People vs Peralta, et al.

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.

G.R. No. L-19069
October 29, 1968

Facts:

On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs
inside the New Bilibid Prison as Sigue-Sigue and OXO were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.

In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, OXO members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue
of final judgments.

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation and
treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed
Sigue-Sigue sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in
the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issues

(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime?

Held:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of a
common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or
implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in
order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of
the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that there
are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all the
deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of Sigue-Sigue gang (OXO members were from
either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned.
Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the
occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade
to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly,
almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison
by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum
period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty
imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall,
jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000;
each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

Case Digest by: cbcabalza2009

Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014

31
JUL
FACTS

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of presumed malice even when the latest jurisprudence
already replaces it with the higher standard of actual malice as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue
that inferring presumed malice from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement
of actual malice as opposed to presumed malice as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on
Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Societys interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains
the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a checkmark, or (Pro-
RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted
against it form Team Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.

2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.

3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.

6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.

7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence
of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the officialactions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt
that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this
case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
 In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for
it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
 Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not
affect anyone elses constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should
be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
 Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858

June 28, 2005

FACTS:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB
products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine
manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter
filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause,
the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of
UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins. No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed
boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of
Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to
the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the
seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and
Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

HELD:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However,
seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce
evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position
from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the
petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in
the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present
when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that
such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only
the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents
knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI
failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.