City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)

expropriation of Chinese cemetery

Facts: The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the Chinese community as cemetery for the purpose
of extending
Rizal Avenue
for public use. The respondents contend that the land already acquires a quasi-public character and many dead
bodies are already buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of taking the land for public purpose since such
is under Torrens title and the expropriation will disturb the resting place of the dead. The plaintiff contends that
under the Charter of City of Manila, they may condemn private lands for public purpose, such being an exclusive
function of the legislature and the only function of the court is to assess the value of the land expropriated.

Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of expropriation.

Held: The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the inquiry of the existence
of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public purpose. The court has the
responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. There are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be public. The
taking of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but the court is
bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The very foundation of the right
to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled
that the cemetery is a public property and it found no great necessity to allow the expropriation of the land by the
City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT,

(Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so
that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent
contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object
for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone
company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone
systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the
construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to
the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town
plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a
house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinances constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:
The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited
conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised
in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which
its impartialenforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to
use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures
offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there
must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall have authority to
exercise the following discretionary powers:
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired
within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the
municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair
permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits
within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them
before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under
the express authority of sec. 2243

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620) - Digest

Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over
a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease
in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00
that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in
question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced
to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, momentary when applied to possession
or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean a limited period -- not indefinite or permanent.
The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the
land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that
the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease
contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown
by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had
been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent
domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvis property should not be determined on
the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held
that the taking of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and
possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent
to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only
relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.
Philippine Press Institute Vs. COMELEC Case Digest

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space
of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used
by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers,
asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.

Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies
to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers.

Sumulong vs. Guerrero [No. L-48685,September 30, 1987]

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels
of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government
employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners
Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated
were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the
amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total market value of thesubject 25 ha. of land,
pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing
upon payment of just compensation.

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the
subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of
the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just compensation, and
due process.

Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings
is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid
exercise of the States power of eminent domain.

(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors.

(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the
NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge.

Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class
members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public
use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced
by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing
falls within the confines of public use.

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties
to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of
fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight
to and leave undisturbed the NHAschoice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and
disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.

(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same
provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional for being
encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking.
It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitute for just compensation.

(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it
allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in
court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.

Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the
case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

The court ruled that the purpose of expropriation for socialized housing project is a valid justification for public
purpose since housing is a basic need. The size of the area to be expropriated is not subject to question as long as it
satisfied the public purpose of expropriation. However, the court held that the petitioners were denied of due process
of law for being deprived of the conduct of hearing and notice upon its order for the immediate possession and
taking of the land by NHA.

EPZA v Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

appointment of commissioners to determine just compensation in expropriation

Facts: A land reserve was provided for the Export Processing Zone which some portion of the land is privately
owned by the respondents. Petitioner offered to purchase the land but both parties did not come to an agreement in
terms of the assessed value of the property. Petitioner files an expropriation case which the court decided in favor of
them and issued a writ of possession for the immediate possession of land subject to just compensation. Respondents
however are not amenable to the amount and thus the court appointed commissioners to determine the appropriate
property value. Petitioner now questions the appointment of commissioners to determine the value of property while
invoking PD No. 1533 that indicates the determination of just compensation is based on the declared value indicated
by the land owner and the assessor whichever is lower and there is no need to appoint commissioners for the
purpose of assessing the property value.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in appointing commissioners to the case at bar

Held: The court ruled that PD No. 1533 only serves as a guiding principle providing some considerations in the
determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. It does not substitute the discretion vested upon
the court to exercise in determining the fair and just compensation in expropriating property. The appointment of
commissioners is one way the court may determine the fair and just compensation in dispute for judicial evaluation.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissibleencroachment to judicial prerogatives. It

tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less
can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998

Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square
meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on
its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will
not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is
primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and
resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its
chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or
welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian
authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints,
imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the
LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution
of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized
through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the
people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to
ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an
LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain,
since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.

REPUBLIC (napocor) v Heirs of Borbon and CA

FACTS: In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered the property owned by the respondents heirs of Saturnino Borbon
located in Barangay San Isidro Batangas City, having a total area of 14,257 square meters. Said entrance was done
to construct and maintain transmission lines of the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission
Project. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Batangas only on May 26, 1995, seeking
the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property involving an area of 6,326 square
meters. NAPOCOR alleged that negotiations with the respondents were done and that no agreement was reached,
further, that it is willing to deposit P9,790.00, which represents the assessed value of the portion sought to be
appropriated. NAPOCOR prayed for a writ of possession so that it may enter and take control, to demolish
improvements and to construct transmission lines. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss countering that
NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that they entered without consent. Such
entrance destroyed fruits without payment, and that other portions of the land were also affected since the
transmission lines passed through the center the land thereby dividing the land into three lots. Further that the
presence of high tension transmission lines rendered the entire property inutile for future use. Respondents do not
object as long as just compensation is paid, not only to the portion directly affected but also to the entire property as
its value greatly diminished. Further, they raised the land is classified not agricultural but as industrial. 2
commissioners submitted a report indicating that said property was classified back in 1994 as Industrial land located
within industrial 2 zoning. They valued the land at P550.00 per square meter. While the third commissioners report
recommended a 10% easement fee of the assessed value on the tax declaration plus cost of damages. Respondents
objected by saying that NAPOCOR should compensate them at P550.00 per square meter and for the entire property.
NAPOCOR on the other hand submitted its objection saying that at the time of the taking, the land was still
classified as agricultural and that it should only compensate for the portion sought. RTC ruled ordering NAPOCOR
to compensate respondents for the entire property and applied recommendation of the two commissioners valuing
the land at P550.00/square meter. CA upon appeal of NAPOCOR affirmed RTC ruling but modified the coverage of
the payment to only 6,326 square meter. NAPOCOR appealed to SC. Pending appeal, on January 3, 2014
NAPOCOR filed a manifestation and motion to discontinue appropriation proceedings because property sought to
be expropriated is no longer necessary for public use. That the public purpose for which the property would be used
thereby ceased to exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation proceeding should continue.

HELD: Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the expropriation procedure is proper, but, must be upon such
terms as the court deems just and equitable. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is not unlimited, it has two
mandatory requirements which are; (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation is
paid. The court said that the element of public use must be maintained throughout the proceeding for absence of
which, the expropriator must return the property to the owner, if the latter so desires it, citing the case of Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v Lozada Sr. The court points out that NAPOCOR entered the property without
consent and without payment of just compensation. Neither was there any deposit as required by law. NAPOCOR
also destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, divided the property into 3 lots as its transmission lines
passed through the center of the property, thereby rendering the land inutile for future use, it would be unfair if
NAPOCOR will not be liable. There will be no payment of just compensation as there was no taking. Instead,
NAPOCOR should compensate respondents for the disturbance of their property rights at the time of the entry in
1993, by paying them actual or other compensatory damages.