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Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Preliminaries

Citation: Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982,

December 11, 1992

Facts:

Antonio A. Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of

Investigation. He was hospitalized for cholecystiis, on account of which he

incurred medical and hospitalized expenses, with an amount of P 40, 831.

He requested for reimbursement of the send amount to the NBI

Director, Alfredo Lim. He contends that he is entitled to the benefits under

Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Director Lim forwarded the concerns of Mecano to the Secretary of

Justice. After finding that the illness of Mecano is service connected, the

Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favourably

recommended the claims of him. However, the Undersecretary objected for

the releasing of the said claims on the ground that the statement of COA to

the Effect of Revised Administrative Code was already repealed by the

Administrative Code of 1987.

The COA further contended that the Illness of Director Mecano was

occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Issue:
Whether or not Antonio Mecano is entitled to his claims for

reimbursement of his hospital expenses

Ruling:

Yes, Antonio Mecano is entitled to his claims for reimbursement of his

hospital expenses.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter

as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied

repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a

continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of

legislative purpose to repeal.

Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless

it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be

passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the

subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not

intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some

matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable,

but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language

used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or

unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence,

every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable

construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a

repeal of the earlier.


Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Preliminaries

Citation: Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

102976, October 25, 1995

Facts:

The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272, in order,

generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.

Initially, it was created for a term of 5 years but when its original term expired,its

term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the

National Development Corporation which is an entity wholly owned by the National

Government embarked on an expansion program which includes the construction of

a steel mill in Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239was issued by the President

withdrawing from sale or settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used by the

NSC.However, certain portions of the public land under Proclamation 2239 were

occupied by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co.(MCFC). LOI No. 1277 was issued directing

NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC for and on behalf of the Government for

the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land. The LOI

directed that ISA may exercise the power of eminent domain should the

negotiations fail. The negotiations failed and ISA commenced expropriation

proceedings against MCFC. While trial was on-going the statutory existence of ISA
had expired prompting MCFC to file the dismissal of the case since ISA has

ceased to be a juridical person.

The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss anchoring on the Rules of

Court that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may

be parties to a civil case. ISA moved for a reconsideration contending that despite

the expiration of its term, its juridicial existence continued until the winding up of its

affairs could be completed. In the alternative ISA urged that the Republic of the

Philippines should be allowed to be substituted in its place. The RTC denied its

motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for

ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term

Ruling:

Yes, the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view

of the expiration of ISAs term.

There is no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or

comprehensive juridical personalityseparate and distinct from that of the

Government. ISA in fact appears to be a non-incorporated agency orinstrumentality

of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the

Government of the Republic are case in corporate form, that is to say,

are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and other times

without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a

juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.


The term Authority has been used t o designate both incorporated and non-

incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.

The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of

the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical

person vested with full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously

described as legal personality. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated

agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities

of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the

Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other

disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution or transmission of

such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or ins

trumentality of the Republic of thePhilippines. When the expiring agency is an

incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first

instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation in the

provisions of the Corporation Code.

Since ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its

powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back

into the Government of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the

Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated

succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in

the expropriation proceedings as party- plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory

term of ISA having expired. The expiration of ISAs statutory did not by itself require

or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. Further, no


new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted

for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings.

Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Preliminaries

Citation: Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-

802,July 10, 2001

Facts:

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the

Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct

anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of

Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating

the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated

from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task

Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as

EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked

the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders.

EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to abolish a

public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the

abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.


Issue:

Whether or not the petition has merit

Ruling:

No, the petition of the petitioner has no merit,.

It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged

with the legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus,

and other offices under the executive department, the president may

deactivate them pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such

office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents

power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has

its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly

grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize

the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate

bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and

classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and

materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB.

EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the

government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF

Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is

invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since

there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid

abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the

public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of.

Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except

constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary

and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its

salary.

Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Preliminaries

Citation: Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No.

152845, August 5, 2003

Facts:

President Joseph Estrada issued several Executive Orders reorganizing

the National Tobacco Administration (NTA). In compliance therewith, the NTA

prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern

(OSSP). Petitioners were rank and file employees of NTA who were

terminated and were not considered in the OSSP. They filed a petition for

certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of

Batac, Ilocos Norte to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the notice of

termination addressed to the petitioners. The RTC decided in favor of

petitioners and thus ordered NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling. The Supreme Court

affirmed the appellate court's decision and denied the motion for

reconsideration.

Petitioners, therefore, filed this motion to admit petition for en banc

resolution of the case allegedly to address the legal and constitutional issue

of reorganizing NTA by an executive fiat and not by legislative action.

Issue:

Whether or not the reorganization of the national tobacco

administration is valid true issuance of executive order by the president

Ruling:

According to the Court, this involved neither an abolition nor transfer of

offices; the assailed action was merely reorganization under the general

provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest

of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It was, therefore, an act well within the

authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the

findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment accepted

by the Court.

It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders No. 29 and

No. 36 have not abolished the National Tobacco Administration but merely

mandated its reorganization through the streamlining or reduction of its

personnel. Article VII, Section 17, of the Constitution, expressly grants the

President control of all executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices


which may justify an executive action to inactivate the functions of a

particular office or to carry out reorganization measures under a broad

authority of law. Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No.

8522 (General Appropriations Act of FY 1998) has decreed that the President

may direct changes in the organization and key positions in any department,

bureau or agency pursuant to Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution,

which grants to the Executive Department the authority to recommend the

budget necessary for its operation. Evidently, this grant of power includes

the authority to evaluate each and every government agency, including the

determination of the most economical and efficient staffing pattern, under

the Executive Department. In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et

al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et

al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the President's power to

reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of

Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the

President Proper. The Court has there .observed: .Under Section 31(1) of EO

292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by

abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from

one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31(2) and (3) of EO 292, the

President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the

President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to

merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to

Departments or Agencies, and vice versa." The provisions of Section 31,


Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of

1987), above-referred to, reads thusly: "SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the

President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in

the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and

efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative

structure of the Office, of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of

the following actions: "(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office

of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential

Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System,

by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions

from one unit to another; "(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the

President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to

the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and "(3)

Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other

department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the

President from other departments and agencies." The first sentence of the

law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to

reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The

succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that

unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to

reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of

Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the President's power to

restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by


abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions

from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive

offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to

transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other

Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under

the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-

versa. In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of

offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general

provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest

of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of

President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the

appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only

but accept.

As to petitioners' Motion for an En Banc Resolution of the Case, the

Court reminded counsel for petitioners that the Court En Banc is not an

appellate tribunal to which appeals from a Division of the Court may be

taken. Petitioners' motion was denied.