GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp

Governmental Powers

Reclassification of Lands

1) DAR vs Sarangani
G.R. No. 165547, January 24, 2007

Petitioner: DAR
Respondents: Sarangani Agricultural Co Inc, ACIL Corporation, Nicasio Alcantara and
Tomas Alcantara
Ponente: Azcuna

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution No. 97-08
adopting a 10 year comprehensive development plan of the municipality and its land
use. On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of
1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were
located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the
municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.
Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-
018 or the Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development
Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of
the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel. A portion of the
area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARP commercial
farms deferment scheme.
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents properties located at
Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and
pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space
in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.
The respondent then field an application for land use conversion of certain
parcels of land. Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary
oppposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that
its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the
commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, the PLUTC agreed
to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which was still viable for
agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to the submission of certain
requirements.
Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACIs application for land use conversion.
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACIs application
for land use conversion. SACI appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of
the President dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied, so they filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same issues.
The CA granted the petition and ordred DAR to issue a conversion order. As to
the deferred portion, DAR was directed to expedite the processing and evaluation of
petitioners application.

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Issue: WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for the
acquisition of land

Held: No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an

indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial
farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998

Issue: WON the DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and
ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference

Held: Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government units to reclassify
agricultural lands. Memorandum Circular No. 54 Prescribing the Guidelines
Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands
Into Non-Agricultural Uses issued by President Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the
scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify
agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances authorizing
reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of the
province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly
urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with Executive Order No.
72, Series of 1993.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-
agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in
declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the
ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent administrative
issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that while the DAR retains
the responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion
filed by individual landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority
should be confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under
existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area]
to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for
conversion and those falling under environmentally critical areas or highly restricted
for conversion under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DARs power in such cases may
not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU
concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in
pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is
required to use the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances of
the local Sanggunian as primary references in evaluating applications for land use
conversion filed by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already
complied with the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and
regulations of the DAR....
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly
regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No.
6657 are present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that
DARs scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited to
examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where,
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because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to
urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the local
government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to non-
agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and
subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive
land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents
whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for non-
agricultural uses.
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is
included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be
automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject
to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is present
here is that a portion of respondents property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion
totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts,
are covered by CARLs ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15,
1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the
lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or
R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of
Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into non-
agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents properties are located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification
that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the
applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands
explicitly states that [n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing,
amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.

Closure and Opening of Roads

1) Sangalang v. IAC
G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988

FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several
streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All
but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the
municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area
ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala
Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely
residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases.
All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said
dismissals.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala

Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD: No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
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RATIO: Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala

Corporation, to build a [f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or
exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between
the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it
was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the
Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare.
The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to
warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

2) MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

GR 135962 March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the
former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter
separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street
and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE: WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an
agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate
one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and
as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and
in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of
authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a
development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an
LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is
not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member.

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In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is
illegal.

3) LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.

452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and
liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights.

FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with
the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631
grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise
of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid.
Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45
before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with
which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the
Decision and Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod
to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive
upon individuals

HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single
location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney
terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of
only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which
was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City
are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
Lucena.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and
liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights.
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A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful
formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of
buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How
the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such
that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead
of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could
be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to
meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to
provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City
supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of
support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be
balanced with that of an individuals rights.

Legislative Power

1) City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which
prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns.
Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to
wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert
said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided

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that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall
be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance,
insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not
a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under
the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the
exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the
ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself
eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is

unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the
beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated
businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their
business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into
allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A
possessory taking and a regulatory taking. The latter occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the
property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are
allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on
substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members
of the class. In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinction between motels,
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inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court
likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in
the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The
ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely
empowers the local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions
of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

2) Social Justice Society v Atienza (GR 156052)

The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the
exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law).

While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates
the delegated police power to local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city.

This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city.

The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police

power

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
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Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence
of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all
the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the residents of
Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to
determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the
best position to determine the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to

restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall
arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or
welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance
which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial.
A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the
continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location
will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial
and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust.

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