G.R. No.
135385 December 6, 2000 On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents. HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO
BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO,
BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO
BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW
VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-
MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY,
ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID,
MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO,
MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO
M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her
mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA
BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC.
and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, intervenor. IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION
FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement
its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is
of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier,
et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression
of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.
For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section
3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within
ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral lands;
1
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources
within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate
the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to
delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend
that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the
States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining
all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed
a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality
of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
2

SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled
"On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay,
Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most
'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual,
custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority,
gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of
youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a
more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come
to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with
settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural
resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering
its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret
IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was
enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to
correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the
natural resources, control and supervision in their development and
exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership
of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7
(b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57
of the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous
Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL
SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal
theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept
that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14,
Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the
Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are
held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order
that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may
seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which
are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future
and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose
of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within
3
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to
the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those
who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed
of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all
lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish
Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions
to Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the
government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of
1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to
the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by
previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of
the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land
in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from
the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the
ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale.
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an
extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title
to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the
land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in
the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize
any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent
was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of
land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law
to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal
Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the
Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands
belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings
who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so
granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not
still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the
adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the
public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be
fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were
to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that
mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land
possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his
name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted
by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered
that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land
would be restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the
Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the
Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of
the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or
not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles
and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the
same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds
within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of
and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully
occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these
regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the
law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other
laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the
Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed,
and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in
these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by
prescription, without any action by the State."17Valenton had no rights other than those
which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the
owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton
upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
4
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title
deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in
Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This
new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited
the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the
same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions
on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par
with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under
Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission,
Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The
law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of
1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of
registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping
Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law
warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system
highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country.28 There was an overwhelming
sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and
natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of
Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant. x x x."
5
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is
this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and
defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same
ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date
of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted
by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve
and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the
right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and
is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the
ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island
groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern
and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The
NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office
for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which
were merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and
practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted
quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by
a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years
and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987
Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of
people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who
have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political,
social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may
have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people
or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads
of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated
from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the
country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their
traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands.
They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
6
 1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or
Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte
and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva
Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of
Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon;
Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental
and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog,
and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of
Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat
of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga
del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island;
the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis
Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis
Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan
and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of
the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the
Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and
Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao
del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal,
and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early
as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by
the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise
to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation
in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth
millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural
influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their
way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of
the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an
essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a
primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and
responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely
uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially
subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They
had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not
only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their
literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not
see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and
religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their
rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and
a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos
adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects
of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close
to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object
of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay
word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay
was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families.
Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's
duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had
wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the executive,
legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally
from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the
barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder
persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders
promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of
laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are
the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or
written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans,
partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption.
Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the
chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of
different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from
neutral barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in
land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social
order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the
community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil
and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay.58 This ancient
communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources
so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land
7
was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the
development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all.
Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing
concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains
and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges
and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their
responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them with the
leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over
territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga.
Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62 The
Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao
del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held
in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of
Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has
no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies
where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of
kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover,
the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked
to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river
banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to
collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish
government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards
regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate
people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material
advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same
laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent
would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their
houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With
the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian
indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to
the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the
Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and
civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as
all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown
lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that
land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the
concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish
colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious,
classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them
into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came
from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and
third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the
Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards.
The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven
from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The
Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally
outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the
hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not
only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process,
separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community.78Their own political,
economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual
feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-
Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and
historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and
vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt
the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North
American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference,
constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in
accord with humanity and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-
Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a
geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."82
8
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they
passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the
Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research
among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization
and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American
Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities
and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The
raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more
rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the
non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and
permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic,
creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law
called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and
for this purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was
given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-
independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation
understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship. 85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce
resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in
Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens
system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With
government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous
peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects
undertaken by the national government in the name of national development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural
minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were
referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized"
culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests"
were to be considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State
policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to
the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked
to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at
the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways
beside the larger community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the
decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral
Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to
members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their
claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created
under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land
problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000
Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam
project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land
bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the
National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately
40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur.
Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water
projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national
government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to
the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino
created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and
the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the
1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral
lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture
distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland
areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central
administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that
are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population.97 The kind of response
the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by
making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions.
The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration,
represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The
political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement
of power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an
ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of
labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms
of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept
constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no
traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership
of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The
people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe
ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the
spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the
right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones
as well.99
9
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the
gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary
law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership
by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or
ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage.
The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the
subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for
instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products,
and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture
and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a
common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the
land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also
sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed
by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual
owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of
an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary
law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage
and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the
family, or loss of crops.104Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-
member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a
non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The
concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as
inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No.
8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation
of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance.
It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486
which was a result of six regional consultations and one national consultation with
indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation
of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered
from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive
migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the
tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their
ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite
among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has been
an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their
ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the
Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by
Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of
lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for
the land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had
territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories-
the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and
the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples
is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual
practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and
depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a
bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens
patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and
jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception
was first laid down in the case of Cario v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the
cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native
title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705,
P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite
the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its
wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of
the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive resettlement
of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their
ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in
the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This
principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which
10
places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are
entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators
voting in favor and none against, with no abstention. 112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on
Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended
on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that
would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and
ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the
indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be
preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously
and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and
the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of
the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was
enunciated in Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had
vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous
Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are
defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government
and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water,
mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures
embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel
Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces
and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and
Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The
guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the
ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the
activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in
Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification
of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon
finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of
11
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation
of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or
clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP
issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired
in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2)
by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect
to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs,
have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that
way since before the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim
of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to
have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which
also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied
in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native
title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and
domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands
and are private.
(a) Cario v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cario v. Insular
Government.130Cario firmly established a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146
hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had
been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather
built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some
parts of the land. Cario inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to
have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the
Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land under the
Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his
possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to
his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military
reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment
was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cario,
off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute ownership to
the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government
appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed
Cario's application. The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying
the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the
Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cario failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required
registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the other, asserted that
he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of
the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations
toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same
zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on
one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was
with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of
"due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was
based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that
"No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the
United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American
Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious
that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one,
we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first
object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369,
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the
12
United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is
reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to
what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own.
The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and,
like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be
enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the
light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the
United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace
the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such
by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and
that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony
or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if
there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of
the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this
title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in
the 1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that
the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed
in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any
royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all
"theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the
powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such
clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land.
To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning
some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to
convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at
will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias,
cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands
viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them
to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by
the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the
King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as
to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own
would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but
simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It
was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been
deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees
and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely
because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even
without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate.
Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on
that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the 148
hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it
upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the
Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration
to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would
have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical
position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all
rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important
part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire
length of the Cario decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native
title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the
University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982,
Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title,
Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited
over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and
development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cario extensively and used the
term "native title" to refer to Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
13
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as
defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the
American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during
the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in
reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial
governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent
reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be
imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to
escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under
the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It
upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only
successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving
their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking
through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people
is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be
derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated
as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United
States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians
are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts
of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to
their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be
drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is
for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so
decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental
system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the
Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the
United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and
occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by
treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also
covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy." 156 The aboriginal right of
possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation
as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied
exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty,
statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties have been
negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their
occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land
they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the
Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the
nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the
chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this
conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized
was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for
the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed
that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing
civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it
necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the
principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments, which
title might be consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans
gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives
and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed
and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil,
while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to
convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." 161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to
acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England,
France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private
person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to
land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the
concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects
14
of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to
the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or
conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted
by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a
title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the
complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive
power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves
the universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands
without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of
Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to
obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was
deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain
said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts
of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the
United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign
potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and
injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They
had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the
British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its
place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under
the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with
the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as
subjects to the laws of a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their
domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade
and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and
manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and
especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which
their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of
the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the
first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which
those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very
term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as
against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to
be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The
discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land,
the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted
the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or
cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish
Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different
nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the
ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to
the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and
the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of
occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete
ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the
whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as
ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title
rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails
that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and
customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such
title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual
Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon
tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used
to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general
laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public
15
domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart
for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the
reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but
Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of,
them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land
claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is
recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point
of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however,
there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may
be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the
Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as
successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized
as ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely
guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal Government.185 Although
there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of
these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly
entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the
ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any
similarities between its application in the Philippines vis--vis American Jurisprudence on
aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined in the
IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cario is the only case that
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases
citing Cario did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral
domains and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the
concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different
matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public
agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act
are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso
jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the
rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant,
belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the
Public Land Act and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive
prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this
long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both
for ordinary citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the
land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the
Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-
owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication
is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public
agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,
or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect
to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same
in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of
the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes,
including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the
approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-
owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and
such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation
of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less
than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may
be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the
Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands
are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided,
they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture
and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands
regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public
Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those
lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for
16
public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by
this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private
lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if
the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself
converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen
per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper
disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has
nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from
October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on
National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d)
national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral
domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify
them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA
law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of
land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the
applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership
over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional
mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a
specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative
legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the
same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than
twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or
tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled,
under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or
tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts
of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he
files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or
disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public
agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at
least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public
and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application
therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a
torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all
the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines
ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the
Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under
Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the
owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the
thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces,205 the right to consume
the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing
owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other
person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title
but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
17
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the
view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material
bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is
held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view
that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private
simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends
there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one
particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil
Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property
held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral
domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very
community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property,
much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum
of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single
instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the
corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or
involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land
but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the
domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs
themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It
belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands
are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following
limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary
laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of
15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative
fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed
under customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil
Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom
should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the
absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can
define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely
applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific
provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is
specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the
laws on land titling and land registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper
title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11
of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition,
when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the
land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time
beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity
of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring,
intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from man, care for
land; from the land, sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine
Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs
to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right
to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
18
 government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon
these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior
informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of
natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs
in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant
settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall
have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and
air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral
domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved
and intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof
shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of
Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs
to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land
or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of
land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the
concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is
transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP
shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15)
years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds,
and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of
ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of
displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean
air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g)
the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral
domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights
to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the
option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to
domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral
Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and
Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources
is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by the State. The
Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
19
resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the same in
four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or,
it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production,224 joint venture,225 or
production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period of 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these
resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the
President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-
owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale
mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple
implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of
ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is
expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will
be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in
the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other
natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership
under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural
resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging
to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a)
complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters
of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters,
and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral
domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the
right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover
ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover
shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or
transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands,
waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare
that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes
a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of
ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57
of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these
resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of
"natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b)
merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned,
or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
20
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon
the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which
they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these
rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of
the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and
the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them
for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and
utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the
purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation
measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring
ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral
domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the
profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time,
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral
domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources
must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-
scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of
forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit
our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure
environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very
nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority
rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be
allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period
of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25)
years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed
to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and
take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights'
therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale
utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive
use that require technology other than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the probability
of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization
of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than
25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal
written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the
natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights
over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of
priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity
has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the
said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the
State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the
provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the
State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the development
and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the
natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of
said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or
enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate
in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a
non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure
21
that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement
shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains,
the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself,
directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for
such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow
such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to
the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose
which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the
right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or
control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the
resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due
respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources
lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the
following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies
shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession,
license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is
conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no
certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written
consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in
accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this
consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of
natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be
issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and
prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the
consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project
granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any
concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by
the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain.
The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to
determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely
gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification
applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the
ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57
of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism
stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the
1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the
limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-
determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of the
civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American Indians,
Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental
rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and during the
1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine
Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It
was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the
building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best-
organized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This
came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for
indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment,
together with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous
rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have
become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example,
first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin
America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its
projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian
Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national
unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the
international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
22
many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention
No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107)
passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt
new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and
religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine
government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin
or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation
of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures
of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the
understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was
made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but
through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a
democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution
of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the
Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is
this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the
country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race
own the land because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of
every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much more man? Man is born to live.
Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives.
And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not
merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be
nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian to all
his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs life.
- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal
Filipinos" in Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World
Bank Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony
with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution.1 The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.2
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed
in view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these
provisions should take into account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to the
constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples be recognized and
protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and
therefore, their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned
"Indians" of the United States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand
and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous
peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the
promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community realized the
injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment among
the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and most
comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the
rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the
resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or
used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without the free and
informed consent of the indigenous peoples.
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the
sense the term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus,
which means "native."3 "Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has been produced
naturally in a particular land, and has not been introduced from the outside.4 In international
law, the definition of what constitutes "indigenous peoples" attains some degree of
controversy. No definition of the term "indigenous peoples" has been adopted by the United
Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a working definition in the 1986
Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:5
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories,
consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sections of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
23
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching
into the present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a
tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of
livelihood, life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the
habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main,
preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
(f) Other relevant facts.6
In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of
Filipinos who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest
culture.7 Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples,
characterized them as "uncivilized,"8 "backward people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10 and
"a low order of intelligence."11
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now
employs the politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural
communities" as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or
homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory,
and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed
and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and
other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads
of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present State boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but
who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already
plowing our soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were
the original inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native culture.
From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American regime,12 these
native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their lands. Today, from
the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao, the indigenous
peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands, the lands of their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our
national culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial
rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible distinction between the cultural
majority and the group of cultural minorities.13 The extant Philippine national culture is the
culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that
are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant.14 While the culture of the majority reoriented
itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has retained its essentially native
character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve
million Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural
communities,15 accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy
million Filipinos16 in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest
sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among them is
significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples are also among the
most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of law and power,
they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in national
politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less
fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people
empowerment and social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors
of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law
several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous
peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development.17
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights
and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.18
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
24
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
property and its increments.19
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.20
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall
consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.21
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies
affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come
from such communities.22
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It
provides, among others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous
peoples within the framework of national unity and development, protect their rights over
the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domains.23 Moreover, IPRA enumerates the civil and political rights of the
indigenous peoples;24 spells out their social and cultural rights;25 acknowledges a general
concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title thereto;26 and creates the NCIP as
an independent agency under the Office of the President.27
Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order
to decide the case.28
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.29 The
threshold issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of
judicial review in the present case.
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe
for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or
anticipatory,30 or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional
problems.31 A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual
controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict
of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the presence of opposing views or
contentions.32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused
because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed
from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation
embracing conflicting and demanding interests.33 The controversy must also be justiciable;
that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination.34
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has
been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been
appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement
the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse
consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial
resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face,
constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public
domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion
to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to
resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the
constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he
has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.35 Evidently, the
rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the
citizens, the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance".36 Yet, in a
sense, all citizens and taxpayers suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the
conduct of government and the allocation of power.37
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing.38 The
proper party requirement is considered as merely procedural,39 and the Court has ample
discretion with regard thereto.40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs.
Governor General 41 held:
x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must
show some personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the
real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.42
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large,
may also be the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a
private citizen may enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein
that:
The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any
other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he
would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different
from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as
distinguished from a private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified
electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would suffer the
same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining a
petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted.43
In Taada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be
informed of matters of public concern.
25
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or
consulted on matters of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law."47Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners-the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As
a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.48
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is
not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the
guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction
as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that
any grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies
with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of
the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizens suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a
taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the
implementation of an unconstitutional statute,49 and by necessity, he may assail the validity
of a statute appropriating public funds.50 The taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to
the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the proceeds of his
taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose of administering
an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.51
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same
manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that "the
amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the current
year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the "ONCC") and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC"),"52which were merged as organic
offices of the NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayers suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said
entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an extraordinary writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said entity or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.55
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the
challenged provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR
Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They further ask that the
Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the
activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the
questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the
law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of
the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the countrys natural resources. Consequently, the petition
for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court
assumes jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should
initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the
hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first
impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a
procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction,56 such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. The resort to this Courts primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall
be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation.57 We held
in People v. Cuaresma58 that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Courts docket x x x.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact
upon the lives not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos
cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is
necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to
allow petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance.
Substantive Issues
26
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around
the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8,
57, 58 and 59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of
ownership60 over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title.61 The term
"ancestral lands" under the statute refers to landsoccupied by individuals, families and
clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are required
to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or through their ancestors "since
time immemorial, continuously to the present".62 On the other hand, "ancestral domains"
is defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural
communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of
indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral
domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein.63 Again,
the same are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present".64 Under Section 56,
property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity
of said law "shall be recognized and respected."
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to
ancestral lands, ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The
fundamental question is, who, between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the
rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation,
of the fundamental law.65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is
assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations.
Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a
valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.66
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public
domain and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive
dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the
Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law
upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to
the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private
titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is
the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cario doctrine exists.
However, petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public
domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that the
doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended
to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral
lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cario doctrine, such native title was
extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the
Constitution to protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article
XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition
and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of Congress.
27
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State,
petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural
resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is
understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been
regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has
been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court.67
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some
grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial
government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is
the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must
emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere.68
In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the
King has by virtue of his prerogatives.70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the
sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property
or propriedad.71 These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the
sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King,
and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them
under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title.72 By fiction of law, the King
was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title,
and from him all lands were held.73 The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more
than a natural fruit of conquest.74
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cario vs. Insular
Government75 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision76of the pre-war
Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x.77 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since
time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to
the theory of jura regalia.
In Cario, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cario applied for registration in his name of an
ancestral land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had
lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as far they could remember. He also
proved that they had all been recognized as owners, the land having been passed on by
inheritance according to native custom. However, neither he nor his ancestors had any
document of title from the Spanish Crown. The government opposed the application for
registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to their
ancestral land.
Cario was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the
U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction.78 We applied the Cario doctrine
in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,79 where we stated that "[a]ll lands that
were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest."80
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling in Cario was premised on
the fact that the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription,
having established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land
applied for by Cario was transferred from the State, as original owner, to Cario by virtue
of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for decreeing "by mere
legislative fiatthat ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous peoples]
without judicial confirmation."81
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cario doctrine applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public
domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cario would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only
to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public
domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of
land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State.
Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its
possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-
interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of
title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State
involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native
title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have
been part of the public domain, the Solicitor Generals thesis that native title
under Cario applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the
classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks under the Constitution82 is irrelevant to the application of
the Cario doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of
lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cario doctrine.
28
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and
occupation thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered
into with Portugal,83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were considered
as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples.84 The discovery and
occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only members of the
international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said continents were deemed
sufficient to create title under international law.85
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not
mean that it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of
Spain, the Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over the
unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands.86
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives
of their property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do
no harm to the natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the early
Spanish colonial period in the Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging
opportunity to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his
written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II
envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could
have been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco
de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King instructed Legazpi to inform
the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons or to their property.
The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and "to explain to
them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish expedition
could defend themselves if attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander to
commit no aggressive act which might arouse native hostility.87
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land
occupancy.88 Thus, the Recopilacin de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership
of lands already held by the natives.89The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not
extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25,
1880, provided that all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize their
possession by means of adjustment proceedings,90 and within the period specified. The
later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared
that titles that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which
adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it
was held in the case of Cario that the royal decree of 1894 should not be construed as
confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such title.91
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United
States, contrary to petitioners assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of
Spain, including the latters rights over lands of the public domain.92 Under the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to
property existing at the time.93 During the American colonial regime, native title to land was
respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that property and rights
acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for the benefit of
the Filipinos.94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinleys Instructions, as
well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of
the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every
division and branch of the American colonial government in the Philippines,95 was that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."96 These
vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly protected by
the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the
indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly
established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the
sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935 Constitution."97 He advances the following
arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to
restructure the consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the
mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has wrested control of
those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely necessary for social welfare
and existence. It has been held that the State may impair vested rights through a legitimate
exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but
determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the
established social system. x x x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural
resources that have been found from generation to generation to be critical to the survival
of the Sovereign and its agent, the State.98
Stated simply, the Solicitor Generals argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to
land, had the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands,
including ancestral lands and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that
such a theory would necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested
rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and may
be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor
General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding.
It simply declares that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State."99 Nowhere does it state that
certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," including
those which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State. If
there is any room for constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor
of the preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated
otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean that
vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that the landowners were
divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural
resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence."
On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of
existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and
other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce,
include the right of ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and
domains. The words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual meaning,100 and the
term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.
29
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution101to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under
IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the
Congress,102since such recognition and protection amount to the alienation of lands of the
public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect
the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary
sense, the term "right" refers to any legally enforceable claim.103 It is a power, privilege,
faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another.104 When used in
relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just and legal
claim to hold, use and enjoy it.105 Said provision in the Constitution cannot, by any
reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of
ownership over such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have
exceeded its constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA,
specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral lands.
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide
for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision, does Congress
have the power to decide whether ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the
public domain? Also, does Congress have the power to determine whether the "extent" of
ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did
not intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private
property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private
property, and that customary laws shall merely determine whether such private ownership
is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the
community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief
Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from
either Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase
"CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS
GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the
extent thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising therefrom. On the
other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights or
relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and
our regular civil laws on property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to
Congress to make the necessary exception to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of
such a customary law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the
ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is the
ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and relations
arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a
different provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding suggestions also by
way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be
ownership based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the
thinking expressed in the consultation is that this should be codified and should be
recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the
concept. 106 (Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the
following exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of
the tribal ownership or community ownership or of private ownership within the ancestral
lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as
ownership by private individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will
set aside the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral
domain it could accept more specific ownership in terms of individuals within the ancestral
lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly
mentioned Cario in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native
title to land, or that they were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura
regalia.108 The framers of the Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were
presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of
constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines into consideration in
construing the Constitution.109
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as
private property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such
ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional mandate and
does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as
subject to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in the State
ownership of all lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural resources.
30
Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization
of lands of the public domain and natural resources, and is of paramount importance to our
national economy and patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the
provisions of this Constitution" mainly to prevent the impairment of Torrens titles and other
prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral domains,
to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands.
How does this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did
say that in cases where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these
two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of
Baguio City are considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one
of the publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as
ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to
certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as
ancestral land?
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that
Filipinos can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the
right of a particular person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110
Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the
framers of the Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of
the indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2
of the same Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution
must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole
Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision. That
construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument.111
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands
and other natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof which
firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth
hereinbefore,112 include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article
XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities
and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize, respect,
and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing the Congress
to create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous
cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is given
prominence as the first objective of national economic development.114 The framers of the
Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs," intend to establish a hierarchy of
constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or to
create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the balancing
of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davides formulation of the first sentence, he says:
"The State, SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or
tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural well-
being." There are at least two concepts here which receive different weights very often.
They are the concepts of national development policies and programs, and the rights of
cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to ask: When
the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this
because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the
interest of national development policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know which
is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands
or is it national development policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more
paramount. The concept introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is
what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests taking into account the specific
needs and the specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we
did so in the autonomous regions.115 (Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the States ownership over the natural
resources within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the
public domain and other natural resources,116 as well as the States full control and
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources.117 Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3
31
(a),118 5,119and 7120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which
states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State."121 They would have the
Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural
resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of
State ownership over these resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent,
limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in
determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and within the
ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points out
what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right
of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important
to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral
domains will result during the delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines
ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso
facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous
peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source of
ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it
recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous
peoples concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil
Law, "ownership" is the "independent and general power of a person over a thing for
purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby."122 The civil law
concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from the
thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use, jus
disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which is
owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing
owned.123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples concept of ownership emphasizes the
importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character of
ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed"124 because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not
merely the individual member.125
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous
peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on
Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to
wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we
transferred the other provision but here itself -
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement.
Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources
because we all agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of
those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by
mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either
rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any
logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our
people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat
could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation
and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are
already considered in subsequent sections which we are now looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous
people where they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior
consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you want to
make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is
already there and I will make sure that they cross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate
version you do not have and if you agree we will adopt that.127 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples
over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim
ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous
peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which
enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found
within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural
resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples rights and welfare in
relation to the natural resources found within their ancestral domains,128 including the
preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous
peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural
resources located therein are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not
been recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v.
Fianza129 in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in
this jurisdiction.130 They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural resources to vest on
a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935
Constitution."131 However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the
position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to natural
resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership
of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land
by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged
and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no
similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The unique value of natural
32
resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for its
consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the Spanish
regime up to the present.132 Natural resources, especially minerals, were considered by
Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars against other nations.
Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found,
whether in public or private lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and that
over minerals which may be found therein. 133
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its
nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latters cession
from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to
explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. A
person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws
then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals within
his property.134Although the United States made a distinction between minerals found in
public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases
sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to
maintain the States ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for future
generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through economic
domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would become a source of
international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security and independence.135
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources
in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973136 and 1987 Constitutions.137
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains
belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP
with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to
the lands and not to the natural resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies.
- The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain.
The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of
Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other
government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such
notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the
administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian
Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these
areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the
IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming
part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural
resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because
said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the
State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State, through
the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural
resources are owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve
the natural resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of such natural resources.138 The statute also grants them
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains.139 Before the NCIP can issue a certification for the
renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the perfection of any
production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples
concerned must be obtained.140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains or portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation.141
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant
role in the utilization of our countrys natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand,
allege that under the Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources may only be undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements.142 To petitioners, no other
method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit that by vesting ownership of
ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives
them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the
State.143
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control
and supervision of the State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. This provision, however,
should not be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of
utilization of natural resources other than the foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution
must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout.144 No constitutional provision is to be
separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the fundamental law.145
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural
resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the
third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by its citizens.146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the
State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the principles of
agrarian reform or stewardship.147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to
protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing
resources.148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-
poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the
Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,149 cannot be construed as a
prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the States
direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources under existing laws,150 the State
retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale basis151 or otherwise.
33
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources
under Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing
laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral land be
declared as a peoples small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous peoples
living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining
contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining
operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community
concerned153 and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community
give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid
to them by the parties to the mining to the contract.154
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the
indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following:
"to manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to
receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights."
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b)
pertains only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to
the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of
determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit.155 The exploration,
which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the entire process of
"exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources which under the Constitution
belong to the State.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the
utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not
mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of preference or first
consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with due
regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in
the grant of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by
government entities. Several factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent
and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the environment and on the
indigenous peoples way of life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous
peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position to
undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a
blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural
resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws,
such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these
resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from
undertaking activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with private entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located
within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as between the State and the
indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the
interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous
peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority
granted by the proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership
rights of the State over the natural resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the
utilization of natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article
XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore."
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the
traditional activities of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior
informed consent of the indigenous peoples before any search for or utilization of the
natural resources within their ancestral domains is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities,
IPRA requires that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The
State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that national development policies and
programs should involve a systematic consultation to balance local needs as well as
national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution
on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the
region after thorough consultation.156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples
the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom without
their free and prior informed consent.157 As to non-members, the prior informed consent
takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and
non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This
requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as the Philippine
Environmental Policy,158 the Environmental Impact System,159 the Local Government
Code160 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995161already require increased consultation and
participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with
significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous
peoples must be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance,
renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any
production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control
the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but merely the imposition
of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law
is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely
affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.
34
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection
of the laws."
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains
under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of
private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process
clause.162 Petitioners contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads:
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and
protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of
indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following
their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to
their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same
communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is
obviously incorrect.
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals,
whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to
the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes
and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-
indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish.163What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or
vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens
titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes
strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land,
whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines.164 With regard to ancestral
domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural
community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the
Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the
ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission
of the final report of the ADO.165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are
within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural
requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and
inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission
of a report by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that
the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIP167 and the application of customary law,168 violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of indigenous peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving indigenous peoples,170 including even disputes between a member
of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the
delineation of ancestral domains.171 Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the
members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely
contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a
member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who
is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a
suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."172
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first
in disputes involving property, succession and land,173 and that such laws shall likewise be
used in disputes involving indigenous peoples.174 They assert that "[w]hen the dispute
involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a
resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due
process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what these
customary laws are."175
Petitioners concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of
the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be
so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A persons possession of
the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In
this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous
peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its
quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable
to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of
procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of
the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not
absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.176 The IPRA prescribes the
application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution acceptable to
the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is
supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands,
involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes,
shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the
area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
35
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall
be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, 177 where
all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples,178 specifically, of the same
indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-
member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to
different groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in
disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous
peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of
recognizing the application thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this
jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is
proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence,179and it is not contrary to law, public
order or public policy.180 Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the
recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members
of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the settling of
disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are
members of indigenous peoples.181
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the
Presidents power of control over the Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the
rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the
Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be carried out
through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the
Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the
President over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President as "lateral but autonomous...for purposes of policy and program coordination."
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing
Rules characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President,
such characterization does not remove said body from the Presidents control and
supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible
for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and
protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition of their
ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto.182 It has been granted
administrative,183 quasi-legislative184 and quasi-judicial powers185 to carry out its mandate.
The diverse nature of the NCIPs functions renders it impossible to place said agency
entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the
reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent
agency" is defined as an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one
not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency"
or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision.186
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all
instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals,187 like
those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain
degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the President" and, as such, is still
subject to the Presidents power of control and supervision granted under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution188 with respect to its performance of administrative functions,
such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the Presidents approval in obtaining loans
to finance its projects;189 (2) it must obtain the Presidents approval for any negotiation for
funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from and from whatever
source;190 (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to
the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples;191 and
(4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President.192 The
President is also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP193 as well as to
remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any
indigenous community.194
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5,
6, 7, and 8) affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral
lands and domains by virtue of native title do not diminish the States ownership of
lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are
considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain,
following the doctrine laid down in Cario vs. Insular Government;195
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands
and other natural resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57,
36
 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples over
the natural resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and
share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as well as
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof.
The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples,
through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural
resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991196and
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.197 Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous
peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains
merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid laws;

(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their
ancestral lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910
ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
ancestral lands and domains;198 v. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.

(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions
(Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others,
establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary
law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is
composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of
being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph
2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an
independent agency under the Office of the President does not infringe upon the
Presidents power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, since
said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under
the Office of the President, and therefore under the Presidents control and
supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned,
the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the
SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the
only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey
y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente
Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband.
The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-described
property:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag,
Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of
light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares;
bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita
Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo
Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by
the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream
called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and
Domingo Ruiz Mateo.

This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is
assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the 18th of
December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the above-
described parcel of land.

After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a
decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926,
directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four
petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of
Remedios Grey.

On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land
Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that
37
he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land which are described in said motion, and
which, according to his allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He
alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by
the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he
was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited them from his father,
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under
the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case,
and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in
said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the
additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908,
its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of
land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the
petitioners appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case
and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said decree
was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in holding that the
two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of the land
described in the petition and were included in the decree of February 12, 1908, and that the
petitioners are the owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including the
two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document dated the
26th of November, 1864, duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge
of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for
several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed
in the old register of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the
appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the
name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two
parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant
and for this reason they did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the
appellee contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under the
estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the
appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of
section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38
of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate
should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to that
time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when their mother
died. So these children were minors when the father of the appellee obtained the estate
grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners, who
were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo
Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the
representative of the petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in
writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his
children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for
himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a
period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose
Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee
admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact,
cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question
were not included in these contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the
petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not described. In the rental contract
between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the
appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, according to the
description given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said court
held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon
Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the petitioners
in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that year. The
same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero
Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained after the death of the petitioners'
parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that
the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their
application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent,
when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the
occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they
include in their application the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the
court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been
entered in February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant,
or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate description of
the land. It shall contain the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the
names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if
not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice
given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set forth
clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and interests,
legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy of all persons,
with their names in full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses.
Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published
twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the adjoining
owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the notice in the Official
Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of the
notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person named in the application
whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be
posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in a
conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the land is situated.
The court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such
manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has
served the notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclusive
proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and
answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default. By the description in the published notice "to all whom it
may concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are made parties defendant
38
and shall be concluded by the default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the
applicant has title, as stated in his application, a decree or registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only
to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such decree
shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year. .
. . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to
above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest
which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express provision
of law the world are made parties defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it
may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the
circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party
defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must
be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the appellee, whether his
(appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been
opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree
was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed
that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the
petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to
reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive
anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there
must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has been
frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts; the first is the
distinction between the meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the
conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the
protection of bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction
between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In none
of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive effect of
certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express indication of the
meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on
Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of
certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned
means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal fraud. In other cases
"fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In
other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate
acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be
"fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary
ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of these three
classes of cases was there absent the element of intention to deprive another of
just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as
distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86,
87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in
Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905,
cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens
System, supra.) The same meaning should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38
of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of
the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not attempt
to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be
determined from the fact an circumstances in each particular case. The only question we
are called upon to determine, and have determined, is whether or not, under the facts and
circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by
means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process
of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given
notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but
he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom
it may concern." If this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due
process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and
purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was
introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its
practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said,
upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration
of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining
owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings,
and have have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the
proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered by the
Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the
community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.
39
 At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to
registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more and
more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without security.
(Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted
because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third
person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against any defect
in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by
Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and
the time occupied from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three
R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has
barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp.
75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was
made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857.
. . . In the Torrens system title by registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of
the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by a
registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The certificate is
guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title
to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be
effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on
the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the
Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of
the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act,
1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of
transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute
and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian
Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which the
Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur. The
percentage of errors, as compared with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is
very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the
average risk of error being only 2 cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error
was only 1 cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in
Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole time of
operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various
countries of the civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and
practical experience has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has been
the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165
Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs.
Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was
copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those
States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never
heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements
of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or
notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either
constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we
have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly
would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding
is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9
Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50
Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular
person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to
bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to
be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right
to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this
jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree
allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings
given is by general notice to all persons interested.
40
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its
judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has
absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death,
but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings
had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack
on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or
in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions
of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we
do not decide.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from
should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without
special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
v. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said
lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the
court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.

41
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that
the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included
in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by
including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however,
without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of
the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration
of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was
binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the
fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the
wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their
name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land
occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same
theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had
already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on
the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was
not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration
must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su
casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the
proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an
action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete
and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an
interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who
are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the
same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect
title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate
of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact
status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence
of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged,
or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of
the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration
of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act
giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which
indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two
different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular
parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view
of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is
forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is
the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently,
and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession.
Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46,
Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has
been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the
"torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory
provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of
the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of
two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in
the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155;
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very
clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that
the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may
be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg
on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier
in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the
prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the
acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the
same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
42
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the
general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser
for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one
year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud,
in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a
collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree
of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of
his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece
of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each
of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a
case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general
provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we
see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double
registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance
with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so
decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name
of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the
application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a
proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the
parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his
right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court
and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that
lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet
title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose
of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate,
then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has
been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in
the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the
plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the
position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts
to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting
that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not
opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an
action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906.
"Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of
a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up
his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a
court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the
wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity
of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should
be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his
vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the
rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of
Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses
which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties
which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate
would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the
provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall,
registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
"innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be
deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose
the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such
purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said
sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land,
is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to
be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning
and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever
be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the
first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is
recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all
the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons
dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of
43
whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well
established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern
National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710
[a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15
Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78
Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument
of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of
every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination
of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a
record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that
he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be
recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a
mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the
statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of
such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the
recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona
fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense
that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all
persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the
law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men,
at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of
the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner
of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land
had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the
opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do
not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He
cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the
record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a
parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land
included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than
that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the
safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections,
should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system,
the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the
world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part
of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example,
that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold
his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in
question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would
his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the
original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying
the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must
be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony
with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe
that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be
required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather
than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The
holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and
complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with
which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting
from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land.
Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary
registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without
deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that
view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone.
Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights
in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all
the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in
the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as
in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
44
I dissent. In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the
reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original
holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent
purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the double
registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, and
also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the innocent
purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority
opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to
the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the
rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to
exception, and of course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which
these rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the
proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to
be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in hand,
may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two persons
have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the same land, under the Land
Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the
absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be
applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it
is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by
the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage
done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such
cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such
circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the
conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case
wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful
reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled
equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first
occurred will be given the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which
have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and
that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19
Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows
that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping registration the earlier
certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser
under the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of
the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to
invoke the "just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his
own title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or
annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly
without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have
prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful
summons personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of
the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead
of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against him
adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for
by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that
as between the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule
should prevail, because both such original parties must held to have been fault and, their
equities being equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning
whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original
holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later
certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to
be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may and should always be
imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it
appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly registered certificate of
title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title of an earlier
date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down
under the various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens
system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court,
is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of
thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry office, so that negligence may
be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him
is included within the boundary lines of any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of
tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the original
registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without
fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that
the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration
by a comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and
parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the
introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The
avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered
lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order
that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it
is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other
certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its
contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land
registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and
instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land
record and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase,
45
will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a
purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens
system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to
facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve
prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of
looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land
Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a
purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other
certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him
should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act
desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands
have been made the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he
pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search out the information with notice
of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the
record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even
with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such
double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to
assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration, would even
seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines
contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those
contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it
was never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a
burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the
knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as
negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which have been
the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a
registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered
against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it
appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the
proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of
Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has
actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming
the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for
him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the
certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the
damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping registration of the land
in question. There is nothing in the new system of land registration which seems to render
it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the duty of
appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in a
court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands
become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject
an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage
resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the
land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities
are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only
where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as
between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same
land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of
the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with
registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by
way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or
overlapping registration. The problem is to determine which of the certificate holders is
entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor of either one must necessarily
have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the other and to that extent
shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the registration of lands.
But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts
to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the
damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the
majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice
of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was
issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the pendency of those
proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings I readily
agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable
negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to
defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in
such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof, but
it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in
permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of
the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring
the earlier certificate. Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the
majority opinion) of requiring the holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the
portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of
losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place
an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not contemplated by
the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed upon the
holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him when he sits
supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title to his
lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the
pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that
he has been personally served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it
seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by
an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the
holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him,
despite actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later
certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent
purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of
convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather
than that of the holder of the earlier title.
46
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown,
unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to
additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with
regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly
adverse to the purpose and object for which the land registration law was enacted, and
imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other than that of
defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual
notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in
which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his
certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the
innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that
under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping
registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and
conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all
or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the
pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any
appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight
trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own
titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in
the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.

The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration

without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things
to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost
invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult
to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud,
without personal service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of
the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served upon the owner or
occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for registration is made; and the
cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings
for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice to the
adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.

In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of
a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the
Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of
the land thus purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default
judgment to be entered against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of
the lands included in his own certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from whom the
defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining
land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally
served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963
there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, v. PROVINCE OF NEGROS
and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee.
increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant.
appear and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Eduardo P. Arboleda and Jesus S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.
Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and
damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally, arising out of
erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration. CONCEPCION, J.:

Carson, J., concurs. Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of Negros
Occidental, the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey of Bacolod, Negros
Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said lot by the

47
defendant from November 8, 1935, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. On June 28,
1951, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
On appeal taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however, set aside by the Supreme
Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise, ordered the case
remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after which another decision was rendered by
said court of first instance dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a
deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case is, once again, before us, this time on
appeal by the plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting
of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the aforementioned cadastral survey,
with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares, originally registered in the name of Agustin
Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less,
and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued on August 25,
1916, in the name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the
aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents as Jose
Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable installments, as set forth in the
deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8, 1924, said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776
was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6295 in his name. Meanwhile, or on March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had
been mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of
P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the
Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first
mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were
duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on
the corresponding certificate of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295,
covering Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-
1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. Accordingly, said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead,
transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151 which, owing to its subsequent loss, had to
be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 in the name of the Bank,
was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on November 8, 1935, the Bank
agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of
P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment
thereof, title would remain in the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares
transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed
the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949,
the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-1371), in
plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by
the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be
entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to
sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat
emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by
the Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda, it
was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations
with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with
the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378 in the
year; 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that immediately after the
commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and began the
construction thereon of the provincial hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since
then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner
thereof; that, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond comprehension of the
defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of said defendant"; that said lot
had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No.
16269 (dated December 31, 1937); and that plaintiff had acted in bad faith in purchasing
said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the provincial hospital was where
it is up to the present, and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment purposes
until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling stockholder,
president and general manager of plaintiff corporation, was the first City Mayor of Bacolod
which contributed to the support, operation and maintenance of said hospital. In an
amended answer, dated November 8, 1950, defendant alleged, also, that the
aforementioned expropriation case was "amicably settled as between the parties herein, in
the sense that the ... Province of Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in fact pay to
Jose Benares the assessed value of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration pertaining to
said lot in excess of its assessed value which was paid by the Province would be donated
and was in fact donated by said ... Jose Benares in favor of the Province purposely for
hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein had
acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings. This decision appealed
from in effect decided this question in the affirmative and declared that plaintiff merely holds
it in trust for the defendant, in view of which it ordered the former to convey said lot to the
latter. This conclusion is predicated, substantially, upon the following premises, namely that
case No. 3041 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the expropriation of
the hospital site of said province, was actually commenced on January 26, 1924; that,
among the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the aforementioned
cadastral survey, belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to the
defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding transfer certificate of title (Exhibit
BB-2) was issued on July 12, 1926; that, according the testimony of Jose Benares, the
expropriation of Lot 378 was settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000;
and that defendant's failure to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot
378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in
the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence,
because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff
and its president, for the former believes that the latter had "manipulated" to
exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been four (4) litigations
between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been finally decided against
the former;
48
 2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he testified
to having been paid P12,000 by the Government, although, at the rate of P1,000 a
hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to sell Lot 378; he should
have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters; (b) he claimed to have
received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days"
after the Government had taken possession of the land, and to have sent the
money next day to Pilar Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have received
the said sum of P12,000 on November 7, 1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco,
former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares asserted
that there was a written compromise agreement between him and the
Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely oral; and (b)
Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot 378,
the assessed value thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the Government
the difference between this sum and the true value of the property, but Benares
affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare, which he rejected, and that he
later demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the Government agreed to pay, although,
subsequently, he said that Rafael Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon
him to accept P1,000 per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso
Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the
expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case "was
not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the acquisition of
Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in 1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise
agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached and that
the expropriation had not been consummated. For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its filing
and the publication in the newspaper of the corresponding notices (Exhibit 1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the
Government, followed by the cancellation of the certificate of title in her name and
the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the Province, when
contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of a transfer
certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly suggest that no
such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had been made or
reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March 12,
1921, and this mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was not cancelled until
September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without
the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not made a party in the
expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in favor of
the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged
then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated subsequently
thereto without the Bank's knowledge and participation. What is more, in the deed
executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935 (Exhibit R), promising to sell the
Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of
Lots 405, 407 and 410, forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots
405-A, 407-A; 407-B and 410-A, had been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that
Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the
expropriation case and the chances are that the case was dismissed. The Court
had to examine carefully and minutely every single piece of evidence adduced by
both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the mystery. The Court
believes that the failure of the government to secure the corresponding transfer of
title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms a part of Lot
405-B. This conclusion was arrived at after examining closely the plan, Exhibit X.
The plan shows that while all the subdivided lots were properly identified by lot
numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the plan encircled with red
pencil, marked Exhibit X-1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot number and
that portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where the hospital building
was constructed. This plan was prepared for the government on May 12, 1927 by
public land surveyor, Mr. Formento, embracing lots covering over 22 hectares for
the Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular portion was not labelled
with the corresponding lot number might have misled the authorities to believe
that it formed a part of lot 405-B, which adjoins it, although separated by the
creek. This lack of reasonable explanation why the government failed to secure
the corresponding certificate of title to lot 378, when there is sufficient proof that
Jose Benares was paid and he executed the deed of sale in favor of the
government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness and
moral courage that account for the well earned reputation and prestige of the Philippine
judiciary, we find ourselves unable to concur in the foregoing view. To begin with, there is
no evidence, and defendant has not even tried to prove, that the expropriation case had
ever been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned. Hence, the lower court merely
speculated about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was dismissed." By the way,
the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela, for he testified
that the expropriation case was still pending in 1934, when he ceased to be the provincial
treasurer, and the record before us suggests that since the Province took possession of the
land in 1924 or 1925 and completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there were no
further proceedings in said case..
With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that the
authorities had been "misled ... to believe" that the portion at the lower corner of said plan
which was enclosed, during the trial, within a circle in red pencil, and marked as Exhibit
X-1 formed part of Lot 405-B, which had been expropriated by the Province of Negros
Occidental. In fact, said portion, Exhibit X-1, is not part of the land covered by the plan
Exhibit X. A close examination of the latter shows that the boundaries of said portion are
not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the right hand side of Exhibit X, the
following appears in bold letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401,
403,405, 406, 407 and 410 Bacolod Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial Government
of Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said
enumeration and the explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to the "Capitol
Site", negates the possibility of its being mistaken by any body, much less by government
49
engineers, as including the hospital site, and, hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the very
evidence for the defendant herein, specially the assessor's field sheets and declarations of
real property for tax purposes (Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the Government
had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In any
event, said possibility of mistake, if any, which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrant
in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary the conclusion that Lot 378 has
already been acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and applied by
him to the payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount could not possibly be the
price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly agreed therefor, its price
could not have exceeded P3,000.00. In this connection, it should be noted that, aside from
the expropriation proceedings for the hospital site, another expropriation case for the
Capitol site, affecting another property of Jose Benares, appears to have been instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have mistaken the
payment for his land included in the Capitol site, as one intended for Lot 378, which was
affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may amount to a probability when we
consider that he erroneously believed that there had been only one expropriation case,
instead of two cases, against him, and that Lot 378, was not included in the mortgage
constituted by him in favor of the Philippine National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at
least, an accurate recollection of the events or transactions affecting his properties, and,
hence, his testimony may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition by the
defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be the exclusive property of plaintiff
herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of plaintiff's
president to the effect that he did not know until 1949 that the land on which the Provincial
Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held that plaintiff was "not a purchaser in good
faith for having constructive knowledge of defendant's possession of the property at the
time it was bought by the plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benares whose right to buy the
Hacienda Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff "is a part owner of the
Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein"; because the hospital was
already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot was declared in the name of the
Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in 1935 the purchaser should have inquired
as to its location and improvement"; because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over the
supposed rights to take possession of lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact
that lot No. 378 was erroneously or inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q
& R) executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiff subdivision and that
same lot was occupied by the defendant government for the provincial hospital for the last
34 years, as owner thereof".
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did not know
until 1949 that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the provincial hospital. Moreover,
there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known to Carlos P. Benares before
1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced from the circumstances that he is a son of
its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the latter appears not to be well-posted on the
status of his properties. Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently know that there were two
(2) expropriation proceedings effecting said properties: that the P12,000 received by him
from the Government was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties
mortgaged by him to the Bank.
"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts
of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry
(Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940,
March 30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13791, February 27, 1961). In the
case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was
not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378.
Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the hospital site had
begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly
registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, was not cancelled
until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was
subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru
foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the
property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to plaintiff
herein, as well as when the bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on
September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that
sugar centrals as well as banks are known to have an array of experienced and competent
lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified in assuming that said institutions
had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were satisfied that the same belonged to
the mortgagor when said mortgages were constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of
sale was executed. In short, we find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for
value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not contested,
and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due by reason of the
expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the fair
and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken
by the defendant, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from which
consequential damages the consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted, with
interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date
of said actual taking. The case should be remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the
reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the amount of compensation
collectible from the defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision
thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs against the
defendant. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon
and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.
50
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449 (February 23,
1909)
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this
Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to
bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of
the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one
who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of
1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is
a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how
far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far
it will recognize actual facts.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied
by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691,
providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one
who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with
certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by
Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years,
and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with
provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the
Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the
continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of
certain land. The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government
of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes. The Court of First Instance
found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of
error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held
the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient
for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it
seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used
parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been
recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his
father in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from
the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made
application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it,
unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be
occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried
out by the Philippine government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a
petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him,
that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The government has
spent some energy in maintaining that this case should have been brought up by appeal,
and not by writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The
proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in
principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens Act, such as
was discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to
equity, and is an assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either
pigeon hole. A writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal
the exception, confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not applying the
general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v.
Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested that, even if
the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's
Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation.
But that act deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc.,
and the perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he
now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act
No. 496, of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout
the Philippine Archipelago," 2, and authorized in general terms applications to be made
by persons claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is
entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely, whether
the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain
assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit
to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and
that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to
make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it
was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so
that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
51
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the
Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to
which the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the
plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general
attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment
accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in
legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States
may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When
theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree.
How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the
head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish
officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which
formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title
beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it does
not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted
and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that,
however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object
in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their
country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. 691, all
the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered "for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus
assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its
attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws."
5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from 12, it is hard to believe that
the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not
embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had
become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had
heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association -- one of the profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish
conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen
hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13,
1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation
was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and
under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were
owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native
who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It
is true again that there is excepted from the provision that we have quoted as to the
administration of the property and rights acquired by the United States such land and
property as shall be designated by the President for military or other reservations, as this
land since has been. But there still remains the question what property and rights the
United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the
necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the
government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say
that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case
like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought
not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the
attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way,
it was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power
and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same
course as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law
14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call
for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship
and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse.
The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain
beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil.
546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is
admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain,
we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines
in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal
lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with
52
the usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For
cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So Judgment reversed.
that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the
very terms of the decree. But, it is said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment
or registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get a
document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it does not
appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made
"for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We follow
the translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was royal
land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided that "interested parties not included
within the two preceding articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty
years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said
lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner."

This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners by lapse
of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of
which they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the
treasury "will reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction
such part as it does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no
attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it should
be noted that the natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council
of state. That report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the
condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general
rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession,
recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then
suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their possession
and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means
may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in
any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13,
1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880,
for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but
as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This
same decree is quoted by the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the
common law prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem
not without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on
that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
53

G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
v. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO
MARTINEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
v. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA
TANALEGA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners. Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October
9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan, Branch I, in LRC No. N-210,
and in LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are
hereby decided jointly.
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for
registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of
Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.
On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the
Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.
On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to
the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.
On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:
Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during
the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land, subject matter of this application, was
a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land was assigned as Lot No. 626
(Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-opened and the Land
Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his report and/or comment as to
whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the
lower court a report stating.
That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely
inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad.
Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097.
Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez,
62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same
from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the
land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42
mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that
possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner.
Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito
Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since 1938, applicant
has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son
Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared
alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the
other; that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.
While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land
of the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less; that said Luisito Martinez
inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there
are 42 mango trees on the land,
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under
Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case
No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of
Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297
square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and
more particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre,
covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively.
On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within
ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has been issued patents or is the subject
of any pending application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed
the Commissioner of Land Registration to submit within the same period his report if the
land applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in
the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to
have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section
1858 of the Revised Administrative Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of
the Land Registration Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation
stating "that Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No.
N-41884, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission does not
appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and
records of said Land Registration application will be subjected to further examination as
soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission
54
to determine whether or not a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to
avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."
At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court
issued an Order of General Default against all persons, with the exception of the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and
the oppositor Eliseo Martinez represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to
file their respective oppositions,
On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands
and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein),
testified in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years
old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support
of her application for registration. On the other hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for
the government, and submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the
provincial fiscal's office in this case.
At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old,
testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept
of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who
allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid
for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.
Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones
working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents, on their request to
owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant;
that 16 hectares of these lands were planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture
land and planting vegetables.
Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had
known Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; that she was the one managing
the planting and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and
another one also named Agapito del Rosario worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land;
that Elisa Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.
At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the
government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District
Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio
Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES
more or less, as shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two
sheets, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and
Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry as
such on February 16, 1972."
The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to
testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also failed to present Guillermo
Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant
was presented as witness to prove that the applicant had possessed the land as owners.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated
October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and
adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now
respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision
of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under
Act 496. Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to
registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory
registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.
It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land
subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral
Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097";
that some portions of Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that
"portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object
of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the
return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details
required by law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots
claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and
municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners
of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express
grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer
need state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was
acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any,
held possession; (6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer
shall set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If
the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance,
if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the
absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the
aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they
were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims
would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in
question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land,
under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole
world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already
determined by final judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be
noted that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that
only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
55
ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the period
thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants,
therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession
in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by law.

Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by
the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration
Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case.
Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of
tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-
beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character
and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of
Lands, the same are not of much value. 4

WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby reversed. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.

56

G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES
COMMISSION, petitioners,
v. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-
R, affirming the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in
Land Registration Case No. N-506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo,
Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission,
oppositors. " The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the
bigger portion of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A together
with the improvements thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age,
widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City,
Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15 meters
wide which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial Road
and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties of the Province of
Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province. The oppositions of
the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Philippine Fisheries
Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of 2.6864 hectares which is
enclosed in red pencil and is found inside Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit is hereby
declared public land. After the decision has become final let the corresponding
decree be issued. SO ORDERED.
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution dated
December 14, 1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive
Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or
varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before it.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan
Psu-150727, containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an
application for registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself
occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose
Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21,
1934. The Director of Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the
applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for,
which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to
the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his
opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter
of the application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove
swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of
Buenavista, Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of
land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in place of the latter,
attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title substantially
reproducing the allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine
Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of
petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be
registered, supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau
of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4)
parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion
Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and
subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the
following errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND
AND LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE
UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE
APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN
PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE TO
CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER.
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for reconsideration of the
same hence the present petition with two (2) assigned errors, basically the same issues
raised with the respondent court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR
STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE
SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
57
 RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS
PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE
REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN
QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL.
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863
hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public
domain. These are more particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the
sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels
A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-A," is now the center of controversy of the
present appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1)
the controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No.
1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18, 1956 of the then
Director of Forestry to the effect that the area in question is needed for forest purposes.
Respondent court in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the
controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within
Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the public
forest not susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit convincing
proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the
presumption is that these are agricultural lands. Respondent court based its conclusion
upon the premise that whether or not a controverted parcel of land is forest land, is a
question of fact which should be settled by competent proofs, and if such a question be an
issue in a land registration proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to
submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for
agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent court
did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force particularly where, as in the case
at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the government taking any
positive step to dislodge the occupants from their holdings which have passed from one to
another by inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise
stated, it is Our impression that private respondents claim the rule of prescription against
the government.
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the controversial
area is within a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by the
Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence
they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director
of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more
valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of whether the
land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said forest land had been declared and
certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several
years before the original applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on
July 11, 1961. In the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49,
cited by private respondents themselves in their brief, We held
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil.
10), it is again held, that whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for
forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which
must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the particular land is
agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular
case unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by
law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or
mineral resources.
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that-
... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under
either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all
public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the
taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the
Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land
is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No.
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government
and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not
the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the
President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to
ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and
(2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription
inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the
portions applied for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription,
unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23
SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE,
and a new one is hereby rendered, declaring that:
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of 11.1863
hectares of coconut land and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain
are hereby ordered registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his
successors-in-interest as provided for by the Public Land Law; and
2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of
19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the
Philippines and are therefore inalienable.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
58

G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORP., and
the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners,
v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods Corporation (hereafter simply
SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH)
bring to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Republic of the
Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the respondent judge dated
October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is
ordered to require private respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said Civil
Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits and to
render judgment thereon.'
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated by the
petitioners in their petition are accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor
of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in
Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register
of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of
defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant
Coral Beach Development Corporation I
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as
Civil Case No. 4062. 2
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative remedies
before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible and
imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the Solicitor General and
not by the Director of Lands. 3 The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the
complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977, 4adopting mainly the theory that since the titles
sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and filed a
Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 . 5 The Solicitor General then moved for an
extension of thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay the docket fee
in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be followed by another motion for extension filed
by the Solicitor General, resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another
extension of fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension
lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals
was filed.
According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint and in
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss, the correctness of its
decision must be decided in the assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the
complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands; hence,
inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not initiated by the
Director of Lands.
59
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for alleged failure of
petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. 6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside the Order of
Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the
presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the private respondents
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises for granting a review:
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient administration of
justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14They must lead to the proper and just
determination of litigation, without tying the hands of the law or making it indifferent to
realities.
Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. 15 The long line of decisions denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was
availed of or specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the
instances when certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests
of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, 16 or when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 17

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give due course to
determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public concern which is the
law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy.

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court, in the
judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance
supervision . 7 in a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the respondent Court has departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has
We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the Republic of the been committed by the respondent court. 18
Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The
filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint
instituted by the Republic.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as
forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied
specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.

If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and
academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open
to disposition. 10

Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands
to the dominion of the State. 11 Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes,
there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain. 12

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity
on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest. 13

The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land is by
remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved.

60

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
v. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the
bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases
at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine
was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children,
Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots
1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and
Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok
Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her
father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and
his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed
with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time,
who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her
tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was
sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located
the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its
purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual
assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25,
1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio.
These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which
has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as
evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and
its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their
claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants
appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the
claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la
61
Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument
that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to
the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and
Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June
Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James
E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the
June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on
October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements
on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted
geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet
redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to
5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims
of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become
private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration
was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at
that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible
and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated
the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment
the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located,
and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had
become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be
granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be
made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if
a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in
a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of
the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as against the Government.
(Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131;
27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there
is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from
the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320,
322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a
grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface
ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except
as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a
lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location
made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66
Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right
from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature
for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was
categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
62
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the
existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations
as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the
private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the
de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership.
They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965,
relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge,
who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the
absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without
sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had
really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept
of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The
property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not
disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and
to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of
the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the
same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to
its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land
while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel
lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go
without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface
and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be
half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be
either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already
observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and
became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As
long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease
to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a
fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as
follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established
under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not
include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may
be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are
excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for
the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person
is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such
land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission
of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the
land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it
is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution
of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
63
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not
have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural
and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE
and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES,
JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T.
TORRES,
LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR.,
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T.
TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners,
v.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of
Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ
and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors.
CARPIO, J.:
This Petition1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,2 dated June 22,
1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision3 dated January
30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC
Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an
application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square
meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro
(formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620.
Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620
signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of
Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On March 24,
1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-
applicants.4 Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners"
for brevity).5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of
Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions
to petitioners application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of
general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was
surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early
as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the
corresponding real estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in
pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted
evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the
Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the
property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22
March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987
and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property.
He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit "X" and
"X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before
the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned and
possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax purposes, the
latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957
(Exhibit "I" and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by
virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the ownership of
the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando
Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name under Tax
Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3
August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under
Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
64
 5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October
1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale
dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1" to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO,
VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the
property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985 (Exhibit
"Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO
FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA,
JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS,
PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE,
ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions
of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO
and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R.
SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")."6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared
without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the
land registration court issued an order considering the case submitted for decision based
on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing
to January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date,
counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice. Hence, the court again
issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that
petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.
Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We
quote the pertinent portions of the courts decision, as follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses
presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious
possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and
said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio
Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for
Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants
and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to
palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish
registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can
only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed are subject to "private rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 "private
rights" is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private rights" means
that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was
acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of
public lands xxx" (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have
acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per
Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area
applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the Marikina
Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283
promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit "K")."7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991,
petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had
become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18,
1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land Registration
Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
whether the land registration court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the
Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor
failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land
registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as
alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the
Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the
petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there
had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and
disposable making it subject to private appropriation.
65
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of
holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for
brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot,
which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed
that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship
issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary
conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as
represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was
whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain.8
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared
null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court
of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art.
XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong
to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of
land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176
SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that
the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the
public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse,
the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-
Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the
Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988,
submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents readily and
effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collados application that "said
parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land
application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis
supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents
which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have forewarned the
respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
"x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public
domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same
(subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not
the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even
before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains
that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action
must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
convert the same into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate
lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563;
Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time (Suarez
vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339)."9
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE
APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR
INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated July 26,
190410 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-
162620, is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of
petitioners claim over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights." They point
out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are "subject to existing
66
private rights, if any there be." Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the
way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim
and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and
claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the
issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 The Spaniards first introduced the
doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias12 which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."13 Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893.
The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended
the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish
land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests
and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as
follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,
and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage
of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141" for brevity) amended Act
2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber
and mineral lands.17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act
496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.18 The Torrens
system requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named
in the title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon
issuance of the certificate.19 PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted
on June 11, 1978,20 amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting,
however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of
natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and
natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and Utilization of
Natural Resources" barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973
Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV24 on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII25 on "National Economy and Patrimony".
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy.
Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the
Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and
submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and
proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes."26
67
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court had
occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the
parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed
to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates
it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important
product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessit(ies).
The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations
and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered
now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any
ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected
area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control
such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may
damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and
took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and
Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both
watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the
activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation
practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would
have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of
the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-
an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the
Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the
protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would be
destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system
to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds
come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management.
More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of
permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers
are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be
of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of
people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented
before the irreversible damage finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or
DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to
resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural
resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population
growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental
degradation from unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present
and future generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day
inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously
argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the
same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title.
An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or
royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or
adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.29 Or, that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the
filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners
application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985.30 As amended, Section 48 (b) now
reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires
that the applicant must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or
for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued."31
68
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the
Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of
the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original
Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA
1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired
ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the
State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only
been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land
in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect
title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of
EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April
25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the
filing of petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted
because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including
watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or
other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,32 the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and
extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. "
33
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the
nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River
Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in
Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of
landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to
the subject land. The Court ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a
title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject
land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free
patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation
No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest
reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation No. 573,
should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant "had
occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the land for
taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the
government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested
and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the
25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of
the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is
enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights" recognized and respected in
Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held
that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude his land from a military or
forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the property in
question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as
well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at
least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale
for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO
33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the
public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation
No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly
excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-
boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this
excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered
alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26,
1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF
1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN
PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME,
TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR
TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC
LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July
26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which
established the Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
69
Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same,
together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under
the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be,
and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the development plan to be prepared
and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community Development,
which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina
Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan, being N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters
more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2;
thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N
75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W
477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00
m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to
point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due
East 1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56
m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty
(3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable and
disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan being N 74 30 E.,
8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to
point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4;
thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence
Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due
North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E
1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04
m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to
point 17; thence S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point
19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand
two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April
18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of the proposed townsite.
According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot
A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to
MWR coverage.34 Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED
THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN
MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND
REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND
REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby
amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established the townsite
reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced
therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly
described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the
area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated
in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-
20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-
25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities
of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-
41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the
Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12,
Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the
herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
70
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to
declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert
it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.35 Unless and until the
land classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is
the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is
excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal,
containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse
side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso,
is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina Watershed
Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso
Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as
Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated
June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the
exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his
internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering & Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and
that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by several documents
submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report37 dated March 2,
1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms
part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration.
The Report states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San
Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title
in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a
portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the
subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948
and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia
Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree
dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining
portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its
information and guidance with the recommendation that the application in the instant
proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter38 dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region
IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly
confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal,
with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX
(126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is within the
Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which
established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
"x x x
71
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant
but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation
No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended
for rejection (Underlining supplied)." Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex "3"
and made an integral part hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as
original applicant] application is the technical description39 of the Lot signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This
technical description categorically stated that the Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and
positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We
hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established
by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land
continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had
been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would
have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The
result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly
possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters
even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According
to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant
communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by
analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply."40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due
course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics petition for
annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of the land registration court
had allegedly become final and executory. The land registration court rendered its decision
on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991.41 Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the
petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 12942 only on August 6,
1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners
further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land
registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority
to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land
registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not
alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision was null and
void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because
it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that the land registration court had
jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is
estopped from questioning the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the
Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and
disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly
show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area
classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab
initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for
annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are
therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as
public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name
of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which
is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over
technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,44 which involved the registration of public lands, specifically
parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the
Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the
Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or
laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be
disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality."
72
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public
properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with
the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought
to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied, developed
and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then President Corazon C.
Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to
them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for
the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the
DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585
dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the
same under the DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY
EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT
SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND
PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33, which
established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public
domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay
San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same
under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel of
land is more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point "1" on plan, being identical to
corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not
otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to
1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays
mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those
awarded were intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease
granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a
period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.45 The DENR
awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-
boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had
conducted.46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC
Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they
filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land
registration court to assert their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land
registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming
petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the decision on August 9,
1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before
the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land registration court could not act
on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8,
1991, enjoining the land registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the
Solicitor General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the
same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene
in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
73
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as Section
2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in
the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals48 reiterated the ruling in
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for
intervention even when the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court
held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x
the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review
said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and,
manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of
Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule
of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court
fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice.
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in
relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of
stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into considering this
too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a
declaration that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We
cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival
groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least
five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side
and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases
between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict
application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71,
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is
AFFIRMED.
Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and,
when it shows itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus
standi, the propriety of the specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of
courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived
as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism,
by the Court.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Courts adjudication
must have a personal and substantial interest in the dispute;1 indeed, the developing trend
would require a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial
power.2 The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case
or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his
invocation of the Courts jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the
Courts remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can
easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no
small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation,3 the Court must take the
liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as
citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them.4 This Court thus did
so in a case5 that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until and
exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself
from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to
what may be considered to be of overriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its
significance to the nation and its people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic
Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently
intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and
development"6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national development policies and programs," to protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.7
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral
domains" to embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources" including "ancestral lands,
forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and
control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains
covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would
comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-
governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the
law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which would encompass
the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands and
natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to
74
their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of
migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains previously reserved
(par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with
customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given
"priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are,
in my view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an
undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a
significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall
not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." 8
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific
mandates in the 1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources", were derived largely from the report of the Committee on
Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources.9 According to the
Committee report, among the principles upon which these provisions were based, was
"that the land, minerals, forest and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage
of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be preserved for those under the sovereign
authority of the Nation and for their posterity."10 The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention were of the unanimous view that the "policy on natural resources, being
fundamental to the nations survival should not be left to the changing mood of the
lawmaking body."11
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
thus expresses this regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that
all lands and natural resources belong to the state other than those which it recognizes to
be of private ownership. Except for agricultural lands of the public domain which
alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other
natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the exploration,
development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and
supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.12
provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has
explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Convention, thus:
"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is
concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to
Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the
codification of these customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now
mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We leave it to Congress to
determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to
whatever may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the
horse."15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the
customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and
make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due process clause," as I so understand it
in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it
is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to
become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them
correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress
to re-examine the law. Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail a
balancing of interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national
interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cario vs. Insular
Government,13 holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals
under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to
downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override the collective will of
the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from
them that all government authority emanates.14 It is not then for a court ruling or any piece
of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to
the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to
provide "for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as
saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws
shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily
75

SEPARATE OPINION (no mention of Regalian doctrine)
MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain
of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek
an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the
questions raised are of "transcendental importance."
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends only to cases and
controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.1 In
this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the
government and other respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by
them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be the
doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case will thus
not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court
the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed
as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions
of the law in question.2
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to
determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive
departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies.
No one reading Art. VIII, 5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the
keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all cases. . . ."
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, 1 not really to give the judiciary
a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking
the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases even where
violations of civil liberties are alleged.
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this Court,
adopting the submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its
jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct and that public safety was
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending
the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
That is why Art. VII, 18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is
noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the opinions of the Court
in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases
or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the
government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a
third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite
them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume
76
jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the
established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him,
it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the
area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party
to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional
but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the
interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even
if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial
invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a
declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not
only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or
hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather than experience.
Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate
questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the
domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot
take place in a vacuum.
regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws." On the
basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to bring these
proceedings.12
In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the
Governor General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The
ruling was that he did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus was
issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit,
because the public has a right to know and the failure of respondents to publish all decrees
and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed petitioners in danger of
violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right is there for
petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in
common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.

Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners will be a "galling cop out"4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism."5 To
decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign of "timidity"
than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to hold that petitioner had the
right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia
only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie, because 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the United States Supreme Court to
issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the courts jurisdiction is mainly
appellate.

Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review,
and so that there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have
enshrined its principle in Art. VIII, 1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result either
in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking and
legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the decisions7 of this Court.

To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is

not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government
whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to
be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in
the Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented."8 For the
exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.9 Until, therefore,
an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of
constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.

Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor
General,10 reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right
and the object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
77
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)
PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted
handling of the procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have
shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of
transcendental importance,1 which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by
the highest court of the land.2 Further, I am satisfied that the various aspects of this
controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by the parties. Moreover,
prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies3 to address the problems raised by
petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral
arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling
copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.

Protection of Indigenous Peoples Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencias resolution of the two main
substantive issues, which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that
Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -

1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public
domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I
respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping
statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of
the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people.
As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire
Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural wealth.

2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the

"exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources," which the
Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the
State."

True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities
right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this
Constitution."4 I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as
well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Such
privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.

Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in
life, Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized
brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be
respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and
the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of
nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the
78
nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the
repository of the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the Philippines.
The Constitution Is a Compact
My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all
other laws must conform.5 It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying
the principles upon which the State and the government are founded.6 Having the status of
a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for
the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made
by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner.7 Truly, the
Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern
themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt
from its compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the
state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development."8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions
that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority. More
specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions
contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated
or Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the
"conquest" of our country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly
territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The
King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our
lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources. By royal decrees, though, private
ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed; or (2)
ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained by
prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the
abandonment or waiver of ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United
States. The latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property
rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government
allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x
exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they are found."10 To
a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and dispose of mineral
resources and other rights arising from mining patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it
crafted and ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the
Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources.11 Although respecting
mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might be entitled to
undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:
"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8
and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state:
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources.
Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
79
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish
workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution."
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially
impelled by the desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos
themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers decided to
embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation of
the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in
support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows: "[T]he natural resources,
particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not
only to the generation then but also to the succeeding generation and consequently should
be conserved for them."12
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all
forces of energy and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the
Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural resources. Their
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted only to Filipino
citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The present Constitution even
goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly states that only
agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant
provision:13
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. x x x."
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all
ancestral domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these
properties - including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are
private and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged to the
indigenous peoples ancestors since time immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the
Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the
1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the States
implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned
have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in
private land, the State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of
its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by
any private person, including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would
impede the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled to just compensation for the
loss sustained.
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim
holders and patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to
comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a
waiver of the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history
cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived
lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the
nations resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply
because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by
statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of lands
and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It would be plain injustice
to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal
opportunity to enjoy the countrys resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not
grant ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it
recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain."16 I say, however, that
such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a provision that
exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares
that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State"; and
"with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,17 the Court declared as belonging to the public
domain all lands not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under
laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory
information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of
ICCs/IPs from that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain
that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair
synthesis of these refers to x x x the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control x x x,
a collective right to freely use the particular territory x x x [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that
preserves the property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of
its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however, still
80
perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by
other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of private
respondents claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and
lands to the pre-Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands
and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-
based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups ownership claims:
limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of
ancestral domains, then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is
IPRAs Section 5719- without the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) - insofar
as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural
resources within ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must
fail. Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but
in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty
to uphold the tenets of that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to
them.
Cario v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution
In this connection, I submit that Cario v. Insular Government20 has been modified or
superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as
referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I
must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cario refers to land ownership only, not to the
natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed
down after our three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority
member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c).22 The reason was that the
property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the
solicitor generals following statements:
"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law
involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to
unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions do not
include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution
states that with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated. The new
Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that with the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is
incapable of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense
of indefeasiblity of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against
the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of
a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab
initio."
RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains
The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural
resources found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings
of the law belies this statement.
Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging
to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein,
held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement x x x. It shall
include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs
encompass the natural resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and
protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law
declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources found therein,
are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest
ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means
that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not
indigenous can never own any part thereof.
On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands
occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial x x x, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, x x x
including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the right of ownership and
possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership need not be by virtue of a
certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, more specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public
domain, minerals and natural resources none of which, except agricultural lands, can be
alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land must
first be reclassified and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
purposes by a positive act of the government.26 Mere possession or utilization thereof,
however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere
conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title."28
81
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are
merely definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions of the
law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group."29 It
determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined.30 Thus, after defining a term
as encompassing several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be
interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated items in its definition. For that
would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law. In other words, since RA
8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found therein and
further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can
own natural resources.
In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral
domains, with no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly
contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards international
law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land.31
No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371
Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than
12 hectares of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than
that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact,
by their mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties
under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes
all "lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as
they have used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back
to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use
enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic
ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land, several
thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on
compounded or consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what their
forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our country."32 They trace their right
to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and
datus, who had settled in many islands that have become part of Mindanao. This long
history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral lands.33
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs
as ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.34 Based on
ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80
percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of
land in the country.35 This means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third of the
country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,36 while
over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the
remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a "more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos.
RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter
into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos.37 Such agreements, however,
shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and conditions
as may be provided by law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs,
insofar as natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their
rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources,
benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof.38 And
they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so
only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period.39 Consistent with the
Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must
also be limited to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State.
Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's
power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in
contravention of our most fundamental law.
I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale
utilization of natural resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection.
These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371
(1) ownership of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2)
the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and utilization of such resources I
believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains
amounts to undue deprivation of private property
2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants
3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies
and other forms of exaction
4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the
settlements of disputes over their rights and claims
5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses
82
 6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces
against their will
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or,
at least, no longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two
major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I think
that in the case of the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those whose
rights may have been injured by specific provisions of RA 8371.
Epilogue
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well being.
"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."
Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of
ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development policies
and programs.
Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society.
This does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the
Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving
them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and
domains.41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth
to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by our
previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of the rule
of law.
In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively
mandating "reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at
the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced
generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to
a conflagration of national proportions.
Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to
coddle the few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be
approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the
nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of
opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from
exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice empowering and
enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings
of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and
to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and
related provisions of RA 8371.
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari
Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of
Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the
total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds
of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to
amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded
and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement
dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
83
 "(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in
the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to
progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed
upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such
works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede
and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of
CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of
December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise
disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately
Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in
the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three
Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight
(3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean
Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First
Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque
issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands
have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred
and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a
result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands
of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom
Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in
view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government
Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA
Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating
panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed
the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling
of the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed
the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to
lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of
the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the
State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on
October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and
(c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for
Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June
22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now
prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared
null and void."14
The Issues
84
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE
MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE
THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and
academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from
"privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for
a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing
of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the
Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the
Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply
fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on
the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from
the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA
and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of
the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed
violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if
already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer
title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of
Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the
Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether
intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to
the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired
the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could
claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to
acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-
agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA
No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the
consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of
their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to
be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to
portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to
AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the
principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly
from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving
factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public.22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual
issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls
under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
85
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly
certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's
direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It
also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the
petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office
of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada,
the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil
Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees.
There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from
the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory
duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts
that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive
legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner
or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the
Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding.
Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and
was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce
his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has
not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation
of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the
power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues
involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern.
Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the
first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands
worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA
to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling
PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez
v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts
that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning
the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the
social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in
this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public
interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public
right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action.
In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed
on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that
the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than
the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared
that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a
citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may
not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development,
management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public
interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of
the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the
disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for
upholding the petitioner's standing.
86
 Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information
and access to official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general,
is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid
down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the
petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources -
matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters
of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces
the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is
expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are
essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are
also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people,"29 for
unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable
for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants
in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right
does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following
discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it
can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials
will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate
public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before
they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to
release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and
without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its
property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property
being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid,
the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose
them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of
the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails
to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time
during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the
right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official
acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of
the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any
87
citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.
In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions
of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There
is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information."
(Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too
late for the public to expose its defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement
will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of
its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern,"
namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies.
The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers
recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official
acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category
refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and
used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings,
terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to
the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords
access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and
copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at
his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect
the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like
rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information
on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information
on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the
accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be
subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings
which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind
of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39This is not the situation in
the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations
on the right to information in several legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public
domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories
and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.42The King, as the
sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and
territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private
individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting,
however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land
ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is
now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership
and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine
Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on
November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act,
which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
88
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and
individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters
within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public
use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article
5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party
undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did
not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public
use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory,
and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service
and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or
commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to
the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the
State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private
parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the
lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing
law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine
Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights
and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta
Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public
lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to
be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located
thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed
with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give
notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are
not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business
purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and
best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the
Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed
by the government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of
foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if
these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public
bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government
reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could
sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act
No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with
government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land
Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
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 "Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of
under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or
other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public
domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the
Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8
of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been
"officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title48 shall be
classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands.
All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-
General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands
of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify
further such disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or
marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public
domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-
General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare
that the lands were "not necessary for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State
policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the
public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for
public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the
lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some
future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under
Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell
to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a
law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private
parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino
people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1,
Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
90
 established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus,
foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by
constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The
government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and
classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the
classification of public agricultural lands.50 However, government reclaimed and marshy
lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only
be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain
that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold
public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four
hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess
of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand
and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares.
Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased
to an individual, private corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of
Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State
policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public
domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands.51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
"alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the
President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA
No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only
lands that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read
as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another,53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by
this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then
declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these
lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber
nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural,
and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or
other means;
(b) Foreshore;
91
 (c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the
case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or
lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in
class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this
Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section
58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed
only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties
only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural
purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands
of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935
Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain
intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not
otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the
land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a
subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter,
as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are
lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654
mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water
remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of
reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the
foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not
necessary for the public service. This requisite must have been met before the
land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under
water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of
the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land remained property of the
State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus
reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale
of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by
the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they
would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private
parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the
President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural
lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or
disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private
parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before
lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or
entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary
for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed
one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall
not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or
branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities
conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or
transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of
in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted
government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be
acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around
and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.
Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and
entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be
used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141
constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands.57
92
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59
of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No.
141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not
needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority
to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall
give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases
or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication
shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with
government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if
classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under
CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion
found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no
longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as
patrimonial property of the State.59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of
their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion
those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for public
service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if
developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the
Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of
the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception
of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources
except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935
Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the
public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would
fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public
domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological,
and development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law
the size of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired
by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the
conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of
twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease,
concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest
resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may
be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the
93
public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds
of alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied
only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special
charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and
powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging,
filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real
property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the
efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out
the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow
of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public
domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned
government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to
"private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold
lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations
by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the
public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This
legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be
subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the
Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned
by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural
resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state
that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
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The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the
1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the
general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through
lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this
ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5
which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was
introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from
acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in
jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982
and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large
landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-
square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would
be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this
way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or
to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to
prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by
corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could
have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could
acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could
acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in
the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands.
If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his
heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland.
This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from
one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire
more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face
of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to
individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists
of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined
titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;"
and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or
less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands
and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of
the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for
PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete,
at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all
the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed.
AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the
95
total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less
30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area,
totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the
Amended JVA provides that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the
Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then
cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than
seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA
shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to
AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional
land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of
367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged
areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform
Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the
Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right,
authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master
Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995
and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under
the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila
Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA
admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No.
365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V.
Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority,
the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been
transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the
same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public
land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to
reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged
areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands
as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved
them for some public or quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified."72 The
President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs.
Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo,
Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen
years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274of the Civil Code, a property of
public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled
that
96
 "The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu
Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands,
108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents
for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On
January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the
name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque
issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To
this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and
President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some
areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus,
the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification
of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of
the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x
owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public
domain which the State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads
as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless
otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from
the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own the
reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This
clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or
withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from
which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea
without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which
would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently
enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of
the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government
can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public
purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was
executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have
converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the
reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the
power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of
areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation
of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a
person contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea
only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission
as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government,"
which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it
with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation
for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in
kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can
be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or
disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15
hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative
or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not
97
covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged
areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are,
under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public domain
and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these
submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution
are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these
lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed
lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter
to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under
Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate
railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain
and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct,
maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue
"rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or
all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to
impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since
many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or
entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA
became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the
government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum
utilization in promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these
reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal
declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still
needed for public service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or
be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once
reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No.
525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity)
the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form
of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or
gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges
concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's
marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the
country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural
resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which
are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the
national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of
all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also
exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs
authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or
in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public
domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as
alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed
lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a
proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised Administrative
Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under
water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the
President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
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Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas
does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National
Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and
open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I
and Title III83of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the
Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands
transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance
shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to
the Government. The Court declared that -
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence."
(Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila
Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November
20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is
hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No.
1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract
shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways)
arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding
shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which)
shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates
Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate
agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural
Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the
subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the
above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land
Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title."
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the
PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or
disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any
and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed
lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by
PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should
dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1084," the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial
or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition
against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however,
cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such
99
sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government
reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not
apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban.
Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to
conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions
of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law
exempting PEA from holding a public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states
that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented
by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the
provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes
PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and
properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654
merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment,
but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public
bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any
cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable
therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized
representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be
valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be
valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the
supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of
the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after
advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than
three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the
value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices
posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the
property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the property
may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same
committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The Commission on Audit
implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-
29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be
disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in
case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are
barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991.
PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of
submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of
the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No one, however, submitted
a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could
sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding,
because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and
the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to
reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the
reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991,
involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding
happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of the original
JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during
the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute
and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity),
cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties,
recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-
and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in
the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not
limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to
the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x
x x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government
BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI,
authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or
developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management
of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
100
 In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment
plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or
the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to
that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply
even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the
reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed
land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in
ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only
way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct
collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to
public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This
theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading
to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain
and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI
contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding
certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become
private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of
the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of
title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes
under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court
ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may
do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to
be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate
of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the
said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of
Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical
Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a
'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center.
Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of
the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or
private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of
this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the
Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the
certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case
cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land
granted by the National Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under
the Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public
land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical
Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-
hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No.
496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496
without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of
PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is
asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust
of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land
covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be
sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership
but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes
of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain
under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title
the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was
made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No.
3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
101
 "NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084,
supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby
granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of
land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which
are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered
by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by
Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to
government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD
No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the
certificate of title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under
Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such
law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA
No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these
lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless
areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO
No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for
all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's
declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation
of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall
be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper
contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National
Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in
the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority
as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure
their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing
authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or
merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible
for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and
on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be
approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government
agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation
with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide,
with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government
agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed
lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR,
when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable
lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the
lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and
authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these
lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public
domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public
domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like
the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in
PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn
around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds
of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation
in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership
of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million
strong.
102
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the
floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private
lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this
country - creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The
1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of
public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any
kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or
PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No.
496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act
No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA
No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No.
1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA
No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a
manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers
to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been
titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress.
The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from
becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain
may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code
states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance
shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality."
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public
wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in
the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an
airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the
airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school
site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become
properties of the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for
the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain
become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No.
1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government
new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or
interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National
Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality
exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified
copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the
particular property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title,
and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall
be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee
simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National
Government, province, city, municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses
incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title
shall be for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein."
(Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively
private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to
existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom
Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words
of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for
reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and
construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic."
Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended
JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
103
except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI
will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a
"disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA
No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged
areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless
converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to
private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain,
increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our
ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the
State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is
contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and
void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether
the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on
this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
104

Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Facts:
In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked
with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of
PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds
of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM
ISLANDS.
Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares,
PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This
caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such
lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).
Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and
from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA
and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null
and void.
Issues:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in
the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Facts: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of
the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
105

G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, petitioner,
v.
HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA
ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA,
EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the
Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired
through such means.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
44568. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE and
RECALLED."2
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA thus:
"On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed with the
District Land Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering
a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .3899
hectares, more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. "A"; Exh "9"). It
appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was executed under
oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and
verification of the land to the District Land Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas.
On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the
application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the applicant. On March 16,
1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent was forwarded to
defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and issuance of the
corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. P-15
Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by defendant Register of
Deeds.
"On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-
complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the
District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of [respondent].
Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division, Land
Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report dated April
17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila,
recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the
cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of [respondent].
"In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage
Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank
(hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of
P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was
annotated at the back of the title.
"On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against
[respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas
City covering Free Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an
area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City.
"On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent] died. He
was substituted by his wife Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette
Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga, Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga. Roqueta
Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga III.
xxx xxx xxx
"After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of Free Patent
Application No. 3358 and issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the
name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio and the
court orders:
a) the cancellation of the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442
covering Lot No. 1, Mli-06-000020-D with an area of .3899 hectares,
more or less, located at Dumulog, Roxas City;
b) the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent
No. (VI-2) 3358 in the name of Felipe Alejaga;
c) the land covered thereby as above described is reverted to the mass
of the public domain;
d) the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine
National Bank, Roxas City Branch, to surrender the owners duplicate
copy of above described Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 to the
106
 Register of Deeds (now Registries of Land Titles and Deeds), Roxas
City;
e) the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15 and the owners duplicate copy of said title
surrendered by above stated defendants;
f) defendants, Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed.
"Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that
respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and
misrepresentation.4 The appellate court likewise held that, assuming there was
misrepresentation or fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for reversion should have
been brought within one (1) year from the registration of the patent with the Registry of
Deeds.5
Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land
Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application
of Felipe Alejaga Sr.6 The CA added that petitioner had failed to support its claim that the lot
covered by respondents free patent and title was foreshore land.7
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
"I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case is already final and
executory as against respondent PNB.
"II
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has proven the allegations to
the Complaint.
"III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action for reversion is
unavailing."9
Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the grant of the
free patent and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title issued in consequence
thereof.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent Alejagas free
patent and Certificate of Title.10 It also avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely
Notice of Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested right over the
parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven open, actual, exclusive
and undisputed possession of the land for more than 30 years.11
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt by Respondent
PNB of a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3, 1993 as alleged by
petitioner.12 Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the 15-
day reglementary period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition -- the presence
of fraud -- is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual
matters.13 However, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions, because the findings
of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the evidence on record.14
We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud
or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.15 The circumstances evidencing fraud
are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case.16 It may assume different
shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.17 Thus, the law requires
that it be established by clear and convincing evidence.18
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of evidence
before the trial court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the patent.19 This Court agrees
with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had
resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were20 ignored by the Court of
Appeals.21
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid
down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.22 Under
Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are true.23
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the
municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the
opportunity to present their claims.24 Note that this notice and the verification and
investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an application for free patent
has been filed with the Bureau of Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent25 was dated and filed
on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation & Verification
107
Report26 prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the
Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated
that he had conducted the "necessary investigation and verification in the presence of the
applicant." Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot
be condoned because, obviously, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation allegedly
conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the Public Land Act.27 As
correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been done
only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for
Recio to conduct his own investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day
before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent.28 It must also be noted that
while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact
that it preceded the filing of the application.29
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not
sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.30 Their
reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty31 is thus
misplaced. Since Recios signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report,
there can be no presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was
actually conducted. Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the
Verification & Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as
will later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever existed
-- is overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully
rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an
investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios
alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A witness may testify as
to the state of mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith
-- and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule.32
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-
examination, the Investigation Report33 he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of
Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his
personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.34 On the other hand,
the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as independently
relevant.35
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated
to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or
falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue36 or (b) is circumstantially
relevant to the existence of such fact.37
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had
conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial
court.38
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention that the free
patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.39 Such fraud is a ground for impugning the
validity of the Certificate of Title.40 The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying
the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of
the former.41 Verily, we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the Alejagas
patent and title was tainted with fraud.42
Second Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a
piece of property belonging to the public domain.43 On the other hand, the Alejagas claim
that, pursuant to Section 32 of PD 152944 -- otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree -- the one-year period for reversion has already lapsed.45 Thus, the States
Complaint for reversion should be dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land
covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after
the issuance of the latter.46 However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation.47 Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration
of a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.48
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,49 the State -- even after the
lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land
that has been fraudulently granted to private individuals.50 Further, this indefeasibility
cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the
purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in
securing the title.51
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by the
Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud.52 Public policy demands that
those who have done so should not be allowed to benefit from their misdeed.53 Thus,
prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property
acquired through fraud by private individuals.54 This is settled law.55
Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is another basis for the
cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 14156 proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired
under a free patent or homestead within five years from its grant.57The prohibition against
any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of
every application.58
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title to, or interest
in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or any improvements thereon.
They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have not secured the
consent of the grantee and the approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture
108
and Natural Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than
education, charity, or easement of way.59
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 335860 was approved and issued on March 14,
1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-1561 was issued on the same date.
On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr.
obtained from Respondent PNB a loan62 in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement
on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable
for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the
parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15.63 In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then
Cashier III of respondent bank, even admitted that the PNB was aware of such restriction.
Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free patent constitutes
sufficient ground for the nullification of such grant, as provided under Commonwealth Act
No. 141, which we quote:
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution
and shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit
originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the State."

"COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you credit Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies the award and
investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have personally examined constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the state, as we held in Republic v.
this? Court of Appeals:68

A Yes, your Honor.
COURT Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] patent?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979.
A Yes, your honor.
COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the
government or within five years from its issuance?
"The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land
acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent.
Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion
of the land to the public domain."69
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years from its
issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel land granted to him.
The mortgage he made over the land violated that condition.70 Hence, the property must
necessarily revert to the public domain, pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is REINSTATED.

A Yes, your honor.

COURT Why did you recommend the loan?

A Because it is just a mortgage."64

Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely within the
term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.65 A mortgage
constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage would
necessarily result in the auction of the property.66

As early as Pascua v. Talens,67 we have explained the rationale for the prohibition against
the encumbrance of a homestead -- its lease and mortgage included -- an encumbrance
which, by analogy, applies to a free patent. We ruled as follows:

"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.
Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the
homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent."

109

G.R. No. 156951 September 22, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
v. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF PASIG, RIZAL, respondents.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, intervenor
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, represented by HON. SECRETARY ANGELO
T. REYES, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by CHIEF OF
STAFF, AFP, GENERAL NARCISO L. ABAYA, intervenors
G.R. No. 173408 September 22, 2006
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, MGEN. MARCIANO ILAGAN (Ret.), MGEN. PONCIANO
MILLENA (Ret.), BGEN. JUANITO MALTO (Ret.), BGEN. RAYMUNDO JARQUE (Ret.)
and COL. DOMINADOR P. AMADOR (Ret.), petitioners,
v. L/T. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, the issue of
ownership of a large tract of land.
In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R.
No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines seeks to nullify and set aside the
Decision1 dated January 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
59454, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71,
of the Republics complaint for declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title against
the herein private respondent, the Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI).
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and five (5)
retired military officers pray that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the present Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), be asked to show cause why he should
not be cited for contempt for having announced time and again that the military officers and
their families in the contempt action would be ousted and evicted from the property subject
of the main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by the
Court.
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment2 to the petition in G.R. No.
156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), followed by the
Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined causes with the petitioner
Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The Court, per its Resolutions dated
September 3, 2003,3 and September 29, 2003,4 respectively, allowed the intervention and
admitted the corresponding petitions-for-intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were ordered
consolidated.
The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following backdrop:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No.
4235 establishing a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The proclamation
"withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and reserve[d] for military purposes, under the
administration of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] the [certain] parcels of the public domain
[indicated in plan Psu-2031]" situated in the several towns and a city of what was once the
Province of Rizal. On its face, the proclamation covers three (3) large parcels of land, to
wit: Parcel No. 2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3
with an area of 15,912,684 square meters and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128
square meters are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort McKinley, Rizal.
Specifically mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are the
American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and
the Diplomatic and Consular area (100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined areas from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them open for disposition. These are
Proclamation No. 4616 and Proclamation No. 462,7 both series of 1965, excluding portions
of the reservation and declaring them the AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village,
respectively, to be disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.) 2748 and R.A. 7309 in relation to
the Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172
dated October 16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to the same laws aforementioned,
save those used or earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions of the
reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and the Signal Village, all
in Taguig, Metro Manila.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A. 7227, as
amended), investing the BCDA the power to own, hold and administer portions of Metro
Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President10 and to dispose, after
the lapse of a number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.11
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land
with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as or are situated in what is
referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the
pleadings, military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective
families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP
on the JUSMAG area.
110
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP
military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1508412 - in its name to
the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the
property covered thereby as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-
2031) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal.
containing an area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057,
being a portion of parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang
(sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (1,320)
SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.)
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a
notarized Deed of Sale13purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo
G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.
The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00
per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice
on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991 deed of
sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner
Eliodoro Constantino are embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. 815-
1093.14 Its highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of the Navy Officers Village
Association (NOVA) containing the signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR." designated as "Q-961" .
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of SHAI containing the
signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." ... designated as "Q-962.
xxx xxx xxx
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures
"ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted,
under stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lens, with the aid of photographic
enlargement reveals that there exist fundamental, significant differences in
writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard/sample
signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner in
execution of strokes; that of the standard/sample signatures show free, rapid
coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of
letters/elements.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-
961" is a product of TRACING PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample
signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same
person.
The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a
TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
REMARKS:
The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR." are still in the process of examination.15
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No.
17316 directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the
cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village
Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in
behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding
nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883 and eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the
court, the Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In
paragraph No. 5 of the complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void
owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is spurious as the
purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of
(i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the
property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under
Proclamation No. 423.17
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material allegations of the
complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as the October 30, 1991 Deed of
Sale are valid documents which the Republic is estopped to deny.18 SHAI also alleged
paying in full the purchase price indicated in the deed as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
6030203-C dated October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which the Republic,
as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October
30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then
defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and "B" as its Exhibits "1" and "2," respectively. As
the pre-trial order was written, it would appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to
the due execution and genuineness of Exhs. "A" and "B."19
111
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner
Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the
signature of Palad in Exhibit "A" is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his
signature appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in
front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point,
Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable
in the first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved around the absence of bureau
records respecting SHAIs application to acquire, payment of the purchase price and Psd-
76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084. 20
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of
Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought with him PNP QDR No. 001-96 and
testified that Palads signature in Exhibit "A" (same as Exh. "1") is genuine. Mrs. Virginia
Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were
signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis,21 followed by the payment
in full of the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal, also
testified about his having endorsed to Palad a letter-inquiry he received from SHAI
respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads response-letter dated January 23,
1992 (Exh. "10"), according to Atty. Garcia, is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must be
genuine as it emanated from the Registrys office on the basis of the October 30, 1991
Deed of Sale.22
On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit "10" and an LMB official would disclaim
transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia.
Eventually, in a decision23 dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15, 1991
is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the deed in
question as no longer part of the FBMR.
Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454.
In the herein assailed Decision24 dated January 28, 2003, the appellate court affirmed in
toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic on the threshold abstract submission that the CA
"completely ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of substance which, if
duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of this case."
In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the "what-can-be-raised"
line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the issues raised therein,
particularly those bearing on the authenticity of Exhibit "A"/"1," are mainly questions of
fact, adding that the matter of the inalienability of the area purportedly sold is outside the
issue agreed upon during the pre-trial stage.
The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the reasons proffered above.
While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from absolute. Reyes
v. Court of Appeals,25 citing Floro v. Llenado,26 for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we
wrote:
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court
to review the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in and subsequent cases
as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment
of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if properly considered would
justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
(Words in bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three of the
exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred from raising
the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the same at the pre-trial
proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule, as articulated in Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro,27 is that the determination of issues at a pre-trial
conference bars the consideration of others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however,
that the rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as
possible the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed maneuverings. And lest it
be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in pre-trials is,
as Bergano v. Court of Appeals28 teaches, citing Gicano v. Gegato,29 subject to exceptions.
And without meaning to diminish the importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed
with inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operations whenever the demands of justice so require.30
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-trial
conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to tackling the question of
inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal than factual. As it were, the
element of surprise is not really present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is central
to the Republics cause of action, was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the CA
and, before it, by the trial court31 and of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined
as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the land
alleged sale was part of the [FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do you know
whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those
government lands that has been assigned to other government agencies that is no
112
 longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that because
the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose under the
DND .32 (Words in bracket added.)
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent SHAI. It
even cross-examined said witness.33 The rule obtains that the introduction of evidence
bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the pre-trial order amounts to implied consent
conferring jurisdiction on the court to try such issue.34
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the clashing
assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during the period material, alienable or
inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private
conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of the
JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the military
reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain
as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses
or purposes.35 Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall
not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.36 Consistent with
the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR,
or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable,37 unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and
alienable public land.38 And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as
part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation
as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,39 even if
incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it
must be here.
There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30,
1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423.
And while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had
not presented evidence that "subject land is within military reservation,"40 and even dared
to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se,41 its own evidence
themselves belie its posture. We start with its Exhibit "2" (petitioners Exh. "B"), a copy of
TCT No. 15084, which described the area covered thereby measuring 399,922 square
meters as a "portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort
Bonifacio." Complementing its Exhibit "2" is its Exhibit "1" - the deed of sale - which
technically described the property purportedly being conveyed to private respondent SHAI
as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan
Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx
(Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private
respondents Exhibits "1" and "2," formed part of that wide expanse under Proclamation
No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of the public domain as
falling within its coverage. These include, inter alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter
area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 located inside the now renamed Fort
Mckinley which, to a redundant point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation Map of
Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu 203142 prepared in
September 1995 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). It indicates in colored ink the outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by
Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced
by SHAIs TCT No. 15084, defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-
colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of the FBMR,
more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No. 3 of the reservation. The
petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate
proceedings, has maintained all along this thesis. Towards discharging its burden of
proving that the disputed property is part of the reservation, the petitioner Republic need
only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu
2031 have been reserved for military purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of
reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and
issuance of which courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court.43
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No.
423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area
coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved
area considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the
appellate court seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain
admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made in its answer
to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of its complaint. To the Republics
allegations that the property covered by TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR,
SHAIs answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the complaint,
the truth of the matter being that in the Deed of Sale , the Director of Lands
Certificate (sic) that he is "authorized under the law to sell" the subject property
and that the "lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee.44 ( Emphasis
and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic alleged in par.
5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers denial to such allegations on the inalienable
nature of the property covered by TCT No. 15084 being in the nature of a general denial.
Under the rules on pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not
specific because it is so qualified or termed "specific" by the pleader.45 The defendant must
specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he will rely to
support his denial.46 Else, the denial will be regarded as general and will, therefore, be
regarded as an admission of a given material fact/s stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what, under the Rules,
is tantamount to a general denial of the Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT No.
113
15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the process, private respondent SHAI is
deemed to admit the reality of such averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than sufficiently established
its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it
had discharged the burden of proof on the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the
burden of evidence to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had,
for settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or excluded from
the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it
should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim respecting the validity of both the underlying
deed of sale (Exh. "A"/"1") and its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") rests on the postulate that
what it purportedly bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the
public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn
from the reservation and declared open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable
right over the area as against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of evidence. To
be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it wanted to, pointed to any presidential act
specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423.
Worse still, its own Exhibit "5,"47 a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding
General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the SHAI, cannot
but be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be excluded
from the military reservation. The Abadia letter, with its feature dis-serving to private
respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Dear Mrs. Gabon:
This is in connection with your move to make a petition to President Aquino
regarding the possible exclusion of Southside Housing Area from the military
reservation and for its eventual allotment to the military officers presently
residing thereat. Allow me to state that I interpose no objection . I find it
helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of the Fort Bonifacio military
reservation . (Underscoring added.)
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand how the CA
could still have found for SHAI.. The appellate court, apparently swayed by what SHAI said
in its Brief for the Appellees48 that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that , then President
Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square meters more or
less. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio containing an area of 4,436,
478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288]
square meters covered by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved
for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857
square meters or more or less 16 hectares .49
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following disquisition:
The foregoing admission aside, appellants [now petitioners] reliance on
Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that the land in litigation is
inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit serous
consideration. While it is true that, under the said July 12, 1957 Proclamation,
then President Carlos P. Garcia reserved the area now known as Fort Bonifacio
for military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our attention to the
fact, among other matters, that numerous exceptions thereto had already been
declared through the years. The excluded areas under Proclamation No. 461,
dated September 29, 1965 and Proclamation No. 172, dated October 16, 1987
alone already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures in bracket added.)
The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to justify speculative
inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved for military purposes roughly a total
area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos.
461 and 172 excluded a combined area of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump
from an acknowledgment of the disputed parcels of land having been reserved for military
purposes to a rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation
because 6,892,338 square meters had already been withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is
simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual speculations do not make for proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and quite
understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any proclamation, or legislative act
for that matter, segregating the property covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation
and classifying the same as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To
reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation
remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from
such classification and declared open to disposition.50 The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale
purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity, could not plausibly
be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel.
And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel
to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It
should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on
the part of its officials or agents.51
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least
at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio.
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the JUSMAG
area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its reclassification as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such hypothesis would not carry the day for
private respondent SHAI. The reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 352 of the 1987
Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated the
observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear under existing jurisprudence,53 the
fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or
otherwise acquiring alienable public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this disposition. An
appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however, without delving to an extent on
the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves
the question of the authenticity of what appears to be Palads signature thereon.
114
With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances and
inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the authenticity of
such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious. Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery.
The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent states,
without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding "criminal
prosecution".54 The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads allegation on
forgery.55Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the
NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each
other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office
at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad
nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the
notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there
stamped "Received" by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of
October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the
whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very
unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in
the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to
repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to
purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act.56 There is also no
record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application
to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation. The
Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and
issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the LMB
pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court57attest to this fact of absence of
records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division,
LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no
entry pertaining to SHAI.58
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the "deed of
sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29 October
1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.." An
official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it
kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment,59 it
failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. A Certification under date
September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that "OR # 6030203 in
the amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not among the series
of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB,
Central Office."60 A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any of the pleadings
filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it
does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid
has, in fact, never been paid.61
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in
cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in a
mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account
taxes credulity to the limit.
A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to pass without
the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a dishonest buck at the expense of the
government and most likely the members of SHAI. No less than its former president (Ms.
Virginia Santos) testified that a "facilitator" did, for a fee, the necessary paper and leg work
before the LMB and the Registry of Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and
issuance of the certificate of title in question.62 Ms. Santos identified Eugenia Balis, a
geodetic engineer, as the "facilitator"63 who "facilitated all these presentation" of
documents,64 and most of the time, "directly transacted" with the LMB and the Register of
Deeds leading to acquisition of title.65 Engr. Balis was, in the course of Ms. Santos
testimony, directly mentioned by name for at least fifteen (15) times. Not surprisingly, Engr.
Balis did not appear in court, despite SHAIs stated intention to present her as witness.66
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this and the NOVA
area litigations is, as described in the Report of the FactFinding Commission,67 "so epic in
scale as to make the overpricing of land complained of in the two hundred AFP
[Retirement and Separation Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty
shoplifting in comparison."68 The members of private respondent SHAI may very well have
paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the JUSMAG
housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the over P11 Million they paid, if that be the
case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the commerce of man apparently fell
into the wrong hands and did not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be some
memorials of such payment.
At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring the petitioner Republic, and
eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There is nothing
unjust to this approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 173408 need not
detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the petitioners therein respecting the
ownership of the JUSMAG area and, accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired
military officers to remain in the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and
academic. However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the
military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their respective
dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R. No. 156951 could be resolved, is
understandable as it is justified. We thus end this ponencia with a reminder to all and
sundry that might is not always right; that ours is still a government of laws and not of men,
be they in the civilian or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat lightly any
attempt to trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming
respect to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court is a must for the orderly
administration of justice to triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the appealed CA
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale dated October 30,
1991 (Exh. "A"/"1") purportedly executed in favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No.
15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such deed are
declared VOID. The Register of Deeds of Pasig or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby
ordered to CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby
is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same has, in the
interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from such reservation. Private
115
respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or their assigns shall vacate the
subject parcels of land immediately upon the finality of this decision, subject to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act.
Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further thereon other
than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same.
G.R. No. 166865 March 2, 2007
ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F. BUENAVENTURA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The case before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72925 entitled, Angelita F.
Buenaventura and Preciosa F. Buenaventura vs. Republic of the Philippines, dated 23
August 2004 and 25 January 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and declared the parcel of land subject matter of this
Petition as public land, thus, reversing the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City dated 29 October 2001, which recognized and confirmed the rights of
herein petitioners Angelita F. Buenaventura (Angelita) and Preciosa F. Buenaventura
(Preciosa), over the subject property, and issued a decree of registration of the same in
their favor.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration of title over the subject
property. They are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses
Buenaventura) from whom they acquired the subject property.
The facts reveal that the subject property was acquired by the spouses Buenaventura from
the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, namely: Aurelio de Leon and his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda
even before World War II. However, it was only on 30 January 1948 that the corresponding
Deed of Sale4 was executed in favor of the spouses Buenaventura. After the execution of
the said Deed of Sale, the spouses Buenaventura transferred the tax declaration in their
name. Consequently, Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 5492 covering the subject property in the
names of Aurelio and Rodencia was cancelled and T.D. No. 61035 was issued in the name
of spouses Buenaventura.
In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of Sale,6 the subject
property, together with the adjacent property, which they previously acquired from Mariano
Pascual, to their children, among whom are herein petitioners. As a result thereof, a new
tax declaration (T.D. No. A-004-05698)7 was issued in the name of the spouses
Buenaventuras children.
Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the RTC
of Paraaque City of the subject property, more particularly described as Cadastral Lot No.
5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, Paraaque Cadastre, located in San Dionisio, Paraaque
City, with an area of 3,520.92 square meters, more or less. Petitioners alleged that "they
and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance,
transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the
period provided for by law."8
As the trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance, it thereby set
the case for hearing, and directed the service and publication of the notice thereof pursuant
to Section 239 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529).
On 27 September 2001, when the case was called for hearing, no interested party
appeared before the trial court other than the petitioners. Consequently, petitioners
proceeded to present several documents in order to establish compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements. The same were marked and offered in evidence before the
court a quo.
No formal opposition had been filed and no oppositor appeared in any of the previously set
hearings of the case; hence, petitioners counsel moved for the declaration of general
default except for the Republic. The same was granted by the court a quo. The case was
then referred to a commissioner, who directly received petitioners evidence in chief.
Petitioners presented five witnesses, namely: Aniceta C. Capiral, Engr. Teofilo R. La
Guardia, Atty. Reginald L. Hernandez, Ricardo H. Lopez, and herein petitioner Angelita, in
order to establish the fact that petitioners and their predecessors have acquired vested
right over the subject property by their open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a
116
bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any adverse
claim, meaning, their possession of the subject property was in the manner and for the
period required by law; likewise, to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
subject property.
Other than the respective testimonies of the above-named witnesses, they also presented
and identified several documents10 offered in evidence, which tend to establish further the
following: (1) petitioners fee simple title over the subject property; (2) the nature of the
possession and occupation of the property; (3) its classification as part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government; and (4) the improvements introduced thereon and the
taxes paid on the subject property. Said documents were duly admitted by the trial court.
On 29 October 2001, based on the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, the court a
quo issued an Order granting the application for registration of title of the subject property,
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the application of registration of title to the subject parcel of land,
known as Lot 5001-B Cad 299, Paraaque Cadastre, and more particularly described in
approved Survey Plan Csd 007604-000176 is hereby confirmed and ordered registered in
the names of [petitioners] Preciosa, Angelita, [and in the names of their other siblings]
Crisostomo, and Alfredo, all surnamed Buenaventura, free from all liens and
encumbrances.
ONCE THIS DECISION has become final, let another one issue directing the Land
Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree.
Let copies of this [D]ecision be furnished to the adjoining owners, Land Registration
Authority, Land Management Bureau, Office of the Solicitor General, Sec. of Public Works
and Highways, Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director, Forest Management Bureau,
Chairman Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, DENR [Department of Environment
and Natural Resources], South CENRO, Land Management Sector, City Mayor of
Paraaque and Registry of Deeds, Paraaque City.11
Feeling aggrieved with the aforementioned Order of the trial court, the Republic appealed
to the Court of Appeals. According to the Republic, petitioners failed to prove continuous,
open, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by
themselves; hence, the trial court erred in granting petitioners application for registration of
the subject property. The Republic prayed for the reversal of the Order of the trial court and
for the dismissal of the application for registration filed by petitioners.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic,
thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads
as:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 274, Paraaque City dated October 29, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the parcel of land subject matter of the application is declared public land.12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision on 20 September
2004. In a Resolution dated 25 January 2005 rendered by the appellate court, said Motion
for Reconsideration was forthwith denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Decision of the trial
court confirming petitioners title over the subject property for not being allegedly
supported by substantial evidence as required by law.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject
property as pubic land and ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50 year
possession in the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any
adverse claim.
In the Memorandum13 of the petitioners, they allege that the appellate court committed
grave error when it nullified the trial courts Order dated 29 October 2001, which confirmed
their title to the subject property. Petitioners claim that contrary to the findings of the Court
of Appeals that the above-mentioned Order was not supported by evidence, the records of
the case clearly speak of the existence, not absence, of sufficient evidence to sustain the
findings of the court a quo that petitioners have established possession of the subject
property in the manner and for the period required by law, that is by open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier, to warrant the registration of their title to the subject property.
Petitioners likewise argue that the appellate court gravely erred when it declared as public
land the subject property despite the fact that they were able to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their possession of the subject property was indeed in the manner
and within the period required by law. Having been in possession of the subject property for
more than 30 years, they have already acquired vested right or title over the subject
property by operation of law based on the period provided for under the prevailing land
registration and property laws; hence, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent
with the facts and the law.
The Petition is meritorious.
In resolving the issues involved in the present case, there is a need for this Court to re-
examine the facts of the case for the proper determination of the issues raised herein.
As a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.14However, the rule is not without
exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions15 in which factual issues may be
resolved by this Court and two of these exceptions find application in this present case, to
wit: (1) when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court; and
(2) when the findings of fact of the appellate court are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.
The issues presented by petitioners will be discussed concurrently, since they are
interrelated.
In the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled that petitioners failed to show
possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership
117
since 12 June 1945 or earlier as provided for in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. It further said that the testimonial evidence presented by petitioners was not
sufficient to prove petitioners possession in the manner and within the period required by
the aforesaid law because petitioners witnesses merely testified on their familiarity with the
subject property.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for registration of
land. The said provision of law refers to an original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings.16 It specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree, we can deduce that
there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first
category, to wit: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier.17 The second classification relates to the acquisition of private lands
by prescription.
In the case at bar, the Republic argues, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that
petitioners own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and
disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
Likewise, under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.18 However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by
the applicants presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of
the application for registration is alienable and disposable.19
After a thorough examination of the records of this case, this Court found out that
petitioners offered in evidence a certification20 from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, National Capital Region dated 29 October 2001, to prove that the
subject property was alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The said
certification contains the following statements:
This is to certify that the parcel of land as shown and described on the reverse side of this
plan- Lot 5001-B, Cad-299, Paraaque Cadastre situated at San Dionisio, Paraaque City,
Metro Manila containing an area of 3,520.92 square meters as prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Mariano V. Flotildes for Amado Buenaventura, et al., was verified to be within
the Alienable and Disposable Land per L.C. Map 2623, Project No. 25 of Paraaque per
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
To our minds, the said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of
the subject property. The certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence.22 As it is, the said certification remains uncontested and even the
Republic itself did not present any evidence to refute the contents of the said certification.
Therefore, the alienable and disposable character of the questioned parcel of land has
been clearly established by the evidence of the petitioners, by 3 January 1968, at the
latest.
Now, going to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, Republic
alleges that no sufficient evidence was adduced by petitioners to show that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in exclusive possession of the subject property since
12 June 1945 or earlier in the concept of an owner, to which the Court of Appeals agreed.
The Court of Appeals in its decision said that:
Although they were able to show possession by their parents, their predecessors-in-
interest, since 1948, they failed to prove the fact of possession since [12 June 1945] before
the filing of the application.23
Emphasis should be given to the fact that the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, did not
question petitioners possession of the subject property since 1948. Verily, it even stated in
the said Decision that petitioners possession may be reckoned from 1948, the year of the
execution of the Deed of Sale. The only reason posited by the appellate court in denying
the Order of the trial court which granted the application for registration of title of the
petitioners was the fact that petitioners evidence was not sufficient to prove that their
possession of the subject property was since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by
petitioners was not enough to prove that their possession of the subject property started
since 12 June 1945 or earlier because the evidence established that the questioned parcel
of land was acquired by petitioners parents only on 30 January 1948, the date of the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale by its previous owners. They can neither tack their
possession to that of the previous owners because they failed to present any evidence of
possession by those prior owners. Moreover, petitioners possession of the subject property
could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the same became alienable and
disposable. "Any period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was]
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership
and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto."24
Be that as it may, this will not be an insurmountable bar to the petitioners to have the title to
the subject property registered in their names.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court closely examined the land
registration laws governing land registration proceedings in the Philippines. In the aforesaid
case, the Court made the following pronouncements:
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When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. [Republic Act]
No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new
starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly the subject lands under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the
same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."26 (Emphasis supplied.)
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the possession of
alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for
registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership.27 Article
1106 of the Civil Code provides:
By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in
the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
Also in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivision not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
Likewise, Article 1137 of the Civil Code states that:
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least 30 years.28 Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands"
under Section 14(2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable
and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous
and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land
despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.29
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while
petitioners possession over the subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968,
the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and
disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject property for
more than 30 years, 32 years to be exact, reckoned from the year 1968, when the subject
property was finally declared alienable and disposable by the DENR to the time they filed
an application for registration of title over the subject property on 5 June 2000. Petitioners
possession of the subject property since 1968 has been characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.
Petitioners presented as evidence their tax declarations covering the years from 1948 until
the third quarter of 2001. They also offered in evidence a certification30 from the Office of
the Treasurer of the City of Paraaque to prove that realty taxes over the subject property
had been duly paid by petitioners. As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.31
In the same breath, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have been in actual possession of
the subject property since 1968, at the latest. According to the testimony of their witnesses,
parts of the subject property are planted with bananas and some vegetables, and a
bamboo grove. The other parts of the subject property were used as a fishpond, as well as
devoted to salt making until 1990.32 However, when the property was no longer suitable for
agricultural purposes, for fishpond, and for salt making because of its conversion to non-
agricultural purposes consistent with the zonal development of the area, the petitioners
backfilled the subject property with gravel and sand, for which they paid their farm helpers
just compensation. Thereafter, they enclosed the property with perimeter fence, installed
guards and a caretaker to prevent potential squatters from penetrating the area.33When tax
declarations and receipts are coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of
great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.34
Conspicuously, the petitioners witnesses are one in pointing out that petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest are the sole claimants of the subject property.
It bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioners are incontrovertible.
No one, not even the Republic, presented any evidence to contradict the claims of the
petitioners that they are in possession of the subject property and their possession of the
same is open, continuous and exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years.
Verily, even the appellate court mentioned in its Decision that petitioners were able to show
possession of the subject property as early as 1948, the only basis for its Decision
119
reversing the Order of the trial court being the insufficiency of the evidence presented by
petitioners to establish their possession of the subject property prior to 12 June 1945.
IN ALL, petitioners were able to prove sufficiently that they have been in possession of the
subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an owner. By this, the subject
alienable and disposable public land had been effectively converted into private property
over which petitioners have acquired ownership through prescription to which they are
entitled to have title through registration proceedings. Petitioners right to have their title to
the subject property registered cannot be defeated simply because the possession of
petitioners commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945, for the law and supplementing
jurisprudence amply, justly and rightfully provides the necessary remedy to what would
otherwise result in an unjust and unwarranted situation. It would be the height of injustice if
petitioners registration of title over the said property will de denied solely on that ground.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 23 August 2004 and 25 January
2005, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court
dated 29 October 2001 which granted petitioners application for registration of the subject
property and directing the issuance of a decree of registration in petitioners favor once the
judgment has become final and executory is hereby REINSTATED.
120