Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Stuart Rosenbaum
Baylor University
I. The Lorax
Most of us are familiar with The L o ra x . The Lorax is the central character
in the story by Dr. Suess about the Onceler, the Truffula trees, the Brown
Barbaloots and the Swomie Swans. The Lorax speaks for the trees and
speechless animals who are victims of the wanton slaughter of the trees by
the Onceler and his increasingly wealthy family. The Onceler doesnt
probably cantheed the Lorax, even though on one occasion he evinces
misgivings about his savaging of the environment. The tale ends with the
trees and animals gone, the environment a mess and the Onceler family
abandoning their thneed factory, useless without the Truffula trees needed
to sustain their production of thneeds. The Lorax, having tried to save the
trees and the environment, finally lifts himself by his own tail through a
hole in the noxious clouds and is never seen again. The small human boy
who comes upon the remains of the plundered environment is left with one
remaining Truffula seed, from which presumably he has an opportunity to
bring back the Truffulas and their pristine environment for the benefit of
a future time.
The Lorax is a fairy tale with a wonderful lesson for immature
psychesand even for mature psyches. The lesson is that our human
environment has moral worth and that it depends on us humans; we must,
along with the Lorax, speak for the trees. One might embellish the lesson
of the Lorax, but for now consider the issues of what the story has to do
with justice for the environment and how it might be relevant to pragmatist
ethics. Begin with justice.
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II. Justice
Justice is commonly interpreted as an understanding of how material goods
ought to be distributed among citizens in a particular society or, more gen
erally, among all humans inhabiting the global community. Thus, John
Rawls gives us two principles of justice that he at least initially believed
would be accepted by any humans who thought about them in circum
stances in which their own particular economic interests were hidden be
hind a veil of ignorance. The strategies of governance and distribution
that resulted from Rawlss two principles were supposed to produce just
distributions of the material goods produced by any society founded on
those principles. Rawlss early optimism about his two principles and the
rationality of accepting them dissipated in the flood of critiques that fol
lowed A T h eo ry o f J u stic e. No need to revisit those sometimes-technical
issues about the rationality of particular choices about those principles.
In a recent book, J u stic e: W h a ts the R ig h t T h in g to D o ? , Michael Sandel
concludes, contrary to Rawls, that justice cannot be segregated conceptu
ally from one or another understanding of the good life (Sandel, 2009, es
pecially pp. 264-269). Sandels conclusion is a pragmatist one in the sense
that he grants that justice is not conceptually available apart from some
full-bodied conception of the good from which it is inseparable. Dewey
puts a similar point in his 1932 E th ics by saying that justice is not possible
apart from benevolence or sympathy (Dewey, LW 7: 249-252). Another
way of putting this pragmatist point is to say that, apart from some con
ception of the goods humans seek to realize, the idea of justice is no more
than a rhetorical tool, one the clever among us will not allow to distract
from their own idea about the goods our societies should make available.
I dont want to draw cynical conclusions about important issues that divide
American culture morally and religiouslyAbortion, stem cell research,
gay marriage, animal agriculture, etc.and Sandel does not draw such
conclusions either. But the point remains that justice cannot be imple
mented or explicated apart from one among many conceptions of what the
good is, what flourishing is or what happiness is. And Sandel concludes
his treatment of justice as inseparable from an understanding of the good
with proper pragmatist optimism and recommends a politics of moral en
gagement based on mutual respect.
Having arrived at a pragmatist understanding of justice as informed
by understandings of the good life, we need to see how this understanding
helps inform and justify the claim that the environment needs justice from
us humans. Is The L o r a x just a nice fairy tale for politically correct parents
to spoon into their children? Or does The L o ra x have moral substance
in presenting a plausible demand for justice for the environment? One
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surely agrees that The L o r a x elicits sympathy for the Truffula trees, the
Brown Barbaloots and the Swomie Swans, but some people sympathize
with some things and not with others, and different people respond dif
ferently to the various plights of the flora and fauna of our environments.
The moral issue about our environment, however, goes beyond the vicis
situdes of sympathy as it waxes and wanes among various human hearts;
the moral issue is how to get beyond vicissitudes of sympathy to objective
legitimacy. How does The L o r a x impart objective leg itim a cy to the claim
of justice for the environment? An answer this question needs a pragma
tist perspective on justice and the good.
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V. Moral Ideals
Natural piety is an ideal of character; part of its content is proper respect
for the natural world of which humans are an integral part. One might
conceive that proper respect in various ways. One Christian way of re
specting the environment is to exercise proper stewardship over it, to use
it in a respectful way that accords with our God-given dominion over it.
The problem with this way of thinking about proper respect for our envi
ronment, apart from its metaphysical and theological presumption, is that
it does not allow any real desires, demands or needs to emerge fromor
even to exist inour environment. When the Lorax cries out on behalf of
the trees and animals, he cries out because they are wounded and suffer
ing; he is expressing their moral claim against us that we must, as a condi
tion of our moral integrity, respect. The Christian stewardship model pre
cludes the Loraxs empathy for their wounds and suffering. Our natural
piety morally requires our respect for the Lorax and our respectful redress
of the injustices that produce that wounding and suffering. At least, this is
how the Lorax sees it.3
What can natural piety be as a virtue of moral character other than
at least partly a disposition to respect legitimate demands for justice that
come from all parts of our environment. We are those parts of our envi-
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ronment having intelligence and judgment, along with empathy for the
wounded of our world. In Jamess understanding of the role of moral
philosophers, one that accepts the centrality of Deweys virtue of natural
piety, we have the responsibility to produce the most inclusive whole of
satisfaction for all the wounded, needy claimants who come to our atten
tion. The Lorax tells us we must heed the agony of those mute, brute parts
of our world who suffer wounding by the acts of those among us who
have not heard or heeded his cries. Why should we listen to a cartoon
character?
The quick answer to this question is that the Lorax is natural piety.
Most philosophers are reluctant to accept this answer because for philoso
phers ideals are first ideas that need analysis, after which analysis those
ideas can figure into principles to be justified, after which justification they
may be available to guide our action. Platos dialogues are the locus clas-
sicu s in philosophy for this way of thinking about ideals, and insofar as we
follow this Platonist model we are footnotes to Plato. James and Dewey,
as pragmatists, are not footnotes to Plato.
But pragmatists still need an answer to the question what natural piety
is, an answer that does not require dialectical skills that transcend human
itys biological origins. One result of pragmatists remaining rooted in
their earthy, biological stuff is that they are able to transcend the philo
sophical obsession with understanding dialectically the content of human
ideals. Another result is that pragmatists need to find ideals among the
realities they, along with their human fellows, commonly experience. The
Lorax is one of those ideals. A Christian predecessor of the Lorax was St.
Francis of Assisi who, though he respected the natural world as does the
Loraxremember the bird and the wolf stories about himdid so within
a conventionally Christian perspective.
St. Francis is a saint officially canonized by the Catholic Church in
1228. The Lorax is a metaphorical saint, unofficially canonized by Dr.
Suess in the mid-twentieth century. Both nevertheless are saints in the
relevant sense that James emphasizes in The Varieties o f R elig io u s E x p e ri
ence:
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The Lorax is one of the saints among us who are, along with some oth
ers, natural piety.4 Natural piety, being a virtue of human character, thus
requires a relationship to the Lorax. Actually, it requires nothing quite that
specific, but only some appropriate surrogate for that relation, maybe a
relation to St. Francis or Peter Singer. Justice for the environment comes
naturally out of a pragmatist understanding of morality when it is joined
with ideals like St. Francis and the Lorax.5
Notes
Works Cited
Dewey, John. (1989a) The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 7: 1932, Ethics. Jo
Ann Boydston (ed.). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
--------- . (1989b) The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 9: 1933-1934, Essays,
Reviews, Miscellany, and A Common Faith. Jo Ann Boydston (ed.). Car
bondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
--------- . (1991) The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 14: 1939-1941, Essays,
Reviews, and Miscellany. Jo Ann Boydston (ed.). Carbondale, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press.
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James, William. (1956) The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Phi
losophy. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
--------- . (1975) The Varieties o f Religious Experience. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Kristof, Nicholas. (Feb. 7, 2010) The World Capital of Killing. The New York
Times.
Lekan, Todd. (2013) A Reconstruction of Jamess Normative Ethics. William
James Studies, volume 9.
Rolston, Holmes, III. (1988) Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the
Natural World. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Rosenbaum, Stuart. (2009) Pragmatism and the Reflective Life. Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books.
Sandel, Michael J. (2009) Justice: Whats the Right Thing to Do? New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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