G.R. No.

135012 September 7, 2004

ANITA ESTEBAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, San Jose City,
and GERARDO ESTEBAN, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this present petition for certiorari,1 Anita Esteban seeks to annul the Orders dated July 9, 1998
and August 20, 1998 issued by Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and
SJC-31(97). The Orders denied petitioners application for cancellation of the cash bail posted in
each case.

Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner
herein, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty.

While out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was again charged
with another crime for which he was arrested and detained.

"Fed up with Gerardos actuation," petitioner refused to post another bail. 2 Instead, on June 18,
1998, she filed with the trial court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in
the four criminal cases.3She alleged therein that she is "terminating the cash bail by surrendering the
accused who is now in jail as certified to by the City Jail Warden." 4

In an Order dated July 9, 1998,5 respondent judge denied petitioners application, thus:

xxx

"In these cases, accused was allowed enjoyment of his provisional liberty after money was
deposited with the Clerk of Court as cash bail. Applicant-movant (now petitioner) did not
voluntarily surrender the accused. Instead, the accused was subsequently charged with
another crime for which he was arrested and detained. His arrest and detention for another
criminal case does not affect the character of the cash bail posted by applicant-movant in
Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SLC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97) as deposited
pending the trial of these cases. Money deposited as bail even though made by a third
person is considered as the accuseds deposit where there is no relationship of principal and
surety (State vs. Wilson, 65 Ohio L-Abs, 422, 115 NE 2d 193). Hence, the money so
deposited takes the nature of property in custodia legis and is to be applied for payment of
fine and costs. And such application will be made regardless of the fact that the money was
deposited by a third person.

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application for cancellation of bail bonds is
hereby DENIED.
 "SO ORDERED."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration6 but was denied in an Order dated August 20, 1998.7

Hence, the instant petition assailing the twin Orders as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner states that she is constrained to bring this matter directly to this Court as the issue is one
of first impression.8

Petitioner submits that by surrendering the accused who is now in jail, her application for
cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

"Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of
the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail."
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners submission is misplaced.

The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among others, the surety or
bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the latters arrest. Thereafter, the court,
upon application by the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.

We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the accused, charged in
the four criminal cases, to the trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was
charged in a subsequent criminal case.

Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash deposit which, as mandated
by Section 14 (formerly Section 11) of the same Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment of fine
and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to any person who made the
deposit. Section 14 provides:

"Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a
written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail
and applied to the payment of fine and costs, while the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to whoever made the deposit." (Underscoring supplied)
The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A cash bond may be posted either
by the accused or by any person in his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money
deposited is regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in payment of
any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court. This was the ruling of this Court as early as
1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma.9 Therein we declared that "when a cash bail is allowed, the two parties to
the transaction are the State and the defendant. Unlike other bail bonds, the money may then be
used in the payment of that in which the State is concerned the fine and costs. The right of the
government is in the nature of a lien on the money deposited." We further held in the same case
that:

"x x x. Similar cases have frequently gained the attention of the courts in the United States in
jurisdictions where statutes permit a deposit of money to be made in lieu of bail in criminal
cases. The decisions are unanimous in holding that a fine imposed on the accused may be
satisfied from the cash deposit; and this is true although the money has been furnished by a
third person. This is so because the law contemplates that the deposit shall be made by the
defendant. The money, x x x, must accordingly be treated as the property of the accused. As
a result, the money could be applied in payment of any fine imposed and of the costs
(People vs. Laidlaw [1886], Ct. of App. Of New York, 7 N. E., 910, a case frequently cited
approvingly in other jurisdictions; State of Iowa vs. Owens [1900], 112 Iowa, 403; Mundell vs.
Wells, supra.). But while as between the State and the accused the money deposited by a
third person for the release of the accused is regarded as the money of the accused, it is not
so regarded for any other purpose. As between the accused and a third person, the residue
of the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a creditor of property obtain (Wright & Taylor vs.
Dougherty [1908], 138 Iowa, 195; People vs. Gould [1902], 78 N. Y. Sup., 279; Mundell vs.
Wells, supra.)."10

In fine, we fail to discern any taint of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge in
denying petitioners application for cancellation of the accuseds cash bail.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157331 April 12, 2006

ARNOLD ALVA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
assailing the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated 18 October 2002 1 and 19
February 2003,2 respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold
Alva.
The CA, in the assailed resolutions, dismissed petitioners appeal of the trial courts judgment of
conviction for failing to post a new bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal.

The Facts

The present petition stemmed from an Information3 charging petitioner with having committed the
crime of estafa defined under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging as
follows:

The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows:

That in or about and during the period covered between October 18, 1993 up to December 18, 1993,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the following manner, to wit: the
said accused, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to said
YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latters application for U.S. Visa
provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar deceit, induced
and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation
and representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason
that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount
ofP120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud, he wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in
the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-143803 and raffled to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, presided by Judge Manuel T. Muro.

On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order4 of the Warrant of Arrest issued on 18 July
1995 against petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond by Hon. William Bayhon, then
Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila.

Upon arraignment on 7 December 1995, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel, 5 pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.

After the trial on the merits, in an Order6 dated 6 April 1998, the RTC considered the case submitted
for decision.

On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation 7 praying for the
resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTCs decision to 17 June 1999 in view
of the fact that said counsel already had a prior commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the
motion. The promulgation, however, was deferred only until 19 May 1999.

A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation, or on 18 May 1999, petitioners counsel again
moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to prior "undertakings of similar importance." 8
On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his
stead, claiming to be petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the
RTC a hand written medical certificate9 expressing petitioners inability to attend the days hearing
due to hypertension.

In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel, the RTC issued an Order 10 directing the
promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against
petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice.

In its decision dated 25 March 1999,11 the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the decretal part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 2(a) of the RPC and sentences him to an indeterminate
term of imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen
(17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal in accordance with the provisions of Article 315, first,
and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and further for the accused to return the P120,000.00 to the
complainant with an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January
1, 1994 (the amount has been given to the accused in October and December 1993).

Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, immediately following an original duplicate copy
of the aforequoted decision, a document entitled Personal Bail Bond12 dated 21 May 1999 issued by
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed before and approved by the RTC as
evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond. 13 For such reason, petitioner
appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction.

Incongruous to the above inference, however, in an Order14 dated 25 May 1999, judgment was
rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued
petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person of
petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its undertaking
should not be forfeited.

In the interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena
Section,15manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May
1999 "for the reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not within our area of
responsibility. x x x" Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC that "the name of the accused will
be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference." Examination of the records of the
case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing the RTC.

On 15 July 1999, hand delivered by a certain Remedios Caneda, petitioner wrote 16 the RTC
requesting for a certified photocopy of his exhibits submitted to it during trial.

On 21 July 1999, a Termination of Legal Services was filed by petitioner before the RTC informing it
of his decision to terminate the services of his counsel and that he was currently in the process of
hiring a new one.

On 26 July 1999,17 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC.
In an Order18 dated 30 August 1999, the RTC declined to give due course to said motion for failure to
set it for hearing; thus, treating it as a mere scrap of paper.

On 2 September 1999, petitioner received the above Order. The next day, or on 3 September 1999,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal19 before the RTC.

In an Order20 dated 20 September 1999, the RTC again declined to give due course to the Notice of
Appeal, ratiocinating thus:

The "Notice of Appeal" filed by accused cannot be given due course as it was filed out of time.
Although accused filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" dated 23 July 1999, the Court considered it as
a mere scrap of paper and was not acted upon as the same was not set for hearing, hence, it did not
stop the reglementary period to file appeal.

On 25 November 1999, petitioner filed anew a motion praying for the RTCs categorical resolution of
his 23 July 1999 Motion for Reconsideration.

In an Order dated 7 December 1999, the RTC granted the abovestated motion, the full text of which
states:

The Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused, dated November 20, 1999 is
granted in the interest of justice, considering that the one who prepared the Motion for
Reconsideration appears to be the accused himself, who may not appear to be a lawyer and may
not be conversant with the rules, among others, governing motions.

Acting on the said Motion for Reconsideration itself, same is denied for lack of merit. The Decision
has examined and discussed the evidence presented and the merits of the case.

Because of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration, the appeal is deemed filed on time, and
the appeal is given due course.

Let the records of the case, together with three (3) copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes be
transmitted to the Hon. Court of Appeals.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution21 dated 16 October 2001, the appellate court
required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed it appearing that no new
bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted, to wit:

Considering the arrest warrant issued by the trial court against the accused who failed to appear at
the promulgation of the judgment, and it appearing from the record that no new bond for his
provisional liberty on appeal has been posted, appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten
(10) days from notice why his appeal should not be dismissed outright.

On 29 October 2001, petitioner, through new counsel, filed a Compliance 22 essentially stating therein
that:

xxxx
3. Upon learning of the course of action taken by the presiding judge, and for purposes of appealing
the decision subject of the instant case, on May 21, 1999, accused immediately posted a new bond
for his provisional liberty. The presiding judge of the lower court, which issued the questioned
decision, duly approved the new bond. Certified true copy of the bond is hereto attached as Annex
1avvphil.net

"3" and made an integral part hereof;

x x x x.

In a Resolution23 dated 18 October 2002, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal
filed by petitioner for "appellants failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal
despite our directive as contained in our Resolution dated October 16, 2001, and in view of the fact
that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired, x x x."

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 thereto seeking its reversal. According to
petitioners counsel, he was of the understanding that the "Show Cause" Resolution of 16 October
2001 merely sought an explanation vis--vis the absence of a bail bond guaranteeing petitioners
provisional liberty while his conviction was on appeal. All the same, petitioners counsel manifested
that Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, had already extended the period covered by its 21 May
1999 bail bond. Attached to said motion was a Bond Endorsement25 extending the coverage of the
bail bond from 21 May 1999 to 21 May 2003.

Asked to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent People of the Philippines
(People), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed objections. In its
Comment,26 respondent People raised two arguments: 1) that "an application for bail can only be
availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty;" and 2)
that "bail on appeal is a matter of discretion when the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years."

On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed Resolution, 27 disposing of
petitioners motion as follows:

Finding no merit in appellants motion for reconsideration (citation omitted) filed on November 12,
2002, the same is hereby DENIED. We agree with the appellee that appellant has failed to
submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his
conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in place when appellant took his
appeal.

WHEREFORE, appellants motion for reconsideration is DENIED. [Emphasis supplied.]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court alleging the following errors:28

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION
DOCKETED AS CA G.R. CR NO. 24077 ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE TO POST A
NEW BOND FOR PETITIONERS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY AND THAT THE PERSONAL BAIL
BOND POSTED IN THE LOWER COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY ALREADY EXPIRED;

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL, THE COMPLAINCE FILED
BY THE PETITIONER WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND
FILED FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
APPEAL;

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION ATTACHED TO
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER;

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR TO THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPITE THE BAIL BOND
POSTED ON MAY 21, 1999; and

VI.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID BAIL BOND IN PLACE WHEN
THE PETITIONER TOOK HIS APPEAL.

The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, only two issues are raised in this petition: 1) with the
exception of the fifth assignment of error, all six can be encapsulated in one solitary question, that is,
whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of
petitioners alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal; and 2)
whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of
the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing "x x x in its questioned resolutions that herein
petitioner did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court or custody of the law, or that there was no
valid bail bond when the appeal was taken when the records of the case would readily prove the
contrary."29 In issuing said resolution, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals made "x x x no
careful examination of the records x x x." Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the following
manner:

x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals (sic) that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner
before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the
promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail
bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered
the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the
respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the
comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and
the Rules of Court.

Equally, petitioner further posits that:

x x x Although it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be
cancelled if sentenced to an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as provided in Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, just the same, there must be a showing by the prosecution with notice to
the accused of the fact that, the accused is a recidivist, has previously escaped from confinement,
evaded sentence, has committed an offense while under probation, there are circumstances
indicating the probability of flight if released on bail, etc. But there was none of the said instances
that may be attributable to herein petitioner.30

Respondent People, in contrast, counters that "x x x [a]lthough a personal bail bond dated May 21,
1999 was executed in favor of petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the
promulgation of the Decision, there is nothing on record which shows that petitioner
had surrendered, was arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty after the promulgation of the
judgment of his conviction in his absence. x x x." To illustrate its point, respondent People cites the
following facts: 1) the return of the Warrant of Arrest issued on May 19, 1999 signed by
P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, which states in
full:

Respectfully returned this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address of the
accused is not within our area of responsibility. Further request that the warrant of Arrest be
forwarded to the Police Station which has Jurisdiction over the address of the accused.

However, the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future
reference.

2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated, or on 25 May 1999, said
court rendered judgment against the bail bond issued by Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation
executed to secure petitioners provisional liberty during the trial, for the bondsmans failure to
produce petitioner before the court, to wit:
In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance & Surety Corporation, bondsman of herein accused, to
produce the herein accused within the period granted it by this Court, judgment is hereby rendered
against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos. 31

Respondent People explains that the first two facts make it improbable to conclude that there existed
a valid bail bond securing petitioners provisional liberty even after conviction. Stated in another way,
petitioners admission to bail presumes that the latter surrendered, was arrested or he had otherwise
submitted himself under the custody of the law.

And, 3) "that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his motion for reconsideration
dated November 7, 2002 submitted before the Court of Appeals, purportedly to extend the expired
personal bond dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did not automatically confer on petitioner the benefits of an
effective bail bond,"32 as petitioner made no extension of the previous personal bond before the
same expired.

We disagree in petitioners assertions; hence, the petition must fail.

A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioners bail bond on
appeal presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTCs
judgment of conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum
of reclusion temporal.

Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing
prefatory matter viz:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
 (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party. [Emphasis supplied.]

From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused
even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than
six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of
bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two
points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty
(20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of
any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar circumstances.

In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17)
years as maximum ofreclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of petitioners application for bail
was discretionary upon the RTC.

It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes that the accused and/ or
accused-appellant is detained or in the custody of the law.33 In the case at bar, the bench warrant
issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case,
neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, as there
has been no related Order of Release issued by any court, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at
the very least placed himself under the custody of the law.

Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail
for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.34

All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond
issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that
nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly
filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other
court process acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of
argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did not render the subject bail
bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal.

That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to object, as evidently required
under the quoted rule, to the application or approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the
accused), fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records of the RTC does
it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioners application for bail, much less the
approval of such application.

Noting that the raison d'tre for such requirement is the discretionary nature of the admission to bail
of an accused after conviction, though discretionary, such assessment must be exercised in
accordance with applicable legal principles. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated
circumstances and the range of penalty imposed, the prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to object and present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused. It is on this
basis that judicial discretion is balanced in determining whether or not an accused-appellant should
be admitted to bail pending appeal of his conviction vis--vis the increased possibility or likelihood of
flight.

Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such
application or, at the very least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial
discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent Peoples right of
procedural due process.

This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar
reveals that petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification his failure to
appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the latters judgment,
absent any justifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail
bond to say the least. As evidenced by the undertaking printed on the face of the bond issued by
Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation and likewise required under Section 6 35 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner must present himself before the court for the reading of the judgment of the
RTC in order to render himself to the execution thereof.

While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a
representative of petitioner, stating therein the reason for the latters absence, the RTC found
insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the promulgation of its judgment in
absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner.

Upon examination, the subject medical certificate36 merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be
suffering from hypertension. It failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating
petitioners physical incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it
considered the absence of petitioner unjustified. What's more, though notarized, the subject
document failed to indicate evidence of affiants37 identity making its due execution doubtful.

Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999, petitioner and counsel had
already been notified of the 19 May 1999 schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed
in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioners counsel.

Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners original bail bond is revealed by the Process
Servers Return,38 indicated at the dorsal portion of the RTCs Produce Order, indicating petitioners
change of address without prior notice to the RTC, it states:

PROCESS SERVERS RETURN

This certifies that on the 17th day of May, (sic) 1999, undersigned return (sic) again to Fersal
Apartelle located at 130 Kalayaan Ave. (sic) Diliman, Quezon City for confirmation and indeed the
addressee, Arnold Alva, had no (sic) longer been residing nor holding office at the aforementioned
address.
By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to
the orders and processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable arrant breach of the conditions of his
bail bond.

Prescinding from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years
but less than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his bail
without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from being admitted to bail on
appeal.

The issue of the validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of
Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on
appeal is, therefore, inconsequential as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be
admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion
than that at the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal
even until now he remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.

Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not
petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues.

The manner of review of petitioners conviction is governed by the Rules of Court. Appropriately,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents the procedural requirements regarding appeals taken to the
Court of Appeals. Section 8 of said Rule finds application to the case at bar, viz:

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The appellate court may,
upon motion of the appellee or its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]

By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the act of jumping bail, among
otherthings, will result in the outright dismissal of petitioners appeal. As pointed out by the Court in
the case of People v. Mapalao,39 the reason for said rule is that:

[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he
losses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the
meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew
his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory.40

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner
revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his
chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has waived
his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc,41 we enunciated that:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the
right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have
waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.

Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law, despite the posting of the subject bail bond,
petitioner argues that his act of filing several pleadings after the promulgation of the RTCs judgment
plus his filing of the application for his admission to bail should be considered a submission to the
courts jurisdiction. He rationalizes that:

[T]he records of the case readily reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the
lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the
decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting
of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision
subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon.
Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the
petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court.

For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated
in the foregoing discussion, the question posed has now become academic. However, to diminish
the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term "jurisdiction of the court (over the
person of the accused)" with that of "custody of the law", it is fundamental to differentiate the two.
The term:

Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender (citation omitted); while
(the term) jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance (citation omitted). One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced (citation omitted). 42

Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused
escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated.43 Evidently, petitioner
is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused petitioner when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive.

As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA, alas, we cannot say
the same for "[b]eing in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law (citation
omitted). Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention."44 In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits
himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he
cannot be granted any relief by the CA.
Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia without calling attention to a very disturbing fact that
petitioner admits of being the author of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by
authorities.

In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes that his appeal, and consequently, this
petition, will succeed and he can then appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, which dismissed petitioners appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED.
In this connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper disposition of the case in line with the
foregoing discussion.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1702 August 20, 2002

ARSENIO R. SANTOS and AMELITA S. NICODEMUS, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MANUELA F. LORENZO and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT EVA S. NIEVALES, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint charging Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo and Branch Clerk of Court Eva S. Nievales,
both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila, with neglect of duty and abuse of authority. The
complainants, Arsenio R. Santos and Amelita S. Nicodemus, are the father and aunt of the victim in
Criminal Case Nos. 95-146904-051 (for Frustrated Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms) and
Criminal Case No. 96-147577 (for Violation of Comelec Gun Ban) filed with the said court.

In a letter/complaint, dated November 17, 2000, to the Office of Court Administrator, complainants,
through the Volunteers Against Crimes and Corruption (VACC), alleged that the cases were
submitted for decision on February 14, 2000, but judgment against the accused Zaldy and Zandy
Prado was rendered only on September 11, 2000. It was further alleged that respondent judge
Lorenzo issued on the date of promulgation an order regarding the bail bonds in the three cases
against Zaldy Prado: the bond of P130,000.00 for illegal possession of firearms remained the same,
while the bond for frustrated murder was increased from P17,000.00 to P22,000.00, and the bond for
violation of the COMELEC gun ban was increased from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00. In the frustrated
murder case, respondent judge Lorenzo likewise increased the bail bond of Zandy Prado
fromP8,500.00 to P17,000.00. However, so it was alleged, on September 18, 2000, on motion of the
accused, respondent judge Lorenzo reduced the bail bond for illegal possession of firearms
from P130,000.00 toP30,000.00. Complainants claimed that the reduction of the bond after the
conviction of the accused was irregular. They also denounced the delay in the rendition of the
decision in these cases.
As to Branch Clerk of Court Nievales, complainants blamed her for the delay in the transmittal of the
records of the cases to the Court of Appeals after the accused had filed a notice of appeal on
September 20, 2000. Complainants alleged that, as of November 3, 2000, the records of the said
cases had not been elevated to the appeals court.

In their letter/complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, complainants asked for clarification
"if the Hon. Judge and the Clerk of Court [had] legal basis [for] what they did in our cases." 2

Required to comment on the letter/complaint, respondent judge Lorenzo stated:

The complainant accuses undersigned of abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law
for reducing the bail of Zaldy Prado. In Crim. Case No. 146905 Zaldy Prado was charged
[with] Illegal Possession of Firearms and the bail recommended then was P130,000.00.
However, after the decision was promulgated Zaldy Prado was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of two years, eleven months and eleven days to four years, nine months and
eleven days of prision correccional. As a matter of fact, Zaldy Prado and Zandy Prado were
brought to prison immediately after promulgation [of judgment] because they cannot put up a
new bond in the increased amount. This is so because in the frustrated homicide case and
violation of election law, the bonds were increased but the illegal possession remained
at P130,000.00 because the undersigned believes that it is high already. Zaldy Prado moved
that the P130,000.00 [bail] for the illegal possession of firearms [case] be reduced and
considering that the penalty was only for two to four years, the Court believes that the
amount of P30,000.00 was reasonable. In allowing the reduction of the bond, the primary
consideration as found in Sec. 9, Rule 114 of the [Revised] Rules of Criminal Procedure has
been followed and that the circumstances that preclude the grant of bail as enumerated in
Sec. 5, Rule 114 [of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure] are not present. Besides, if
they found [that] the Court erred in reducing the bond to that amount why did they not ask for
reconsideration? The remedy is available to them.3

On the other hand, in her comment dated May 15, 2001, Branch Clerk of Court Eva S. Nievales
explained the reasons for the delay in the transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals:

1. Criminal Case No. 35-146304 was never filed in this Court, hence the undersigned branch
clerk of court should not be made accountable for the record of this case;

2. Criminal Case No. 96-147577 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Zaldy Prado y
Donato" was tried and decided by this Court in consolidation with two other criminal cases. In
the drafting of her Decision (consisting of thirty-one (31) pages) the Honorable Manuela F.
Lorenzo brought to her house the original of the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs).
The decision was promulgated on September 11, 2000.

3. This Branch was designated as a Family Court effective September 1, 2000 and pursuant
to the guidelines in AM-99-11-07 SC an inventory of our pending cases was made for the
purpose of unloading those over which this Court has no jurisdiction. We unloaded eighty-
five (85) cases on September 14, 2000 and in the tedious task of the inventory (where pages
were numbered, return cards were pasted and records were sewn) the undersigned cannot
remember where exactly the TSNs of the questioned Zaldy Prado case were placed when
they were returned by the Honorable Manuela Lorenzo. Moreover, the undersigned as well
 as the other Court personnel were overwhelmed by the incoming Family Court cases (72 in
September, 81 in October, 61 in November 2000).

4. Considering the strict procedure at the Court of Appeals, the undersigned cannot forward
immediately the questioned records of the case.4

On April 4, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the complaint in this case was
referred for evaluation, recommended that the administrative case against respondents be
dismissed for lack of merit.

EVALUATION: After a careful study of the documents on file, we recommend that the letter
dated November 17, 2000 of Mr. Arsenio R. Santos and Ms. Amelita S. Nicodemus not be
given due course.

While the documents on file show that the aforesaid criminal cases were submitted for
decision on February 14, 2000 and the decision was promulgated only on September 11,
2000 the same should not be taken against the respondent judge considering the heavy
caseload of the court within the National Capital Judicial Region. Moreso, there is nothing on
record that will show that the delay was done maliciously or was caused with deliberate
intent to inflict damage.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court

recommending that this case be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

With regard to the delay in the transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals, we find the
explanation of co-respondent Atty. Eva S. Nievales worthy of credence so as to exculpate
her from administrative liability. It has been noted that Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Manila was designated as Family Court and was tasked to conduct an inventory for the
purpose of unloading of cases to other branches.

The disarray of records in the course of the inventory should be considered so as [to] justify
the delay in the transmittal of the records.5

We find the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to be well taken.

A. With regard to Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo

Two questions are raised with respect to Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo. The first is her reduction of the
bail bond for accused Zaldy Prado in Criminal Case No. 146905 from P130,000.00 to P30,000.00.
This is a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. At the time the bail was initially fixed in 1995,
it was set at P130,000.00 in view of the penalty (reclusion perpetua to death) then prescribed for the
crime under P.D. No. 1866. However, R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1997, reduced the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms to prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years and 1
day to 6 years) and a fine of not less than P15,000.00. In accordance with the new law, respondent
judge sentenced accused Zaldy Prado to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months, and eleven (11) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days. As the bail
was originally fixed in view of the penalty imposed in P.D. No. 1866, it became necessary for
respondent judge to fix the bail at a lower amount when the accused applied for bail on appeal on
September 19, 2000 in view of the provisions of R.A. No. 8294.
Bail, after conviction by the Regional Trial Court, is afforded to the accused as a matter of discretion.
A trial judge acts according to law in granting bail if the circumstances enumerated in Rule 114, 5
for denying it are not present. Thus this provision reads:

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

There is no claim in this case that, in fixing the bail for the purpose of appeal at P30,000.00,
respondent judge abused her discretion. Complainants only basis for objecting to the same is that
the reduction of the amount of the bail from P130,000.00 to P30,000.00 was a drastic one. But that
was because there was a considerable reduction in the penalty attached to the crime involved.

The second matter raised against respondent judge is that she decided the criminal cases more than
three months after they had been submitted for decision. But the Office of the Court Administrator,
which has supervision of lower courts, found that this was because of the heavy caseload of courts
in the National Capital Region. Indeed, considering the cases in the docket of the court of
respondent judge, a delay of about seven months may be excused. Submitted for decision on
February 14, 2000, the decisions in these cases were actually promulgated on September 11, 2000.

B. With respect to Branch Clerk of Court Eva S. Nievales

The only complaint against Nievales is that she failed to transmit the records of the cases to the
Court of Appeals from the time the accused gave notice on September 20, 2000 that they were
appealing from the decision of the trial court. It appears that she actually transmitted the records on
November 15, 2000. The Branch Clerk of Courts explanation for the delay in the transmittal of the
records is quoted at the beginning of this opinion. The Court is satisfied with the explanation given.
The same reason justifying respondent judges failure to decide the cases in question within ninety
(90) days justifies the failure of respondent Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records on time.
The heavy caseload of the court, coupled with the fact that an inventory of cases had to be made as
a consequence of the designation of Branch 43 as a Family Court, prevented the early transmittal of
the records to the Court of Appeals. Rule 122, 8 states:

Transmission of papers to appellate court upon appeal. Within five (5) days from the filing
of the notice of appeal, the clerk of court with whom the notice of appeal was filed must
transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the complete record of the case, together
with said notice. The original and three copies of the transcript of stenographic notes,
together with the records, shall also be transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court without
undue delay. The other copy of the transcript shall remain in the lower court.

The Court has not hesitated to discipline lower court judges and court personnel who are found
guilty of violations of the law or the Code of Judicial Conduct. But it has likewise not hesitated to
exonerate them whenever it finds the charges to be without basis. Let the guilty ones be severely
brought to book, but let those who are innocent enjoy merited exoneration to which they are entitled
as a matter of simple justice.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the complaint
against Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo and Branch Clerk of Court Eva S. Nievales, both of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149723 October 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
August 31, 2001 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20431 which granted
the Motion for Bail2 of accused-appellant, herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald, (Fitzgerald).

The facts are of record.

An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 422-94, charged Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section
5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,3 allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH
FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously induced complainant "AAA,"4 a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in
prostitution by then and there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and
thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage
and prejudice.5

After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision dated May 7, 1996, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph 5 of Republic Act No.
7610, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with all the accessory penalties attached
therewith; and to indemnify the private complainant "AAA" the amounts ofP30,000.00 as
moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Lingap Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in
Olongapo City shall hold in trust the said awards and dispose the same solely for the
rehabilitation and education of "AAA", to the exclusion of her mother and her other relatives.

The accused under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code shall be credited in full of his
preventive imprisonment if he has agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.

Upon completion of the service of his sentence, the accused shall be deported immediately
and forever barred from entry to the Philippines.

In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for Rape, the accused is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.6

Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied in an Order dated August 1, 1996, which reads:

xxxx
 In fine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution during the hearing on the
bail petition, the Court is of the considered view that the circumstances of the accused
indicate probability of flight and that there is undue risk that the accused may commit a
similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Petition for Bail pending
appeal is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.7

Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which, in a Decision8 dated September 27, 1999, affirmed the RTC
Decision, thus:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that the penalty imposed on the accused-
appellant is imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua, the
decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9

Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial10 and a Supplemental to Accused's Motion for New Trial11 on
the ground that new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA granted
the Motion for New Trial in a Resolution dated August 25, 2000, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appellant's Motion for New Trial dated October 14, 1999 is
GRANTED. The original records of this case is hereby REMANDED to the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City Branch 75 who is DIRECTED to
receive the new evidence material to appellant's defense within sixty days from
receipt and thereafter to submit to this Court the said evidence together with the
transcript of stenographic notes together with the records of the case within ten (10)
days after the reception of evidence. The Motion to Transfer appellant to the National
Penitentiary is DENIED.12 (Emphasis ours)

The People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 from the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution
while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation. 14 Both Motions were denied by the CA in
its November 13, 2000 Resolution.15 In denying Fitzgerald's bail application, the CA held:

[T]his Court hereby RESOLVES to:

xxxx

2. DENY accused-appellant's Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation, pursuant to the

provisions of Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides:

"Sec. 7. Capital Offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is
strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal procecution."

In the case at bar, the maximum imposable penalty in accordance with Republic Act 7610
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
 Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, hence,
We hold that his motion for bail cannot be granted at this point.

With regard to his alleged physical condition, let it be stressed that accused-appellant
is not precluded from seeking medical attention if the need arises provided the
necessary representations with the proper authorities are made.

SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis ours)

The People filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari17 docketed as G.R. No. 146008
questioning the August 25, 2000 and November 13, 2000 CA Resolutions. The petition was
dismissed in a Resolution18 dated January 15, 2001, which became final and executory on May 2,
2001.19

Meanwhile, on December 3, 2000, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the
Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail. 20 The People
filed its Comment21 to both Motions.

On August 31, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution22 granting Fitzgerald's bail
application, thus:

xxxx

Be that as it may, while We maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, We
have taken a second look at appellant's plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the
fact that appellant is already of old age23 and is not in the best of health. Thus, it is this
Court's view that appellant be GRANTED temporary liberty premised not on the
grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice and
considering the new trial granted in this case. Accordingly, appellant is hereby DIRECTED to
post a bail bond in the amount of P100,000.00 for his temporary liberty provided he will
appear in any court and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof if and when
required to do so. The appellant is likewise refrained from leaving the country now or in the
future until this case is terminated. Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
ORDERED to include appellant in its hold departure list xxx.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis ours)

Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on

September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.25

Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set
aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite
the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence
of his guilt is strong.26 It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering
that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.27

In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the
previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt; 28 and justifies his provisional
release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and
deteriorating health.29

The petition is meritorious.

We resolve first the preliminary question of whether the CA, after issuing its August 25, 2000
Resolution granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on respondent's Motion to Post Bail. Our
ruling on this matter, however, shall be limitted to the effect of the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution on
the latter's jurisdiction; it shall have no bearing on the merits of said Resolution as this has been
decided with finality in G.R. No. 146008.

According to petitioner, considering that the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution, referring the case to the
RTC for new trial, had become final and executory on May 2, 2001 when this Court denied its
petition for review in G.R. No. 146008, then, when the CA issued the August 31, 2001 Resolution
granting respondent bail, it had been stripped of jurisdiction over the case. 30

Petitioner is mistaken.

When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court convicting the
accused31 and the judgment of the CA affirming it,32 and remands the case to the trial court for
reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment, 33 at times with
instruction to the trial court to promptly report the outcome. 34 The Court itself does not conduct the
new trial for it is no trier of facts.35

However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ, notwithstanding Sec.
1,36 Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides for uniformity in appellate
criminal procedure between this Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may decide questions
of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.37 Thus, when it grants a new trial under Sec. 14, Rule
124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered evidence under Sec. 12, 38 or
(b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such evidence under Sec. 15. 39 In either case,
it does not relinquish to the trial court jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient authority to
resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.

Now then, the CA, in its August 25, 2000 Resolution, ordered: first, the remand of the original
records of the case to the RTC; second, that the RTC receive the new evidence material to
appellant's defense within 60 days from receipt of the original records; and third, that the RTC submit
to it the said evidence together with the transcript of the case within 10 days after reception of
evidence.40 From the foregoing dispostion, it is evident that the CA retained appellate jurisdiction
over the case, even as it delegated to the RTC the function of receiving the respondent's newly-
discovered evidence. The CA therefore retained its authority to act on respondent's bail application.
Moreso that the the original records of the case had yet to be transmitted to the RTC when
respondent filed his bail application and the CA acted on it.

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA
erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in
the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, 41 be allowed
provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specified conditions.42
Implementing Sec. 13,43 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 444 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of bail
applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, 45 but a matter of discretion
on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong. 46 As for an accused
already convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or
revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec.
5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a)
That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d)
That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e)
That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-
paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence of
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial.47 As already discussed, the
CA retainedappellate jurisdiction over the case even as it ordered the remand of the original records
thereof to the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside only its
own September 27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. In fact, in its
August 31, 2001 Resolution, the CA emphasized:

As we have pointed out earlier, the propriety of appellant's conviction of the offense charged
as well as the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved during the appreciation of the new
trial after considering the new evidence which appellant insist would prove his innocence. 48
The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And under said Decision, respondent
stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years.

Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence
of the guilt of respondent.49 These findings were not overturned when the CA granted a new trial.
Under Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered
evidence but maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a finding that
evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon another motion and
hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against the accused has remained
strong.50 In the present case, no new evidence had since been introduced, nor hearing conducted as
would diminish the earlier findings of the RTC and CA on the existence of strong evidenc against
respondent.

In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right
but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the
stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon
evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein 51 such as those indicating
probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.

As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, "xxx
not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is
already of old age and is not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it
is, the evidence of guilt is strong xxx."52The Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural
requirements on bail.

It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by
respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A
mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.53 It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail
for prisoners who are seriously sick.54 There may also be an existing proposition for the "selective
decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases.55 But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from
an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the
only evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating
that, as of August 30, 2000, respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile
area xxx."56 That medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November
13, 2000 Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison. 57

Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar
offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate an
undue risk that he would commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal. 58 The RTC
explained its findings thus:

Dr. Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that phedophilia is a state of
sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and recurrent. The possibility of the
commission of a similar offense for which the accused was convicted is great if the accused
will be exposed to "stress" and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.59
The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such
finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail
application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST
ISSUE against the person of the accused, Victor Keith Fitzgerald.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I.
CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEA, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse
with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. 3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests"4(Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at
the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the
regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings,
consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc.,
 which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial
Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and
the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in
order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at
the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working
area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the
budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings,
briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him
in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the
press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while
at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public
policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks
and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who
may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place
of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,
particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the
Senate is not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate
and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the
Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim
them down to three.7The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18,
2007.8

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition andmandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource
persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as
Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner
preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to
convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio
Calunsag; Philippine Marines Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks
Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obea (Obea).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30,
2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the
foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-
named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use.
Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this
Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising
custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or
continued the assailed actions of the former custodians.12

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY

INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP DETAT",
A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO

BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.
 GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE
BRIGS COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE
SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR

SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK
AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT

OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR
MISUARI.13

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out
that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending
appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is
a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
detat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of
Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other
circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election
to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. 15

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial courts judgment of
conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of
the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted
prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes
their rights more limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail
or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention
or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos,
which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could
somehow accomplish legislative results.27

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of
innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court
in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the
accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a
promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his
proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk
since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous
times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on
November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the
courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila
Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape
ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. 31 In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike
petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution.
Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital
cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only
capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious
reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee."37 Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate
his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeas
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obea
that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioners duties,
flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political
office inside a military installation owing to AFPs apolitical nature.39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention. 40 The officer with custodial
responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to
secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the
detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the
same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of
proper representation, denying the peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.

Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed foradministrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor."42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is
no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the
voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison."44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of
lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord
may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people"
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and
former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and
reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps
on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed
under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house
arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. 48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in
December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to
bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-
around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions
and blanket authorizations.

Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioners case
fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings

for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1454 August 27, 2002

ARIEL Y. PANGANIBAN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. VICTORIA N. CUPIN-TESORERO, Presiding Judge, Second Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Silang-Amadeo, Cavite, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint against Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero, Presiding Judge of the Second
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Silang-Amadeo, Cavite, for gross ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in connection with her grant of
bail to Jayson Toledo Marte, the accused in Crim. Case No. TG-3266-00 for rape.

The facts are undisputed:

On July 26, 1999, Maricel Toledo-Panganiban, wife of complainant Ariel Panganiban, filed a
complaint against Jayson Toledo Marte for violation of R.A. No. 7610 for allegedly inserting his finger
into the private parts of Peewai Panganiban, their two-year old minor daughter.1 The said criminal
complaint was filed with the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite for
preliminary examination by respondent Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero. Respondent judge
issued an order, dated August 9, 1999, finding probable cause for the continued detention of the
accused Jayson Marte for violation of R.A. No. 7610.2
After conducting a preliminary investigation, respondent judge issued a resolution, dated October 27,
1999, finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against the accused Jayson Marte for
violation of Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, otherwise
known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. She recommended bail of P120,000.00 for the provisional
liberty of the accused and ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Cavite City.3 Hence, on November 17, 1999, the records of the said case
were forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite for appropriate action. 4

On January 6, 2000, an information was filed against the accused Jayson Marte for rape in violation
of Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 in relation to R.A. No. 7610,
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cavite City. No bail was recommended for the
provisional liberty of the accused.5

The present administrative complaint alleges that on February 26, 2000, despite the fact that an
information had already been filed against the accused Jayson Marte in the RTC and no bail had
been recommended for his provisional liberty, respondent judge nevertheless issued an order
approving the bail bond of Jayson Marte in the amount of P120,000.00 and directing the provincial
jail warden of Trece Martirez City to cause his release from custody.6 Complainant alleges that, in so
doing, respondent judge committed grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, dishonesty, and violation of R.A. No. 3019.7

In her comment, dated July 10, 2000, respondent judge does not deny that she issued the
questioned order. She states, however, that after the accused Marte was released on bail as a result
of her February 26, 2000 order, the Hon. Alfonso S. Garcia, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch
18, Tagaytay City, issued an order directing her to explain why she approved the said bail and
ordered the release of the accused considering that she no longer had jurisdiction over the
case8 and that Judge Garcia had cancelled the bail bond, previously approved, of the accused
Jayson Marte and had ordered the accused to be remanded to the custody of the provincial jail
warden of Cavite City.9

Respondent judge maintains that her grant of bail to Jayson Marte was proper because he was
charged with a non-capital offense as the penalty for rape committed under Art. 266-A, par. 2, in
relation to Art. 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, was only prision
mayor. Thus, respondent judge claims that the accused Jayson Marte is entitled to bail as a matter
of right. She alleges that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City violated the constitutional rights of the accused
Jayson Marte as the information against him failed to specify which particular provision of R.A. No.
8353 was violated by him and no bail was recommended for his provisional liberty. Respondent
judge likewise relies on Rule 114, 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in support of her
position that she had authority to issue an order granting bail even though a case has already been
filed in court considering that the judge was unavailable at that time or was unable to act on the
request. She says that she was the only judge present on February 26, 2000, a Saturday, when
Melito Cuadra, the process server of the Regional Trial Court, Tagaytay City, came to her for the
approval of the accused Jayson Marte's bail bond. She claims that Melito Cuadra represented to her
that Judge Garcia, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, was absent and that she
was the only judge who could approve the bail bond. She disclaims knowledge of the fact that, at the
time she issued her order granting bail to the accused Jayson Marte, the information filed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor made no recommendation for bail. She pleads good faith in
approving the bail bond in question.10
For his part, Melito Cuadra, process server of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, executed an
affidavit admitting that he approached respondent judge on February 26, 2000 to seek the approval
of a bail bond involving a case filed in RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. However, he claimed that he
did so at the instance of a bondsman who requested his assistance. He also claimed that, upon
seeing the application for bail in question in the amount of P120,000.00, respondent judge remarked,
"Dapat P40,000.00 lang. Sabagay, mas malaki sa akin sa 2%. Ibalik na lang ninyo sa akin sa next
working day ang balanse sa aking 2%." ("It should only have been P40,000.00. In any event, my 2%
is bigger. Just return to me on the next working day the remaining balance from my 2%.") Cuadra
said that respondent judge never mentioned anything about any documents he was supposed to
bring her nor did she inquire about any changes that may have been made in the case. He also
pointed to several cases wherein respondent judge granted bail even when the judge before whom
the said cases were pending were not absent.11

This case was referred to Executive Judge Manuel M. Mayo, RTC, Cavite City, for investigation,
report, and recommendation.12

After due investigation, Executive Judge Manuel Mayo recommended that respondent judge be
reprimanded for granting bail without authority in the following cases: (1) Jayson Marte y Toledo in
Criminal Case No. TG-3266-00; (2) Joselito Borja in Criminal Case No. TG-3085-99; (3) Rodelio
Guardo in Criminal Case Nos. TG-3186-99 and TG-3187-99; (4) Rodolfo Sangalang Borja in
Criminal Case No. TG-3210-99; (5) Modesto Javier y Roxas in Criminal Case No. TG-3214-99; and
(6) Elmer B. Daan in Criminal Case No. TG-3131-99. 13

Respondent judge invokes Rule 114, 17(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 14 to justify
the issuance by her on February 26, 2000 of an order approving the accused Jayson Marte's bail
bond and directing his immediate release from custody. She says that Melito Cuadra, process server
of the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, told her that the judge before whom the case of
Jayson Marte was pending was unavailable on February 26, 2000, a Saturday, so that she was
compelled to act on Jayson Marte's bail bond. She claims she was unaware that no bail was
recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor with respect to Jayson Marte's case.

These contentions are without merit. Under Rule 114, 17(a) of the then Rules of Criminal
Procedure:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same
court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if
no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.

The case of Cruz v. Yaneza15 has explained this provision in this wise:

The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is arrested in the same
province, city or municipality where his case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the
province, city or municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused
may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the
accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city or
municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail
with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

Jayson Marte was not arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where his case is
pending. To the contrary, it appears that the accused Jayson Marte, a resident of Silang,
Cavite,16 was detained at the Municipal Jail of Silang, Cavite17 and later transferred to the Cavite
Provincial Jail, Trece Martires City.18 He was thus arrested in the province of Cavite and detained
there. At the time of the issuance of respondent judge's order to release him on bail, his case was
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. Applying Rule 114, 17
(a) to the foregoing circumstances, the accused Jayson Marte could file a petition for bail only in the
court where his case is pending, that is, in Branch 18 of the RTC of Cavite, or with another branch of
the same court within the province or city, that is, with any other branch of the RTC of Cavite.
Certainly, the said provision does not allow the accused to apply for bail before a municipal circuit
trial court judge. Hence, respondent judge did not have authority to issue an order approving the bail
bond of Jayson Marte. Respondent judge's reliance on Rule 114, 17(a) is clearly misplaced.

More importantly, however, is the fact that respondent judge had already lost her jurisdiction over the
case of the accused Jayson Marte. At the conclusion of the preliminary investigation and after she
had recommended the filing of the corresponding information against Jayson Marte and had
forwarded the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor, her court had lost its preliminary
jurisdiction over the said case.19 Having been divested of her jurisdiction over the said case,
respondent judge no longer had authority to issue any order or directive in connection therewith,
specially such as would involve the liberty of the accused. The case of Jayson Marte had been filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. Indeed, respondent judge even admitted that she was aware
that an information had already been filed against the accused Jayson Marte. Whether or not she
also knew that no bail had been recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor is irrelevant. The fact
remains that she had lost her jurisdiction over the said case and, hence, any matter that required
resolution in the said case had come within the exclusive domain of the RTC.

Respondent judge claims good faith in issuing her February 26, 2000 order and makes much of the
fact that she is a relatively new judge who was appointed to her position only in December 1998.
This plea is likewise unavailing. It bears emphasis that a judge, as an advocate of justice and a
visible representation of the law, is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the
interpretation of our laws. A judge should exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the basic
legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. Having accepted her exalted
position as a member of the judiciary, respondent judge owes it to the public and to the court over
which she presides to maintain professional competence at all times and to have the basic rules at
the palm of her hands.20 In the case at bar, respondent judge failed to live up to these standards. Not
only did she approve the bail bond of the accused without the requisite authority to do so, but her
manner of doing so shows a flagrant disregard for the very laws that she had sworn to uphold and
serve.

First, it appears that no application for bail was in fact made by the accused Jayson Marte before
respondent judge. Respondent judge herself admitted that it was only Melito Cuadra, the process
server of the court where the accused Jayson Marte's case was pending, who saw her on that day,
seeking approval of the bail bond posted by the said accused. She also admitted that she merely
relied on Cuadra's representations that no other judge was in court to act on the bail petition. She did
not inquire whether or not bail was in fact recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the
provisional liberty of the accused, which, as it turned out, he did not.
Second, respondent judge did not give notice to the prosecutor of such request to approve the bail
bond of the accused Jayson Marte, in violation of Rule 114, 18 which provides that "the court must
give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation." Whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion, the prosecutor must be
given reasonable notice of the hearing or he must be asked to submit his recommendation before
the judge may grant an application for bail.21

Third, respondent judge did not conduct a hearing to afford the prosecution an opportunity to present
its side. Jayson Marte was accused of rape, in violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which
is not a bailable offense. Respondent judge should thus have conducted a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, to give the prosecution the chance to prove that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong.22 This she did not do. Instead, she approved the bail bond of the accused on
the same day that she was approached by Melito Cuadra to do the same. 1wphi1

Respondent judge contends, however, that the accused Jayson Marte was entitled to bail as a
matter of right because he was being charged with a non-capital offense as the penalty for rape
committed under Art. 266-A, par. 2, in relation to Art. 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353, was only prision mayor. Suffice it to say that a municipal judge conducting the
preliminary investigation has no legal authority to determine the character of the crime and,
regardless of his belief as to the nature of the offense committed, his only duty after conducting the
preliminary investigation is to transmit to the Provincial Prosecutor his resolution of the case together
with the entire records of the same.23 Jayson Marte was accused of rape by the Provincial
Prosecutor. Although she was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation, respondent
judge was not authorized to change the designation of the offense charged against him in order to
justify her grant of bail in his favor.24 The rationale for this is simple. After the preliminary investigation
by the municipal judge, it could very well happen that the prosecution may have gathered such other
evidence, in addition to or in connection with that which he already has, which, when taken together,
are sufficiently strong to prove the guilt of the accused of a capital offense. 25 The fact remains that, in
the case of the accused Jayson Marte, he was accused of a capital offense and no bail was
recommended for his provisional liberty.

Fourth, respondent judge granted bail and ordered the release of the accused in several cases
pending before the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, namely: (1) Joselito Borja in Criminal
Case No. TG-3085-99; (2) Rodelio Guardo in Criminal Case Nos. TG-3186-99 and TG-3187-99; (3)
Rodolfo Sangalang Borja in Criminal Case No. TG-3210-99; (4) Modesto Javier y Roxas in Criminal
Case No. TG-3214-99; and (5) Elmer B. Daan in Criminal Case No. TG-3131-99. 26

These circumstances belie respondent judge's protestations of good faith. It is an imperative for a
judge to remain conversant with basic legal principles, and errors on this score deserve
administrative sanction.27 A judge presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must
also live by it and render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge, by the
very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He should not only
apply the law, but must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. 28 Respondent judge has
certainly been remiss in performing her duties in accordance with these precepts.

With respect to the charge of Melito Cuadra that respondent judge had a pecuniary interest in
granting bail in favor of the accused Jayson Marte, this Court cannot lend credence to the same.
Although Melito Cuadra executed a sworn statement before Investigating Judge Manuel A. Mayo on
July 18, 2002, he never appeared at the trial nor was he subjected to cross-examination by the
counsel for respondent judge. Thus, his affidavit can only be considered hearsay which cannot be
given probative value.29 Indeed, the counsel for complainant simply dispensed with Cuadra's
testimony when he failed to attend the hearings conducted before the Investigating Judge despite
due notice to him.

On the question of penalty to be imposed on respondent judge, in Depaymaylo v. Brotarlo,30 this

Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on an erring judge for her manifest partiality in granting bail in favor
of the accused without authority to do so, adamant refusal to grant the prosecution time to study its
case, haste in holding the hearing without observing the proper procedure, and her attempt to
downgrade the charge against the accused to justify her grant of bail. Similarly, in Sule v.
Biteng,31 this Court also fined the respondent judge therein in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law in granting a petition for bail on the very day it was filed even though the petition
contained no notice of hearing to the prosecution. In view of the gravity of the procedural lapses
committed by respondent judge in hastily granting bail in favor of the accused, even those charged
with capital offenses, we find the same penalty to be appropriate under the circumstances pertaining
to this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero, of the Second Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Silang-Amadeo, Cavite, is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774 May 27, 2004

PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant,

vs.
Judge ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch 72 respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By a Sworn Complaint1 dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial
Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta (complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G.
Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with "gross ignorance of [the]
law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct."

Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, on motion of the accused, by
Order2 of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say Chaw, et al., for
illegal entry.

Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97 "[d]espite . . . the provision of P.D.
1599 which established the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the apprehension of
the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone," respondent "virtually surrender[ed] our
sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction to the Chinese government."3

Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve, the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse of
more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure, complainant charges respondent
with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose
of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and of SC Circular
No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires lower courts to resolve cases or matters before them within
three months or ninety days from date of submission.

Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, "without giving notice to the prosecution,"
the petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause against him for violation of
Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 ("Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act").4

Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him (complainant) from appearing in Crim
Case No. 634-99, People v. Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainants) designation to handle the
prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman.

By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000, 5 respondent contends that petitioner has no
personality to initiate the complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof.

On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial jurisdiction over the area where the
accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were arrested within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal has
not yet been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the conflicting claims thereover by the
Philippines and China and the absence of an inter-country agreement determining the common
boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone.6

As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July 9, 1997 Order dismissing, for
lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No. 212-97, respondent points out that said motion was filed after the
accused were already released from detention. He further points out that during the pendency of
said motion, representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed him that said office
was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it was suggesting an amendment of
the order.7 Respondent explains though that since the accused had already been released from
detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the DFA was merely for the amendment of
the order of dismissal, the motion had already become academic.

As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who was then
under preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a
copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig heard on the
morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office; and
that as the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense, respondent
granted him bail.

As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No. 634-99, respondent explains that he
had already reconsidered the same through his February 10, 2000 Order,8 he having earlier failed to
see petitioners designation by the Ombudsman.
In its August 16, 2002 Report,9 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found, as to the first
charge, that it was not shown that respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith sufficient to
find him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared that respondent based his dismissal
order on his interpretation of a provision of law. The OCA thus concluded that as respondents
conclusions in his assailed order are not without logic or reason, and unattended by fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith,10 he could not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The OCA
hastened to add, however, that respondent "is nonetheless required to act on the motion for
reconsideration."

As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of Court requires a movant to serve notice
of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof,
hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without hearing the prosecutions side.

Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents explanations were fraught with
inconsistencies since his allegation that he failed to see complainants designation as Ombudsman-
Prosecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17, 2000 Order 11 wherein he noted
that complainant was deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA
in fact noted that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001 Order reconsidering his December 17,
2000 Order was issued only after the latter order had attained finality and the instant case was filed.

The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos.

By Resolution of February 26, 2003,12 this Court noted the OCA Report and required the parties "to
MANIFEST within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are submitting the case on the basis of
the pleadings/records already filed and submitted."

By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003,13 complainant proffered additional charges against respondent
and submitted in support thereof, among other things an administrative complaint filed by one Dr.
Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders issued by respondent. Dr. Rosetes
complaint, which was addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, is both undated and
unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant submitted the case for decision.

On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this Court received an undated
manifestation14 of respondent stating that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed in the case.

This Courts Findings

I. On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97

On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the Code of
Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are
supposed to apply to a given controversy.15 They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to
maintain the desired professional competence.16
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim. Case No. 212-97 on jurisdictional
grounds is, however, a matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved
by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an administrative complaint. 17

For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous.18 Only in cases where the error is gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred
with evident bad faith may administrative sanctions be imposed.19 There is no showing that this was
the case here.

With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in his
Reply to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondents explanation in this wise:

When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the Chinese fishermen were not yet
released from detention. It was during the pendency of the motion that the Chinese fishermen were
allowed to leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our representation that they
should not be released from jail as another case for illegal fishing was still pending
investigation. . . . The representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely wanted to convey to Judge
Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
territorial integrity and national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon
publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge Ubiadas as evidenced of an article which
appeared in the July 13, 1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said article is hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made integral part hereof.

There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no longer interested in the setting aside
of his Order of dismissal. In fact, the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal was
already filed in his Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 July 1997 submitting the said Motion
for resolution. Copy of said Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made
integral part hereof. Since the said Motion for Reconsideration of his Order of dismissal was already
considered by him as submitted for resolution as of 18 July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should have
resolved one way or the other, the said motion.20 (Underscoring supplied)

Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already released at the time of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration did not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he even issued an
order stating that it was submitted for resolution.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the prescribed periods, failing
which they are liable for gross inefficiency.21

To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with,
this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 1322 which provides, inter alia, that:

Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus,
all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all
lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so.
(Underscoring supplied)
This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-9923 which requires all judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, failure to observe
which is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their
cases.24

Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent is liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000 but
not exceeding P20,000.

II. On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99

Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court
against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought. 25 So Fortuna v. Penaco-
Sitaca26 instructs:

[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with
law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidencebecause by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on
the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt
of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but
of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied) 27

True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000
at 8:30 a.m.28Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be
said that the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it
received a copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the
prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the application for bail by
showing that evidence of guilt is strong.29

While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires
the court to give a "reasonable notice" of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of
motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter
notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for
bail on shorter notice.

Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into
account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in
the hands of the prosecution.

In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610,30 which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted
for statutory rape31 qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of
due process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure 32 which is a serious
charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than P20,000 but
not exceeding P40,000.33

This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the
interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction,34 against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of
the community from dangerous elements.35

III. On the failure to recognize complainants special designation from the Ombudsman in Crim. Case
No. 634-99

The brushing aside by the OCA of respondents explanation on the matter is well taken.

In the exercise of his power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient,"36 the Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for assistance.37 Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 provides:

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his
office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service
to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control.

It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus
Guerrero endorsed Case No. OMB-1-98-2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant with the
instruction to file the Information and to prosecute the case. 38 The indorsement included an order to
submit a monthly report to the Office of the Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the case.

Respondents December 17, 1999 Order39 which states, inter alia, as follows:

The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby directed to designate any of the
Assistant Prosecutors of the City Prosecutors Office to take the place of Provincial Prosecutor
Dorentino Z. Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta appears to have been deputized by the Office of
the Ombudsman to prosecute this case, no special reason was given for such authority. Instead, it
appears that such designation was merely based on the premise that the offense charged was
committed in Subic municipality as erroneously indicated in the original Information filed with this
Court.

Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows
that the place of the commission of the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor does not have the authority to continue prosecuting this case for the People of
the Philippines (Section 2, Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For this reason, the Office
of the City Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch as the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged. 40 (Underscoring supplied),

shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation, hence, belying his explanation that
he must have overlooked the same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited provision of the
Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special reason for the designation or
deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.

It would appear though from respondents above-quoted December 17, 1999 Order that he was of
the belief that it was the City Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had "territorial
jurisdiction" over the offense. It is in this light that he is given the benefit of the doubt, absent any
showing that he was motivated by malice or bad faith.

With respect to the charges raised against respondent in complainants April 1, 2003 Manifestation,
by which complainant submitted an unsigned and undated complaint by a certain Dr. Reino Rosete
and copies of respondents other assailed decisions: While Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, allows the institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous
complaint, the veracity of Rosetes complaint is doubtful as it does not bear his signature. It is clearly
not intended to be an anonymous complaint.

Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court is unable to pass upon them as
complainant merely submitted photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating clearly
and concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 72,
Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the
law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording the prosecution due process. He
is accordingly FINED in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with WARNING
that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee
his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to
a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the
"dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.3

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.4 An accused not released on
bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has
never owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case
and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest
in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of
bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection
of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
interests of society and those of the accused.9

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided
by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in
fact convicted by the trial court.10

The Facts

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence,
it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner

failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of
[petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he
clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician. 14

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary
evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. 15

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed
by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.

The Issue

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
 (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be
granted.

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While
the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only
where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 16

Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions
to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the
prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted
with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground
that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.

We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case
such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus,
the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission
to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgmentbut it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law.
In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals
exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not
unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court
also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question.
The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings
of this Court.

At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. 21 In this connection, Lee
v. People22 is apropos:

Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would
at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory
orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will
also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)

Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioners Interpretation

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
following rules:
 xxx xxx xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in
Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court
(Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied
even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In
other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts
stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of
the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail.
This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or
revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are
governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination
of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is
that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted
pending appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out
the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." 28 Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely clipping
the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications
for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant
is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision
that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of
the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its
appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.31 In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the
accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. 32 It should also give
due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the
record, character and reputation of the applicant, 33 among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the
very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of
law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. 34 In other words, a threshold
requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended
for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will
be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a
lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound, 36specially
since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the
Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 38 rule in statutory
construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts
the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may
be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be
granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of
the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?

Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal

Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940
Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the
discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
 Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988
to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated
January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity
of the bail of the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he
may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal,
unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of
Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;
 3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before
his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from
notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru
the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days,
his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal
taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994
which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
 (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.

The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach
to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending
appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by
the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the
action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua. 39

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent
rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court
has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. 40 Under the
present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on
bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What
is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which
favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels
the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural
provisions on bail emanated.41While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows
that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail
should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. 42 In fact, it has even
been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting
bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5."43

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted
only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From
another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in
Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that
denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."

A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely
to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite
of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal
justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131 November 22, 2010

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2241-RTJ)

LORNA M. VILLANUEVA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE APOLINARIO M. BUAYA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

In a verified affidavit-complaint1 dated March 15, 2005, complainant Lorna M. Villanueva, assisted by
her father Pantaleon Villanueva, charged respondent Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M. Buaya of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, with Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Abuse of Authority.

In an affidavit-complaint executed on June 5, 2004, 2 Villanueva accused then Vice-Mayor

Constantino S. Tupa of Palompon, Leyte, (of the crime of Qualified Seduction. She later filed another
complaint against the same accused for violation of Section 5, paragraph (b), Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act)3 with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Palompon, Leyte.

MTC Judge Delia Noel-Bertulfo forwarded the case to the Office of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor after finding probable cause for two counts of violation of Section 5, paragraph (b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, allegedly committed on October 29, 2002 and December 16, 2002. Judge Noel-
Bertulfo allowed Tupa to post bail in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for
each case.
On September 27, 2004, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Prudencio O. Borgueta, Jr. issued a Joint
Resolution on Review,4 recommending the filing of two separate informations for violation of Section
5(b) in relation with Section 31,5 of R.A. No. 7610 against the accused. He likewise recommended
the cancellation of the bail bond ofP100,000.00 (per case) posted by Tupa as, under Section 31,
Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, if the offender is a public officer or employee, the penalty provided in
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 76106 is imposed in the maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.
Thus, bail is not a matter of right. He also added that the cancellation of the bail bond was all the
more appropriate since there was strong evidence of guilt against the accused based on Villanuevas
affidavit-complaint and her material declarations during the preliminary investigation. The accused
did not refute these declarations and, in fact, even admitted the alleged sexual acts in his counter-
affidavit and through his statements during the clarificatory hearing.

Based on the above recommendation, the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte filed two separate
Informations7 for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, in relation with Section 31,
Article XII of the same law, against Tupa before RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte. No bail was
recommended in both cases.

Judge Eric F. Menchavez, then Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, issued
a warrant for the arrest of Tupa.8 However, the warrant was not served because Tupa went into
hiding and could not be located. Meanwhile, Judge Menchavez was reassigned to the RTC in Cebu
City. This led to the designation of Judge Apolinario M. Buaya as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 17 on December 8, 2004.

On the very same day (December 8, 2004), Tupa allegedly surrendered voluntarily to SPO2 Charito
Daau of the Ormoc City Police Station and filed with the RTC, Branch 17 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Grant Bail (ex-partemotion).9 Tupa argued that the Prosecutor, in recommending the denial of bail,
erred in considering the special aggravating circumstance provided in Section 31, Article XII of R.A.
No. 7610 in the computation of the penalty to be used as basis in determining his right to bail.
Citing People of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court,10Tupa contended that for purposes
of the right to bail, the criterion to determine whether the offense charged is a capital offense is the
penalty provided by the law, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

In an Order11 issued on the same day the ex-parte motion was filed, without hearing and without
notice to the prosecution, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion and ordered the release of Tupa
on bail.

On December 16, 2004, Villanueva moved to reconsider the order granting the ex-parte motion. She
argued that an application for bail should be heard and cannot be contained in a mere ex-parte
motion. Judge Buaya noted that Villanuevas motion for reconsideration was submitted by the private
prosecutor without the conformity of the public prosecutor, as required under the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Without acting on the merits of the said motion, Judge Buaya issued an order allowing
the accused to submit his comment or opposition within ten days; thereafter, the matter would be
submitted for resolution.

Judge Buayas differing treatment of the ex-parte motion and her motion for reconsideration
apparently irked Villanueva, prompting her to file the present administrative complaint against the
RTC judge. She observed the seeming bias and unfairness of Judge Buayas orders when he
granted the ex-parte motion without the required notice and hearing; on the other hand, he did not
act on her motion for reconsideration because it was not in the proper form, but allowed the accused
to comment on her motion.

In an Indorsement dated May 4, 2005,12 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. required
Judge Buaya to comment on the administrative complaint filed against him. The Court Administrator
likewise required the Judge to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
violation of his professional responsibility as a lawyer, pursuant to the Courts En Banc Resolution
dated September 17, 2002 in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.13

Judge Buaya vehemently denied the charges against him in his Comment. 14 He argued that the
crime charged against Tupa was a bailable offense; when bail is a matter of right, no hearing of the
motion to grant bail is required. Thus, he stood by his order granting the accused temporary liberty,
through bail, without a hearing. His assailed order, reiterated in his comment, held that a hearing
would be superfluous and unnecessary given the peculiar and special circumstances attendant to
the case. During the preliminary examination, the investigating judge already passed upon and fixed
the amount of bail for the temporary liberty of the accused. In fact, the accused had availed of and
exercised his constitutional right to bail by posting the necessary bond. In his view, the prosecution,
1avvphi1

in canceling the bail bond in its joint resolution for review, acted to the prejudice of the accuseds
paramount right to liberty. Judge Buaya, therefore, asked for the dismissal of the present
administrative complaint for lack of merit.

Villanueva filed a Reply15 contending that Judge Buayas assailed order on the ex-parte motion was
contrary to the Rules of Court requirement that a motion to grant bail must be set for hearing to
afford the State and the prosecutor their day in court. She further accused Judge Buaya of being
manifestly partial as evidenced by the two temporary restraining orders (TROs) he issued in favor of
the accused in another case for quo warranto,16then pending before the RTC, Branch 17. She
observed that the first TRO read more like a decision on the merits even though the case had not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. The second TRO, on the other hand, was allegedly issued without a
hearing and was antedated.

Prior to the Office of the Court Administrators (OCAs) action on the administrative complaint, the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 00449,17 rendered its decision18 on the bail issue, granting
the petition forcertiorari and prohibition filed by Villanueva, thus annulling and setting aside Judge
Buayas order granting bail to Tupa. Villanueva furnished the OCA with a copy of the CA decision.

On May 9, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao further evaluated the merits of the
case and opined that the issue of whether or not bail was a matter of right in the present case is
judicial in nature. She preferred not to resolve the administrative complaint based on the CA decision
(which found the offense non-bailable) since the decision was not yet final and executory at that
time. However, she found Judge Buayas precipitate haste in granting the accused bail to be unjust.
She reasoned out that since there was doubt on whether the offense was bailable, basic
considerations of fair play should have compelled Judge Buaya, at the minimum, to consult with the
prosecution and the other judge (who issued the warrant of arrest) on the reason for not
recommending bail. Court Administrator Elepao, therefore, recommended that the present
administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case and that Judge Buaya, for
lack of prudence, be reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
By Resolution of July 9, 2008,19 this Court required the parties to manifest, within ten days from
notice, whether they were submitting the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.

In his Manifestation,20 Judge Buaya maintained his position that the offense at issue is a bailable
offense, therefore, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required. He further alleged that the
investigating prosecutor (who recommended that no bail should be granted to Tupa) was pressured
to reverse the investigating MTC judges recommendation for bail during the preliminary
investigation stage. The prosecutor allegedly asked for a transfer of assignment from Palompon,
Leyte to Tacloban, but his request was denied, prompting him to resign and work in a private bank.

As added proof of the lack of merit of the present administrative case filed against him, Judge Buaya
furnished this Court with the Affidavit of Desistance and Declaration Against Interest 21 executed by
Villanueva, together with the Transcript of Stenographic Notes 22 of her October 11, 2007 testimony
before Presiding Judge Celso L. Mantua of the RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte. In both
documents, Villanueva retracted her accusations against Tupa and totally denied the occurrence of
the alleged acts of lasciviousness committed against her by the accused. Judge Buaya alleged that
Villanueva was merely used by certain political figures in their locality, and was pressured to file the
criminal cases against their former vice-mayor and the present administrative case against him.

THE COURTS RULING

As a preliminary matter, we cannot give any weight to Judge Buayas unsubstantiated allegation that
the prosecutor who had recommended bail was only pressured to make his recommendation. This
allegation, aside from being unsubstantiated, is totally irrelevant to the case whose issue is the
propriety of the action of the judge in granting bail ex-parte, not the action of the prosecutor in
recommending that no bail be granted.

The complainants desistance is likewise not legally significant. We reiterate the settled rule that
administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for
reasons of his own, accept and condone what is otherwise detestable. Neither can the Court be
bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power.
Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against
the respondent. Where public interest is at stake and the Court can act on the propriety and legality
of the conduct of judiciary officials and employees, the Court shall act irrespective of any intervening
private arrangements between the parties.23

On many occasions, we have impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal
profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply in a given controversy.24 They are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be
conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence. 25

With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of bail, we feel justified to expect judges to
diligently discharge their duties on the grant or denial of applications for bail. Basco v. Rapatalo26 laid
down the rules outlining the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation x x x;
 (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion x x x;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution x x x; [and]

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
[bail bond]. x x x Otherwise, petition should be denied.

In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on the same day that it
was filed by the accused. He did this without the required notice and hearing. He justified his action
on the ex-parte motion by arguing that the offense charged against the accused was a bailable
offense; a hearing was no longer required since bail was a matter of right. Under the present Rules
of Court, however, notice and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion.27 Likewise, jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion.28
1avvphi1

Judge Buaya further argued that in granting the ex-parte motion, he was merely correcting a
reversible error. Believing that the offense committed was bailable in nature, he opined that when the
investigating prosecutor revoked the bail already posted by the accused, the prosecutor gravely
violated the accuseds constitutional right to bail. Judge Buaya firmly relied on the previous order of
the investigating MTC judge who, according to him, correctly fixed the amount of bail. Thus,
conducting a bail hearing on the ex-parte motion was no longer necessary. Even assuming,
however, that the previous order of the investigating MTC judge was correct in granting bail to the
accused, reliance on a previous order granting bail does not justify the absence of a hearing in a
subsequent petition for bail.29

The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where
bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to
properly exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence
of guilt is strong.30 This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be
held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt
against the accused.

In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required
in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
in fixing the amount of bail.31 This Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the
prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court
may still require the prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of
the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. 32

One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times.33 When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the
duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. 34

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M. Buaya of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority, and is hereby FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall merit a more serious penalty.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the
said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,-a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts
ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON,
LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA,
MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO
LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ.
FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C.,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO
JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero,
Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and
Joey Sarroza.

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.

Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.

Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.

Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.

Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.

Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.

Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .

Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.

Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.

Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning
the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against
them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
assailed oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority
either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial
Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon
City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your
witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for
violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified

shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the
PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March
14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a
person subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal
knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are
true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include
inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and
what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline.
At such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in
 his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded
after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance
of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not
been able to submit their counter-affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however,
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He
later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to
all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing
court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial
No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that
bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground
that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings
on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include
other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial
No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of
petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges.
The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to
respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation
was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had
been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned
counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit
controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be
dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is
now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general
court-martial of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not

mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v.
Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70

(The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act
408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to
the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The
Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its
language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the
absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial
could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military
reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
 court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that
Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments
wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards
prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous
pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the
investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate

General of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial
investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this
holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge
Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way
effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in
1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged
the language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to
the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation

under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial
might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one
obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of
preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved
more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D.
No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging
petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer,
were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had
investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the
reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the
testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser,"
in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War.
Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory
application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided
under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required
 to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled
pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were
not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never
even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made
to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of
the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when
empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major command or task
force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area,
the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate
brigade or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such
commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the
court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has
not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition
Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and
appointed its president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or
revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had
been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the
Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12,
1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be

challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court.
The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a
challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate
shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered.
Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the
court shall not be challenged except for cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for
a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and
 naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete
dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps
of the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly
military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it
was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted
and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18
of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14,
1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the
accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the
Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the
Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines.
This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on
December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the
officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large
number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It
was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on
June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole
proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel
and such other cases as may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,

Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained

to insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and
determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie
vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member
shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to
meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the
state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of
the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases.Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio
legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No.
39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of
the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the
present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom
of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional
Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held that
"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not
to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over
the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not
open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true
that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an
abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse
 of discretion" as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the
point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and
prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies
and on petitions forhabeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that the
decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only
before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise
similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right
to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate
within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms
by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid
out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario
of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the
assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number
alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could
freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of
duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after
more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge
memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required
to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge
investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of
enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses,
had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The
pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved
were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command
units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges
were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of
Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders
of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed
against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon
(now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if
a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps
must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him.
Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the
case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the
latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under
Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received
by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the
Court in Arula:
 The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and
discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
ofcertiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the
reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No.
96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise
the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of
the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over
Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (AN
ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
VIOLATION, AND OTHER PURPOSES). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an
entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant
Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted
by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner's room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman,
Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioner's
activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April
3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was
staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-
shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant
and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550. 1wphi1.nt
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein
Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged. 1

On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer
Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to
Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations,
petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . .
given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse."

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine
cases.

On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner's Omnibus Motion, as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under
detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules. He must therefore
remain under detention until further order of this Court;

2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right
to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the
cases under the following conditions:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. 2

On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed
in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial
court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.3 Then on May 22, 1997, he filed a
motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case
and that the same be done prior to his arraignment.4
On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner's motions to reduce bail
bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned
during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon
posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997
order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on June 7,
1997.

On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of
Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23,
1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of May 16,
1997, respectively.

While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against
petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated.

On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b), 5 of the
May 23 [should be May 16], 1997 Order, are separable, and would not affect the cash bond
which petitioner posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole modification that those
aforesaid conditions are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, the May 16, May 23 and May
23, 1997 Orders are MAINTAINED in all other respects.6

The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the
grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making
arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be moot and academic. It
noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he
pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention." The
Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable."

With respect to the denial of petitioner's motion to quash the informations against him, the appellate
court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it, but what he
must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the
decision be adverse to him.

Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred7

1. In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the approval of petitioner's
bail bonds "shall be made only after his arraignment" is of no moment and has been
rendered moot and academic by the fact that he had already posted the bail bonds and had
pleaded not guilty to all the offenses;

2. In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only because it was
made under compelling circumstance which left petitioner no option to question the
respondent Judge's arbitrary action but also because it emanated from a void Order;
 3. In ruling that the denial of petitioner's motion to quash may not be impugned in a petition
for certiorari; and

4. In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be validly charged for
violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several informations corresponding to the
number of alleged acts of child abuse allegedly committed against each private complainant
by the petitioner.

We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are stated by
petitioner.

First. As already stated, the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four conditions for the
grant of bail to petitioner:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases
shall proceed to trial in absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue
with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of
the trial court which makes petitioner's arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds.
His contention is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was
held pursuant to such invalid condition.

We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of the
conditions imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because petitioner's
contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for bail.

In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court
apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their
cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner's bail bonds should
be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can
proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since
under Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of
the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.

This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could
ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place
him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held,
and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter
be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be
put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail.8

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be
made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The
condition imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his
appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of
the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman
shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In
such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the
trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of
innocence or of guilt,9 (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes,10 and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by
counsel or representative.11 At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot
be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza,12 in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.

Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting himself
from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his absence. So it
thought that to ensure petitioner's presence at the arraignment, petitioner should be denied bail in
the meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that such court strategy violates petitioner's
constitutional rights.

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May
23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not emanate from
the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even
without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the
condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings
against him are valid.

Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is
denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right to
reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or on appeal if an
adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he argues that this case should be treated as
an exception. He contends that the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether
he should be charged under several informations corresponding to the number of acts of child abuse
allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.

In Tano v. Salvador,13 the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to
quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are special circumstances
clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused may resort to the
appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is
liable for just one crime regardless of the number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the
number of children with whom he had sexual intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse
constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is
important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if
there is only one offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not
matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the complainants. On the
other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter
whether the other children are presented during the trial.

The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of remanding
this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide the issue now so that
the trial in the court below can proceed without further delay.

Petitioner's contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one offense of child
abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number of acts of sexual
intercourse committed with them (twelve). He argues that the act of sexual intercourse is only a
means of committing the offense so that the acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness with minors
attributed to him should not be subject of separate informations. He cites the affidavits of the alleged
victims which show that their involvement with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of events," i.e.,
the first victim was the one who introduced the second to petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that
child abuse is similar to the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where there is only a single
offense regardless of the number of workers illegally recruited on different occasions. In the
alternative, he contends that, at the most, only four informations, corresponding to the number of
alleged child victims, can be filed against him.

Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:

Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,14 whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of
age. Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group.

Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the circumstances
mentioned in Air. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense is
similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or
lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information. This conclusion is confirmed by
Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:

[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period;

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED
declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second paragraph of the order of
May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby
declared void.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ- 03-1767 March 28, 2003

ROSALIA DOCENA-CASPE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ARNULFO O. BUGTAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern
Samar, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence or to interpose objection to a petition for
bail will not dispense with the conduct of a bail hearing.1 Neither may reliance to a previous order
granting bail justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail, 2 more so where said
order relied upon was issued without hearing and while the accused was at large. 3

The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence against respondent
judge stemmed from a murder case filed against accused Celso Docil and Juan Docil for the death
of Lucio Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on September 3, 1993, Judge
Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar, conducted a preliminary
investigation on the said murder case, and thereafter issued the corresponding warrants of arrest.
No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused who were at large since the commission of the
offense on August 29, 1993.

Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, then presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter allegedly
granted a P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without conducting a hearing, and while the
two were at large. Meanwhile, accused Celso Docil was apprehended on June 4, 2000.

Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, now presided by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a
motion praying that an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan Docil; and that
both accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge. Thereafter,
accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be allowed to post bail on the
grounds that (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because he is charged with murder
allegedly committed at the time when the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the
Constitution; and that (2) both the investigating Judge and the First Assistant Prosecutor
recommended P60,000.00 bail for his temporary liberty.

On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said motion.4 He explained that notwithstanding
the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the time the accused committed the offense,
bail for the crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He cited Section 13, Article III, of
the Constitution which explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law." The
respondent Judge added that contrary to the accuseds claim, there is nothing in the records which
show that bail was recommended for his temporary liberty.

Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his previous contentions. Then, he
filed a manifestation pointing out that on page 49 of the records is an order granting him and his co-
accused the recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution five (5) days within
which to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.

On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the said motion for
reconsideration on the basis of a previous order granting bail to the accused. 5 He ratiocinated that on
page 49 of the records, there indeed appears a final and executory order dated July 22, 1994 issued
by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez granting bail of P60,000.00 to the accused, hence, the
inevitable recourse is to grant bail to accused Celso Docil.

On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant administrative case against the respondent
Judge for granting bail to accused Celso Docil without conducting a bail hearing.

In his Comment,6 the respondent insisted that he committed no gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence. He contended that the prosecution is estopped from objecting to the grant of bail to
accused Celso Docil because it questioned the said order issued by his predecessor Judge only on
February 4, 2000, or after six (6) years from the issuance thereof on July 22, 1994. He added that
despite the five-day period given to the prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the motion for
reconsideration of the accused, warranting the presumption that it has no objection to the accuseds
petition for bail.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent Judge be fined in an
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, with a warning that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.7

In a Resolution dated February 6, 2002, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. 8 On April 24, 2002, the
respondent Judge manifested his conformity to the said Resolution. 9 The complainants
manifestation, on the other hand, was dispensed with by the Court.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.10 Under the
present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. 11 It
must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.12

In Santos v. Ofilada,13 it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of
the prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing.
Thus

Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to
the accused will not justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of
it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to
the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as
would ascertain the strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of
the bail. Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all
justified.

Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to
the accused, the respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail
for hearing and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact
contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take
into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail. Only after respondent judge
had satisfied himself that these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule
on whether or not to grant bail.

Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the
prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez;
nor on the prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration of the
August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail.

It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a
responsible judge, he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. 14 To make things worse, respondent
Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact that the same appears to have been
issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused was at large. In
addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have known the
basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition
for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. 15

In Basco v. Rapatalo,16 the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a judge in
case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. 17 A summary is defined
as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the
summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.18

In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecutions
motion praying that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his
opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The importance of a
bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the
grant or denial of bail.19

The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and
indefatigably stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the
Rule of Law.20

In Dericto v. Bautista,21 the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent Judge for granting
bail without conducting a bail hearing. We explained therein that although the Rules of Court
authorize the investigating judge to determine the amount of bail, such authority does not include the
outright granting of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter, more so in cases where the
crime charged is punishable with death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And while it may be
true that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, this discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but
in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused.

In Goodman v. De La Victoria,22 the erring Judge was found guilty of serious misconduct in office and
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for failing to conduct a bail hearing in the manner required by law.
It was held that the brief inquiry conducted by the said Judge before granting bail did not constitute
the hearing mandated by law, for such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to
guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition.

In Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores,23 the Court sustained the recommendation of the OCA to impose the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 on the erring judge for granting bail without hearing to
the accused in a rape case.

In Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno,24 the Court imposed the penalty of fine of 15,000.00 on the
investigating Judge for denying bail on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In said case, the accused
was arrested in the municipality presided by the respondent judge. The Court ruled that the latter
had the authority to grant bail and to order the release of the accused, even if the records of the
case had been transmitted for review to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The Court further
noted therein that the respondent Judge was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00, when without a hearing, he granted bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense.

In the following cases, the Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on the Judges found to be grossly
ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting or denying bail, to wit:

(1) Manonggiring v. Ibrahim,25 where the respondent Judge, in violation of Rule 114, Section
17(b), of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, granted bail to the accused in a criminal
case which was then pending with another branch involving an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death;

(2) Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,26 where the erring Municipal Trial Court Judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation granted bail to the accused (a) without jurisdiction
and in violation of Rule 114, Section 17a, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
corresponding Information against the accused being pending with the Regional Trial Court;
(b) without notice to the prosecutor of the request to approve the bail bond in violation of
Rule 114, Section 18; and (c) without conducting a bail hearing;
 (3) Tabao v. Barataman,27 and Comia v. Antona,28 where the Judges concerned entertained
an application for bail even though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.

(4) Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,29 where a Regional Trial Court Judge granted bail in a murder case
without the requisite bail hearing.

The record shows that this is not the first administrative case of the respondent Judge. In a decision
promulgated on April 17, 2001, in RTJ-01-1627, he was found guilty of gross inefficiency for failure to
resolve a civil case within the three-month reglementary period and consequently ordered to pay a
fine of P5,000.00. For this second infraction, respondent Judge deserves a heavier penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is ordered to pay a
FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335 March 5, 1997

INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LEO M. RAPATALO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or
willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal
Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against
a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The
hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the
respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent
Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize.
Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on
said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another
attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.

In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He
later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at
all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated
June 29, 1995 1 was issued on the basis of a marginal note 2 dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the
bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and
approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a
release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated
June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and instead arraignment took place)
when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.

In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition
based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation
setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to
oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared
that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was
doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended
bail.

Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a
warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration. 3 To date, accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.

A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature and
purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the
accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges
brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused
in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. 4 In other words, if
the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability
of evasion of the prosecution. 5 In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused
who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release." 6

It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases
where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person" charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the
very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, 7 it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." 8
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-
known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual
views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the
part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful; but legal and regular." 9

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination." 10 If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural
due process.

That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in the
following cases:

(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981. 11 In this case seven separate informations for
murder were filed against the accused Sola and 18 other persons. After preliminary
investigation. the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest. However without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary
release. Citing People v San Diego, 12 we held: "We are of the considered opinion that
whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order
of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.

(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989. 13 In this case, an information was filed against
the accused for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge, without conducting any
hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough evidence to warrant a
case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were allegedly
not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held: "Whatever the court possessed at the
time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the crime
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to established unless
the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate
the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or
held. It is equally entitled to due process.

(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990. 14 In this case, the prosecution was scheduled to
present nine witnesses at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence against
the private respondents was strong.After hearing the fifth witness, the respondent judge
insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The prosecution in the instant case
was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and to
present within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present.

(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991 15 which involved an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. In
this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior hearing, directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with murder, fixing at the
same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the ground that the evidence against them was
merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial
court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to allow the prosecution to
present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the
temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the
instant case amounted to a violation of due process." The respondent judge was ordered
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the performance of his
duties.

(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992. 16 In this case, the judge issued an order admitting
the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any hearing. We held: "The
prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial
discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong."

(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992. 17 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, without notice and hearing, and even before the accused had been arrested or
detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail from a person charged
with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for
hearing at which both the defense and the prosecution must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the evidence of guilt of the applicant
is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise
greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.

(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993, 18 the respondent judge issued a warrant of
arrest and also fixed the bail of an accused charged with the non bailable offense of
statutory rape, without allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge alleged that the only evidence
on record = the sworn statements of the complaining witness and her guardian = were
not sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an established principle that in
cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a
hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a
violation of due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest was returned unserved
and that after the case was re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the warrant was set
aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on record showing whether the approved
bail was revoked by the complainant judge, whether the accused was apprehended or
whether the accused filed an application for bail. Hence, the respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual P20,000.00 that the court imposes
on judges who grant the application of bail without notice and hearing.

(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993. 19 In this case, a complaint for murder was filed
against five persons. While the preliminary investigation was pending in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused before the
respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge ordered the
prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is
strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to appear prompting the
respondent to grant the application for bail. We held: "Whether the motion for bail of an
accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present
within a reasonable time all evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 and was warned
that the commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994. 20 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued two separate warrants of arrest against two persons charged with murder
and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each accused without notifying the
prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the same. Citing People
v. Dacudao, 21 we held: "A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial
of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a
right to which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge
a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec 6."
The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994. 22 In this case, an administrative

complaint was filed against the respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she
granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged with murder. The grant was
made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence of guilt was
strong and without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in this regard. We held:
"In immediately granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for each of the accused
without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence, the respondent denied the
prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many cases and had imposed
sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove
that the evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from service
because the erroneous granting of bail was just one of the offenses found to have been
committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.

(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994. 23 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own motion, authorized
the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal cases for murder. The
accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail was issued. We held: "A
hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a
capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. He was
meted a fine in a higher amount than the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two
criminal cases wherein the respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but
likewise the applicant therefor."

(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994. 24 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued an order directing the arrest of the accused charged with rape and, motu
proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without any application
on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the accused filed a motion to
reduce bailbond, the respondent judge, again, without any prior notice and hearing,
reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that when an accused is
charged with a serious offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may
be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a
hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's
evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar or the same offense will be dealt
with more severely.

(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995 25 involving an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for granting bail to the two accused charged with serious
illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint application for bail, the petition
for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused and the prosecution in
opposition thereto were properly taken into account. However, the respondent judge
denied the application for bail on the around that it was premature since the accused
were not yet in custody of the law. In a subsequent order, the respondent judge, without
conducting any hearing on aforestated application and thereby denying the prosecution
an opportunity to oppose the same, granted said petition upon the voluntary appearance
in court of the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing but the
proceeding he adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for bail was
first considered and then denied for being premature. We held: "The error of the
respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the application
for bail, he acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another hearing and what is
worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or resume of the evidence
presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of bail." The respondent
judge was reprimanded because despite the irregularity in the procedure adopted in the
proceeding, the prosecution was undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and hearing.
No erroneous appreciation of the evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate
its desire to introduce additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated
grant of bail by the respondent.

(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995. 26 In this case, an administrative complaint was
filed against the respondent judge, who, without notice and hearing to the prosecution,
granted bail to an accused charged with murder and illegal possession of firearm. We
held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is mandatory before an
accused can be granted bail. At the hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must
be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in case of the prosecution, that the evidence of
guilt of the applicant is strong, and in the case of the defense, that evidence of such guilt
 is not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.

(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995. 27 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted with
indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused charged with murder because the
accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he was informed that
he was one of the suspect (sic) . . . ." We held: "With his open admission that he granted
bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to be heard, the
respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this court holding that such act amounts
to a denial of due process, and made himself administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law for which appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996. 28 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without hearing nor comment from the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail was
recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of discretion, the
judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such hearing to the fiscal or
require him to submit his recommendation. . . . Truly, a judge would not be in a position to
determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong unless a hearing is first
conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was imposed on the respondent judge with the stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of
strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the
court.

Hence:

(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., 29 an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with homicide case without affording
the prosecution a chance to be heard. The respondent judge explained that he issued an order for the
motion to fix bail but the public prosecutor filed a comment instead which respondent judge thought was
adequate compliance with law. Respondent added that the evidence of guilt of the accused, as disclosed
by the records, was not so strong as to deny the application for bail. In fact, the accused who filed for bail,
together with three others, were later dropped by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor from the
information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify them. We held: "The grant of bail is a matter of
right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound discretion of the court.
That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing should be held but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. . . . A hearing is
plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong." Although the respondent judge's explanation was not
enough to completely exculpate him, the circumstances, coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety of
his order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction the court imposes in cases of this nature. The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to a person charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in
five separate informations. The accused filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge instead of
setting the application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its comment or opposition. The
prosecution submitted its comment leaving the application for bail to the discretion of the court. The
respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering the prosecution to
comment on the accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of a
formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce evidence but the latter
refused and left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court held, "It is true that the weight
of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may
only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of determining whether or not he should be granted liberty. . . . In the case at bar, however, no formal
hearing was conducted by the respondent judge. He could not have assessed the weight of evidence
against the accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail." The respondent judge was
dismissed from service because he was previously fined for a similar offense and was sternly warned that
a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison, 31 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge
for granting bail to several accused in a double murder case. The respondent judge claimed that he
granted the application for bail because the assistant prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not
interpose an objection thereto and that the prosecution never requested that it be allowed to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted the incident for resolution. The respondent judge further
claimed that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only after due
consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We held: "The discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there
will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the
accused." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or
ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused." 32

In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas, 33 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent
judge for granting bail to an accused charged with murder. The application for bail contained the
annotation "No objection" of the provincial prosecutor and the respondent judge, without holding a hearing
to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the release of
the accused from detention with instructions to the bondsman to register the bond with the Register of
Deeds within ten days. It was later found out that the assessed value of the property given was short of
the amount fixed for the release of the accused. We held: "Although the provincial prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should have nevertheless
have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter
was not really contesting the bail application . . . . Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not
wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into account
the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should respondent judge have ordered the
petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused." Respondent judge herein was ordered to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 and was given a stern warning that the commission of a similar offense in the future
would be dealt with more severely.

Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. 34 This Court, in a number of cases 35 held that
even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the
court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the state' s
evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.

After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution. 36 On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise,
the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of
evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as
an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.

This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang 37 invalidated the order of respondent judge granting bail
to the accused because "Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely
stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the
evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."

With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly remind trial court
judges to perform their mandatory duty of conducting the required hearing in bail applications where
the accused stands charged with a capital offense.

An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his
knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.

Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not
to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his
having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to
the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused
is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional
liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.

In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria, 38 this Court held that the respondent judge is duty bound to
exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to determine whether in the case at bar, the proof is
evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant and to grant or deny the petition for
provisional liberty. It also held that a writ of mandamuswill lie in order to compel the respondent judge to
perform a duty imposed upon him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is
the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the
basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation
made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be
a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accused's
provisional release will be determined at the hearing.

The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails
to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the
case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons 39 where this Court gave the following "instructions" to
the People's Court, 40 thus:

1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition
for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its
discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the
purpose;

2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not
justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or
to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;

3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question
on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the
prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do
so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as
head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of
the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present
evidence which he does not want to introduce provided, of course, that such
refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee. 41

The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:

If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for
any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled and
the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence and, in so
doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a
certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it
to exist, and the opposite course if that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not
voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court's clear duty would be to adopt that
course which has been provided for in case of absence of such evidence. Applying
the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within the power nor discretion
of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the
prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a
perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the
application for bail.

As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:

 The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy
his burden of proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's
attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over him in
the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance, the court is authorized
by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor
to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail.

As for the third instruction, this Court declared:

It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of the
Solicitor General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence may
endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This is
so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without having the
evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is sought to be
avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution before the trial.

It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under a completely
different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason
cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under the
1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.

In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail" provides, as follows:

Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule,
is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of
a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Capital offense burden of proof. On the hearing of an application for

admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a
capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution.

The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have been intercalated, as
shown by the underscored phrases and statements below:

Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these
rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death.

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
 Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for
admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise
unable to testify.

It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in the
counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a
situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the
application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case, the
judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a judge
since all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is to refrain
from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the
1940 Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person
charged with a capital offense is strong cannot be determined if the prosecution chooses not to
present evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial
judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or
refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should be
scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the application for bail necessarily means presentation of
evidence, and the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the bail application by the
prosecution will not suffice.

The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to
prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of
bail to the accused. "This also prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used
as a means to force the prosecution into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to
do so, the accused would claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not
strong." 42

It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail
must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution
were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose
of the proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare
for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution
witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.43

In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court
reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
 strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections
7 and 8, supra);

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.

The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection
with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of
the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof. 44 A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith
in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 45

Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail to the accused
since the Assistant Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no objection to the grant of bail and
recommended, instead, the bailbond in the sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although
the court may have the discretion to grant the application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached after due
hearing which, in this particular instance has not been substantially complied with by the respondent
Judge.

While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing three times,
thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not
completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted
in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for
purposes of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where the judge
grants the application for bail without notice and hearing. In view however of the circumstances of
this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo,
La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.