SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO
On appeal, CA in 1998 rendered a Decision reversing the assailed
CABANG ALIAS "DONDON", Petitioners,
vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY, Respondents
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
DOCTRINE: Family home - Art. 158. The family home may be sold,
alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof
with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's
spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict,
the court shall decide.
RULING FORMAT: follow facts. It was remanded back to the court of
origin. (two sets of appeal..)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777,
located in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. However, Felix Odong and
his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot.
2. On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property
from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00. Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-
appellants. The latter also did not occupy the said property.
3. Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous
possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present.
They were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot No.
7778 of the Molave Townsite.
4. defendant-appellees claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the
area they were actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned
out, it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually
occupying Lot No. 7777.
5. In 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Property against defendant-appellees. In 1996, the trial court
rendered its decision, in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff Holding that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the land
registered in their names, have been effectively barred by laches,
and ordering the dismissal of the case.
6.
decision declaring the plaintiffs-appellants to be entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 7777 of the Molave Townsite, subject to the
rights of the defendants-appellees under Article (sic) 448, 546, 547
and 548 of the New Civil Code.
The case are hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings to determine the rights of the defendants-appellees under the
aforesaid article (sic) of the New Civil Code.
7. During the hearing on May 10, 2002 in the rtc, plaintiff-appellants
offer to pay P21,000.00 for the improvement of the lot in question
was rejected by defendant-appellees.
8. On June 18, 2002, plaintiff-appellants filed their Manifestation and
Motion for Execution alleging therein that defendant-appellees
refused to accept payment of the improvements. On September 6,
2002, the court a quo issued the herein assailed Order denying the
motion for execution it being a family home.
9. Respondents elevated his case to the appellate court which
reversed the trial court in its May 31, 2007 Decision.
10. Hence, this petition in SC.
Petitioners insist that the property subject of the controversy is a duly
constituted family home which is not subject to execution, thus, they argue
that the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N the houses may be subject of an order of execution it being a
family home?
HELD: Petition lacks merit. The refusal, therefore, of the trial court to
enforce the execution on the ground that the improvements introduced on
the litigated property are family homes goes beyond the pale of what it had
been expressly tasked to do.
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from
execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given
that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons
constituting it. The family home must be established on the properties of (a)
the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive
property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However,
it can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property
and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the
latter.

If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no

communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only on his or
her own property.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their
arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is that the property
on which their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents Thus,
petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of
respondents.

The most important phase of any proceeding is the execution of

judgment.31 Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party should
not, through some clever maneuvers devised by an unsporting loser, be
deprived of the fruits of the verdict.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated May 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76755 declaring
respondents entitled to the writ of execution and ordering petitioners to
vacate the subject property, as well as the Resolution dated September 21,
2007 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA,
Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN, Respondents.
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J
DOCTRINE: Family home - Art. 158. The family home may be sold,
alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof
with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's
spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict,
the court shall decide.
RULING FORMAT: RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession
explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since the
redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued in
the name of the spouses Lapitan.
* Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, claiming that the subject
property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. On
October 11, 2005, however, the RTC issued an Order denying their motion.
CA - affirmed RTC, stressed that any question regarding the regularity and
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification
for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since the proceedings is
ex parte and non-litigious. Moreover, until the foreclosure sale is annulled,
the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. Spouses Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and
Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million
subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, spouses
Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in of Los
Baos, Laguna.
2. When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness
including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property .The public
auction sale was set on May 9, 2001.
3. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife
Rona (respondents) emerged as the highest bidders with the
bid amount of P2.5 million.Then, they were issued a Certificate
of Sale
4. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses
Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
5. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership and the registered the subject property in their
names.
6. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses
Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession
of the subject property.
ISSUE: W/N the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it
is a family home?
HELD: Petition lacks merit. As a general rule, the family home is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the
Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In
this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on
January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution
or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for
exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not
mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment
debtor to redeem the property.
Equally without merit is spouses Fortalezas reliance on the cases of
Tolentino and De Los Reyes in praying for the exercise of the right of
redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period. In Tolentino,
we held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption, with
a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is
equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to
redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year period. And in
De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the disputed property
after finding that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made
within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount.

The circumstances in the present case are far different. The spouses
Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the
subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse
from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the
mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or
abandoned their right of redemption.

Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the

original owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of liberality to
accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence or omission to
exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without
justifiable cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 10, 2007 and Resolution dated June 6, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,
vs. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent
PONENTE: GARCIA, J.
DOCTRINE: Legitimate children (pls. refer to the course outline) FC 172.
RULING FORMAT: ( July 12, 1999) the trial court, on its finding that
respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco,
dismissed the petition. Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which
motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of December 17,
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002,reversed and
set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint
respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. This is a legal dispute between he decedents wife (Petitioner) and
the alleged decedents child w/ certain Genoveva.
2. Francisco died on Jan. 21, 1998 leaving four parcels of land and a
building. Basically, there is a need to appoint an administrator of
Franciscos estate.
3. The respondent posits that, she is the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and a certain Genoveva Mercado and she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an
administrator.
4. The petitioner on the other hand, prayed also that she be made the
administratix of Franciscos estate.
5. Petitioner also stated that she was married to Francisco on Aug. 7,
1948 before an MTC judge and their marriage was ratified 2 mos.
After in a religious rite at Our Lady of Grace in Caloocan city.
6. The petitioner and the respondent had during there marriage
adopted a certain Concesa Yamat, thus the respondent is not the
sole child of the deceased.
7. The birth certificate of the respondent was not signed by Francisco
and has not presented marriage contract between her supposed
parents or any other document to rove such union.
8. In her reply, the respondent said that the certificate or records of
marriage between her parents were destroyed.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in ruling that the respondent is the legitimate child
of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado thus the rightful
adminstratix of Franciscos estate?
HELD: Yes.
in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents
marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage
certificate or marriage contract was offered in evidence. No priest, judge,
mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to
declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two.
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner,
there is nothing in the record to support petitioners claim that she is indeed
a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y.
Mercado. In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before
or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of
petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were
married in 1938.
While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the
records of marriages during the war years were totally destroyed, no
secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence of
the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado,
even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such
marriage
Petitioner presented pictures. However, it is already settled law that
photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.
Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged
natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real
party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not
essential or required.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court
dismissing the case is hereby REINSTATED.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H.
AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS,
Respondents.
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J
DOCTRINE: Legitimate children (pls. refer to the course outline)
RULING FORMAT: follow facts.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died.
2. Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with
the SSS for death benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo was
survived by his minor child, Jeylnn.
3. Her claim for monthly pension was settled until SSS received a
sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting
Rosannas claim for death benefits.
4. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
approximately more than 6 years before, and lived with another
man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further
averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.
5. The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer
entitled to support from Pablo.
6. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablos legitimate
child, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC
deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the
same person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo
and Rosanna but with no legal papers.
7. CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.
ISSUE: W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet( the respondents) are entitled to
the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo?
HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn
has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which
bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the
certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October
29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on
December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latters death on
December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during
Rosanna and Pablos marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas (born on October 29, 1991)
and Jenelyn H. dela Pea ( born on November 24, 1991) are one and the
same person. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Pea was born
approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically
impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in
so short a time.
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was
established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records
show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal
papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.
Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not
qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to
show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately.