Meralco v. ERC G.R. No.

145399 March 17, 2006

Facts:

On October 18, 1999, herein private respondent Edgar L. Ti, doing business under the name
and style ELT Enterprise, filed a verified complaint3 before the ERB against petitioner Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO). In it, Ti alleged inter alia that MERALCO unlawfully
disconnected partially the electric service in his business establishment located at Little
Baguio, San Juan, Metro Manila and seized three (3) of his electric meters on mere suspicion
of meter tampering. Aggravating the situation, Ti adds, was the fact that the notice of
disconnection was served at night, while the actual disconnection was not done in the
presence of the owner of ELT Enterprise or his representative. The unauthorized
disconnection, Ti claimed, has caused him great damage which, if not immediately
addressed, would result to irreparable injury. He thus prayed that pending hearing of his
complaint, docketed as ERB Case No. 99-67, electric service be restored in his
establishment.

In an Order dated October 22, 1999,4 the ERB, by way of provisional relief, ordered the
desired reconnection of electric service and, at the same, directed MERALCO to submit its
comment on the complaint.

On October 29, 1999, MERALCO moved for a reconsideration of the aforementioned

provisional reconnection order, alleging that an inspection conducted by its service
inspectors accompanied by elements of the Philippine National Police found Ti to have
tampered three (3) electric meters installed in his business premises by manipulating the
dial pointers thereof. The fraudulent act of Ti, according to MERALCO, constituted a violation
of R.A. No. 7832 legally warranting the immediate disconnection of the electric supply on his
establishment, as provided under Section 45 in relation to Section 66 thereof. MERALCO
further argued that the ERB is without jurisdiction to issue a provisional relief and order the
restoration of electric service, that authority being vested only on regular courts.

Issue: WON public respondent ERB has jurisdiction to order the reconnection of electric
service in cases arising from alleged violation of R. A. No. 7832.

Held: Yes.

Petitioner has evidently lost sight of Section 8 of E.O. No. 172 which explicitly vests on the
ERB, as an incident to its principal functions, the authority to grant provisional relief, thus:

SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. The [Energy Regulatory] Board may, upon the
filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior
hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional
relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final
decision after hearing

SEC. 13. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Commission shall have general
supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public utilities, and also over
their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises so far as may be
necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, and in the exercise of its
authority it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of the public force
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 22, 2000 is AFFIRMED.

KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ERB v. ERB & FE BARIN

Facts:

RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), was
enacted on 8 June 2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136 provides for
the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the ERC. On 5 November 2005, KERB sent a
letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB members objection to the Commissioners
stand that Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in the
selection and placement of the ERC employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish
the ERB or change the ERBs character as an economic regulator of the electric power
industry. KERB insisted that RA 9136 merely changed the ERBs name to the ERC and
expanded the ERBs functions and objectives

KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members, filed the present
petition on 20 December 2001. KERB later filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Enjoin
Termination of Petitioner ERB Employees on 2 January 2002. However, before the ERC
received KERBs pleadings, the Selection Committee already presented its list of proposed
appointees to the Commissioners.

Issue:

1. Whether Section 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional; and

2. Whether the Commissioners of the ERC were correct in disregarding and considering
merely suppletory in character the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB employees or
petitioner in this case

Held:

The petition has no merit.

All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach
of the Constitution.

The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There
should not be any controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself.
[7] Section 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and its
related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and
removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an
abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus,
impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the
abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related
positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions.
 Because of the expansion of the ERCs functions and concerns, there was a valid abolition of
the ERB. Thus, there is no merit to KERBs allegation that there is an impairment of the
security of tenure of the ERBs employees.

G.R. No. 144158 April 24, 2007

NPC EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION (NECU) vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC)

Facts:

On December 16, 1997, the NPB passed Resolution No. 97-293 approving NPCs Privatization
and Restructuring Program. This Program was to sustain the declared policy of the State to
restructure the power industry and privatize the NPC operations.

Petitioners alleged that the National Power Corporation (NPC), respondent, and the National
Power Board (NPB) committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing Resolutions, Circulars, and Orders allowing the privatization of NPCs assets and
restructuring NPC.

Petitioners claimed that as a result of the foregoing issuances, more than two thousand
(2,000) NPC employees have been dismissed or dislocated. This is in violation of the security
of tenure of civil service employees under Section 2 (3), Article IX-B of the Constitution and
pertinent civil service laws and regulations.

The petitioners, believing that the foregoing actions were an actual reorganization which
would result in the illegal dismissal of thousands of NPC employees, filed the instant petition
anchored on the grounds that the restructuring was without legislative authority and violates
the security of tenure of their employees. Meanwhile, on June 8, 2001, during the pendency
of this case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed R.A. No. 91367 into
law expressly authorizing the privatization of the assets of the NPC and its restructuring.

Issue: WON the privatization of the NPC was valid?

Held:

This issue has become moot and academic in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9136 which
took effect on June 26, 2001. We have ruled that a case is moot and academic when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits.8 Courts of justice are constituted to pass upon substantial rights.
Hence, they will not consider questions which are moot, as the resolution of the case will
have no practical use or value.9

R.A. No. 9136 has mandated not only the restructuring of the entire electric power industry,
but also the privatization of the NPC. This is clear from the following provisions of the law
Whether the States policy of privatizing the electric power industry is wise, just, or
expedient is not for this Court to decide. The formulation of State policy is a legislative
concern. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature.10

WHEREFORE, for being moot, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND

EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.), vs.
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM),

Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)
AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. AHEPPs main units built in 1967 and
1968, and 5 auxiliary units, form part of the Angat Complex which includes the Angat Dam,
Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.

On December 15, 2009, PSALMs Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for the
privatization of the AHEPP. An Invitation to Bid was published on January 11, 12 and 13, 2010
in three major national newspapers. Subject of the bid was the AHEPP consisting of 4 main
units and 3 auxiliary units with an aggregate installed capacity of 218 MW.

Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the
bidding it disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed under the
Constitution, as follows: There was no transparent bidding process, no terms and conditions
of the bid were released to the public, and no disclosure as to basic information of the
purpose of the bidding. As to the participation in the bidding of and award of contract to K-
Water which is a foreign corporation, petitioners contend that PSALM clearly violated the
constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water as a natural resource,
as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens
and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.

PSALM contends that the sale of AHEPP to K-Water did not violate the Constitutions
provision on the States natural resources and neither is the ruling in Manila Prince Hotel
applicable as said case was decided under different factual circumstances. It reiterates that
the AHEPP, being a generation asset, can be sold to a foreign entity, under the EPIRA, in
accordance with the policy reforms said law introduced in the power sector

Issue: WON the AHEPPs privatization was mandatory under EPIRA?

Held:

Yes. Under Sec. 47 of the EPIRA titled NPC privatization, subsection (d) states that all assets
of NPC shall be sold in an open and transparent manner through public bidding. The intent of
Congress not to exclude the AHEPP from the privatization of NPC generation assets is
evident from the express provision exempting only the aforesaid two power plants in
Mindanao.

Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing laws. The
construction, rehabilitation and development of hydropower plants are among those
infrastructure projects which even wholly-owned foreign corporations are allowed to
undertake under the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718).

The bidding conducted and the Notice of Award issued by PSALM in favor of the winning
bidder, KOREA WATER RESOURCES CORPORATION (K-WATER), are declared VALID and LEGAL;

Neptali v. ERC

Neptali Franco and Melinda Ocampo (Ocampo), former chairpersons of the ERB, and Artemio
Magabo, Bernarda Lavisores, Nicomedes Deynata, Alberto Dosayla and Marietta Larracas,
former members of the ERB (collectively referred to as the petitioners), retired under
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 172 which created the said body on May 8, 1987.

Subsequently, on June 8, 2001, R.A. No. 9136 was passed to reform and restructure the
electric power industry and privatize the National Power Corporation (NPC). It abolished the
ERB and created the ERC as an independent regulatory body vested with quasi-judicial,
quasi-legislative and administrative functions to oversee the electric industry. In addition to
ERB's traditional functions to regulate electric rates and services, the ERC focuses on two
primary responsibilities: (1) to ensure consumer education and protection; and (2) to
promote competitive operations in the electricity market.

The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus before the CA wherein they sought to compel
the ERC and the DBM to adjust their monthly pensions. The petitioners argued-that, as
retired members of the ERB, they are entitled to the retirement benefits provided in Section
39 of R.A. No. 9136, in relation to Section 2-A of R.A. No. 1568, wherein The Chairman and
the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming eligible for
retirement under existing laws shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and
privileges provided for the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.

After the denial of their letter-request for pension adjustment, the petitioners filed the
petition for mandamus in the CA to compel the ERC and the DBM to adjust and release their
monthly pensions to keep up with the salary levels of the ERC Chairman and Members. On
May 13, 2010, the CA Special 2nd Division dismissed the petition for lack of legal basis.

Issue:
WON THERE IS NO LAW GRANTING THE PETITIONERS THE RIGHT TO RETIREMENT PENSIONS
EQUIVALENT TO THE PRESENT SALARIES OF THE CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE ERC.

Held: The petition is bereft of merit.

R.A. No. 9136 has expressly abolished the ERB. Section 38 provides:

Sec. 38. Creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission. - There is hereby created an
independent, quasi-judicial regulatory body to be named the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC). For this purpose, the existing Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) created under Executive
Order No. 172, as amended, is hereby abolished.

Moreover, while the retirement benefits provided under E.O. No. 172 may appear to be
inconsistent with those provided under R.A. No. 9136, emphasis is laid that the inconsistency
relates only to what the retirement benefits shall consist of, and not to the grant or
readjustment of the same per se.

Clearly, nowhere does R.A. No. 9136 extend to the retired ERB Chairman and Members the
retirement benefits it grants to the ERC Chairman and Members. Section 39 of R.A. No. 9136
specifically provides only for the retirement benefits of the ERC Chairman and Members.