Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario 73 Phil.

607 (July 8, 1942)

Facts: A taxicab figured in a head-on collision with a carretela. The carretela overturned, causing death to
one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy. A criminal case was instituted by the parents of the deceased against
Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former reserved the right to institute a separate civil action
for damages. The driver of the taxicab was convicted. Subsequently, the parents instituted the present civil
action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver. Barredo contends that his liability
rests only on the provision of the penal code and hence, since no civil action has been filed against
Fontanilla, he too cannot be held civilly responsible.

Issue: Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against the employer of the taxicab driver making him
primarily and directly responsible under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?

Held: YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability.
Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, an employer is primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts
of his employee.

There are two remedies available for the parents to choose:

The first is under Article 100 of the Penal Code wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from the crime committed by his employees. If the parents choose this remedy, the
complainant must first exhaust the properties of the employee, before the employers properties could be
made answerable.

The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein the
negligent employer is held primarily liable, subject to the defense that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and engagement of his employees.

In this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is more practical to file for damages
against the employer, who is more solvent than his employee.

NOTE: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code.
The principle enunciated in said case (that responsibility for fault or negligence under a quasi-delict is
separate and distinct from the negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code) is now specifically
embodied in Art. 2177 of the New Civil Code.
Elcano vs. Hill 77 SCRA 98 (May 26, 1977) In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
Facts: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence,
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
Reginald Hill is still a minor and, under laws effective at the time, also legally married. Reginald is still
However, inasmuch as Reginald is now of age (at the time the case reached the Supreme Court), it is a
living and receives subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his
matter of equity that the liability of Atty. Hill should be declared merely subsidiary to that of his son.
acts were not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
Note: In this case, there is no doubt that Reginald killed Elcano. His acquittal is based on lack of intent to
Issues: (1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar the present civil action for damages?
kill, coupled with mistake and not on the non-commission of the acts alleged.
(2) Is Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liable?

Held:

1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish his liability arising from
quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof required in the criminal case differs from that required in a civil
suit. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil
cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient.

The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that Responsibility for
fault or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also criminally charged, to
recover damages on both scores. And assuming awards made in the two cases vary, he would be entitled only
to the bigger award of the two.

In other words, the extinction of civil liability refers exclusively to the civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil liability arising from quasi- delict is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted.

2. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation by marriage of the minor,
such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living with his father and still
dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. The minor may be emancipated, but that does not mean that he is no longer under the
responsibility of his parents.
Cinco vs. Canonoy 90 SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979) civil action based on quasi-delict.

Facts: On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident
involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same
accident.

At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, unitl final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered.

The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.

Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of
the criminal action.

Held: Yes, the civil suit for damages brought by the petitioner is based on quasi-delict predicated on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action:

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court:

Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
Baksh vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97336 (February 19, 1993)
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Facts: Private Respondent Marilou Gonzales filed an action for damages against Gashem Baksh for the
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Gonzales is 22 years old, single, Filipina, a pretty lass of
be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising from the criminal offense not the
good moral character and has a reputation duly respected in her community; Baksh, on the other hand, is an
Iranian citizen and is an exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City.

Gonzales alleges that before 20 August 1987, Baksh courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married after the end of the school semester. In fact, Baksh
visited Gonzalez parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. In August 1987, Baksh
forced her to live with him in an apartment. According to Gonzales, she was a virgin before she began living
with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, Bakshs attitude towards her started to change. He
maltreated and threatened to kill her. During a confrontation in the barangay, Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore, saying further that he is already married to someone
else.

Issue: Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong, thus making Baksh liable for
damages.

Held:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se . This
notwithstanding, Article 21 of the Civil Code has expanded the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions
and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. In the Philippine legal system, as envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
torts.

Where a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause for the woman to give herself unto him in
sexual congress, and there is proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to obtain her consent to the sexual act, the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 is in order. The court took notice that Gonzales is an innocent barrio lass and a typical
Filipina, who under our customs would not have gave in to sexual congress with Baksh much more lived-in
with him, were it not for his promise to marry.
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals 243 SCRA 220 (1995) [see infra] Garcia vs. Florido G.R.No. L-35095 (August 31,1973)
Facts:
Facts:
Petitioners German C. Garcia, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, boarded a public
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the Big Bang sa
utility car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson,
Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, in which Torzuela, a security guard in the said carnival shot and
for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. While the car was negotiating a slight curve on the
killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Torzuelas security agency. Petitioner Maria Benita
national highway, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co.,
Dulay, widow of the deceased Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against Torzuela and SAFEGUARD
Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the collision, petitioners sustained various
and/or SUPERGUARD security agency, which were impleaded as alternative defendants being the
physical injuries which necessitated medical treatment and hospitalization.
employer/s of Torzuela. Petitioner Dulay alleged in her complaint that the incident resulting in the death of
Atty. Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants, Torzuelas wanton and reckless Petitioners filed for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD public utility car and the passenger bus.Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer admitting the
contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the
SUPERGUARD filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Torzuelas act of shooting was beyond the
negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver.
scope of his duties and that the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), and
therefore, the civil liability is governed by the Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code: Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is
for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a criminal case already for "double serious and less
also civilly liable.
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence," by the Chief of Police. Hence, with the filing of the
SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
Code, could not lie, since the civil liability under Art. 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art. 365 of
adjudicated. Therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer
the RPC. The RTC upheld the arguments of SAFEGUARD. Thus in their appeal, the Dulays allege that:
is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro
without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law...x x x...Respondent judge
Tumala, guilty of negligence.
also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Art.100 &103,
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may recover damages under a separate and independent action while a
RPC as distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court,
criminal case is pending.
hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.
Held:

Yes. Petitioners may recover damages for liability arising from quasi-delict. Under Sec. 2 in relation to
Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be
instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his
right to institute it separately. But it should be noted, however, that neither Sec. 1 nor Sec. 2 of Rule 111 fixes
a time limit when such reservation shall be made.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted
by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of the accused. Petitioners have two options from where they
could recover damages fromthat arising out of the criminal act, and that under quasi-delict. Petitioners
opted to recover damages under quasi-delict, which in effect operated as their abandonment of their claim to
damages under the pending criminal case. Therefore, petitioners may still recover damages from their civil
action against the defendants.
Andamo vs. Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 195 (November 6, 1990)
Facts:
Petitioner-spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances (including an artificial lake)
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land; caused a young man to drown;
damaged petitioners' crops and plants; washed away costly fences; endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons; and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Issue: Whether or not a corporation, which has built waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its
land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: A careful examination of the complaint shows that the action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated
the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building
these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action, if proven, constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not
to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that
they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
 leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. 16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910)
NOTE for undergraduates: Read the analysis of US turn-table case in the original.
Facts: Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of
dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power plant. Fifteen year old David Taylor is a son of a
mechanical engineer. Two years before the incident David spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on an
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and
mechanical engineering. It appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more
mature both mentally and physically than most boys his age.

David, along with Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the premises of the defendant without permission.
While playing, the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some pieces and brought them home. In the
presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl , The two boys made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust
the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. Next, they tried to break the cap with
a stone and failed. They then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys and to Jesse. This action was
brought by the plaintiff, through his father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.

Issue: Whether or not the company was liable for the injury sustained by plaintiff.

Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence of the defendant of leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury. When the immediate cause of an
accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own acts, he cannot recover damages for the injury.

The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiffs injury, was his own act in putting a
match to the contents of the cap. True, David Taylor may not have known and probably did not know the
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred, but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible
of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that his age and
his experience qualified him to understand the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him
must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it
may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence of the defendant in
Tayag vs. Alcantara 98 SCRA 723 (July 23, 1980) contractual relation between the parties.\

Facts: The Heirs of Tayag filed a complaint for damages against Phil Rabbit Bus lines alleging among others
that Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along McArthur highway on his way home. He was hit by the
bus driven by Villa which caused his death.

Philippine Rabbit filed motion to suspend trial on the ground that criminal case against Villa was still
pending. When Villa was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, Philippine Rabbit filed a motion to
dismiss the civil case. The heirs opposed alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on
quasi-delict. The Judge indeed dismissed the case, hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of Villa in the criminal case will result to the dismissal of the civil case
based on quasi-delict.

Held:

No. The acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages
based on quasi-delict. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter.

Evidently, the above quoted provision refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged
as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi delict. In
the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action was based upon
a quasi-delict, to wit:

That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by defendant Romeo Villa y
Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent,
careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to persons and damage to
properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulation.

That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan
otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property
would not have occurred.

The essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission
constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or
commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing
Quasi Delict vs. Delict

Barredo vs. Garcia- Art. 2177 Discussion 73 Phil 607 (July 8, 1942)

Facts:(Supra)

Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, making him
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

Held:

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil
Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under
the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means
of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt.
People vs. Ligon 152 SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987) injured victim.

Facts:

Accused Fernando Gabat was riding a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the
other accused, Rogelio Ligon. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando called a cigarette
vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. While the transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to
green, and the car suddenly moved forward. While the car was moving, Rosales was clinging to the window
but lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. The bystanders rushed Rosales to PGH where he was treated
for multiple physical injuries until his death.

Since Ligon did not stop the car, Castillo, a taxi-driver chased him and sought the assistance of two
police officers in an owner-type jeepney. At an intersection, Castillo was able to overtake the car and blocked
it, while the jeep pulled up right behind. The police officers drew their guns and told them to alight from the
car. They were brought to the police station.

Ligon was then charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. A charge of robbery with homicide
was likewise charged to Ligon and Gabat, since there was an allegation that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette
box of the victim. Ligon however was never apprehended after the police released him, so only Gabat was
convicted by the RTC. An appeal was then brought to the SC, which ruled that the guilt of the accused was
not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not accused may be held civilly liable despite the finding of the Court of Appeals that his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

Yes. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it does not follow that he is free from civil liability,
since only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.

The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, a preponderance of
evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act
and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage
done. Gabats willful act of calling the victim to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set
the chain of events which led to the death of the victim. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to
prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help the victim
while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to
stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the drivers act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals 129 SCRA 558
Facts:
Petitioner Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedena, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanaoc, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Garrido, Ortega jr., Celestino, Kamlon and 14 Ricardo Does was
charged of Grave Coercion. On Feb 1964 around 9 am at Camarines Norte, The petitioners willfully and
feloniously prevented Antonio Vergara and his family from closing closing their their stall stall at at the the
Public Public Market. Market. Petitioners Petitioners forcibly forcibly opened opened the the door door of of
the the stall stall and and brutally brutally demolished demolished the the stall stall using using axes axes
then then carrying carrying away away the the goods goods and and merchandise. merchandise. Such Such
acts of the petitioners where said to be pursuant to an ordinance. The damage amounted to 30K for actual
damages and 20K for exemplary damages. Roy Padilla and company also took advantage of their public
position, being the Mayor of the said municipality and the others being policemen. The CFI finds them guilty.
The CA acquitted the accused but ordered them to pay jointly and severally 9,600 as actual damages.
Issue: WON the order of payment for damages is valid notwithstanding the acquittal of the accused.
Held:
Yes it is valid. Civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. No separate civil action is necessary considering that the facts
to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceeding. To require a separate
civil action would only clod the court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation. A separate civil
action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 282 SCRA 188 (1997)
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Cruz is a surgeon at Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. She examined Lydia
and found the latter to have 'myoma' in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hsyterectomy operation. On the
day of the operation, Lydia's daughter noticed how untidy the hospital was. She asked that the operation be
postponed but Lydia said that Dr. Cruz told her she must be operated as scheduled.
During the operation, Lydia's family was asked to buy tagamet ampules. Later they were asked to buy
blood for Lydia at a blood bank. They were again asked to buy blood but the blood bank already ran out of
type A. They also saw Lydia gasping for breath as the oxygen supply had ran out so they had to go and buy
oxygen for Lydia again. Later that night, Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50.
Lydia was brought to the San Pablo Hospital however the doctors were not able to save her. She was
announced dead at 3:00 AM the following day. Petitioner and her anaesthesiologist were charged with
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The MTC, RTC, and the CA all found petitioner guilty
(anaethesiologist was acquitted) on the ground that the clinic was untidy and they lack the needed facilities
like blood and oxygen which are essential for the continuity of the operations they undertake.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide as a consequence of
medical malpractice is supported by the evidence on record.
Held: No. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that
the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. The 4th element is lacking in the case at bar.
The material damage was not proved to be the result of the reckless imprudence. In litigations
involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well
as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. As shown by the experts
presented by both parties, the death of Lydia may have been caused by DIC (clotting defect). Therefore, the
cause of death cannot be attributed to petitioner's fault or negligence.
Furthermore, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of
the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the case at bar, no physician was
asked to testify to show the standard care that needed to be observed given the present circumstances.
Therefore, the conviction is not supported by the evidence.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People GR No. 147703 (2004)
Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property
and was sentenced to imprisonment. injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to imprisonment.
The court further ruled that in the event of insolvency of accused, Philippine Rabbit, as its employer,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become
final and executory. Admittedly, accused jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mentioning that
Section 8, rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may
appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
HELD:
No. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.
While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. In the
case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he
is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
Petitioner admits helping the accused employee, hence, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the civil liabilities
of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability
fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with respect to the formers civil liability, but also with as to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)
Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived
in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company.
Everyday, he comes by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works and he uses a pass,
supplied by the company, which entitles him to ride the trains free of charge.
One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It
appears that after the plaintiff
alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries he
had received were very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the city of Manila where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated.
He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages
from the defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to
the security of passenger alighting from the trains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence was
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that the breach was due to the
negligence of their servant.
2. Whether Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held: (1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the
negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control
of the servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
Fores vs. Miranda 105 Phil 266 (March 4, 1959)
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned
Facts: Miranda was riding a jeepney driven by Luga. While the vehicle was descending Sta. Mesa bridge at
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is
high speed, the driver lost control. It swerved and hit the bridge wall, resulting to injuries to the passengers
necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant
and Miranda. Miranda broke some bones in his right arm. The driver was charged with serious physical
company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
injuries through reckless imprudence, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced accordingly. Fores, owner of the
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
jeepney, claimed that one day before the accident, she sold the vehicle to a certain Sackerman. In the
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from
meantime, Miranda prays for moral damages.
the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
Issues:
is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be Whether or not approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for the sale of a public service
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same. 2.
is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the Whether or not an award for damages is proper.
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.

(2) No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent to
Held: While the sale, sale, without the required approval, approval, is still valid and binding between the
the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are
parties, parties, approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for such sale, sale, as provided for
to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the
by Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146).
surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would
place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The As to the second issue, the award of moral damages is not proper. It has been held that moral damages are not

nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract of transportation, in view of Art. 2219 and

even surface on which to alight. 2220 of the new Civil Code:

Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases:

means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged 1.
or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say,
a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries 2.
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. quasi delicts causing physical injuries

Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on ART. 2220. Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should

and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of

length of the step, which he was required to take, or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under The exceptional rule in Article 1764 provides that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages
way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. The mere carelessness
of the carriers driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the
carrier, as in the case at bar. Facts: Private respondent Luis Luna applied for and was accorded a Fareastcard issued by petitioner FEBTC.
Upon his request, a supplemental card was issued to Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her card and
In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed that the lawmakers intended in article 2220 to
FEBTC was forthwith informed. Due to bank policy, petitioner recorded the lost card, along with the
limit recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. The fact that negligence may be so
principal card as a hot card or a cancelled card. In October, Luis used his card to pay for lunch at the
gross as to amount to malice, must be shown in evidence, and a carriers bad faith is not to be lightly inferred
Hotel Intercontinental Manila. However, after verifying with the bank, the card was not honored and Luis had
from a mere finding that the contract was breached though negligence of the carriers employees. The award
to pay cash. He was embarrassed by this incident. Luis, through counsel, wrote to petitioner and asked for the
for moral damages is eliminated.
payment of damages. The VP of the bank wrote a letter to Luis and expressed his apologies in their failure to
inform the latter of the bank's security policy. Also, the VP sent a letter to the hotel to assure the latter that the
private respondents were very valued clients. Still feeling aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for
damages in the RTC. The RTC ruled in their favor and ordered FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary damages.
CA affirmed the said decision.

Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

Held

NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of contract. (Art. 2220 NCC) While it is true that the bank was
remiss in neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation, there is no finding that there
was deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to Luis. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in
failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Thus, the award of moral
damages is inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.

Exemplary or corrective damages are awarded, in the case of quasi-delicts, if the defendant is shown
to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. And in case of contracts and quasi-
contracts, it is awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. Thus, the award of exemplary exemplary damages damages is is improper.
improper.

NEVERTHELESS, the bank's failure to honor its credit card issued to Luis should entitle him to recover a
measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals 241 SCRA 671 (February 23, 1995)
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Air France vs. Carrascoso G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts:
Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila
for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a first
class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in first
class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the first class seat that
he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a white man who, the
Manager alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his first class seat, the plaintiff refused,
and told defendants Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. A commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when
they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his first class seat in the plane. Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI of Manila
sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary
damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of
the trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoss plane ticket.
Issue: WON Carrascosos action is planted upon breach of contract, with the existence of bad faith, entitling
him to the award of damages.
Held:
There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-
Teheran leg. The said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok.
The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith,
with the aggravating circumstances that defendants Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening
the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the first class
seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a white man whom he
(defendants manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proved that this white man had
any better right to occupy the first class seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which
the corresponding first class ticket was issued.
The responsibility of an employer for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in
law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21
of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, held upon the provisions of Article
2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
Thus, Where a steamship company had accepted a passengers check, it was a breach of contract and
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her, that the check
was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection; though the language used was not insulting and
she was not ejected. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature
the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. And in another case, Where a passenger on a rail-road
train, when of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort. And in another case, Where a passenger on a rail-road train, when the conductor came
to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told
him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to
him, as by calling him a lunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the
mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioners contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carasscosos
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample to
power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant
should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this is in addition
to moral damages.
PSBA vs. Court of Appeals 205 SCRA 729 (February 4, 1992) Facts: Juan Syquia, father of deceased and the private respondent executed a Deed of Sale of a memorial lot
and an Interment Order, where the private respondent was authorized to bury the remains of the deceased in
Facts: Carlito Bautista, a student of PSBA, was stabbed while on the second floor of Philippine School of
accordance with its procedures.
Business Administration (PSBA) by some elements from outside the school. Carlito died. His parents, filed
an action for damages against PSBA and the school authorities (President, Vice-President, Preparatory to transferring the remains to the newly-purchased lot also in Manila Memorial Park, the
Treasurer/Cashier,Chief of Security and Vice Chief of Security). Both the trial court and the CA ruled in concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its Preparatory to transferring the
favor of parents. remains to the newly-purchased lot also in Manila Memorial Park, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed from its niche underground. It was then discovered that said vault has a hole and
Issue: Whether or not PSBA and the school authorities can be held liable under 2176 and 2180 for quasi-
after one hour or less water drained out of the hole.
delict.
Pursuant to the authority granted by the MTC the concrete vault was opened and it was discovered that
Held: No. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that pupils or students of the educational institution should
the interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding and the coffin as well as the
have caused the damage.
clothing and exposed parts of the deceaseds remains were entirely damaged.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
A complaint was filed by petitioners (parents and siblings of deceased) for quasi-delict, alleging that
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc, and more recently, in
there was breach of respondents contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault. RTC dismissed the
Amadora vs. CA. In all such cases, it had been stressed that Article 2180 plainly provides that it is the
complaint since there was no guarantee in the contract that the vault shall be waterproof and since there was a
students who must have caused the damage before the educational institution can be held liable for quasi-
pre-existing contractual relation defendant cannot be guilty of quasi-delict. The RTC also sustained the
delict. In the case at bar, the assailants were not students or pupils of PSBA but were elements from outside
explanation given by the private respondent, that the hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because
the school.
if it has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. CA affirmed RTCs decision
Hence, PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable under Article 2180.
hence the instant petition.
The circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of quasi-delict.
Bautista since they entered into a contract the moment Bautista enrolled in the school. There being a contract,
Held: No. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of
the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, should the act which breaches the contract be done in
a culpa aquiliana, SC find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
bad faith and be violative of Article 21 as ruled in the Air France case, then there is a cause to view the act as
Article 2176 provides that Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
constituting quasi-delict.
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
In the case at bar however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . The agreement between the parties governed
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing security measures. This would be for the trial
their relations and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on
court to determine. And, even if there be, a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
the part of the private respondent it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for
breach of contractual obligation only. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: Those who in the performance of
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the
their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21.
thereof, are liable for damages.
Therefore, PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable for quasi-delict under Art. 2180.
Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof.
Syquia vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Memorial Park and Cemetery, Inc. 217 SCRA 624 (January 27, In this regard SC held that there was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and in the Rules and Regulations of
1993) the private respondent that the vault would be waterproof. Seal" is defined as any of various closures or
fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized
opening." It is therefore clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof".
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 332 SCRA 356 (2000)
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
Facts: Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman at Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the
operated by Vicente Calalas. She was given by the conductor an extension seat at the backdoor of the jeepney
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
at the rear end. On their way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave way to the outgoing
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. The circumstances
passengers, just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena which is owned by Francisco
surrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the hole negate the allegation of negligence.
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney, which injured Sunga.

Sunga then filed action for damages against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage, in failing to
exercise the diligence required by him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva.

Issue: Whether or not Calalas can blame Francisco Silva as the proximate cause of the loss.

Held:

No. There was a contract of carriage between the parties, which was violated, hence, proximate cause
is immaterial.

The Supreme Court found Calalas guilty of violating the contract of carriage as a driver failed to
transport Sunga safely to her destination, being negligent in (1) not properly parking the jeepney; (2) taking
more passengers, than the allowed capacity; and (3) the fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat
placed in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.

The determination of the proximate cause of the damage incurred, whether it was the collision
between the jeepney and the truck or the negligence of the driver is immaterial. The The doctrine doctrine of
of proximate proximate cause cause is is applicable applicable only only in in actions actions of of quasi-
delict, quasi-delict, not not in in actions actions involving involving breach breach of of contract. contract.
Where Where there there is is a a pre-existing pre-existing contractual contractual relation relation between
between parties it is the parties themselves that create the obligation and the law will merely regulate the
relation created. (Since there was a contract of carriage here in the case at bar).