Bara Lidasan vs.
Commission on Elections,21 SCRA 542 Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by
Facts: RA 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur, took effect on June 18, 1966. It
sought to create the new municipality of Dianaton within barrios in
Lanao del Sur, but also included barrios located in Cotabato. Bara
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,
Cotabato requested for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA 4790
as unconstitutional because its Title is misleading and invoked the
provision of the Constitution that the title of a bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Issue: Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" satisfied the provision of
the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to notify the
public and others concerned of its substance.
Decision: RA4970, An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in
the Province of Lanao del Sur, is deemed unconstitutional. The very
title projected the impression that Lanao del Sur is the only province
affected by the act. This statute apprised neither Congress nor the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato that part of Cotabatos territory is being taken to
add to the adjacent Lanao del Sur.
Surigao Electric Co., Inc.vs. Municipality of Surigao
Posted on October 23, 2012
No. L-22766 August 30, 1968
FACTS:
On June 18,1960, Congress amended the Public Service Act and
introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for
public services owned or operated by government entities or
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC), but at the
same time affecting its power of regulation which while exempting
public services owned or operated by any instrumentality of the
government or any GOCC from its supervision, jurisdiction and control
stops short of including the fixing of rates.
Surigao Electric Co., and Arturo Lumanlan filed a petition for review
challenging the validity of the order of respondent Public Service
Commission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it held that it had no
alternative but to approve the tentative schedule of rates submitted by
the applicant, the Municipality of Surigao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain &
operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the
purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity
duly issued by the PSC.
HELD:
Yes.
The Municipality of Surigao is not a GOCC. However, it cannot be said
that it is not a government entity.
As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon (33 Phil. 508), the dual
character of a municipal corporation has long been recognized: (1)
as Governmental, being a branch of the general administration of the
State, and (2) as Quasi-Private and Corporate.
It is an undeniable fact that legislative and government powers are
conferred upon a municipalityto enable it to aid a state in properly
governing that portion of the people residing within its municipality,
such powers (being) in their nature public, xxx (1 Dilon, Commentaries
on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., p.68 [1911]).
being delegated to the municipal governmentsto preserve the peace,
protect the morals and health of the community and so on is to
administer government, whether it be done by the central government
itself or is shifted to a local organization. (Mendoza v. de Leon).
A municipal corporation is a government entity and functions as
an extension of the national government, and, therefore, it is an
instrumentality of the latter. By express provisions of Sec.14(e) of
RA 2677, an instrumentality of the national government is exempted
from the jurisdiction of the PSC except with respect to the fixing of
rates.
A legislative franchise cannot override the specific constitutional
restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any
individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress (Art.XIV,
Sec.8, Constitution). Such amendment/alteration may be implied from
a latter act of general applicability.
A legislative franchise cannot be availed of to defeat the proper
exercise of police power. In the American case of Charles River Bridge
v. Warren Bridge (1837): the continued existence of a government
would be of no great value ifit was disarmed of the powers
necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation; and the functions it
was designed to perform, transferred to the hands of privileged
corporations. xxx while the rights of private property are sacredly
guardedthe community also have rights, and that the happiness and
well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.
TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No.
40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta.
Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the
abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was
then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its
investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse
of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the
people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the
Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within
a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to
respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed
in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties
by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that
Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the
meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality
of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a
nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the
same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets
the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy,
and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is
to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its
decision.
Limbona vs. Mangelin
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of
the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker
of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed
the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there
shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that
the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared
that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.
Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question
which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly,"
for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor
of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In
the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for
the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not
be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention
to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason,
we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith
SAN JUAN VS SCS, DBM & ALMAJOSE
Posted by kaye lee on 6:50 PM
Reynaldo R. San Juan vs CSC, DBM, Cecilia Almajose
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
FACTS:
The position of Provincial Budget Officer for the Province of Rizal was
left vacant on March 22, 1988.
Provincial Governor, petitioner informed the Director of DBM that Ms.
Dalisay Santos, then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal,
assumed offices as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 and requested
the Director of DBM to endorse the appointment of Ms. Santos to the
position of PBO. DBM Regional Director found Cecilia Almajose,
among the nominees of the petitioner to be the most qualified and
recommended to the DBM Secretary the appointment of Almajose as
PBO of Rizal, which the DBM USec signed the appointment papers of
Almajose as PBO.
Upon learning of Almajoses appointment, petitioner wrote DBM Sec
protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that the DBM
Usec is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO, that Almajose lacks
the required 3 yrs works experience as provided in Local Budget
Circular No. 31, and that under EO No. 112, it is the Provincial
Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the
power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DBM has the power to appoint the PBO without
violating the principle of Local Autonomy.
RULING:
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is
capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy but
distinguished presidential control to supervision:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)"
The President controls the executive departments. He has no such
power over local governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
Article II, S. 25, 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."
The 14 sections in Article X, on Local Government not only reiterate
earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local
autonomy more meaningful.
"Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation
of the local units."
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy
where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the
prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only
from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor
explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through
Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or
activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction,
and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is
concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the
LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said
charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is
basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special
law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police
power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake
region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants
powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail
over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna
de Bay.
ABELLA vs COMELEC Case Digest
ABELLA vs. COMELEC
201 SCRA 253
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to
intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as
Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of
Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running
for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However,
when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already
proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella,
who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take
his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote
may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position
was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-
546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of
candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1,
1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as
a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election.
He was repudiated by the electorate.
MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
Posted on November 18, 2012
GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision
from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner,
praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic
as an agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which
is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a
body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the
LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod
and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and
in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under
the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs,
there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development
authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an
LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed
by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence,
its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
Case Digest: LCP VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition
filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the
sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby
into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5
vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as
unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal
protection clause.
In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by
a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a
vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because
RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city
are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in
the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still
be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
>NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP GR NO. 183591
Posted on May 7, 2010 by krizsexzy
>FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an
aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The
agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all
natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed
of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not
the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated
and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is
contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for
peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of
peoples participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct
periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless
such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities
and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled
with the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon
signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to
proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place
nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need
to amend therein
Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public
funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said
executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel
Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against
the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as
this power has been vested in the legislative department.
RULING:
ection 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more
power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
Miranda vs Aguirre GR No 133064 16 September 1999
POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
 LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: On 5 May 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city
was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified
R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No.
8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720, it changed the status of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the
constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of ratification through plebiscite
pursuant to Section 10 Article 10 of the Constitution. Petitioners also
contend the petition raises a political question over which the Court
lacks jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on juticiable and
political question.
Decision: Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
The plea that the court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the
petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to
be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light
of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines
judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the
cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this
Court in many cases.
Padilla vs. COMELEC
Governor (P) vs. COMELEC (D)
GR 103328, October 19,1992 (214 SCRA 735)
Summary: A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted
and the voters rejected its creation. The governor questioned the result
and challenged the inclusion of the voters of the mother municipality in
the plebiscite.
Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
Section 10, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law,
the COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its approval. In its
resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included
all the voters of the Municipality of Labothe parent unit of the new
municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the
creation of the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon.
Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to set aside the result arguing
that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not include the parent political
unitthe Municipality of Labo.
Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?
Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that
residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated
by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is
contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as
those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law
Requirements in challenging the constitutionality of the law)
FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of
RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground
that the same attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit
for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously served by
them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art
VI).
SSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the
constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e.,
that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
Case Digest: Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Ermita
G.R. No. 180050 : May 12, 2010
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL., Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,Respondents.
PERALTA,J.:
FACTS:
Before us are two Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
February 10, 2010 one filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in behalf of public respondents, and the other filed by
respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman, representing the
Province of Dinagat Islands.
The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for
reconsideration of Governor Villaroman can be subsumed under the
grounds for reconsideration of the OSG, which are as follows:
I.
The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. Article 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely
interpretative of Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
II.
The power to create a local government unit is vested with the
Legislature.The acts of the Legislature and Executive in enacting into
law RA 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity or constitutionality.
III.
Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact
doctrine as a reason for upholding the validity and constitutionality of
laws involving the creation of a new local government unit as in the
instant case.
As regards the first ground, the movants reiterate the same arguments
in their respective Comments that aside from the undisputed
compliance with the income requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355, creating the Province ofDinagat Islands,has also complied with
the population and land area requirements.
The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon
by the Court in its Decision, ruling that R.A. No. 9355 is
unconstitutional, since it failed to comply with either the territorial or
population requirement contained in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as theLocal Government Code of 1991.
When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province
onDecember 3,2006, it had an official population of only 106,951based
on the2000 Census ofPopulation conducted by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of
250,000 inhabitants.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a
special census of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded
a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO
as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents
failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population
of the original unit (motherProvinceofSurigao del Norte) would not be
reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the
time of the creation of the new province.
Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO
conducted the2007Census of Population. The NSO certified that as
ofAugust 1, 2007,DinagatIslandshad a total population of
only120,813,which wasstill below theminimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants.
Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the
population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the
statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.R.A. No. 9355
specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an
approximate land area of802.12 square kilometers. This was not
disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of Dinagat
Islands in her Comment.She and the other respondents instead
asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one
island, is exempted from theland area requirementbased on the
provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article
9which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.The
certificate of compliance issued by the LandsManagement Bureau was
also based on the exemption under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.
However, the Court held thatparagraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRRis null
and void, because the exemption is not found in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules
and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law.
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461
of the Local Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting
Opinion ofAssociate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355
failed to comply with the population requirement.However, he contends
that the Province ofDinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the
territorial requirementbecause it is composed ofa group of islands;
hence, it is exempt from compliance not only with the territorial
contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land
area criterion inSection 461 of the Local Government Code.
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in
paragraph (a) (i) above is the one being referred to in the exemption
from the territorial requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends
that if the province to be created is composed of islands, like the one in
this case, then, its territory need not be contiguous and need not have
an area of at least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that this is
because as the law is worded, contiguity and land area are not two
distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify each other. An
exemption from one of the two component requirements in paragraph
(a) (i) allegedly necessitates an exemption from the other component
requirement, because the non-attendance of one results in the
absence of a reason for the other component requirement to effect a
qualification.
ISSUE: Whether the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion
ofAssociate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded.
POLITICAL LAW: general powers and attributes of local
government units
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitledGeneral Powers and Attributes of Local
Government Units) of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 7.Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another
levelshall be based onverifiableindicatorsof viability and projected
capacity to provide services,to wit:
(a)Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
(b)Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants
within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned;
and
(c)Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or
more islands, or is separated by a local government unit independent
of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions;andsufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO),
and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
POLITICAL LAW: requirements for land area
Itmust be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the
generalruleinthecreation of a local government unit, states in
paragraph (c)thereof that the land area must be
contiguousandsufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities
to meet the requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area:(1) the land area
must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.A sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least
2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local
Government Code .

Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the
requisites for the creation of a province, specifically states the
requirement of acontiguousterritoryofat leasttwo thousand (2,000)
square kilometers.
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of
a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least
2,000square kilometers aredistinctand separate requirements for
landarea under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of
the Local Government Code.
POLITICAL LAW: exemption from the requirement of territorial
contiguity
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances
ofexemption from the requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:
(b)The territoryneed not be contiguousif it comprises two(2)or more
islands,or is separated byachartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the incomeofthe province.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above
pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity.It clearly states
that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in
the case of a province comprisingtwo or more islands, or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied
that when a province is composed of two or more islands, or when
theterritory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such
province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least
2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of
Section 461of the Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce
exceptions or conditions where none is provided from considerations of
convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may
it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated, nor construe its
provisions by taking into account questions of expediency, good faith,
practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance
therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, but only for application.
Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local
government unit is vested with the Legislature, the acts of the
Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting into law R.A. No.
9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity or constitutionality.
The contention lacks merit.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution States:
SEC. 10.No province, city, municipality, orbarangaymay becreated,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
exceptin accordance with the criteria established in the local
government codeand subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the
Legislature that imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as
contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.No law has
yet been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government
Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the creation
of a province.The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the
Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province;
hence, any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record
proved that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either thepopulation or
territorial requirements prescribed in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands;
hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010 are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Ordillo vs. COMELEC case brief summary
Ordillo vs. COMELEC case brief summary
Facts:
The province of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-
Apayao, and Baguio City cast their vote in a plebiscite held in pursuant
to R.A. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The result of
the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was only
approved by Ifugao. In consideration of the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that
only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the
CAR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao can validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Ruling:
No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of the 1987
Constitution it includes provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas, that a region is to be made up of two or more
constituent unit.
Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely constitute a region.
Abbas vs Comelec (179 SCRA 287)
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire
S
tandard
Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may
generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make
the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of
R.A. No. 6734 which declares that [t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the
purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the
creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two
provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still
be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes
were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its
composition needs to be clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of
the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and
only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the
Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included
in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region
is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall
be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces
and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall
compromise it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region

is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite,
but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and
the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes
cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as
that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a
simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the
sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under
Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when
they ratified the Constitution.
 SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
[G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005]
FACTS:
This case involves the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,
which is a town that is not supposed to exist yet but is insisted by
some as actually alive and thriving. Andong was created through
Executive Order No. 107 issued by Pres. Macapagal in 1965,
which was declared void in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor
General (1965).
Sultan Camid alleges that Andong has metamorphosed into a
full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed
to handle essential services for the municipality and its
constituents.
He however concedes that since 1968, no person has been
appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local
government positions in Andong. He also alleges that the town
has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS Office, among
others. According to him, public officials of Andong have been
serving their constituents in their own little ways and means
despite absence of public funds. To bolster his claims, he
presented to the Court a DENR-CENRO Certification of the total
land area of the Municipality of Andong. He also submitted a
Certification issued by the Provincial
Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning Andongs population
(14,059). He also lists several government agencies and private
groups that have allegedly recognized Andong.
Camid assails the DILG certification of 18 municipalities certified
as
existing per DILG records. These 18, were among the 33
municipalities whose creation was voided by the Court in the
Pelaez case. He imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DILG for not classifying Andong as a regular existing
municipality and in not including it in its records and official
database.
Camid also argues that EO 107 remains valid because of the
decision of court in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Hon. Mendez,
where the court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of
San Andres in Quezon as a de facto municipal corporation. He
insists that inspite of insurmountable obstacles, Andong lives on.
Hence, its existence should be given judicial affirmation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality whose creation by executive
fiat, which was previously voided by the Court, may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative or implementing
statute.
RULING:
The Court said that the case is not a fit subject for the special civil
actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo
appreciation of factual questions. Also, the Pelaez case and its
offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create
municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However,
with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal
cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive
order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by
the Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed
curative whatever legal defects these municipalities had labored under.
Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal
corporation. This is because there are eminent differences between
Andong and the other municipalities. The most prominent is that, the
EO which created Andong was expressly annulled by the Court in
1965. The court said that if it would affirm Andongs de facto status by
reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, it
would in effect condone defiance of a valid order of the Court.
Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by
the parties aggrieved.
Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the
Local Government Code (LGC), as it requires that, for the municipality
created by EO to receive recognition, they must have their respective
set of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the
LGC. Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. The
national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong,
depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct
municipal elections in the void municipality. Andong is not listed as
among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur in the Ordinance
apportioning the seats of Congress in the 1987 Constitution. Finally,
Andong has not been reestablished through statute. In contrast, the 18
municipalities in the DILG certification, were recognized as such
because subsequent to the ruling in the Pelaez case, legislation was
enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.
Section 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the
judicially-dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. On
the other hand, the municipalities judicially-dissolved in cases such as
Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless
recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the
eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON. ANTONIO V.
MENDEZ, SR.
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire
S
tandard
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued,
pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating
the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San
Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with
their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President
and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal
council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later
officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that (t)he
conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in
House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto
with RTC which petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning
the creation of the new municipality and that the case had become
moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec.
442. Requisites for Creation. . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the
date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate
as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the
Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally
existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had
been void ab initio.
ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto
municipal corporation.
HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost
thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being
the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a
choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to
have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality
of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on
24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The
ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the
case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the
States recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of
San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a
fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement
laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the
municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing
the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in
the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL
[G.R. No. 116702. December 28, 1995]
FACTS:
The case revolves around the controversy on territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Alicia, Bohol. During the
proceedings, after presentation of evidence by the Municipality of
Candijay, the latter asked the trial court to bar the Municipality of
Alicia from presenting
its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. It was
adjudged by the lower court that Barangay Pagahat is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. Therefore, said
barrio forms part and parcel of its territory. The Regional Trial Court of
Bohol permanently enjoined defendant Municipality of Alicia to respect
plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of Barangay
Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and
ownership over the same barrio.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court. It ruled that the trial court committed an error in declaring
that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Candijay because the lower court rejected the boundary
line being claimed by the Municipality of Alicia based on certain
exhibits. If allowed, the Municipality of Candijay will not only engulf the
entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of many other barrios. Candijay will
eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction
under the law creating her.
CA also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans
both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the
boundary lines. It decided the case based on the rule on
equiponderance of evidence. Hence, the Municipality of Candijay now
files a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Alicia has a juridical
personality to claim its territory.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds that the issues of fact in this case had been
adequately passed upon by the Court of Appeals with the application of
the equiponderance doctrine which states: When the scale shall stand
upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall
incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent
Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which
will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or
capricious; here, there has been no such showing.
As to the issue on the personality of the Municipality of Alicia, it is
noteworthy that the Municipality of Candijay commenced its collateral
attack on the juridical personality of respondent municipality on
January 19, 1984 or some thirty five years after respondent
municipality first came into existence in 1949. The Municipality of
Candijay contended that Executive Order No. 265 issued by President
Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating the Municipality of Alicia is
null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code constituted an undue delegation of legislative
powers, and was therefore declared unconstitutional in Pelaez vs.
Auditor General.
However, the factual milieu of the Municipality of Alicia is strikingly
similar to that of the Municipality of San Andres in the case of
Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez. The latter case, in
appreciating the de jure status of the municipality, considered the
peculiar circumstances supporting its juridical existence.
In the case at bar, respondent Municipality of Alicia was created by
virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the
municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence
for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was
PUBLIC CORPORATION CASE DIGESTS || USC LAW BATCH 2013
promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the
years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of
the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order
No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered
by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court. Likewise, under the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, it is one of twenty
municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.
Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated
as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from
the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code,
which states that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered
as regular municipalities.
Municipality of Jimenez vs. Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr.
Posted on September 11, 2012
G.R. No. 105746
December 2, 1996
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then
Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid
claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao,
Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical
dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the
Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction
on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban.
This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950,
fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area
to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving
the agreement between the parties was void since the Board had no
power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that
power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the
LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied the
motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against
Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial
Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local
Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive Secretary.
Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to
the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of
plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in
E.O. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis
Occidental which should be used as basis for adjudicating
Sinacabans territorial claim.
Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly
created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor
General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a
legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to
create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban.
However, where a municipality created as such by executive order
is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal
validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto
municipal corporation where its legal existence has been recognized
and acquiesced publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter
must be commenced within 5 years from the act complained of was
done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet
the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned.
Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was
questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that is
apparently desired for its revenue. The State and even the Municipality
of Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence.
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their
common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning
legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed
to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban since it states
that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.
2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it
attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect.
The plebiscite requirement for the creation of municipalities applies
only to new municipalities created for the first time under the
Constitution it cannot be applied to municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the
barrios (now barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that
Sinacaban contains those barrios. The reason for this is that the
technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a
municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a
relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of
the municipality & consequently to which municipality the barangays in
question belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the
law is not the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a
resolution of a provincial Board declaring certain barrios part of one or
another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the
territory of the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical
description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez
as basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute
should be elevated to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983).
Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the Decision and
Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the
LGC of 1983, the governing law when the action was brought by
Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of
1991 (RA 7160).
Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr
from the start of the proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of
1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the
Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision
rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period prescribed by
law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only
makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
Posted on November 20, 2012
GR 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the
Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the
capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003
which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs
to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF
and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to
declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar
as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount
of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions
for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of
1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA
they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and
must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall
ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent with
the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision,
which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v.
Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the
rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his
subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but
has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent
required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall
be released to them without need of further action. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules &
regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional
mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the
LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current
fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding
fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of
the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can
it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only
through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or
GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a
specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which
is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate
provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of
1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress
to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by
the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not
only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, DILG-Liga ng mga Barangay, quasi-legislative power)
Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage
the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged
violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of
their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify,
nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue
interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not
subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge contends
that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs
including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No.
267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the
DILG.
Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power
of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity
exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILGs authority is limited to
seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such
rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the
same.
________________________________________________
Basco vs PAGCOR GR 91649 (May 14, 1991)
Posted on November 20, 2012
GR 91649
197 SCRA 52, 65
May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic &
tends toward crony economy, waiving the Manila City governments
right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection
clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For
a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear &
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869
is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of
franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now
vested exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the
power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in the City of
Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government
instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from
local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local
governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat
national policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The
power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the
very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of
LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided
by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign
within a state, it simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The
equal protection clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some
gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos 261 SCRA
667 (1996)
Oct23
Facts:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by
virtue of R.A. 6958, mandated to principally undertake the economical,
efficient, and effective control, management, and supervision of the
Mactan International Airport and Lahug Airport, and such other airports
as may be established in Cebu.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of
exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14
of its charter. However, on October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa,
Officer in Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment from realty taxes in the total amount of
P2229078.79. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as
baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor the afore cited Section 14
of R.A. 6958. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the
government performing governmental functions, citing Section 133 of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 133. Common limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units.
The exercise of the taxing powers of the provinces, cities, barangays,
municipalities shall not extend to the levi of the following:
xxx Taxes, fees or charges of any kind in the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs. xxx
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax
account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government-controlled
corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by
virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code that took effect on
January 1, 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a taxable person
Rulings:
Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAAs
exemption from payment of taxes is withdrawn by virtue of Sections
193 and 234 of Labor Code. Statutes granting tax exemptions shall be
strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally construed in favor
of the taxing authority.
The petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under
its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of realty taxes. The
grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of
the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes,
except real property tax.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers,
the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the
government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not
only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises
the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the
levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public
APPEALG.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006
dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
Facts:
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the
Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real
and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The
estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million.
term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article
The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of
420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Republic of the Philippines.
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because
they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other
and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary
charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport
restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque
Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.
from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of
the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the
Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code
Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned
public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as
and-controlled corporations upon the effectivity of the Local
the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the
Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of
income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such
statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing,
fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public
or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the
use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing those
exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code.
among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all
Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport
the public including those who never use the particular public facility.
Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being
exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any
outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction
public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax
sale.
creditor.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
Issue:
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential
tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments
public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
issued by the City of Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the
such assessments, are void.
City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the
600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
Held:
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an
for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative
instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local
Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties
taxation.
owned by the Republic. n MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee of
the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided
head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic.
into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members.
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization
A non-stock corporation must have members.

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air
Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership
of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely
toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a
separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial
owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely
by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs
assets adverse to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic
of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases
to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the
land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private
corporations is subject to real estate tax.
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
16AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June
1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of
Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An
Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And
Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms
And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued
by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All
Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise,
License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public
On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other
Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement
Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and
non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record
to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered
or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the
executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD
No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts
First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the
effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the
Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the
well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
J. Gancayo
Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April
21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the ticket price given to
minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a
2-6 month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to
prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its
decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police
power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the
power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n)
of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can
only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by
invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the
cited law.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the
fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and
amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the
general welfare clause as invoked by the City?
Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition
granted.
Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to
include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem
that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement,
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police
regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters,
cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to
regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police
power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run
cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was
upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact
the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in
Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under
the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the
interest of the public generally requires an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words,
the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is
not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust,
confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right
of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners
are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission
prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the
fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by
any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must
be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of
cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of
money for the admission of their children, as they would for
themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean
corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the
ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not
only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners
point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as
already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as
below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The
ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable
practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that
birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age
of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the
business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety,
morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children
are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the
children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are
treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house
and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome
movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to
avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for
themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license,
revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be
evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the
purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket,
therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may
be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is
clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also,
necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the
absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he
obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
pleases and at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has
not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the
admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however,
that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even
to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important
both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of
the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing
cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that
such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under
the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the
exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and
lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of
the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
protection of the due process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless
be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the
face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence
Dela Cruz v. Paras Digest
Dela Cruz v Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Fernando, CJ:
Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of
night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted
with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging
that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were
violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is
entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the
Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of
Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial
Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely
"the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however,
remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a
municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night
clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit.
The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that
of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night
clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court
upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not
embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute
as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result
in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide
gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in
the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending
to all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which
it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by
such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that
would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly
commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an
exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that
petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to
operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In
the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a
temporary termination of their business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the
regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
Case Brief: White Light Corporation v City of Manila
N OV EM B ER 2 6 , 2 0 1 3 J EF F R E Y
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and
STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO
S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting
Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up
Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the
Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who
will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC),
who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed
a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention
on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the
State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of
police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the
respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view
of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely
restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the
State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and
its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of
the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access
or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights
at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty
as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint
or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in
with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent
that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion
of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
M AR C H 3 0 , 2 0 1 3 ~ VB D I A Z
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City
of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-
Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City
Council of Manila,et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading
as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim
(Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the
said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that
the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D.
499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments,
except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court
did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise
of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated
power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of
the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a
violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting
for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within
the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for
the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive
of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and
moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded
social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may
be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-
repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication
and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such
as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to
suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even
impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means
to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for
the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation
and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind
up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business
operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles
of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government
units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as
this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance
should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the
standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It
is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just
and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious
if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is
also discriminatory as prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance
aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and
women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit,
the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the
only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance
per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse
or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and
property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit
that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, et al.
G.R. No. 128509, 22 August 2006
Facts: Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service
operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide
and render arrastre and stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of
Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels berthed thereat, from September
1992 to September 1993.
In December 1993, pending final consideration of petitioners
application for renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its
Port Manager Salvador L. Reyna of the Tacloban Port Management
Office issued a 90-day holdover authority to petitioner. Stated therein
was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90day period aforementioned,
the authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or sooner
withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA Administrative Order
No. 1081. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with respondent mayor an
application for the renewal of its business permits, which, in turn, was
denied. Petitioner thus filed for a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction, and enjoined respondent mayor to issue the
business license sought.
On the other hand, the respondent mayor averred that the remedy of
mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the permit sought is not a
ministerial function, but one that requires sound judgment and
discretion. In denying petitioners application, respondent mayor
invoked Municipal Resolution No. 9327, passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Hilongos, Leyte which prohibits any party which likewise
operates shipping lines plying the route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice
versa, from engaging in arrastre and stevedoring services at the port of
Hilongos.
Issue: Is respondent mayors issuance of the permit a discretionary
duty?
Held: Yes.
It can be deduced from Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government
Code that the limits in the exercise of the power of a municipal mayor
to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same can be
contained in a law or ordinance The said section is pursuant to Section
16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, which
encapsulates the delegated police power to local government units.
Thus, under the LGC, the municipal mayor has the power to issue
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation
of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance.
The pursuit of its duty under the police power necessarily entails
exercise of official discretion in order for any local officials to ascertain
which will better serve their constituents who elected them into office.
Full discretion must necessarily be granted them to perform their
functions and it will not be sound logic to simply make them perform
purely ministerial functions. And when the discharge of an official duty
requires the exercise of official discretion or judgment, it is never a
ministerial one.
Furthermore, where the only power given to a municipal corporation or
official is to issue license, as in Section 444 of the Local Government
Code, it is clearly regulatory in nature rather than a revenue raising
one. Conclusively, regulation being the object of the power to issue
license and permits the exercise of discretion by the issuing authority
becomes an inescapable prerogative. This could be the very same
reason why business permits and licenses are renewed almost
annually in order that the licensing officials in carrying out their
functions could examine and evaluate availing circumstances and
conditions and with the exercise of discretion determine whether to
grant or deny the application or, to revoke a license or permit already
issued. It should also be understood that a municipal license is not a
property such that it is revocable when public interest so requires.
However, the fact that there only was the Resolution No. 93-27,
and no ordinance nor law, petitioners cause still cannot prosper
because the proper action is certiorari to determine whether
grave of abuse of discretion had been committed, and not
mandamus.
A Mayor Cannot Be Compelled By Mandamus To Issue A
Business Permit Since The Exercise Of The Same Is A Delegated
Police Power Hence, Discretionary In Nature
AUGUST 8, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST\
The Facts: Naguillian Emission Testing Center Inc., filed a petition for
mandamus and damages against Abraham Rimando (petitioner), the
municipal mayor of Naguilian, La Union. In its complaint, the company
alleged that from 2005 to 2007 its business is located on a land
formerly belonging to the national government which was later certified
as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain by the
DENR. On January 18, 2008, it applied for a renewal of its business
permit and paid the corresponding fees, but the petitioner refused to
issue a business permit, until such time that the company executes a
contract of lease with the municipality; the respondent is amenable to
signing the contract but with some revisions, which the petitioner did
not accept; no common ground was reached among the parties, hence
the company filed the petition. The RTC ruled in favour of the
petitioner; ratiocinating that: (a) the Municipality of Naguiian is the
declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax
Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue
Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to
require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business
operation is being conducted on a real property owned by the
municipality; and (c) a mayors duty to issue business permits is
discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus
writ.
On appeal, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case even
though the petition itself is dismissible on the ground of mootness. It
held that the factual milieu of the case justifies issuance of the writ; the
tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to
require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine qua
non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed
that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the
municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it
failed to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. It held the mayor not
liable for damages since he acted in the performance of his duties
which are legally protected by the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty; the case against the mayor also was moot
and academic since his term as mayor expired. Nevertheless, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
 The Issue:
Whether or not the issue had become moot and academic;
Whether or not the issuance of a business permit maybe compelled
thru a petition for mandamus.
The Ruling:
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already
become moot and academic owing to the expiration of the period
intended to be covered by the business permit.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would
be without practical use and value1 or in the nature of things, cannot
be enforced.2 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.3 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.4
The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to
grant a business permit in favor of respondent corporation for the
period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of
time and the expiration of the petitioners term as mayor. Verily then,
the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor,
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondents
business permit ceased to present a justiciable controversy such that
any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be
issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity
date of the business permit no longer subsists.
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise
moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the decretal portion of its
decision was erroneously couched.
The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land
and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81,
aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no
longer be practically utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the
overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was
its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along with
the petition for mandamus that spawned it.
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue
a business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated police
power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of
this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor5 where a
determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to
grant business permits under the Local Government Code6, viz:
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section
444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides,
thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues,
and apply the same to the implementation of development plans,
program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of
this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for
agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress,
and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had
been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to
issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the
delegated police power to local governments. Local government units
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance. x x x
xxxx
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby
the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and permits is
circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a
municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be
deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly
exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but
certainly, not of mandamus.7 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed
by the respondent is incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayors
discretionary duty to issue business permits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REYES, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo*, Perez, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012, ABRAHAM
RIMANDO, PETITIONER, VS. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING
CENTER, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ROSEMARIE
LLARENAS AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
1
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425, 436 (2003).
2
Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, 494 Phil. 125, 133 (2005); See also
Gonzales v. Narvasa, 392 Phil.518, 522 (2000); Villarico v. Court of
Appeals, 424 Phil. 26 (2002); King v. Court of Appeals, 514 Phil. 465,
470 (2005).
3
Soriano Vda. De Dabao v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 928 (2004).
4
Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
168792, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70, 76..
5
531 Phil. 30 (2006).
6
Although the case involved the issuance of a business permit for
arrastre service, the general power of a mayor to issue business
permits is encapsulated in the same legal provision of the Local
Government Code without distinguishing the nature of the business for
which a permit is sought.
7
Supra note 13, at 43-46.
Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998
J. Panganiban
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on
September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of
10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of
the property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing
petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with
its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market
value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of
action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied.
The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the
same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case
is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal
council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially
complies with the requirements of the law because the terms
ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public
use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate
said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its
chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise
thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may
therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only
when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU
can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose
or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the
power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal
council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that
the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms
resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language
of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a
clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section
19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.[35]
Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from
resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a
strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules,
which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is
controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is
in reality not eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to the
limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in
eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the
requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case.
There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation
case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action,
which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata,
which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot
bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State
might need for public use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the
State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues
decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State
or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere
fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has
become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or
its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to
expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are
complied with.
PERCIVAL MODAY vs COURT OF APPEALS
Posted on July 25, 2013 by winnieclaire
[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997.]
FACTS:
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along
the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of
Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal
Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for its approval
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and
returned it with the comment that expropriation is unnecessary
considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center.
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently
filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday
before the RTC
, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon
the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had
already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
and that it would be in the governments best interest for public
respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property
the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipalitys motion to
take possession of the land
o that the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to declare the resolution
invalid leaves it effective.
o that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review
the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
under the old LGC
o that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts
enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had
erected three buildings on the subject property.
ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private property by
virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD: YES.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in
the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of
private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for
public use and there must be just compensation
The Municipality of Bunawans power to exercise the right of eminent
domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in force at the
time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law
states:
Section 9.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through
its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise
the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings
for public use or purpose.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW
ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF
INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND
THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE
THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigans disapproval of Municipal Resolution
No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null
and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337,
grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the
power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although
pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then
obtaining, the Courts pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we
cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon
the council or president making the same. Absolutely no other ground
is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the
provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The provincial (boards) disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the
fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the
legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits,
it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president.
Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. Thus, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly
has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it
follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be
used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners
property.
Masikip v. City of Pasig
on 12:59 PM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be
expressly provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land,
which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the
sports development and recreational activities of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said
portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was
dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine
necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court
of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate
private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a
reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is
inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It
delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and
public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations.
LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it
only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer
was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property
There is already an established sports development and recreational
activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no
genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show that
the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which
became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit
organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
Case Brief: Republic v Lim
N OV EM B ER 1 7 , 2 0 1 3 L EAVE A C OM M E N T
G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004
Republic of the Philippines v Chule Y Lim
Facts:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese
father and a Filipina mother, who never got married due to a prior
subsisting marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that there
were few mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit:
1. That her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using the Republic is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Yu in all of her school records and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To
(Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
been Filipino considering that her father and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate
when in fact, it should have been illegitimate. Both the trial court and
Court of Appeals granted the respondents petition.
Issue:
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court on the following grounds:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the
citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from Chinese to Filipino
despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance
with the legal requirements for election of citizenship.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to
continue using her fathers surname despite its finding that respondent
is an illegitimate child.
Held:
1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No.
625. The Supreme Court held that the two above provisions only apply
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of the respondent
who was an illegitimate child considering that her parents never got
married. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as such, there was no
more need for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Also, she registered as a voter inside the country when
she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.
2. No. The Republics submission was misleading. The Court of
Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers surname. What it
did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can remember. The court held that
prohibiting the respondent to use her fathers surname would only sow
confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 which regulates
the use of aliases as well as the jurisprudence state that it is allowed
for a person to use a name by which he has been known since
childhood. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate
children of their father from using his surname. While judicial authority
is required for a chance of name or surname, there is no such
requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition brought by
AFFIRMED.

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)
Posted on October 19, 2012
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized
the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension
and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon.
This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved
by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into
a contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain &
manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned
streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
government of Paraaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction
and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran.
He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea
market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary
injunction. The trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined
petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.
Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of
Paraaque authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares
as sites for the flea market is valid.
Held:
No.
J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
Streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of
the local government devoted to public service are deemed public and
are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments
have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or
other public property from public use when circumstances show that
such property is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service.
Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of
the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as
an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the
public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public
property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for
another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it
cant be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due
to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of
said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations
laid down by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every
LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the
public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and
promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand
the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads &
streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the
corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets
and restore them to their specific public purpose.
The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws
applicable during its time.
CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. V. BERCILLES
66 SCRA 431
FACTS:
The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a
part of a street. Through a resolution, it was declared to be an
abandoned road and not part of the City development plan.
Thereafter, it was sold through a public bidding and petitioner was
the highest bidder. He then sought to register said land but his
application was dismissed.
HELD:
The portion of the city street subject to petitioners application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use. Then it
follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
of the State. It is also very clear from the Charter that property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed
CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Pilapil vs. CA
JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
(G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit above his eye by
a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. Respondents personnel
lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner
partially lost his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as

the stoning in this case?

HELD:

In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the

business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier
does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to
passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties
to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach
thereof.

xxx

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make
the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

xxx

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a

passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger

which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause
of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common
carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same
could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the
same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract
is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree
of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the
protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
PubCorp:CityCouncilofCebuvs.Cuizon
GR No. L- 28972 October 31, 1972
FACTS:
Respondents Mayor Cuizon and Tropical Commercial Co.
entered into a contract involving the purchase of road
construction equipment for $520,912.00 cash from Tropical.
The City Council of Cebu filed with the CFI a complaint to
nullify said contract as having been executed without prior
authority from it.
Complaint was dismissed for lack of legal capacity.
The lower court held that there is no provision of law
authorizing the city council to sue in behalf of the city and
that the authorized representative under the LGC is the city
mayor for that purpose.
Hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the city councilors have the legal capacity to
question the validity of the contract entered into by the mayor.
RULING:
Yes. Generally, suit is commenced by the local executive, i.e. the
mayor, upon authority of the sanggunian, except where the city
councilors themselves and as representatives in behalf of the city,
bring the action to prevent unlawful disbursement of public funds.
Here where the defendant city mayors acts and contracts purportedly
entered into on behalf of the city are precisely questioned as unlawful,
the city mayor would be the last person to file such a suit on behalf of
the city, since he precisely maintains the contrary position that his acts
have been lawful and thus duly bind the city.
To adhere to the lower courts interpretation would mean that no action
against a city mayors acts and contracts in the name and on behalf of
the city could ever be questioned and subjected to judicial action for a
declaration of nullity and invalidity, since no city mayor would file such
an action on to question, much less nullify, contracts executed by him
on behalf of the city and which he naturally believes to be valid and
within his authority.
Hence, the order appealed from is set aside and the lower court is
ordered to proceed with the trial and disposition of the case.
Monday, June 23, 2014
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
Ponente: Kapunan
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from
her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon,
to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC).
Hosaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But
the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for
the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist botched the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and
suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by
Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing
of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and
the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert
testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the
anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in intubating
Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying Ang hirap
ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit
to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care
in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to
provide a good anesthesiologist and for arriving 3 hours late and the
hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling
the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally
liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and
thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for
the damages.
RATIO:
Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary rule which means the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It is a maxim for the rule that
the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must
present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was
negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation,
Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to the private
respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her. Apart
from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit.
Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged
res ipsa loquitur!the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence Private respondents were not able to disprove the
presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need not be
an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a
success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also
found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the
day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and
which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The municipal government demolished the the stalls and subsequently
issued a new resolution revoking the right previously granted to the
vendor. Said resolution indicated that the said area will be a parking
space for the town plaza.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to

exercise the proper authority as the captain of the ship in determining
if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he
was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery.
Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government
alleging that they have the right to use the said lang because the
resolution allowing them to use the area constitutes a contract between
them (vendors) and the municipal government.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted
diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its
from the area. But such eviction was not enforced and the number of
doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the one
in control of the hiring and firing of their consultants. While these stall owners even grew.
consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls
on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which is
one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls
hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

Damages temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of

actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to

Rabuco vs Villegas 55 SCRA 656 the stall owners making them lawful lessees of the land

Facts

The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of
the City of Manila contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate
area into disposable and alienable lands of the state and placing its
administration and disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into lots and
selling it to bona fide occupants thereof in installments constitutes a
deprivation of the City of Manila of its property by providing for its sale
without the payment of just compensation.
Issue
2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use
HELD:
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was
previously used as a town plaza and being such it is considered as
beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of lease or
any contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no right in the first
place to occupy the disputed premises.

Whether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed without

paying just compensation to the City of Manila? 2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the
area such as
Held

The court held that the assailed RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in
question are owned by the City of Manila in its public and
governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which
Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it which cannot be deprived from the City without
just compensation and without due process. RA 3120 expressly
provides that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal
property and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable
lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. It has been an
established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to classify its
property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere
on such power of the state.
VILLANUEVA v. CASTAEDA, JR.
> the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area
susceptible of fire endangering public safety
> said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market
> the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation
problems
> the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic
3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not
for public use), the petitioners must yield to the police power exercised
by the municipal government. It is a well settled rule that any valid
contract may be cancelled if it causes danger to the public.

DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS
FACTS

This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city

Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by
government of Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the RTC to
the municipal government. They were ed to lease the said land through
evict the occupants of a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan.
a municipal council resolution in 1961.
January 5, 1979 Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an
ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea markets
subject to several conditions.
1987 Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and
the stallowners filed a case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions
(Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence
outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city
administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of
the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for
mandamus to remove the stalls in their street
ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by
virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila
Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be
the subject of lease or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they
were intended to serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of
the public street because it is going to be contrary to the general law
Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois
Facts:
The municipality of Paoay leased 6 fishery lots to Francisco V. Duque
for a period of four years but the latter failed to comply with the terms
of the lease contract. Thus, the municipality approved a resolution
confiscating said lots and advertised its lease for public bidding.
Teodoro Manaois, being the highest bidder, was awarded the lease.
However, Manaois was not able to exercise his right to possession
because Duque continued to claim possession over the properties and,
despite the appeal to the Municipality of Paoay to put him in
possession and the efforts of the municipality to oust Duque, Duque
succeeded in continuing in his possession and keeping Manaois and
his men out.
Manaois filed a case against the Municipality of Paoay to recover the
sum paid by him for the lease of the fishery lots plus damages. The
trial court ruled in his favor and a writ of execution and attachment
were issued to enforce the judgment. The municipality filed a petition
asking for the dissolution of that attachment of levy of the properties
but it was denied. Thus, the municipality filed a petition for certiorari
with the writ of preliminary injunction, asking that the order of the trial
court be reversed and that the attachment of the properties of the
municipality be dissolved. The municipality contended that the
properties attached by the sheriff for purposes of execution are not
subject to levy because they are properties for public use.
Issue:
May the fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay or its usufruct
may be levied upon and subject to execution? How about the revenue
or income derived from the renting of these fishery lots?
Held:
No. There can be no question that properties for public use held by
municipal corporation are not subject to levy and execution. Properties
for public use like trucks used for sprinkling the streets, police patrol
wagons, police stations, public markets, together with the land on
which they stand are exempt from execution. Even public revenues of
municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the municipality
are also exempt from the execution. The reason behind this exemption
extended to properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is
that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are
created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to
execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances
destroy said purpose.
Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by
municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by great weight of
authority as the private asset of the town and may be levied upon and
sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies to municipal
funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been
held that shares of stocks held by municipal corporations are subject to
execution. If this is true, with more reason should income or revenue
coming from these shares of stock, in the form of interest or dividends,
be subject to execution.
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte,
which had been parceled out or divided into lots and later let out to
private persons for fishing purposes at an annual rental are clearly not
subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the
municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. What the
municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be considered
the usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by
section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay over its
municipal waters, subject to execution to enforce a judgment against
the town? No. First, it is not a usufruct based on or derived from an
inherent right of the town. It is based merely on a grant made by the
Legislature. These marine waters are ordinarily for public use, open to
navigation and fishing by the people. The municipality of Paoay is not
holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute
manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away
from it as its property through execution. The Legislature thru section
2321 of the Administrative Code, as already stated, saw fit to grant the
usufruct of said marine waters for fishery purpose, to the towns
bordering said waters. Said towns have no vested right over said
marine waters. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a
matter of public policy, may at any time, repeal or modify said section
2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and open these marine
waters to the public. Or the Legislature may grant the usufruct or right
of fishery to the provinces concerned so that said provinces may
operate or administer them by leasing them to private parties. All this
only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this
usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to
enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its
property through execution.
Second, if this were to be allowed and this right sold on execution, the
buyer would immediately step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor
municipality. Such buyer presumably buys only the right of the
municipality. He does not buy the fishery itself nor the municipal waters
because that belongs to the State. All that the buyer might do would be
to let out or rent to private individuals the fishery rights over the lots
into which the municipal waters had been parceled out or divided, and
that is, after public bidding. Then, we shall have a situation rather
anomalous to be sure, of a private individual conducting public bidding,
renting to the highest bidders fishery lots over municipal waters which
are property of the State, and appropriating the results to his own
private use. The impropriety, if not illegality, of such a contingency is
readily apparent. The situation imagined implies the deprivation of the
municipal corporation of a source of a substantial income, expressly
provide by law. Because of all this, we hold that the right or usufruct of
the town of Paoay over its municipal waters is not subject to execution.
But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of
these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable,
if not necessary, to distinguish this kind of revenue from that derived
from taxes, municipal licenses and market fees are provided for and
imposed by the law, they are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of
municipal corporations. Not so with the income derived from fisheries.
In the first place, the usufruct over municipal waters was granted by
the Legislature merely to help or bolster up the economy of municipal
government. This kind of revenue is not indispensable for the
performance of governmental functions. In the second place, the
amount of this income is far from definite or fixed. It depends upon the
amounts which prospective bidders or lessees are willing to pay. In
other words, too many municipalities engaged in this business of
letting out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a sort of sideline,
so that even without it the municipality may still continue functioning
and perform its essential duties as such municipal corporations.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for
fishing purposes as a business for the reasons that the law itself
allowed said municipalities to engage in it for profit. And it is but just
that a town so engaged should pay and liquidate obligations contracted
in connection with said fishing business, with the income derived
therefrom.
In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in the
municipality of Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are
not subject to execution. For this reason, the levy and attachment
made by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte of theses fishery lots is
void and the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan insofar
as it failed to dissolve the attachment made on these lots is reversed.
However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of Paoay
representing the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out
by the municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the
attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is valid. (Municipality of Paoay
vs. Manaois, G.R. No. L-3485, June 30, 1950)