Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO
LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and
ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K.
LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented
by RITA K. LEE, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges
Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by
private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of
birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers.
One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng.
The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.

Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee
(hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee,
Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all
petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed
as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and
docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.

Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting
the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of
spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita
K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.

Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named
Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their
housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan
gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners,
their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that
petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived
in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before
private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.

The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his
children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be
published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not
suspicion.7

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that
pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following.

1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that
he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital
Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of
the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth
delivery" (refer to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY Annex I). Also, the age of the mother
when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH
SHIOK CHENG's age was then already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient
record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name
of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.

2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third
child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK
SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22
years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.

3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was
the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As
per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.

4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th
child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG
have stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother was
omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she
have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.

Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23
years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible
for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given
birth at that impossible age.

5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK
CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.

6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's allegation, she was born at their
house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.

7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of
KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from
28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on
22 April 1959.
 8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the
mother is 48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only
39 years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK
CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already
impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per
diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN
SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.

In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:

10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the
mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is
in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of
making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd
family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been
necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the
legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in
petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674
on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and
filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and
(3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.9

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for
failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion. 10 Then on
February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let this
petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th
Floor of the City Hall of Manila.

Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of
hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.

Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC.
No. C-1674, to wit:

It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the
Court setting the case for hearing was published in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the
clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the "Media Update" published on the aforementioned
dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been
served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the
private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements
for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
 xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge
Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners averred that
respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth to
prosper in the lower courts.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is
inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a
collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common
father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The
petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.13

Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October
28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15

Hence, this petition.

1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private respondents
seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a
completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a
declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress,
Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label private respondents' suits before the
lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:

xxx xxx xxx

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . . , the proceedings are simply aimed
at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to
establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of
persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.17

xxx xxx xxx

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for the
correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological
reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their
birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng,
but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at
all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.19

Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the leading
case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their
records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that
the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this
Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In
the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil
register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we held:

"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

'SECTION 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.'

'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.'

'SECTION 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.'

"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register are (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1)
issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings."22 (Emphasis supplied.)

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.

We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private
respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of
the order setting the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In
both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of
Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the
Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A
motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and
Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma
Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by
way of a special proceeding cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite
 parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate
action.23(Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go
beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code
or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs.
Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in
earlier cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil
Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same
would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we declared
null and void the portion of the lower court's order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation
of one of her children as appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect
such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties
to the case.

We explained in this wise:

"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to
the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings
taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are
sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would
be changed from 'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that
the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as
to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive
rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code."31 (italics supplied).

Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse to Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only
requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished
from a summary proceeding. Thus:

"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under
a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon
the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the
 issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted
upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a
special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see
that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition
three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties
of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil
registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the procedural
requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.

It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a seesawing of opinion
on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule
108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of
Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the
scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights,
such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:

"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor
filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner
Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the "non-observance of
the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the
Court held as follows:

'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding "marriages"
in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it
is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this
Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of
a marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov.
28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226,
Feb. 14, 1958).'

'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her
children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x
x .'

'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under
Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status
from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate x x x '

"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from
"legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings."39

It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each
other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is
embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters that
may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this case
that:

"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then
the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial
change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our
substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory
that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving
controversial issues."41

This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said that:

"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised
Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure
judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant
to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a
procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the
matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of
the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive
rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code."43 (Italics supplied).

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that
Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain,
and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like.
Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except
to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases
involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however,
shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.

First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must
be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining
such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its ordinary sense,
to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors from"44 while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute".45 The provision
neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect
that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be
changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles
407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
 "Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register."

"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also
nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect
civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the
rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction
that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or
phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article
412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations."

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected
and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious
effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.
Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the
civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps
another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the failure to
delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or
innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding,
we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary
procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be
decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the
preceding treatise.

II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as Article
171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only
after his death.48

Article 171 provides:

"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:

"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.

In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment
of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and
ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled therein
that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, had the
requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the
same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.50

We likewise held therein that:

"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's
child at all x x x. ''51

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:

"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case
at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless
then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:

'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not
well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not
the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. "'53

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years had
lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in
December of 1992 and February of 1993.54

We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a
fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the
following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:
 "Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five
years from the time the right of action accrues."

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the
part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of
action has arisen.55

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that is, the
act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly
speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or right to sue accrued. However, we
must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact
had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth
about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the
dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the case of
private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would
commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother's (Keh Shiok
Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions were aroused and confirmed.
From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth
among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in
petitioners' birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents,
hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the
time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public
documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water.
Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a
particular mother or not. It is that simple.

IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed by
private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:

(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal
and against defendants as alleged accessories;

(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and

(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.57

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of
the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu
Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in order to
determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.58

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various
cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs
prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct
and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108
petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and
their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng
naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and
his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has
for its cause of action the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept
that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. HCISED

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,
1994 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 22-36 .

2
Entitled "MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K.
LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE and TIU CHUAN versus HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON.
JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 47, and RTC-Kalookan
City, Branch 130, respectively, and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, in their personal capacities
and ROSA K. LEE VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG-ONG, JULIAN K.
LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE MIGUEL and THOMAS
K. LEE represented by RITA K. LEE."

3
Presiding Judge of Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.

4
Presiding Judge of Branch 130 of the RTC of Kalookan.

5
CA Rollo, Annex A of Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

6
CA Rollo, Annex A- I of Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

7
Rollo, pp. 171-172.

8
Rollo, pp. 348-349

9
CA Rollo, Amended Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

10
CA Rollo, Annex D of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

11
CA Rollo, Annex B of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

12
CA Rollo, Annex E of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 92-63692.

13
CA Rollo, Amended Petition in CA-G.R. No. 92-63692.

14
Rollo, p.22.
15
Rollo, p. 38.

16
Rollo, p. 7.

17
Rollo, p. 33.

18
Sec. 3 (c), Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

19
Babiera v. Catotal, 333 SCRA 487 (2000); Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 468
(1994); Cabatbat-Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451 (1988).

20
141 SCRA 462 (1986).

21
Id., p. 468.

22
Id., pp. 473-474.

23
Rollo, p. 32.

24
Rollo, p. 310.

25
168 SCRA 294 (1988).

26
Supra, see note 20.

27
Brown v. Republic, 99 Phil. 818 (1956); Black, et al. v. Republic 104 Phil. 848 (1958); Bantoto Coo v.
Republic, 2 SCRA 42 (1961); Beduya v. Republic, 11 SCRA 109 (1964); Reyes vs. Republic, 12 SCRA 377
(1964); Baybayan v. Republic, 16 SCRA 403 (1966); Tan, et al. v. Republic, 16 SCRA 692 (1966); Matias v.
Republic, 28 SCRA 31 (1969); Uy v. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu, 46 SCRA 1 (1972); Republic v.
Medina, 119 SCRA 271 (1982); Rosales v. Castillo Rosales, 132 SCRA 132 (1984); Tan v. Republic 133
SCRA 591 (1984), to name a few.

28
94 Phil. 321 (1954).

29
39 SCRA 350, 361 (1971).

30
Supra, see note 25.

31
Id., pp. 301-302.

32
Supra, see note 25.

33
Id., p. 299.

34
Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880, 882 (1920).

35
Supra, see note 20.

36
Ibid

37
156 SCRA 69 (1996).

38
305 SCRA 438 (1999).
39
Id., p. 444.

40
Supra, see note 28.

41
Id., pp. 323-324.

42
38 SCRA 409 ( 1971 )

43
Id., p. 415.

44
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, @ 1993.

45
Ibid.

46
Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688, 694 (1922); Araneta v. Concepcion and Araneta, 99 Phil. 709, 713
(1956); National Tobacco Administration v. COA, 311 SCRA 755, 769 (1999); Paras v. COMELEC, 264
SCRA 49, 54 (1996)

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
47

CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST

NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

48
Rollo, p. 13.

49
Supra, see note 19.

50
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

51
Supra, see note 19, p. 495

52
Ibid.

53
Id., pp. 472-474.

54
Rollo, p. 14.

55
Espaol v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314, 318 (1985).

56
Article 410 of the New Civil Code.

57
Rollo, p. 15.

58
Rollo, p. 16.

International School, Inc. (Manila) v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 474, 480 (1999); Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA
59

465, 475 (1999).

 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF G.R. No. 170340

THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson

CARPIO,**
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL PROMULGATED:

KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-
FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA
KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and June 29, 2007
KELLY DOGMOC KHO
(Minor),
Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27,

2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which
affirmed the September 4, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito),
Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the
correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as those of Carlitos minor
children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy
Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of
entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and
Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to Filipino instead of Chinese, as well as the deletion of
the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because his
parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married.

The same request to delete the married status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira.

With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of
his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000,
the date appearing in their marriage certificate.

The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.

On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition [3] in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his record of
birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage
certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and Filipino to Chinese,
respectively.

As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks [4] in
Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which
it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.

In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil
registrar[5] stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in
the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the
other amendments.

On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel
for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to
enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing
to October 9, 2001.[6] On September 14, 2001,[7] the OSG entered its appearance
with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case
and render assistance to it (the OSG).

On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing

compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also
presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his
mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the first name of
their mother be rectified from Maribel to Marivel.

By Decision[8] of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil
registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as
follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2)
delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of
marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in
the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of
the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel
Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
Maribel as Marivel.

With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the

corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from
John Kho to Juan Kho and the latters citizenship from Filipino to Chinese.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the

CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the
subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother,
Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
corrections with regard to the questioned married status of Carlito and his siblings
parents, and the latters citizenship.

Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name
Carlito John Kho to Carlito Kho for non-compliance with jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners

appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines
the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry,
was observed in the case.

Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held
that the correction of their mothers first name from Maribel to Marivel was made
to rectify an innocuous error.

As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit
the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not
affect the minors filiation from legitimate to illegitimate considering that at the
time of their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlitos first marriage
was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.

In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were
born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on
to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having
been represented by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 3[9] of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the

requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with
the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlitos birth
record, it noted, falls under letter o of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule
108.

In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.

Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change

Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied
because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona fide
residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos
aliases and his true name as Carlito John I. Kho. Petitioner concludes that the same
jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos father.
 The petition fails.

It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the
married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves
the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
[10]
Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.

For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in

his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on
the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.[11]

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were
married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.

Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary

proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[12] explains the raison d etre:

x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could
be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not
through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would
be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. Valencia,[13] however, this Court ruled, and has since

repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108.[14]

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This
Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
 aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.

xxxx
What is meant by appropriate adversary proceeding? Blacks Law Dictionary
defines adversary proceeding[] as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte

application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x
x [15] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR
THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF
JUDICIAL ORDER, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the
judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons
recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under
Rule 108.[16]

Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito[17] observed that the obvious

effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction
of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in
the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the
civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
entries of the civil register is satisfied. [18] The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court read:

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
 court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

There is no dispute that the trial courts Order[19] setting the petition for
hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose
it was posted[20] as well as published for the required period; that notices of
hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan
and the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002
during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively
participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.

What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and

Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and
the trial courts judgment void.

A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[21] That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,
June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo)
and to correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial
court.

Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,

however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that she should have
been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the
RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.

In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the
order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.

The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the

civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
 Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

xxxx

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule

108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards
share in the estate of her father. x x x.

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.

xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but
were inadvertently left out. x x x

xxxx

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a

thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding
has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[22]

Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or

respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It
may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31,
2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise
any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the
proceeding.

Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the

proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates, especially since
the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the
residence[23] she shared with Carlito and the children.
 It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to
correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.[24]

With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate
of marriage[25] shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not
on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April 27,
1989 was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the
time his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.
[26]
Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors
were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all
in the nature of their filiation.

With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. [27] Again,
that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.

The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his
siblings birth certificates of the entry Married opposite the date of marriage of their
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St.
Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have
never contracted marriage legally.[28]

A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.[29] Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word Married opposite the date of marriage of parents is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of
entries involving changes of name falls under letter o of the following provision of
Section 2 of Rule 108:[30]

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and

valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments
of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
 beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.

More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from

the Urious College in Butuan City,[31] certificate of eligibility from the Civil
Service Commission,[32] and voter registration record[33] satisfactorily show that he
has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the
dropping of the second name.

The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as

appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during
the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to
question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which
certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial
nature of the proceedings.

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings

uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as Filipino. To disallow the correction
in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably
born of the same mother and father.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of

the name of Carlitos wife from Maribel to Marivel. The mistake is clearly clerical
or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding[34] considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of
Carlito and his wife is Marivel.

Apropos is Yu v. Republic[35] which held that changing the appellants

Christian name of Sincio to Sencio amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted
through a summary proceeding.[36] The same ruling holds true with respect to the
correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name from John Kho to
Juan Kho. Except in said marriage certificate, the name Juan Kho was uniformly
entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
On Official Leave.
**
Acting Chairperson.
[1]
CA rollo, pp. 50-63; penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Justices Romulo V. Borja
(then Chairman of the Twenty-Second Division) and Ricardo R. Rosario.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 45-48; penned by Judge Augustus L. Calo.
[3]
Id. at 39-43.
[4]
Records, pp. 62-64. The petition was published on June 1, 8, and 15, 2001 as shown by the copies of the
newspaper publications of even date, which were marked as Exhibits E, F and G.
[5]
Id. at 30-31, Soledad A. Cruz.
[6]
Id. at 34; Order of August 9, 2001.
[7]
Id. at 36.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[9]
SEC. 5. Minor or incompetent persons. A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with
the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem.
[10]
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-53417, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 294, 300-
301; Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408, 413 (1986); Baybayan v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 230,
232 (1966); David v. Republic, 122 Phil. 848, 851 (1965).
[11]
Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321, 324 (1954).
[12]
Supra note 10 at 299-300, citing Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, supra.
[13]
Supra note 10.
[14]
Vide Republic v. Lim, 464 Phil. 151, 157 (2004); Eloeosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 431 Phil. 612,
619 (2002); Republic v. Labrador, 364 Phil. 934, 943-944 (1999).
[15]
Republic v. Valencia, supra note 10.
[16]
Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 61 (2004).
[17]
G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492-493.
[18]
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 405 (2001).
[19]
Records, pp. 28-29. The Order was issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Victor A. Tomaneng.
[20]
Id. at 32. Affidavit of Posting.
[21]
Supra note 16.
[22]
Supra at 55-57. The ruling was reiterated in Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005, 465
SCRA 495, 506-508.
[23]
Records, p. 75. Copies of these Orders and of the Decision were mailed to 717 Molave Road, Guingona
Subdivision, Butuan City, which was reflected as the residence of both Carlito and Marivel in their Certificate
of Marriage. During the hearing on January 31, 2002, Carlito also testified that Marivel was still living with
him.
[24]
Republic v. Valencia, supra note 10 at 416.
[25]
Records, p. 55, Exhibit K.
[26]
Id. at 74-76. Transcript of Stenographic Notes, January 31, 2002.
[27]
Id. at 67.
[28]
Id. at 50, Exhibit I.
[29]
Id. at 20, Annex A to Amended Petition.
[30]
Vide Republic v. CA, 325 Phil. 361, 368 (1996).
[31]
Records, pp. 51-52, Exhibit J.
[32]
Id. at 53, Exhibit J-1.
[33]
Id. at 54, Exhibit J-2.
[34]
Leonor v. CA, 326 Phil. 74, 87 (1996); Black v. Republic, 104 Phil. 848, 849 (1958).
[35]
129 Phil. 248, 249 (1967).
[36]
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, supra note 10 at 300.
[37]
Records, pp. 7-10; Exhibits N to Q.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-36478 April 29, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE CORRECTION OF THE SURNAME OF CESAR YOUNG, AS RECORDED IN THE
REGISTRY OF BIRTHS OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA. CESAR YU and DRA. MAPALAD
CRUZ-YU, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed the petition for correction of entry in the
Civil Registry of Manila.

Petitioners-appellants Cesar Yu and Mapalad Cruz, son and mother, respectively, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal a petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry of Manila alleging that both petitioners are residents of
San Juan, Rizal; that petitioner Cesar Yu is the son of petitioner Mapalad Cruz and Aproniano Yu; that Cesar Yu was
born at the Sacred Heart Hospital at Looban, Paco, Manila, on April 2, 1943; that the physician who attended his
delivery erroneously gave the surname "Young" instead of "YU" to the newly born child when the birth of the child was
recorded in the Civil Registry of Manila; that the entries in the birth certificate of Cesar Yu as recorded in the Civil
Registry of Manila contain the following entries:

Full Name Cesar Young Name of Father Aproniano Young;

and that these erroneous entries in the birth certificate of Cesar Yu in the Civil Registry of Manila were due to the
mistake of the person who supplied the information to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Petitioner Cesar Yu prays
that an order be issued directing the Civil Registrar of Manila to - correct the erroneous entries in his birth certificate
by changing the surname "YOUNG" to "YU" under the column "Full Name of Child", and the surname "Young" to "Yu"
under the column "Father" so that the full name of the petitioner should read "CESAR YU" instead of "CESAR
YOUNG", and that of his father as "Aproniano Yu" instead of "Aproniano Young."

The trial court on June 26, 1969, issued an order as follows:

It appearing from the records that the civil registry to be corrected is located in the City of Manila
and that the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila has not been made party to this proceedings as
provided for in Sections I and 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, this case is
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs.

It is the submission of the petitioners that the provisions of Article 412 of the Civil Code should apply instead of
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; that the Local Civil Registrar of Manila need not be specifically
mentioned as party and that the case may be filed in the residence of the petitioner as provided for in Section 2, Rule
4 of the Rules of Court; and that the court a quo acquired jurisdiction by publication because the petition for correction
of surname is by its nature a special proceeding. Further, petitioners contend that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
contemplates cancellation or correction of an error on a substantial matter in the civil register and that petitioner
Cesar Yu's surname was not entered correctly in the civil register and the correction may therefore be secured
judicially pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation with the general provisions of the Rules of Court in
special proceedings.

The opposition of the Solicitor General is based on the ground that the changes sought by petitioners-appellants
cannot be effected by a proceeding under Article 412 of the Civil Code.

The opposition is well-taken. Article 412 allows correction only of clerical mistakes, not those substantial changes
which may affect the civil status or nationality of the persons involved. (Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, L-5609, February 5,
1954; Beduya vs. Republic, 11 SCRA 109). A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black v. Republic of the
Philippines, L-10869, November 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous changes such as correction of a name
that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parties (Ansaldo v. Republic of the Philippines,
L-10226, February 14, 1958).

The correction sought by petitioners-appellants is clearly substantial, not only clerical, affecting as it does not only
their names but also their Identities. Thus, the correction can only be made in a proper proceeding wherein the
person concerned (Civil Registrar of Manila) should be made a party and be given the opportunity to be heard.

Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

and, Section 3 thereof requires that the Civil Registrar and an persons who have or claim any interest which may be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Thus, the petition must conform and comply with the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and, petitioners having failed to comply with the requirements thereof,
the trial court committed no error in dismissing the petition. The reason why non-clerical mistakes cannot be
corrected under the summary proceeding set by Article 412 of the new Civil Code "lies in the fact that the books
making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
primar facie evidence of the facts therein contained, (Article 410, new Civil Code), and if the entries in the civil
register could be corrected or changed through a mere summary proceeding, and not through an appropriate action,
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented we would set wide open the door to
fraud or other mischief the consequences of which might be detrimental and far reaching. (Ansaldo vs. Republic, 102
Phil. 1047). "

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SOORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005]

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural

guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal
capacity, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C.
HERRERA, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] are the February 27, 2004 decision[2] and the
May 14, 2004 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which
dismissed petitioners original action for annulment of judgment [4] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo
C. Herrera filed a petition[5] for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate
of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to the name
of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba
Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the childs mother,
Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the
challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he
learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with
Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo
Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented certifications from the Civil Registrar
of Mandaluyong City[6] and the National Statistics Office, [7] both stating that they have no
record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition, [8] impleading
Armi and all the persons who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition. [9]
 On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for
hearing on January 24, 1997, and directed the publication and service of said order to
Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General.
The full text of the order, reads:

In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia,
that the following entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:

1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned
therein;

2. The surname Herrera appended to the childs name;

3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.

Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for
hearing on January 24, 1997 at nine oclock in the morning before this Branch at
Rooms 447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All interested parties are hereby
notified of the said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the Petition should not
be granted.

Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Manila, and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila with copies of the Petition and of this Order.

Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the
address indicated in the subject Certificate of Live Birth.

SO ORDERED.[10]

On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court
issued an Amended Order[11] with substantially the same contents, except that the
hearing was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997. A copy of said Amended Order was
published in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its January 20, 27,
and February 3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza
St., Ermita, Manila, on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the
Solicitor General.
 At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the
Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other
hand was not present. The return of the notice sent to her had the following notation:

This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server] personally
served a copy of the Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated January 13,
1997 to the private respondent, Armi Alba Herrera at 418 Arquiza St., Ermita,
Manila, but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent is no
longer residing at said given address.[12]

On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and
executory on June 2, 1997.[13] The dispositive portion thereof, states:

ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live
Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry under the name of the
child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as
ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date
August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper
correction and entry.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Private respondent filed a motion [15] for amendment of the decretal portion of the
decision to include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of
petitioner minor. This was granted in the August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as
follows:

ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live
Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entries under the name of
the child, the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas
Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and
the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong,
MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.

SO ORDERED.[16]

On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial
court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her son was enrolled
as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court
order directing the change of petitioner minors surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302
Plaza Towers Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such
was her residence when she and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife
from 1982 to 1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was born on March 8, 1985.
Even after their separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son
until 1998; and that Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on June 14,
1991 as part of his support to petitioner minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., No.
418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth certificate of their son, was
entered in said certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister,
Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418
Arquiza St., is the residence of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of
notice therein to prevent her from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his
purported cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as false
statements coming from a polluted source.[17]
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among
others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and
purposely deprived them of their day in court. It further held that as an illegitimate child,
petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother. [18] Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments
may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. [19]
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and
her minor child depends on the nature of private respondents action, that is, in
personam, in rem orquasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person
based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of
the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is
to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. [20]
Hence, petitions directed against the thing itself or the res,[21] which concerns the
status of a person,[22] like a petition for adoption,[23] annulment of marriage,[24] or
correction of entries in the birth certificate,[25] as in the instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
[26]
The service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. [27]
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested
the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in
civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected
through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with
the proper Regional Trial Court. [28] Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough
that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the
requirement of due process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said
address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi.
Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing
therein are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication
of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor,
which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. [29] The absence of personal
service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial courts compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change
of entries in a minors birth certificate to reflect the name of the minors real father as well
as to effect the corresponding change of her surname. In seeking to annul said
decision, the other children of the alleged father claimed that they are indispensable
parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to
annul the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition which was
sustained by this Court on the ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an
indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by the publication of the order
of hearing. Thus

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that
June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her
father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the
time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests
may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse
or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and
Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule
108, which requires notice by publication, thus:

Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were
inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:

The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of
January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred
jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. While nobody
appeared to oppose the instant petition during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did
not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue
trying the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues
until termination of the case.

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.[30]

Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondents alleged concealment of

Armis present address, was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here, Armi contended that private
respondent is aware of her present address because they lived together as husband
and wife in the condominium unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private respondent
continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her claim, she presented (1)
private respondents title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to
private respondent for payment of homeowners or association dues; (2) a photocopy of
a January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the
subsequent title issued to the latter. However, these documents only tend to prove
private respondents previous ownership of the unit and the subsequent transfer thereof
to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does the sale
prove that the conveyance of the unit was part of private respondents support to
petitioner minor. Indeed, intimate relationships and family relations cannot be inferred
from what appears to be an ordinary business transaction.
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale [31] stated that Armi resides at 1175 L.
Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent
has knowledge of Armis address because the former objected to the offer of the deed
for being a mere photocopy.[32] The counsel for petitioners even admitted that they do
not have the original of the deed and that per certification of the Clerk of Court, the
Notary Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notarized
document as required by the rules. [33] The deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing
knowledge of Armis address to private respondent inasmuch as the authenticity thereof
was neither admitted by private respondent nor proven by petitioners.
While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they
were only attached as annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence
before the Court of Appeals. More importantly, said letters/notes do not have probative
value because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic writing
of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits [34] of Armi and her sister, Corazon
Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such
affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written
statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-
examination.[35] Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of
Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and
without probative value.
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.[36] Armis claim that private respondent is aware of her present address is
anchored on the assertion of a live-in relationship and support to her son. Since the
evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported cohabitation and
support, it follows that private respondents knowledge of Armis address was likewise
not proven. Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the
court that which was not shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore
correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of failure to
establish extrinsic fraud.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an
action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, where only
questions of law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action
of certiorari will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file a petition for
review under Rule 45, which should be instituted within 15 days [37] from receipt of the
assailed decision or resolution. The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another
reason to dismiss this petition.[38]
Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial courts
decision. In an action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court
that something may indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled.
[39]
Under Article 176[40] of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255,
which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
fathers surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar,[41] it was held that an illegitimate child
whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mothers
surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is
only when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his
status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an
illegitimate child because she was never married to private respondent. Considering
that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is
therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his
mother.
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not
warrant the annulment of the trial courts decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the
May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Cancio C. Garcia with Associate
Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Danilo B. Pine, concurring. (Rollo, pp. 43-67).
[3]
Rollo, pp. 88-89.
[4]
Penned by Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, Rollo, pp. 122-125.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 97-103.
[6]
Dated October 7, 1996, CA Rollo, p. 375.
[7]
Dated October 16, 1996, CA Rollo, p. 376.
[8]
CA Rollo, p. 365-372.
[9]
Id. at 365.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 189-190.
[11]
Id. at 104-106.
[12]
Id. at 191, dorsal side (emphasis supplied).
[13]
Id. at 129.
[14]
Id. at 125.
[15]
Filed on July 8, 1997, Rollo, pp. 130-133.
[16]
Rollo, p. 134.
[17]
CA Rollo, p. 119.
[18]
The decretal portion thereof, provides:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(CA Rollo, p. 674)
[19]
SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment.The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief. (n)
[20]
Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, 11 March 2003, 399 SCRA 43, 47-48.
[21]
Valmonte v. CA, 322 Phil. 96, 106 (1996).
[22]
Republic v. Elepano, G.R. No. 92542, 15 October 1991, 202 SCRA 748, 751.
[23]
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, 31 March 2005.
[24]
Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 449 Phil. 824, 835 (2003).
[25]
Barco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120587, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 162, 173.
[26]
Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, G.R. No. 141423, 15 November 2000, 344 SCRA 838, 851.
[27]
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 98, 104.
[28]
Barco v. Court of Appeals, supra at 174-175; 177-178.
[29]
Id., p. 173.
[30]
Supra, note 25 at 172-174 (emphasis supplied).
[31]
CA Rollo, pp. 52-53. The photocopy marked as Exhibit C cannot be found in the CA Rollo. At any rate,
petitioners admitted that the deed of sale they offered was not a duplicate original or certified true
copy but a mere photocopy (TSN, 7 November 2001, CA Rollo, pp. 526-527).
[32]
Comment on Formal Offer of Exhibits, CA Rollo, p. 316.
[33]
TSN, 20 November 2001, CA Rollo, pp. 555-557.
[34]
CA Rollo, pp. 108-109; 37-42.
[35]
Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 819, 829 (2000).
[36]
Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 449 Phil. 664, 666 (2003).
[37]
Sec. 2 of Rule 45 states:
 SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension.The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioners
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion
duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable
reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition. (1a, 5a)
[38]
Linzag v. CA, 353 Phil. 506, 524 (1998).
[39]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 560.
[40]
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child.
[41]
Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 189476

PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
BERSAMIN, and
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON VILLARAMA, JR., and
COSETENG-MAGPAYO SERENO, JJ.
(A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM Promulgated:
COSETENG), February 2, 2011
Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth [1] shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
 Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent
filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition
to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The
petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled IN RE PETITION
FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the

National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear
in [its] National Indices of Marriage. [2] Respondent also submitted his academic
records from elementary up to college[3] showing that he carried the surname
Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his
surname.[4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected
as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG.[5]

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,[6] respondent amended his

petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement
under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[7]

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was
published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6,
2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.[8] And a copy of the
notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default
was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present
evidence ex parte.[9]

By Decision of January 8, 2009,[10] the trial court granted respondents

petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:

1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES [in herein respondents Certificate
of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last Name of the
[respondent] to COSETENG;
 3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle Name of
the [respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the space for
FATHER of the [respondent] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for

reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,
[11]
hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on
pure question of law.

The Republic assails the decision in this wise:

I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES

THE CHANGE OF [RESPONDENTS] CIVIL STATUS FROM
LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD
BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS

II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT

DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS
FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.[12] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing
his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.[13]

The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date
of marriage and the name of respondents father from the entries in respondents
birth certificate,[14] the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in
accord with respondents prayer reading:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that

the Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of
petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the
 Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant
government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.

Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.
[15]
(underscoring supplied)

Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil
Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of
copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before
the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no
oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.[16]

The petition is impressed with merit.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF

NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. [17] Respondents
reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of

the Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon,
to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use
the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her
favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do
so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
 The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that
of illegitimacy.Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that changes which

may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings . . .

Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act,

event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.

xxxx

SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil
status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to
the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not

in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the
above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows,
neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim

that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however:

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the
sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the
provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of ones name or the
correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . .
(emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of

these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to
have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all
affected parties as respondents in the case.

Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that a petition for a substantial correction

or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in
relation to his parentsis a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil
registry.

Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties

in a petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case,
the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the
correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and
Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz
alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her
nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the
birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as married on 1953 Bulan are erroneous
because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the
data in said birth certificate.

The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly directed
the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her childrens birth
certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victorias
birth certificate from married to single and the date and place of marriage to no
marriage.

On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order
of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial courts
order directing the change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of her child
Victoria in light of the following observations:

x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other

indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include
not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely
affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should
be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary
system of justice.

The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from legitimate to
illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she
will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108,
like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the
proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become
an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the
Civil Code.[24] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
 As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the

court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly
mandates two sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice is
that given to the persons named in the petition and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as
creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4
is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for
two periods (for the two types of potential oppositors) within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[25] In

that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the
birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June
Salvacion Gustilo, Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughters real
father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a CONSTANCIA wherein he
acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.

After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change
of Junes family name to Gustilo.

Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy
Ann Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging
that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial courts Order as
Mary Joy was, by Barcos claim, also fathered by Gustilo.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-
intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in
Nadinas petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But
since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the
affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of
Barco as a party to the case.Thus the Court explained:

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of

Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any
judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina
knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner
under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be
affected by the granting of a petition.For example, a petitioner cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of
his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.

xxxx

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world
to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the
civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of
entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and
correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor children. Carlito and
his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of
their mother Epifania to Filipino, instead of Chinese, and the deletion of the word
married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because their parents
Juan and Epifania were not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the
birth certificates of their children of his and his wifes date of marriage to reflect the
actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course
of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his
wife from Maribel to Marivel.

The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that
she was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos petition.

The trial court granted the petition.

On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos parents
rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and
the trial courts judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing
cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted
that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since
the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting
their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual
date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos petition for change
of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself
took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under
Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would
naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who
is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be
affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is
notified through publication.

IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing

discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

 Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Records, p. 7.
[2]
Id. at 8.
[3]
Id. at 9-16.
[4]
Id. at 16.
[5]
Id. at 17-22.
[6]
Presided by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig.
[7]
Id. at 23.
[8]
Id. at 48-50.
[9]
Id. at 45.
[10]
Id. at 116-117.
[11]
Id. at 135-136. 7
[12]
Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[13]
Id. at 17-18.
[14]
Id. at 18-19.
[15]
Rollo, p. 18.
[16]
Id. at 53-56.
[17]
Vide See Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996).
[18]
186 Phil. 600 (1980).
[19]
G.R. No. L-53417, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 294.
[20]
G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 76.
[21]
241 Phil. 966 (1988).
[22]
G.R. No. 132980, 305 SCRA 438 (1999).
[23]
Supra, note 19.
[24]
Id. at p. 301.
[25]
465 Phil. 39 (2004).
[26]
Id. at 55-56.
[27]
G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 177.
 SECOND DIVISION

PLATON AND LIBRADA G.R. No. 140305

CERUILA,
Petitioners, Present:

- versus - PUNO, Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROSILYN DELANTAR, CALLEJO, SR.,
represented by her TINGA, and
guardian,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
WELFARE and
DEVELOPMENT, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 9, 2005
x------------------------------------------------
x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila

(Ceruilas) filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932, for the
annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case
involving Romeo Jaloslos.[1] The RTC granted the Ceruilas petition
in its decision dated April 11, 1997[2] which was nullified, however,
by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999.[3] The CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. [4] Hence the present
petition.

The antecedents are as follows:

Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father,

Simplicio Delantar (Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly
prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail
starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition
for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts
of the mother, Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was
granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119 on November 9,
1996 and Simplicios motion to vacate said judgment was denied
by said court on January 20, 1997.[5]

On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC

of Manila, entitled IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR, praying that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for
the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of
the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious,
and it falsified all material entries therein, as follows:

a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada

A. Telin;

b. The signature of informant referring to Librada T.

Delantar being a forgery;

c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological

father, considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely the
foster father and co-guardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the
name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;

d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents,

since the parents reflected in said certificate were (sic) actually
full blood brother and sister and therefore marriage between the
two is virtually impossible;

e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as

the same (sic) is actually not legitimate;

f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since

the known father merely made it appear that she was born at
the time the informations for the birth certificate were supplied
by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper recording;

g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of

birth of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos.[6]
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing
on March 19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that
any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or
opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing.[7]

Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. [8] However, no representative
appeared during the scheduled hearing.[9]

On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the
Ceruilas as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria

Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No.
85-27325 of the office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and
void ab initio: and

2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National

Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage
registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents
pertaining thereto, if any.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC explained in its Decision thus:

During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find
out if there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioners
counsel, Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the
jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits A to E). [11] Thereafter, petitioner
husband Platon Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness for
the petitioner and after he completed his testimony, Atty. Paderanga
formally offered his evidence and rested his case.

The evidence on record reveals the following:

On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial
Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her
birth certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit I). In the said
birth certificate the name of the childs mother appear as Librada A.
Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar
(Entry No. 9). The birth certificate likewise shows that the parents of
the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married
on February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21
of the same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the
child was 27 years old when the child was born and that she was
attended in her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth
certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos Santos as the informant
and mother of the child with her given address
as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very
certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein
petitioners.

In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal

certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit J) and Librada Delantar
(Exhibit K) to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could
not have been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said
baptismal certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio and
Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen (Exhibit
J-1 and K-1). The Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the
petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn
would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that
 they are the parents of the herein minor. The court has also observed
that in the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered
therein that she was born on January 8, 1940 in Tubod,
Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit K-2). Such being the case, then Librada must
have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in stark
contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth
certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at
the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of
Librada Delantar as secondary evidence of her birth certificate was
resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Minglanilla,
Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file
with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all
destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit L). And going for the jugular, so to
speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in
the birth certificate (Exhibit I) purporting to be that of the petitioner
wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the
petitioner (sic) (Exhibit A-6) are so strikingly dissimilar that they could
not have but proceeded from two different hands. For it does not
require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such
discrepancy in the writing style.

In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the

petitioners claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified
document, the Court is left with no other alternative but to grant the
relief prayed for in the petition. To let the birth certificate reamin (sic)
as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of the herein
petitioners.[12]

On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the

DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the annulment of
judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth
certificate.[13] She claimed that she and her guardian were not
notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned
about the same only from the news on May 16, 1997.[14] She
argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and
in violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not
have authority to declare her to be illegitimate; and that mere
correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is
the appropriate remedy.[15]

Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that

Librada is not her mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or annul
her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an interested party
concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father, the date
of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to
the birth;[16] Libradas allegations are also contradicted by (a) the
Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book dated April 13-May
29, 1985, issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical
Records Section and Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which
is attached to the petition for annulment as Annex E and which
states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at
the Fabella Hospital and that her parents are Librada Telin and
Simplicio Delantar;[17] and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his
Motion to Vacate Judgment[18] in Sp. Proc. No. 96-419[19] regarding
the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul
as Annex F, where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of
Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority. [20]

On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision,

the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition

is GRANTED.

Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision

of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in Special
Proceedings No. 97-81893.

With costs against private respondents.

 SO ORDERED.[21]

The CA reasoned that:

As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-

81893 entitled In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth
Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, herein petitioner Rosilyn
Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a
party-respondent therein,contrary to the mandatory provision of
Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon

Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or
correction of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar
but in effect sought to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register
the subject birth certificate. With more reasons, therefore, that all
parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian,
the DSWD, whose birth certificate was sought to be annulled or
cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but must be
made a party in the said petition.

Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest
which would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is
the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and
cancelled.

In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of

substantial entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors,
should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with
all the persons interested are made parties therein Republic
vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474).
 The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893
is indeed wanting of the required notice to all the parties having claim
or interest which would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial
proceedings, as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1997

With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April
11, 1997 null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
said decision. Also, the said decision dated April 11, 1997 is considered
null and void for lack of due process there being no adversarial
proceedings (was) conducted by the public respondent Regional Trial
Court.

And, even if the same judgment had already become final and
executory, and had in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still
the execution thereof produces no legal effects. [22]

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners.

[23]
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997
IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF
 CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA
ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE

EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE THE SUBJECT BIRTH
CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.[24]

As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the

falsification of the entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn renders
the same void ab initio, the case should be liberally construed as
an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified
documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code [25] and Section 15,
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court [26]and not as a special proceeding;
petitioners were only constrained to utilize the provisions of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of the Civil Code
provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents
which happens to be a birth certificate in this case; since the
present case involves an ordinary civil action, the cases relied
upon by the CA which are applicable only to special proceedings
should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an
indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail;
respondent, meanwhile, is not an indispensable party and
granting that she is, she was deemed duly impleaded as her
name was clearly stated in the caption of the case; respondents
location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran
away from the custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the
petition and the order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once
a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation should be considered substantial notice and the
requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with;
there was no adversarial proceeding in court because the parties
were declared in general default thus, just like an ordinary civil
case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.[27]
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have
exercised its peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of
Rosilyn as null and void ab initio following the doctrine that where
an instrument is void ab initio for being contrary to law, no
amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity;
otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties will
have to file cases anew to annul respondents birth certificate. [28]

They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be
reversed and that the RTC judgment dated April 11, 1997 be
reinstated.[29]
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent,
contends that: since the petitioners chose to file a petition under
Rule 108 they cannot in the present action turn around and claim
that their case is not a special proceeding; in any case, due
process was not complied with rendering the proceedings a
quo annullable; petitioners sought to establish Librada Ceruilas
status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother of respondent, thus,
the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court;[30]petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit
to enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress a wrong,
for their case to be categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5
of the Civil Code which is being invoked by petitioners is a general
provision, while entries of record of birth in the civil register are
governed by Republic Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides
for a remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil registry
is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by their mere
allegation, transport their case from the realm of the rules on
special proceedings for the correction of entry to that of an
ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document;
in Republic vs. Valencia,[31] it was held that the parties who must
be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar
and all persons who have or who are claiming interests who would
be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose interests
would be adversely affected by the petition, is an indispensable
party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice;
respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not
properly notified.[32]

Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no

authority to rule on the merits of the case since in a petition for
annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its
authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the petitioner was
denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the
merits of the case, it would have deprived respondent of due
process; and that in any case, respondents record of birth is not
void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother
of respondent.[33]

Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states

that it is one for review on certiorari, it claimed at the same time
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a ground for a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of
the issues raised herein, we shall treat the present petition, as it
claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.[34]

Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth

certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a special
proceeding? Considering that the petition, based on its
allegations, does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all
matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth
certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the
Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having
been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding
pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We

answer in the negative.

Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:

SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the

civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register must be made parties thereto. [35] As enunciated
in Republic vs. Benemerito,[36] unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be
considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.[37]

Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the

cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her
filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
 Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a
party to the proceeding, it is enough that her name was included
in the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is without merit.

As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[38] where the

mother sought changes in the entries of her two childrens birth
certificates:

since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the
Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is
summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have
been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the
paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be
adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected
by the change should be notified or represented . . ..
[39]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served
summons, who, however, did not participate in the proceedings.
This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the
requirements laid down by the rules.

Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was

cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the
case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation.

We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the

purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with
the requirements of fair play and due process. [40]This is but
proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
her interest if she so chooses.

Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an

interested party was not impleaded in the petition, such defect
was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In
said cases, however, earnest efforts were made by the petitioners
in bringing to court all possible interested parties. [41]

Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all
to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth
certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the
Solicitor General.

It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in

seeking the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not
making her, her guardian, the DSWD, and the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties to the
petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo
Jalosjos, where her father, as appearing in the birth certificate,
was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal
case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn
should not have been considered by the trial court to prove
Rosilyns age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth
certificate has been cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in
the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in
this regard, however, were thwarted when the CA overturned
Branch 38s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos. 132875-
76[42] considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the
time of the commission of the crime.

There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that

because of the false entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the
same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under Art. 5 of the
Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in exercise of its
peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate.

The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts
decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2
and 7 of said Rule, to wit:

Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside

the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the
same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being
refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order
or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court
may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein.

is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of

extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do
not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the
amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or
to substitute its own findings thereon.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
 ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached

in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
 Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
[1]
See People vs. Jaloslos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 179, 209-210.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 31-34.

[3]
Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Fermin A. Martin,
Jr., and Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo, p. 65.

[4]
Rollo, p. 66.

[5]
Id., p. 53, CA Decision.

[6]
Records, p. 3.

[7]
Id., p. 8.

[8]
Id., p. 12.

[9]
Id., p. 10.

[10]
Id., pp. 53-54.

[11]
Exhs. A, A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4, petition filed by the Spouses Ceruilas, Records, pp. 1-5; Exh. B, RTC Order
dated February 7, 1997, Records, pp. 7-8; Exh. C, Summons sent to the Civil Register of the City of
Manila, Records, p. 12; Exh. D, Affidavit of Publication, Records, p. 13; and Exh. E, copy of newspaper
Metropolitan Post, Records, p. 14.

[12]
Records, pp. 51-53.

[13]
CA Rollo, pp. 1-16.

[14]
Id., p. 6.

[15]
Id., pp. 6-7.

[16]
Id., pp. 11-13.

[17]
CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.

[18]
Id., pp. 37-64.

[19]
Entitled In Re: Petition for the Custody of the minor Rosilyn Delantar, DSWD, Petitioner vs. Simplicio
Delantar & Librada T. Delantar, Respondents.

[20]
CA Rollo, p. 50.
[21]
Rollo, p. 65.

[22]
Rollo, pp. 56-64.

[23]
Id., p. 66.

[24]
Rollo, p. 16.

[25]
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity.

[26]
Section 15. Liberal Construction. All pleadings shall be liberally construed as to do substantial justice.

[27]
Rollo, pp. 17-20.

[28]
Id., pp. 20-21.

[29]
Id., p. 22.

[30]
Sec. 3. Cases governed -

(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

[31]
No. L-32181, March 5, 1986, 141 SCRA 462.

[32]
Rollo, pp. 83-92.

[33]
Id., pp. 93-94.

[34]
Chua Tee Dee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135721, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 418.

[35]
Republic vs. Valencia, No. L-32181, March 5, 1986, 141 SCRA 462, 473; Republic vs. Benemerito, G.R. No.
146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.

[36]
Republic vs. Benemerito, supra.

[37]
Supra.

[38]
No. L-53417, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 294.

[39]
Id., p. 301.

[40]
Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, January 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 92; Asiavest Limited vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 539, 554; Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 127692, March 10, 2004; Alba vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005.

[41]
See Barco vs. Court of Appeals as reiterated in Alba vs. Court of Appeals.
[42]
People vs. Jalosjos, supra, p. 210.