Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Errors on Exercise of Powers

Citation: Commission of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals,GR

No. 86785, November 21, 1991

Facts:

Respondent corporation City trust filed a refund of overpaid taxes with

the BIR by which the latter denied on the ground of prescription. City trust

filed a petition for review before the CTA. The case was submitted for

decision based solely on the pleadings and evidence submitted by the

respondent because the CIR could not present any evidence by reason of the

repeated failure of the Tax Credit/Refud Division of the BIR to transmit the

records of the case, as well as the investigation report thereon, to the

Solicitor General. CTA rendered the decision ordering BIR to grant the

respondent's request for tax refund amounting to P 13.3 million.

Issue:

Whether or not Failure of the CIR to present evidence to support the

case of the government, should the respondent's claim be granted

Ruling:

No, not Failure of the CIR to present evidence to support the case of

the government, should not the respondent's claim be granted

 It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not

bound by the errors committed by its agents. In the performance of its

governmental functions, the State cannot be estopped by the neglect of its

agent and officers. Although the Government may generally be estopped

through the affirmative acts of public officers acting within their authority,

their neglect or omission of public duties as exemplified in this case will not

and should not produce that effect.

Nowhere is the aforestated rule more true than in the field of taxation.

It is axiomatic that the Government cannot and must not be estopped

particularly in matters involving taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation

through which the government agencies continue to operate and with which

the State effects its functions for the welfare of its constituents. The errors of

certain administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the

Government's financial position, especially in the case at bar where the

amount involves millions of pesos the collection whereof, if justified, stands

to be prejudiced just because of bureaucratic lethargy. Thus, it is proper that

the case be remanded back to the CTA for further proceedings and reception

of evidence.
Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Errors on Exercise of Powers

Citation: Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service

Commission, G.R. No. 96938, October 15, 1991

Facts:

The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of

irregularities in the canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to

the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and declared the

dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to

the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The

CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded

the payment of backwages.

The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released

from service. The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC.

SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying o The CSC acted within its

authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the SC modified the

requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of

the disciplinary proceedings. Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion

for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that back wages can be paid.
GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the

ruling.

CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion.

GSIS was made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the

SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC

has no power to execute its judgments.

Issue:

Whether or not the Civil Service has the power to enforce its

judgments

Ruling:

Yes, the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments.

The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional

commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with

authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It

has the authority to hear anddecide administrative disciplinary cases

instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too,

sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and

practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however

diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would

appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or

authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would

seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless

accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided

is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power,

or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be

deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the

judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. Therefore, the

GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.

Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Errors on Exercise of Powers

Citation: Donato, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, Regional Office No.

1, G.R. No. 165788, February 7, 2007

Facts:

Donato, Jr. was a secondary school teacher at the San Pedro Apartado

National High School in Alcala, Pangasinan while Gil C. Arce held the position

of Assessment Clerk II at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the said

municipality. On October 5, 1998, the Management Information Office of the

CSC in Diliman, Quezon City received an anonymous letter-complaint

requesting an investigation on the alleged dishonest act committed by

Donato, Jr. It was alleged that Donato, Jr., falsely representing himself as Arce

during the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in 1995, took

the said examination in behalf of the latter.

The letter-complaint was immediately forwarded to the CSCRO 1, City

of San Fernando, La Union, which required Donato, Jr. and Arce to submit

their respective answers thereto.

Taking into consideration the foregoing, a Formal Charge dated

October 12, 1999 was filed by Romeo C. De Leon, Director IV of CSCRO 1,

 against Donato, Jr. and Arce for dishonesty and falsification of official

document. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 99-27.

Donato, Jr. and Arce were, accordingly, required to file their respective

answers to the said formal charge.

Donato, Jr. and Arce sought reconsideration of the said decision

and/or new trial but their respective motions were denied by the CSCRO 1

for lack of merit. By way of appeal, they elevated the case to the CSC.

After due consideration of the pleadings, the CSC promulgated

Resolution No. 020348 dated March 7, 2002, affirming the earlier decision

of the CSCRO 1. The CSC ruled that there was substantial evidence to

hold both Donato, Jr. and Arce guilty of the charges of dishonesty and

falsification of official document.

Donato, Jr. and Arce's claim of violation of their right to due process

when they were found administratively liable, allegedly despite the absence

of witnesses against them, was given short shrift by the CA. It pointed out

that the records clearly showed that they were accorded the opportunity to

present their side and, in fact, they submitted evidence to controvert the

charges against them.

Issue:

Whether or not Donato, Jr. and Arce was denied of due process
Ruling:

No, Donato, Jr. and Arce was not denied of due process.

It must be stated, at the outset, that the CSCRO 1, the CSC and the CA

uniformly found the petitioner liable for the charges of dishonesty and

falsification of official document. In so doing, the PSP, on which the ID picture

of the petitioner appeared above the name of Arce, was given credence by

the CSCRO 1, the CSC and the CA to support the administrative charges

against the petitioner and Arce.

No rule is more entrenched in this jurisdiction than that the findings of

facts of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are

controlling on the reviewing authority. Stated in another manner, as a

general rule, factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC,

that are affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon and generally not

reviewable by this Court.

To be sure, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1)

when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or

conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,

or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the

judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of

facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond

the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of

both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without

citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts

set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs

are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the

evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain

relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,

would justify a different conclusion. None of these exceptions has been

shown to be attendant in the present case. AEDISC

On the other hand, petitioner would like this Court to re-examine the

evidence against him as he impugns, in particular, the PSP which

contained his ID picture above Arce's name. However, it is not the

function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and

credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal or office.

This flows from the basic principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of

facts. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law

imputed to the lower court, the latter's findings of fact being conclusive

and not reviewable by this Court. 17

The petitioner's contention that his right to due process was

violated because he was not able to cross-examine the person who had

custody of the PSP is unavailing. In another case, the Court addressed a

similar contention by stating that the petitioner therein could not argue

that she had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-
examination took place. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due

process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable

opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to

move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Such

minimum requirements have been satisfied in this case for, in fact,

hearings were conducted by the CSCRO 1 and the petitioner and Arce

actively participated therein and even submitted their respective

evidence. Moreover, they were able to seek reconsideration of the

decision of the CSCRO 1 and, subsequently, to elevate the case for review

to the CSC and the CA.

Likewise unavailing is the petitioner's protestation that the PSP was

not identified and formally offered in evidence. The CSC, including the

CSCRO 1 in this case, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial

powers, is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the

adjudication of cases, subject only to limitations imposed by basic

requirements of due process. As earlier opined, these basic requirements

of due process have been complied with by the CSC, including the CSCRO

1.
Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Errors on Exercise of Powers

Citation: Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994

Facts:

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of

Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-

complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the

operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay

Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the

residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the

surrounding area.

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) Legal and Technical

personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an

open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental

Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau

(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required

under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required

under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813

and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The LLDA found that the water

collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably

affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the

presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the

sample during collection or handling. On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued

a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,

Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to

completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage

and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine

National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the

entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being

utilized as a dumpsite.The City Government of Caloocan filed with the

Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of

the cease and desist orderIn its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan

sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the

health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a

balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.

 On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the

motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's

motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its

behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which

prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin

dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the

court.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision

holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try,

hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order,

including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive

and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority

has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its

enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and

Executive Order

No. 927, series of 1983.

Issue:

Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease

and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws
Ruling:

Yes, the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and

desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws.

By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.

813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to

"make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or

pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the

LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its

jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue

an ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City

Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National

Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,

admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of

1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that

there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power

"to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is

expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,

series of 1983.The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of

protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology

embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987

Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in

accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the

correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the

declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the

people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in

mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health

as a fundamental human right.

Subject: Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law

Topic: Errors on Exercise of Powers

Citation: Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October

12, 1998

Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray

y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law

spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He then

filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising

constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape.

Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution

of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed

Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed
a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him

under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual

punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the

Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue

delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by

respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of

delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the

petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the

constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death

penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by

lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules,

is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more

economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas

chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death

penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that

the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the
TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an

executive function.

Ruling:

No, the court did not abused its discretion in granting a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that

the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the

TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an

executive function.

The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant

reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after

conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted

as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions

after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save

the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason

that there is no higher right than the right to life.For the public respondents

therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an

accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and

coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.