Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima et. al.

Petitioner: Abakada Guro Partylist Respondents: Hon. Cesar Purisima, Hon. Guillermo Parayno Jr. and Hon. Alberto
LinaPonente: J. CoronaG. R. No. 166715August 14, 2008

Nature: Petition for Prohibition seeking to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act 9335
(Attrition Act of 2005)

Facts:

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.The Fund is sourced from the collection of
the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC
in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.The DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 9335 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, A Tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration
of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act 9335 is unconstitutional?

Ruling:

Yes, R.A. 9335 is unconstitutional due to section 12, creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the law. However, R.A. 9335 is still at full effect as only section 12 is exempted.
R.A. 9335 in its full capacity is active as it was published on May 30 2006. The reason for its effect without section 12 is
that The Separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision
from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently
of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law
which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.
Legarda vs De Castro

P.E.T. Case 0003

March 31, 2005

Loren B. Legarda, protestant, vs Noli L.De Castro, protestee.

Facts:

In a Resolution dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the jurisdiction over the
protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee, Noli L. de Castro for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal
further ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and preservation of the ballot boxes and
election documents subject of the protest.

On February 4, 2005, De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said resolution.

De Castro argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots;
that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the
canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest
errors can be made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts
based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial
function of canvassing election returns. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the
statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC). But it is not suggested by any of the parties that questions
on the validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the Tribunals jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Tribunal can re-canvass the ballots and can correct the manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

RULING:

Yes. The SC finds no reason why the Tribunal cannot perform this function. SC agrees that the ballots are the best
and most conclusive evidence in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is
involved. Legarda merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of
transposition and addition of votes.

The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There is no necessity, in the
SCs view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional function.

In the instant protest, Legarda enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the results
in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a
challenge to De Castros title to his office.

Considering that the protest is sufficient in form and substance, the SC again stress that nothing as yet has been proved
as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the Legarda the
opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots,
nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the
Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition
and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for
the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority
to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4,
Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with
Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution,
they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect.

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up
embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs
what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because
of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article
VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

ESTRADA V DESIERTO
Facts

After Estradas impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the Presidential post, a cluster of legal
problems started appearing. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion including among others, bribery and graft and corruption, plunder, perjury, serious miscounduct, malversation
of public funds, illegal use of public funds. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner.Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on
his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Held

No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity
that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. However, petitioner needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Thus the petition was
dismissed.
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE

FACTS:

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department
of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting
his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office
and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita, 472 SCRA 587

(Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and Acting Appointments)

Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that while Congress is in session, there
can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in
the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform
his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]

Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in
session.

Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an
office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is
the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus,
by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of
her choice even while Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as
her temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in
the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose
on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL

Facts:

RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of ARMM. Unfortunately
said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were
enacted to provide for the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26,
2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in June, Congress enacted
RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.

Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.

Issue/s:

1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should not be required to hold its
election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.

2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to appoint OIC for several
elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013 elections.
Held:

1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the synchronization of election. SC held
that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading
Local Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms
of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local governments, and does not make a
distinction between the local government and the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units,
still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it
follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is no incompatibility between
the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief
that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners
foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not
of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision states:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by
the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power
to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

GANZON VS CA

G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:

Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a
petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with
10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and
remove local officials.
RULING:

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief
Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President
cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases
in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power,
yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a
grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents
and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his
suspension.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS ERMITA

Biraogo vs Truth Commission:

Facts:

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order
No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Held:

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not
due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands
firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate,
the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have
a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it
does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration"
as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former
President Arroyo.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

Decision

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain
the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive
Order No. 1.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article
7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call
out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from
illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended
that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion

Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction;

Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora)

President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases,
PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power
for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based
on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by
it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can
he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.