Adm. Case No. 5036. January 13, 2003. Rizalino C. Fernandez, Complainant, vs. Atty. Dionisio C. Esidto, Respondent

2. Adm. Case No. 5036. January 13, 2003.
RIZALINO C. FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ESIDTO,

respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to

assist in the proper administration of justice.The conduct of respondent constitutes a clear
violation of Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 12.04. This Court has repeatedly impressed upon
counsels that the need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential to an effective
and efficient administration of justice and [that] once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. As
officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless [cases] that only add to the
workload of the judiciary . . . which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the
facts and the law should advice them when a case should not
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Esidto
be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They
do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer
lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to
the same parties but also to their successors-in-interest.Respondents contention that Civil
Case No. 98-10520 is not barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 3726 because the
two involved different parties and causes of action have no legal basis. The doctrine of res
judicata applies not only to the same parties but also to their successors-in-interest. In this
case, the respective heirs of the parties in civil Case No. 3726, became the parties in Civil
Case No. 98-10520, which concerned the same parcels of land and the same title subject of
litigation in Civil Case No. 3726. Furthermore, as the IBP investigating commissioner
noted, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-10520 merely adopted the defense raised by their
mother Cresencia Dahildahil in Civil Case No. 3726, i.e., their natural father, Ko Chun, had
purchased the parcels of land in question from a certain Venancio Lim but had them titled
in the name of Vicente Fernandez, his nephew, because of the prohibition of ownership of
real estate by aliens.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Misconduct and Violation of
the Lawyers Oath.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Vicky C. Fernandez for complainant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complainant against respondent Atty. Dionisio C. Isidto for misconduct and
violation of the lawyers oath.
Complainant Rizalino C. Fernandez is the son of Vicente K. Fernandez,
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3726, entitled Vicente K. Fernandez v. Cresencia
Dahildahil, filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City. He alleges
that on February 24, 1997, judgment was rendered by the trial court declaring his
father to be the owner of Lot Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the Bacolod Cadastre covered by
TCT No. 29264 and ordering defendant Cresencia Dahildahil to surrender
possession of the lots to the plaintiff. According to complainant, the decision became
final on October 3, 1998 as defendant Dahildahil, who had filed a notice of appeal,
decided not to pursue her appeal upon the advice of respondent Atty. Isidto.
3
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 3
Complainant claims that on May 24, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of execution,
but respondent moved to quash the same on the ground of the pendency of another
case filed in Branch 11 of the same court. It appears that respondent had filed on
October 26, 1998, a complaint, entitled William Ko, Sio Bee Ko, and Chona Ko v.
Rizalino Fernandez, Virginia Fernandez, Elena Fernandez, Vicky Fernandez,
Vivian Fernandez and Venancia Fernandez and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
10520, in which he sought the cancellation of a certificate of title issued in the name
of Vicente K. Fernandez (TCT No. 29264), which had been declared valid in Civil
Case No. 3726.
On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied respondents motion to quash on the
ground that the action instituted by respondent in behalf of the children of
Cresencia Dahildahil was barred by the judgment of February 24, 1997 in Civil
Case No. 3726. Respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash the writ, but it
was similarly denied by the trial court on December 9, 1999. Meanwhile on motion
of the children of Vicente K. Fernandez, as defendants in Civil Case No. 98-10520,
the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondent as it was barred by the
judgment in Civil Case No. 3726. Respondent filed a notice of appeal and, on his
motion, the Court of Appeals granted him an extension to file the appellants brief.
Nonetheless, for unknown reasons, respondent failed to file the appellants brief, as
a result of which the appeal was dismissed.
Complainant claims that respondents actions were calculated to delay the
execution of the decision of Civil Case No. 3726.
Respondent denies the allegations made against him. He claims that although it
was upon his advice that Dahildahil did not pursue her appeal in Civil Case No.
3726, he nevertheless filed Civil Case No. 98-10520 in behalf of Dahildahils
children because he honestly believed that they had a valid ground for seeking the
cancellation of the certificate of title in the name of Vicente K. Fernandez. He
contended that the decision in Civil Case No. 3726 did not constitute a bar to the
filing of Civil Case No. 98-10520 as the two cases involved different parties and
causes of action. 1
Complainant filed a Reply and Supplemental Reply to respondents comment,

after which the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and
_______________
1
Comment, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 28-31.
4
ANNOTATED
recommendation. In its Resolution No. XV-2002-404, dated August 3, 2002, the IBP
Board of Governors approved the recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner, Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr., that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year for misu[sing] the [R]ules [of] Procedure to
impede the noble ends of justice.
The investigating commissioners report reads in pertinent parts:
The records sufficiently establish that Vicente Fernandez (father of complainant) filed
Civil Case No. 3726 (hereinafter referred to as the first case) in the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City on October 10, 1985 against Cresencia Dahildahil (common law wife of Ko
Chun) involving Lots 3, 4, and 5 all of Bacolod Cadastre covered By TCT No. 29264 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City. The action was for recovery of possession and sum of
money.
The case suffered considerable delay due to one reason or another stated in the trial
courts decision of February 24, 1997. Finally, after eleven (11) long years of litigation, the
trial court resolved the main issue that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove his
ownership of Lot 3, 4, and 5, Block 1, evidence by TCT No. 29264 (page 18 Decision; Annex
A of Complainants Position Paper) and ordered the defendant Dahildahil to return
possession of the property to plaintiff.
The decision was appealed by Dahildahil to the Court of Appeals. But, later, she
abandoned her appeal (CA G.R. No. 56999) and did not pursue it on the advice of herein
respondent (Comment of Respondent dated August 5, 1999). Consequently, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal which dismissal became final on October 3, 1998.
On October 26, 1998, or 23 days after the dismissal of the appeal, Civil Case No. 98-
10520 (hereinafter referred to as the second case) was instituted by Dahildahils children
against the heirs of Vicente Fernandez, including the complainant, for cancellation of title
of the same property litigated in Civil Case No. 3726 (first case) and adjudged by the court
as belonging to Vicente Fernandez, upon the advice of herein respondent (Respondents
Position Paper on page 2).
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that [the] plaintiffs in the second case (children
of Dahildahil by the late Ko Chun) merely adopted as their cause of action the defense put
up by their mother in the first case.
....
When the final judgment in the first case (Civil Case No. 3726) was being executed by
the prevailing party, the defendant Dahildahil, thru respondent, vigorously opposed the
move on the ground that the pendency
5
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 5
of the second case (Civil Case No. 98-10520) poses a civil prejudicial question which must
be resolved before any further proceedings, or execution, can be taken in the first case.
With equal vigor, the trial court rejected this position. It ruled that precisely there
being identity of partiesplaintiffs and defendants in Civil Case No. 98-10520 (second case)
are mere successors-in-interest of the parties at bar; [as the] cause[s] of action and subject
matter [of the two cases are the same], the finding of this Court having become final and
executory, res judicata sets in and Civil Case No. 98-10520 is barred by prior judgment
(Resolution dated August 19, 1999; Annex A of the Supplemental Reply).
....
Notwithstanding all the foregoing, however, with evident obduracy, respondent continued
to resist execution of the judgment in the first case [by filing a supplemental motion to
quash the writ of execution] reasoning out this time around that the judgment in the first
case will operate only as against Dahildahil but not [as] against her children (plaintiffs in
the second case), who were not parties to the first case (Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ
of Execution dated August 20, 1999).
Once more the trial court repudiated this feeble stand of the respondent and [denied
Dahildahils Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution].
Under the Revised Rules of Court, a lawyer shall counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. (Rule 138, Sec. 20, C)
The persistent obstruction engineered by the respondent to the execution of the final
judgment in the first case coupled with his filing of the second case which was primarily
intended to relitigate the settled issue of ownership of subject property is clearly
transgressive of this rule.
....
The Resolution of August 19, 1999 (resolve[d] respondents motion to quash writ of
execution in the first case) and the Order of December 9, 1999 (which resolve[d] the motion
for reconsideration filed by respondent of the August 19, 1999 resolution) as well as the
Order dated August 3, 2000 (which resolve[d] the motion to dismiss and the Opposition
thereto filed in the second case), discussed thoroughly the doctrine of res judicata.
Unfortunately, however, the respondent did not benefit from the lessons therein.
Likewise clear in the judgment dated February 24, 1997 (first case) is the trial courts
resolution of the question of who is the true owner of Lot No. 3, Block 1, Lot 4, Block 1 and
Lot 5, Block 1 evidenced by TCT No. T-29264, the plaintiff (Vicente Fernandez, herein
complainants father) or
6
ANNOTATED
the late Ko Chun (father of respondents client who are plaintiffs in the second case) (on
page 3).
....
The issue of true ownership, therefore, of the lots in question is no longer debatable.
....
From all of the foregoing, it is not unreasonable to conclude and hold that respondent
indeed availed of unfair means to unduly delay the termination of the first and second cases
which achieve[d] his objective of prolonging the enjoyment of the property by his
clients gratis et amore and to the detriment and prejudice of the complainant.
Stated in another way, the respondent misused the rules of procedure to impede the
noble ends of justice.
Premises considered, therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent Atty.
Dionisio Isidto be temporarily suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
with the stern warning that a repetition of any similar act shall merit a more harsh
sanction. 2
The case has been transmitted to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B 12 (b) of the
1964 Rules of Court. After a review of this case, we find the IBP report and
recommendation to be well taken.
First. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 10.03A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 12.03A lawyer shall not after obtaining extensions of time to file . . . briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes.
To be sure, respondent advised his client (Dahildahil) to desist from her appeal
in Civil Case No. 3726, as a result of which the trial courts decision in that case
became final and executory. However, he subsequently filed Civil Case No. 98-
10520 in behalf of his clients children, based on the same ground invoked by
Dahildahil in Civil Case No. 3726, and later invoked the pendency of the said Civil
Case No. 98-10520 to block execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 3726. Such
subterfuge proved unsuccessful as the trial
_______________
2
Report and Recommendation, pp. 5-6, 8-10, 12, 16-19.
7
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 7
court dismissed Civil Case No. 98-10520 under the doctrine of res judicata.
Respondent then filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals, only to let the
period for filing the appellants brief lapse without complying with the requirement
despite an extension granted to him to do so. All these clearly show respondents
efforts to frustrate the final judgment in Civil Case No. 3726, which remained
pending in the trial court for nearly 18 years.
The conduct of respondent constitutes a clear violation of Rules 10.03, 12.03 and
12.04. This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the
prompt termination of litigation is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice and [that] once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. As 3
officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless [cases]
that only add to the workload of the judiciary . . . which is burdened enough as it is.
A judicious study of the facts and the law should advice them when a case should
not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.
They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. 4
Second. Respondents contention that Civil Case No. 98-10520 is not barred by
the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 3726 because the two involved different parties
and causes of action have no legal basis. The doctrine of res judicata applies not only
to the same parties but also to their successors-in-interest. In this case, the
5
respective heirs of the parties in Civil Case No. 3726, became the parties in
civil Case No. 98-10520, which concerned the same parcels of land and the same
title subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 3726. Furthermore, as the IBP
investigating commissioner noted, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-10520 merely
adopted the defense raised by their mother Cresencia Dahildahil in Civil Case No.
3726, i.e., their natural father, Ko Chun, had purchased the parcels of land in
question from a certain Venancio Lim but had them titled in the name of
Vicente Fernandez, his nephew, because
_______________
Chua Huat v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 1 (1991); Li Kom Tho v. Go Siu Kao, 82 Phil. 776, 778
3
(1949).
Baragon v. Zerna, 154 SCRA 593, 598 (1987).
4
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 39, 47 par. (b).

5
8
ANNOTATED
of the prohibition of ownership of real estate by aliens. Thus, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 98-10520 alleged:
1. 2.That the plaintiffs are the son[s] and daughter of spouses Ko Chun and
Cresencia Dahildahil, said spouses not [being] legally married[.] Plaintiffs
are Filipino citizens, while the defendants are the children of spouses
Vicente Fernandez and Venancia Chua Fernandez;
2. 3.That in the month of August 1965 Ko Chun purchased Lot 3 Block 1, Lot 4
Block 1 and Lot 5 Block 1 from the original owner Venancio Lim for the sum
of P65,000.00[.] Ko Chun being a Chinese citizen put the title of the property
in the name of Vicente Fernandez, . . . a relative of Ko Chun. 6
On the other hand, as the trial court stated in its decision in Civil Case No. 3726:
In her answer with counterclaim, defendant alleges inter alia: That subject properties Lot
3, Block 1, Lot 4 Blk. 1 and Lot 5 Blk. 1 all situated in the City of Bacolod, . . . are actually
owned by her husband Ko Chun or his estate. The money paid for the acquisition of said lots
came from the exclusive and personal funds of the Ko Chun. However, since the late Ko
Chun at the time of the acquisition of said properties was a Chinese citizen, he placed the
title of said properties in the name of the plaintiff, Vicente K. Fernandez, in order to
circumvent or do away with the constitutional prohibition against aliens, who are
disqualified from acquiring properties in the Philippines . . .7
In its decision in Civil Case No. 3726, the trial court declared Vicente
K. Fernandezto be the owner of the parcels of land in question. The trial court
said:
After going over the version of the plaintiff [Vicente Fernandez] as supported by the
testimonial evidence of his witnesses as well as his documentary evidence and the version
of the defendant [Cresencia Dahildahil], supported by the testimonial evidence of her
witnesses as well as her documentary evidence, this Court is inclined to give plaintiffs
version more credit and weight.
....
All told, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to prove his ownership of Lots 3, 4,
and 5, Block 1, evidenced by TCT No. T-29264.
_______________
6
Rollo, p. 23.
7
RTC, Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.
9
VOL. 395, JANUARY 13, 2003 9
While on the other hand, the evidence presented by defendant falls short of establishing the
ownership of her husband [Ko Chun] of Lots 3, 4, and 5, Block 1, evidenced by TCT No. T-
29264. 8
As successors-in-interest of their mother Cresencia Dahildahil, the plaintiffs in Civil

Case No. 98-10520 are bound by the foregoing findings.
In Millare v. Montero, this Court suspended the respondent attorney from the
9
practice of law for a period of one year for trying to frustrate the execution of a
judgment through the filing of frivolous appeals and resort to other dilatory tactics.
We find it appropriate for the same penalty to be meted out to respondent in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the IBP Investigating Commissioner as approved
by the IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent Atty. Dionisio C. Isidto guilty of
violation of Rules 10.03, 12.03, and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is AFFIRMED and respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year, with WARNING that commission of any or similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. Let copies of the Decision be entered in his record as an attorney
and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Decision of IBP Investigating Commissioner affirmed, respondent suspended from

practice of law for one (1) year, with warning against commission of similar acts.
Note.A lawyer has a responsibility to assist in the proper and sound
administration of justice. (Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 216 [1999])
o0o
January 14, 2015.G.R. No. 166357.*
VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has
usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on
the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were
not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected in order to have the law allow some resiliency in its
application. Illustrative of the less specificity than expected has been the omission by the
Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that
would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle
of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
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* SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION.
513
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 513
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on
the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given
the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less specificity
obviously to enable some resiliency in its application. Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no case
would be on all fours with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court. In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on
the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a
marriage has no legal existence.The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the
existence or nonexistence of a partys psychological incapacity should be final and binding
for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other
evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the
findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented
during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.
It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family
Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an invio-
514
4 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
lable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded
to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal
existence. In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution.
The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; If the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was
ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of
psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently, the
lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court
has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), that there is no requirement for
one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; An expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation.Verily, the totality of the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in
the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
This is so,
515
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 515
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted
by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric
evaluation had been based on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; We should weigh and consider the probative
value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded. Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the
findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The long term effects of the respondents obsessive
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities
of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties
and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender
ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long term effects of the respondents
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very
young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw
the parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his
father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation
is fully substantiated with proof.Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the
burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in
516
6 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who
imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in
both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage
has to be deemed null and void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In this case, the marriage never existed from the
beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to
the time of the marriage.In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning
because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time
of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage
between the parties. To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the
basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is ill-
equipped to promote family life.
DEL CASTILLO,J., Dissenting Opinion:

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; View that under the law,
the parties own desire to dissolve their marriage is not a determining factor in assessing the
existence of a ground for annulment or declaration of nullity.Under the law, the parties
own desire to dissolve their marriage is not a determining factor in assessing the existence
of a ground for annulment or declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates the court to guard against the possibility of collusion between the parties:
ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; View that psychological
incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity, is not a lack of understanding of what
marriage entails, nor is it a failure to commit ones self to the essential marital and
familial obligations. It is a downright inability to understand, perform, or
517
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 517
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
comply with, the said duties and obligations.The inadequacy of the trial courts
ruling and its understanding of the concept of psychological incapacity is apparent.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity, is not a lack of
understanding of what marriage entails, nor is it a failure to commit ones self to the
essential marital and familial obligations. It is a downright inability to understand,
perform, or comply with, the said duties and obligations. How can any appellate court rely
on the trial courts assessment of whether the evidence constituted psychological incapacity
when there is none and its understanding of the concept of psychological incapacity is
doctrinally flawed?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must not only be clinically identified by experts, it must also be sufficiently proven and
clearly explained in the decision.While the courts may consider the assistance of the
experts, the courts are duty-bound to assess not only the correctness of the experts
conclusions, but also the factual premises upon which such conclusions are based. The
experts conclusions, like any other opinion, are based on certain assumptions or premises.
It is the courts job to assess whether those assumptions or premises are in fact true or
correct, and supported by evidence on record. The soundness of experts conclusions lie in
the quantity and quality of the input they received in making their conclusions. This is
precisely where the courts take the reins from these experts. The root cause of psychological
incapacity must not only be clinically identified by experts, it must also be sufficiently
proven and clearly explained in the decision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that while the experts testified that the alleged
dysfunction in respondents family and her subsequent actions within her marriage are
indicative of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), the court records themselves reveal
no credible and preponderant evidence of the supposed family dysfunction in respondents
childhood and of her supposed narcissistic habits later in life.It remains my opinion that
the factual premises for the experts conclusions in this case were not established in court.
While the experts testified that the alleged dysfunction in respondents family and her
subsequent actions within her marriage are indicative of a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, the court records themselves reveal no credible and preponderant evidence of the
518
8 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
supposed family dysfunction in respondents childhood and of her supposed
narcissistic habits later in life. There was no independent witness presented, who is
knowledgeable of respondents upbringing and of her actions before and after the
celebration of marriage. This is detrimental in proving that the cause of her psychological
incapacity occurred before, or at the time of the celebration of, the marriage, and renders
the experts opinion on the root cause of her psychological incapacity conjectural or
speculative. Also there was no evidence of respondents supposed obsessive desire for
attention and selfishness, which obsession, according to the experts, indicates a narcissistic
personality. The most that was proven was a single incident wherein she was found in a
hotel room with another man (after they have separated in fact), a penchant for visiting
salons and for meeting friends over a mahjong game. This can hardly be considered as a
pattern, defined as a reliable sample of traits, acts or other observable features
characterizing an individual, much less an obsession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that while it has been proven that respondent
played mahjong, there is no evidence whatsoever that it involved gambling, which is the act
of playing a game and consciously risking money or other stakes on its outcome. Without the
element of gambling, a mothers act of bringing her kids with her when she meets with
friends (which is the most that can be said of this matter) can hardly be described as
undesirable.Much is said about respondents undesirability as a mother for supposedly
exposing her children to the culture of gambling; this, from the evidence that she brought
her children with her to their aunts house where she frequently played mahjong. I find
this judgment unsupported by the evidence and irrelevant. While it has been proven that
respondent played mahjong, there is no evidence whatsoever that it involved gambling,
which is the act of playing a game and consciously risking money or other stakes on its
outcome. Without the element of gambling, a mothers act of bringing her kids with her
when she meets with friends (which is the most that can be said of this matter) can hardly
be described as undesirable. Even Fr. Healy acknowledged that playing mahjong and
spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They would only constitute
psychological incapacity if inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of ones familial duties.
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot simply adhere to
the experts opinion when there is an obvious dearth of factual evidence.It must be
emphasized that the Court does not disrespect the experts findings when it disagrees with
them; nor does it assert that it is wiser in analyzing human behavior. It is simply
performing its duty to go over the evidence independently, consider the experts opinions,
and apply the law and jurisprudence to the facts of the case. The Court cannot simply
adhere to the experts opinion when there is an obvious dearth of factual evidence. The
Court is not a passive receptacle of expert opinions; otherwise, there would be no need for
psychological incapacity cases to be tried before the courts. Courts would be reduced to a
mere rubber stamp for the experts conclusions. That is not what the framers of Article 36
envisioned.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Erlando A. Abrenica and Jose Mari S. Velez, Jr. for petitioner.
Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretaa for respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011, 1 the Court dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following
ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the
trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
_______________
1 657 SCRA 822.
520
0 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted
to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and
neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not
proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he
intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove
the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute
that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the
children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No
proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital
affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated
with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they
narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food
they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children
despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two
sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is
nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.
522
2 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial
courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did
not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the
weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may
have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their
children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May
27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 64240 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 2
In his Motion for Reconsideration, 3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a
thorough second look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the
findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses;
and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital
obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 836-839.

3 Rollo, pp. 689-704.
523
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36

of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of
the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the
term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by
reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee
that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not
unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected in order to have the law allow some resiliency in its
application.4 Illustrative of the less specificity than expected has been the
omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of
psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision
conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the
provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have ren-
_______________
4 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 31.
5 See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108.
6 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra.
524
4 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
dered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of
the Family Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances, and could not be taken and
construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be legitimate.7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8the Court set some guidelines for the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be(1)
_______________
7 Id., at p. 34.
8 G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of(2) ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.(3)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
(4) incurable. Such in-
526
6 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
curability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of marriage.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.(5)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.(6)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:(7)
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
527
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the(8) defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the
fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly
and too literally read and applied given the clear in-
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 209-213.
528
8 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
tendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less specificity obviously
to enable some resiliency in its application. Instead, every court should approach
the issue of nullity not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no
case would be on all fours with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts
in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts. 11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or nonexistence
of a partys psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not
shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. 12 In every situation where the findings
of the trial court are suffi-
_______________
10 Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at p.
214.
11 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Republic v.
Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735.
12 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 158, 170.
529
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
ciently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate
court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not enough
reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our
own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has
no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social
institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and
solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence
because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying. 16 The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
_______________
13 Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8.
14 Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.2.Section
15 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 ([B]lind adherence by
the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological
incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly
inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.)
16 Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 206,
212; People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 382-383.
530
0 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions
tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground
that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to
give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least
of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of
the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of
Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioners factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners
testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his
son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such
circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After
all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the
side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must
accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature
of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-
_______________
17 Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 379.
531
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the
trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the
respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like
the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has
stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because
what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an
assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible
and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify
_______________
18 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.
19 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 757.
20 Id., at p. 764.
21 Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V, pp. 804-805 (1999).
532
2 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands
the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on
the parties upbringing and psychodynamics.23
In that context, Dr. Gates expert opinion should be considered not in isolation
but along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial
court was expected to compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad
Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report, 24Dr. Dayan impressed that the
respondent had compulsive and dependent tendencies to the extent of being
relationship dependent. Based from the respondents psychological data, Dr.
Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached
in her ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance.
She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections.
Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding
in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed.
And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that
others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on
having significant others would depend on most times.
_______________
22 Supra note 15 at p. 487.

23 Carcereny, et al., Annulment in the Philippines: Clinical and Legal Issues, p. 16 (2010).
24 Records, Volume II, pp. 87-105.
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most
important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. 25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that the
respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to
wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q: How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A: Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and
there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the
score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q: Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A: When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and
below, it will be considered as acceptable.
Q: In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A: Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it
is 84.27
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 100, 103.

26 A psychological test used to find personality disorders based on the respondents answers to 175
true/false questions (Ng, et al., Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, p. 109 [2006]).
27 TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.
534
4 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the
findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with Anti-Social Disorder. Dr. Gates
relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q: Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology
terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at
your findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A: I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood
background, her father died in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and
thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinners role in her
family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings
against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and
responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband
died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions
ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she
herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a
precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a
particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat some kind of
experience or the lack of care, lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to
sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son
because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even
though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not see,
according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he
preferred to live with the father actually.
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Q: Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?
A: Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and
she is still in search of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from
one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q: And that led you to conclude?
A: And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty
as a wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement
of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the
courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded. 29Hence, we should weigh and
consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the
other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate
before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the
Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healys expert testimony, we
have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by
current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological
incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon
Law.
_______________
28 TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.

29 Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 569, 585.
536
6 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Father Healy tendered his opinion on whether or not the respondents level of
immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband
constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q: Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically
incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this
Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?
A: I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and
traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q: So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A: Yes. It should be rejected.
Q: Why do you say so?
A: Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has
been manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and
irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her
early life and being the breadwinner of the family put her in an unusual position of
prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own
beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating
to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.
Q: You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the
impact on the relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A: Also the same thing. It just did not fit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her
husband and to her children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and
her mahjong and as-
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
sociating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q: And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A: Secondary.
Q: And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A: That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which
everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before
everything else would be subordinated to the marriage with her. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in
her life.
Q: And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A: That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical
case in Roman history.
Q: Could you please define to us what narcissism is?
A: Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in
the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as
narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q: And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider
this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or .?
A: I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes
serious obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so
concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
538
8 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Q: And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was
already existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A: When you get married you dont develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You
bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you
accept these responsibilities. And now you show that you dont accept them and you are not
capable of fulfilling them and you dont care about them.
Q: Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A: No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was
depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate
her ego so much that this became the top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.
Q: What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the
marriage?
A: That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because
she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q: And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this
narcissism that you mentioned?
A: Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family
background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q: What specific background are you referring to?
A: Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was
so important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very
unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting
the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.
31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys
opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and
findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties psychological
incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court
on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he
could as well thereby provide to the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject
as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly
disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr.
Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed
in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the
_______________
31 TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.

32 Supra note 18.
540
0 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented
since the obligations of marriage
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves
a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of
one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to
the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even
with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual
542
2 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack
of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost always is proof of someones failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert
testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evi-
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
dence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity. 33
Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly

applying the standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of
evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, viz.:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow,
been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in
the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
justices concurred in the result and another three including, as aforesaid, Justice
Romero took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 229-232.

34 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8.
544
4 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure
in the world. The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
straitjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36,
for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of
cases involving marital
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the
Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity
of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there
is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case.
We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. 35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court declared as follows:

_______________
35 Supra note 18 at pp. 220-228.
546
6 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Respondent admittedly played mahjong,but it was not proven that she engaged
in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent
refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained
it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her
husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other
than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he
was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have
been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no
dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse
effect on the children were not proven. (Emphasis supplied)
36
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing
along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them
to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing
surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do
find to be revealing
_______________
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw 37 the parties eldest son in
his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother
had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz.:
ATTY. PISON: From the timebefore your parents separation, do you remember any
habit or activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot,
and I cant remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do
you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz we would go to my aunts house in White Plains and I think
we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the
morning.
ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed go out by herself.
38
_______________
37 Records, pp. 354-391.

38 Id., at p. 363.
548
8 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to
her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also
manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of
her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs
for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was
the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan
both explained that the current psychological state of the respondent had been
rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and
mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and
protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children,209.Article parental authority and responsibility shall
include the caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.
The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:220.Article
(1)To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by
right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with
their means;
x x x x(2)
(3)To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4)To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental
health at all times;
To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others,(5) protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
x x x x(6)
x x x x(7)
x x x x(8)
x x x x (emphasis supplied)(9)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the
findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had
been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to
that effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not
she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioners psychological incapacity was substantiated by
Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q: You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
_______________
39 Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:

She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Petition alleging that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations to the marriage
and that such incapacity manifested itself only after the marriage, the truth of the matter being that it is
the petitioner who is psychologically incapacitated.3.
550
0 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that the marriage was a mistake?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?
A: Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of
those short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived in with
him and even the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had
noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also
dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was
denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q: To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What
led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A: I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He
was not really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that
he had to marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q: Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the
petitioner?
A: I think so, Sir.
Q: Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner
admitted to you that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. Im
referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment
scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions
is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment
and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for
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Kalaw vs. Fernandez
this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
A: Sir, its difficult.
Q: It would be difficult for that person?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A: Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q: So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with
the respondent?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What is the bearing of this fear of commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as
his psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A: Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed
to the role of husband to Malyn.
Q: Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the
petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I
asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?
A: Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.
40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of
the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the
psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psycho-
_______________
40 TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.
552
2 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
logical incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated
with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both
of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage
has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now,
they must have already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their
marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair.
Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the
lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should we
insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their
children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that
Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a
wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased
to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
into a habitual tryster or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from
her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to nonrecognition of its evident purpose
and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
_______________

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opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of
his wifes psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the
marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic
foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is
ill-equipped to promote family life, thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that [t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development[t], and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of
the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put
into operation the con-
554
4 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
stitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished
at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married
and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of
what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not
be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation
of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under
Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
42
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for

Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November
_______________
555
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 555
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of
the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Chairperson), Perez** and Leonen,*** JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
DEL CASTILLO,J.:
On September 19, 2011, this Court issued its Decision 1 denying petitioner Valerio
E. Kalaws petition and affirming the appellate courts determination that there is
insufficient evidence of psychological incapacity that would render the parties
marriage null and void. The Court, in making its Decision, relied on the experts
own proffered guideline for making their conclusions. They said that actions, such
as those allegedly performed by respondent, when performed constantly to
the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of [Narcissistic
Personality Disorder].2 The Court, using the experts own guideline, reviewed the
evidence to determine if there is indeed proof, before the Court, that respondent
engaged in the alleged acts, that she performed them constantly, and to the
detriment of the quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
_______________
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
* ** Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 2, Internal Rules.
1 Rollo, pp. 672-688.
2 Id., at p. 685.
556
6 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
wife. Considering the opposing views of the trial and appellate courts on the
matter, the Court thoroughly reviewed the records of the case, including the
psychiatrists reports. Despite the Courts considerable effort to respect and accept
the psychologists findings, we simply found no adequate evidence of the factual
premises of their diagnosis of Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Thus, we agreed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) that the evidence is insufficient for a declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), 3 arguing that the Court
erred in finding the psychological experts conclusions (that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to understand the demands of a marriage)
unsupported by the available evidence.
The respondent, in lieu of a Comment, 4reiterated her earlier Manifestation that
she is now conceding that petitioner, not herself, may actually be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations.5
The Majority Opinion opines that the Court would be unjust to keep the parties
in a marriage despite their shared opinion that their marriage is beyond repair.
However, under the law, the parties own desire to dissolve their marriage is not a
determining factor in assessing the existence of a ground for annulment or
declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates the court to
guard against the possibility of collusion between the parties:
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent col-48.ARTICLE
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 689-705.

4 Id., at pp. 707-709.
5 Id., at pp. 650-654.
557
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 557
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
lusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
xxxx
The Courts Decision should rely solely on the available evidence and the law.
The Majority Opinion claims that our Decision failed to appreciate the evidence,
as found by the trial court and by the expert psychologists and that the trial courts
ruling on the psychological incapacity of the parties should be final and binding on
the appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts and on opinion of the
qualified experts.
I agree that the ruling of a lower court should be given due respect and finality
when it is adequately explained, rests on established facts, and considers the
opinion of qualified experts. Unfortunately, such kind of trial court ruling is not
before us; hence, our September 19, 2011 Decision did not see fit to adopt the
findings of the trial court.
The trial court summarized the parties respective evidence, including the
testimonies of their psychologists, in the first six pages of its decision. 6 It then
proceeded to quote Article 36 of the Family Code and the definitions of psychological
incapacity in Santos v. Court of Appeals7and in the Republic v. Court of
Appeals.8Without any indication of which pieces of evidence it found convincing,
reliable, and overwhelming, much less a discussion of how these evidence tend to
prove the existence or nonexistence of psychological incapacity ergo, without
factual findings whatsoever the trial court ruled in a terse and unsatisfying
paragraph that:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological
incapacity to perform their
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 74-79.

7 310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
8 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
558
8 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered
into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit
themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become
responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that
both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and
incurable. (Emphases supplied)
9
The inadequacy of the trial courts ruling and its understanding of the concept of
psychological incapacity is apparent. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
declaration of nullity, is not a lack of understanding of what marriage entails, nor is
it a failure to commit ones self to the essential marital and familial
obligations.10 It is a downright inability to understand, perform, or comply with, the
said duties and obligations.11 How can any appellate court rely on the trial courts
assessment of whether the evidence constituted psychological incapacity when there
is none and its understanding of the concept of psychological incapacity is
doctrinally flawed?
The trial court then characterized the parties psychological incapacity as grave
and serious, without even going over the evidence upon which it relied in making
such conclusion. It appears to the Court that the last sentence of the trial courts
decision that the incapacity has been clinically estab-
_______________
9 Id., at p. 80.
10 Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 539-540; Agraviador v. Amparo-
Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519, 533-534.
11 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 351; 484 SCRA 353, 368 (2006).
559
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 559
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
lished encapsulates the process by which the trial court arrived at its
judgment. It relied merely and solely on the conclusions of the psychological experts,
without doing its duty to make an independent assessment of the evidence.
To reiterate, while I agree that the trial courts ruling on the psychological
incapacity of the parties should be final and binding on the appellate courts when
such ruling is based on the facts and on the opinion of the experts, I believe that the
trial courts decision in this case was not based on facts, but solely on the opinion of
the experts. Such blind reliance by the trial court was an abdication of its duty to go
over the evidence for itself.
While the courts may consider the assistance of the experts, the courts are duty-
bound to assess not only the correctness of the experts conclusions, but also the
factual premises upon which such conclusions are based. The experts conclusions,
like any other opinion, are based on certain assumptions or premises. It is the
courts job to assess whether those assumptions or premises are in fact true or
correct, and supported by evidence on record. The soundness of experts conclusions
lie in the quantity and quality of the input they received in making their
conclusions. This is precisely where the courts take the reins from these experts.
The root cause of psychological incapacity must not only be clinically identified by
experts, it must also be sufficiently proven and clearly explained in the decision. 12
The expertise of courts lies in determining which facts are admissible, which are
relevant, which carry weight, which have been proven, which have been debunked.
In resolving legal disputes, the courts have the expertise in evaluating the quantity,
quality, and relevance of the facts to the legal issue involved. Courts have to conduct
its independent assessment
_______________
12 Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249, 260; 351 SCRA 425, 431 (2001); Republic v. Court of Appeals,
335 Phil. 664, 677; 268 SCRA 198, 210 (1997).
560
0 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
of the quality of the facts that the psychologists relied upon in support of their
conclusion. It is only if, and when, the court is convinced that the psychologists
conclusions are strongly anchored on verifiable, admissible, and relevant evidence
that it can adopt the psychologists findings. Even petitioners expert witness, Fr.
Healy, acknowledged in his testimony that it is the courts job, not that of the expert,
to verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding respondents alleged
habits. Fr. Healy cautioned that his opinion rests only on his assumption that the
factual allegations are true.13
It remains my opinion that the factual premises for the experts conclusions in
this case were not established in court. While the experts testified that the alleged
dysfunction in respondents family and her subsequent actions within her marriage
are indicative of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the court records themselves
reveal no credible and preponderant evidence of the supposed family dysfunction in
respondents childhood and of her supposed narcissistic habits later in life. There
was no independent witness presented, who is knowledgeable of respondents
upbringing and of her actions before and after the celebration of marriage. This is
detrimental in proving that the cause of her psychological incapacity occurred
before, or at the time of the celebration of, the marriage, 14 and renders the experts
opinion on the root cause of her psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative.
Also there was no evidence of respondents supposed obsessive desire for attention
and selfishness, which obsession, according to the experts, indicates a narcissistic
personality. The most that was proven was a single incident wherein she was found
in a hotel room with another man (after they have separated in fact), a penchant for
visiting salons and for meeting friends over a mahjong game. This can hardly be
considered as a pattern, defined as a reliable sample of traits, acts
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 676.
14 Republic v. Galang, supra note 10 at pp. 540-541; Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, supra note 10
at pp. 535-536.
561
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 561
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
or other observable features characterizing an individual, 15 much less an
obsession.
Much is said about respondents undesirability as a mother for supposedly
exposing her children to the culture of gambling; 16 this, from the evidence that she
brought her children with her to their aunts house where she frequently
played mahjong. I find this judgment unsupported by the evidence and irrelevant.
While it has been proven that respondent played mahjong, there is no evidence
whatsoever that it involved gambling, which is the act of playing a game and
consciously risking money or other stakes on its outcome.17Without the element of
gambling, a mothers act of bringing her kids with her when she meets with friends
(which is the most that can be said of this matter) can hardly be described as
undesirable. Even Fr. Healy acknowledged that playing mahjong and spending time
with friends are not disorders by themselves. They would only constitute
psychological incapacity if inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities
to the detriment of ones familial duties. 18 The Court, in our Decision, applied Fr.
Healys standards. We concluded that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated because there was no proof that she spent inordinate amounts of time
in these alleged activities or that her kids were adversely affected. 19On the contrary,
the records revealed her efforts to maintain supervision of her kids, even when she
was among her friends. Further, the kids recalled that, after respondent left the
conjugal home, she would surreptitiously visit them in their schools; and, once
granted visitation rights, spent weekends with them and took care of them at any
time they got
_______________
15 Blacks Law Dictionary (abridged 5 ed.)

th
16 Majority Opinion, p. 546.

17 Websters Third New International Dictionary (unabridged version).
18 Rollo, p. 676.
19 Id., at p. 685.
562
2 ANNOTATED
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
sick.20 These are hardly the actions of a woman with an inability to understand
her filial duties and obligations.
It must be emphasized that the Court does not disrespect the experts findings
when it disagrees with them; nor does it assert that it is wiser in analyzing human
behavior. It is simply performing its duty to go over the evidence independently,
consider the experts opinions, and apply the law and jurisprudence to the facts of
the case. The Court cannot simply adhere to the experts opinion when there is an
obvious dearth of factual evidence. The Court is not a passive receptacle of expert
opinions; otherwise, there would be no need for psychological incapacity cases to be
tried before the courts. Courts would be reduced to a mere rubber stamp for the
experts conclusions. That is not what the framers of Article 36 envisioned.
In the end, this is simply the sad story of two people who married and started a
family, but realized early on that they have made a mistake. They both contributed
to the demise of their marriage, as hurt people often do. Despite their brokenness,
they tried to make the most of the situation, caring for their children while they try
to move on with their now separate lives. Now, in their advanced years, they want a
magical solution that would erase any trace of their follies of youth; unfortunately,
the provision for psychological incapacity is not such a miraculous fix for dissolving
the marriage bond. The policy of our 1987 Constitution continues to be to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. (Art. 11, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) The existence of
any doubt should still be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
I, therefore, submit that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration be denied with
finality.
_______________
20 Id., at p. 679.
563
VOL. 745, JANUARY 14, 2015 563
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Motion for Reconsideration granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of

marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. (Republic vs.
Tanyag-San Jose, 517 SCRA 123 [2007])
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.(Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes, 628 SCRA 461 [2010])
o0o

Adm. Case No. 5036. January 13, 2003. Rizalino C. Fernandez, Complainant, vs. Atty. Dionisio C. Esidto, Respondent

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Adm. Case No. 5036. January 13, 2003. Rizalino C. Fernandez, Complainant, vs. Atty. Dionisio C. Esidto, Respondent

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2. Adm. Case No. 5036. January 13, 2003.

RIZALINO C. FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ESIDTO,

Administrative Law; Attorneys; As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Complainant filed a Reply and Supplemental Reply to respondents comment,

officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 39, 47 par. (b).

As successors-in-interest of their mother Cresencia Dahildahil, the plaintiffs in Civil

Decision of IBP Investigating Commissioner affirmed, respondent suspended from

January 14, 2015.G.R. No. 166357.*

VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;

* SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION.

DEL CASTILLO,J., Dissenting Opinion:

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

1 657 SCRA 822.

2 Id., at pp. 836-839.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36

9 Id., at pp. 209-213.

22 Supra note 15 at p. 487.

25 Id., at pp. 100, 103.

28 TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.

31 TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.

Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly

33 Id., at pp. 229-232.

In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court declared as follows:

35 Supra note 18 at pp. 220-228.

36 Supra note 1 at pp. 837-838.

37 Records, pp. 354-391.

39 Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:

40 TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.

41 Supra note 4 at p. 38.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for

42 Supra note 17 at pp. 371-373.

3 Id., at pp. 689-705.

6 Id., at pp. 74-79.

15 Blacks Law Dictionary (abridged 5 ed.)

16 Majority Opinion, p. 546.

Notes.The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of

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