ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

Facts:

Victim Cantre and Sanano, together with two other companions had a
drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten o'clock in the morning of February 4, 1996.
Thereafter, they decided to part ways and went to their respective houses. On their
way home, Cantre and Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre
suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the one
responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night. After being hit,
bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as man's fist, ran
toward Cantre, and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back. When
Cantre turned his attention to the petitioner, Sanano tried pacify the two. Both
Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. When Cantre arrived at
his house, he complained of the pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the
stone. At that night, he again complained of backache and also of stomachache. He's
condition immediately became worst, and at around three o'clock in the following
morning, Cantre died.

Right after his death, Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer and made a findings that the cause of death was cardio-
respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the Cantre family
requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim by the NBI. Dr.
Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that the cause of the
death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. The victim suffered from an internal
hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity
due to his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.
Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but the latter
refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. When he saw the victim was about to stab
Bulalacao, he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to
hit the victim. He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense of his
companion.

The RTC rendered a decision, which was later affirmed by the CA, holding that
petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a stone
from behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony which
caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is criminally liable for all the
direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had
not been intended. Hence, these case.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim and thus liable for
homicide?
Decision:

While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and
the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim
Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the CA as
to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner
should have been convicted for.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the

means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2)
culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by
the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender.

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the

language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The
offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to
cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. In the Petition at bar,
this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner any malicious intent to
injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this
Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime
of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution did not establish that
petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of
killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this
Court was petitioner Calimutan's intention to drive away the attacker who was, at
that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as
earlier described, much younger and
smaller in built than the victim Cantre.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts:

This is a case filed against Eduardo Manuel for bigamy by Tina B. Gandalera.
Complainant allege that she met the petitioner in Dagupan City sometime in
January 1996. When he visited her in Baguio, as one thing led to another, they
went to a motel where, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Petitioner
proposed marriage and even brought his parents to assure that he is single. Tina
finally accepted the marriage proposal and they were married on April 22, 1996. In
their marriage contract, it appeared that Eduardo is "single". However, their happy
relationship turns into a disaster, Manuel started making himself scarce and went
to their house only twice or thrice a year. One day, petitioner took all of his cloths,
left and never returned. Out of curiousity, Tina went to NSO in Manila where she
found out that petitioner had been previously married to Rubylus Gana. She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when they exchanged their own vows.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he informed Tina of his previous marriage,
but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. He abandoned her when he noticed that
she had a "love-bite" on her neck, suspecting it that it come from another man.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract
with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He
did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina.. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. After
trial, the court rendered judgment finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy. It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not
exculpate him from liability for bigamy and that even if the private complainant had
known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA maintaining
his contentions. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was
not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so
only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. Hence, these case.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has criminal intent to contract on the second
marriage to be liable for bigamy?

4
Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
married to Gana in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity;
hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the
Family Code. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is
not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. lgnorantia legis
neminem excusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded
belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a
competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good
faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist
without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act
without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act
or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed
by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of
his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.

5
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Defendant herein a chinese man named Ah Chong is employed us a cook at

Fort Mckinley. At that time there were rumours and accounts of frequent robbing
of homes in the area. On the night of the killing, Ah chong before going to bed, and
afraid of the rumoured robberies taking place in the vicinity locked himself in their
room by placing wooden blocks and chairs for the purpose of thwarting robbers in
case they tried to rob him.

After having gone to bed, he was awakened by the noise of someone

trying to open the door. Ah Chong for his part called out twice, "Who is there, but to
no avail". Fearing that the person trying to enter was robber Ah Chong leaped from
his bed and shouted "If you enter the room I will kill you". But at that precise
moment, he was suddenly struck by the chair that he had placed in the door, and
believing that he was being attacked he seized a knife and struck it on the
supposed assailant/robber, who was killed by the blow. However the deceased was
not a robber not intruder it turned out that the person was his roommate, trying
to enter their room.

Issue:

Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable?

Decision:

NO. Ah Chong must be acquitted on the basis of honest mistake of fact.

Where the facts been as Ah Chong perceived them to be, he would have been
justified in killing the intruder under Article 11 of the Revised, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides for a valid self-defense of his person. If the
intruder was indeed a robber, forcing his way to enter the room, unlawful aggression
would be present. Also the necessity means to avoid or to repel the attack would
be reasonable. Using the knife to defend himself. And lastly Ah Chong gave no
provocation at all to warrant such aggression. The Supreme Court Held that there
is nothing unlawful in the intention as well in the act of Ah Chong, his act would not
have been a felony if the real scenario was the facts he believed them to be.

6
EDUARDO P. DIEGO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint filed against herein respondent for

Gross ignorance of the law in rendering his decision in a criminal complaint for
bigamy. On 1965 Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio Jr. Both of
which were Filipino Citizens. However on February 15, 1978 the two acquired a
Decree of Divorce in Texas, USA. On June 4, 1987 the same Lucena Escoto contracted
marriage with herein complainants brother Manule P. Diego, celebrated at Dagupan.
Judge Castillo held in this case the acquittal of Ms. Escoto on the basis of good
faith on her part. That Ms. Escoto believing that her previous marriage had been
validly dissolved by the divorce decree acquired in a foreign country and that she
was legally free to contract the second marriage. That according to Judge Castillo
as an ordinary laywoman , she entertains the impression that she can contract a
subsequent marriage. Furthermore Judge Castillo stressed that knowledge of the
law should not be exacted strictly from her since she is a lay person, and that
ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

Issue:

Whether or not mistake of fact to cut-off the criminal liability of Ms. Escoto
was validly taken up by Judge Castillo?

Decision:

No. As carefully distinguished by the Supreme Court in its previous decisions

that mistake of fact, which would could be a valid defense of good faith in a bigamy
case, from mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from
liability. In People vs. Bidtu the Supreme Court held that even if the accused, who
had obtained a divorce decree under Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that
in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of law,
and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify the her act. The
Court further that it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one doe not know that his act constitutes a violation of law
does not exempt him from the consequence thereof.

7
8
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The residents of Barrio of Municahan of the Municipality of Zamboanga were

alarmed by the presence of 3 suspicious looking persons prowling around the town,
suspecting them as moro prisoners who recently escaped from Jail.

Fernando the accused herein was a policeman, when passing in front of the
house of Remigio Delgado he was called by the latters daughter and said to him that
her father wanted to talk to him. Remigio told Fernando that 3 unknown and
suspicious looking fellows were prowling around the house, dressed in blue same as
those purportedly worn by the escapees. Fernando stayed in the house talking to the
daughter of Remigio,, both seated in a bench near the window. At about 7 o'clock
in the evening , there appeared a figure in the dark about 4 meters from the
stairs, a person in dark clothes, calling Mang Miong. Fernando and the daughter of
Remegio had no idea who was calling. Fernando asked the man what he wanted but
instead of answering the question the man continued to the walk with bolo in hand.
Fernando upon seeing this took out his revolver and fired a warning shot. Thereafter
having fired a shot into the air the man continued his ascend to the stairs, Fernando
took a shot at him. However it was found out that the unknown man was
Buenaventura Paulino, nephew of Remigio. The trial court held that Fernando was
guilty of the crime of murder. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Fernando is criminally liable for his acts?

Decision:

Yes. But not for the crime of murder. The accused being agent of the law, to
whom notice was given of the presence of the suspicious looking persons who might
be the escapees. The appearance of a man unknown to him, dressed in
clothes as that of the escaped convicts, and calling to the owner of the house, of
which the daughter of the owner of the house did not also recognized, caused the
accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the escaped convicts, and
after firing a warning shot, the man still did not halt his advance with bolo in hand.
In the midst of the circumstances and believing that the man was a wrongdoer he
tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the allege intruder.
At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were
at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation. However,
a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a
friend but a relative when the man called "Nong Miong, and in not asking the
daughter of the owner of the house who was it who was calling to her father with
such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used
before talking such fatal action. Hence he is liable for homicide through reckless
negligence.
Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052

Mala in se v. Mala prohibita

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560)

Facts:

Petitioner Former President Joseph Estrada was prosecuted for a crime of

violation of RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659. Thus, he questions the constitutionality of the said Law. One
of the issues that was raised in the petition is whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080
is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to
so classify it.

Issue:

Whether or not Plunder is a crime malum prohibitum?

Decision:

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense

implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral
or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. BIg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.
 Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052

People v. Go Shiu Ling (G.R. No. 115156)

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finds accused-appellant Antonio Comia
guilty of conspiring with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of Art. III,
Section 14 in relation to Article IV, Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act
No. 6425, as amended).

Issue:

Whether or not a crime for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is a crime

malum prohibitum?

Decision:

Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminal
responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is a malum prohibitum. Lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. As held inPeople
v. Lo Ho Wing:
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a "malum prohibitum" because
it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is
prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a
wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense
punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.
Likewise, in People v. Bayona, it was held:
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those
mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must
be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime
and the intent to perpetrate to act."
Luis Celestino 2006-0354

Art. 4: Criminal Liability

Wrongful Act Done be Different from That Intended

Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)

Facts:

On Nov. 13,1995, Dante Andres and Randyven Pacheco invited Wilson Quinto
and Edison Garcia to go fishing with them inside a drainage culvert.
However, only Quinto joined the two, Garcia remain in a grassy area about two meters
from the entrance of the drainage system. After a while, Pacheco came out, went back
again, and emerged again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid the boy's
lifeless body down in the grassy area and went to the house of Wilson's mother and
informed her that her son had died. After more than three months, the cadaver of
Wilson was exhumed and the NBI performed an autopsy thereon. An information was
later filed with the RTC changing Andres and Pacheco with homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused has criminal liability for the death of the victim?

Decision:

The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It failed to prove the guilt of the accused is criminality liable although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The Supreme Court
agreed with the trial and appellate courts that the proximate cause of the death of the
victim was not cause by any wrongful act of the accused. It is the burden of the
prosecution to prove the corps delicti which consists of criminal act and the
defendant's agency in the commission of the act. This, the prosecution failed to do.
 Luis Celestino 2006-0354

People v. Ortega (276 SCRA 166)

Facts :

In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe were
changed with murder for the killing Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated by a witness,
the victim answered the called of nature and went to the back portion of the house
where they were having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him and later they
heard the victim shouting for help and when they ran towards the scene he saw the
accused on top of the victim and stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon.
Thereafter, Ortega and Garcia brought the victim to a well and dropped him and
placed stones into the well. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused appealed averring that the trial court erred in holding them
criminally liable because at the time the victim was dropped into the well, he was still
alive.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the
victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?

Decision:

A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct natural and
logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more
serious than that intended. The essential requisites for this criminal liability to attach
are as follows :

1. the intended act is felonious ;

2. the resulting act is likewise a felony; and

3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor's wrongful acts.
Luis Celestino 2006-0354

People v. Pilda (405 SCRA 134)

Facts:

Accused Edman Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba and Rene Pilola were changed with
murder for the death of Joselito Capa. Rene Pilola devised stabbing the victim and
interposed the defense of alibi. The trial count found all the accused guilty and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Rene Pilola appealed the decision by
contending that there was no conspiracy and he may not be held criminally liable as
principal by direct participation. He argued that the prosecution failed to prove that he
conspined with the others in stabbing the victim to death. He asserts that he is merely
an accomplice.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant may be held criminally liable as principal by direct
participation in the absence of proof of conspiracy?

Decision:

The court in applying paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code ruled
that even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder,
they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform
overt acts which immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. They are all
criminally liable although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.

22
Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388

Impossible Crimes

People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245)

Facts:

In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate
along Roque Street in Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man (Domasian) who
requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical
certificate.Enrico agreed to help and rode with Domasian in a tricycle to
Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of
taking him to the hospital, Domasian flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. Domasian told him to stop crying or he would not be
returned to his father.

Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed

to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the driver got
suspicious and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. The tanods went after
the two, Somehow, Domasian managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico
was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding
in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.

At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra
received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for
the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought
the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in
the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination.The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.

Issue:

Whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime?
Decision:

No. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery
of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense,
which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.

Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act
of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its
delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and
geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective
Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388

Intod v. CA (215 SCRA 52)

Facts:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig

went to Mandaya's house in Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go
with them to the house of Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room.It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied
by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Issue:

Whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime?

Decision:

Yes. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical

impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment and
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the
act an impossible crime.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be
by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either

2S l P a g e
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an
impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime.Factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category.

In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of

accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of
the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted

Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent
of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as
an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.
Melencio S. Faustino 2008-0094

Art. 6: Stages of Execution

People v. Campuhan(G.R. No. 129433)

Facts:

On April 25, 1996 at around 4pm while Ma. Corazon Pamintuan was
downstairs busy preparing drinks for her two daughters, she heard Crysthel, one of
her daughters crying, "Ayo'ko, Ayo'ko" prompting her to rush upstairs. Thereupon,
she saw Primo inside her children's room kneeling in front of her four-year old
daughter, whose pajamas were already removed, while his short pants were down
to his knees.

Primo was apprehended and was charged with statutory rape.

The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to the extreme penalty of
death. In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the
testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees
kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already
removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina."

Issue:

Is Primo guilty of Consummated rape?

Decision:

Judgment modified into attempted rape.

In People vs. Dela Pena, the SC clarified that the decisions finding a case for
rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the external portions of the female
genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis
capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a
limp of flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into
the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the
basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to
insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her
pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the
accused touched the middle part of her vagina.

Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the
penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this
case.

There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched
the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the
labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural
situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with
the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape.

Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-
quoted "touching of the female organ," but has also progressed into being described
as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum," or "the
bombardment of the drawbridge." But to the SC's mind, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or a "strafing of the citadel
of passion."

Under Art.6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only of attempted
rape - are present in the instant case; hence, the accused should be punished only
for it.
Melencio S. Faustino 2008-0094

Valenzuela v. People (G.R. No. 160188)

Facts:

Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were charged with the crime of
theft.

On 19 May1994, Valenzuela and Calderon were seen outside the Super Sale
Club inside the SM Complex along North Edsa by Lorenzo Lago, SM Security
Guard. Valenzuela was hauling a push cart with cases of Tide detergent and
unloaded these cases of Tide in an open parking space where Calderon was
waiting. Valenzuela went inside the supermarket again and came back with more
cases of detergent.

Thereafter, Valenzuela left the parking lot and haled a taxi. He boarded the
cab and told the driver to go to the area where Calderon was waiting. Calderon
loaded the cases of Tide and boarded the taxi. Lago saw all of this and
proceeded to stop the taxi. When Lago asked for a receipt of the merchandise,
the two accused reacted by fleeing on foot. Valenzuela and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene.

Valenzuela and Calderon were both convicted by the trial court of

consummated theft.

It was only Valenzuela who filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the
time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, hence, this Petition
for Review.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty only of frustrated theft?

Decision:

Petition dismissed. Under the statutory definition of theft, free disposal of the
stolen items is not a constitutive element of theft.

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of theft is defined as
follows. "Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without force
or violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the
property of another without the latter's consent xxx"

On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by
the actor involved in theft - the taking of personal property of another. It is also
clear from the definition that in order such taking may be qualified as theft, there
must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with
intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of
persons; and is was without the consent of the owner of the property.

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commissions in

the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced?
There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property due to to its taking by one with intent to
gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony
that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is
able or unable to freely disposed of the property stolen since the deprivation from
the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.

Indeed the SC, after all, held that unlawful taking is deemed complete
from the moment of the offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.
Melencio S. Faustino 2008-0094

People v. Orita (G.R. No. 88724)

Facts:

In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year old
freshman student at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house from a
party. All of a sudden, appellant held her and poked a knife to her neck.
Appellant dragged complainant up the stairs and with the Batangas knife still
poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.

After removing his clothes and ordering her to remove hers, the appellant
began to rape the complainant. However as they were in a position where he
continued to poke the knife to her, appellant could not fully penetrate her.

Upon changing positions, the complainant managed to dash into the next
room. However, the appellant chased her until she jumped out of a window and ran
to a nearby municipal building where two policemen were on duty. Upon being
told what happened, the policemen rushed to the boarding house, however, they
failed to apprehend appellant.

The complainant was brought to a hospital where she was examined. The
medical Certificate stated Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude findings: "No visible abrasions or
marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted
surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact;"

The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape and the
Solicitor General shares the same view.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated
rape was committed by the accused.

Decision:

The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rapeand sentenced to reclusion perpetua.There is no debate that rape can be
attempted and consummated. Our concern now is whether or not the crime of
rape can be frustrated. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator's will.

In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished (consummated). In the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction.

In the case of People v. Erina, We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape
there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended
party. However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been
reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is
attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a
dead provision.

There was no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the

victim, but neither was it ruled out. However the medical certificate stated that the
vulva was erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin
due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. However, Dr. Zamora's
(in place of Dr Abude) testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable
element in the prosecution of this case. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may
be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible.
Jaypee Garcia 2007-0280

Art. 8: Conspiracy

People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509)

Facts:

On December 4, 1993, in celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a

"benefit disco dance" was held at the local UCMA Village. Appellants, Juanito and
Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, attended.

At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the
night with some friends. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution
principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was
asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home.

Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would just follow. Wilson was
behind them at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms when the group passed by the
house of Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in front
of his house and frisk them.

Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of
handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug,
Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they
proceeded to the airport runway.

Wilson, hidden behind a bush, said he could hear Benjamin plead for his life. A
few seconds later, Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot
Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged
down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel while
Juanito started stabbing him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting
Roel.

The lower court and Court of Appeals find that there was conspiracy and
convicting them despite their defense of alibi.

Issue:
Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing facts?

Decision:

Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to

commit the crime.Neither it is necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit
and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a
common purpose and design. The conspiracy in the instant case was sufficiently
proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and walking
together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed performed acts in
unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common purpose and design.

Anent Mario's defense of alibi, despite corroboration from Exequiel Aranas, it

is still an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive identification
from a witness found credible by the trial court. Absent arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of significance and influence, we will not interfere with
the credence given to the testimony of Wilson over that of Mario and that of Exequiel,
as assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial court whose proximate
contact with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent
position to discriminate between true and false testimony. Moreover, as correctly
discussed by the Court of Appeals, the distance between the scene of the crimes and
where Mario claims he passed out is not so far away as to prevent him from being
physically present at the place of the crimes or its immediate vicinity at the time the
crimes were committed.
Jaypee Garcia 2007-0280

People v. Comadre (431 SCRA 366)

Facts:

At around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy

Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree
on the terrace of the house of Robert's father, Barangay Councilman Jaime
Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog
was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the
companions of his son.

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in
front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an
object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the
fence of a nearby school.

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the
roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat
and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.

The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of
throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on
without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist
him. The trial court held that the mere presence of George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano provided encouragement and a sense of security to Antonio Comadre, thus
proving the existence of conspiracy.

Issue:

Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing facts?

Decision:

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish
conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval
of an illegal act is required.

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must

be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a
conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their
mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with
Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no
positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Jaypee Garcia 2007-0280

Sim v. CA (428 SCRA 459)

Facts:

Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire supplier. He had been

dealing with accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is engaged in
the same business of selling tires and rims.

In March 1998, private complainant talked to Elison and expressed his

interest in buying a vehicle. Elison told him that he knew someone who sells
vehicles at a cheap price, and that he had bought a Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower
than the market price. Private complainant then asked Elison to ask if there was
an Isuzu pick-up for sale. A month later, Elison called private complainant to
inform him that he was able to find a 1997 Nissan Pathfinder. They agreed to
inspect the vehicle together.

On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to Dagupan City to get the Nissan
Pathfinder from his friend, petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Elison that
the Nissan Pathfinder was given to him by a customer in payment of a debt and
had been used only for a year.

Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to San Pablo City. Private
complainant at first did not like the vehicle since it was not the brand he
was looking for. Elison said that his kumpadre would look at the vehicle as the
latter was also interested in it.

Private complainant decided to buy the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder at the

agreed price of P480,000.00. The amount was paid in five checks issued by Fe
Ilagan. One check was dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of P350,000.00, and four
checks in the sum of P32,500.00 each was dated June 6, July 6, August 6 and
September 6, all in 1998.

Elison gave private complainant photocopies of the Certificate of

Registration (C.R.) and Official Receipt (O.R.) issued by the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) showing the name of the owner as one Henry Austria. After a week,
Elison brought the deed of sale which private complainant signed without the
signature of the owner, Henry Austria. After private complainant signed the deed of
sale, he gave it back to Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the
owner/vendor and transfer of registration in the name of private complainant.

On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to private complainant the

deed of sale signed by the owner/vendor, together with the new C.R. and O.R.
issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the name of private complainant. The
checks given by private complainant in payment of the vehicle were deposited by
petitioner in his name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five checks were debited in
favor of petitioner. After receiving the registration papers from Elison, private
complainant was eventually able to use the Nissan Pathfinder.

On October 28, 1998, private complainants vehicle was apprehended by Anti-

Carnapping operatives of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR NCRTMO). The vehicle
and its registration papers were inspected and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. It
turned out that the vehicle was a "hot car."

Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged and convicted with estafa.
Further the court also ruled that conspiracy is present. With this, the accused
appealed.

Issue:

Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner and Elison Villaflor in

defrauding private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan?

Decision:

Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the

crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before,
during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common
design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Conspiracy is deemed
implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its
execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the
moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal
responsibility.
 In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be
established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown as clearly
as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need not be shown by direct
evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would
conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and
decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation.

As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioners actions in relation

to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant clearly
established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts transcend mere
knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison. Notwithstanding the fact that it was
only Elison who dealt with or personally transacted with private complainant until the
time the sale was consummated, by his own testimony petitioner admitted all the
acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the
fraud upon private complainant. That petitioner is a conspirator having joint criminal
design with Elison is evident from the fact that as between them, both knew that
petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the false pretense that a certain
Henry Austria was the registered owner.Petitioner, together with Elison, clearly
deceived private complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of
P480,000.00, to the latter's damage and prejudice. In addition, the acts of
petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting himself to private complainant as having
the necessary authority to possess and sell to the latter the vehicle so that he could
collect from him P480,000.00 only to renege on that promise and for failure to
reimburse the said amount he collected from private complainant, despite demand,
amount to estafa punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Shaun Jayoma 2005-0016

Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances

Self-defense

People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 161007)

Facts:

Sanchez's account of the facts shows that he and Jamero were tenants of
adjacent lots located in San Jose, Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 7:00
o'clock in the morning of September 4, 1993, Sanchez saw Jamero destroying the
dike which served as the boundary between the two lots. Sanchez confronted Jamero
and told the latter that he was encroaching on his land. Jamero struck him with a
shovel. The shovel got stuck in the mud so Jamero resorted to throwing mud at
Sanchez. Fighting back, Sanchez hacked Jamero with a bolo, resulting in the latter's
death. Sanchez then proceeded to the municipal building to surrender upon the
advice of his son-in-law.

According to the OSG, Jamero's attack on Sanchez was unsuccessful

because the latter was able to evade it and Jamero's shovel got stuck in the mud.
Jamero fled toward the ricefield when Sanchez unsheathed his bolo. Sanchez
pursued him and struck his head with a bolo. Jamero fell down but was able to
stand up again. He ran away but after a short distance, fell down again. Sanchez
approached him and stabbed him several times. Not satisfied, Sanchez pushed
Jamero's face down into the knee-deep mud. After Jamero's aggression ceased when
he fled and left his shovel stuck in the mud, there was no longer any
justification for Sanchez to go after him and hack him to death.

Issue:

Whether or not unlawful aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute

aggression warranting self-defense?

Decision:

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the accused

proves the first essential requisite-unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person - a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not sufficient. There must be actual physical force or a
threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and
positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury.
Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-
defense.

In this case, the twin circumstances of Jamero's shovel getting stuck in the mud
and his running away from Sanchez convincingly indicate that there was no longer
any danger to the latter's life and limb which could have justified his pursuit of
Jamero and subsequent hacking and killing of the latter.

Sanchez's failure to prove unlawful aggression by Jamero and the

prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that it was Sanchez who was the
unlawful aggressor completely discounts Sanchez's claim of self-defense. Even
incomplete self-defense by its very nature and essence would always require the
attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be
shown.
Shaun Jayoma 2005-0016

Soplente v. People (G.R. No. 152715)

Facts:

The cousins, Rogelio and Nicanor, watched the amateur singing contest being
held near the Sta. Cruz Chapel. While engrossed with the singing contest, they were
approached by two persons from the group of Leyson who then tapped Nicanor's
shoulder. They insisted on bringing Nicanor along with them so Nicanor called for
Rogelio's help. The latter immediately intervened to stop the two from harassing
Nicanor.

At about past eleven o'clock in the evening (11:00 p.m.), before the conclusion
of the amateur singing contest, Rogelio and Nicanor decided to go home. At past
midnight, Bukay (their cousin's wife) asked Rogelio and Nicanor to accompany her in
looking for her children who had watched the singing contest. They obliged but
before they had gone about three hundred meters, Nicanor separated from them
to buy cigarettes from a nearby store. Rogelio and Bukay went onwards but at a
distance of about fifty meters from the stage, Rogelio stopped and Bukay
proceeded alone to look for her children. A few minutes later, Bukay appeared with
the children and they all headed home.

While on the way home, Rogelio suddenly found himself surrounded by

around ten persons led by Leyson. He shouted at Nicanor to run and the latter
immediately scampered away. Leyson drew his gun and fired at Rogelio but the
latter was able to parry it by tapping the base of Leyson's hand holding the gun.
Forthwith, Rogelio stabbed Leyson once. He was kicked by Notarte immediately after
he stabbed Leyson. Rogelio also stabbed Notarte. Rogelio managed to escape
after that and he sought refuge in the house of Susing (their cousin).

Before dawn, a policeman arrived at Susing's house and Rogelio voluntarily

gave himself up. The knife he used was also turned over to the police. He was
brought to the police substation at Lagao.
Issue:

Whether or not our laws on self-defense are suppose to approximate the

natural human responses to danger.

Decision:

At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio could not have been obliged to
view Notarte, or any other member of the posse for that matter, as a less
menacing threat than Leyson. We have to understand that these events occurred
spontaneously in a matter of seconds or even simultaneously. Rogelio bore no
superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent the events from unfolding at
virtual warp speed, to be able to assess with measured certainty the appropriate
commensurate response due to each of his aggressors. Even those schooled in the
legal doctrines of self-defense would, under those dire circumstances, be barely
able to discern the legally defensible response and immediately employ the same.
Our laws on self-defense are supposed to approximate the natural human
responses to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient rulebook based on which we
should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril.

It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have discerned the appropriate

calibrated response to Notarte's kicking when he himself was staring at the evil eye
of danger. That would be a gargantuan demand even for the coolest under pressure.
Shaun Jayoma 2005-0016

Urbano v. People (G.R. No. 182750)

Facts:

Petitioner Urbano testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993, in

the nearby town of Bugallon for a picnic. He was with Tomelden and several others,
including Dominador Navarro, Chairperson of Lingayen Water District. At a restaurant
in Bugallon, the group ordered goat's meat and drank beer. When it was time to
depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then seated in another table, to
prepare to leave.

When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had no

business stopping him from further drinking as he was paying for his share of the
bill. Chastised, petitioner returned to his table to report to Navarro. At that time,
petitioner saw that Tomelden had already consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the
group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half hours before returning to the
LIWAD. Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and
hurled insults at him, calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his employment as
Navarro's tricycle driver. Tomelden allegedly then delivered several fist and kick
blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions. Petitioner
maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing that lucky punch in
the course of parrying the latter's blows.

Thereafter, Tomelden went to the hospital several times complaining of

dizziness, headache, and other pains. The last time he went to the hospital,
things turned for the worst. Tomelden died due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

Orje Salazar, their co-worker, attests to the provocative acts of Tomelden and
to his being the aggressor.

Issue:

Whether or not the victim's insulting remarks directed at the accused, and
uttered immediately before the fist fight constitute sufficient provocation?
Decision:

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as

an essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is
not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation
must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should
immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1)
when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if
provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was
sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or
(4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not
proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and

uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not
to mention other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having
beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
Ray Nagrampa Jr. B. 2008-0061

Defense of Relatives

Balunuecov. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968)

Facts:

On May 2, 1982 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening Amelia Iguico saw
accused Reynaldo, his father Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed
Balunueco, and one Armando Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico.
With the five (5) individuals in hot pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of
Amelia's house. Meanwhile Senando went out of the house fully unaware of the
commotion going on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention
on him and gave chase. Senando instinctively fled towards the fields but Reynaldo,
Ricardo, and Armando cornered him and ganged up on him. To shield him from
further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but it was not enough to
detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg.

In his defense, accused Ricardo invoke defense of relatives. He testified that

at that time he was fetching water he heard somebody shout. When he hurried
to the place, he saw his brother Ramon embracing Senando who was continuously
hacking Reynaldo. Thereafter, Senando shoved Ramon to the ground and as if further
enraged by the intrusion, he turned his bolo on the fallen Ramon. Ricardo screamed,
"tama na yan, mga kapatid ko 'yan." But the assailant would not be pacified as he
hacked Ramon on the chest. At this point, Servando, the brother of Senando, threw
an axe at him but Reynaldo picked it up and smashed Senando with it.

The trial court found the accused guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide.
According to the trial court, the denial of Ricardo was self-serving and calculated to
extricate himself from the predicament he was in. Further, the trial court added that
the wounds allegedly received by Ricardo in the hands of the victim, Senando
Iguico, if at all there were any, did not prove that Senando was the aggressor for
the wounds were inflicted while Senando was in the act of defending himself from
the aggression of Ricardo and his co-conspirators.
 The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo with
modification that his conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, should be for
attempted homicide only.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid defense of relatives?

Decision:

Petitioner invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives under Art.

11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code. The essential elements of this justifying
circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the provocation was
given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein.

Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a

condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In
order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary
that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the
intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening
or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is
punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it
was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative. It has always been so
recognized in the decisions of the courts, in accordance with the provisions of the
Penal Code.

Having admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has the burden of proving
these elements by clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
prosecution evidence is weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has admitted
the killing.

In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient

proof of the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the
deceased Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there is
nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando.
Justiniano Quiza 2008-0290

Fulfilment of a Duty

Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)

Facts:

On July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the evening, a certain Liberty Contreras was
heard shouting, "Magnanakaw.Magnanakaw." Several residents responded and
thereupon chased the suspect who entered the yard of Antonio Abacan and
proceeded to the rooftop of Abacan's house.

At about 9:00 o'clock that same evening, the desk officer of the
Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a telephone call that a robbery-
holdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, immediately contacted and dispatched to
the scene the crew including herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun. With the
permission of Abacan, petitioner Mamangun, and two others went to the rooftop
of the house whereat the suspect was allegedly taking refuge.

The three policemen, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the
rooftop. There, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At that
instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his
handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras
(Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect.

Contreras died from the gunshot wound.

Issue:

Whether or not the shooting in question was done in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office?

Decision:

No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5,

Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense
successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and

(2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police

officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the
crime was in accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof that the
shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from criminal
liability.

To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely

justify the petitioner's firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as
one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then in progress, was
performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the
arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit
the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying
circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Justiniano Quiza 2008-0290

Baxinela v. People (G.R. No. 149652)

Facts:

Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a pub drinking with two other
policemen in as early as 11:00 p.m. of October 18, 1996. At around 12:00 a.m.
to 12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between the deceased Sgt. Lajo
and another customer at the pub but eventually the two were able to patch
things up. While on his way out, Lajo was followed by Braxinela with a gun
already drawn out. From behind, Baxinela held Lajo's left arm and asked why he
was carrying a gun. Thereafter an explosion coming from Baxinela's gun was
heard. Lajo, still standing, took two steps and then
fell down.

Issue:

Whether or not fulfilment of duty may validly be invoked by the petitioner?

Decision:

No. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that:

1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of

a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly
lacking. Baxinela's duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun
tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing
when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety,
edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by
firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be
considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious
threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.The Court will,
however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as
a privileged mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was
held that if the first condition is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69
of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower than one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.
Angcaco v. People (G.R. No. 146664)

Facts:

At around 4 o'clock in the morning of September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and
his brother Noel Bergante and his cousin Freddie Ganancial were awakened by the
sound of gunfire while they were asleep in their house. Petitioner John Angcaco
and his co-accused were serving a warrant of arrest issued on Restituto Bergante,
who was wanted in connection with a robbery case. Noel informed the policemen that
his father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. One of them
ordered the men in the house to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and
later called Noe to also come out of the house. Noe and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial,
did as bidden.

Once they were outside the house, Noe and Freddie were flanked by
petitioner Angcaco on the right side and accused Ramon Decosto on the left side.
Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and warned them not to run. Noe and
Freddie joined Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, "You are
tough," and pushed him. Then, shots rang out from the armalite and short firearm
of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which Freddie Ganancial turned around and
dropped to the ground face down.

Issue:

Whether or not the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty is

applicable in this case?

Decision:

No. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be

established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such right or office.
 In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the
arrest of Restituto Bergante. The standard procedure in making an arrest was, first,
to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee
and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee
under custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in
furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that
Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting
Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie
Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest
the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As
regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie
Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto
Bergante.
Alexander Santos 2006-0205

Obedience to an Order

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 103501-03)

Facts:

Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of

malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in the total amount of P55
Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their
incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively,
of MIAA.

Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to
the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it."
About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 reiterating in
black and white such verbal instruction, directed to pay immediately the Philippine
National Construction Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account
with said Company signed by the then President Marcos.

In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum,

Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of
MIAA funds

The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and

Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal
procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the
disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the
P55 Million was presented.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners' defense of good faith is tenable?

Decision:

Yes. It is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for

malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.To
constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or
to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There
can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was
what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he
had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue
otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's
superior - the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and
PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter- government
agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of
one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a
recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no
less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any
question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the
justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by
a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between
Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in
the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability
of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.
Renato Segubiense 2006-0040

Art.12: Exempting Circumstances

Insanity/Imbecility

People v. Rubinos (G.R. No. 138453)

Facts:

Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as

in the present case for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall
be applied in the absence of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, the imposable
penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.

In an Information dated May 31, 1995, appellant was accused of killing his
pregnant wife and the fetus inside her. When arraigned on July 27, 1995,
appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. After due trial, the
RTC convicted him.

Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he
indeed killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the
defense of insanity.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the
testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the
accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under
schizophrenia, paranoid type?

Whether or not the court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's

defense of insanity?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
the commission of the crime. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the
defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the
very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. Accordingly,
one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving
it. Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was committed.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of

insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both
prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was
completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal
killing of his wife.

As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a

domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that
appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the
nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and
conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by
their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robinos.

Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife.
He was even bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her.

Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he
had just killed his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and
remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of
his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is
inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done.
Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when
the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even showed to
them the knife used to stab the victim. Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife
was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of his act.
 Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly
supports his claim of insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his
allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the crime. Except for
appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robinos, all the other defense witnesses
testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been
detained in prison.

To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the
offense, or the accused must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he
would still be criminally responsible. Verily, his alleged insanity should have
pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act
was committed, not at any time thereafter.

Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal

responsibility, the evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. lf the evidence points to
insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.

Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had
already been completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim. Verily, the
evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had been completely
deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear
and convincing proof is required to establish its existence. Indubitably, the defense
failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of
sanity.
Renato Segubiense 2006-0040

People v. Valledor (G.R. No. 129291)

Facts:

On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was

in his house at Burgos Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He
was working on a lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first
cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and
Antonio Magbanua. Roger was working at his table and seated on his bed while
Elsa was across the table. Antonio was on the left side, while Simplicio was
seated near the door, on the right side of Roger.

All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Roger's

nickname ("Jer") and immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was
able to parry the thrust and was stabbed instead on the right forearm.
Accused- appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, "Ako
akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant
fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio and Antonio unharmed.

Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980,

accused-appellant suspected him of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused-
appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one occasion, Elsa spat on and
slapped accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on the

facts: following

On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto
Princesa City interviewed accused-appellant and thereafter made the following
conclusions and recommendation, that subject patient be committed to the
National Mental Hospital, Metro Manila for proper medical care and evaluation
soonest.

The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on
accused-appellant by Dr. Guia Melendres of the National Center for Mental
Health, pertinent portion of which reads: In view of the foregoing
history,
observations, physical mental and psychological examinations the patient Enrico
Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified under
Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder characterized by deterioration from
previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of
control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight. Likewise, he is found
to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse. This is
characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated by
continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social,
occupational, psychological or physical problems.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact
that when he allegedly committed the offense charged he was mentally ill, out of
his mind or insane?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that in considering a plea of insanity as a defense,

the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind.
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper
to presume that acts were done unconsciously.

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as

an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
to the very moment of its execution.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental

faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity
may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance,
his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational
acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can
only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and
emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind.
 In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of
overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The
following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that accused- appellant was
not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1)
Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to
stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of Roger before
stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside
the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused- appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa,
uttered the words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa) after
stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the
victims.

Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who
was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts,
accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he
in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also
inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant
emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against
the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had
my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the
scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the
consequence thereof.

Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying;

swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not
sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." Then, too, the medical
findings showing that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder
after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is
his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to
discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the
victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204

Minority

Llave v.People (G.R. No. 166040)

Facts:

On Sept. 24, 2002, on an errand from her mother, the victim, who
was only 7 years old at that time, proceeded to their house, where the accused
waited for her, and accosted her; he proceeded to sexually abuse her, while
the victim cried for help.

A barbecue vendor nearby heard her cries and came to the scene; the
accused fled, and the vendor told the victim to tell her parents what happened.

Together with her parents, the victim went to the police and reported
the incident; the vendor also testified to what he saw during that time.

The medical examiner found no injury on the hymen and perineum,

but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora; there was also
fresh abrasion of the perennial skin at 1 o'clock position near the anal opening.

The trial court found the victim guilty, declaring that he acted with
discernment, but crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of
minority.

Issue:

W/N accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and if yes, whether he
acted with discernment, being a minor of age more than 9 years old but less
than 15?
Decision: YES

Penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male

organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence,
even if the
penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the
conclusion that the rape was consummated.

While it is true that medical examiner did not find any abrasion or laceration in the
private complainant's genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter's testimony the
petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations
does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this
case.
The court have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from
the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account
of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which
they testified is not true.

Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between

right and wrong.

The accused, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile
of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passers-by would not be able
to discover his dastardly acts.
Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204

Jose v. People (G.R. No. 162052)

Facts:

Accused was arrested in a drug buy-bust operation conducted by the police;

accused was a passenger in the car of Zarraga, whom allegedly made the deal with
the undercover in the said operation. They claimed that they were kidnapped by the
police and asked ransom for their release from one of the accused's wife.

The trial court found them guilty, and credited in their favour the preventive
imprisonment they had undergone.CA reduced the penalty on petitioner since he was
13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

Issue:

W/N petitioner acted with discernment and that prosecution failed to allege in
the information that he acted with discernment?

Decision: NO

For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to

prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted
with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.

Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his
overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the
nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence
a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.

The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car
with his cousin, co-accused, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, if he
could afford to buy shabu.
 There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft
white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed,
the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that
pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs.

Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to

commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the
parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the
prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot
thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused.

Miguel Paolo Soliman

2010-0204

Declarador v. Judge Gubaton (G.R. No. 159208)

Facts:

The accused, a 17-year old, minor, stabbed a teacher, wife of the

complainant, 15 times; he was charged with murder aggravated by evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, to which the accused plead guilty to
the crime charged.

In view of the accused's plea, RTC rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty, but the sentence was suspended by the judge automatically because the
accused was a minor at that time; he was ordered to be committed to the
Regional Rehabilitation for Youth.

The husband of the victim, herein petitioner, claimed that in Art. 192 of P.D. No.
603, the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who was
convicted of a crime punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of or excess in jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the
sentence of the accused?

Decision: YES

The benefits of P.D. No. 603 shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once
enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted
for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted
for an offense by the Military Tribunals.

Furthermore, it shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with law who has
once enjoyed suspension of sentence or, when at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, the juvenile is already 18 yrs. old.

GS l P a
ge
 The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the
imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after
trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the
disqualification of a juvenile.

Rep. Act No. 9344 only amended the disqualification of those juveniles in
conflict with law, who at the time of the promulgation of judgment, was already 18
years old, and allowed the benefits to apply to them. The other disqualification in
P.D. No. 603 remains unchanged. Hence, the accused is still disqualified under law
to benefit from such suspension of sentence.

Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed
together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the
legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and
to have enacted the new act with reference thereto.

Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178

Accident

Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94)

Facts:

The accused Toledo was charged with homicide for the killing of one
Ricky Duarte. Toledo insisted that when he killed the victim, the same was purely
accidental. He claimed that the victim was so drunk that the same charged at
the door of his house. This prompted the accused to get his bolo and when he
tried to prevent Ricky from entering, he accidentally hit the latter whereby killing
him.

But still the RTC and the Ca found him guilty.

And so, the accused goes to the SC wherein this time, he claims that his
actions were purely on self-defense. It was done when the victim attacked
him and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed Duarte.

Issue:

Should the Court find his actions exempting and/or justifying?

Decision:

The Sc ruled that there is no such thing as accidental self-defense. The

accused cannot claim the death purely accidental and when the findings of the
lower courts were unfavorable, later on change his defense by alleging that what
happened was purely self-defense.

The two defenses perpetuated by the accused are totally inconsistent with
each other. Although in the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is
excused because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an unlawful aggression
which could have killed or injure him. And so, such acts are not in tune
with ACCIDENT which presupposes an act which was not even contemplated
or planned but purely accidental.

Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178

People v. Concepcion (386 SCRA 74)

Facts:

The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder for the
killing of one Lorenzo Galang. According to testimonies of both parties' witnesses,
Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall because he was so drunk and
unruly at the town plaza and was continually disturbing the peace.

The accused then came to the barangay hall apparently to question

Galang. But herein lies the differences in the testimonies. The prosecution witnesses
(2 of them) testified that while interrogating Galang, Concepcion suddenly fired two
shots past the ear of the victim without injuring him. But later on, he hit the victim
in the abdomen and fired a shot which wounded Galang in the thigh and then
Concepcion fired three more shots which hit the victim in the chest and killed him.

But according to the accused, he was merely pacifying Galang when the
victim became so unruly that the accused fired two warning shots. But instead of
scaring Galang, the latter tried to grab the gun from the accused. Two shots were
accidentally fired which hit Galang thus causing his death.

The accused claims that he should be exempted because he was just

performing his lawful duty as a police officer and that the shooting was purely
accidental.

The trial court found Concepcion guilty.

Issue:

Should the accused be exempted from criminal liability due to accident?

Decision:

Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has theburden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. However, once the
defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an exempting
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere
accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is entitled
to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code.

Unfortunately for the accused, his testimony was too full of inconsistencies
which failed to discharge the burden . For one, Concepcion claims that when the
victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. But
then he claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the BARREL
OF THE GUN". This was very inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not believable that
a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a police officer who also
had a handgun tucked by his waist.

Lastly, the prosecution witness categorically testified that he saw

Concepcion shoot the victim with the M-16 rifle.

And so, the finding of guilt by the lower court was proper.
Mark Vergara 2008-0323

Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear

Ty v. People (G.R. No. 149275)

Facts:

This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22
against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and issue to Manila
Doctors' Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino several post-
dated checks. The said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such checks
in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the checks or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.

Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury." She claims that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release
of her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and would not
discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.

The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appeal with
the CA and reiterated her defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or
injury." The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to
pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the amount
of the check, in each case.

Issue:

Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her

exemption from criminal liability?
Decision:No.

Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked

successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable
fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or

anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or
may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such
gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb. A
mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the
compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only
without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape.

The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her mother's health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her
mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable
fear contemplated by law.
Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021

Entrapment v. Instigation

People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019)

Facts:

On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, P/Chief

Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the
Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an
intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay
Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant
Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a
police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November
29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a
confidential asset found by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for the
purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latter's house at No. 123
Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the
evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust
operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was
provided with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and
place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellant's house
and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant
introduced to him PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the
two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of
shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-
arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was
consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two marked P100-bills recovered
from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was
allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant's house and from whom drug
paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from
appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu
weighing 0.041 gram.

The accused was charged of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.

9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

 The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision denying the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not instigation was the act which preceded Sta. Maria's arrest?

Decision:

In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture
a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself
becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation,
the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the
accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of
entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its

commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at
the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.

The solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the

police merely furnishes evidence of the course of conduct. The police received an
intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They
duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.
Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021

People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309)

Facts:

On April 6, 1998, Atty. Yap supervising agent of the Dangeroud Drugs

Division of the NBI, received an information that certain Roberto Pacis was
offering to sell kilo of shabu for the amount of P950 per gram or a total of
P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust
operation. Atty. Yap and Sr. Agent Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case.
The two officer and an informant went to the house of the appellant at 375 Caimito
Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. They negotiated the sale of kilo of
shabu. The total price was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed that the
payment and delivery of shabu would be made the next day at same place.

On April 17, 1998, NBI agents and the informant went to appellant's house.
Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag, the latter saw a transparent plastic with
white crystalline substance inside. Appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap
introduced Congzon to get the money from the car. When Congzon returned, he
gave the "boodle money" to Atty. Yap who handed to the appellant. Upon receipt of
payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him.

The trial gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the "buy-bust" operation that led to the appellant's arrest
was valid?

Decision:

In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping
and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation
on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would- be
defendant into the commission of the offense and become co- principals
themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is
sanctioned by law as legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engage in
the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.

The records show that the operation that led to the arrest of the appellant was
indeed an entrapment, not instigation. Courts generally give full faith and credit to
officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in the
regular manner. In entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an
incident by the prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law.

Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of

illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited
drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold was a dangerous drug. The
elements were duly proven in the case herein. The record shows that the appellant
sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers.

7S l P
age
Arlyn Barcelon 2006-0021

Chang v. People (G.R. No. 165111)

Facts:

Chang was the Municipal Treasurer of Makati who was tasked to examine or
investigate tax returns of private corporations and companies operating within Makati
and determine the sufficiency and insufficiency of the income tax assessed on them
and collect payments, San Mateo was the Chief Operations, Business revenue
Examination, Audit division, Makati Treasurer's office.

The examiners found that Group Developers, Inc. (GDI) incurred a tax
deficiency inclusive of penalty in the amount of P494,601.11. The assessment
notice was received by Mario Magat, Chief Operating Officer of GDI. Magat was later
able to talk to San Mateo via phone. On May 15, 1991, Magat and San Mateo
met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club. Chang later joined the two, the three
agreed that if GDI could pay P125,000 by the end of May 1991, the
assessment would be 'resolved'.

On June 6, 1991, Magat met again for lunch with San Mateo and Chang at the
Makati Sports Club. Magat tried to convince the two that GDI wanted to pay the
correct amount of tax to the municipality. He was advised by San Mateo and Chang,
however, that GDI had only two options: Pay the P494,601.11 to the municipality
or P125,000 to them.

On June 12, 1991, Magat met with the NBI Deputy Director Epimaco
Velasco who advised him to file a complaint with the NBI. Magat thus gave a
sworn statement. After several days, Magat contacted San Mateo and asked him if
their position was still the same to which the latter said yes. Magat thereafter told
San Mateo that he would deliver the P125,000 on June 19,1991 at the Makati
Sports Club.

On June 19, 1991, Magat informed the NBI that payment was to be made that
day around lunchtime. The NBI formed a team to conduct an entrapment. The
genuine money as well as the boodle money and the envelope where the money
was placed were then laced with fluorescent powder.
 San Mateo arrived and joined Magat at his table. Chang arrived and joined the
two. Magat told Chang and San Mateo that GDI was ready to pay and asked them if
they could give him the Certificate of Examination showing that GDI has no more
tax liability. Chang handed the Certificate while Magat gave the brown envelope. At
that instant, the NBI agents announced that they were being arrested.

The Sandiganbayan convicted San Mateo and Chang of violation of sec 3(b)
of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid entrapment operation?

Decision:

Petitioners were undisputedly public officers at the time of the commission of

the offense. The prosecution, not only established creditably how the offense
charged was committed. It is established just as creditably how petitioners conspired
to commit the crime.

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to

ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the
crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The
difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens reoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the
resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution.

From the evidence of the prosecution, it was clearly established that the
criminal intent originated from the mind of the petitioner. Even before the June 19,
1991 meeting took place, petitioners already made known to Magat that GDI only
had two options to prevent the closure of the company, either to pay the assessed
amount of P494,601.11 to the Municipality or to pay the amount of P125,000 to
them.
Jasmine Calaycay 2005-0049

Art. 13: Mitigating Circumstances

Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstances

People v. CA and Tangan (G.R. No. 103613)

Facts:

On December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone

on Roxas Boulevard heading south and Generoso Miranda was driving his car in
the same direction with his uncle, Manuel Miranda. Generoso was moving ahead
of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him
to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times.
Generoso, slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook
Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four
or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his
lane. When Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn, Generoso passed him, pulled
over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and
got out. Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Then Tangan went to
his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.

According to the prosecution witnesses, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia

Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda
and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at
Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso
Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter.
The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall. Manuel
Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling,
Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has
taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her.
The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the
gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
 On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness
by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the
accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of
the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying
to
wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the
accused. The accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his
car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting
Generoso Miranda.

Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. Manuel looked for the
gun and ran after Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to enter his
patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his
nephew. Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, Mary
Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested
that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine
General Hospital but he expired on the way.

Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. However, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a
licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm. Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to
quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various
grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court. On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial
of the two cases was ordered.

After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but
convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his
favor; Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and
was allowed bail in the homicide case.

Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial
court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His subsequent
motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt
were denied by the Court of Appeals.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of

discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, naming as respondents the
Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment
be modified by convicting accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in his
favor any mitigating circumstance.

Issue:

Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense?

Decision:

Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a

mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the
information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully
appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-
defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other
two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful
aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, because if
there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no
basis.

The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the
person defending himself but from the victim.

A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. The exchange of

insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter
how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when
coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either
antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.
Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316

No Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701)

Facts:

Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder in the
death of Alfredo Senador. Callet used a 9-inch hunting knife in stabbing the latter
on the left shoulder near the base of the neck causing Senador's death shortly
thereafter. Callet appealed his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City (Branch 30) gravely erred in failing to consider the
mitigating circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong thereforehis liability should be mitigated.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet be mitigated in that he had no

intention to commit so grave a wrong?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The lack of "intent" to commit a
wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part
of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the
accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without
giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do
what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefore, without the benefit
of this mitigating circumstance.
Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406

Vindication of a Grave Offense

People v. Torpio (G.R. No. 138984)

Facts:

In the evening of October 11, 1997, Anthony went to the house of Dennis and
invited the latter for a drinking spree. Afterwards both left the house of Dennis
and went to a nearby store and started drinking with a companion named Porboy
Perez. The three proceeded to Shoreline. In a cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis
drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled
him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him
with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran towards their home.

Upon reaching home, he got a knife. Alarmed by the action of Dennis, his
mother shouted. Manuel, his father, tried to scold his son and confiscate from him
the knife but failed to do so, resulting to Manuel's incurring a wound in his hand.
He went back to the cottage. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony ran towards the creek
but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but got
entangled with fishing net and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and
continued stabbing him resulting to the latter's death. After stabbing, Dennis left and
went to Camp Downes and slept there. The next morning, Dennis voluntarily
surrendered himself to Boy Estrera, a well-known police officer.

The trial court rendered a judgment convicting Dennis for the crime of
Murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating three
mitigating circumstances. His father Manuel was acquitted. Not satisfied with the
judgment, Dennis appealed his case.

Issue:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the

immediate vindication of a grave offense is appreciated?

Decision:
 The Supreme held that the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Dennis was
humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful
aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave
offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance.

However, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be

considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two
circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant
by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.
Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz 2005-0048

Passion or Obfuscation

People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438)

Facts:

Segundina Cayno was engaged in the business of selling rummage goods.

Early in the morning of October 21, 1996 her son, Jerry Cayno went to the "dap-
ayan" or barangay hall, in front of the Tadian Public Market to display the goods for
sale. After displaying the goods, Segundina arrived and took over. Before noontime,
while Nancy and Julie were plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant
Wilson Lab-eo arrived and approached his aunt, Segundina. Upon seeing him,
Nancy went to a distance of about two meters while Julie was still near Segundina.
Appellant sat down in front of his aunt and uttered something to her in a very soft
voice. Nancy did not hear what he said because of her distance from them while
Julie could not make out the conversation because of the sound coming from a
running motor engine. What they only heard was Segundina's answer which was
uttered in a loud angry voice "koma-an ka tay baka mahigh bloodac" ("you get out
because I might suffer high blood"). They saw appellant leave. When appellant
returned about 3 to 5 minutes after, Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In
front of her were Nancy and Julie, they did not notice appellant's return, especially
Segundina who had her back to appellant. When Julie saw appellant approach
Segundina from the back, Julie thought that he would just box his aunt because she
did not see the knife, which was wrapped in his blue jacket. Then appellant suddenly
made a thrusting motion and he stabbed Segundina on the left portion of her back.
He then ran away leaving the knife at the victim's back with the jacket he had
covered it with, hanging by the knife's handle. Appellant surrendered to the
police authorities. The appellant was indicted for murder. The appellant does not deny
stabbing Cayno. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The Trial Court found the
appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Issue:

Whether or not the actuation of the accused can be properly appreciated as

passion or obfuscation in his favour?

Decision:

For a person to be motivated by passion and obfuscation, there must first exist
an unlawful act that would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to overcome
reason and self-control. There is passional obfuscation when the crime is
committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In
asking the appellant to leave, the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an
absolute lack of proof that the appellant was utterly humiliated by the victim's
utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that remark in an insulting and
repugnant manner. The victim's utterance was not the stimulus required by
jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome reason and self-restraint.
Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz 2005-0048

People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)

Facts:

Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes,

Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra
to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering
copra around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to Barangay
Esperanza. While they were along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates,
the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding the trail,
aiming his firearm at Jose Boholst who was then walking ahead of his companions.
Jose grabbed Carlito's right hand and elbow and tried to wrest possession of the
firearm. While the two were grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito
who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son
Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the
banana plantation each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking
him several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on
hacking him. Marcelo, then, turned to Simon and Edgar and shouted "huwes de
kutsilyo". Upon hearing the same, Simon and Edgar ran.

Upholding the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment,
finding Marcelo Bates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Issue:

Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of

passion and obfuscation?

Decision:

Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant.

To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise
from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from
anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon
seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose
and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked
Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from
doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito
dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the
ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting
out of anger in the spirit of revenge.
Maria Faye D. Dela Cruz 2005-0048

People v. Malejana (G.R. No. 145002)

Facts:
Prosecution's witness Andres Madrid narrated that on July 28, 1990
at

around 7:15 p.m., while he was seated in front of his jeep parked at the side
of the road at Marisfoque, Pilar, Sorsogon in the company of Janus Roces,
Antonio Sy, Samuel Andrade, Bernarda Sy, Jose Belmonte and Ernesto
Francisco, he saw appellant at about 30 meters away heading towards their
direction. Upon reaching their group, appellant asked them where Roces was.
When he noticed Roces who was sitting at a distance of 1 meter beside Madrid,
appellant brandished an armalite rifle and fired a shot into the air. Then he
pointed the barrel of the gun at Roces and fired five (5) times, hitting Roces
thrice. After the victim fell to the ground, appellant left the scene of the
incident and went ot his house about 150 meters away. Madrid and his other
companions tried to assist Roces but discovered that the latter was already
dead, presumably from the gunshot wounds that were inflicted upon him by
appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the defense was able to establish that accused
was

entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?

Decision:
Passion and obfuscation similarly cannot be appreciated in favor of the
appellant. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following elements
must be present: 1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such condition of mind, 2) The act that produced the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity. The bare assertion that the victim and appellant had an argument
does not provide justifiable basis for applying to him this mitigating
circumstance. The cause that produced the passion and obfuscation has not
been established nor proven by clear and convincing evidence. The defense
advance mere speculations and conjectures to gloss over the fact that there is
lack of proof of the cause. Courts are not permitted to render judgments upon
guesses or surmises. Suspicion, it has been said, cannot give probative force
to testimony which in itself is insufficient to establish or justify an inference of a
particular fact.
 Voluntary Surrender

People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051)

Facts:

On November 3, 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information for Murder

allegedly committed as follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around
10:00 o'clock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the
qualifiying circumstance of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without warning
one Norman Conception y Habla while the latter was unarmed and completely
defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused the victim's death. When arraigned on November 9, 1999, appellant pleaded
"Not Guilty" to the charge therein. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Appellant, on his defense admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but
insisted that he did the same in self-defense. Furthermore, appellant also claimed
that Norman is taller than him; that he was forced to kill Norman because the latter
insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City to surrender
to police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa City.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC's Decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant Honorato Beltran, Jr. is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Decision:

Appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code states that the
offender's criminal liability may be mitigated if he voluntarily surrendered to a
person in authority or his agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary
surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested or
apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent.

Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay
officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police by a certain Tomas
Dimacuha. Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the
same was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the hacking incident,
appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother,
Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the bext day, to his sister in Lipa City. It
took him three long days to surrender to the police authorities. Moreover, the flight
of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was apprehended by the barangay
officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that characterizes
the mitigating circcumstance of voluntary surrender.
Andrada v. People (GR No. 135222)

Facts:

In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Baguio City charged petitioner with Frustrated Murder committed as follows: That

th
on or about the 24 day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Arsenio
Ugerio on the head twice with a bolo thereby inflicting the latter: hacking wound,
head, resulting in (1) skull and scalp avulsion vertex; (2) depressed comminuted
skull fracture, right parieto occipital with significant brain laceration; operation done;
craciectomy; vertex debridement; craniectomy; right parieto occipital; dural repair;
debridement, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was not
committed by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by
the timely medical attendance extended to Arsenio Ugerio which prevented his
death. When arraigned on February 9, 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of
counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Peter Andrada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC's Decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused Peter Andrada is entitled to the mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Decision:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the
victim, ran away. He was apprehended by responding police officers in the
waiting shed at the corner of Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a
manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them
the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.
Maricris Ella 2007-0030

People v. Quimzon (G.R. No. 133541)

Facts:

In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant, Ricky Quimzon and three
oher persons, namely Salvacion Lascarom, Canoto Cabero and Edgardo Detona were
charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about

th
the 7 day of March 1992, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte,
Philipines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with treachery
and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniuosly attack, assault, strike, stab and wound one Marlo
Casiong with short bolos locally known as "pisao" which accused provided themselves
for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the said Marlo Casiong with
fatal wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death shortly
thereafter.

Appellant surrendered to the police authorities on August 18, 1994 while his
other co-accused remain at-large. When arraigned on September 28, 1994,
appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Ricky Quimzon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC's Decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant Ricky Quimzon is entitled to the mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Decision:

It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of the MTC of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant "voluntarily
surrendered to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on
August 18, 1994." An examination of the records reveals that it can not be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. For the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surreder to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with
three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to
a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.
There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or wishes to spare
them the trouble and expense concominant to his capture.

The surrender of appellant was far from being spontaneous and

unconditional. The warrant of arrest is date June 17, 1992 and all the accused,
including appellant, remained at-large, which prompted the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Palo, Leyte to achieve the case. It took appellant two years before he finally
surrendered to the police. In between said period, appellant, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Fix Bail Bond without surrendering his person to the jurisdiction of
the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion had been acted upon by the
trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a condition set by him
before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his subsequent act of
surrendering from being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226

Confession of Guilt

People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)

Facts:

On 18 November 1996, William Montinola, armed with an unlicensed Cal

.380 Pistol Llama deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence against or
intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount of
P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion. Montinola shot the victim on the
neck, killing Reteracion. Two criminal cases were filed against Montinola and he was
later on sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with homicide and death for
illegal possession of firearm.

Issue:

Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by

reason or on occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide?

Decision:

Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the

use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said
Presidential Decree was however, amended by R.A. 8294, while Montinola's case
was still pending. R.A. 8294 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court held "In recent cases, we
ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm
if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm;
instead, such use shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance in
the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new law will be
advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a separate conviction for illegal
possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect." Pursuant to the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, use of an
unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. "At any rate, even assuming that
the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of homicide or murder
may be counted in the determination of the penalty for robbery with homicide,
we cannot appreciate in this case the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime was
committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being
unfavorable to him." The Court further held "Under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the
same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the
commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we would
apply retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the
imposable penalty would be death. Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez,
insofar as the new law would aggravate the crime of robbery with homicide and
increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, it would not be given
retroactive application, lest it would acquire the character of an ex post facto law.
Hence, we shall not appreciate that special aggravating circumstance. There being no
modifying circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon accused-appellant WILLIAM."
Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226

People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247)

Facts:
Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial court of murder
qualified by

treachery and was sentenced to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas

Lavares and several companions, including Dawaton were drinking in the house
of the accused's uncle. Already drunk, Leonidas Lavares decided to sleep while
the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton awakened
Lavares by stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing
Lavares until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his
other relative, where he was later on arrested by the police.

Issue:
Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon
the

accused was correct?

Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not
considering the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of the
accused. "Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the
offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.The
allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the crime was
corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking
companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo
Cortez, each one drinking at least a bottle. It was also attested that while
the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the house of Amado Dawaton,
it was the accused who drank most of its contents." The Court further stated
that "Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in
this case, when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there
existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be
sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua."
 Similar and Analogous Circumstances

Canta v. People (G.R. No. 140937)

Facts:

Narciso Gabriel owns a cow that was passed on from one person to another
and each person was responsible for the care and custody of the said cow. At the
time the cow got lost, it was under the care and custody of Gardenio Agapay.
Agapay took the cow in the mountain of Pilipogan, 40 meters away from his hut, at
around 5:00 in the afternoon. When he came back to get the cow at past 9 in the
evening, the cow was gone. However, Aagapay saw footprints that led to the
house of Filomeno Vallejos. Vallejos told Agapay that Exuperancio Canta took the
cow.

Agapay and Maria were instructed by Narciso to get the cow and on their way
to Florenitno Canta's house, they saw Exuperancio. The latter told them that if it was
really Narciso who was the owner of the cow, he should get it himself. Exuperancia
accompanied the two to his father's house and both recognized the cow but
Florentino was not home. Exuperancio told Maria and Agapay that he would call them
the next day to talk about the matter with his father. Exuperancio never called.
The matter was reported to the police and Narciso and Exuperancio were called for
investigation. Exuperancio admitted taking the cow but claims that he was the real
owner of the cow and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. However, Narciso
presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal
treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. Then, the
petitioner also presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated
February 27, 1985 and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, who was the
janitor at the treasurer's office of the municipality, that he executed the certificate of
ownership in favor of Exuperancio. The trial court rendered its decision finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Exuperancio filed a Motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower courts were correct in sentencing Exuperancio to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five
(5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and
to pay the costs?
Decision:

No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found petitioner
guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P.
D. No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v.
Macatanda,P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms
of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code,
thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal
Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the law
provides:

The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in

the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed
in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art.
64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i. e.,prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the
maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum period.
Katrina Garcia 2006-0127

Art. 14: Aggravating Circumstances Classes of Aggravating

Circumstances People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152)

Facts:
Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence of Reclusion Pertpetua
for

raping certain Ms. Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts, Gerardo took
advantage of the time when the victim's mother was not around. He would
likely forced Maritess to have carnal knowledged against her will and even
poked a knife at her while doing the deed in the victim's dwelling and threthened
the victim to kill her family should she tell her parents what happened. On
November 13, 1991 when the appellant arrived at the Catcharro residence he
proceeded inside the bedroom of Maritess, the latter ran out of the bedroom
and told her mother not to leave her because her Papa Gerry might raped her
again. Surprised by what he heard, the following day Maritess was brought to
Tacloban City Medical Center for a check-up and found to have lacerations to
the victims genitalia. Contrary to the facts above, appellant claimed that the
night of the incident he was working as porter until 10 PM, thus it cannot be
said that he committed the crime accused of him. Based on the information
submitted, aggravating circumstances of use of weapon and dwelling were not
alleged.

Issue:
Whether or not aggravating circumstances proved during trial
but

was not alleged in the information may be considered?

Decision:
The supreme court held in the negative. Although the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling were proven, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered
in fixing the penalty because they were not alleged in the information as
mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Although the crimes charged were committed before the effectivity
of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being
favorable to the appellant.
Katrina Garcia 2006-0127

People v. Palaganas (501 SCRA 533)

Facts:

On January 16, 1998 brothers Servillano and Michael Ferrer went to

Tidbits Videoke bar singing and drinking beer. On the same evening Jaime
Palaganas and Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived. The two
groups occupied separate tables. After the Ferrer's singing Jaime Palaganas
started singing and was joined by Tony Ferrer who sang loudly and in mocking
manner. This insulted Jaime and soon a fight ensued between Ferrer's and
Palaganas. Ferdinand ran towards his house and sought help from his brother
Fuijeric, the latter went outside however he was stoned by the Ferrer
brothers. As they were continuously stoned the appellant Ferdinand suddenly
pulled the trigger with the gun in his hands. The trial court rendered a
decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Homicide and Frustrated
homicide but not guilty of violation of COMELEC RES. 2958.

Issue:

Whether or not violation of COMELEC RES. 2958 may be considered as

Special aggravating circumstances which will negate consideration of mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender?

Decision:

With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL

68
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the
commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed
firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and
appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic
aggravating circumstance.
Katrina Garcia 2006-0127

People v. Mendoza (327 SCRA 695)

Facts:

Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of murder for killing Anchito
Nano. In this case Efren alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at their house and
upon arrival it started to destroy the house and that the her wife was shouting for
help. Efren immediately look for something to protect his family but found a bolo. He
approached Anchito but the latter tried to hacked him but he was able to hacked
him first on the right side of his neck resulting to the death of the victim. Thereafter
Mendoza went to Municipal Hall of Vinzon and voluntarily surrendered to the police.
He claimed that it was self defense. The autopsy revealed that location of the
wounds found on the body of the victim came from the back of the victim's body. The
court ruled rejecting appellant's self defense. This court finds that the accused was
not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend
himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo is
unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating

circumstances of treachery?

Decision:

The Supreme Court held in the negative. A qualifying circumstance changes

the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand,
does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of
the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating
circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying

32
circumstance may not.

Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating

circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at
the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the
imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.
Kristine Gonzales 2008-0192

In Contempt or With Insult to the Public Authorities

People v. De Mesa (G.R. No. 137036)

Facts:

Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas of Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City was
pronounced dead on arrival on October 15, 1996 at San Pablo City District
Hospital. The autopsy report showed that the cause of death was shock and
hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds at the back of the victim.

Hernando De Mesa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. He was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, pay the costs and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim. Treachery, nighttime, in contempt of or with assault to public authorities,
were appreciated by the trial court as aggravating circumstances attending the
case thereby qualifying the crime committed to murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime
committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed?

Decision:

Yes. The prosecution failed to positively prove the presence of anyqualifying

aggravating circumstance whereby the crime committed is only homicide for which the
imposable penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code is Reclusion Temporal.

Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law may now be applied and
absent any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be
imposed is prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion temporal in
its medium period as maximum.
Kristine Gonzales 2008-0192

People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39)

Facts:

Renato Tac-anand Francis Escanowere close friends being classmates in high

school and members of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on
the advice of his mother who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visits to their
home. Things started turning sour between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14,
1984. After an earlier altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his
gun. He entered the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and
shouted for Francis. After locating the victim he fired at him but missed. He was
later able to hit him in the head as he was running to the door with his classmates
to escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher unknowing
that Renato was the culprit, asked him for help unwittingly informing him that
Francis was still alive. Renato immediately re- entered the room and saying "So,
he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on
the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The
bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest
just above the right nipple.

Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866.
An amended information for murder was subsequently filed aggravated by the use of
illegal possession of firearms.

Issues:

Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating

circumstance in crimes of homicide and murder?

Decision:

No.Under an information charging homicide or murder, the use of an unlicensed

firearm is not an aggravating circumstance nor can it be used to increase the penalty
for the second offense of homicide or murder to death or reclusion perpetua. The
character of the instrument used in taking or destroying
human existence is not one of those included in the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, under an information for unlawful possession of a

firearm or ammunition, P.D. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty
for unlawful possession if the unlicensed firearm was used to destroy human
existence. Though it is not one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be considered to increase the
penalty imposed because of the explicit provision of the said special law.
Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154

Abuse of Public Position

Fortuna v. People (G.R. No. 135784)

Facts:

On July 21, 1992, siblings Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo were
standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets. A mobile patrol car stopped in
front of them and a policeman alighted. The policeman frisked Mario and took Mario's
belt. He motioned Mario to enter the car. Mario obeyed and was followed by
Diosdada. While inside the car, the policemen told Mario that he would be brought to
the Bicutan police station where he would be interrogated, mauled and heckled for
carrying a deadly weapon. They told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a
deadly weapon was P12,000. The Montecillos were asked how much they had and
then Diosdada was asked to alight from the car.
The driver followed her, took P1,500 from her wallet and instructed her to tell the
others that she only had P3,500. Inside the car, they were told to put all her money
on the box. The Montecillos were told to get off at Harrison Plaza. From there, they
went home. The 3 policemen, Fortuna, Garcia, and Pablo, were charged with robbery
and were found guilty of having conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of
persons.

Issue:

Whether or not abuse of public position should be taken as an aggravating

circumstance by the mere fact that the accused were police officers?

Decision:

The Supreme Courted held that the lower courts failed to appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public position."
Being police officers, it placed them in a position terrify the Montecillos to surrender
their money as bail. It was on the account of their authority that convinced the
Montecillos that they had committed a crime and that they would be taken to the
police station. Had they not been police officers, they would have not convinced the
Montecillos into giving them their money.
Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154

People v. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08)

Facts:

On November 25, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez and Jelord Velez were on
their way home on board a motorcycle. A motorcycle was speeding behind them
and as they were about to cross the bridge, they heard gun shots firing
behind them. As they turned around, Jerry identified PO3 Renato Villamor and
Jessie Maghilom riding the motorcycle behind them. Shots were fired at them
and Jerry sustained wounds on the abdomen and elbow while Jelord died on the
spot. The trial proceeded against PO3 Villamor while Maghilom was still at
large. During trial, the Trial Court found the PO3 Renato Villamor guilty of
having commited Murder aggravated by the circumstance of taking advantage
of his public position.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court properly applied the aggravating

circumstance of taking advantage of public position?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of "taking

advantage of public position" under paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code was improperly applied.

A public officer must use the influence that is vested in his office as a
means to realize the purpose of the crime to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. The question "Did the accused abuse his office to commit the
crime" must be asked in order to appreciate this circumstance as an aggravating
circumstance.
 No proof was shown that Villamor took advantage of his position of being
a policeman when he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence, prestige or
ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even without occupying a public position, the
accused could have committed the crime.
Lourizza Genabe 2008-0154

People v. Magayac (G.R. No. 126043)

Facts:

On February 11, 1994, Jimmy Lumague, Tino Magayac and Manuel Magayac,
were preparing for fishing along with other persons. Tino Magayac, pushed Jimmy for
no reason. When Jimmy asked why, Tino proceeded to hit Jimmy at the back. Hours
later, Tino hit Jimmy at the stomach and Manuel proceeded to hit Tino as well. The
fight, however, was intervened. The next day, Jimmy and Manuel exchanged blows.
They were, again, separated from each other. On February 12, Manuel, while carrying
a long rifle, approached Jimmy.
As the Jimmy was trying to leave, he was shot by Manuel right on his stomach. Jimmy
fell on the ground and was shot at the back several times. Afterwhich, Manuel
surrendered to the PC Mobile Force. An information for Murder with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of
public position as a member of the CAFGU. The Trial Court found him guilty of Murder
aggravated by cruelty and taking advantage of public position, appreciated by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Issue:

Whether or not the circumstance of taking advantage of public position should

be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance considering the facts of the case?

Decision:

The Supreme Court held that in the commission of the offense, there was no
aggravating circumstance, specifically "abuse of public position".
Considering the facts of the case, Manuel was a member of the CAFGU and the
weapon used to shoot Jimmy was a government issued M-14 rifle.
These, however, do not necessarily prove that Manuel took advantage of his public
position as a member of the CAFGU when the crime of murder was committed.
Cheryl Navarro 2007-0026

Nighttime, Uninhabited or Obvious Place or Band

People v. Villanueva (G. R. No. 135330)

Facts:

For automatic review by the Supreme Court is the judgment of 12 May

1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
46026-A, finding accused-appellant Camilo Villanueva (hereafter Camilo) guilty of
the crime of rape committed on the victim, Nia Gabuya (hereafter Nia), and
sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death and to pay Nia moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.

In an amended Information dated 16 January 1998, Camilo was charged with

rape as defined and penalized in R.A. No. 8353. The accusatory portion of the
indictment states:

That at midnight of 4 December 1997, in Cebu City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with deliberate intent, with force
and intimidation upon person, did then and there willfully, feloniously and
unlawfully have carnal knowledge with Nia Gabuya, a minor of only 11 years of age
and step-daughter of the said accused, against the latter's will. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Issues:

Whether the private complainant Nia Gabuya was really raped by the
accused Camilo Villanueva on 4 December 1997 at around midnight?

Whether the testimony of the private complainant Nia Gabuya is not tainted
with material inconsistencies and grievous falsity?

Whether the testimony of the private complainant is enough to convict the

accused for a crime punishable by death?
Decision:

The issue of credibility raised in the three assigned errors should be

resolved against Camilo.

Nia clearly testified that Camilo raped her. She recounted the details of her
harrowing experience in a credible, convincing and straightforward manner.

The prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the fact of
penetration, although incomplete. In order that the crime of rape may be said to be
consummated, the successful penetration by the rapist of the female's genital organ
is not indispensable. Penile invasion, it has often been held, necessarily entails
contact with the labia and even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of
force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration of the hymen, is
deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence. It would, in fine, be enough in a
conviction for rape that there is an entrance of the male organ within the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Neither the penetration of the penis beyond the
lips of the vagina nor the rupture of the hymen is indispensable to justify conviction.

Consequently, the finding that Nia's hymen is intact does not disprove that
rape was committed. Even the fact that there was no reddening or hematoma in the
external genitalia does not render the occurrence of rape improbable. The doctrine
is well settled that the absence of external injuries does not negate rape.Even
Camilo's claim that the sperm found in the vagina of NIA was not his because he
has undergone vasectomy, is inconsequential. The absence of spermatozoa is not an
essential element of rape. This is because in rape, the important consideration is
not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male
organ.

On the issue of inconsistencies and discrepancies, these things on minor

matters neither impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a
whole nor reflect on the witness' honesty. Such inconsistencies, which may be
caused by the natural fickleness of the memory, even tend to strengthen rather
than weaken the credibility of the witness because they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.
 Camilo has moral ascendancy over Nia, being the common-law spouse of her
mother and the man who acted as her father since she reached the age of reason.
Nia's tender age and Camilo's custodial control and domination over her had rendered
her so meek and subservient to his needs and desires, thus, becoming an easy prey to
Camilo's lecherous advances. Moreover, Camilo threatened her with a knife.

For rape to exist it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be
so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused
had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception
and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is
enough that it produces fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. It is this
form of intimidation which explains why there are no traces of struggle which
would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker.

Under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, any physical overt act manifesting
resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or
where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving
valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished
in the new Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Cheryl Navarro 2007-0026

People v. Ancheta (G.R. No. 70222)

Facts:

Juan Ancheta was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, with
the crime of robbery with arson, committed in conspiracy with two other persons
who could not be tried with him because they were then at large. He asks for a
reversal of the decision convicting him of the crime of arson and sentencing him
to the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua plus civil indemnity in the sum of
P40,000.00 for the properties burned.

On 25 August 1980, at about 11 o'clock in the evening, Ancheta and his two
companions awakened Teresa Gorospe, forced their entry into her house,
demanded the amount of P1,000.00, and burned her house when the money was not
delivered. Later, while the house was in flames, the Ancheta, brandishing a bolo,
prevented the people from approaching and putting out the fire by warning them
that he had thirty companions.

Issues:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between and among the accused? Whether or

not the penalty imposed on Ancheta was proper?

Decision:

On whether or not there was conspiracy between and among the accused. The
Supreme Court agreed that there was a conspiracy among the accused- appellant
and his two companions when they forcibly entered the house of Teresa Gorospe
and burned it after their demand for P1,000.00.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act
through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. It is
settled that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of acts
charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be
accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference
deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparent
criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them.

The conspiracy having been established, it should follow that the accused-
appellant is as guilty as his companions of the crime of arson, even if it be
conceded that he was not the one who actually poured the kerosene and ignited it to
burn Teresa Gorospe's house. When there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all and visits equal guilt upon every conspirator.

On whether or not the penalty imposed on Ancheta was proper. Under

Article 321 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed "if the offender shall set fire to any building,
farmhouse, warehouse, hut, shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied at
the time by one or more persons. .... "

The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was correctly appreciated because

it was sought by the defendants to facilitate the commission of the offense and
their subsequent escape. Evident premeditation should also have been applied
because the offenders had deliberately plotted the crime, as early as 9 o'clock of the
night in question, or two hours before they actually burned the house.

With these aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances to

offset them, the proper penalty as imposed by the trial court is reclusion perpetua.
The civil indemnity of P40,000.00 is allowed, but the costs of the suit shall be
adjudged in toto against the accused-appellant and not to be shared, as ordered by
the trial court.
Cheryl Navarro 2007-0026

People v. Baroy (G.R. Nos. 137520-22)

Facts:

The Supreme Court, in its Decision promulgated on 9 May 2002, affirmed the
conviction of both appellants for three counts of rape with the use of a deadly
weapon. The penalty imposed upon them by the trial court was, however, reduced
from death to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, because aggravating
circumstances had neither been alleged in the Information nor sufficiently proven
during the trial.

Appellant Alfredo Baroy has since then filed a Motion for a partial
reconsideration of the Court's Decision. He claims that he is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and, hence, to a penalty two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua. He presented various pieces of conflicting
documentary and testimonial evidence during the trial. He now prays for the
consideration and giving weight to his Birth Certificate as the best evidence of his
age. His Birth Certificate shows that he was born on 19 January 1984, while the
crimes in question were committed on March 2, 1998.

Issue:

Whether or not Baroy's Certificate of Live Birth sufficiently proves his

minority when he committed the crimes?

Decision:

The Motion has merit.

Baroy's Birth Certificate -- the authenticity of which was confirmed by the

NSO -- outweighs the other evidence submitted to prove his date of birth. "A birth
certificate is the best evidence of a person's date of birth."

The earlier evidence submitted by appellant during the trial did not
conclusively prove his age. However, since the OSG did not object to the belated
appreciation of Annex "A" and left the matter to the sound discretion of this Court,
we resolve to rule in favor of the accused.

If the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his
claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact."

Based on his Birth Certificate, it is clear that Baroy was only fourteen (14)
years old when he committed the crime of rape. Hence, a reconsideration of the
Court's 9 May 2002 Decision is proper.

Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "when the offender is a
minor x x x under fifteen years x x x a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed." The penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed by
Baroy is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision
mayor.Additionally, Baroy is entitled to the benefits granted by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Christine Perez 2006-0104

Recidivism

People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)

Facts:

Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot were indicted for murder in an
information and that the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

The case against appellant's co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally

dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.Appellant was
arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter.

When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000,
appellant immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12,
2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year.

On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of
murder and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death. The Court finds the
accused Francisco Dacillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is
hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not it is necessary, in recidivism as an aggravating

circumstance, to be alleged in the information?

Decision:

The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that
he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that
appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating
circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to
death.

In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is

necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the
sentences previously meted out to the accused.This is in accord with Rule 110,
Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the

information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the
imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Bernadette Remalla 2007-0392

Reiteracion

People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498)

Facts:

On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a resident of Manila, arrived in

Basey, Samar, and stayed with her sister Marie. The following day, Marita was
fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also known as Meling, and by the latter's
common law husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as Elming. Upon being
told by Meling that they would be going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went with
Meling and Elming to the couple's house in Sitio Catuhaan in Barangay Serum.
Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita stayed with Meling and Elming together with
their two (2) small children in a house consisting of only one room without any
partition.

In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining witness Marita Cajote slept at one
end of the room with the two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at the other end. At
about two o'clock the following morning Marita was awakened by the weight of
accused who was already on top of her. The accused who was holding a bolo told her
to keep quiet or he would kill her. He then placed his bolo aside and held Marita's
hands with his right hand. With his left hand accused lowered Marita's pants as well
as her panty down to her knees. Marita shouted for help but her sister Meling just
wrapped her head with their mosquito net and pretended to be asleep. Marita
struggled continuously against the advances of the accused but he was much
stronger, while she was getting weak. The accused first inserted his fingers into
Marita's private part and later succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Meling then pulled Elming away from Marita and hit Elming in the eye. Elming
boxed Meling on the mouth and kicked her when she fell on the floor. Elming
went back to Marita and continued with his beastly acts. By this time, Marita was
already too weak to resist. Elming inserted his fingers first and then his penis into her
private organ. The older of the two (2) children of Meling cried. Meling who was
holding her youngest child helplessly watched the accused rape her younger sister.
 The trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death. The
Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to show any
compelling or justifiable reason to set aside his conviction for rape and his penalty
of death, citing Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of Qualified Rape.

Decision:

The Solicitor General is correct in finding the accused guilty of rape. The bare
denial of the accused and his common-law wife cannot overcome the categorical
testimony of the victim. Denial when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence is negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters.
No woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to
a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. The Court likewise agrees with the finding of the trial
court that Marita's positive identification of the accused as the person who raped
her was given in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner which
rendered it worthy of faith and belief.

Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and the stand of the Solicitor
General, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua. It was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of death. Although
the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was alleged
in the Information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the lack or absence
of such circumstance to qualify the rape because the accused and Merly Tagana,
sister of the victim Marita Cajote, were mere common-law husband and wife and
were not legally married at the time of the rape. The accused and the victim
cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the
commission of the crime.Neither can the accused be convicted of qualified rape on
the basis of the circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of the
relatives of the victim within the third degree of
consanguinity because this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the
Information or in the Complaint against the accused.

The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14,
par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated
murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal
possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were
later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He
was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November
1991.Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when
the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches
an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for
two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed,
herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty
therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.

The Decision of the trial court convicting the accused ELMEDIO CAJARA alias
Elming of Qualified Rape is MODIFIED to the effect that he is convicted instead
only of Simple Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Michelle Ricaza 2008-0040

By Means of Inundation, fire, etc.

People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470)

Facts:

On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr.

was accused of setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the destruction of
his employer's house and the death of six persons including his employer Roberto
Separa Sr., some seven adjoining residential houses, were also razed by fire.

She was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought to the
Barangay Hall. She was then identified by a neighbor, whose house was also
burned, as the housemaid of the Separas and upon inspection, a disposable
lighter was found inside accused-appellant's bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant
confessed to the Barangay Chairman.

On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of Manila,

charging the accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. The
RTC as well as the Court of Appeals finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Arson with multiple homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Edna Malngan was guilty of the crime of destructive arson or
simple arson?

Decision:

The crime committed by the accused-appellant is Simple Arson and not

Arson with Multiple Homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex
crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. There are two laws that govern the crime of
arson where death results therefrom - Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1613, quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code

Art. 320. Destructive Arson - xxxx If as a consequence of the

commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1613

Sec. 5. Where Death Results from Arson - if by reason of or on the

occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed.

Both laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether
considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The reason is
that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.

The case falls under simple arson since from a reading of the body of the
information it can be seen that it states that "the accused, with intent to cause
damage, xxx deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house, xxx that by
reason and on the occasion of the said fire, xxx which were the direct cause of their
death xxx." It is clear that her intent was merely to destroy her employer's house
through the use of fire.

When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a
house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder
only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is
murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end.
There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main
object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the
main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be
absorbed by the crime of arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.
Michelle Ricaza 2008-0040

People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)

Facts:

At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog,

Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a
drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert's father, Jaime Agbanlog.
Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the
companions of his son.

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in
front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an
object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the
fence of a nearby school.

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole
in the roof of the house. Robber Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel
and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the hospital for
medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital for
wounds sustained which the grenade explosion inflicted. Robert's companions
sustained shrapnel injuries.

The appellants were arrested the following day but denied any participation in
the incident, claimed they were elsewhere when the incident occurred and that
they had no animosity towards the victims whatsoever.

After trial, the court a quo convicted appellants of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder for having conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
with the use of an explosive.

Issue:

Whether or not the use of explosive qualifies the crime to murder?

Whether or not appellants conspired to kill the victims?

Decision:

Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. The
information alleges that both treachery and the "use of explosive attended the
crime.

Since both circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is
perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered
as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudencesupport this view but
also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates
that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which
will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.

No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio
Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or
performed any act to assist him.

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must

be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a
conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their
mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with
Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no
positive act in furtherance of the crime. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio
Comadre must answer for the crime.
Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140

Craft, Fraud or Disguise

People v. Labuguen (G.R. No. 127849)

Facts:

The deceased Bonifacio Angeles was engaged in buying cows and selling them
to the public market. One day, the accused Vivencio Labuguen went to him and told
him that he knows of three big cows for sale and that the place where they are is
near. Believing on such declaration, he took money from his cabinet at his house
amounting to P40,000 and then drove in his motorcycle with the accused to see
the cows. On their way to see the cows, they have been seen together by several
witnesses who later on identified them in court as the victim and the accused
respectively. The accused according to the witness was wearing a jacket and with a
handkerchief tied on his forehead. One of the witnesses, a driver of a minibus
testified that while driving on his way to his destination, he saw a man behind
the 'talahibs' and he noticed that he was wiping something from his head and
right face. It was the same man whom his conductor identified as the one who
stopped their bus and rode on it. His conductor testified further that he noticed that
the man's jacket was soaked with blood including his pants and that he did not
talk when asked where he was headed to and instead just gave his fare. The
conductor even noticed that there was a lot of money on the breast side pocket of
his jacket and that one bill was even falling. The man then alighted from the
minibus after reaching his destination without saying any word. Later that afternoon,
a news broke out that a man's body was found dead in the middle of the
ricefield. He was later on identified as Bonifacio Angeles. Based on the strength of
the testimony of the witnesses, complaint and information were filed against
Vivencio and the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced with the penalty of death. The case was brought to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue:

Whether or not the court has correctly appreciated the employment of

generic aggravating circumstance of fraud and craft in the commission of the
crime even if not alleged in the information?

Decision:

Though not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstances

of fraud and craft were properly appreciated by the trial court. Craft involves
intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct
inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. By saying that he
would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to buy,
appellant was able to lure the victim to go with him.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Robbery with
Homicide is reclusion perpetua to death Applying Article 63 of the same Code, the
imposable penalty under the premises is death in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of craft and fraud and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance.

Four members of the Court are steadfast in their adherence to the separate
opinion expressed in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. However, they bow to the
majority opinion that the aforesaid law is constitutional and therefore, the penalty
prescribe thereunder has to be imposed.
Sheryll Tablico 2008-0341

Abuse of Superior Strength

People v. Amodio (G.R. No. 177356)

Facts:

On June 10, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., Richard Avila Roda, an Assistant
Manager of Nognog Videoke Restaurant in Quezon City, went out of the restaurant
to invite customers. He noticed that three of the attackers, whom he later identified
as accused-appellants Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were regular customers of their
restaurant. He saw Lo-oc hold the shoulders of the victim while Marino and
Amodia took turns in beating the victim.As a result of the beating, the victim fell
on the ground where Roda immediately approached the victim and saw blood oozing
out of the back of his head. One of the maulers was about to deliver another blow
on the victim but Roda was able to stop him, thereafter the appellants then went
inside the restaurant and drank one bottle of beer each.But, Roda did not
immediately report the incident because he was threatened by accused-appellants
who were still hanging around the area.

Later, in the early morning of the same day, there were already some
barangay tanods and police officers investigating the incident.The victim, later
identified as Jaime Bartina, was then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital
and died at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2003.

Upon the advice of a person from the La Loma Police Station, Roda went to
Camp Karingal in Quezon City to report what he had witnessed.The police then
filed an investigation report which became the basis for the filing of an
Information against accused-appellants.

However, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge against them

by denying involvement in the death of the victim and averred alibi as their defense.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding accused-appellants guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
 The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision
affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the killing was qualified by the circumstance of abuse of

superior strength?

Decision:

No.The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength had not been

sufficiently proved. To appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, what should be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. Mere superiority in
number is not enough to constitute superior strength. There must be clear proof
that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the defense
available to the person attacked.

In this case, although the victim was unquestionably outnumbered, it was not
shown that accused-appellants deliberately applied their combined strength to
weaken the defense of the victim and guarantee the execution of the crime.
Notably, accused-appellants took turns in boxing the victim. When the victim fell, the
prosecution witness was able to hold him, preventing accused-appellants from
further hurting him. Then accused-appellants simply turned away. To be sure, had
accused-appellants really intended to use their superior strength to kill the victim,
they would have finished off the victim, and probably even the lone prosecution
eyewitness.
Sheryll Tablico 2008-0341

People v. Jamon (413 SCRA 282)

Facts:

Information was filed dated September 15, 1998 against appellant charging
him with murder for shooting Victoria Tacla at her left chest with the use of a gun,
thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her untimely death.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the

merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as eyewitness Pilar Evangelista Tacla, the

appellant's wife and the victim's own mother as well as Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra,
Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), also testified.

On the witness stand, Pilar said that on July 9, 1998, at around 9 o'clock in
the morning, she had a heated altercation with appellant.Appellant warned Pilar
that once they moved out, she could never set foot in her daughter's house again
and he added in a threatening manner, with his eyes bulging that if Pilar came back

.
to Victoria's house, he would beat her up

However, when appellant presented, he declared that the shooting was

unintentional.

The court disbelieved appellant's claim of accidental shooting whereby

convicting the appellant based on the evidence of the parties.Furthermore, the
court concluded that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the
crime.
.

Issue:

Whether or notthe killing was attended by abuse of superior strength to

qualify the crime as murder?
Decision:

Yes.The prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse

of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality
of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority
of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.

In the present case, the victim was a woman with a smaller build. She was
unarmed. Appellant was a fifty-one-year-old male, in the prime of his life, and
armed with a deadly weapon. The killing indubitably constitutes an instance of
abuse of superior strength, hence the offense is qualified to murder, and not
merely homicide.Thus, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, as
alleged in the information, attended the fatal shooting of Victoria Tacla.
Sheryll Tablico 2008-0341

People v. Calpito (416 SCRA 491)

Facts:

st
That on or about the 21 day of November, 1990, appellant Francisco
Calpito armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to gain did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on the
person of Florentina Villas rob, take and carry away a shoulder bag containing cash
in the amount of P15,000 and jewelries amounting to P30,000 belonging to
Florentina Villas.

The appellant attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas and
Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas which caused her death and a
wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical attendance on him for a
period of 5-7 days and which incapacitated him from performing his usual work for
the same length of time.

However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial. But on
June 15, 1993, appellant was re-arraigned and after being appraised of the
consequences of the nature of his offense, he changed his plea to one of guilty.

The court a quofinding the charge of Robbery with Homicide

unsubstantiated by evidence, convicted appellant of the crime of murder.

Appellant, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the trial
court erred in convicting him of Murder instead of Homicide and in failing to apply
the mitigating circumstance of minority.

The court denied the motion and affirmed appellant's conviction for murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder?
Decision:

Yes.A perusal of the facts of the case readily reveals that abuse of superior
strength attended the crime. In several cases, this Court has ruled that this
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the
crime. In a recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the
aggressor's superior strength. The circumstance must apply with more reason in
the present case, where the abuse of superior strength is evident from the
notorious disparity between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old
unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a knife.
Eileen S. Tan 2007-0027

Treachery

People v. Piedad (393 SCRA 488)

Facts:

On the night of April 10, 1996, victim Mateo Lactawan, and his friend
Andrew were drinking beer when he got involved in a fist fight with other people
drinking alcohol in the nearby store. That was when Luz, Mateo's wife arrived in the
scene of the crime and saw that a group of men were attacking his husband. Among
the other aggressors who continuedly boxed Mateo who's already lying on the
ground, Luz saw Niel struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Lito stabbed
Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which
eventually led to Mateo's death. Niel Piedad claims that the attack on the victim was
made upon an impulse of the moment and was not the product of deliberate intent;
while Lito Garcia contends that treachery cannot be appreciated inasmuch as the
attack was preceded by a quarrel and heated discussion.

Issue:

Whether or not treachery must be appreciated as an aggravating

circumstance?

Held:

Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove: a) that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself, and b) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
While it is true that the victim herein may have been warned of a possible danger to
his person, since the victim and his companion headed towards their residence
when they saw the group of accused-appellants coming back for them after an earlier
quarrel just minutes before, in treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was
executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.

In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any chance of defending himself from
the concerted assault of his aggressors, even if he was forewarned of the attack.
Mateo was obviously overpowered and helpless when accused- appellants' group
numbering around eight, ganged up and mauled him. More importantly, Mateo
could not have actually anticipated the sudden landing of a large concrete stone
on his head. The stone was thus treacherously struck. Neither could the victim
have been aware that Lito came up beside him to stab his back as persons were
beating him from every direction. Lito's act of stabbing the victim with a knife,
inflicting a 15-centimeter-deep wound shows deliberate intent of using a particular
means of attack. Considering the location of the injuries sustained by the victim
and the absence of defense wounds, Mateo clearly had no chance to defend
himself. In view of the foregoing, treachery was correctly appreciated by the trial
court.
Eileen S. Tan 2007-0027

People v. Piliin (515 SCRA 207)

Facts:

On 19 November 1997, Rodrigo arrived at the gate of his house aboard on

an owner-type jeep he was driving. His wife, Norma Zayenis (Norma), who was
inside the house at the time, went out to open the gate. When Rodrigo was
about to park his jeep, a man, later identified as Piliin, suddenly approached him,
poked his gun, and fired at him, hitting the left side of his neck. Rodrigo fell
unconscious and the man quickly ran away. By reason of the gunshot
wound, the victim thereafter died. Piliin confesses killing Rodrigo and
implicated Yu and Caballes as his co-perpetrators. However, After trial,
appellant was found guilty for murder. The two other accused, Yu and Caballes
were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

During the stage of appeal, Piliin argues that the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of treachery. According to him, the witness failed to see
the inception of the attack because she was in the act of opening the gate for
her husband when the latter was shot. She lacked knowledge of the attending
circumstances prior to the shooting incident. Hence, the trial court's finding
of treachery becomes speculative.

Issue:

Whether or not treachery must be appreciated as an aggravating

circumstance?

Decision:

Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in their execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended party might
make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that
the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.
The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim
which renders the
latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and
severity of the attack. Appellant's wife witnessed the incident from its inception up
to its consummation.

In this case, the victim was about to park his car when appellant suddenly
appeared and shot him without any warning. The attack was so sudden that the
latter had no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. It can readily be inferred
that the manner of the attack adopted by appellant manifested treachery.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the weapon used and
the nature of the injury inflicted, which pertained to the lone gunshot fatally
wounding appellant, established that appellant deliberately and consciously adopted
the particular mode of attack to ensure the commission of the offense with
impunity.
People v. Ilo (392 SCRA 326)

Facts:

Amadeo, a witness declared that on the night of July 23, 1997 he and the
accused had a drinking spree in the latter's house. Moments later, appellant and his
live-in partner Virginia had a heated argument. Accused Ilo kicked her several
times.Ilo rushed to the kitchen, got hold of an old frying pan and struck Virginia
with it. She fell on the floor. Amadeo tried to placate his friend but was rebuffed
anew. Ilo got hold of a stone used as tripod in cooking and smashed Virginias
head with it. Consequently Virginia died. Thereafter the trial court rendered a
decision finding the Ilo guilty of Murder. On appeal, Appellant argues that the
injuries inflicted by him on the victim were spur-of- the- moment reflexes during a
passionate lovers quarrel, spawned by jealousy. He avers that the prosecution
failed to prove that the killing of Virginia by the Ilo was the product of a
preconceived plan. He further contends that his actuations were triggered by the
provocation emanating from the victim herself. Hence, appellant contends that he is
guilty only of homicide and not of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the
killing of the victim ?

Decision:

NO.Treachery is not presumed. The circumstances surrounding the murder

must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. To constitute treachery, two
conditions must be present, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or to retaliate; and (2) the
deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The Court held that
treachery cannot be appreciated if the assailant did not make any preparation to kill
the victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible or difficult
for the victim to defend herself. The prosecution must prove that the killing was
premeditated or that the assailant chose a method or mode of attack directly and
especially to facilitate and insure the killing without danger to
himself. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. There is no
treachery where the attack is neither sudden nor preconceived and deliberately
adopted but just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the offender. To
establish treachery, the evidence must show that the offender made some preparation
to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make
it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself. The mode of
attack must be planned by the offender and must not spring from the unexpected
turn of events. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal
altercation between the victim and the assailant such that the victim was forewarned
of the impending danger.

The prosecution failed to discharge its burden. The prosecution failed to

adduce evidence as to the relative positions of appellant vis--vis the victim. Taking
into account the sequential continuity and rapidity of the events resulting in the
death of Virginia, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant made preparations to kill
Virginia and adopted a mode of attack as to make it impossible or difficult for her to
defend herself.
Marie Joan Tusi 2007-0276

Ignominy

People v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 148712-15)

Facts:

On December 28, 1999, at 6:00PM, two armed men suddenly entered

Barnachea residence in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. The two ordered a
12-year old boy, Jessie E. Barnachea, to drop the floor by hitting him in the back with
the butt of a long gun. They hurriedly proceeded to the living room and shot Jessie's
uncle, Victorino Lolarga, and continued shooting in the kitchen hitting his mother
Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr., and his cousin Rubenson
Abance.

His eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, who then was in his uncle's
house, noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables
dealer," and with the description of the "El Shaddai" parked in front of the fence of
their house. Also, the jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors, Russel Tamba
and Francisco Andrada.

The incident was immediately reported to the police and at around 7:45
p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police
force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were
found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter brought to the
Aringay police station and then turned over to the Bauang police. Jessie was able to
identify two of the eight appellants by the name of Cachola and Amay as the two
assailants who entered the house. The next day a paraffin test was conducted on
the appellants.

The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings. Carmelita
sustained one gunshot wound on her head and three on her body; Felix, Jr., two
gunshot wounds on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and
arms; Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his body, and with his
penis excised;Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head and a stab wound that
lacerated his liver.
 RTC convicted all the eight appellants but the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) recommended the affirmance of the conviction for murder of appellants
Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the other appellants for failure of the
prosecution to establish their identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not excising of penis amounts to ignominy that can aggravate the
offense charged?

Decision:

NO. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be

committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus
adding to the victim's moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his
body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the
accused.

In this case, the information states that Victorino's sexual organ was severed
after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to
the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an
aggravating circumstance.

SC sustained the conviction of Cachola and Amay but the rest of the six
appellants were acquitted for the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
Marie Joan Tusi 2007-0276

People v. Bumidang (G.R. No. 130630)

Facts:

On September 29, 1996, at 2:00AM, accused Bumidang loudly called Melencio

Imbat (father of the victim) to open the latter's door. Melencio, an octogenarian
who was sleeping at that time, hurriedly opened the door as the accused
threatened to kill them if the door was not opened. The accused entered and asked
the old man to bring him upstairs where he and his 56-year old unmarried
daughter Gloria was sleeping. When they were in the room, the accused got a spear
at the side of Melencio's bed and ordered the latter to lie in a prone position as he
headed the daughter's bed. Gloria arose and screamed for help but his old father
was in no strength to help her and remained in a prone position as told by the
accused.

The accused approached Gloria and poked the spear at her. She recognized him
because he was lighting the room with a flashlight. The accused ordered her to stand
up and removed her pajama, with the panty going along with it. While the accused
was removing her clothes, she sat and struggled. The accused then removed his short
pants and became completely naked. He used the flashlight to examine her genital.
He placed the spear beside her and whenever she attempted to move, he would
point the spear at her. The accused then went on top of her, inserted his penis into
her pudenda, held her breasts and kissed her until he became sated. The accused
threatened the father and daughter that he will kill them if they will report it to the
authorities. Then he went to the door and left after satisfying his lust.

Despite the threats, Gloria reported the incident to a Kagawad who handed a note
to be given to the authorities (security). The accused was immediately arrested.

On October 1, 1996, Gloria submitted herself to a vaginal examination of Dr.

Quines, confirming a laceration of the hymen at 6:00 o'clock but no spermatozoa
were obtained. The laceration was about 3 to 5 days old at the time of the
examination.
 On 8 October 1996, a complaint for rape was filed before the MCTC of
Villaverde-Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya, and found a prima facie case against Bumidang.
The records were forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

When it reached RTC, it rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of rape
with the use of a deadly weapon under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and was
sentenced to death by lethal injection.

Issue:

Whether or not dwelling, nighttime and ignominy shall be appreciated as

aggravating circumstances of the crime of rape?

Decision:

YES. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of

dwelling. There was a clear violation of the sanctity of the victim's place of abode
when Gloria, who apparently did not give any provocation, was raped in her own
house. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode.

Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the

offender; (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of
the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture.

In this case, other than the fact that the crime was committed at about 2:00
o'clock in the morning, nothing on the record suggests that Bumidang
deliberately availed himself or took advantage of nighttime nor proved that
Bumidang used the darkness to facilitate his evil design or to conceal his identity.

The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account if

means are employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that
tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral
suffering.

In this case, it was established that Bumidang used the flashlight and
examined the genital of Gloria before he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed
in the presence of Gloria's old father. These facts clearly show that Bumidang
deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria, thereby aggravating and
compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a
woman was raped in the presence of her betrothed or of her husband or was made
to exhibit to the rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her.

SC sustained RTC's decision finding Baliwang guilty of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
Marie Joan Tusi 2007-0276

People v. Siao (G.R. No. 126021)

Facts:

On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00PM, accused-appellant Rene Siao, in his

residence, ordered Reylan Gimena, his family's 17-year old houseboy, to pull
Estrella Raymundo, their 14-year old housemaid, to the women's quarters. Once
inside, appellant Siao pushed her to the wooden bed and asked her to choose one
among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. Appellant lit the candle and dropped
the melting candle on her chest. Estrella was made to lie down on her back on the
bed w/ her head hanging over one end.

Appellant then poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to spread her
arms w/ his gun pointed to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet and hands
w/ an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed. As Siao
pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to undress and commanded her to take
the initiative on Gimena. Not understanding what he meant, appellant motioned to
her poking the gun at her temple. Gimena was then ordered to remove his
shorts. He did not do so but only let his penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms
of Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and shouted for help
twice. Siao then ordered Gimena to rape Estrella. At first, Gimena refused because
he has a sister. However, Siao said that if they would not obey, he would kill both of
them.

Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and intimidated at gunpoint by Siao to
have carnal knowledge of each other. They performed the sexual act because they
were afraid they would be killed. Siao commanded Gimena to rape Estrella in 3 diff
positions (i.e. missionary position, side-by-side and dog position as narrated
vividly in the case), pointing the handgun at them the whole time. Thereafter,
Siao warned them, "If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers."

Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the whole event. He asserts that she
retaliated through this accusation because Estrella herself was accused of stealing
many of his family's personal effects.
Issue:

Whether or not ignominy, as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of

rape, is attendant to justify the award of exemplary damages?

Decision:

YES. The RTC overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing
the rape used not only the missionary position i.e. male superior, female inferior
but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven in the
case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.

Still, SC respected RTC's finding of facts and found any inconsistencies in the
witnesses' testimonies inconsequential considering that they referred to trivial matters
w/c have nothing to do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape that is
carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even if it was pointed out
that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a span of less than 30 mins, w/c does
not conform to common experience, rape was still present from the evidence
because rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is
what constitutes rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied by many people at
the time of the crime, rape was still committed because lust is no respecter of time
and place. And Estrella's and Gimena's decision not to flee proves only the fear and
intimidation that they were under because Siao was after all their "amo" or
employer who threatened to kill them or their family if they did not succumb to his
demands.

The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of a deadly
weapon. Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral damages, w/c is
automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in the amount of
PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment
affirmed w/ modification of damages awarded.
Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140

Aid of Minor or By Means of Motor Vehicles

People v. Mallari (404 SCRA 170)

Facts:

Based on the accusatory portion of the Information filed against Rufino

Mallari, he was accused of hitting and bumping one Joseph Galang with an Isuzu
Canter Elf truck on or about July 7, 1996. The evidence for the prosecution
showed that the said incident was preceded by an altercation between Rufino
Mallari and Joseph Galang when the latter admonished the former not to drive fast
while passing by the latter's house. To end the situation Joseph, together with his
brothers, who were also present at that time, asked for apology from Rufino.
However, the conflict did not end there because when dusk came and while Joseph
was watching basketball game with his wife, Rufino arrived with some companions
and attacked Joseph with bladed weapons. They chased him and when Joseph was
able to run away, Rufino pursued him with the use of the Isuzu Canter Elf truck.
When he caught up with him, he bumped him which resulted in his instant
death. The doctor who conducted the medico-legal inspection of the cadaver
testified that Joseph's cause of death was "crushing injury on the head secondary
to vehicular accident". The trial court found Rufino liable with murder and sentenced
with the penalty of death after considering the qualifying circumstance of use of
motor vehicle in committing the crime. The case was brought to the Supreme Court
pursuant to the requirement of automatic review of cases penalized with death
penalty based on Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. Rufino argued that the use of
a motor vehicle was only incidental, considering that he resorted to it only to enable
him to go after Joseph after he failed to catch up with the latter.

Issue:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle was

correctly appreciated by the trial court in imposing the death penalty?
Decision:

The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used
by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.

The case of People v. Munoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the

present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the
accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the
place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused
the latter's death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by
running over him.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another "by
means of a motor vehicle" is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle
qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, we shall apply
Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation

and treachery, which were alleged in the information, were not proved. What was
proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the
testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution.

In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of

one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty
to be imposed on Rufino.
Anna May Vallejos 2007-0140

People v. Enguito (326 SCRA 508)

Facts:

On or about September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme was driving a motorela,

together with his wife Rosita and another passenger, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre,
who is the deceased in this case. The deceased was picked up by them on their
way home and requested them to bring him to his house. While on their way, a white
vehicle, which was later on identified as a Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No.
722, intentionally hit and pushed the motorela that they were riding and violently
kept pushing it causing it to turn around facing the direction from where it came
from and fell on its right side. Rosita testified that while she was struggling out of
the motorela she noticed that the white vehicle went up the elevated catwalk or
pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit when he was already at the railing
(barandilla). Then she observed that the white vehicle drove away without even
caring to see what happened to them. The spouses/victims were brought to the
police station while the Achumbre was brought to the hospital who was declared
dead on arrival. It was later on found out upon investigation that said incident was
predicated on the earlier fight which transpired between Achumbre and the driver of
the motor vehicle, Thadeos Enguito, the accused in this case. As a result of the
death of Achumbre, his wife filed a criminal complaint against the accused. The
Regional Trial Court found him guilty with the crime of Homicide with Less Serious
Physical Injuries, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of use of
motor vehicle which was alleged in the information. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter modified the crime to Murder due to the aggravating
circumstance. The accused went to the Supreme Court imputing error on the decision
of the Court of Appeals with respect to the declaration of the crime of Murder against
him on the ground that he did not intentionally choose the motor vehicle he was
driving as a means of committing the offense, and that at most, the vehicle was
the only available means to stop the deceased from escaping. He argued that it was
his intention to apprehend and surrender the deceased to the police for his
previous act of mauling him but in the process, he killed the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
should be considered in this case?
Decision:

The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of

motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same
was perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor
vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By
his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the
crossing. Accused-appellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police
instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already
noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his
pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased[16] who was hit
when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant
further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1)
kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon
seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.

Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of

homicide with two (2) mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and voluntary
surrender; and had the charge been homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find
that these mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-
appellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping and
pushing the motorela which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the
deceased and he was allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on
him. When he regained consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a
policeman to report that he was mauled. Clearly, accused- appellant's state of mind
after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death was such that he
was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile
patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in
the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme. For passion to
be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show causes
sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason. The turmoil and
unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused
with the sentiment or excitement in the
mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his
sanity and self-control.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated.

Evidence shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant
himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but
admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". SPO3 Catiil further
testified that appellant did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its right
tire was already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was
patrolling the portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being
driven by accused-appellant already destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle
a little bit lower as it was running flat. Clearly, accused- appellant could have
eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his vehicle suffered a flat tire.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a

mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-
appellant is the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries. Under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the
maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The crime was committed
in 1992 where the penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious crime,
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty
for murder should be imposed for the complex crime of murder with less serious
physical injuries considering that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be
affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. And,
consonant with the ruling in People vs. Munoz that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution did not change the period of the penalty for murder except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to
reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Katherine Yarte 2011-0296

Cruelty

People v. Guerrero (389 SCRA 389)

Facts:

Orlando Guerrero, Jr., also known as Pablo, together with his father Orlando
Guerrero, Sr., nicknamed Dino, was accused of murder. The accuseds, conspired,
confederated and mutually helped one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and without justifiable cause, attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut off
the penis of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which caused his death thereafter, to the
damage and prejudice of his lawful heirs.

Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Orlando interposed self- defense
while his father, Dino, denied any complicity in the killing.

According to the the witness, Jacalne, he was informed that one Dino Guerrero
was inside the house nearby. Dino Guerrero came out with his hands extended
forward. SPO1 Emilio Taracatac immediately frisked and handcuffed him. Before Dino
was handcuffed, according to the witness, he said that it was his son who had killed
the victim. Thereafter, Dino was brought to the police station for custodial
investigation.

Further, Jacalne testified that appellant Orlando Guerrero, Jr., was not at the
scene of the crime during their investigation. But upon their return to the police
station, appellant was already there.[11 Appellant admitted killing the victim,
according to Jacalne, by clubbing the victim first with the wooden stick, and then
cutting his head and his penis with a knife.

Another withness, Ireneo Acierto, appellants brother-in-law, testified that while

he was resting in his house at past 11:30 in the morning of July 7, 1997, he heard
someone screaming. When he looked out from his window, he saw that the person
screaming was his sister-in-law, Ana. He went out of the house and went near the
porch of the Guerreros, where he saw Ernesto Ocampos head about to be severed by
appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed
 the same on the right side of the victims trunk. After that, appellant cut off Ernestos
penis. Ireneo noticed that while the head was being severed, the victim was lying
down on the floor, but not moving. Ireneo then told appellant, That is enough, bayaw.
Stop it. According to the witness, his wife Ana was also saying, That is enough,
Manong. Appellant angrily turned to Ireneo, telling him not to interfere or else he
might also be implicated. Ireneo hurriedly went away after that. Ireneo did not see his
father-in-law, Dino, at the time of the incident and did not know where Dino was.

The trial court convicted Orlando Guerrero, Jr. of murder while his father Dino
was acquitted.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of cruelty and/or outraging and scoffing the corpse in order to classify
the killing as murder despite failure of the prosecution to allege the same in the
information

Decision:

The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of (1) treachery and

(2) evident premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in the perpetration of the
crime, where there was deliberate and inhuman suffering of the victim and the
offender had scoffed at the victims corpse.

On treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court found that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution fell short of the requirements of the law.[ we hold that in
the present case, the trial court did not err when it found neither treachery nor
evident premeditation. However, the trial court found there was cruelty as well as
outraging or scoffing at the corpse, thus, qualifying the crime to murder.
Katherine Yarte 2011-0296

Simangan v. People (434 SCRA 38)

Facts:

On February 10, 1980 at about 8 pm, Simangan and four other men
wearing fatigues knocked on the door of the store owned by Ernesto and Sofronia.
The couple was having dinner with their daughter Lorna. Simangan asked Ernesto
to guide them on the road as they were not familiar. Ernesto agreed, he then
ordered his houseboy Romeo to accompany him in guiding the group of Simangan.
The next morning, Romeo reported to Sofronia that Ernesto is dead. Ernesto was
found near a creek, he sustained 10 stab wounds.

Issue:

Whether or not Simangan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Decision:

Yes. The testimonies of Romeo and Sofronia are credible. Thus, Simangan's
conviction is affirmed. It is found that Simangan stabbed Ernesto 10 times, three of
which were fatal. But the number of stab wounds does not qualify as an
aggravating circumstance against Simangan for it must be proven that Simangan
intended to exacerbate the suffering of Ernesto. Nigh time is also not appreciated
as it was included in the original information.
Katherine Yarte 2011-0296

People v. Catian (374 SCRA 514)

Facts:

PEDRO CATACUTAN alias "Pedro Duling" was accused of murder and frustrated
murder.

The trial court adjudged the accused guilty of murder qualified by treachery
for the death of Ligaya Santos. For the injury sustained by Renato Licup, the
accused was adjudged guilty of attempted murder only because Licup would not
have died even without medical attention. Nocturnity was not considered because
the site of the shooting was well lighted and for lack of evidence to indicate that
nighttime was purposely chosen to facilitate the commission of the crimes.
Recidivism was also considered because the accused "admitted that in 1963 he was
convicted of murder and frustrated murder for which he was sentenced to serve 8
years to 14 years imprisonment. As a matter of fact, he was granted parole and at
the time of the incident he was a parolee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that there was treachery?

Decision:

The record shows that the appellant had a previous misunderstanding with
Ligaya Santos; and that when he suddenly attacked her he was with a group of
armed men so that there was present not only the element of surprise but also the
advantage of no risk to himself.

Aleviosa was certainly present.

Joseph Oseo 2006-0350

Art. 15: Alternative Circumstances

Relationship

People v. Calongui (G.R. No. 170566)

Facts:

Calonqui was found guilty for two counts of rape. On January 1, 1998
about 2 am in Tagbong, Camarines Sur, Calonqui was able to rape the 13 year old
girl Maricel in the latter's house. On September 26, 1998 at about three in the
morning, the accused again raped the victim. Both rape incidents were witnessed by
the brother of Maricel.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and relationship be

appreciated against Calonqui and the latter circumstance as an alternative
circumstance?

Decision:

Calonqui and Maricel live under the same shelter as they are first cousins. At
the time of the incident, both are living in the same house and in the same room.
Therefore, the supposed aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated
as there was no trespass to the sanctity of the house of the victim on the part of
Calonqui, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship is likewise cannot go
against Calongui, even as an alternative circumstance, as being first cousins is
not within the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, his conviction is nonetheless affirmed.
 Joseph Oseo 2006-0350

People v. Marcos (G.R. No. 132392)

Facts:

Prosecution, with the testimony of a lone eye-witness, who happened to be

the son of the victim, along with the admission of guilt, found Cesar Marcos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of his elder brother, Virgilio, as
aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
During Appeal, the Solicitor General insisted that since the accused is a brother of
the victim, the alternative circumstance of relationship must be considered in
determining the imposable penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the alternative circumstance of relationship shall be

considered in the imposition of the proper penalty?

Decision:

In order that the Alternative Circumstance of relationship may be taken into

consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty, Paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the offended party must either be the
(a) spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother
or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degree, of the offender. Relationship is
Mitigating in Crimes against Property, while it must be considered as Aggravating in
Crimes against Persons where the offended party is a relative of a higher degree
than the offender or when in the same degree or level, as in brothers.

Therefore, the Alternative Circumstance of relationship shall be considered

as Aggravating.
Ray Nagrampa Jr. B. 2008-0061

Intoxication

People v. Marquita (G.R. No. 137050)

Facts:

On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was
sitting on a bench outside her house. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to
her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuna. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was
followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of
the house. When Edlyn was about to go upstairs, accused followed her and
successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but was
overpowered by the accused. Junilla shouted for help and the accused run away. She
was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.

On August 12, 1998, the provincial prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, an Information for murder against accused
George Cortes y Ortega. Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn and enter the plea
of guilty of the said crime. The prosecution presented evidence to prove the presence
of intoxication as aggravating circumstances. The accused on the other hand
presented evidence proving the alternative mitigating of intoxication.

On September 2, 1998, the trial court rendered decision finding accused

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentence to suffer the
penalty of Death.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime committed by the accused was aggravated by

reason of intoxication?

Decision:

Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating,

depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand,
when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A
person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having
taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime,
sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that
person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic
drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.

Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances

alleged in the information and considering that there was one mitigating
circumstance attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but
reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that "the only
aggravating circumstance present was treachery which qualified the killing to
murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in
accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6759
Ray Nagrampa Jr. B. 2008-0061

People v. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954)

Facts: On September 27 1998, appellant, Damaso Delima (Damaso), Damaso's

son Delfin and three other unidentified individuals were having a drinking spree in
Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. Anthony (damaso's another son) joined the group. At
around 6:00 p.m., Mondigo, using a "jungle bolo," suddenly hacked Anthony on the
head, causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Appellant next attacked
Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi, hearing shouts coming from
the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant repeatedly
hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off appellant's
blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained. Anthony sustained
wound on his left temporal area.Appellant was charged before the RTC with
Murder and Frustrated Murder. TheRTC found appellant guilty of Murder for the
killing of Damaso and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking of Anthony, mitigated
by intoxication.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in giving credence of alternative circumstance

of intoxication to mitigate the crime?

Decision:
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of
intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because "the stabbing incident ensued in
the course of a drinking spree." For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to
be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the
intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the
accused's drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the only proof on
record on this matter is appellant's testimony that before Damaso, Anthony, and
Delfin attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of beer." The low alcohol
content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed, and the absence of any
independent proof that appellant's alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all
negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time he committed
the crimes to mitigate his liability.
Alexander Santos 2006-0205

Arts. 16-20: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies

Principals

People v. Batin (GR No. 177223)

Facts:

Eugenio's wife, Josephine Refugio testified she glanced to her left and
saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their compound, looking towards her
and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars,
opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going
towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!"
Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just
proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed
the gun back to him. When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine
heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by
drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her
husband, and firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to
the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her.

Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the street, went between
the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and
Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan
ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na."

Issue:

Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable
as principal by inducement?

Decision:
 The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This
finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that
Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by
shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice - were
credible and
sufficed to prove Castor's indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio.
Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as
Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.

While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be
considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the
gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to
Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly
stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car
grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at
the spouses.

As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor's

utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not
to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the
gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the
Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and
Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil - a
crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the
commission of a felony.

Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.Even if we
pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would
be the same. Castor's argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words
'Sige, banatan mo na' cannot be considered as the moving cause of the
shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement.

Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or

agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have
actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held
that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime.
The moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of
conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger
would make no impression. There is no doubt in our minds that Castor's words
were the determining cause of the commission of the crime.
Alexander Santos 2006-0205

People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939)

Facts:

The appellant drove the passenger jeepney with his cohorts on board
looking for Luable and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in the
opposite direction, the appellant drove the vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo. And
when Geronimo fled, the appellant, armed with a bolo, pursued him. When the
appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned to the passenger jeepney and
drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant urged them on
to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts, leaving the
hapless Geronimo mortally wounded.

After trial, the court rendered judgment acquitting Ramon, but convicting the
appellant of murder for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted homicide for
attempting to kill Luis.

The appellant avers that he and his brother Ramon had no motive to kill
Geronimo. The appellant contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were not
in agreement as to who killed Geronimo. The appellant noted that according to the
testimony of the witness, the appellant stayed in the jeepney and merely yelled to
his companions who ganged up on Geronimo, "Sige patayin ninyo, patayin ninyo
na, at huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!"

The appellant further posits that the prosecution witnesses were not even in
accord as to where Geronimo was stabbed to death. The appellant argues that
because of the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution, it failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the said charges.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant when the witnesses
testimony didn't confirm who chased and stabbed the victims?

Decision:
 Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred by
Luis Luable or whether the accused merely incited his companions in the jeepney
to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the
determination of his liability because a conspiracy among the occupants of the
jeepney has been established.

In order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it

must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or
by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene
of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to
move them to executing the conspiracy."

The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed that where there are several accused
and conspiracy has been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint who among
the accused inflicted the fatal wound. Where conspiracy has been established,
evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary.
All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character
of their participation because the act of one is the act of all.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more person agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,
showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may
be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it
has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty
as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of
a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it
was not intended as part of the original design.

Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a

particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to
and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended
the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which
necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of
law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for
the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively
from that which they intended to commit. When a conspirator embarks upon a
criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and
membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he
understands them."

All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of conspiracy between the
appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus,
criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he did
not actually stab the latter.
Alexander Santos 2006-0205

People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)

Facts:

Appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of murder for the
death of Rosemarie Tallada, with aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and sentenced to the extreme penalty of
death.

In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his
participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemarie's legs to prevent
her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as
Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.

He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation

(DUCC), was looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could
spend the night. He offered his brother's house which was under his care. In the
evening of February 6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the
house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.

After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that
evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When
he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot
was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of heeding him, the latter
ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated
just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of
the woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls."

The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot
wanted to dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide.
Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot
gave appellant P500.Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7,
2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete mixture and cast the dead
body in cement.
Issue:

Whether or not appellant is liable as a principal?

Decision:

The rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any such
disclaimer by appellant.

Moreover, despite appellant's self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his

involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. Assuming for the
sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellant's admission that he
participated in its commission by holding Rosemarie's legs made him a principal by
direct participation.

Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered
principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present: 1.) they
participated in the criminal resolution and 2.) they carried out their plan and
personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same
end.

Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have
participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of
the commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there
be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.

It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of

another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in
the commission of the crime charged. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission
of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a
common purpose or design.
Mark Vergara 2008-0323

Accomplices

People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)

Facts:

An information for the murder of Roderick Ferol was filed against accused-
appellant Restituto Roche and three others, namely, Marcelino Fallore, Francisco
Gregorio, and one John Doe. The Court found that the prosecution evidence has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Restituto Roche for the
crime of murder but could not make a pronouncement as to the guilt of accused
Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and therefore could not be
arraigned.Finding that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of
accused Francisco Gregorio and Marcelino Fallore, both accused were acquitted.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant should held liable for the killing of
Roderick Ferol on the ground of conspiracy?

Decision:

No. In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto
Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.Apart from Helen
Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness
was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated in the commission
of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with
Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that accused-appellant was
responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him
(Restituto), this would not suffice to find accused- appellant in conspiracy with
Dorico Caballes.

For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the

crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.

In People v. Elijorde, Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the

crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold
an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence,
conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing
the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases,
complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield
the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent
or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular
acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference.

Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant, together with Dorico

Caballes, had resolved to attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on
Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out of the desire to
get even with him for the offense committed against his brother. In no way can such
act be attributed to accused-appellant.Neither can accused-appellant be held liable
as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites must concur in order
that a person may be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e.,
knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant performed any previous

or simultaneous act to assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has
not been proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes plan to attack and kill
Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict
accused-appellant, we cannot uphold the trial courts finding of guilt. Our legal
culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any
person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even
property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and
must be consistent with all of them.
Mark Vergara 2008-0323

Abarquez v. People (G.R. No. 150762)

Facts:

The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and

attempted homicide alleging in the two informations filed that said accused
was conspiring and confederating with one Alberto Almojuela in the killing of
Ricardo Quejong Bello, by stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting
him with a gun at the back.

The trial court found Abarquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an

accomplice in the crime of homicide.

Abarquez filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However the Court of

Appeals rejected Abarquez's allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to
pacify the quarreling parties.

Abarquez alleges that the prosecution's evidence does not satisfy the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an
accomplice. He further alleges that there was a misapprehension of facts and
that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the
credibility of the witnesses against him.

Issue:

Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to prove that fact that

Abarquez was an accomplice in the killing of Ricardo Bello?

Decision:No.
 Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice:

(1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs
with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and

lG9 l P a g e
(2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are
not indispensable to the commission of the crime.Mere commission of an act,
which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly

rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal
act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable
as an accomplice; that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation.

The court held in one case that the mere presence of the accused at the
crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged.

In convicting Abarquez in this case, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by
Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was
grappling with Almojuela.

Paz's testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela's
criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to
stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was
only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking
to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling
with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez's action as an attempt
to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the
trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz
admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him
and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz
from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz
from joining the fight. Abarquez's act of trying to stop Paz does not translate
to assistance to Almojuela.
Mark Vergara 2008-0323

People v. Compo (G.R. No. 112990)

Facts:

Mauricio Gonzaga and Lemuel Compo were charged conspiring in the

murder of Procopio Dales
.
Based on the statements of Libardo, Gonzaga, PO3 Pedro Wate, and the
post mortem findings the the Court held the accused Mauricio Gonzaga and
Lemuel Compo guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced each one of them to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused Lemuel Compo filed with the trial court a notice of appeal. In this
appeal, accused-appellant imputes a single assignment of error to the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of the witness Librado that he saw

Lemuel carrying an Indian Pana is sufficient to establish the latter is an
accomplice to the crime?

Decision: No.

The court held that the prosecution failed to overcome the

constitutional presumption of innocence. Basically, accused-appellant Lemuel
was convicted based on the testimony of the conductor of passenger bus
Gilberto Libardo who saw Lemuel carrying an "Indian Pana" and a flashlight.
Without any testimony positively identifying accused-appellant as the assailant
nor any evidence directly linking him as the author of the crime, Lemuel Compo
cannot be convicted of the murder of Dales. The accused-appellant deserves
an acquittal and must forthwith be given back his liberty.

The testimony of witness Mauricio Gonzaga, states that Lemuel was

merely present before the stabbing incident, holding a flashlight. No other
overt act was established to prove that Lemuel shared and concurred with the
criminal
design of Mauricio. The mere presence of Lemuel, who was not shown to be
armed, at the scene of the crime does not connote conspiracy.

Singularity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are
essential to establish conspiracy.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.Conspiracy transcends companionship.The presence and company of Lemuel
were not necessary or essential to the perpetration of the murder.

Neither can Lemuel be considered an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised

Penal Code provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a principal, cooperates
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. To be convicted as
such, it is necessary that he be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and
then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the
efficacious execution of the crime.

The prosecution, however, failed to present convincing evidence establishing

that accused-appellant Lemuel knew of the other accused's intent to kill Dales.
Again, his mere presence at the scene of the crime and his flight therefrom with
the other accused are not proof of his participation in the crime. The quantum of
proof required in criminal prosecution to support a conviction has not been reached
with regard to accused-appellant Lemuel. The oft-repeated truism that the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence applies.He must, therefore, be acquitted on
reasonable doubt.

Jasmine Calaycay 2005-0049

 Accessories

People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)

Facts:

On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila
Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca,
Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked
what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house
located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo
immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo
explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the
sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to
the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to
Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan.

Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen
and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin,
just stayed quiet in the living room.Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his
hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When
about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately walloped Hernan on
the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the
ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring
Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by
the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried
Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped, then
Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the
latter's instant death. After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the
three immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila and Merwin and warned
them that if they will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed
whatever Tolentino told them.

On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of

Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing
the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one who killed
Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also
fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.

However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become final
and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience- stricken,
executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario
and retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros.

The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified
Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and later
stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by
treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant (Jonathan
Fabros) manifested his approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with

8
those of the other accused. Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-
conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be convicted as an

accessory?

Decision:

Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal

Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime
and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part
subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty
of some other crime. To convict an accused as an
accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the
commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three
above-cited modes.

Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction

of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have
been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is
wanting in the present case.

In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co- accused
would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim
towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his
innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the
stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not incredible for an
eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if
to do so would put the former's life in peril.

The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome

by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.
 5-0049

People v. Cui (G.R. No. 121982)

Facts:

In the evening of December 5, 1990, ten (10) armed robbers raided the
compound of Johnny and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims,
their three (3) children, and the employees of the family-owned business, were able
to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias "Toto" Garcia and two of his men, Mawe
Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be identified as they had
flour sacks over their heads. The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). They also blindfolded and forcibly abducted
seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the Lims. They
demanded a ransom of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) for her release.Johnny
Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the afternoon of the next
day at an arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father.

Initially, the Lim's kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they
reported the kidnapping to the Philippine National Police Cebu Metropolitan District
Command (Cebu Metrodiscom). The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST)
conducted an investigation and Johnny Lim identified one of the suspects as Toto
Garcia.

Toto Garcia was known as the leader of a group of armed robbers called the
Baong Gang. The gang's base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu.
When the police learned that Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City,
they decided to interrogate him.

Upon Basingan's interrogation, he identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and

Edgar as the three (3) who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two
(2) who held him and the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain
Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed outside the
Lim compound. He named Toto Garcia as the chief plotter of the crime at bar, and
revealed that his neighbor and close family friends, the spouses Leonilo and Beverly
Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to join the plot and was
assured that he would not be under suspicion because he
would be placed at gun point together with the other members of the Lim household
when the crime is committed. However, he refused to join the plot during the
December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the residence of the Cuis in Quiot, Pardo,
Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even invoked their close ties as godfathers of each other's
children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar,
Rey, Sadam and the Cuis.

On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement reiterating

these revelations in writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by
executing a Joint Affidavit. Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr. filed an
information for Kidnapping with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and the
members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn
statement.On the same day, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested.

On March 14, 1991, Joselito "Tata" Garcia, Hilaria Sarte and her live-in
partner, Luis Obeso, referred to by Basingan as "Laring" and "Leos", respectively,
were arrested in the neighboring Negros Island. The next day, however, Tata
Garcia died due to "hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds." Upon
presentation of his death certificate, the trial court ordered his name deleted from
the information.

After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Manuel J. Adlawan found that the

participation of the Cuis was only that of accomplices amended the Information
downgrading the charge against the Cui's as mere accomplices in the kidnapping
with ransom of Stephanie Lim.

On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and
they all pleaded not guilty. On June 27, 1991, Basinga escaped from the prison.
Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in
absentia.

On February 13, 1992, Beinvenido Nacario, alias "Rey Nacario", was arrested.
On arraignment on April 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1991,
he, too, escaped from detention and remains at large to this date.
On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested before the trial court that, per
newspaper report, Toto Garcia had been killed in Davao. Thus, on December 6, 1993,
the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and Nacario.
Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appeal on May 19, 1994. The Cui's filed
theirs on May 31, 1994.

Issue:

Whether or not the Cui's are liable as accessories?

Decision:

Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accessories to the

crime those who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein by profiting
themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime, without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices. Conviction of an
accused as an accessory requires the following elements: (1) that he has
knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part in it
subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These twin elements are present in
the case of the Cui's, and indubitable proof thereof is extant in the records of the
case.

The Court held that the Cui's profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim
and are liable as accessories.
Jasmine Calaycay 2005-0049

People v. Verzola (G.R. No. L-35022)

Facts:

On September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo

Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at
Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by
the two appellee to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Appellant
Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and threw his bloodstained
sweater undershirt and underwear, including the piece of wood be used in clubbing
the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal building and
reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. The police
authorities together with the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a
photographer went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. They found the body of the
deceased Bernardo Molina sprawled at the foot of the bamboo ladder. Blood had
oozed from the mouth, nose and ears. There were bloodstains on the floor of the
bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on the beddings of the deceased. The
bloodstains led to the bamboo ladder where some of the stains could be found on
the steps of the ladder. When questioned by the police, Josefina revealed that the
assailant of her husband was Ricardo Verzola.

Upon her request, she was brought to the Office of the Chief of Police of
Bangued, where at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 1969 she
gave a written statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the incident in
question and pointing to appellant Verzola as the assailant of her husband. In that
extra-judicial statement, she stated that immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the
evening of September 28. 1969, appellant Ricardo Verzola went to their house in
Barrio Lipcan, Bangued Abra entered the room where she was sleeping with her
husband, Bernardo Molina, woke her up and had carnal knowledge of her; that
when Bernardo Molina woke up and attempted to rise from the floor, that was the
moment when Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting him on the head several times
that afterwards, she heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs and the
voice of Verzola saying that he was leaving and warning her not to say anything
about the incident. She looked out of the door and saw her
husband already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was
sworn to by her before Municipal Judge Francisco T. Valera.

On that same morning, appellant Verzola was picked up by the police and
brought to the municipal building, and there he also executed a written statement
admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. Both appellants admit that it
was appellant Verzola who inflicted the fatal blows on the victim.

The trial court convicted Verzola as principal and Josefina Molina as an

accessory to the crime of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not assisting the principal in bringing the body of the deceased to
the ground will make one an accessory to the crime?

Decision:

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the
commission of the felony, but with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he
subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the
crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to
prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the
principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply assisting

Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said
body for anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy
the body of the crime. The concealing or destroying of the body of the crime, the
effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime.
In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it
was easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been
any attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. Thus,
Josefina Molina is acquitted.
 John Kirvy 2008-0032

Accessories Exempt from Criminal Liability

People v. Mariano (G.R. No. L-40527)

Facts:

That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8, 1971, in San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being then
appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino
Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of the municipality and authorized to receive and
be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said
municipality, received from the said USAID/NEC the following items with a total
value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of making delivery of said items
to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in
possession of the said items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation
and in spite of repeated demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply
and convert to his own personal use and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or
P4,797.35, belonging to the said USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the
said owner in the said sum of
$717,50 or P4,797.35. On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his
counsel Filed a motion to quash the Information on the following grounds:

1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the
person of the defendant;
2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a legal excuse or

justification.

In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the
subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which
Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco was indicted before a Military Commission under a
charge of malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had been
found guilty and that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already
been decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had
lost jurisdiction over the case against him.
 On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows:

Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the
malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter in its
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court, the case involving the subject properties had
already been heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the Military
Commission, and as such this Court is without jurisdiction to pass upon anew the
same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to quash on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction but did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion to
quash.

Issue:

Whether or not Mariano can be held liable for estafa?

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent court gravely erred when it
ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the
filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military
Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in
the case now before the SC the accused in one is different from the accused in the
other.

The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived

exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of
jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case filed before it is to be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction.
That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided
that Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction ln all criminal cases
in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months,or
a fine of more than two hundred pesos.The offense of estafa charged against
respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty
imposed which exceeds six (6) months
 imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims in

his Order is that his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military
commission and because the latter tribunal was the first to take cognizance of the
subject matter, respondent court lost jurisdiction over it .That statement of
respondent court is incorrect. In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through
then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the settled
rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, it is rightly contended by
the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM- 649 was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that was December 18, 1974, the law in force
vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular
provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any Presidential
issuances under Martial Law. The Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction
over the crime of estafa.
Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316

Arts. 21-24: Penalties in General Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws People v.

Evina (G.R. No. 124830-310)

Facts:

Gerardo Evina was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City
(Branch 9) of two counts of simple rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count. The crime of rape was committed on
November 3, 1991 and on November 7, 1991, in the City of Tacloban against
Marites Cacharo while she was sleeping in her bedroom. Evina tied Marites's hands
with a big handkerchief and poked a knife at her. This special aggravating
circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
were both proven during the trial. However, these were not alleged in the
information.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances be considered in fixing the

penalty?

Decision:

The aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty

because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes
charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the
same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant. Although
the aggravating circumstances in question cannot be appreciated for the purpose of
fixing a heavier penalty in this case, they should, however, be considered as bases
for the award of exemplary damages, conformably to current jurisprudence.
Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316

People v. Lazaro (G.R. No. 112090)

Facts:
Lazaro was charged, tried and convicted for two separate crimes of illegal

possession of firearms/ammunition and homicide under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866

which was the governing law at the time the crime was committed in 1991. The two
separate cases, Criminal Case No. 91-3487 (for homicide) and Criminal Case No. 91-
3483 (for illegal possession of firearm) were not tried jointly, although filed in the
same trial court. Republic Act No. 8294 has since amended
P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of
illegal possession and considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6,
1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was committed on May 5, 1991. In
view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act 8294 to Presidential Decree
1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in
order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating
circumstance in the homicide case.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be rightfully convicted of the crime of

illegal possession of firearms separately from the crime of homicide under RA 8294
(amending PD 1866).

Decision:
No. As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application
except where the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In this case R.A.
8294 will spare accused-appellant Lazaro from a separate conviction for the crime
of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive
application.

Accordingly, accused-appellant Lazaro should be spared from a separate

conviction for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of the
present review. Accused-appellant Lazaro was hereby acquitted of the said crime and
the case was dismissed.
Heide Olarte-Congson 2007-0316

People v. Pacifador (G.R. No. 139405)

Facts:

On October 27, 1988, Arturo F. Pacificador then Chairman of the Board

of

the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation,

and therefore, a public officer was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The crime was committed from December
6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila by Pacificador. After his
arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
prescription of the offense. Sandiganbayan on November 10, 1998 dismissed
the Information against the respondent on the ground of prescription. The
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General was denied by
the Sandiganbayan. Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive
period. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides
that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen
(15) years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019 by
B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for
offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime had not yet prescribed as the special
law
governing the same have been amended increasing the prescriptive period from ten
(10) to fifteen (1) years.

Decision:
The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11
of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the
reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused, cannot be given
retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten
(10) years from January 6, 1976. The crime had already prescribed when the
Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.It
bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be
adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on
prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the
state in favor of the offender.

Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406

Pardon by Offended Party

Sta. Catalina v. People (G.R. No. 167805)

Facts:

Lorenzo Ballecer entered into a joint business venture with Arnold Sta.
Catalina involving importation of Jute sacks from China. Petitioner told that he had
a ready buyer in the Philippines which was willing to buy the jute sacks at P12.25
per piece. Convinced, Ballecer ordered one container to Sta. Catalina.

Thereafter, Ballecer and Sta. Catalina proceeded to Citytrust Bank to open a

letter of credit. They were required to post a marginal deposit amounting to P100,
000. The two went to United Coconut Planters Bank to encash a check. After the
encashment, they went back to Citytrust but arrived after banking hours. Sta. Catalina
suggested that the money be deposited in his account which Ballecer agreed.

Few days after, while preparing the supporting documents for the letter of
credit, Ballacer found that there was an overpricing on the cost of the jute sacks.
Realizing that his business venture was losing proposition he asked Sta. Catalina to
return the P100, 000, however, the latter failed to return the money despite
repeated verbal and formal demands made by the former.

Sta. Catalina as defense alleged that there was no misappropriation of the

money. He further claimed that the said money was spent and used for the office
expenses, salaries and other expenses of the office which both of the occupy.

The trial court convicted Sta. Catalina for the crime of Estafa. Aggrieved, he
appealed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. However, the
public prosecutor filed a manifestation stating that Ballecer is no longer interested
in pursuing his complaint and the case should be decided based on Ballecer's
Affidavit of Desistance. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the
judgment of conviction by the trial court. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Ballacer will justify the
dismissal of the action?

Decision:

The Supreme Court held that an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. In the case at
bar, Ballecer made the so-called pardon of Sta. Catalina after the institution of the
action, almost two years after the trial court had rendered its decision.

The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when

executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who had given it
later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a
solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.
Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406

Balderama v. People (G.R. No. 147578-85)

Facts:

Rolando Balderama and Rolando Nagal are employees of the Field

Enforcement Division of LTO. On the other hand, Juan Armamento is the operator of
SJ Taxi. On July 14, 1992, the team of Flying Squad flagged down one taxi owned
by Armamento. They impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was
defective, however, upon inspection and testing by the LTO the results showed
that the meter was functioning normally.

Feeling aggrieved, Armamento filed a complaint for Bribery and violation of

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. He alleged that prior to
the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting protection
money from him in exchange of non-apprehension and non- impounding of his
vehicles.

Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine
(9) Information for violation of Direct Bribery and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. During the pendency of the action, accused De Jesus died. The cases against
him were dismissed but the hearing proceeded against Balderama, Nagal and
Lubrica.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, convicting Balderama, Nagal and

Lubrica for the above violation. They filed a motion for reconsideration but were
denied by the former. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Armamento's affidavit of recantation will result to the dismissal

of the complaint?
Decision:

The Supreme Court held that the complaint shall not be dismissed. A
recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The
court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It
is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the
accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention.

The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which
when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld.

In this case, there is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on the
guilt of the accused Balderama and Nagal.
Ozelle Dedicatoria 2006-0406

People v. Dimaano (G.R. No. 168168)

Facts:

Maricar Dimaano is the daughter of the accused Edgardo Dimaano. A

complaint was filed by Maricar charging Edgardo with two counts of Rape and one
count of attempted rape. Maricar alleged that she was only 10 years old when her
father Edgardo started sexually abusing her. It was only on November of 1995 that
she confided the sexual abuses to her mother. The last sexual assault happened
in the afternoon of January 1, 1996.

Maricar and her mother went to Camp Crame upon the advised of a
relative. The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the
complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and
was in a non-virgin state.

On the other hand, the accused denied such accusations. He contended that
he could not have raped Maricar because he was always in the office. He claimed
that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter because there were other people
in the house. He further argued that had he raped Maricar, then she would have not
accompanied him to the Paranaque Police Station to apply for police clearance.

The trial court rendered its Decision, convicting Edgardo of the crime of
Rape. Aggrieved, he appealed his case before the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the Affidavit of Desistance
by Maricar is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint against Edgardo?
Decision:

The Supreme Court held that by itself, an Affidavit of Desistance is not a

ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. A
private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape
charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore
continue to be heard by the trial court.

The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when

executed afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact
that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having
the accused arrested by the police, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly
turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.

In the case at bar, Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open

court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and had
shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.
Maria Garalde 2008-0326

Arts. 25-45: Penalties

Reclusion Perpetua

People v. Novio (G.R. No. 139332)

Facts:

On September 23, 1994, 13-year-old Maricel B. Talisay, together with her

minor brothers Jun and Joey slept side-by-side at their store. Their parents were
caretakers of a beach house and needed to sleep there at that time. At 3:00 in the
morning, a ticklish sensation and stabs of pain in her vagina awakened Maricel.
When she woke up, she saw the accused, Noli Novio, naked on top of her. Her
duster was rolled up to her neck and her panty has already been removed by
the accused. Noel Novio was able to penetrate his penis inside Maricel's Vagina.

Meanwhile, Maricel's parents were awakened by their neighbor and reported

to them that a man was inside their store. Nenita, Maricel's mother immediately
got hold of her bolo and flashlight and proceeded to their store. Nenita saw a
man's sandals at the doorstep. Nenita knocked and called out to Maricel and
ordered her to open the door. Despite repeated demands to open the door, Maricel
was not able to do so. Nenita was able to forcibly open the door and beamed the
flashlight to Maricel and saw Noel Novio on top of her. The accused was holding the
hands of Maricel with his left hand and covered her mouth with his right hand.
Nenita mounted to hack Novio with her bolo but the accused immediately took his
jogging pants and ran away leaving his shirt, wallet, underwear and sandals.
Nenita immediately reported the incident to the barangay and went to the police for
investigation. Maricel submitted herself to medical examination right after the
incident.

Noli Novio denied the allegations and argued that Maricel and him are
sweethearts. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of rape and sentenced him to 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of these
proceedings.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the proper penalty for
the crime of rape?

Decision:

No, the Supreme Court held that the penalty imposed by the trial court is
void. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659,
the prescribed penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. However, the trial court
sentenced the appellant to thirty years of reclusion perpetua. The penalty
imposed by the trial court is void.Although under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Republic 7659, reclusion perpetua has a range of twenty years and
one day to forty years, by nature, the penalty remains a single and indivisible
penalty. It cannot be divided into periods or equal portions. If the law prescribes
reclusion perpetua as a single and indivisible penalty for a felony, the trial court is
mandated to impose said penalty, absent any privileged mitigating circumstances
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court is not
authorized to vary the penalty provided for by law either in the character or the
extent of punishment inflicted.

There was no need for the trial court to specify the duration of thirty years of
reclusion perpetua whenever it is imposed as a penalty in any proper case. The
Court is not impervious to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which
pertinently provides that, in applying the so-called "three-fold rule," i.e., that
"(w)hen the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, . . . the maximum duration of
the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him" - "the
duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."
The imputation of a thirty-year duration to reclusion perpetua in Article 70 is, as this
Court recently held, "only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's
eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of
multiple penalties.
Maria Garalde 2008-0326

People v. Zacarias (G.R. No. 138990)

Facts:
Sergio Pelicano, Sr., on direct examination, testified that on June 23,
1993

at about 12:30 in the morning while waiting for his son, he heard a
commotion outside his house. When he looked outside, he saw Christopher
Sacay, son of his long-time friend, being chased by Sammy Zacarias, Rodel
Zacarias, Wally Ticalo and Rene Matugas. The boy ran towards the Seventh
Day Adventist Church. Pelicano followed the group and when he was only
about 10 meters away from the four men, he saw Rodel Zacarias hold the
victim while the rest took turns in stabbing and hacking the boy.However,
Ticalo claimed that on the day of the said incident, he was working in the
farm and had a drinking spree with the owner of the farm until 10:00 in the
evening. The owner of the farm even contended that the town where his farm
was was far distant from the town where the stabbing incident took place. The
trial court sentenced Ticalo to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
death of Christopher Sacay

Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding Ticalo guilty
of the

crime charged?

Decision:
No, the Supreme Court is not convinced with the contention of Ticalo,
however, a word, in passing, about the manner the trial court imposed the
penalty. In the scales of penalties under the Revised Penal Code, reclusion
perpetua is the penalty immediately higher than reclusion temporal which has
a duration of twelve years and one day to twenty years. The minimum range
of reclusion perpetua should then, by necessary implication, start at 20 years
and 1 day while the maximum thereunder could be co-extensive with the
rest of the natural life of the offender. Article 70, however, provides that the
maximum period in regard to the service of sentence shall not exceed 40
years. Reclusion perpetua remains to be an indivisible penalty and, when it
is the prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety, i.e., reclusion
perpetuasans a fixed period for its duration, regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the
crime. In prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua,its duration in years, in
fine, need not be specified.
Maria Garalde 2008-0326

People v. Ramirez (G.R. No. 138261)

Facts:

On May 23, 1993, at 7:30 in the evening in Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City,
Montano Banez, while strolling in the plaza, saw the victim Jonathan 'Jojo" Alkuino.
Since Jojo was a former resident of the barangay, Banez invited him to have a
drinking spree in the nearby store. The two sat side-by-side and were exchanging
stories when Pedro Ramirez suddenly came up to them. Ramirez hit Jojo on the right
side of his body just below his ribs. Jojo was immediately brought to the hospital
and was still alive on arrival but died the next day due to hypovolemic shock or
massive blood loss. The trial court found Ramirez guilty of murder and sentencing
him to "suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua."

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court was correct in specifying the length of
imprisonment in the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua?

Decision:

No, the Supreme Court held that in sentencing appellant "to suffer
imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua." There was no justification or
need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment, because reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The significance of this fundamental principle was
laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit, "Since reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed
in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code)
Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it
shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by
reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be considered by the
Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code)."
Christine Perez 2006-0104

Arts. 46-77: Application of Penalties

Complex Crime

People v. Latupan (G.R. Nos. 112453-56)

Facts:

On April 29, 1991, Ceferino Dagulo heard shouts of a woman and a child
coming from the north. He saw accused Gerardo Latupan walking in his direction,
carrying a thin, bloodied knife. Accused Latupan entered the house of Ceferino and
started chasing Ceferino's wife, who was able to run.

The house of Emilio Asuncion known as "Emy" was 100 meters from
Ceferino's house. He reached his house and found his wife, Lilia, dead on the
ground with several stab wounds on her body and his 3 children (Leo, Jaime, and
Jose) wounded. Doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime, However, Jose was
transferred to another hospital due to seriousness of his wounds. Jose was declared
dead on arrival.

On May 25, 1993, at arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of
frustrated murder. During the pre-trial conference of the four cases (Criminal Case
No. 379-T, Criminal Case No. 380-T, Criminal Case No. 381-T, Criminal Case No.
382-T), accused offered to change his plea of not guilty to guilty of the complex
crime of double murder and frustrated murder.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused
Latupan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Double Murder
and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs.

Issue:

Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the

complex crime of double murder?
Decision:

The trial court, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the "complex crime of

double murder" and separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period."

The instant case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances
when a complex crime is committed. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion
and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion resulted not from a single act but
from several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the death of two persons does not
result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not
a complex crime, are committed."

Thus, accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime of double murder,

but for two separate counts of murder, and separate counts of physical injuries.
Christine Perez 2006-0104

People v. Pineda (G.R. No. L-26222)

Facts:

On July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were
asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod(homemade gun)
were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead.
Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and
let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple
and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases: Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo, moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case."
Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one
impulse."

Respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal
cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the
other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."
The City Fiscal moved for reconsideration upon the ground that "more than
one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was
killed." Thereafter, the defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took
the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts
on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by
one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of
shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder
should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."
Issue:

Whether or not there should be one information, either for the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with
multiple homicide and frustrated homicide or should the five indictments remain as
they are?

Decision:

Four separate crimes of murder and a frustrated murder result from the
firing of several shots at five victims. The crimes are not complex. Five information
should be filed. There is a complex crime where one shot from a gun results in the
death of two or more persons, or where one stabbed another and the weapon
pierced the latter's body and wounded another, or where a person plant's a bomb
in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons
are killed. When various victicms expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.
Christine Perez 2006-0104

People v. Sanidad (G.R. No. 146099)

Facts:

On 16 January 1999, Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla,

Rolando Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby
Velasquez and Dennis Balueg left Budac, Tagum, Abra, on board a passenger
jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the town of Lagangilang,
Abra. When they arrived they joined the residents in a drinking spree that lasted
the following morning.

Accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong and

several other residents of Lagangilang joined them in drinking. Marlon Tugadi and
accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies and members of the CAFGU before
then.

On 17 January 1999, Jimmel Sanidad and his companions finished drinking

and left. Shortly after, the group of Marlon Tugadi also stopped drinking and headed
home for Budac, Tagum, Abra, boarding the same jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo.

As the jeepney moved closer, the accused in a classic case of ambuscade

suddenly and without warning unleashed a volley of shots at the
jeepney.Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with the exception of Rolando
Tugadi, survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries.

Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid in a
culvert on the side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the
scene. Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid on the
side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the scene.

An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and malicious

mischief was filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, John Doe
and Peter Doe. The defense of the accused rested on bare denial and alibi.
 The trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused and
convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, and
sentenced them to death.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of complex crime of murder and

multiple attempted murder and imposing upon then the supreme penalty of death?

Decision:

The Supreme Court fully agreed with the lower court that the instant case
comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of
complex crimes, provides that when "a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period." In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the
conscience of the offender.

Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in

firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine
who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no
evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and every one of the
victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the evidence
clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole. Thus,
one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we
were not able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy animates several persons
with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex
offense.
Bernadette Remalla 2007-0392

Delito Continuado

Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 169727-28)

Facts:

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to

"prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-
RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the
acquisition of certain parcels of land," Ombudsman Investigators Ricardo Sullano,
Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio Alejandrino of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, the following may be
charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019: petitioner B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-
RSBS president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head of the AFP-RSBS Legal
Department in charge of Land Acquisition; Capt. Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-RSBS
Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land Acquisition; and Notaries Public Alfredo
Nasser and Manuel Satuito.

The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman Investigators,

which issued on March 30, 2001 a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to file the
corresponding Informations for 148 counts of violation of Article 315, in relation to
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty. Manuel Satuito. However, it was likewise
recommended that the complaint against petitioner be dismissed, without prejudice
to a thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability.

After conducting clarificatory hearings, the investigating panel issued a

Memorandum, recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be charged with 148
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents, and one count violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation of
the Panel of Prosecutors. Petitioner and his co-accused filed their respective Motions
for Reconsideration of the investigating panel's June 15, 2004 Memorandum.The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It likewise denied the
motion for the consolidation of the cases, considering that the other cases filed
were pending in its other divisions.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution which was

denied again by the Sandiganbayan. Motion to Quash was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not only one information for estafa should be filed for all these
cases?

Held:

The petition has no merit.The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the
contention of respondents and ruled that the determination of (a) the charge/s
and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the sound
discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes
committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series of
acts arising from a single criminal resolution.

When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his co- accused
for a consolidation of the charges filed against them before the Sandiganbayan, the
Special Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting that there were as many crimes
committed by the accused as there were sales contracts forged by them.

Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged
are matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter
of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and his co-accused under the
Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito
continuado or classified as concurso de delitos; orinvolve separate crimes under the
category of concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such factual issues should
be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being tasked
to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-
accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an
uninterrupted force however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter
best left to the determination of the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
Bernadette Remalla 2007-0392

Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266)

Facts:

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed
by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program.

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162
[1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was
then a presidential candidate. The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding

Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on
November 13, 1992. The Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer
the arraignment. Petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars. According to
petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she
could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a

resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the
corresponding bail bonds. Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the 32 Amended Informations may be admitted?

Held:

The petition is denied.

 The Court find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed
in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file
against her.The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito
continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."

The original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal

act - that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that
the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law
- Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the
original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original
information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay
was legalized.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the
same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even
exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32
aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied
in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing
the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or
injury.

The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993
in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the
32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one
information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No.
16698.
Michelle Ricaza 2008-0040

Habitual Delinquency

People v. Espina (G.R. No. 43556)

Facts:

The appellant was charged in the lower court with the crime of theft of
articles valued at P 585.15 and, having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six
months and one day of prision correccional and, being a habitual delinquent, to an
additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional.
The appellant is a recidivist and plead guilty to the crime of theft. He is also a habitual
delinquent, this being his third conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not recidivism, as inherent in habitual delinquency, should still be

taken into consideration in fixing the principal penalty?

Decision:

Yes, recidivism should still be taken into consideration in fixing the principal
penalty even though it is inherent in habitual delinquency. The appellant in this case
is a habitual delinquent, this being his third conviction. Recidivism, although
inherent in habitual delinquency, should still be considered in fixing the principal
penalty. There is no doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing additional
penalty on a habitual delinquent is to punish him more severely. However, the result
would be otherwise if, for imposing the additional penalty, recidivism could not be
considered as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the principal penalty. In the
instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty is present. If
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is not to be taken into consideration for
imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, the mitigating
circumstance would require that the penalty prescribed by law be imposed in it
minimum period. The imposition of the additional penalty would make the penalty
lighter, instead of more severe, contrary to the purpose of the law.
Michelle Ricaza 2008-0040

People v. De Jesus (G.R. No. 45198)

Facts:

Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted by the Court of First Instance of

Manila of the crime of theft of an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P
2.65 committed, according to the information, on April 28, 1936. He was therein
sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor with accessory penalties,
to indemnify Francis Liwanag the value of the umbrella which was not recovered,
and being a habitual delinquent, the additional penalty of two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional.

The accused plead guilty of the crime imputed to him in the

information filed against him. It was alleged in the information that he is a
habitual delinquent, having been convicted by final judgments of the crimes of
theft and qualified theft on January 4, 1933 and November 18, 1935
respectively, the date of his last release being January 10, 1936.

Due to his admission of guilt of the crime imputed to him in the

information, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that when one pleads guilty of
the crime imputed to him in the information, it is understood that he admits
all material facts alleged therein, not excluding those alleging his former
convictions of other crimes.

Issue:

Whether or not the circumstance of recidivism can be and must be twice

taken into consideration, first as an aggravating circumstance, and second as a
qualifying circumstance or one inherent in habitual delinquency?
Decision:

Yes, recidivism can be considered as an aggravating circumstance in

determining the principal penalty and as a qualifying circumstance in
habitual delinquency.
 As to the principal penalty, there is the rule that in cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the courts must take into
consideration, in the application of said penalty, the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances established at the trial if they do not appear to be compensated by
other circumstance. It is reiterated in People vs. Melendrez that the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, even in cases of habitual delinquency, should be
taken into consideration in the application of the principal penalty in the
corresponding period.

The proposition that if recidivism is considered an inherent or qualifying

circumstance of habitual delinquency it should not be taken into account in the
imposition of the principal penalty, seems to be untenable because it is based
upon the erroneous assumption that habitual delinquency is a crime. It is simply a
fact or circumstance which, if present in a given case, gives rise to the imposition of
the additional penalties prescribed therein.

As to the additional penalty, if we must rely upon the spirit and letter of the
law, we would say that the purpose of the latter in establishing it was to prevent
those for the second time or more commit the crimes from relapsing thereafter at
least during the period fixed thereby. The lower court correctly ruled in imposing the
additional penalty.
Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052

Arts. 89-93: Total Extinction of Criminal Liability

Death of the Accused

De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 154579)

Facts:
On February 8, 1995, in the City of Makati, petitioner De Guzman, stole

several pieces of jewelry valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine

Gongora.The trial court rendered its decision finding de Guzman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and imposed a penalty of imprisonment, as well as the penalties
accessory thereto. The Court further finds the accused De Guzman civilly liable
and orders her to pay the private offended party. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction but reduced the award of damages. During the appeal in the Supreme
Court, on January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a Manifestation informing
the Court that the petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003.The death of the
petitioner resulted from a vehicular accident, as indicated in the Certificate of Death
attached thereto.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the petitioner
is

extinguished by reason of her death?

Decision:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.Although both the trial and
the appellate courts found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, she had the
right to appeal her case to this Court of last resort and challenge the findings of
the two courts below. The judgment of conviction was pending review until her
untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained finality. Thus, pursuant to Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the instant
petition for review. The Court is dismissing the case because there is no longer a need
to continue with the review of the appeal. The lower court's decision has thus become
ineffectual.
Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052

People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007)

Facts:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
thereof on June 19, 1991.

Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the

National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.

Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file
its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the
offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?

Decision:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
 Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052

People v. Abungan (G.R. No. 136843)

Facts:

On August 4, 1992, at Capulaan, Villasis, Pangasinan, the accused conspiring,

confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms,
attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds
on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.

An Information, dated March 9, 1993, was filed charging appellant Pedro

Abungan, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with
murder.

The trial court rendered a decision finding Abungan guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

During appeal, in a letter dated August 7, 2000, however, Joselito A.

Fajardo, assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that
Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the appellant is

extinguished by reason of her death?

Decision:

In the present case, it is clear that, following the case of People vs.Bayotas,
the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died
during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against
him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was
also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on
sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a
separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural
rules.
Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388

Prescription of Offenses

Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)

Facts:

Cawili and his business associate Tongson borrowed from Panaguiton

(petitioner) sums amounting to 1,979,459. They issued checks signed by both of
them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon presentation.Panaguiton
made demands to pay but to no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24,
1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutor's Office.

Tongson moved to drop his name from the case as his signatures were
allegedly falsified. Case against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding that
Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the chief state prosecutor directed
the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.Tongson moved for reconsideration
but denied.

In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the complaint for the action has
prescribed pursuant to Act 3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of
statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She claims that the filing of the
complaint on August 24, 1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the law
refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of the complaint in the prosecutor's office tolled the
prescriptive period?

Decision:

Yes. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutor's office tolls the prescriptive
period for violations of BP22.When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary
investigation of cases was done by the justices of peace, and not by agents of the
executive department (i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time is
that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of peace (a judicial process).
However, since then, the conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to the
function of the executive department.

Today, the term proceedings must be understood to mean either executive

or judicial proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of investigation may
ultimately lead to sufficiently toll prescription.

To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays not under his control. As seen in this case, various
conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his cause. Aggrieved parties who do not sleep
on their right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of circumstances
beyond their control.
 Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388

Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 881)

Facts:

Sometime in April 1985, Caridad Dorol mortgaged her property--an

agricultural land located in Bacon, Sorsogon to her cousin Recebido.Dorol and
Recebido did not execute any mortgage document, but instead, the former gave to
the latter a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 which was done by Juan
Dorol (father of Caridad).

On September 9, 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of Recebido to

redeem such property, wherein Recebido refused to allow claiming that Dorol has
already sold to him the land on 1979. Dorol, on the other hand, insisted that the
transaction between them was not a sale, but a mere mortgage.

Caridad Dorol, then, went to the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon and
verified the existence of a file Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 in which she
knew that the property was already registered in Recebido's name.A comparison of
the specimen signatures of Caridad's other documents and that in the questioned
Deed of Sale was done, and NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas found out
that in the latter's signature was falsified.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information

indicting Recebido for Falsification of Public Document with the Regional Trial Court
of Sorsogon.

The trial court rendered the decision convicting the petitioner of the crime and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six
(6) months of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.

The defense of prescription was raised only during the motion for reconsideration
of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:

Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed?

Decision:
No. Prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be
invoked on appeal. Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash the
information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise the
same anytime thereafter including during appeal.

Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The
petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already
prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable
therefore, which in this case is "prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos."

Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same
way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine
being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that the
petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive period.
The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily
started at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall "commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents.
 Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388

Caniza v. People (159 SCRA 16)

Facts:

OnMarch 20, 1974, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filedan Information for
falsification of public documentsallegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by
Caniza.

On May 24, 1974, Caniza filed Motion to Quash sayingthat allegations in

the information did not constitute an offense, and that the information contained
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification.TheTrial
court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza. Fiscal's Motion
for Reconsideration of this Order was denied.

On June 13, 1979, a second Informationwas filed charging Caniza

with substantially the same offense as that charged under the previous
information.Caniza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that
1) the offense charged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first Information
had been on the merits, 3)the allegations of the second Information did not
constitute and offense.

The judge issued an order denying the motion to quash. He also

denied Caniza's motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the offense charged had already prescribed?

Decision:

No. 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had elapsed between November 5,

1968 (the date of commission of the alleged offense) and March 20, 1974 (date
of filing the first information); 4 years, 2 months and 12days had elapsed
between April 3, 1975 (date of denial by the trial court of the Fiscal's motion for
reconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date of filing of the second information). A
 total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the time the
second Information was filed in court.

Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of falsification of public document committed by a private individual - the
offense with which petitioner Caniza is presently charged - prescribes in ten
(10) years. In this respect, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further:
"Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run fromthe day on which the
crime is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents, andshall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation, andshall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted,or are justifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him."
Alvin Ocampo 2011-0386

Amnesty

People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)

Facts:

On August 16, 1990, an Information for murder was filed against Jose
Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., for killing Alfredo
Arevalo.

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the
killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.

On January 20, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision convicting the
herein accused-appellant.

Thus, Accused-Appellant filed his appeal. However, while his appeal was
pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending
Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed
Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political
Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.

After a careful verification and evaluation on the claims of the applicant, the
Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his
political beliefs. It, thus, recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application
for amnesty.
 The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999,
resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the
National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion
for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken
by the NAC.
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among
other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.

Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under

Proclamation No. 724 on May 17, 1996.

Issue:

Whether or not the grant of amnesty in favor of Jose Patriarca, Jr. - while
the various criminal cases filed against him were pending - shall completely
extinguished his criminal liability?

Decision:

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or

other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense.

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal

liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the
penalty and all its effects.
 In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and
amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes
of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense."

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant
Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end
to the appeal.
Renato Segubinese 2006-0040

Arts. 100-103: Civil Liability

Nuguid v. Nicdao (G.R. No. 150785)

Facts:

Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of

Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that
sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of
Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if they [could]
borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them and
because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the
former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release
P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.

As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner a open

dated Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) with the assurance that if the entire amount is
not paid within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check.

In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of

the sums [above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the
indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned
checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money
given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks were all returned
for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). A verbal and written
demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the
bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was
filed against the [respondent].

Issue:

Whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum ofP1,150,000. In
this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the
aggregate amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid?
Decision:

From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an
offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as
an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the
crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability
arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be
compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime). What gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil
liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the
Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily
civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof
beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere
preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a
person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If
the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held
civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It
may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.

Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not
criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or
is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to

respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully
satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate
court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges
against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability.

Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from

petitioner on a daily basis but argues that the same were applied to interest
payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent]
with an exorbitant rate of interest on a daily basis. In any event, the cash payments
[made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her
own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence
as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to
[petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she
stopped making further payments when she realized that she had already paid such
amount.

From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment
of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely
much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from
[petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].

Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that

there was a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her
loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].

By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long
before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account
only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing
obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We
therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment presented
by [respondent] worthy of credence.
 Eddie Tamondong 2009-0178

Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons

Nueva Espana v. People (460 SCRA 547)

Facts:

Petitioner Nueva Espana was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting into
double homicide when the passenger bus he was driving rammed into a Honda
motorcycle driven by Reynard So with Nilo Castro as passenger resulting into the
death of both. An aggravating circumstance was also imposed as Espana also left the
scene of the crime without lending assistance to the victims.

During trial, the father of So and the mother of Castro were both called on to
testify as to the earning capacity of the two. So's father claimed that his son was
earning P80,000 a month while Castro's mother said that his son was bringing in
P8,000 a month. So's father additionally testified that the funeral expenses incurred
by them was P87,000 while Castro's mom stated that they spent P30,000 for the
funeral.

As a result the trial court, besides imprisonment, awarded the following

amounts to the heirs of the victims:

TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM REYNARD SO

1) P2,997,000.00 - indemnity for loss of earning capacity of victim
2) 14,200.00 - for expenses of the wake
3) 20,000.00 - for funeral parlor
4) 12,000.00 - for the tomb
5) 53,000.00 - for cost of burial site
6) 30,000.00 - for attorney's fees
7) 200,000.00 - for moral damages
8) 100,000.00 - for exemplary damages
P3,429,200.00 - TOTAL AMOUNT

TO THE HEIRS OF VICTIM NILO CASTRO

1) P1,728,000.00 - indemnity for loss of earning capacity
2) 20,000.00 - for funeral expenses
3) 200,000.00 - for moral damages
4) 50,000.00 - for exemplary damages
P1,998,000.00 - TOTAL AMOUNT

The court based the amount of loss of earning capacity based on the formula
used by the Supreme Court as illustrated:

As to the civil liability, particularly the indemnity for the loss of the earning
capacity of the victims, the formula last enunciated by the Supreme Court is:

"Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross-living

 expenses annual (50% of gross annual
income)"

Thusly, since the victim Reynard So was earning P80,000 a month at the time
of his death when he was thirty (30) years old, his lost earning capacity should be
computed as follows:

x = 2 (80 - 30) x [P960,000.00 - P480,000.00)

3
x = 33.4 x P480,000.00
x= x P16,032,000.00

With respect to the victim Nilo Castro, he was earning P8,000.00 a month when
he died at the age of twenty-six (26). His lost earnings were:

x = 2 (80 - 26) [P96,000.00 - P48,000.00]

3

x = 36 x P48,000.00 x = P1,728,000.00

As a result, petitioner appeals to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court regarding the damages, Consequently, the CA declared that
Vallacar Transit Inc., should not yet be held subsidiary liable for the liability of the
petitioner as its driver. Thus, this petition for review with the SC.

Issue:

Was the award of damages amounting to P8 million proper?

Decision:

The SC modifies the award of damages mostly to the fact that loss of
earning capacity should be properly adduced and supported by competent evidence
to prove the same. This rule also applies to the funeral and burial expenses. In
the case at bar, the lower courts based their award for damages solely on the
testimony of SO's father and Castro's mother, even though both of them never
substantiated the amounts claimed with receipts, papers and other evidence. And
so the award is modified as follows:

To summarize, the heirs of the deceased Reynard So are entitled to the following: P

50,000 - civil indemnity ex delicto

73,000 - actual damages 25,000 - temperate damages 50,000 - moral
damages 25,000 - exemplary damages

30,000 - attorney's fees P 253,000 - TOTAL

The heirs of Nilo Castro are also entitled to the following: P 50,000 - civil

indemnity ex delicto
50,000 - temperate damages 50,000 - moral damages 25,000 - exemplary
damages
30,000 - attorney's fees P 205,000 - TOTAL

The SC meanwhile adopts the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals regarding

the subsidiary liability of petitioner's employer, Vallacar Transit Inc., under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. An employer may be subsidiarily liable for the
employee's civil liability in the criminal action if it can be shown that:
(1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) the accused is insolvent.
However, subject to prevailing jurisprudence, the subsidiary liability may be
enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary writ of execution against Vallacar
Transit, Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.

Eddie Tamondong 2009-0178

Pangonorom v. People (455 SCRA 211)

Facts:

Pangonorom was the driver of a passenger bus owned and operated by

MMTC which collided with a Gemini Isuzu car driven by Carlos Berba, resulting into
the damage of the car and physical injuries obtained by Berba.

Pangonorom was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting into damage

to property and physical injuries.

The trial court awarded damages amounting to P42,000 but was silent as to
the subsidiary liability of MMTC. Consequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court and also found MMTC subsidiary liable for the amount notwithstanding
the fact that the judgment of the trial court was silent as to said matter.

Issue:

Did the CA err in not holding MMTC not subsidiary liable despite the fact that
the RTC did not mention anything to that effect?

Decision:

The SC ruled that even when the dispositive portion of an RTC decision does
not expressly pronounce subsidiary liability of the employer, they are deemed written
into the judgment whenever applicable.

But, he subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal action. In the present case, there exists an employer-
employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the
transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However,
there is no proof here of Olimpio's insolvency. The judgment of conviction against
Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of
execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the
accused-employee's insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be
enforced.

In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer's

subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employee's primary
liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact
cannot be known until sometime after the verdict of conviction shall have become
final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee
cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of
course. The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed.
Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and
after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of his
insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC
after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC
subsidiarily liable with its accused- employee considering that there is no proof yet of
Olimpio's insolvency.
Eddie Tamondong 2009-0178

Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)

Facts:

Petitioner Quinto is the mother of an 11-year old boy named Wilson who died
while going inside a drainage with the respondents Andres and Pacheco, who were
also of the same age.

What was clear according to a witness who was a friend of the victim was that
the three of them (Wilson and the respondents) went inside the drainage filled
with water. First to emerge was Pacheco who immediately went home, and then next
to come out was Andres who was already carrying the dead body of Wilson.

After being charged with homicide, the trial court the respondents not
guilty and also found the same not civilly liable because of the absence of
preponderance of evidence to prove liability. QUinto appealed the civil aspect of the
decision which the CA affirmed.

Issue:

Petitioner comes to the Court and raises the following issues: 1) Does
extinction of criminal liability carry with it extinction of the civil liability; and 2) was
the prosecution able to establish preponderance of evidence.

Decision:

The civil action based on delict is not extinguished unless the court itself
finds that civil liability did not arise. In the case at bar, the trial court was very
clear that the prosecution was not able to establish a preponderance of evidence to
find the respondents liable.

As to whether preponderance of evidence should have been considered, the

trial court and the CA was correct in their findings. Preponderance of evidence
should not be based on the fact that the evidence of the defense is
weaker. The evidence presented must be strong enough to SUFFICIENTLY
SUSTAIN THE CAUSE OF ACTION.

In the case at bar, the prosecution single prosecution witness testified that the
hematomas on the alleged victim may have been caused by either hitting with a
blunt object or slipping and falling on the hard pavement.

Even the friend of the deceased testified that the drainage was so dark and
this was the reason that he did not come with the other boys inside.

And so, the possibility of slippage by Wilson was very much a possibility.
Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204

Probation Law (P.D. No. 968)

Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747)

Facts:

Petitioner, as President and General Manager of the company, humiliated his

employees and blurted out invectives against the latter. He was charged with
multip[le grave oral defamation by 5 of his employees who were allegedly the
recipient of the said invectives.

He was found guilty of oral defamation in 4 out of 5 cases filed against him.
Petitioner elevated the judgment from the MeTC to the RTC; however, the latter
affirmed his conviction, with modification, accrediting to him the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation. His appeal to the CA was to no avail also.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation?

Decision: NO

Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to

those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act
of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted
by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted.

The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
 That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and
express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.

The penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there
was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable
period.

The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the
terms exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to probation,
unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for
probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose
too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for
serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the
offense they might further commit.

Considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but
taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should
have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified
after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was
ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability.
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his
right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies.
Miguel Paolo Soliman 2010-0204

Lagrosa v. People (G.R. No. 152044)

Facts:

Petitioners were found guilty by the RTC, of violation with Sec. 68 of P.D.
No. 705, for having found in possession of forest products without permit.
They appealed the decision to the CA, but it affirmed their conviction, with
modifications as to the penalty imposed by the lower court; from 2-8 years to
6 months to 1 year.

Petitioners applied for probation but was denied by the trial court,
and subsequently affirmed by the CA.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioner can still apply for probation?NO Whether or not

Fransisco v. CA applies in this case?YES

Decision:

The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue
on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what was
admittedly an incorrect penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners
connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not
simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed.

For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only
for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty - to reduce it to within
probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after
asserting their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking
probation.

By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the

alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is
simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so
only after failing in his appeal.

Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused
from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to
within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to
accept this proposition, especially given the factual circumstances of this
case. Had the petitioners' appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the
impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this
Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their
misrepresentation has led to their own undoing.
Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)

Facts:

Petitioner was convicted for violation of an ordinance against peddling fish

outside of market, as well as for the crime of resisting and disobeying an agent
of a person in authority.

Petitioner filed an application for probation, but subsequently withdrew

it and filed a notice of appeal. MTCC granted the withdrawal of application
for probation butdenied her notice appeal for being filed out of time.The court
ordered petitioner to furnish the City Prosecutor's Office a copy of her
memorandum and the assailed judgement of conviction. Petitioner failed to do
so, and the court dismissed her special civil action for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on
ground of petitioner's failure to comply with the earlier Order of the same court?
Decision: NO

The fact that the City Prosecutor's Office has not yet entered its
appearance is no justification to petitioner's adamant and continued insistence
not to comply with a lawful order of the court. Every court has the power
to enforce and compel obedience to its orders, judgments, and processes in
all proceedings pending before it.

Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a

judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for
probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968,
which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for
petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by
the filing of an application for probation.
Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226

Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612)

Francisco v. People (434 SCRA 122)

Facts:

Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita Rodriguez. Pacita, through her
brother Macarion, sold to petitioner Ernesto Linghon several pieces of jewelry
stolen from Rodriguez. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, found
petitioner Ernesto Francisco guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties corresponding to the latter, and to pay the corresponding value of the
subject pieces of jewelry. The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that the
prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the charge, and
that Macario sold the said pieces of jewelry to him.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's decision
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic)
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law?

Decision:

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or
should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on
the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Macario Linghon testified that he sold the jewelry to petitioner. "Although the well-
entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be
credible and reliable. In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be dubious;
hence, barren of probative weight." The Court further held "It bears stressing
that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the
jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances
from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the
property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a)
to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial
court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends
on the value of the property."
Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226

Tan v. People (313 SCRA 220)

Facts:

Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries; upon inventory, she
found that several pieces of equiptment were missing. Manuelito Mendez was a
former employee of Lim, who left her employment before Lim found out that her
goods were missing. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas
and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the
complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless
propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant's
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the
stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop,
and they split the amount with one another. Tan was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential
Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to
indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the
sum of P18,000.00.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of

fencing as against petitioner?

Decision:

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him,
to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The essential
elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there
is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The Supreme
Court stated that there was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers
property. The theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain
to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her
former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from
the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is
insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.The Court held that
accused Tan could not be held guilty because there was no showing at all that the
accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold
to him.