of estafa against Dr. Fe

Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere. The case was heard before
the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The accused filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against them but it was
denied. They were later found guilty for said crime.

Issue:

Whether or not conviction can be had in a criminal case only upon

proof beyond reasonable doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.

Ruling:

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the

accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an
acquittal. But when the trial court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had
established a prima facie case against them, they assumed a definite
burden. It became incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet
and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to
the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as
petitioners would seem to believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal

case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense.
It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposedthe
prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This
burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which
balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of

evidence or by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which
equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is
sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should
it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at
equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of
proof, he cannot prevail.

04

Benares v. Pancho
457 SCRA 652
Topic: Quantum of Proof/Evidence, Probative Value
Facts:

Complainants Jaime Pancho, Rodolfo Pancho Jr., et al. worked at

Hacienda Maasin II, a sugar cane plantation owned and managed by Josefina
Benares. Complainants alleged to have been terminated without being paid
termination benefits by Benares in retaliation to what they have done in
reporting to the Department of Labor and Employment their working
conditions. The complainants filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
money claims before the labor arbiter. The labor arbiter dismissed the case
for failure of the complainants to discuss the facts and circumstances
surrounding their dismissal and to prove their entitlement of monetary
awards. The NLRC reversed such decision, ruling that complainants were
illegally dismissed for failure of Benares to prove that there was just or
authorized cause in their dismissal. On appeal, Benares questioned NLRC's
general statement to the effect that the payroll she submitted is not
convincing, she asserts that she submitted 235 sets of payroll, not just one,
and that the NLRC did not even bother to explain why it found the payroll
unconvincing. She also said that NLRC should have remanded the case to the
labor arbiter since there are gray areas in the facts.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in not

considering the petitioners evidence.

Ruling:

No. The probative value of petitioners evidence has been passed upon
by the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Although the labor
arbiter dismissed respondents complaint because their position paper is
completely devoid of any discussion about their alleged dismissal, much less
of the probative facts thereof, the ground for the dismissal of the complaint
implies a finding that respondents are regular employees. According to
petitioner, however, the NLRCs conclusion is highly suspect considering its
own admission that there are gray areas which require clarification. She
alleges that despite these gray areas, the NLRC chose not to remand the
case to the Labor Arbiter as this would unduly prolong the agony of the
complainants in particular. Petitioner perhaps wittingly omitted mention that
the NLRC opted to appreciate the merits of the instant case based on
available documents/pleadings. That the NLRC chose not to remand the
case to the labor arbiter for clarificatory proceedings and instead decided the
case on the basis of the evidence then available to it is a judgment call this
Court shall not interfere with in the absence of any showing that the NLRC
abused its discretion in so doing. It is well to note at this point that in quasi-
judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to support the
findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.

05

Canuto v. Mariano
37 Phil. 840

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts:

Espiridiona Canuto executed a Deed of Sale of land in favor of Juan

Mariano reserving the right to repurchase within one year from the date of
sale. One year lapsed and Canuto failed to exercise the right to repurchase.
When Mariano claimed absolute ownership over the land subject of the sale,
Canuto alleged that she be given an extension to repurchase. Canuto claims
that Mariano agreed but the latter failed to appear at the place and time
agreed upon to receive the money for the repurchase and for executing the
necessary Deed of Repurchase. Canuto then filed a case to compel Mariano
to receive the purchase money and execute the necessary documents. To
prove the alleged oral extension of the period to repurchase, one witness
who was alleged to be present when Mariano agreed to extend the time was
presented. The trial court ruled that Canuto may exercise her right to
repurchase. Mariano appealed asking that parol evidence may not be
introduced to prove the alleged extension of time.

Issue:

Whether parol evidence may be introduced to prove the alleged

extension of time.

Ruling:

Yes, considering the circumstances. Refusal by the vendee of a valid

tender or offer of purchase price in the exercise of the vendors right to
repurchase preserves the vendors right to repurchase. The defendant having
extended the time within which the plaintiff could repurchase the land on
condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the
extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to repudiate his
promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment
within the extended period, and was only prevented from doing so by the
conduct of the defendant himself.

The SC citing the cases of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil.
Rep., 495), ruled that that a bona fide offer or tender of the price agreed
upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of the party
making it, without the necessity of making judicial deposit, if the offer or
tender is refused. The case of and in the case of Fructo vs. Fuentes (15 Phil.
Rep., 362) was further cited holding that in such cases when diligent effort is
made by the vendor of the land to exercise the right to repurchase reserved
by him in his deed of sale "and fails by reason of circumstances over which
he has no control, we are of the opinion and so hold that he does not lose his
right to repurchase on the day of maturity."

06

City of Manila v. Garcia

19 SCRA 413

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts:

The City of Manila owns parcels of land occupied by illegal settlers,

who were later ordered to vacate the area for the expansion of the Epifanio
delos Santos Elementary School. The defendants Gerardo Garcia et al.,
however, refused; hence the suit for recovery of possession. At the trial, the
City presented the certification of the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board, stating that the amount of Php
100,000.00 had been set aside in an Ordinance for the construction of an
additional building of the said school. The court ruled out the admissibility of
said document. But then, the trial judge reversed his views, and ruled in
favor of the City by citing such evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court may alter its ruling as to evidence
presented in a case.

Ruling:
Yes. A court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its
power, to make it conformable to law and justice. Defendants' remedy was to
bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done
so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.

Elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit defendants.

For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken, because he
was duty bound to take, judicial notice of the Ordinance appropriating an
amount for the school. This is because the city charter of Manila requires all
courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the
municipal board of Manila. And the ordinance itself confirms the certification
aforesaid that an appropriation of Php 100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary
School.

07

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hantex Trading Co., Inc.

454 SCRA 301

Topic: Best Evidence Rule

Facts:

Hantex Trading Co. is a corporation engaged in the sale of plastic

products. Lt. Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of
the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received
confidential information that Hantex had imported synthetic resin amounting
to P115,599,018.00 but only declared P45,538,694.57. An investigation was
conducted and the following were presented against Hantex: certified copies
of Hantexs Profit and Loss Statement on file with the SEC; machine copies
of the Consumption Entries submitted by the informer; and excerpts from the
entries certified by the investigators. Administrative hearings and Hantex
wrote the BIR Commissioner, questioning the assessment because of the
failure to present the original, or authenticated, or duly certified copies of the
Consumption and Import Entry Accounts, or excerpts thereof if the original
copies were not readily available.

Issue:

Whether or not the final assessment of the petitioner against the

respondent is based on competent evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. The best evidence envisaged in Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as

amended, includes the corporate and accounting records of the taxpayer
who is the subject of the assessment process, the accounting records of
other taxpayers engaged in the same line of business, including their gross
profit and net profit sales. Such evidence also includes data, record, paper,
document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from other
taxpayers who had personal transactions or from whom the subject taxpayer
received any income; and record, data, document and information secured
from government offices or agencies, such as the SEC, the Central Bank of
the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff and Customs
Commission.

The law allows the BIR access to all relevant or material records and
data in the person of the taxpayer. It places no limit or condition on the type
or form of the medium by which the record subject to the order of the BIR is
kept. The purpose of the law is to enable the BIR to get at the taxpayer's
records in whatever form they may be kept. Such records include computer
tapes of the said records prepared by the taxpayer in the course of business.
In this era of developing information-storage technology, there is no valid
reason to immunize companies with computer-based, record-keeping
capabilities from BIR scrutiny. The standard is not the form of the record but
where it might shed light on the accuracy of the taxpayer's return.

08

Dalandan v. Julio
10 SCRA 400

Topic: Admission

Facts:
 Clemente Dalandan filed a civil case against Victoria Julio alleging in
their complaint that what transpired between the former and Victorina
Dalandan is not a facto de retro sale but an equitable sale. Victoria Julio filed
a motion to dismiss which was granted by the court. Clemente Dalandan
went to the SC saying that upon filing of the motion to dismiss of the other
party it is deemed that they admitted that the transaction was really an
equitable sale.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of motion to dismiss was in effect admitting

the allegation that it was an equitable sale.

Ruling:

No. As the trial court correctly pointed out, "such allegation of

'equitable mortgage' in the complaint is a mere conclusion of plaintiffs
(appellants) and not a material allegation, so that the same cannot be
deemed admitted by defendants (appellees) who filed the motion to
dismiss". As a rule, the complaint should contain allegation of ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Neither is it proper to allege in a
pleading inferences of fact from facts not stated, or incorrect inferences from
facts stated, for they are not the ultimate facts required by law to be
pleaded. Legal conclusions need not be pleaded, because so far as they are
correct they are useless, and when erroneous, worse than useless. And to
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint and no other should be considered. The allegation of nullity of a
judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and not a material allegation, is
not deemed admitted by the party who files a motion to dismiss.

09

Dela Rama v. Ledesma

G.R. No. 28608

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts:

Salvador Dela Rama is one of Inocentes Dela Rama Inc.s

incorporators and Rafael Ledesma is his nephew. The corporation claimed
from the Philippine War Commission war damages and it was paid in two
installments. After the first installment was paid, Dela Rama sold 140 shares
that he owns to Ledesma. There was an alleged understanding that De la
Rama reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage
benefits due on his 140 shares which Ledesma promised to deliver to him
upon payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission of the United
States. Subsequently, new certificates of stocks were issued in Ledesmas
name. When the 2nd installment was paid to the corporation, Dela Rama
demanded the return of his shares. Ledesma refused so Dela Rama filed a
collection case against the former. On his answer, Ledesma denied the
existence of the agreement accompanying the sale of shares of stocks.
Ledesma raised as defenses that the indorsement by De la Rama of the
Stock Certificate in question without qualification or condition constituted the
sole and exclusive contract between the parties and to allow De la Rama to
prove any alleged simultaneous oral agreement would run counter to the
Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. In reply, Dela Rama alleged
that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties, does the
Parol Evidence Rule does not apply. The trial court did not allow Dela Rama to
introduce parol evidence to prove the existence of the agreement upon
which, the sale of his shares of stocks was conditioned upon.

Issue:

Whether Parol Evidence is admissible to prove the existence of an

alleged agreement that accompanies a sale but not put into writing.

Ruling:

No. Dela Rama is not allowed to introduce Parol Evidence to prove the
alleged agreement accompanying the sale of his shares of stocks to
Ledesma. It is a well-accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.

While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the

meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating
into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case,
there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the
true agreement of the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been
intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed in writing such an
important reservation.

10

Duduaco v. Laquindanum
A.M. MTJ-05-1601

Topic: Quantum of Proof

Facts:

Mercedes Duduaco charged Judge Lily Laquindanum with grave

misconduct, abuse of discretion, and gross ignorance of the law. Mercedes is
the manager of Toyota Service Center where respondent brought her vehicle
for repairs and replacement of parts due to a vehicular mishap. The service
advisor told respondent that her vehicle will be released upon payment of
deductible franchise, respondent refused saying that it should be paid by the
insurance company. She asked to speak with the manager Mercedes but the
latter was in a meeting. It was explained to respondent that the payment of
the deductible franchise was upon instruction of the insurance company but
the respondent got angry. Upon being told that Mercedes was in a meeting,
respondent said that she was a judge and she should have a preferential
treatment. She was referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement
was reached, she suggested that they put in writing the demand for the
deductible franchise before she would pay. Upon presentation, she paid the
amount under protest but refused to sign a blank form which is release of
claim with subrogation. They told her that she cannot get the car unless she
signs the form. She did not sign it so she left without her car. She filed a case
for replevin, damages, and atty. fees against the service center. The
Investigating Justice of CA recommended the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. OCA adopted
such decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner must prove beyond reasonable doubt her
case against defendant.

Ruling:

No. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of

proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints.
Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in
character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.
The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should
thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, petitioner also failed to present substantial evidence. To constitute
gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty and corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful
conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause.
In this case, respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was
justified. Her insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, together with
her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave
misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was
only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she
would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the
right to claim for refund.

11

Estrada v. Desierto
356 SCRA 108

Topic: Hearsay Evidence

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada denies he resigned as President or

that he suffered from a permanent disability and contends that the Office of
the President was not vacant when respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took
her oath as president. To overturn his claim, the prosecution presented the
Angara Diary which contains direct statements of petitioner: his proposal for
a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his
statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second
envelope would be opened by Monday; and his statement that he is very
tired and he just wants to clear his name then he will go.

Issue:

Whether or not the Angara diary relied upon is violative of the hearsay
evidence rule.

Ruling:

No. The Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. It is part of the
pleadings in the case at bar. Petitioner cannot complain that he was not
furnished a copy of the diary since the same was frequently referred to by
the parties and three parts thereof were published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Supplemental Reply
Memorandum both the 2nd and 3rd parts of the diary. Thus, petitioner had all
the opportunity to contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do
so. Even assuming that it was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the Hearsay Rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative
face depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are
three reasons for excluding it: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence
of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Section 26 of Rule 130
provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him." It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. In the case at bar, the
diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as
admissions of a party.

12

Fule v. Court of Appeals

162 SCRA 446

Topic: Stipulation of Facts as Evidence

Facts:

Petitioner Manolo Fule was convicted of violation of B.P. 22, the

Bouncing Checks Law, on the basis of a stipulation of facts entered into
between the prosecution and the defense during pre-trial which was not
signed by the petitioner or by his counsel. On appeal, the respondent
appellate court upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction.

Issue:

Whether the conviction, based solely on a stipulation of facts which

was not signed by either the petitioner or his counsel, was proper.

Ruling:

No. The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the stipulation of facts
inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his
memorandum, confirmed the stipulation of facts does not cure the defect
because Rule 118 requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel.
What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering the lack of the
required signatures, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the
crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused.
Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused
cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

13

Gallego v. People
8 SCRA 813

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts:

Florentino Gallego, in view of holding a religious meeting at the public

market without the required permit, was convicted of slight disobedience of
an agent of a person in authority. He however assailed the decision of the
court by contending that there is no proof of the existence of an ordinance in
force requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting; and claims that it is
error for the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2,
series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo when the trial court itself allegedly did not
take cognizance of the ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court may be prohibited in taking judicial notice of

an ordinance.

Ruling:

No. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court from taking
cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123
of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which
are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court
of Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to petitioner's contention,
there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of religious
meeting in public places."

Besides, it is not true, that the trial court did not take notice of the
ordinance in question. For the lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to
secure the necessary permit" with obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1957. In People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, it was held that courts of
first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their
respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that the trial
court took notice of said Ordinance.c

14

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 17740

Topic: Best Evidence Rule

Facts:

Petitioners Carolina, Dolores and Cesar Gonzales sought the

settlement of the intestate estate of their brother Ricardo Abad. They
claimed that they were the only heirs of the deceased as the latter allegedly
died a bachelor, leaving no legitimate o illegitimate descendants or
ascendants. As such, Cesar was then appointed as the administrator of the
estate. Sometime later, private respondents Honoraria, Cecilia and Marian
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside the special proceeding. In their
motion, they alleged that Honoraria, the widow of Jose Libunao, had been the
common-law wife of Ricardo for 27 years and that during the said period
their union had produced 2 children: Cecilia and Marian. Petitioners, in
contesting Cecilia and Marians filiation, presented the joint affidavit of Juan
Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos stating that to their knowledge Libunao had
died in 1971 and had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park. With this,
petitioners claimed that Cecilia and Marian Abad, who were born in 1948 and
1954 respectively, are not then the illegitimate children of Ricardo, but
rather the legitimate children of the spouses Libunao and Empaynado. They
likewise submitted the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo's physician,
declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo and found him to be
infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a
consequence thereof thereby rendering him to incapable of fathering a child.

Issue:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence presented and submitted by the

petitioners are admissible.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that the joint affidavit as to the supposed death of
Libunao was not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time,
being merely secondary evidence thereof. Libunao's death certificate would
have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. The Court ruled
further that as to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was inadmissible and the
same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of
Ricardo Abad as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on confidential communications between
physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the
relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the
privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or
treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician
while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary
for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. On the fifth
requisite, Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted
gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation.

15

In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone,

without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted
disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient.

Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 117384

Topic: Original Document

Facts:

Felomino and Gregorio Madrid allegedly sold 3 parcels of land to

Teodoro dela and allegedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the latter.
Dela Cruz and his heirs took possession of the land but they found out that a
Torrens Title in the name of the Madrid brothers were issued on the subject
lands, so they filed a petition for reconveyance. The Madrid brothers denied
having executed the Deed of Sale and alleged it to be falsified. The original
copy of the Deed of Sale was said to be lost, thus only a photocopy was
presented during trial. To prove due execution of the Deed of Sale, the
Notary Publics testimony that his signature in the Deed of Sale was genuine
was offered. The Madrids did not object to the admissibility of the
photocopy. Despite this, the trial court ruled that the photocopy was
inadmissible because no proof was presented as to the loss or destruction of
the retained copy by the Notary public or the duplicate copy held by the
Madrids. It was then held that there was no valid sale and the case was
dismissed. On appeal to the CA, the photocopy was held admissible but has
no probative value, so still the trial courts decision was upheld. The CA held
that despite the Notary Publics testimony, the Deed of Sale is not
trustworthy since the alleged surviving witness was not presented to
corroborate the Notary Publics testimony.

Issue:

Whether or not the photocopy of the Deed of Sale is inadmissible as

evidence and if it has probative value.

Ruling:

Yes. The photocopy of the Deed of Sale is admissible as evidence but

has no probative value. Nonetheless, the petitioners appeal was granted
because their possession was never questioned by the Madrids. Not even a
written demand to vacate was issued. Despite being owners of land covered
by TCTs the Madrids were adjudged guilty of laches. All original copies must
be accounted for before secondary evidence may be introduced. The Notary
Public who signed in the Deed of Sale testified that there were five copies
made. None among the five were presented. Although the Dela Cruzs claim
that the National Archives does not have among its copies these documents,
this claim was not supported by any certification from the same office.
However, despite the original not having been presented, the respondents
failed to object as to its admissibility. The Notary Public was not even cross-
examined.

16

Thus, the photocopy has become primary evidence. However, despite

its admissibility, it holds no probative value regarding the sale it was
intended to prove. The photocopy which was alleged to be have been copied
from one of the Deeds carbon copies, was unsigned by the parties and was
not even dated. The Notary Public failed to verify the Deed from his own
records. Taken together, these casts serious doubt on the due execution of
the Deed of Sale.

Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa

G.R. No. 152807

Topic: Admissibility of Evidence

Facts:

The heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan filed a complaint for unlawful detainer

with damages against respondents Alberto Comorposa, et al. The MTC ruled
in favor of the heirs, but the RTC reversed such decision. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment, ruling that respondents had the
better right to possess the subject land; and it disregarded the affidavits of
the petitioners witnesses for being self-serving. Hence, the heirs filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that
the Rules on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits and that
the failure of respondents to file their position papers and counter-affidavits
before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

Issue:

Whether or not the affidavits in issue should have been considered by

the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:

No. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its

probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces
of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the

witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply
does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

17

Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo

453 SCRA 283

Topic: Burden of Proof

Facts:

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners

Savings and executed a mortgage as security. Marcelino eventually died and
was survived by his wife Miguela. Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding and as a result, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage and a
certificate of sale was issued in its favor as the highest bidder in the
extrajudicial sale. After the lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an
affidavit and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Miguela claimed that she had no
knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, so she instituted a case to nullify the real estate
mortgage and the certificate of sale. Petitioner claims however that the
property mortgaged is Marcelinos exclusive property.
Issue:

Who has the burden of proving that the property mortgaged is conjugal
property?

Ruling:

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of
his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade the Court.
Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of
the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of his family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.

In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the
trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed
with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to
the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the
family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only
when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the
issue raised in the new theory.

18

Lechugas v. Court of Appeals

143 SCRA 335

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts:

Petitioner Victoria Lechugas filed an unlawful entry case against private

respondents Marina Loza, Salvador Loza et al. Another case was filed for
recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried
jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Leoncia Lasangue in
1950. Private respondents contended that the same land in question was
bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941. Lasangue
testified for the Lozas stating that she sold the south part of the land which is
lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims.

Issue:
 Whether the court of appeals erred in considering parol evidence over
the objection of petitioner.

Ruling:

The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial courts action
in admitting the testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was
sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in
any proceeding in the lower court. The parol evidence rule does not apply
and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of
a party to a written instrument in the question and does not base a claim on
the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.

The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the
parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of
Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not
being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her cousin,
petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.

19

Lopez v. Valdez
32 Phil. 644

Topic: Objection to Admissibility of Evidence

Facts:

This is an action begun by Benito Lopez, the administrator of the estate

of Marcela Emradura, deceased, against Tomas Valdez for the recovery of
possession of the land. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the
plaintiff. Defendant went to the Supreme Court assigning as error the
procedure adopted by the court when objections were interposed by counsel
for defendant to questions designed to adduce evidence of the contents of
written documents when the destruction or the loss of the documents had
not been properly established. It appears from the record that Lopez relied
on certain written contracts entered into between Valdez and Marcela
Emradura during her lifetime to prove the cause of action set out in the
complaint. The documents themselves were not produced and when counsel
for appellee sought to prove by certain witnesses the contents of these
documents, without presenting facts justifying secondary evidence with
reference thereto, counsel for appellant made the objection that the
evidence was incompetent and improper as the documents themselves were
the best evidence. A decision on these objections was thus left in abeyance
and the trial terminated without a resolution of the questions presented. In
spite of that the trial court in its final decision took into consideration the
secondary evidence thus introduced and based its decision thereon.

ISSUE:

Was the procedure valid?

RULING:

No. A party who offers an objection to a question propounded to a

witness testifying on the trial of a civil action is entitled to a ruling at the
time the objection is made, or as soon thereafter as may be possible; in any
event during the trial and as such time as will afford the party against whom
the ruling is made a reasonable opportunity to meet the situation created by
the ruling. It is error for a court to reserve decision on such a question until
after the trial is closed and the case submitted; and if such error is
prejudicial, the judgment will be vacated and the cause returned for a new
trial.

20

Macasiray v. People
291 SCRA 154

Topic: Waiver to Admissibility of Evidence

Facts:

Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales and Benedicto

Gonzales were charged with murder for the death of Johnny Villanueve. In
the course of the trial, the prosecution introduced in evidence the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant Benedicto Gonzales and the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation
wherein he affirmed the contents of his confession. The defense objected
thereto on the ground of inadmissibility for having been executed without
assistance of counsel. The trial court sustained the objection of the defense
which, nonetheless, presented appellant Gonzales for the sole purpose of
denying the contents of the confession and the transcript of stenographic
notes. It did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits. Aggrieved by the
ruling of the trial court, the prosecution elevated the issue to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the trial court. It ruled that failure of the defense to
move for the exclusion of the documents constitutes a waiver of their
objection.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of the defense to move for the exclusion of
the documents constitutes a waiver of their objection.

Ruling:

There is no waiver to admissibility of the documents where objections

were made during the stage of formal offer; that objection to the document
during their identification and marking is not equivalent to objection during
their formal offer; and that there is no need to impeach appellant where his
extrajudicial confession and the transcript of stenographic notes wherein he
admitted liability had been excluded in evidence.

21

Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals

241 SCRA 192

Topic: Foreign Judgment as Evidence

Facts:

Plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines authorized defendant C.F. Sharp &

Co. through its Japan branch, to sell the former's airlines tickets. Sharp failed
to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of Northwest
which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount
with claim for damages. The Tokyo District Court of Japan rendered judgment
ordering Sharp to pay Northwest and Sharp failed to appeal making the
judgment final. However, Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan,
hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring that the judgment of the
Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having
been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp. The trial court
granted the demurrer to evidence motion of Sharp, holding that the foreign
judgment in the Japanese court sought to be enforced is null and void for
want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Issue:

Whether or not foreign judgment in the Japanese court need to be

proved as evidence in the Philippine courts.

Ruling:

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country

from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume
the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Under
Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in
personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce
the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule
131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese
court, Sharp had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In
an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial
service of summons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not
only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore,
acquire jurisdiction over it.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those

relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex
fori or the internal law of the forum.

22

In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process
on Sharp. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be
taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.
It was then incumbent upon Sharp to present evidence as to what that
Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Ong Chia v. Republic

328 SCRA 749

Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence

Facts:

Ong Chia was born in China but he came to the country when he was a
boy and stayed here since then. When he was 66 years old, he filed a
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen. He testified as to his
qualifications and presented witnesses to corroborate the facts which will
admit him Filipino citizenship and the trial court granted such petition.
However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial courts decision when
the State appealed to it, annexing in its appellant's brief the pertinent
documents for naturalization which contends that petitioner failed to support
his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Ong Chia now
contends that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and that such
documents, not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, are
mere scraps of paper.

Issue:

Whether or not the documents annexed to the States appellant briefs

should be considered as evidence even if they were not formally introduced
as evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. The documents should be considered as evidence. In this case,

the Supreme Court held that the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132,
Section 34 of the Rules of Court) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly
not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. Rule
143 of the Rules of Court states, These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient . The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."

23

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the
State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial
court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. However,
the Supreme Court is not persuaded, ruling that the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is
to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals.

Ordono v. Daquigan
2 SCRA 270

Topic: Marital Disqualification Rule

Facts:

Avelino Ordoo was charged with rape having raped his daughter,
Leonora. In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the mother
of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that
same date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was
filed because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina if they
reported the crime to the police. Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement
further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa.
Avelino Ordoo, invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoo had not consented
expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him. The trial court
overruled the objection.

Issue:

Whether or not the marital disqualification applies.

Ruling:

No. Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other" be restricted to crimes committed by one spouse against
the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or
should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense
causing marital discord?

There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony
and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

24

That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably

abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications, positively
undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require
much elucidation.

Ortiz v. De Guzman
A.M. No. P-03-1708

Topic: Implied Admission

Facts:

Atty. Jose Ortiz's initial investigation revealed that on various dates,

respondent Larry de Guzman demanded and received cash bond deposits in
violation of standing regulations of this Court. After issuing either fake
receipts or unauthorized provisional receipts, he then ordered jail officers to
release the accused in different cases. According to Atty. Ortiz, the
falsifications committed were apparent after comparing the fake receipts
with the original receipts duly issued by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). De Guzman was also caught extorting money from a winning party
litigant for the implementation of a certain court decision in an entrapment
operation of the National Bureau of Investigation. De Guzman was ordered to
make a comment on the allegations against him but none was heard nor
received from him during the formal investigation.

Issue:
 Whether or not respondent's silence may be considered as an implied
admission of guilt.

Ruling:

Yes. Throughout the entire process, and despite the many

opportunities given to respondent, he refused to comment and present his
side. The gravity of the charges and the weight of the evidence against him
would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name.
However, he opted to maintain his silence. The respondent's refusal to face
the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law
that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is to
express his innocence at the first opportune time, for his silence and inaction
can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse,
an admission of guilt. Therefore, the Supreme Court was inclined to believe
that the respondent is guilty of all the charges against him.

25

People v. Brioso
37 SCRA 336

Topic: Contradicting Evidence

Facts:

Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were found guilty for the murder Silvino
Daria. The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the
spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their
daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to Manila for her to avoid Mariano
Taeza. The courtship is admitted by Mariano Taeza. The two accused
appealed the conviction alledging that the lower court erred in relying on the
uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the
prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence is admissible.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the

material points. She stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun
when both the accused passed by. But this brief observation does not
necessarily mean that he was not actually armed or carrying a gun on his
person. The fact that he did was proved when both the said accused were
seen pointing their respective gun at the victim and each subsequently fired
once at him, Taeza using a short weapon that could have been carried
concealed in his person. Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this
heinous charge of murder against the above-said accused, considering that
Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even
Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should testify
against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the
truth should be believed. The witness also stated that she was hard of
hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged
inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the "positive and
straightforward" identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at
the scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria. Moreover, the
testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the
victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot
him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem
statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria
must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely
inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending
death, considering that he died only one hour after being shot.

26

People v. Bulos
G.R. No. 123542

Topic: Admission

Facts:

Both Nancy Cordero and Rogelio Bulos are stay-in-workers for spouses
Mario and Delia Fariolan. Nancy was the cook and general househelp while
Rogelio worked as a truck helper for the business of Mario. One day when the
spouses were away, Rogelio raped Nancy. During his trial, Rogelio and the
combined testimonies of Mario and Conrado Perido, sought to establish that
Rogelio was not at the Fariolans' house on the afternoon in question but was
vacationing in Cotabato where he stayed at Perido's house. On rebuttal,
Merson Cordero, Nancys brother who also worked as helper at the rice mill
of the Fariolans, testified that Rogelio in fact left the Fariolans house after he
had already raped his sister. Cordero also said that the accused in fact
offered marriage to Nancy, that the Fariolan spouses actively persuaded
Nancy to accept the offer of marriage, and that Nancy refused.

Issue:

Whether or not the offer of marriage in rape cases is an admission of

guilt.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court takes into consideration the flight of Rogelio the day
after the rape, and his offer of marriage to the victim after the incident had
been reported to the authorities. As a rule in rape cases, an offer of
marriage to the offended party is an admission of guilt. In this case, it was
proved that Rogelio did indeed offer marriage to the victim. Thus, he is found
guilty of the crime of rape.
 People v. Calumpang
454 SCRA 719

Topic: Alibi

Facts:

Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts
of murder, committed against the spouses Alicia Catipay and Santiago
Catipay. The trial court dismissed the defense of alibi interposed by the
defendants because it was weak and then convicted the defendants, relying
on the testimony of Magno Gomez who allegedly eye witnessed the killing of
the two victims. The defendants appealed, contending that the testimony of
Magno is unreliable and inconsistent, and that the trial court erred in
dismissing their defense of alibi.

27

Issue:

Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the

guilt of the accused.

Ruling:

Yes. Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis
were corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown
that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However,
the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never
intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic
that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the
prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient
evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators
of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.

The Supreme Court found that the testimony of the lone witness
Magno is full of inconsistencies. While Magno claimed to have witnessed the
gruesome killings, the records show that serious discrepancies attended
Magnos testimony in court and his sworn statement executed during the
preliminary examination. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances stand. Magnos
testimony failed to satisfy such rule, hence, the presumed innocence of the
accused must be upheld.
 People v. Darilay
421 SCRA 45

Topic: Direct Evidence, Circumstantial Evidence

Facts:

Appellant Noel Darilay, who was then 15 years old, was found guilty for
the rape and murder of minor Marilyn Arganda, and the attempted murder of
Ailyn Arganda. Ailyn testified that she and Marilyn were on their way home
when they met appellant who suddenly struck them with a piece of wood
which left them unconscious. Appellant left Ailyn under such state but he
carried Marilyn to a grassy place where he repeatedly raped and eventually
killed her. The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he
raped and killed the victim because only Ailyns testimony was relied upon
and there was no direct evidence presented.

28

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of direct evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused warrants his acquittal thereof.

Ruling:

No. The Court agrees with the appellant that the prosecution failed to
adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the
occasion or by reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not
indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged; it may
be proved by circumstantial evidence. Based on the evidence on record and
as declared by the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the appellant who
raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the rape. Hence, he
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex
crime.

First.

The appellant alone waylaid Ailyn and Marilyn while the two were walking
home after buying tinapa. The appellant hit Ailyn twice with a piece of wood
on her back and boxed the left side of her face, rendering her unconscious.
The appellant also struck Marilyn with a piece of wood on the back. After
dragging Ailyn to a grassy area, he left her there. Second. When Ailyn
regained consciousness, Marilyn and the appellant were nowhere to be
found. Third. The torn dress, the pair of panties, and a slipper were found
about 15 meters away from where the two young girls were waylaid by the
appellant. Fourth. The appellant testified that he himself accompanied the
policemen and pointed to the place where Marilyns body was dumped,
completely naked, with blood oozing from her nose and vagina. Considering
all of these, the court is convinced that the appellant raped Marilyn about 15
meters from where he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn
across the river where he killed her to prevent her from revealing to the
authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid her body under the bushes
and trees to prevent police autho
 People v. De Gracia
18 SCRA 197

Topic: Dying Declarations

Facts:

The Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte charged Alfredo Salva, Narciso
de Gracia, and Raymundo Sorima with the crime of murder for the killing of
Ernesto Flores. After being stabbed by respondents, Flores rushed away in
the direction of his father's house, shouting for help. Kauswagan Vice-Mayor
Nemesio Agawin, who was then reading a newspaper in his house, was
attracted by these shouts. He immediately got his rifle, went down and
followed Flores, finally overtaking him in the back stairs of his father's house,
sitting by the stairs but supported by his two brothers, and with his intestines
protruding out of his abdomen.

29

Upon Agawin's inquiry as to what happened, Flores spontaneously

declared that Alfredo Salva stabbed him while "Naring" (de Gracia) and
"Mundo" Sorima were holding his arms. Flores died afterwards. Agawin
testified in court.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence is admissible.

Ruling:

Yes. Accused contends that the testimony of Vice-Mayor Nemesio

Agawin regarding Ernesto Flores' dying declaration had not satisfied the
requirements of an ante mortem statement since the declarant had not
made it under the consciousness of an impending death, nor had the
statement fulfilled the requirements of res gestae, because said declaration
was neither natural nor spontaneous, or unreflective and instinctive, but
rather it was made in reply to a question asked from the declarant; and the
prosecution not having specified the purpose for which Agawin's testimony
was offered, the same is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. The trial
court in admitting the testimony of Vice-Mayor Agawin regarding Flores'
dying declaration, wherein he identified accused as his assailants. It is
believed that the circumstances under which the victim made such
identification have fulfilled the requirements of either an ante mortem
statement or as part of the res gestae. Judged by the nature and extent of
the injury inflicted (deep stab wound on the abdomen, causing his intestines
to protrude), Flores could not ignore the seriousness of his condition, and it is
safe to infer that the deceased made the declaration under the
consciousness of impending death. The same identification may also be
considered as part of the res gestae, since it was made immediately after the
stabbing incident and appears to be natural and spontaneous, and made
before the deceased, who had no enmity toward appellants, could contrive or
devise a plan to incriminate them. There was no necessity for the
prosecution to specify the purpose for which it offered Agawin's testimony,
for said purpose was self-evident. Besides, the defense failed to object on
time to its presentation in the trial court. Hence, the trial court correctly
admitted said testimony.
 People v. Francisco
78 Phil. 694

Topic: Marital Disqualification Rule

Facts:

Juan Francisco, who had been previously arrested on charges of

robbery, was being held as detention prisoner. He was charged with the
crime of parricide. On a visit to his family, Francisco allegedly wounded his
wife and caused the death of their child. Franciscos wife testified against
him, which he later questioned.

30

Issue:

Whether or not testimony of the wife is admissible.

Ruling:

Yes. The law states that neither a husband nor wife shall in any case
be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other have been. However, as all other
general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which,
in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there
is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other

that it may be waived. Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to
testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the
case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her
privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby
making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner. It is
well-established that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his
behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and
pertinent to her testimony on direct examination. It is also true that objection
to the spouses competency must be made when he or she is first offered as
witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the
accused to make timely objection to the admission of the spouses
testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony
admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the admission, either
expressly or impliedly. Other courts have held that the witnesss testimony is
not admissible even with the other spouses consent. Clearly, if the statute
provides that a spouse shall in no case testify against the other except in a
prosecution for an offense against the other, the failure of the accused to
object does not enable the state to use the spouse as a witness.
 People v. Galleno
291 SCRA 761

Topic: Expert Testimony as Evidence; Evidence in Criminal Cases

Facts:

Joeral Galleno was charged with statutory rape committed against

Evelyn Obligar, a five year old girl. The prosecution presented three expert
witnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada, and Dr.
Machael Toledo, whose testimonies convinced the trial court that rape was
committed against Obligar.

31

Galleno contended that he should be acquitted since the expert

testimonies were not impeccable considering that the doctors found that
there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to
what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina.

Issue:

Whether or not the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses as to

the occurrence of carnal knowledge should result to the acquittal of the
accused.

Ruling:

As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions
or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence
and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions
of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert
testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject
matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the
court in reaching a judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with
the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the
possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other
prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such
expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment
on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible
causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference
is wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate
the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina.
In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.

People v. Lara
54 Phil. 96

Topic: Dying Declarations

Facts:

The deceased, Juan Advincula, was a resident of the barrio of Salitran,

in the municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite. Crispo Lara was
charged with his murder. Lara shot Advincula, who sought help in the house
of a neighbor, Felix Ramirez. Advincula found the family of Ramirez sitting at
the table eating their evening meal; and he told them that he had been shot
by the Lara at the same time exhibiting the bloody stain on his left side.
Ramirez at once called the barrio lieutenant, one Ciriaco Reyes; and upon the
arrival of the latter, Advincula repeated his account of the occurrence, adding
that he was weak from the pain resulting from his wound and that he would
not survive. The next day the justice of the peace of the municipality, one
Restituto Paman, took Advincula's affidavit, in which the declarant reiterated
what he had told the lieutenant, but upon this occasion he said he felt better
and he indicated to the justice of the peace that he thought he would not die
of the wound.

32

On the next day Advincula was taken to the Philippine General Hospital
in the City of Manila where he remained for three weeks, at the end of which
time he was discharged. In a few days, however, the bullet, which had never
been extracted from the shoulder, begun to make trouble again, and
Advincula was taken back to the hospital, where blood poisoning from the
internal wound soon developed and later on, Advincula died.

Issue:

Whether or not the statements of Advincula regarding Lara as the one

who shot him can be admitted as dying declarations.

Ruling:

The statement made to Ciriaco Reyes in the house of Felix Ramirez,

was in our opinion admissible as a dying declaration because when this
declaration was made the deceased was weak, complained of the pain which
he was suffering from the wound and stated that he would not survive. It is
true that the deceased lived for nearly six weeks after that statement was
made, and in this interval recovered, to external appearances, almost
completely from the wound. Nevertheless it appears that in the end the
deceased died from the same wound; and the admissibility of the first
declaration depends upon the state of mind of the deceased when the
declaration was made, and not upon the length of time that elapsed between
the infliction of the wound and the declarant's death. This statement supplies
ample proof that the accused was the author of Advincula's death. It was not
a dying declaration with regard to the affidavit given to the justice of the
peace by the deceased on the day after the fatal injury was inflicted, for the
reason that when that declaration was made the deceased indicated that he
was under the impression that the injury would not be fatal.
 33

People v. Matito
G.R. No. 144405

Topic: Circumstantial Evidence

Facts:

Ferdinand Matito was charged with murder, committed against Mariano

Raymundo, Jr. The prosecution presented the following during the trial: (1)
testimony of the widow that her husband, prior to his death, declared that it
was appellant who had gunned him down; (2) the presence of nitrate
powder on the cast taken from the right hand of appellant; (3) the bitter
quarrel that ensued between Matito and the victim after the latter had cut off
the formers water supply; (4) the denial by Matito of the request of his
neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of way along the premises
of his house; and (5) hours before the victim was killed, the threatening
remarks of appellant to the formers daughter. The Regional Trial Court
convicted Matito.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to convict

the accused.

Ruling:

Yes. Circumstantial evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and

forcefulness, may be the sole basis of a criminal conviction. It cannot be
overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly

proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from
the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct
testimony would result in setting a felon free." It is not a weaker form of
evidence vis--vis direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect
upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter in weight and probative
force. To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken
chain showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current

case, we hold that the court a quo did not err in convicting appellant of the
crime charged. The combination of the circumstances comprising such
evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to appellant, to the exclusion
of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.

34

People v. Negosa
G.R. No. 142856-57

Topic: Testimonial Evidence

Facts:

Roberto Negosa was charged with two counts of rape, committed

against Gretchen Castao. As to the second count of rape, Gretchen testified
on direct examination that the penis of the appellant was able to penetrate
her vagina. However, on cross examination, she testified that she and the
appellant were wearing short pants and underwear, hence, it was physically
impossible for his penis to penetrate her vagina. The RTC convicted Negosa
for statutory rape and for acts of lasciviousness in lieu of the second count
for rape. Negosa appealed, contending that the trial court should have not
believed the inconsistent testimony of the victim.

Issue:

Whether or not the inconsistent testimony of the victim is sufficient to

acquit the accused.

Ruling:

No. The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony on the second

count of rape that the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his
penis through the side of his short pants and the side of the victims loose
short pants and convicted the appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. This,
however, does not impair Gretchens credibility and the probative weight of
her testimony that she was raped by the appellant. In People vs. Lucena, we
ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved,
depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the
witness to pervert the truth.

The principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in

this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with
the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an
inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors
more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and
partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the
trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its
material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not
from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a
rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court,
which may accept or reject portions of the witness testimony based on its
inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case.
 35

People v. Sevilleno
G.R. No. 152954

Topic: Circumstantial Evidence

Facts:

Appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged for rape with homicide,

committed against Virginia Bakia. The RTC convicted appellant based on the
following circumstances presented by the prosecution: (1) appellant invited
the victim to watch a "beta-show"; (2) victim and the appellant proceed to a
sugarcane field in Hacienda San Antonio, the place where the corpse of the
victim was found; (3) the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone
and without the victim, with fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms;
(4) the multiple scratches suffered by the appellant on the right side of his
face and ears were all caused by human fingernails; and (5) the victim
suffered hymenal laceration, contusions, abrasions and hematoma on
different parts of her body and was strangled resulting to her death which
indicated that there was a struggle and the victim vigorously put up a fight
against her attacker. Sevilleno appealed, contending that the scratches on
his face do not prove that they were inflicted by Virginia, much less that he
committed the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution evidence is sufficient to convict the

accused.

Ruling:

Yes. The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of

an accused through circumstantial evidence require the presence of the
following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt
in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires
that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to
the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. The prosecution were
able to establish all of these.

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable

doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude
resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available.
Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all
circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes
in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.

36

People v. Singh
45 Phil. 676

Topic: Confession

Facts:

Santa Singh, an East Indian, was found dead on the sidewalk in front
of his tienda in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. There were three knife wounds on
the body, one of them necessarily mortal. Sometime the accused Buda Singh
confessed to a friend of his, Ram Singh that he had killed Santa Singh and
related the details of the crime, implicating five other East Indians in its
commission. On a subsequent occasion Ram Singh thought that Buda Singh
looked at him with malos ojos. Suspecting that Buda Singh regretted
having made the confession and contemplated killing him, Ram Singh
reported the matter to the authorities and the present action was instituted
against Buda Singh and his five alleged companions. On motion of the fiscal
the case was dismissed against all of the defendants except Buda Singh.
Upon trial, the court below found Buda Singh guilty of homicide. The counsel
of Buda moved that the confession made by Ram Singh be stricken from the
record on the ground that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct
evidence that the confession had been made freely and voluntarily.

Issue:

Whether or not the confession made by Buda Singh to Ram Singh is

admissible.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no merit in this contention. The evidence was clearly

admissible. Act No. 619, upon which the argument of counsel is evidently
based, has been repealed by the Administrative Code and evidence of a
confession may now be received without direct affirmative evidence that the
confession was freely and voluntarily made. (U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308.)

The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the confession into
consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the
record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence in rebuttal,
the matter should have been brought to the attention of that court through
the appropriate motion.
 37

Republic v. Court of Appeals

277 SCRA 633

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court, after hearing, adjudicated a parcel of land in

favor of Josefa Gacot. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), contending that the land was previously declared to be the property of
the Republic in a decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos following an
order of general default. A rehearing of the case was conducted. However,
the Government failed to present the said order of Judge Garlitos in
evidence. Thus, the CA ruled in favor of Gacot because the order of Judge
Garlitos not having been offered as evidence, it cannot take judicial notice of
such.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of the order of Judge
Garlitos.

Ruling:

Yes. Firstly, that the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not

sanction the grant of evidentiary value in ordinary trials of evidence which is
not formally offered, and secondly, that adjective law is not to be taken
lightly for without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not remain
assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure
are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the
proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore,
the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the
cause of substantial justice.

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same
case facts established in prior proceedings in the same case of the
authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of
the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in
the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record,
pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties
or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case
between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken
of court personnel.
 38

Rivera v. Court of Appeals

284 SCRA 673

Topic: Burden of Proof

Facts:

Esmundo Rivera filed an ejectment case against Peregrino and

Merlinda Mirambel alleging that they constructed their house in his land as
indicated by a private survey. He presented the following evidence: private
survey commissioned by Rivera which was not properly authenticated by the
Bureau of Lands, a letter of the district land officer to Rivera informing him
that his application cannot be given due course because of a prior
application. MTC ruled in favor of Rivera because he was able to establish his
cause of action through preponderance of evidence. The RTC reversed MTCs
decision because the houses of the Mirambels were built outside the land of
Rivera and located in a public land. Rivera appealed to the CA saying that
RTC's findings lack evidentiary support. The CA found that both decisions are
not supported by substantial evidence. According to the CA, there should be
a field survey directed by the court or ocular inspection of the subject
premises, and not just the sole survey conducted by Rivera which is self-
serving if without thorough verification.

Issue:

Whether or not Rivera was able to prove the fact that Mirambels are
within his property.

Ruling:

No. Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence simply means evidence which is of greater
weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In
the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving
that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled land. To
justify a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a
preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.

The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties was
insufficient to determine with certainty whether the private respondents
houses were inside the petitioners titled property. As noted by Respondent
Court, private respondents claim that their houses were built on public land
is not convincing because petitioner has a transfer certificate of title over the
same parcel of land. Likewise unconvincing is the private survey
commissioned by the petitioner himself to prove that the houses of private
respondents encroached on his property. The reliability of the survey would
have been indubitable had it been properly authenticated by the Bureau of
Lands or by officials thereof.

39

Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is

doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof fails upon that issue. Therefore, as neither party was able to
make out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail
with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they
proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only
leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss
the complaints/petitions.

Samalio v. Court of Appeals

454 SCRA 462

Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence

Facts:

Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport, was taken to

Augusto R. Samalio, Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), because her passport was suspected to be fake. Qin paid
Samalio $500 in exchange of her passport but Samalio returned Qins
passport without an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter, a criminal case
for robbery and violation of the Immigration Law was filed against Samalio in
the Sandiganbayan, as well as an administrative case for dishonesty,
oppression and misconduct. Samalio was found guilty of the charges in both
proceedings and was ordered dismissed from service by the BID
Commissioner, and such decision was affirmed by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals. The
CSC and the Secretary of Justice took cognizance of the testimony of Weng
Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan case, applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Rules on Evidence applies in the administrative

case.

Ruling:

Yes. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on
former testimony, in deciding petitioners administrative case. The
provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of
procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless
otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative
agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every
litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to
proceedings before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the
absence of different and valid statutory or administrative provisions
prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudication
of cases before it. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites
must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;

40

(b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or

proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same
subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness in the former case. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was
unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID because
she left the country even before the administrative complaint against
petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of
Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan case, the very basis for filing the
administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in
such case was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether
petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the
opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to
defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan.

Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on
former testimony were satisfied. Furthermore, the proper foundation was laid
because in the early stages of the proceedings before the Board of Discipline
of the BID, Weng Sai Qins departure from the country and consequent
inability to testify in the proceedings had already been disclosed to the
parties

Service Wide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 117728

Topic: Admission of Liability

Facts:

Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money with

damages against spouses Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa, alleging that the
spouses failed to pay the installments due on the purchase price of a jeepney
despite several demands. Later on, Servicewide amended its complaint and
included Eduardo Garcia as defendant alleging that the Tolosa spouses,
without Servicewide's knowledge and consent, executed and delivered to
Garcia a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" over the jeepney
sought to be recovered. Lourdes Bartina filed a complaint-in-intervention
claiming that the vehicle subject of the complaint was sold to her by Binan
Motors owned by Garcia and that the vehicle was in her possession when it
was seized by the sheriff and thereafter turned over to Servicewide. Later,
Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors, with the assistance of their respective
counsels, moved to dismiss the complaint-in-intervention. They alleged that
they had arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims. The decision was
rendered by the trial court and included Garcia in the payment of liability to
Servicewide.

Issue:

Whether or not an offer to compromise is considered an admission of

liability in civil cases.

41

Ruling:

No. The compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors
cannot be taken as an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability. With more reason, a
compromise agreement should not be treated as an admission of liability on
the part of the parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise settlement of
a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but
merely admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of
the controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission of any
liability to someone else. The policy of the law should be, and is, to
encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third parties are
not in any way affected thereby.

State Prosecutors v. Muro

236 SCRA 505

Topic: Judicial Notice

Facts:

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against

Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction
in the Central Bank Circular 960. Judge Manuel Muro dismissed all 11 cases
solely on the basis of the report published on 2 newspapers, which the judge
believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision
was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive
Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby
divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case. He
further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the
newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the
judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge may take judicial notice of a statute before it
becomes effective.

Ruling:

No. Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. Judicial notice is
not equivalent to judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute
before it becomes effective.

42

A law not yet in force and hence still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.

Sy v. Court of Appeals
330 SCRA 550

Topic: Original Document

Facts:

Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy are married and blessed with 2 children.

Fernando left his family later and never returned. Filipina filed a petition for
legal separation but later amended it to a petition for separation of property,
which was granted by the court. She then later filed a petition for legal
separation on the grounds of abandonment and physical violence against her
husband, which was granted by the Court. Filipina then filed a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity citing habitual alcoholism, refusal to live with her
without just cause, and refusal to have sex with her. The trial court denied
her petition since her grounds do not constitute psychological incapacity.
This was uphold by the appellate court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she
alleged lack of marriage license as her new ground, attaching therein mere
photocopies of a marriage license and marriage certificate.

Issue:

Whether or not a mere photocopy of a document is admissible in

evidence.

Ruling:

A marriage license is a formal requirement and its absence renders

the marriage void ab initio. It is clear on the evidence presented that the
issuance of marriage license and marriage certificate was on September 17,
1974 but the celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973 which
also what was written on the birth certificates of their 2 children. Since the
documents presented were just photocopies of the original, the Court ruled
that although the marriage certificate and other pieces of documentary
evidence were only photocopies, the fact that these have been examined
and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to
their authenticity and due execution, means that these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. Likewise, no
objection was interposed to petitioners testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on
November 15, 1973. Therefore, having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed
sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
 43

Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

196 SCRA 650

Topic: Formal Offer of Evidence

Facts:

Juan Peralta Jr., the half-brother of petitioner Jose Tabuena, sold a

parcel of land to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States.
Tabernilla returned to the Philippines and upon his request, the subject land
was conveyed to him by Damasa, Peraltas mother. The latter, however,
requested that she be allowed to stay in said property to which Tabernilla
agreed on the condition that she will pay all realty taxes. Damasa remained
on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son, took
possession thereof. The complaint was filed upon Tabuena to surrender the
property and the trial court ruled against petitioner. The petitioner faults the
decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of
basis because the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence
not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Petitioner claimed that the court, in arriving at its factual findings,
took cognizance of pieces of evidence which had been marked by the
plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not decisions/factual findings may be drawn from

evidences which are not formally offered.

Ruling:

No. It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the

factual findings of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive
where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The
exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record
and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness, as in
this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on exhibits of

evidence, which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore
should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The
trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in another civil
case and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the
petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not
have been sustained by the respondent court.

The Supreme Court found that the private respondent, as plaintiff in

the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed
property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By
contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary
contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in his favor
and dismiss the complaint.
 44

Tan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125861

Topic: Parol Evidence Rule

Facts:

Tan Kiat averred that he bought a parcel of land from Mr. Tan Keh
where he built his house, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title
in his favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale.
Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan
Keh turned over to Tan Kiat the owners duplicate copy of the TCT and
executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for 40 years.
However, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother
and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties
are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of Tan Kiat and that Remigio
would execute the proper documents of transfer in favor of Tan Kiat should
the latter at anytime demand recovery of the subject properties. Another
contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of private
respondent to further safeguard the latters interest on the subject
properties, but private respondent never paid any rental and no demand
whatsoever for the payment thereof had been made on him. Remigio was
killed. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of Tan Kiats ownership of the
subject properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to
Tan Kiat who by then had already acquired Filipino citizenship by
naturalization. Petitioners, however, never made good their promise to
convey the subject properties despite repeated demands by Tan Kiat. In fact,
petitioners had the subject properties fraudulently transferred to their
names.

Issue:

Whether evidence is admissible.

Ruling:

Inadmissible. Petitioners are in possession of a TCT which evidences

their ownership of the subject properties. On the other hand, Tan Kiat relies
simply on the allegation that he is entitled to the properties by virtue of a
sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously,
private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the
circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the Dead
Mans Statute found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation
to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in question on the part of
the surviving party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
 45

U.S. v. Antipolo
37 Phil. 726

Topic: Dying Declarations, Marital Disqualification Rule

Facts:

Dalmaceo Antipolo was charged with the murder of Fortunato Dinal.

The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he has
appealed. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial
judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of Dinal, to testify as a witness
on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. The
witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of
Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this
question the fiscal objected upon the following ground that she is not
competent to testify under the rules of procedure in either civil or criminal
cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and
cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from
testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.

Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent,

arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind
relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a
proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a
criminal case are the Government and the accused; that, furthermore, the
marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her
husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any
disqualification arising from the status of marriage.

Issue:

Whether or not the marital disqualification applies to a dying

declarations made by either spouse.

HELD:

No. On grounds of public policy the wife cannot testify against

her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of
the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication
made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The
declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be
proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard
the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as
to any other fact known to her. It cannot be contended that the dying
declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication
made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of
justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the
prosecution of the defendant.

The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in excluding the
testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such
exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his essential rights. That being
the case, a new trial must be granted.

46
 U.S. v. Dela Cruz
12 Phil. 87

Topic: Dying Declarations

Facts:

Timoteo Dizon, together with a band, had just committed robbery in

two houses when they were surprised by Constabulary forces which attacked
them, resulting to the wounding of a member and in the death of Dizon. The
accused appellants were convicted of the crime of robbery in an armed band.
The accused appellants were convicted based on the ante-mortem
statements of Dizon, for the purpose of identifying the appellants as
members of the band. The ante-mortem statements admitted by the trial
court were an alleged extra-judicial declaration made by Dizon a few hours
before his death, wherein he confessed his guilt of the robbery and stated
that the appellants were members of the band. The evidence further
discloses that this confession was made to the provincial fiscal and an officer
of the Constabulary, and that, although the appellants were there present,
under arrest, charged with the commission of the crime, and heard the dying
man charge them with being members of the band, they kept silent and did
not attempt to deny the charge.

Issue:

Whether or not the dying declarations of Dizon is admissible to prove

membership of the accused in the band which committed the robberies.

Ruling:

No. The grounds for the admission of evidence of co-conspirators

clearly require that such acts or declarations must have been made during
the progress of the conspiracy and in pursuance of the ends for which it had
been formed, and not after the transaction had ended; and further, before
such evidence can be admitted it must appear by competent evidence that
the conspiracy actually existed and that the accused were members of the
conspiracy.

The declaration under consideration was made after the transaction to

which it referred was at an end, was not made in pursuance of the
conspiracy, and was clearly inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the
defendants were co-conspirators with the defendant. It is suggested,
however, that while the statements in question were inadmissible as proof of
the truth of their contents, they might have been received for the purpose of
showing that, when they were made in the presence of the defendants, they
made no attempt to deny them, and by their silence admitted their truth.
Though silence may sometimes mean admission of guilt, there must be a
proper opportunity to reply and the surroundings were not such as to render
a denial expedient and proper; and the right of a defendant in all criminal
prosecutions "to be exempt from testifying against himself" clearly prohibits
any inference of guilt from the silence of an accused person who has been
arrested and charged with crime.

47
 The statements in question were made after defendants had been
arrested, and in the course of an official investigation which was being
conducted by the provincial fiscal, and under these circumstances, proof of
the fact that the statements were made in the presence and hearing of the
defendants, and that they kept silence and failed there and then to deny
their truth, could in no event support the inference that by thus keeping
silence they implicity admitted the truth of the facts alleged by the
declarant.

48
PAGE LIST OF CASES

01. Ayala de Roxas v. Case 8 Phil. 197

02. Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Aying G.R. No. 144773

03. Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc. 403 SCRA 699

04. Bautista v. Sarmiento 138 SCRA 587

05. Benares v. Pancho 457 SCRA 652

06. Canuto v. Mariano 37 Phil. 840

07. City of Manila v. Garcia 19 SCRA 413

08. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hantex Trading Co., Inc.

454
SCRA 301

09. Dalandan v. Julio 10 SCRA 400

10. Dela Rama v. Ledesma G.R. No. 28608

11. Duduaco v. Laquindanum A.M. MTJ-05-1601

12. Estrada v. Desierto 356 SCRA

108

13. Fule v. Court of Appeals 162 SCRA 446

14. Gallego v. People 8 SCRA 813

15. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 17740

16. Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117384

17. Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa G.R. No. 152807

18. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo 453 SCRA

283

19. Lechugas v. Court of Appeals 143 SCRA 335

20. Lopez v. Valdez 32 Phil. 644

21. Macasiray v. People 291 SCRA 154

22. Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals 241 SCRA 192

23. Ong Chia v. Republic 328 SCRA 749

24. Ordono v. Daquigan 2 SCRA 270

25. Ortiz v. De Guzman A.M. No. P-03-1708

26. People v. Brioso 37 SCRA 336

27. People v. Bulos G.R. No. 123542

i
27. People v. Calumpang 454 SCRA 719

28. People v. Darilay 421 SCRA 45

29. People v. De Gracia 18 SCRA 197

30. People v. Francisco 78 Phil. 694

31. People v. Galleno 291 SCRA 761

32-33. People v. Lara 54 Phil. 96

34. People v. Matito G.R. No. 144405

35. People v. Negosa G.R. No. 142856-57

36. People v. Serrano G.R. No. L-17937

37. People v. Sevilleno G.R. No. 152954

38. People v. Singh 45 Phil. 676

39. Republic v. Court of Appeals 277 SCRA 633

40. Rivera v. Court of Appeals 284 SCRA 673

41. Samalio v. Court of Appeals 454 SCRA 462

42. Service Wide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117728

43. State Prosecutors v. Muro 236 SCRA 505

44. Sy v. Court of Appeals 330 SCRA 550

45. Tabuena v. Court of Appeals 196 SCRA 650

46. Tan v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125861

47. U.S. v. Antipolo 37 Phil. 726

48. U.S. v. Dela Cruz 12 Phil. 87

ii
List of digested Cases
Evidence

Submitted to
Atty. Roney Jone Gandeza
College of Law
University of Cordillera
Baguio City

Submitted By
Ginievive A. Bengdaen
3rd year - Section C

May 13, 2016