Agenda For National Mobilization

Vartan Oskanian's analysis based on his speech at a conference in Stepanakert

Tuesday, 14 July 2009 12:35

The topic of national mobilization is urgent today. Of course, given our size – small territory,
small population – and given Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s enormous capabilities and sophisticated
machinery, we have always used all national and international resources albeit with varying
intensity, scope, depth and effectiveness, but nevertheless we have used them.

Today, the changing circumstances around us, and the new challenges emerging before us,
make the need for this kind of new mobilization more timely and necessary.

Let me cite four major reasons for this kind of mobilization at this time.

First, the new global and regional developments and changes that have taken place over the
past year and half and continue to evolve.

Second, our own policies and the complications that have been created as a result of our
short-sighted, miscalculated policies.

Third, the wedge that has been driven between the Diaspora and Armenia’s leadership as a
result of that policy, particularly the statement issued on April 22 by the foreign ministries of
Armenia and Turkey.

Finally, the issues of legitimacy, fragmentation, and increased tension among different layers of
our society and the deepened distrust between society and government, as a consequence of
the lack of democratization, repeated bad elections, March 1 and its consequences.

With all this in mind, and in order for us to understand what a renewed mobilization of resources
means, we must answer a few questions.

First, what are we trying to mobilize? Where are our resources, how do we go about revealing
and identifying them, beyond the usual core, and how do we bring them together for the
common good?

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Agenda For National Mobilization

Vartan Oskanian's analysis based on his speech at a conference in Stepanakert

Tuesday, 14 July 2009 12:35

Second, for what purpose do we want to mobilize and with whom would we work to pursue our
common goals? What are the centers of power and influence that we want to target and what or
where are the levers that need to be influenced?

Finally, and most importantly, what is the ideological premise around which we will rally our
resources? What is it that the Armenian people as a nation, as one people – in Nagorno
Karabakh, Armenia and Diaspora – together want to achieve?

This is the all important question on which I’d like to focus – our common goals and our
vulnerabilities.

To understand better our vulnerabilities and the ultimate challenges, let me give you a quick
rundown of what has changed in this past year and a half, and what are the new threats that
face us:

First, at the global level, there is the changing US-Russia relationship. There is an attempt at
reconciliation and a new détente between the powers. In a reconciled environment, these two
countries will view global issues differently, the scope of interests that must be shared or divided
will be enlarged, and the opportunities, the gain, the benefits for both sides will be greater. In
this kind of situation, where all problematic issues, all sources of potential discord are on the
table – energy, arms control, nuclear safety, security, conflicts – Nagorno Karabakh will clearly
be on the table, too, as we witnessed just today by the statement issued at the G8 meeting, by
the presidents of the three Minsk Group co-chair countries – US, Russia and France. Under
such circumstances, the possibility for trade-offs is greater, and even greater is the risk that they
will come at our expense. We can’t ignore or merely observe these changes. We must be
persistent, vigilant and prevent detrimental developments for Armenia.

Second, the Georgia-Russia war last year changed the balance that had been maintained
between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. Prior to that war, the West
had recognized Kosovo’s independence, despite Russia’s deep opposition. Although Russia
had threatened to counter the Kosovo decision by making a similar unilateral move by
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it could not do so easily. That would have presented a
serious political problem. But the Georgia-Russia war changed the environment, and provided
the necessary cover for them to do so. They did. Russia responded to the West’s unacceptable,
unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s independence by a similar move itself. Now that this tit-for-tat
recognition is over, there seems to be a general internal understanding that this series of

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Agenda For National Mobilization

Vartan Oskanian's analysis based on his speech at a conference in Stepanakert

Tuesday, 14 July 2009 12:35

recognitions of self-determination efforts has ended, that others who aspire to the same will be
viewed differently. It goes without saying that this concept of quotas on self-determination is a
problem that will require attention and must be countered.

Third, all this comes in the context of Turkey’s emerging role in the region, and in regard to the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict. As a result of the Russia-Georgia war, and even more, as a result of
the very public Turkey-Armenia diplomatic engagement, we are facing an unnecessary but
significant problem. Look what we have today. Because of their attention and expectations of
the very visible and very high-level process, because of their concerns over the genocide
recognition process, the US, the EU, Russia too, and certainly Turkey and Armenia all put their
prestige on the line, expecting to succeed in opening the Turkey-Armenia border. This did not
happen and everyone came to understand what they should have seen at the beginning that
Turkey will not move until Azerbaijan is satisfied on the Nagorno Karabakh situation. What
started out as a Turkey-Armenia bilateral process, ended up with Nagorno Karabakh resolution
becoming a condition for progress in Turkey-Armenia relations. We all understand that under
these circumstances, with huge international pressure on Armenia most of all, an accelerated
Nagorno Karabakh process, not only for its own sake, but to resolve another political knot, can
lead to lots of bad decisions, especially and particularly for us.

Fourth, we have signed the Moscow declaration last November, and that declaration includes a
stipulation which is going to continue to haunt us – that the conflict must be resolved based on
not only international principles but also the decisions adopted by international organizations.
That was a serious diplomatic blunder. That declaration has made it easier for Russia and other
countries in their relations with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make
pro-Azerbaijani statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia must do everything to
neutralize that declaration and diminish its impact.

Fifth, the military and political equilibrium between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan has
changed. The ceasefire has held for 15 years. This can’t be explained by simple goodwill or by
the existence of ongoing negotiations. An effective buffer zone, an equality in the balance of the
opposing forces, the Azerbaijani army’s insufficient capacity to mount a serious strike – these
have played an important role in encouraging the sides to maintain the ceasefire.

Today, this component of the balance has been dislodged. The security of the buffer zone is
effected because there is increased pressure on Armenians to return territories. Azerbaijan is
massively building up its military. Our confidence in our military has not changed.  But
Azerbaijan’s decision whether to go to war or not, will be based solely on their own perception
of the military balance.  At the same time, the negotiations process too is vulnerable. The

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Agenda For National Mobilization

Vartan Oskanian's analysis based on his speech at a conference in Stepanakert

Tuesday, 14 July 2009 12:35

document under discussion is the fifth document in 10 years. If the sides lose confidence in the
negotiations process, this loss of faith, coupled with a perceived change in the military balance,
is extremely dangerous and can bring on the great and imminent danger of war.

I have just enumerated five areas of great vulnerability for us. These must be at the basis of all
our mobilization efforts.

We must ensure that Nagorno Karabakh does not become the object of trade among the great
powers. We must not accept quotas on self-determination or independence. We must not allow
Turkey to exploit the existing deadlocked situation between us and divert their responsibility by
putting the blame on Armenians for not making concessions in Nagorno Karabakh.  We must
clearly articulate that a decision by a small group of countries at the UN cannot pretend to
resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  Finally, because we who have won the military battles
know full well that there is no military solution to this conflict, we must do all we can to avoid
war, to encourage compromise on all sides, compromise that respects the realities on the
ground and that offers real, historical, legal, human justice.

These objectives form the basis for our mobilization effort, an effort that has as its ideology and
purpose the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to safety and security and a future of
dignity.

This is where the history of the last two decades brings us – to a claim that the world
acknowledge this universal right for the people of Nagorno Karabakh, who have themselves
voted for it, fought for it and developed institutional frameworks to consolidate it. A lasting
resolution must be based on the realities of these last 20 years and look forward, with realism
again, to a future of peace.

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