A.C. No.
8158 February 24, 2010 In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON v ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD
In a verified complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon)
sought the disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule
16.01, Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving
negligence in handling a case.
The Facts
Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8, Tacloban City. Although he is in public
service, the DENR Secretary has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon by a
mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty.
Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern
Samar and owned by Atty. Solidons relatives. For a consideration of Eighty Thousand
Pesos (P80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted the task to be completed within a period of
eight (8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial
payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be paid
when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property.
Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled
up to the present time.
In the Complaint, Position Papers and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon
claimed that he tried to contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the case six (6)
months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text
messages to their known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by
courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he did not receive any communication from Atty.
Macalalad.
In the Answer, Position Paper,7 and affidavits of witnesses, Atty. Macalalad posited that the
delay in the filing of the petition for the titling of the property was caused by his clients
failure to communicate with him. He also explained that he had no intention of reneging on
his obligation, as he had already prepared the draft of the petition. He failed to file the
petition simply because he still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his clients
should have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon tried to
communicate with him.
The Findings of the IBP
Randall C. Tabayoyong made the following finding of negligence against Atty. Macalalad:
complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the
mutual acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-
Borata described how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how
respondent turned a deaf ear towards the same. There is nothing on record which would
prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with caution. In fact, considering that the
allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of the instant case...
As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the
application despite the lapse of about a year from the time his services were engaged, it is
plain that his negligence in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And such
negligence is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs factual findings and legal conclusions.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge. 8 We fully considered the
evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainants evidence, as outlined
above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalads negligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on
negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer
to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez, 9 we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to
protect his clients interest after receiving his acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones, 10 we
ruled that the failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary
period (to the prejudice of his client who languished in jail for more than a year) is an
offense that warrants disciplinary action. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, we penalized a lawyer
for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters.11
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan,12 we reiterated that the act of receiving money as
acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainants case and, subsequently, in
failing to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We made the same conclusion in Canoy v. Ortiz 13 where we emphatically
stated that the lawyers failure to file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability
for his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer
cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the
lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of the case. 14 Our rulings in Macarilay v.
Seria,15 in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,16 and in Villaflores v. Limos17 were of the same
tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of
communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best
means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the client and his
lawyer, the latter has more control in handling the case.
All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to his client once an
engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears
the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence.18 The lawyer
bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best
efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client.19 Accordingly,
competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by
giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.
The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he
failed to file the required petition. He cannot now shift the blame to his clients since it was
his duty as a lawyer to communicate with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalads
defense that it was his clients who failed to contact him. Although no previous
communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his clients, the records nevertheless
show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted Atty. Macalalads services in behalf of his relatives,
tried his best to reach him prior to the filing of the present disbarment case. Atty. Solidon
even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-up on the status of the registration
application with Atty. Macalalad.
21
As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit, she succeeded several times in getting in
touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those occasions asked him about the progress of the
case. To use Ms. Cabo-Boratas own words, she received "no clear-cut answers from him";
he just informed her that everything was "on process." We give credence to these narrations
considering Atty. Macalalads failure to contradict them or deny their veracity, in marked
contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidons allegations.
We consider, too, that other motivating factors specifically, the monetary consideration
and the fixed period of performance should have made it more imperative for Atty.
Macalalad to promptly take action and initiate communication with his clients. He had been
given initial payment and should have at least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the
engagement.
We further find that Atty. Macalalads conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his
obligations. If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted to file the petition, he could have acquired the
necessary information from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline investigation. As matters now stand, he did not take any
action to initiate communication. These omissions unequivocally point to Atty. Macalalads
lack of due care that now warrants disciplinary action.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to
account for all the money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not
immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even
after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement.
The Penalty
Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines
recommended penalty by increasing the period of Atty. Macalalads suspension from the
practice of law from three (3) months, to six (6) months. 23 In this regard, we follow the
Courts lead in Parias v. Paguinto 24 where we imposed on the respondent lawyer
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.01 and Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. We impose on Atty. Ramil E.
Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective
upon finality of this Decision. Atty. Macalalad is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the
date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount is returned.
Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.
Before this Court is the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and
inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon a
public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon
C. Abelita III recommended that respondent beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor
any similar action, otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe penalty. The
Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013.
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro
G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the
time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients
Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang
Boys") were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2
December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during
the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and
"cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House
Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed
during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients
using the letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary
Raul Gonzales.
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated
that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a
highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the
DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondents alleged violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty.
Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in
drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter
was not a government prosecutor. Atty. Lozanos verified Complaint Affidavit was filed with
the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.
Officers of the IBP, Cebu City Chapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical
conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACCs filing of disbarment
proceedings. On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that
a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both
cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report and recommendation.
RESPONDENTS VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges
against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the
immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused,
together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his
clients. Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous;
yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited." In any case,
respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and
therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all."
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-
complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was
adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent
drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of
"feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to
influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a
warning not to repeat the same or any similar action.
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset that the Court may conduct its own investigation into charges
against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before
it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real
question for determination in these proceedings is whether the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.
As to Atty. Lozanos withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-
Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.
After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to
hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating
Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts,
but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all
times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent
stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order from the
DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the
Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasi
he is very political also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken that day because of the
timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob
ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan
na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer nowI prepared
the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with
our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I
sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with
the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 oclock
or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary
tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x
Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan
sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho
milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usapsabi niya okay I
will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those particular words, I will study the matter.
Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not
pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case.
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very
open;" and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family,
my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows my
sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they were together in Congress. In other words,
I am not a complete stranger to him." Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A.
Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally acquainted with the Secretary;
however, they were not that close.
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondents admission
that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still
pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release
order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of
"expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment
and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-
bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the
outcome of an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice . To that
end, their clients success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer
shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within the bounds of the
law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an
attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell
short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on
the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month
suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling whenshe
solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her help in the
case of her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a pendingcase with the Supreme Court,
because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high court.24 We find that the
same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof
violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately. This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that repetition of any
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
** Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary
A.C. No. 8382 April 21, 2010
ALFREDO B. ROA vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO
This complaint, filed by Alfredo B. Roa (complainant) against Atty. Juan R. Moreno
(respondent), stemmed from a transaction involving the sale of a parcel of land.
Complainant asks that respondent be disciplined and ordered to return the amount of
money paid for the sale.
The Antecedent Facts
Sometime in September 1998, respondent sold to complainant a parcel of land located
along Starlite Street in Cupang, Antipolo. Complainant paid respondent P70,000 in cash as
full payment for the lot. Respondent did not issue a deed of sale. Instead, he issued a
temporary receipt and a Certificate of Land Occupancy purportedly issued by the general
overseer of the estate in which the lot was located. Respondent assured complainant that
he could use the lot from then on.
Complainant learned, not long after, that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be
registered in the Register of Deeds. When complainant went to see respondent, the latter
admitted that the real owner of the lot was a certain Rubio. Respondent also said there was
a pending legal controversy over the lot. On 25 February 2001, complainant sent a letter to
respondent demanding the return of the P70,000 paid for the lot.
Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent in the Municipal Trial Court
(Branch 2) of Antipolo City. On 26 September 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4
convicting respondent of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTC sentenced respondent to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for one month and one day and ordered him to return the amount of P70,000
to complainant.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Antipolo City set aside the lower courts
ruling. For lack of evidence establishing respondents guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
RTC acquitted respondent in a decision5 dated 20 December 2005. The decision further
stated that the remedy of complainant was to institute a civil action for the recovery of the
amount he paid to respondent.
On 23 February 2006, complainant filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) an
Affidavit-Complaint6 against respondent.
In his Answer,7 respondent explained that what he sold to complainant was merely the right
over the use of the lot, not the lot itself. Respondent maintained he never met the
complainant during the negotiations for the sale of said right. Respondent claimed it was a
certain Benjamin Hermida who received the purchase price. Respondent further alleged that
it was one Edwin Tan, and not the complainant, who paid the purchase price.
At the hearing set on 14 October 2008, complainant narrated that respondent personally
sold to him the lot in question. Complainant stated respondent assured him that the papers
would be processed as soon as payment was made. Complainant claimed he duly paid
respondent P70,000, but when he followed up the sales documents, respondent just
dismissed him and denied any transaction between them. For his part, respondent did not
appear at the hearing despite receipt of notice.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation8 dated 17 October 2008, the IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
three months and ordered to immediately deliver the amount of P70,000 to complainant,
thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of violating Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the amount of Seventy Thousand
Pesos (P70,000.00) to herein complainant.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-63210 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors suspended respondent from the practice of law
for three months and ordered him to return the amount of P70,000 to complainant within 30
days from receipt of notice. Thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Juan R. Moreno is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months and Ordered to Return the Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P70,000.00) to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.
Complainant and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to
complainant, respondent claimed to be the owner of the lot and even offered to be his
lawyer in case of any legal problem that might crop up from the sale of the lot. On the other
hand, respondent denied ever meeting complainant, much less selling the lot he insisted he
did not even own. In his answer, he presented the affidavits of Benjamin and Cepriano
Hermida who claimed that upon receipt of the payment for the right to use the lot, they
immediately removed the improvements on the lot. The Hermidas also claimed they
received the payment from one Mr. Edwin Tan, not from complainant.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court gives credence to complainants
version of the facts.
Respondents credibility is highly questionable. Records show that respondent even issued
a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to complainant whose only fault was that he did not
know better. The Certificate of Land Occupancy has all the badges of intent to defraud. It
purports to be issued by the "Office of the General Overseer." It contains a verification by
the "Lead, Record Department" that the lot plan "conforms with the record on file." It is
even printed on parchment paper strikingly similar to a certificate of title. To the unlettered, it
can easily pass off as a document evidencing title. True enough, complainant actually tried,
but failed, to register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds.
Complainant readily parted with P70,000 because of the false assurance afforded by the
sham certificate.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of respondent are not without
recourse in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he
owned the lot he sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid by complainant.
As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant. It is crystal-clear in the
mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We cannot, and we should not, let respondents dishonest and
deceitful conduct go unpunished.
Time and again we have said that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is
enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character. Thus, lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their dealings with their clients
but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards
of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and even disbarment.
Respondents refusal to return to complainant the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a
member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct, respondent failed to live up to
the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents acts violated the trust and respect complainant reposed in him as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court.
However, we cannot sustain the IBPs recommendation ordering respondent to return the
money paid by complainant. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Our only concern is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Our findings
have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other.
That said, we deem that the penalty of three-month suspension recommended by the IBP is
insufficient to atone for respondents misconduct in this case. We consider a penalty of two-
year suspension more appropriate considering the circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Juan R. Moreno GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon finality of this Resolution.
A.C. No. 8391 November 23, 2010
MANUEL C. YUHICO vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ
Before us is a Complaint dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a
Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented by
Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each
other during the hearings of the case.
On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of
P30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses
of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn,
Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his
attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of
P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized.
Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to
P60,000.00.2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within
a short time."
On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a
text message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:
I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking advantage of
our friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week
from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its release is delayed
due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by me
on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said
Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the
licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all
his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m.,
Atty. Gutierrez said:
As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my
wife got sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To
get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my immediate problem is
the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I
dnt want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4
Aug.10 pls. Thanks.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he
demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text
message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him to give him another week to pay his
debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December
2005. Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed
to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number and promised to
deposit his payment there, but he never deposited the payment.
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his debts,
but to no avail.
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the
complaint against him.
In his Answer, Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in
gratitude for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his
clients. He, however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances.
Gutierrez added that he has no intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is
currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his
debts when his financial condition improves.
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference
before the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position
papers.
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's
counsel attended. There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez,6 had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in
view of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez
guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety
Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court
that, instead of rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew
effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court
Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of
double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or
multiple disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission
to the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649,
resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with
modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this
time, without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which
a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must
conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he
justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not
have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and
misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them.
Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet
repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay
his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his
promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral
character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and
as officers of the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez
from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and
issuance of bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however,
adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that
Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not
have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law
mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while
Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which
found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is
ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the
complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.
A.C. No. 7472 March 30, 2010
LIGAYA MANIAGO vs. ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya
Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of
law despite having been suspended by the Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese
national, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was
represented by Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.
Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding
suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited
from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case
No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata
before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel.
Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her
flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, 2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay
Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach
counsel in the cases. ang Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.

Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de 3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong
Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court
suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong
on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on
November 17, 2001, which she actually did. 4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the
Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong
of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering December 14, 2001.
respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years
2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent, 5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -
nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter,
respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley
Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales,
Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios
which "gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of
isang (1) araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.
law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked." Acting on the
said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr.
Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) Respondents Urgent
dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
Motion for Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have
served her six (6) months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17
November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED. 5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista
noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at
(c) isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios
notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May
to have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice
16, 2001.
on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago,
aking personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni
during which she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way
Atty. de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and
Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty.
should be dismissed outright.
de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.

In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC
new matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar
directed the complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of
Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007,
appearances of Atty. De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as
cannot supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According
counsel in the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-
to her, the resolution should be the "final nail to the coffin of this case."
2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.

On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts consideration.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular,
which reads:
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBCs
reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty.
De Dios.1 Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not
automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty.
Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty.
Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily
shown his compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat that his suspension could
thereby extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not
automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Courts decision, and an order from the
Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to
resume the practice of his profession.
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his
compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from
the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period
of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable
recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and
thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that
this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume
her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the
OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the
OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the
order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as
such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance
with the lawyers public responsibilities.3 Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is
no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not
only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.4 However, as
much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time,
also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his
profession unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be
observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the
Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or
she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP
and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases
handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the
order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted.
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the
practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes;
filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort
to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow
lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-
year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss
over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has
disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not
even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him.
Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and
the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for
misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience
and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents
professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164
dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the
Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon
12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections
20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP
imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion
praying that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations,
but the Court En Banc resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He
maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of
disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin
Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from
liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own
doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Courts
compassion and mercy. He sought the Courts forgiveness stating that he has learned his
lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Courts finding for lackof factual support. He
appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE
compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was
denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En
Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among
others that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he
has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the
services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, Commonwealth Avenue as Eucharistic Minister
leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of
Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church,
Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already
served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing
repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Courts consideration, and
vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and
energy for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three
years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any
unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high
degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the
legal profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit
his previous requests for reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2,
2011, July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 denied the motion with
finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency
reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has
already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had
been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis
thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the
practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility
as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church,
Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but
to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He
expressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18
evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter
Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a
disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court
should see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of
the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession
as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as
a matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on
the sound discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will
take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement.
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had
demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon
admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were in need of legal
service. Thereafter, the respondent was appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had
continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects,
through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member,
Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions
and claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longer questioned the Courts
decision. According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time
to reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the
gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance,
and deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly
contributed to his character reformation. He professed that during his almost five (5) years
of disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage
Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had
served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion
and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at
the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as
shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently
achieved moral reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to
reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time he was
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The
Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also noted that he had made a significant
contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings;
and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the
Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other
transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of
the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove
that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyers sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the
document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years).
The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniws disbarment, he has been persistent in
reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged in humanitarian and civic services, and
retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials
of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and
members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and
after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys sincere realization and A.C. No. 7494 June 27, 2008
acknowledgement of guilt.
WILSON CHAM vs. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years
is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional
Before Us is a Complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against
transgressions.
respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased
apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due.
We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and was found
guilty of gross misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty.
According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998, respondent entered into a Contract of
Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr., was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful
Lease with Greenville Realty and Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant
and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay
as its President and General Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by
the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law
GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00
mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
per month for a term of one year.
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondents motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent. Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she
would no longer renew the same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment
unit until 30 June 2000 with a commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental
Considering the respondents earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the
during the extension period. Complainant approved such request but increased the rental
penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still
rate to P8,650.00 per month for the period beginning 1 October 1999 until 30 June 2000.
pending review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent
has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long
considering the nature and perversity of the respondents misdeeds. We believe that it is still Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to October 2000 without paying her rentals
early for the Court to consider the respondents reinstatement. from July to October 2000. She also failed to settle her electric bills for the months of
September and October 2000. The Statement of Account as of 15 October 20043 shows
that respondents total accountability is P71,007.88.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.
While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self- Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainants office that respondent had
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent secretly vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent
also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear did not heed complainants repeated written demands for payment of her obligations despite
and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.
thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.
In her Answer, respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical not vacated the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of another place because she was given notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to
law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and give way for the repair and renovation of the same, but which never happened until
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this presently. Respondent actually wanted to ask that complainant to account for her deposit for
requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not know complainants address or
Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door
in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands. keys to the vacated apartment unit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED. of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City,
the parties were given time to submit their respective Position Papers per Order5 dated 17
February 2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his Position Paper.6 Respondent,
despite the extension given, did not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his
Report and Recommendation,7 recommending the imposition of the penalty of three-month
suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be held guilty of
having violated the aforequoted provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
imposed upon her the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-5858 dated 15
December 2006, amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case
for lack of merit.
We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. The
Complaint should not be dismissed and respondent must face the consequences of
her actions.
It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she executed with GRDC, respondent was
able to occupy the apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1 October 1998 to 30
September 1999, paying a monthly rental of P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease
contract9 on 30 September 1999, the same was renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at
an increased rental rate of P8,650.00. Under such an arrangement, respondent was able to
stay at the leased premises until October 2000, undoubtedly incurring electric bills during
the said period.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay
just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations
that she failed to settle.
Annex "D"10 of the Complaint is a letter dated 11 September 2000 signed by complainant
and addressed to respondent demanding that she settle her unpaid rentals for the period of
three months, particularly, from 1 July to 30 September 2000. The letter appears to have
been received by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex "H" of the same Complaint is another
letter dated 30 August 2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier demand for respondent to
settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand
was sent through registered mail and received by one Nonie Catindig. Respondent did not
expressly deny receipt of both letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint. Having
failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in
the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damage, shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied.
Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where it is the plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of
showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence that a receipt of payment is the
best evidence of the fact of payment. In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,13 the receipts of payment,
although not exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence. A receipt is a written and
signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered. In the instant case, the
respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was unable to
produce receipts or any other proof of payment of the rentals due for the period of 1 July to
20 September 2000.
It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just debts. Her
unpaid rentals and electric bills constitute "just debts," which could be any of the following:
(1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence and justness of which
are admitted by the debtor.
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle
them when they became due. Respondent should have complied with just contractual
obligations, and acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the courts
integrity, since she is an employee thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her
duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction.
Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without the
complainants knowledge and consent. Respondents abandonment of the leased premises
to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which
explicitly state:
"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondents defense that she does not know where to find the complainant or his office is
specious and does not inspire belief considering that she had been occupying the
apartment unit and paying the rents due (except for the period complained of) for almost two
years. How she could have dealt with complainant and GRDC for two years without at all
knowing their office address and contact numbers totally escapes this Court. This is only a
desperate attempt to justify what is clearly an unjustifiable act.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system,
they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.15 In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial and legal system is ensured.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court
may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.
The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.17 It demands a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but
also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.18 In this case, respondent fell short
of the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law and justice.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground
for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of
such privilege.20 The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six
months upon partial payment of the obligation.
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct. The
case at bar merely involves the respondents deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without
her issuing a worthless check, which would have been a more serious offense. The
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for three months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this
Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
A.C. No. 10576 January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN vs. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine
Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer
and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group
of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to
St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc.
(LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for
"updating purposes". The GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors
(BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18,
2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board
and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held
any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He
also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman
would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and
President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to
comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately
LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and
submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the
last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October
13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a
Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and
said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected
to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the
strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretarys
Certificates dated May 16, 20066 , May 22, 20067 , and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins
signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the
directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et
al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings,
Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured.
She averred that this Court held that "when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings."11 During the
mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed
by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin.12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment. She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any
unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law
for three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a
stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible tobe a member of the BOD. Neither
was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCIs
bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or
designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not
legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated
upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the
company. The Secretarys Certificates with Guarins signature Atty. Limpin presented were
of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank
accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in totothe CBD
Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014
Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a
dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and
has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP
that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is
therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the
GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also
contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein.
That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential:
he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would
support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS
that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform
to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation
despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false
document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from
the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. 165771 June 29, 2007
HEIRS OF ANTONIO BOBADILLA vs. JAIME CASTILLO
The present petition for review on certiorari assails the May 5, 2004 Decision and the
October 20, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76575.
For over 20 years, Antonio Bobadilla (Bobadilla), Maria Del Mundo (Del Mundo) and
Ernesto,2 Danilo, Policarpio, all surnamed Serrano (the Serranos) have been leasing
respective portions of a 348square meter parcel of land located at the corner of Lakas ng
Mahirap Street and Gen. Luna Street in Caloocan City. While the lease agreement was not
reduced into writing, rentals were paid on a monthly basis.
Bobadilla, Del Mundo and the Serranos built their houses on the land, with the
understanding that in case the owner-lessor, Virginia Rayo (Rayo), decides to sell it, she
would first offer it to them.
After August 1991, Rayo offered to sell the land to Bobadilla for P3,000 per square meter,
and had stopped accepting payment of rentals.3 Bobadilla was interested in buying only the
148-square meter portion where his house stands and at a lower price, however, to which
Rayo did not accede. Rayo just the same gave Bobadilla two months from September 9,
1992 to decide on her offer.
Since Rayo and Bobadilla heard nothing from each other, Rayo sold the land on November
12, 1992 to respondent, Jaime Castillo, who was on February 22, 1993 issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 262687 by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.4
In separate final demand letters all dated March 15, 1995, 5 respondent required Bobadilla,
Del Mundo and the Serranos to vacate the land after failing to heed his previous demands
to pay a monthly rental of P10 per square meter.
Refusing to vacate the property and insisting on exercising his preemptive right,
Bobadilla instituted a complaint at the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the
sale between Rayo and respondent based on fraud and bad faith, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-15888.
Respondent in turn filed a complaint at the Caloocan RTC against Del Mundo, the Serranos,
and herein petitioners-heirs of Bobadilla,6 for recovery of possession with damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-16952. Branch 124 of the Caloocan RTC rendered judgment
in favor of respondent, by Decision of April 19, 2001 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, discussion considered, judgment is hereby entered in PLAINTIFFS favor
and against the defendants, declaring the month-to-month lease agreement between the
plaintiff, Jaime C. Castillo, and the defendants, Heirs of Antonio Bobadilla, Danilo Serrano,
Policarpio Serrano, Gil Serrano and Luz Serrano-Maniego (conjunctively, the "Serranos")
and Maria del Mundo, TERMINATED, hereby directing the defendants and all persons
claiming right under them:
(1) to VACATE the subject property/leased premises, located at Lakas ng Mahirap corner
Gen. Luna Street, Caloocan City, described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 262687 of the
Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, and to SURENDER peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff;
(2) to PAY to plaintiff rentals, at the rate of TEN PESOS (P10.00) per square meter,
starting from March, 1993, until peaceful possession is surrendered to the plaintiff. In
this regard, defendants are ordered to allow plaintiff to survey, at his own expense, the
leased premises where defendants houses are erected;
(3) to PAY to plaintiff, jointly and severally, attorneys fees in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); and
(4) Costs.
Plaintiffs claim for moral damages is DENIED for lack of merit. Defendants counterclaims
are DENIED for lack of merit.
The Serranos and petitioners appealed8 to the appellate court which, by the assailed
Decision and Resolution, affirmed the trial courts decision except with respect to the award
of attorneys fees which it deleted.
Hence, petitioners9 present petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ERRONEOUSLY
DECLARED THAT PD 1517 COULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE CASE FILED BY
PLAINTIFF[-]APPELLEE, JAIME CASTILLO, AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,
HEIRS OF ANTONIO BOBADILLA; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 122, CALOOCAN CITY, IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-15888 ANNULLING THE SALE
BETWEEN RAYO AND CASTILLO WHICH WAS FILED BY DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
HEIRS OF ANTONIO BOBADILLA SERVES AS RE[S] JUDICATA.10
Petitioners assert the right of first refusal of their predecessor-in-interest Bobadilla under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1517 (issued on June 11, 1978) otherwise known as the
Urban Land Reform Act, Section 6 of which reads:
Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants
who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land
and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten
years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to
purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and
conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management
Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. (Underscoring supplied)
As the decree is not self-executing,11 Proclamation No. 1967 (issued on May 14, 1980) was
issued identifying 244 specific sites 12 in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority
Development (APD) and Urban Land Reform Zones (ULRZ). It amended Proclamation No.
1893 (issued on September 11, 1979) by expressly limiting the operation and narrowing the
coverage of PD No. 1517 from the entire Metropolitan Manila to the specific areas declared
as APD/ULRZ.13
In Caloocan City where the land is situated, only 11 such areas/zones14 were identified,
none of which was found to encompass the subject land. Such finding of fact, as affirmed by
the appellate court, is final, conclusive and binding on this Court.
Only legitimate tenants then who have resided for ten years or more on specific parcels of
land, and who have built their homes thereon, have the right not to be dispossessed
therefrom and the "right of first refusal" to purchase them under reasonable terms and
conditions to be determined by the appropriate government agency.15If the land is not
embraced in an APD/ULRZ, no preemptive right under PD No. 1517 can be invoked.16
There being no showing that the subject land is located within any of the APD/ULRZ, the
lower courts correctly ruled that the right of first refusal did not, and could not have accrued
in petitioners favor.
In fine, respondent is clearly entitled to recover possession of the land.
Petitioners nevertheless submit that the decision in Civil Case No. C-15888, the case for
annulment of sale which their predecessor-in-interest Bobadilla filed against respondent and
Rayo, serves as res judicata but that the appellate court glossed over the same.
The records show that petitioners raised the issue of res judicata only in their motion for
reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, despite the fact that the decision of the trial
court in the annulment case was promulgated long before the filing of the appellants brief.
In any event, petitioners invocation of the trial courts decision in the annulment case is not
only grossly misleading but also utterly baseless. For the trial court dismissed the complaint
for annulment for lack of cause of action which dismissal was affirmed by the appellate
court.17
A note on respondents attitude on the present petition.
This Court observes the perfunctory manner by which respondent complied with this Courts
Resolution requiring him to comment on the petition. In his terse comment incorporated in
his Compliance, he pithily averred in one sweeping paragraph that the allegations contained
in the petition are all rehash or reiterations of the issues and arguments already passed
upon by the appellate court. With such lackadaisical outlook, respondent blinded himself
with what appeared to be gross misrepresentation foisted by petitioners, which would have
otherwise put him on guard.
At this juncture, it is apropos to firmly remind lawyers of their duties, as officers of the court,
to exercise utmost care and complete candor in the preparation of pleadings and to lay
before the court the pertinent facts with methodical and meticulous attention, without any
suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are affirmed.