Evid Full 1

State Prosecutors vs.
Muro
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a premium
on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to the
judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting
himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the
law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know the
very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of
justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service
in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V.
Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases
(docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned
complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as
amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11,
1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on
August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign
exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of
foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation
had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme
Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to
charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular
or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and
basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by
the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge
acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the new
CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the
case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank
Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a
matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting
of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular,
erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is
officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective
shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the
People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of
something which has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not
yet been published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had
miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule
3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of the
prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the
pending cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due
process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be
gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled
continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its
evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1,
1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting for a
motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular
repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public announcement made
by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute,
without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such announcement,
he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules
rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17,
1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order
of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the
Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they
chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis
of the announcements of the President which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB
Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular
No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that
assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an
appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a
judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a
doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified"
because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower
courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he
theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a
colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by
complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not
affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular 960
under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial
notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of
complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere
newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President announced the
lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future, because of the use of
the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice, violated
Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall
be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of the present
administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure
legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section 16 of
CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of Circular
No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers to and
includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving
violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate
dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to quash or a
comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is
clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the
advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated
February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court
Administrator Ernani Cruz-Pao.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as
amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other
accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the
government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to
give full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive Department,
specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction of proof, the announcement published
in at least the two newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs.
Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil.
225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes
the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the
prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the
repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the
aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the crimes punishable in
the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under
which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because violation thereof
is penalized with specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which
penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme
Court decisions and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction,
this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to
do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise,
after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite
notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue.
Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13,
1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the
accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of
newspaper reports announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can
become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise
provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992,
entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992
issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB
Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353,
he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused
Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the regulations
on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect
to violations of former regulations that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they
shall be governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his
conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he
awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution
to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not
speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice
is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes
that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is
taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is
sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of
foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general
notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of
dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes
effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court
can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions.
Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular
No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall
remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign
exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of
which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar
as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such
pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued
shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the
eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960
is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter,
there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the
same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on non-
trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are
the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions
or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations,
the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of the circular are clear
and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had
already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases
had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is
supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No. 1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he
would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving clause
as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including
amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as
well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly:
Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are
concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No.
960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then
pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318
necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such
a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a judge should
not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law
in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave
in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that
he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His
actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond
suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should show their
full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their intellectual
integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is
the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that
he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally
consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on
him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer
his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of
arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very
essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the
present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason
that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign
exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As
a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal
mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an
altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own
personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the
appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the
face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent
judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been
filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by
way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for
abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of
the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the
cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened him to
suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated
changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact
remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the
guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. 27 More
importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's
announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he
nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his
action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President
was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non-
existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the
opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the
trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least,
respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and
thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially affected
the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the
dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal
complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals
that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day
for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as
a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the
trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an
answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her
defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and
erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence and
power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to the
consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it
must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service.
Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless
results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal
precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or
even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no explanation
at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further
depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be
quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in
paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank
Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was
announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the
Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the
words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED
the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both
quotations supplied) not only the President made the announcement but also the Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at
the decision after noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions,
there was no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The
purpose of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the
latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In
this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no need to await publication. It
would have been different if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under
which the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or
modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases
but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's
announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense
(Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the
government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead says that the government
"has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The
government yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The
lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign exchange
regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the
Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the
policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, published the
following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases
already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of
said order was published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's
issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases
against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former President
Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of
currency in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules
still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman
Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by
the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary
Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a
position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August 11,
1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on
the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President was at the very
least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise the
President to correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President
had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered
moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier,
economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated")
advice, and brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of
foreign exchange controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments).
Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors
in the latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of
their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become
of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with
more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly,
disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge
would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind
similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular
No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for
Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the
illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken
interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered
dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross ignorance
of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused charged
with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter
granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for
due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and
impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the law
after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the
complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the
accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice
or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of
the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and
unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment
in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or
continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or discipline
for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has been held to
be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's
integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case
against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest judge, if he were
denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become unduly cautious in his work, since he
would be subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good
faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held
administratively responsible . . . for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be nothing
short of harassment or would make his position unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot
be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in
good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general
principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose
being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice
but to apply it to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of
the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth
in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of
Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases
filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for Violation of
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published
in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority on
various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the appellate court, which
reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused
except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively, much more civilly or
criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in
bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only when the error appears to be deliberate or in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no need to await publication
of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of
general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately
effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash
having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on
the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some interested
or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood
obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or
ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists that
there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that he
sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not is
thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The
immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the restrictions were lifted,
no law was then being violated. It is an elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the
repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law
prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law
cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith means
that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what he
gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the criminal
charges against accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the information and consequently dismisses
the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a
judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held
accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused invoked
the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as has been
pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the prosecution is denied
due process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges -
which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he
should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted the accused.
Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus,
in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of
Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has committed an
error in deciding the case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher court for review and
correction, the action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate court, and consequently
invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, 19 may be indulging in needless
speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a prominent public figure brought about the
dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit his
dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision by the
appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal
advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the accused, was quoted
as saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange deregulation policy of his
administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to
everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have
become moot and academic because of the new regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board, but that
is to her advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not without logic or reason, it
cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But
the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful appellant who
feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to a particular instance,
that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such
system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards
the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law." 24 As it
has been said, he must interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence, his own
personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his
eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of judges: "We
may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our
own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have
continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming with what has been settled. yet, whether
reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be
effective dispensers of everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued the
assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings before
courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by
the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of this Court,
reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic concept first
announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this character being in their
nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the opinion
further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of
the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard has been adhered to by this
Court in subsequent decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging the same to prove
want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to
prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge
Dizon, 29respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs without
any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus,
respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently dismissed from the
service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge, after his
reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal possession of
firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four
(4) times, that the judge is either grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit
to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being
administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance of
the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was charged
with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal cases"
against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of
Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly, the actuations of the respondent
judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions of herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was charged with a litany of administrative cases, six
(6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all the
charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even
disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and
displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed, "[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against
respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to continue to discharge the functions and
duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There
is nothing in the records of the instant case which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted theories which
breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to abide
by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open defiance of
higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of grave and
serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge who
entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted
allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the appointment of
respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case
for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be
condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that
he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro
was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is
uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's assailed decision was
inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not
proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of judges and send
the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for expressing
their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly and long-
drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some
extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his
decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this Court may slightly bend
backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step
forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only
the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion at other times tormentor of trial
and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must
also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to harass them. In
dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for
exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows, are no longer
easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It is
unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of
ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
Latip vs Chua
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
89300:1 (1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case
No. 04-0052;2 and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building,
a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran,
Paraaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar
and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.?r?l??
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B.
Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24
Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes
Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque
Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an
area of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
A. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND
(P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES
agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the
LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said
premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a
written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the
Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their
expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and
shall not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate
any of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease.
Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the
rentals for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the
LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to
December ______, 2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December,
1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSOR LESSEE
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
Republic of the Philippines)
City of Manila)s.s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No.
12885654 at Paraaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on
Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two
(2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that
the same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this
____th day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased
cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie's
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie's claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2)
cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the
total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie's handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip &
Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs.
Contract.
P2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua
(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:6
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2)
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily
accepted Rosalie's offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the
time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction
of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without
waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had
been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a
demand letter from Rosalie's counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby
ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building
situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The
[Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to
PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to
December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in
paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased
premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorney's fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per
[Rosalie's] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latip's] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence
to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on
this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie's
husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the
contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to
December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999
are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly
uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the
entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount
of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie's claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by
prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and
pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On
the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully
paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of
the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is
reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay
the former '
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorney's fees;
andcralawlibrary
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of
the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized,
remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the
contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00
merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of
Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was
bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalie's appeal, the CA disposed of the
case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of
RTC Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial
notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that
the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is
taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a
wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court
cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of
which the court has no constructive knowledge.???r?bl?
People vs Reanzares
This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, finding accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando Rianzares" guilty of Highway
Robbery with Homicide under PD 532[2] and sentencing him to the extreme penalty of death. He was also
ordered to pay the heirs of his victim Lilia Tactacan P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related
expenses, P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag, and to reimburse
Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.
The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses Gregorio Tactacan
and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at around 8:10
in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their store and left for home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas on board their passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep backwards from where it
was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board. His wife Lilia immediately asked them where
they were going and they answered that they were bound for the town proper. When Lilia informed them that they
were not going to pass through the town proper, the two (2) said they would just get off at the nearest intersection.
After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the
other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and ordered Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of
whom was later identified as accused Armando Reanzares, were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as
the vehicle stopped, the accused and his companion approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then pulled from the
driver's seat to the back of the vehicle. They gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also
took his Seiko wristwatch worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after being told by one of
them, "Sige i-drive mo na."[3]
Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded. After several minutes, he felt the
vehicle making a u-turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his wife kept uttering, "Maawa
kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak, kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto ninyo." Immediately after the last time she
uttered these words a commotion ensued and Lilia was heard saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her but could not do
anything. After three (3) minutes the commotion ceased. Then he heard someone tell him, "Huwag kang kikilos
diyan, ha," and left. Gregorio then untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and blindfold and jumped out of the
vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his wife. He ran to San Roque East shouting for help.[4]
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He went to the drivers seat. There he saw
his wife lying on the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her bag containing P1,200.00 was
missing. He brought her immediately to the C. P. Reyes Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.[5]
At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old. According to Gregorio, he was deeply
depressed by her death; that he incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and that his wife was
earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.[6]
Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on the
body of the victim. Her medical report disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8) stab wounds on the chest and
abdominal region of the body. She testified that a sharp pointed object like a long knife could have caused those
wounds which must have been inflicted by more than one (1) person, and that all those wounds except the non-
penetrating one caused the immediate death of the victim.[7]
Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and three (3) John Does in
relation to the incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed with bladed weapons and a .38
caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1) Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan and P1,000.00 cash
of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The second was for violation of RA 6539, An Act
Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and intimidation of persons one (1)
passenger-type jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan and valued
at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was arrested. The other three (3) have remained
unidentified and at large.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the crimes imputed to him
with three (3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his
daughter Jessica when the incident happened.[8] His father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated his story. Jose
claimed that the accused borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say that he
actually saw the accused leave for his intended destination.[9] To bolster the alibi of the accused, his brother
Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged that he saw the accused off on 9 May 1994, the day
before the incident. Romeo maintained that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and even
helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He however could not categorically state where and when the
accused alighted or that he in fact reached Bicol.[10]
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible and ruled that the alibi of the accused
could not prevail over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court a
quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to death. It further
ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia Tactacan P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for funeral, burial
and related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag. The accused was also ordered to
reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.[11] But the trial court exonerated
the accused from the charge of carnapping under RA 6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is erroneous
as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony of private complainant
Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the perpetrators of the crime, is incredible. He maintains that
Gregorio failed to identify him because when the latter was questioned he stated that he did not know any of the
culprits. He also claims that in the publication of Hotline by Tony Calvento in People's Tonight, Gregorio even
asked the readers to help him identify the malefactors.
The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, and was consistent on cross-examination. Indeed, Gregorio might not have immediately revealed the
name of accused Armando Reanzares to the police authorities when he was first investigated but the delay was
not an indication of a fabricated charge and should not undermine his credibility considering that he satisfactorily
explained his reasons therefor. According to him, he did not immediately tell the police about the accused because
he feared for the safety of his family as his neighbors told him that they saw some people lurking around his
house on the day of the incident. Moreover, he was advised not to mention any names until after the burial of his
wife. No ill motive could be attributed to him for implicating the accused. If at all, the fact that his wife died by
reason of the incident even lends credence to his testimony since his natural interest in securing the conviction of
the guilty would deter him from implicating persons other than the real culprits, otherwise, those responsible for
the perpetration of the crime would escape prosecution.
To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused underscores Gregorio's refusal to be subjected to a
lie detector test. We cannot subscribe to this contention as the procedure of ascertaining the truth by means of a
lie detector test has never been accepted in our jurisdiction; thus, any findings based thereon cannot be
considered conclusive.
Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very material piece of evidence, i.e., the latter
failed to present as witnesses a certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the holduppers running away from
the crime scene. But this is only a disputable presumption under Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the Rules of Court
on evidence, which does not apply in the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is equally accessible and
available to the defense.
These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither can they bolster his
alibi. For alibi to be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.[12]
In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To prove this, he presented his
father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish his alibi. While his father
testified that the accused borrowed money from him for his fare to Bicol for the baptism of a daughter, he could
not say whether the accused actually went to Bicol. As regards the claim of Romeo, brother of the accused, that
he accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May 1994 and even helped him with his things, seeing the
accused off is not the same as seeing him actually get off at his destination. Given the circumstances of this case,
it is possible for the accused to have alighted from the bus before reaching Bicol, perpetrated the crime in the
evening of 10 May 2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived there on 12 May 2000 for his daughters baptism.
Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he was positively
identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.
Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532
was erroneous. As held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused
were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately.[13] There is no proof in the instant case that the
accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither is there proof that they
attempted to commit similar robberies to show the "indiscriminate" perpetration thereof. On the other hand, what
the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the particular persons of the Tactacan
spouses. Clearly, this single act of depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to
deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of the
nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people.
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art.
294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659[14] as the allegations in the Information are enough to
convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information, what controls is the description of the offense charged
and not merely its designation.[15]
Article 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes the crime of robbery with homicide
by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63, second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: x x x 2. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is imposed in the absence of any modifying circumstance.
As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the wrongful death of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages is
ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning capacity of Lilia Tactacan must be granted to her heirs. The testimony
of Gregorio Tactacan, the victims husband, on the earning capacity of his wife, together with a copy of his wifes
payroll, is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life expectancy of Lilia
Tactacan, applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age
of the deceased).[16] Since Lilia was 48 years of age at the time of her death,[17] then her life expectancy was
21.33 years.
At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher at the San Roque Elementary School
so that her annual income was P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as reasonable and
necessary living expenses to arrive at her net earnings. Thus, her net earning capacity was P438,971.40
computed as follows: Net earning capacity equals life expectancy times gross annual income less reasonable and
necessary living expenses
Net earning = Life expectancy x Gross annual reasonable &
income - necessary living
capacity (x) expenses
x = 2 (80-48) x [P41,160.00 P20,580.00]

-
......3
= 21.33 x P20,580.00
= P438,971.40
However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia Tactacan must be increased to P1,200.00
as this was the amount established by the prosecution without objection from the defense. The award
of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses must be reduced to P22,000.00 as this was the only
amount sufficiently substantiated.[18] There was no other competent evidence presented to support the original
award.
The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch taken from Gregorio Tactacan must be
deleted in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence aside from the self-serving valuation made by
the prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial
notice of the value of goods which is a matter of public knowledge or is capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either category of which the court can take judicial notice.[19]
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as
"Armando Rianzares" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for actual
damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity, and P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses.
Costs de oficio.
People vs. Tundag
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases
Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and
sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office
two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186,
alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a
13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a
13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges
against him since he and his daughter, had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out
whenever he was not at home.[3]
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230
of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape
with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230
of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape
with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private complainant
Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a
very low general mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue
City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house together with her
father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just lied
down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However, when she was already sleeping, she
noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was embracing her. Then, he undressed
her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that,
he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her
genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by saying
(sic) : Does it feel good? And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman who does not
marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense pain that
she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it feels so
good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she did not
get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just smoking
and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her father embraced
her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside
and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he was
holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her neighbor by the name of
Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the police,
which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was
examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by them.
[5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which
found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO
EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5,
1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and
sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he
argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired,
he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts
decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to
prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of
death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the records,
including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less
than a moral certainty of guilt.[8] But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment concerning
appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty
ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life.Against the testimony of private complainant who
testified on affirmative matters,[9] such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense,
which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator
of her honor.[10] Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing
her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent.[11] Her
testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death
penalty if found guilty by the court.[12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important issue.[13] The
determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for this is that
the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and,
therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and conclusion.[14] Absent any showing that
certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the case, or that
the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and
the judgment rendered affirmed.[15]
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical findings that
lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private
complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: -do-
Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a
history of sexual congress on her part.[17] According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of
an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus
may be inferred from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet
experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.[18] While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that the
existence of the datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual
intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things,[19] nonetheless, the
presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled
with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his testimony
regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed
against him as the result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior.[20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous
rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human experience
that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless
that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.[21] More so, where her charges could mean the
death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him
considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is impertinent
and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with
him.[22] As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial
lust on his daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76
in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her
twice. We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own
father, as shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father
would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,[25] penalizes rape of a
minor daughter by her father as qualified rape[26] and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution
must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her
consent[27] and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the
victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.[28]
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father.[29] But the victims
age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years
old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her
mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In her own words,
the victim testified - [30]
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial
notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof
because they already know them.[31] Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or
discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice
of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always
nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has
been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5)
meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accuseds
sister.[32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in
publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.[33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of
professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,[34] the trial court took judicial notice of
the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as premature since one of
the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be
facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by
a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can
take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which
requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of
a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission,
thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such
as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim
may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said
documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape
committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so was
only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because
the victims birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled
that the mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish
that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple
rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who was
allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal
certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their
non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for
the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside
from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,[35] we stressed that the prosecution
must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The
minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,
[36] we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below
18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the
case was bereft of any independentevidence thereon, such as the victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth,
accurately showing private complainants age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified
form. In People v. Veloso,[37] the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It
held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than
through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to
sufficiently establish victims age by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in
the words of Melo, J., independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to
remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances for the imposition of the death
penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death
penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was
committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil
indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing
jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the basis thereof.
[38] Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each
count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different
amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of
the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and
8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance
which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory.[39] However, in this case, the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of
mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this
instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters,
exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior
from sexually abusing their own daughters.[40]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos.
DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts
of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Camitan v Fidelity
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision[1] dated November
28, 2003 and of the Resolution[2] dated May 12, 2004, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
37291 entitled Fidelity Investment Corporation v. Alipio Camitan, Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez, the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 37) and the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
The case arose from the Petition[3] for the issuance of another duplicate copy of Certificate of Title No. T-(12110)
T-4342 (TCT) filed in 1993 by herein petitioners, together with Alipio Camitan, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Calamba, Laguna. The case was raffled to Branch 37 of the said court and was docketed as SLRC Case
No. 1198-93-C.
The petition contained, among others, the allegations that: (1) the petitioners are the true and lawful registered co-
owners of a parcel of land located at Maunong, Calamba, Laguna, consisting of 30,000 square meters covered by
the TCT; (2) the lot is declared for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 14187; (3) petitioners paid the realty
taxes on the said property until 1993; (4) the owners duplicate copy was lost and could not be found despite
diligent efforts to locate it; (5) per Certification[4]dated June 21, 1993 of the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna, there were no legal claims annotated at the back of the TCT filed with that office; (6) petitioners filed with
the Register of Deeds an affidavit of loss of the said owners duplicate copy; (7) they secured a certified true copy
of the original TCT from the Register of Deeds with the affidavit of loss annotated at the back thereof; (8) at the
last page of the original certificate of title, a mortgage was annotated, which upon verification was found to have
already been paid; (9) the Register of Deeds of Calamba could not cancel the mortgage from the original copy of
the title until presentation of the owners duplicate copy to the bank; and (10) petitioners were in possession of the
subject property.
After due proceedings, the RTC, in its Order[5] dated April 8, 1994, granted the petition, directed the Register of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the TCT, and declared void the first
owners duplicate copy thereof.
Later, on , herein respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation (Fidelity) filed a Petition[6] for annulment of
judgment and cancellation of title before the CA. According to Fidelity, on , it purchased the property covered by
the subject certificate of title from the registered owners thereof pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale[7] of the
same date. It said that upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment in full of the purchase price,
the vendors delivered to Fidelity their owners duplicate copy of the TCT, which has been in its possession since. It
also alleged that it had been in actual physical possession and continuous occupation of the subject property and
that it had been paying the real estate taxes due thereon.
It further said that, sometime in March 1995, upon verification with the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, it
learned for the first time of the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy as recorded under Entry No. 357701
dated and annotated on the TCT. Thus, it caused the sale of the property in its favor to be annotated on the
TCT. The notice of the sale was annotated on as Entry No. 384954. Fidelity then filed, on , a Notice of Adverse
Claim with the concerned Register of Deeds, which was annotated on the TCT as Entry No. 387483.
In fine, Fidelity argued that the Order dated April 18, 1994 is null and void, the RTC having no jurisdiction to issue
the same as the owners duplicate copy of the TCT was in its possession all along and the respondents therein
had no standing to file the petition on account of the Deed of Absolute Sale they executed in its favor. It claimed
that the petitioners perjured themselves before the RTC when they stated that the duplicate copy of the TCT was
lost and that they gave notice to all who had interest in the property, because they failed to notify Fidelity despite
knowledge of the latters possession of the property.
In their Comment,[8] private respondents [herein petitioners] Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez, and the surviving
heirs of deceased Alipio Camitan, denied having committed falsehoods in their petition before the trial court, which
they claimed had jurisdiction over the case. They submitted that the long, unexplained, and questionable silence
of Fidelity on its alleged possession of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property and the non-registration and titling thereof in its name for about 27 years since the purported sale,
was tainted with malice and bad faith, thus, subjecting it to estoppel and laches.
By its Resolution dated , the CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of judgment, and a preliminary
conference was set, directing Fidelity to bring the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. At the preliminary
conference, Fidelitys counsel presented what was claimed to be the owners duplicate copy of the TCT.Counsel for
private respondents examined the certificate of title and admitted that it is the genuine owners copy
thereof. Thereafter, counsel for Fidelity manifested that they were no longer presenting other evidence. On the
other hand, counsel for private respondents prayed that an additional issue, the question of the validity of the
deed of sale in favor of Fidelity, be likewise resolved. Fidelitys counsel objected on the ground of
irrelevancy. However, in order to expedite the
proceedings, he agreed to have private respondents amplify their position in their memorandum.
In their Memorandum, private respondents retracted their counsels admission on the genuineness of the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest mistake and negligence owing to his excitement and
nervousness in appearing before the CA. They pointed to some allegedly irreconcilable discrepancies between
the copy annexed to the petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity during the preliminary conference. They also
reiterated the issue on the validity of the purported deed of sale of the property in favor of Fidelity.
In its Comment to the Memorandum, Fidelity countered that there were no discrepancies between the owners
duplicate copy it presented and the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. It argued
that private respondents are bound by the judicial admission made by their counsel during the preliminary
conference. It, likewise, objected to the inclusion of the issue on the validity of the deed of sale over the property.
In the Decision dated , the CA ruled in favor of Fidelity. It declared that the RTC was without jurisdiction to issue a
second owners duplicate copy of the title in light of the existence of the genuine owners duplicate copy in the
possession of petitioner, as admitted by private respondents through counsel.According to the CA, a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party making it and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It said that honest mistake and
negligence, as raised by private respondents in retracting their counsels admission, are not sufficient grounds to
invalidate the admission.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT
THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF THE COUNSEL OF THE PETITIONERS DURING THE HEARING
IN C.A.-G.R. SP. NO. 37291 WAS A PALPABLE MISTAKE.
Herein petitioners argue that despite the existence of a judicial admission, there is still some leeway for the court
to consider other evidence presented. They point out that, even as early as in their Memorandum before the CA,
they had already retracted their counsels admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT
presented by Fidelity, and claim that their counsel was honestly mistaken and negligent in his admission owing to
his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA. Petitioners likewise cite, in support of their position,
the circumstances they alleged in their petition before the RTC which convinced the latter to issue them a new
owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Further, petitioners raise in issue the discrepancies between the certificate of
title on file with the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and that submitted by Fidelity during the preliminary
conference before the CA.
In its Comment,[9] Fidelity reiterate the arguments it presented before the CA.
We find for the respondent.
At the outset, we emphasize that the core issue in this case is the validity of the issuance by the RTC of a new
owners duplicate copy of the TCT in favor of petitioners.The applicable law is Section 109 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which states:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owners
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his
behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or
theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other
person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and
due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum
of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for
all purposes of this decree.
Petitioners were able to convince the RTC that their owners duplicate copy had indeed been lost. They appeared
to have complied with the requirements of the law. This led the RTC to grant their petition.
Upon discovery of the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the TCT, Fidelity went to the CA seeking to
annul the judgment of the RTC. Unfortunately for petitioners, their counsel admitted the genuineness of the
owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity during the preliminary conference at the CA. The following
exchange is revealing:
J. MARTIN:
Counsel for the private respondent, will you go over the owners copy and manifest to
the court whether that is a genuine owners copy?
ATTY. :
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Make it of record that after examining the owners copy of TCT NO. (T-12110) T-
4342, counsel for the private respondent admitted that the same appears to be a
genuine owners copy of the transfer certificate of title. Do you have a certified true
copy of this or any machine copy that you can compare?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. REYES:
Including all the entries at the back page.
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Does it include all the list of the encumbrances?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. :
We do not admit, Your Honor this being only a xerox copy and not certified . . .
J. MARTIN:
It is only for purposes of substitution. Will you compare that with the other copy which
you already admitted to be a genuine owners copy.
ATTY. :
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Counsel, are you marking that?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Your Honor, we request that this copy of the transfer certificate of title No. T-12110, T-4342
be marked as Exhibit A to A-3 for the petitioner?
J. MARTIN:
Preliminary conference.
Alright, after examining the machine copy consisting of three pages and comparing
the same with the admittedly genuine owners copy of the transfer certificate of title,
counsel prayed for the substitution of the machine copy after marking them as
Exhibits A-A-3 inclusive. We will return the owners copy to you so that you can submit this
already in lieu thereof.
This is a preliminary conference. Unless you have other incidents to thresh out, I think that
we can terminate the conference this morning. Counsel for the private respondents?[10]
The foregoing transcript of the preliminary conference indubitably shows that counsel for petitioners made a
judicial admission and failed to refute that admission during the said proceedings despite the opportunity to do
so. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
[11]
Petitioners, in their Memorandum before the CA, attempted to retract their counsels judicial admission on the
authenticity of the owners duplicate copy of TCT in the possession of Fidelity. Petitioners explicate that the wrong
admission was an honest mistake and negligence attributable to the counsels nervousness and excitement in
appearing for the first time before the CA. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, such an admission may
only be refuted upon a proper showing of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Thus, the claim
of honest mistake and negligence on the part of the counsel due to his excitement and nervousness in appearing
before the CA did not suffice.
Petitioners now claim that the honest mistake and negligence of their counsel amount to palpable mistake. They
also enumerate observed discrepancies between the original TCT on file with the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna and the owners duplicate copy presented by Fidelity, to wit:
1. On the above left margin of the xerox copy of the ORIGINAL COPY of TCT No. (T-12110) T-4342
on file with the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna in question, (Annex A, Respondents Petition
in question before the Court of Appeals) Annex C, supra, the PRINTED WORDS were:
(JUDICIAL FORM NO. 109)
(Revised September, 1954.)
However, in the belated submission of the alleged xerox copy of the alleged duplicate copy of the
title in question by the respondent to the Court of Appeals (Exh. A; Annex H, supra,) the following
PRINTED WORDS appeared:
(JUDICIAL FORM NO. 109-D)
(Revised September, 1954.) (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
[2.] The Serial Number of the Xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question on file with the
Register of Deeds of Calamba City was written in handwriting as 158640.
However, the Serial Number of the purported duplicate copy of the original title in question of the
respondent was PRINTED in letters and in figures: No. 158640.
3. The typewritten words on the heading of the xerox copy of the original copy of the said title on
file with the said Register of Deeds were written in big type of letters.
However, in Exh. A, Annex H, supra, of the respondent, it was typewritten with small type of letters.
4. In the FIGURES of the xerox copy of the original copy of the said title: NO. (T-12110) T-4342 in
question, they were written in a big type of letters. The same is true in the letters T and DASH after
the letter T. The figures 4342 were printed in big letters.
However, the printed and handwritten figures and words in Exh. A, Annex C, supra, were
small. The figures 4342 were in handwriting.
5. In the xerox copy of the original copy of title of the property in question covered by TCT No. (T-
12110) T-4342, which cancelled TCT No. T-10700, the type of letter T, figures, 10700 and dash
thereof were in big letters.
However, the purported duplicate copy of the original copy of the title in question submitted to the
Court of Appeals by the respondent, the type of the letter, dash and figures thereof were in small
letters.
6. The type of the printed words, dashes, and figures in the body of the Xerox copy of the original
title in question, it was typewritten with big letters and figures.
The purported duplicate copy of the original title of the property in question submitted to the Court
of Appeals by the respondent, the letters, dashes and figures there of were typewritten in small
letters.
7. The letters, dashes, and figures of the xerox copy of the original title in question were typewritten
in a manual typewriter with big letters.
In Exh. A, Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of the original title in question submitted to
the Court of Appeals by the respondent, they were typewritten in a manual typewriter with small
letters and figures.
8. The signatures of the Registrar of Deeds in the xerox of the original copy of the title in
question; had loop in small letter d and the rest had no loops.
In Exh. A, Annex H, supra, of the purported duplicate copy of the title in question submitted by the
respondent to the Court of Appeals, there was no loop, except there were two (2) open vertical
lines below thereof after four letters.
9. The xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question after TCT No. T-10700 was cancelled,
it was entered in the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna since at
10. In view thereof, it is but NATURAL that the judicial forms and descriptions of letters and figures
of the original copy of title in question and file with the Register of Deeds its duplicate copy since
September 24, 1954, were the SAME and already OLD.
11. However, in Exh. A, Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of the title in question
submitted by the respondent to the Court of Appeals, the judicial form thereof was already small
and it clearly appeared that it might have been NEWLY ISSUED NEW COPY OF TITLE. It might be
the revised new form in 1988 that is presently used in the Register of Deeds.[12]
Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the alleged discrepancies are more imagined than
real. Had these purported discrepancies been that evident during the preliminary conference, it would have been
easy for petitioners counsel to object to the authenticity of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by
Fidelity. As shown in the transcript of the proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners counsel to
examine the document, retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he chose not to contest
the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the petitioners counsel was made through palpable
mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel within the scope of his general and
implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of the clients counsel, which may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment, generally binds
the client. To rule otherwise would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to claim neglect
or mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation, as every shortcoming of counsel
could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would
likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is deprived
of his day in court or of his property without due process of law. In these cases, the client is not bound by his
counsels mistakes and the case may even be reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his
case.[13] In the case at bar, however, these exceptional circumstances do not obtain.
With proof that the owners duplicate copy of the TCT was in the possession of Fidelity, the RTC Decision
dated was properly annulled. In a catena of cases, we have consistently ruled that if an owners duplicate copy of
a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is
void, as the court rendering the decision never acquires jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked
at any time.[14]
The circumstances cited by petitioners in support of their petition, i.e., the TCT is still in their names; the property
in question is declared for tax purposes in their names; they were the persons informed by the Municipal
Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna for the non-payment of real estate taxes for the years 1990-1993; they paid the
real estate taxes due on the property; no one was claiming the property per the certification of the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; the questionable delay of Fidelity in registering its claim over the property
under the purported sale of ; and the validity of the Absolute Deed of Sale, all pertain to the issue of ownership
over the property covered by the TCT.
In a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, on
which this case is rooted, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction, has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land covered by the lost owners duplicate copy of
the certificate of title.[15] Consequently, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a
separate suit where the trial court will conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties presenting their respective
evidence to prove ownership over the subject realty.[16]
At this point, we reiterate the principle that possession of a lost owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not
necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. Registration of real property under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The certificate of title, by
itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over the particular property described therein.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated and the Resolution dated of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Aguenza vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. 271 S 1

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now the Court of Appeals)[2] finding petitioner J. Antonio Aguenza liable under a continuing surety
agreement to pay private respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (hereafter, Metrobank) a loan jointly
obtained by the General Manager and a bookkeeper of Intertrade, a corporation of which petitioner is President
and in whose behalf petitioner had, in the past, obtained credit lines.
The following facts are not disputed:
On February 28, 1977, the Board of Directors of Intertrade, through a Board Resolution, authorized and
empowered petitioner and private respondent Vitaliado Arrieta, Intertrade's President and Executive Vice-
President, respectively, to jointly apply for and open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. Pursuant to
such authority, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed several trust receipts from May to June, 1977,
the aggregate value of which amounted to P562,443.46, with Intertrade as the entrustee and private respondent
Metrobank as the entruster.
On March 14, 1977, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement
whereby both bound themselves jointly and severally with Intertrade to pay private respondent Metrobank
whatever obligation Intertrade incurs, but not exceeding the amount of P750,000.00.
In this connection, private respondent Metrobank's Debit Memo to Intertrade dated March 22, 1978 showed
full settlement of the letters of credit covered by said trust receipts in the total amount of P562,443.46.
On March 21, 1978, private respondents Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, a bookkeeper in the employ of Intertrade,
obtained a P500,000.00 loan from private respondent Metrobank. Both executed a Promissory Note in favor of
said bank in the amount of P500,000.00. Under said note, private respondents Arrieta and Perez promised to pay
said amount, jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of P20,000.00 each starting on April 20,
1979 with interest of 18.704% per annum, and in case of default, a further 8% per annum.
Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several installments, thus resulting in the
entire obligation becoming due and demandable. In 1979, private respondent Metrobank instituted suit against
Intertrade, Vitaliado Arrieta, Lilia Perez and her husband, Patricio Perez, to collect not only the unpaid principal
obligation, but also interests, fees and penalties, exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit.
More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed an Amended
Complaint dated August 30, 1980 for the sole purpose of impleading petitioner as liable for the loan made by
private respondents Arrieta and Perez on March 21, 1978, notwithstanding the fact that such liability is being
claimed on account of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977 executed by petitioner and
private respondent Arrieta specifically to guarantee the credit line applied for by and granted to, Intertrade, through
petitioner and private respondent Arrieta who were specially given authority by Intertrade on February 28, 1977 to
open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. The obligations incurred by Intertrade under such credit lines
were completely paid as evidenced by private respondent Metrobank's debit memo in the full amount
of P562,443.46.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision absolving petitioner from liability and
dismissing private respondent Metrobank's complaint against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring that the Promissory Note dated March 21, 1978, marked as Exhibit A, is the responsibility only of
defendant Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, in their personal capacity and to the exclusion of defendant
Intertrade and Marketing Co. Inc.;
2) Ordering defendants Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez to pay, jointly and severally, the
plaintiff the sum of P1,062,898.92, due as of September 15, 1982, plus interest, fees and penalties due from that
date pursuant to the stipulations in the promissory note until the whole obligations shall have been paid and finally
settled;
3) Ordering defendants Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia Perez to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum
of P44,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses, albeit there is no award for exemplary
damages;
4) Declaring defendant Patricio Perez, as conjugal partner of defendant Lilia Perez, as jointly and severally liable
with her for what the latter is ordered to pay per this Decision;
5) Dismissing this case insofar as defendants Intertrade and Marketing Co., Inc. and J. Antonio Aguenza are
concerned, although their respective counterclaims against the plaintiff are also ordered dismissed.
Costs of suit shall be paid, jointly and severally, by defendant Vitaliado Arrieta and Lilia Perez.
SO ORDERED."[3]
Private respondents Arrieta and spouses Perez appealed the foregoing decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On February 11, 1986, respondent appellate court promulgated the herein assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering Intertrade & Marketing
Co., Inc., and J. Antonio Aguenza, jointly and severally:
1) to pay the Bank the principal of P440,000.00 plus its interest of 18.704% per annum computed from April 15,
1979 until full payment;
2) to pay the Bank the sum equivalent to 8% of P440,000.00 as penalty, computed from July 19,
1978 until full payment;
3) to pay the Bank the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The complaint is dismissed as against Lilia Perez, Patricio Perez and Vitaliado P. Arrieta who are absolved from
liability.
All counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against Intertrade and Aguenza, jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED."
In setting aside the decision of the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals ratiocinated such reversal in this
wise:
"No dispute exists as to the promissory note and the suretyship agreement. The controversy centers on whether
the note was a corporate undertaking and whether the suretyship agreement covered the obligation in the note.
As far as Intertrade is concerned, it seems clear from its answer that the loan evidenced by the note was a
corporate liability. Paragraph 1.3 of the answer admits 'x x x defendant's obtention of the loan from the plaintiff x x
x'; the affirmative defenses admit default, and invoking the defense of usury, plead adjustment of excessive
interest which Intertrade refused to make.
On the basis of this admission, it is no longer in point to discuss, as the appealed decision does, the question of
the capacity in which Arrieta and Perez signed the promissory note, Intertrade's admission of its corporate liability
being admission also that the signatories signed the note in a representative capacity. The Bank itself gave
corroboration with its insistence on Intertrade's liability under the note. x x x
The stated purpose of the note is 'operating capital.' It cannot be contended that the words 'operating capital' refer
to the capital requirements of Perez and Arrieta. In the first place, it was not shown that they were in business for
themselves. Besides, Perez was only a bookkeeper of Intertrade with a salary of P800.00 a month x x x Their
combined resources would not have been sufficient to justify a business loan of the note's magnitude. From these
follows the only logical conclusion: that Arrieta and the Perez spouses are not liable on the note.
The surety agreement presents a different problem.
There is no question that Aguenza signed the agreement x x x Its second paragraph shows, typewritten in bold
capitals, that the agreement was executed 'for and in consideration of any existing indebtedness to the Bank of
INTERTRADE & MARKETING COMPANY, INC.' Nowhere in its entire text is it shown that its execution was for
the benefit of Perez or Arrieta.
Aguenza feigns ignorance of the promissory note and claims his knowledge of it came only when he received
summons. This is difficult to believe. As Intertrade's first letter to the Bank x x x shows, the Board of Directors and
principal stockholders met to discuss the obligation. Aguenza was at the time president of Intertrade and acting
chairman of its board x x x.
Aguenza also argues that the suretyship was executed to enable Intertrade to avail of letters of credit to finance
importations, which had all been paid in full, and therefore the agreement was thereby terminated. Again, the
agreement shows up the fallacy of this argument. The document is boldly denominated 'CONTINUING
SURETYSHIP,' and paragraph VI thereof stipulates it to be a continuing one, 'to remain in force until written notice
shall have been received by the Bank that it has been revoked by the surety x x x' In other words, the option to
cancel, in writing, was given to the sureties; the evidence does not show any written notice of such cancellation. x
xx
And, the argument that the agreement was executed as security for letters of credit that had already been paid is
in itself confirmation that the suretyship was meant to benefit Intertrade. The trust receipts x x x and the bills of
exchange x x x are all in the name of Intertrade.
The suretyship is both retrospective and prospective in its operation. Its wording covers all obligations of
Intertrade existing as of its date as well as those that may exist thereafter. Hence, its coverage extends to the
promissory note as well."[4]
Understandably, petitioner lost no time in bringing this case before us via a petition for review on certiorari on
the following grounds:
"THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING AND [SETTING] ASIDE THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENTS VITALIADO
ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS NOT A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT LIABLE THEREON UNDER THE 'CONTINUING SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT' DATED 4
MARCH 1977.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21
MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENT VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF
RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND CONSEQUENTLY RENDERING PETITIONER LIABLE IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY AS A SURETY UNDER THE 'CONTINUING SURETYSHIP' OF 4 MARCH 1977, IS GROSSLY
ERRONEOUS AND PREMISED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
THE CONCLUSIONS AND CONSTRUCTION REACHED BY RESPONDENT COURT FROM THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE OF RECORD, ARE INCORRECT RESULTING IN AN ERRONEOUS DECISION GRAVELY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER."[5]
The petition has merit.
The principal reason for respondent appellate court's reversal of the trial court's absolution of petitioner is its
finding that the loan made by private respondent Arrieta and Lilia Perez were admitted by Intertrade to be its own
obligation.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, however, we find and we so rule that there is neither factual nor legal
basis for such a finding by respondent Appellate Court.
First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader"[6] is not an absolute and inflexible rule[7]and is subject to exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4,
of the Rules of Evidence, provides:
"Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." (Underlining supplied)
In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing that it
was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made, i.e., "not in the sense in which the
admission was made to appear or the admission was taken out of context."[8]
In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in appreciating the
"Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful study
of the responsive pleading filed by Atty. Francisco Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there was
neither express nor implied admission of corporate liability warranting the application of the general rule. Thus, the
alleged judicial admission may be contradicted and controverted because it was taken out of context and no
admission was made at all.
In any event, assuming arguendo that the responsive pleading did contain the aforesaid admission of
corporate liability, the same may not still be given effect at all. As correctly found by the trial court, the alleged
admission made in the answer by the counsel for Intertrade was "without any enabling act or attendant ratification
of corporate act,"[9]as would authorize or even ratify such admission. In the absence of such ratification or
authority, such admission does not bind the corporation.
Second, the respondent appellate court likewise adjudged Intertrade liable because of the two letters
emanating from the office of Mr. Arrieta which the respondent court considered "as indicating the corporate liability
of the corporation."[10] These documents and admissions cannot have the effect of a ratification of an
unauthorized act. As we elucidated in the case of Vicente v. Geraldez,[11] "ratification can never be made on the
part of the corporation by the same persons who wrongfully assume the power to make the contract, but the
ratification must be by the officer as governing body having authority to make such contract." In other words, the
unauthorized act of respondent Arrieta can only be ratified by the action of the Board of Directors and/or petitioner
Aguenza jointly with private respondent Arrieta.
We must emphasize that Intertrade has a distinct personality separate from its members. The corporation
transacts its business only through its officers or agents. Whatever authority these officers or agents may have is
derived from the Board of Directors or other governing body unless conferred by the charter of the corporation. An
officer's power as an agent of the corporation must be sought from the statute, charter, the by-laws, as in a
delegation of authority to such officer, or the acts of the Board of Directors formally expressed or implied from a
habit or custom of doing business.[12]
Thirdly, we note that the only document to evidence the subject transaction was the promissory note dated
March 21, 1978 signed by private respondents Arrieta and Lilia Perez. There is no indication in said document as
to what capacity the two signatories had in affixing their signatures thereon.
It is noted that the subject transaction is a loan contract for P500,000.00 under terms and conditions which
are stringent, if not onerous. The power to borrow money is one of those cases where even a special power of
attorney is required.[13] In the instant case, there is invariably a need of an enabling act of the corporation to be
approved by its Board of Directors. As found by the trial court, the records of this case is bereft of any evidence
that Intertrade through its Board of Directors, conferred upon Arrieta and Lilia Perez the authority to contract a
loan with Metrobank and execute the promissory note as a security therefor. Neither a board resolution nor a
stockholder's resolution was presented by Metrobank to show that Arrieta and Lilia Perez were empowered by
Intertrade to execute the promissory note.[14]
The respondents may argue that the actuation of Arrieta and Lilia Perez was in accordance with the ordinary
course of business usages and practices of Intertrade. However, this contention is devoid of merit because the
prevailing practice in Intertrade was to explicitly authorize an officer to contract loans in behalf of the
corporation. This is evidenced by the fact that previous to the controversy, the Intertrade Board of Directors,
through a board resolution, jointly empowered and authorized petitioner and respondent Arrieta to negotiate, apply
for, and open credit lines with Metrobank.[15] The participation of these two was mandated to be joint and not
separate and individual.
In the case at bench, only respondent Arrieta, together with a bookkeeper of the corporation, signed the
promissory notes, without the participation and approval of petitioner Aguenza. Moreover, the enabling corporate
act on this particular transaction has not been obtained. Neither has it been shown that any provision of the
charter or any other act of the Board of Directors exists to confer power on the Executive Vice President acting
alone and without the concurrence of its President, to execute the disputed document.[16]
Thus, proceeding from the premise that the subject loan was not the responsibility of Intertrade, it follows that
the undertaking of Arrieta and the bookkeeper was not an undertaking covered by the Continuing Suretyship
Agreement. The rule is that a contract of surety is never presumed; it must be express and cannot extend to more
than what is stipulated.[17] It is strictly construed against the creditor, every doubt being resolved against
enlarging the liability of the surety.
The present obligation incurred in subject contract of loan, as secured by the Arrieta and Perez promissory
note, is not the obligation of the corporation and petitioner Aguenza, but the individual and personal obligation of
private respondents Arrieta and Lilia Perez.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals[18] dated
February 11, 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the trial court dated February 29, 1984 is
hereby REINSTATED.
Philamgen vs. Sweet Lines, Inc. 212 S 195

A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American General Insurance
Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI) and
Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line (The Shipping Corporation of
India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or
damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to defendants' negligence,
with the following factual backdrop yielded by the findings of the court below and adopted by respondent court:
It would appear that in or about March 1977, the vessel SS "VISHVA YASH" belonging to or
operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2) consignments
of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags
Low Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400 bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both
consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum
Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were covered, respectively, by Bills of
Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier (Exhs. E and F). The necessary packing
or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well as the Commercial Invoices (Exhs. C and D) accompanied
the shipment. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine
American General Insurance Co., Inc., (Exh. G).
In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port of
Manila for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and made use
of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland
carrier.
Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the interisland carrier. These were
commingled with similar cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also Standfilco.
On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of
the consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977, upon the instance of the plaintiff, shows
the following:
Of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6, supposed to contain 6,400 bags of Low
Density Polyethylene 647 originally inside 160 pallets, there were delivered to the consignee 5,413
bags in good order condition. The survey shows shortages, damages and losses to be as follows:
Undelivered/Damaged bags as tallied during discharge from vessel-173 bags;
undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the pier-699 bags;
and shortlanded-110 bags (Exhs. P and P-1).
Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey conducted on the same day shows
an actual delivery to the consignee of only 507 bags in good order condition. Likewise noted were
the following losses, damages and shortages, to wit:
Undelivered/damaged bags and tally sheets during discharge from vessel-17 bags.
Undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the pier-66 bags;
Shortlanded-10 bags.
Therefore, of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets, only a total of
5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a balance of 1,080
bags. Such loss from this particular shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to
(sic).
As already stated, some bags were either shortlanded or were missing, and some of the 1,080
bags were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially emptied, but, worse, the
contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and therefore could no longer serve their
intended purpose. The position taken by the consignee was that even those bags which still had
some contents were considered as total losses as the remaining contents were contaminated with
foreign matters and therefore did not (sic) longer serve the intended purpose of the material. Each
bag was valued, taking into account the customs duties and other taxes paid as well as charges
and the conversion value then of a dollar to the peso, at P110.28 per bag (see Exhs. L and L-1 M
and O). 2
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and defendants S.C.I.
Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the claim against them. Whereupon,
the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable
settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without
pronouncement as to costs."
The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners on this dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Philippine General American
Insurance Company Inc. and against the remaining defendants, Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao
Veterans Arrastre Inc. as follows:
Defendant Sweet Lines, Inc. is ordered to pay said plaintiff the sum of P34,902.00, with legal
interest thereon from date of extrajudicial demand on April 28, 1978 (Exh. M) until fully paid;
Defendant Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc. are directed to
pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with legal interest thereon from April
28, 1978 until fully paid;
Each of said defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the additional sum of P5,000 is
reimbursable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;
Each of said defendants shall pay one-fourth (1/4) costs. 4
Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground of prescription, 5 in
effect dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners, and the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, 6 petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, faulting respondent appellate court
with the following errors: (1) in upholding, without proof, the existence of the so-called prescriptive period; (2)
granting arguendo that the said prescriptive period does exist, in not finding the same to be null and void; and (3)
assuming arguendo that the said prescriptive period is valid and legal, in failing to conclude that petitioners
substantially complied therewith. 7
Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are jointly pursuing this case, considering their common
interest in the shipment subject of the present controversy, to obviate any question as to who the real party in
interest is and to protect their respective rights as insurer and insured. In any case, there is no impediment to the
legal standing of Petitioner Philamgen, even if it alone were to sue herein private respondents in its own capacity
as insurer, it having been subrogated to all rights of recovery for loss of or damage to the shipment insured under
its Marine Risk Note No. 438734 dated March 31, 1977 8 in view of the full settlement of the claim thereunder as
evidenced by the subrogation receipt 9 issued in its favor by Far East Bank and Trust Co., Davao Branch, for the
account of petitioner TPI.
Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the insurer's entitlement to subrogation pro tanto, being of the
highest equity, equips it with a cause of action against a third party in case of contractual breach. 10 Further, the
insurer's subrogatory right to sue for recovery under the bill of lading in case of loss of or damage to the cargo is
jurisprudentially upheld. 11 However, if an insurer, in the exercise of its subrogatory right, may proceed against the
erring carrier and for all intents and purposes stands in the place and in substitution of the consignee, a
fortiori such insurer is presumed to know and is just as bound by the contractual terms under the bill of lading as
the insured.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the appealed decision
on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof and that the
bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court action against the
carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that the existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid
periods have allegedly not been established, petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they can possibly
comply therewith. 12 In refutation, SLI avers that it is standard practice in its operations to issue bills of lading for
shipments entrusted to it for carriage and that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor
with proof of their existence manifest in the records of the case. 13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the propriety of
the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitioners' failure to prove its direct responsibility for the loss of
and/or damage to the cargo. 14
On this point, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolved that although the
bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such bills of lading which are
practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably involved and their provisions cannot
be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto. 15
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so considered and
controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the court even if not inceptively
raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant pleadings. 16 In the case at
bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer, 17 except that the bills of
lading embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to
whether or not prescription can be maintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the
strength of mere references thereto.
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in the bills of
lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the Rules must be properly
pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, 18 and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed
admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. 19 The rules on actionable documents cover
and apply to both a cause of action or defense based on said documents. 20
In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is a prescriptive period,
respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its answer setting forth paragraph 5 of the
pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation thereon by parties, to wit:
5. Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if
container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery, loss or
damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising from shortage, damage or loss,
non-delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action.
Failure to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim
or right of action. In no case shall carrier be liable for any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of
damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of carrier. 21
In their reply thereto, herein petitioners, by their own assertions that
2. In connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer, plaintiffs state that
such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as contracts of adhesion (see Sweet
Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Bernardo Teves, et al., G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978) and, consequently,
the provisions therein which are contrary to law and public policy cannot be availed of by answering
defendant as valid defenses. 22
thereby failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and the aforequoted provisions therein, hence they
impliedly admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject stipulations.
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the
instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in
the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being
required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. 23 Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness of an
instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof,
the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact. 24
Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the procedural earmarks of what
in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the
averment it is directed to. 25 Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being contrary
to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by
them.
We find merit in respondent court's comments that petitioners failed to touch on the matter of the non-presentation
of the bills of lading in their brief and earlier on in the appellate proceedings in this case, hence it is too late in the
day to now allow the litigation to be overturned on that score, for to do so would mean an over-indulgence in
technicalities. Hence, for the reasons already advanced, the non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the
formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of this particular case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse as
would bar respondent carrier from raising the defense of prescription. Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the
provisions of the bills of lading, particularly on the time limitations for filing a claim and for commencing a suit in
court, as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention.
It is to be noted that the carriage of the cargo involved was effected pursuant to an "Application for Delivery of
Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20, 1977 in Davao City 26 with the notation therein that
said application corresponds to and is subject to the terms of bills of lading MD-25 and MD-26. It would be a safe
assessment to interpret this to mean that, sight unseen, petitioners acknowledged the existence of said bills of
lading. By having the cargo shipped on respondent carrier's vessel and later making a claim for loss on the basis
of the bills of lading, petitioners for all intents and purposes accepted said bills. Having done so they are bound by
all stipulations contained therein. 27 Verily, as petitioners are suing for recovery on the contract, and in fact even
went as far as assailing its validity by categorizing it as a contract of adhesion, then they necessarily admit that
there is such a contract, their knowledge of the existence of which with its attendant stipulations they cannot now
be allowed to deny.
On the issue of the validity of the controverted paragraph 5 of the bills of lading above quoted which unequivocally
prescribes a time frame of thirty (30) days for filing a claim with the carrier in case of loss of or damage to the
cargo and sixty (60) days from accrual of the right of action for instituting an action in court, which periods must
concur, petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive period which is in the nature of a limitation on
petitioners' right of recovery is unreasonable and that SLI has the burden of proving otherwise, citing the earlier
case of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 28 They postulate this on the theory that the bills of lading
containing the same constitute contracts of adhesion and are, therefore, void for being contrary to public policy,
supposedly pursuant to the dictum in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al. 29
Furthermore, they contend, since the liability of private respondents has been clearly established, to bar
petitioners' right of recovery on a mere technicality will pave the way for unjust enrichment. 30 Contrarily, SLI
asserts and defends the reasonableness of the time limitation within which claims should be filed with the carrier;
the necessity for the same, as this condition for the carrier's liability is uniformly adopted by nearly all shipping
companies if they are to survive the concomitant rigors and risks of the shipping industry; and the countervailing
balance afforded by such stipulation to the legal presumption of negligence under which the carrier labors in the
event of loss of or damage to the cargo. 31
It has long been held that Article 366 of the Code of Commerce applies not only to overland and river
transportation but also to maritime
transportation. 32 Moreover, we agree that in this jurisdiction, as viewed from another angle, it is more accurate to
state that the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor under Article 366 actually
constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for damages caused to the
merchandise. The shipper or the consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition and if he omits
such allegations and proof, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in his favor. As the requirements in
Article 366, restated with a slight modification in the assailed paragraph 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable
conditions precedent, they are not limitations of action. 33 Being conditions precedent, their performance must
precede a suit for enforcement 34 and the vesting of the right to file spit does not take place until the happening of
these conditions. 35
Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in
existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of the
particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be
performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been
such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition. 36
It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, while a cause of action
consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The right of action does not arise until the
performance of all conditions precedent to the action and may be taken away by the running of the statute of
limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances which do not affect the cause of action. 37 Performance
or fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which a right of action depends must be sufficiently
alleged, 38 considering that the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of action is upon the person
initiating the suit. 39
More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of giving notice of loss of or
injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action for loss or injury or the right to
enforce the carrier's liability. Such requirement is not an empty formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of
such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has
been damaged and that it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and
extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while
the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims. 40
Stipulations in bills of lading or other contracts of shipment which require notice of claim for loss of or damage to
goods shipped in order to impose liability on the carrier operate to prevent the enforcement of the contract when
not complied with, that is, notice is a condition precedent and the carrier is not liable if notice is not given in
accordance with the stipulation, 41 as the failure to comply with such a stipulation in a contract of carriage with
respect to notice of loss or claim for damage bars recovery for the loss or damage suffered. 42
On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a carrier shorter
than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation merely affects the shipper's
remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to
the requirement on the reasonableness of the stipulated limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may
fix by agreement a shorter time for the bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than
that provided by the statute of limitations. Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way
defeat the complete vestiture of the right to recover, but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at an
earlier period than would be necessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute of limitations. 43
In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with the requirement for the filing of a
notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that effect. It may then be said that while
petitioners may possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with the above condition precedent they lost
whatever right of action they may have in their favor or, token in another sense, that remedial right or right to relief
had prescribed. 44
The shipment in question was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it was from this
date that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within which to file a claim with the
carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the cargo and thereby perfect their right of
action. The findings of respondent court as supported by petitioners' formal offer of evidence in the court below
show that the claim was filed with SLI only on April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in the bills of
lading 45 and violative of the contractual provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the loss of petitioners'
remedy or right to sue. Even the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 is of no remedial or practical
consequence, since the time limits for the filing thereof, whether viewed as a condition precedent or as a
prescriptive period, would in this case be productive of the same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of
action to begin with or, at any rate, their claim was time-barred.
What the court finds rather odd is the fact that petitioner TPI filed a provisional claim with DVAPSI as early as
June 14, 1977 46 and, as found by the trial court, a survey fixing the extent of loss of and/or damage to the cargo
was conducted on July 8, 1977 at the instance of petitioners. 47 If petitioners had the opportunity and awareness
to file such provisional claim and to cause a survey to be conducted soon after the discharge of the cargo, then
they could very easily have filed the necessary formal, or even a provisional, claim with SLI itself 48 within the
stipulated period therefor, instead of doing so only on April 28, 1978 despite the vessel's arrival at the port of
destination on May 15, 1977. Their failure to timely act brings us to no inference other than the fact that petitioners
slept on their rights and they must now face the consequences of such inaction.
The ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on this aspect is worth reproducing:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time limitation in the presentation of claim for
loss or damage, is but a restatement of the rule prescribed under Art. 366 of the Code of
Commerce which reads as follows:
Art. 366. Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise, the
claim against the carrier for damage or average which may be found therein upon
opening the packages, may be made, provided that the indications of the damage or
average which gives rise to the claim cannot be ascertained from the outside part of
the packages, in which case the claims shall be admitted only at the time of the
receipt.
After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or the transportation charges have been
paid, no claim shall be admitted against the carrier with regard to the condition in
which the goods transported were delivered.
Gleanable therefrom is the fact that subject stipulation even lengthened the period for presentation
of claims thereunder. Such modification has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. In the case
of Ong Yet (M)ua Hardware Co., Inc. vs. Mitsui Steamship Co., Ltd., et al., 59 O.G. No. 17, p. 2764,
it ruled that Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce can be modified by a bill of lading prescribing the
period of 90 days after arrival of the ship, for filing of written claim with the carrier or agent, instead
of the 24-hour time limit after delivery provided in the aforecited legal provision.
Tested, too, under paragraph 5 of said Bill of Lading, it is crystal clear that the commencement of
the instant suit on May 12, 1978 was indeed fatally late. In view of the express provision that "suits
arising from
. . . damage or loss shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action," the
present action necessarily fails on ground of prescription.
In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is usually held or
recognized that it is competent for the parties to a contract of shipment to agree on a
limitation of time shorter than the statutory period, within which action for breach of
the contract shall be brought, and such limitation will be enforced if reasonable . . .
(13 C.J.S. 496-497)
A perusal of the pertinent provisions of law on the matter would disclose that there is no
constitutional or statutory prohibition infirming paragraph 5 of subject Bill of Lading. The stipulated
period of 60 days is reasonable enough for appellees to ascertain the facts and thereafter to sue, if
need be, and the 60-day period agreed upon by the parties which shortened the statutory period
within which to bring action for breach of contract is valid and binding. . . . (Emphasis in the original
text.) 49
As explained above, the shortened period for filing suit is not unreasonable and has in fact been generally
recognized to be a valid business practice in the shipping industry. Petitioners' advertence to the Court's holding in
the Southern Lines case, supra, is futile as what was involved was a claim for refund of excess payment. We ruled
therein that non-compliance with the requirement of filing a notice of claim under Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce does not affect the consignee's right of action against the carrier because said requirement applies
only to cases for recovery of damages on account of loss of or damage to cargo, not to an action for refund of
overpayment, and on the further consideration that neither the Code of Commerce nor the bills of lading therein
provided any time limitation for suing for refund of money paid in excess, except only that it be filed within a
reasonable time.
The ruling in Sweet Lines categorizing the stipulated limitation on venue of action provided in the subject bill of
lading as a contract of adhesion and, under the circumstances therein, void for being contrary to public policy is
evidently likewise unavailing in view of the discrete environmental facts involved and the fact that the restriction
therein was unreasonable. In any case, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 50 instructs us that "contracts of
adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other . . . are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his
consent." In the present case, not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses non-compliance with the
contractual stipulations since the responsibility for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of
carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as the case may be.
While it is true that substantial compliance with provisions on filing of claim for loss of or damage to cargo may
sometimes suffice, the invocation of such an assumption must be viewed vis-a-vis the object or purpose which
such a provision seeks to attain and that is to afford the carrier a reasonable opportunity to determine the merits
and validity of the claim and to protect itself against unfounded impositions. 51 Petitioners' would nevertheless
adopt an adamant posture hinged on the issuance by SLI of a "Report on Losses and Damages," dated May 15,
1977, 52 from which petitioners theorize that this charges private respondents with actual knowledge of the loss
and damage involved in the present case as would obviate the need for or render superfluous the filing of a claim
within the stipulated period.
Withal, it has merely to be pointed out that the aforementioned report bears this notation at the lower part thereof:
"Damaged by Mla. labor upon unloading; B/L noted at port of origin," as an explanation for the cause of loss of
and/or damage to the cargo, together with an iterative note stating that "(t)his Copy should be submitted together
with your claim invoice or receipt within 30 days from date of issue otherwise your claim will not be honored."
Moreover, knowledge on the part of the carrier of the loss of or damage to the goods deducible from the issuance
of said report is not equivalent to nor does it approximate the legal purpose served by the filing of the requisite
claim, that is, to promptly apprise the carrier about a consignee's intention to file a claim and thus cause the
prompt investigation of the veracity and merit thereof for its protection. It would be an unfair imposition to require
the carrier, upon discovery in the process of preparing the report on losses or damages of any and all such loss or
damage, to presume the existence of a claim against it when at that time the carrier is expectedly concerned
merely with accounting for each and every shipment and assessing its condition. Unless and until a notice of claim
is therewith timely filed, the carrier cannot be expected to presume that for every loss or damage tallied, a
corresponding claim therefor has been filed or is already in existence as would alert it to the urgency for an
immediate investigation of the soundness of the claim. The report on losses and damages is not the claim referred
to and required by the bills of lading for it does not fix responsibility for the loss or damage, but merely states the
condition of the goods shipped. The claim contemplated herein, in whatever form, must be something more than a
notice that the goods have been lost or damaged; it must contain a claim for compensation or indicate an intent to
claim. 53
Thus, to put the legal effect of respondent carrier's report on losses or damages, the preparation of which is
standard procedure upon unloading of cargo at the port of destination, on the same level as that of a notice of
claim by imploring substantial compliance is definitely farfetched. Besides, the cited notation on the carrier's report
itself makes it clear that the filing of a notice of claim in any case is imperative if carrier is to be held liable at all for
the loss of or damage to cargo.
Turning now to respondent DVAPSI and considering that whatever right of action petitioners may have against
respondent carrier was lost due to their failure to seasonably file the requisite claim, it would be awkward, to say
the least, that by some convenient process of elimination DVAPSI should proverbially be left holding the bag, and
it would be pure speculation to assume that DVAPSI is probably responsible for the loss of or damage to cargo.
Unlike a common carrier, an arrastre operator does not labor under a presumption of negligence in case of loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods discharged into its custody. In other words, to hold an arrastre operator liable
for loss of and/or damage to goods entrusted to it there must be preponderant evidence that it did not exercise
due diligence in the handling and care of the goods.
Petitioners failed to pinpoint liability on any of the original defendants and in this seemingly wild goose-chase, they
cannot quite put their finger down on when, where, how and under whose responsibility the loss or damage
probably occurred, or as stated in paragraph 8 of their basic complaint filed in the court below, whether "(u)pon
discharge of the cargoes from the original carrying vessel, the SS VISHVA YASH," and/or upon discharge of the
cargoes from the interisland vessel the MV "SWEET LOVE," in Davao City and later while in the custody of
defendant arrastre operator. 54
The testimony of petitioners' own witness, Roberto Cabato, Jr., Marine and Aviation Claims Manager of petitioner
Philamgen, was definitely inconclusive and the responsibility for the loss or damage could still not be ascertained
therefrom:
Q In other words, Mr. Cabato, you only computed the loss on the basis of the figures
submitted to you and based on the documents like the survey certificate and the
certificate of the arrastre?
A Yes, sir.
Q Therefore, Mr. Cabato, you have no idea how or where these losses were
incurred?
A No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Witness, you said that you processed and investigated the claim involving the
shipment in question. Is it not a fact that in your processing and investigation you
considered how the shipment was transported? Where the losses could have
occurred and what is the extent of the respective responsibilities of the bailees
and/or carriers involved?
xxx xxx xxx
A With respect to the shipment being transported, we have of course to get into it in
order to check whether the shipment coming in to this port is in accordance with the
policy condition, like in this particular case, the shipment was transported to Manila
and transhipped through an interisland vessel in accordance with the policy. With
respect to the losses, we have a general view where losses could have occurred. Of
course we will have to consider the different bailees wherein the shipment must have
passed through, like the ocean vessel, the interisland vessel and the arrastre, but
definitely at that point and time we cannot determine the extent of each liability. We
are only interested at that point and time in the liability as regards the underwriter in
accordance with the policy that we issued.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Witness, from the documents, namely, the survey of Manila Adjusters and
Surveyors Company, the survey of Davao Arrastre contractor and the bills of lading
issued by the defendant Sweet Lines, will you be able to tell the respective liabilities
of the bailees and/or carriers concerned?
A No, sir. (Emphasis ours.) 55
Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish the stage in the course of
the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. What can only be inferred from the factual
findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to DVAPSI, loss or damage had already
occurred and that the same could not have possibly occurred while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as
demonstrated by the observations of the trial court quoted at the start of this opinion.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the complaint in
the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
Alano vs. CA 283 S 269

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37[2] denying petitioners
motion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Arturo Alano as well as his motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The information[3] alleges:
That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending
to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold
the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one
Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful
ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the
aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question
pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch
68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and entitled Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo
Alano, et al., concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned
Civil Case, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of
said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was
previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private
respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery,
hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was
filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioners motion as well as a subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking the
nullification of the assailed order.
On July 26, 1993,[4] the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question
justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondent
was a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel of land. Otherwise stated, if the Court
in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of
petitioners signature in the first deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.
While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioners claim, we are compelled to affirm the Court of
Appeals findings.
The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved such resolution would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action.[5] In other words, if both civil and
criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.[6]
On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the disposition of the
issue raised need not unduly detain us. We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double
sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of
the alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.[7]
Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of Appeals still affirmed the Order of the
trial court denying petitioners motion for the suspension of the proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the
stipulation of facts, had already admitted during the pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the
validity of his signature in the first deed of sale between him and the private respondent, as well as his
subsequent acknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three (23) cash vouchers evidencing the payments made
by the private respondent. [8] Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even wrote to the
private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid.[9]
In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule 118 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. x x x. The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining
(b)Stipulation of facts
From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is
recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties[10] and by virtue of
which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to
contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit.[11]
Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the petitioner
resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf.While it is true that the right to present
evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution,[12] this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.[13]
Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the same
is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused.After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for
the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large.[14]
Accordingly, petitioners admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal amounts to a
waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.[15]Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner
himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.[16]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
People vs. Solayao 262 SCRA 255

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition[1]defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No.
1866.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about in the evening of , with CAFGU
members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were
to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence
of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.[2]
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met
the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed
that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.[3]
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he
seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade
firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said
firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had
no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession
of firearm.[4]
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was
only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut
leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since
they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after
the others had been used up.[5] Accused-appellant's claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed
received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves.[6]
On , the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided by law.[7] It found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino
confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found
credible accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon
reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie
Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions.[8]
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:
"I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
"II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in the imposition of the
maximum penalty against the accused-appellant."[9]
This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati[10] ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same.
In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm
in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his
person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence for
being "the fruit of the poisonous tree."[11] As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-
appellant acquitted.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al.[12] where this Court
declared: " emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based
on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardly
tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the
fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit[13] and that upon espying the peace
officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission
to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.[14]
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals[15] where this
Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They
did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the case brought about by the suspicious
conduct of himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a search
even before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as
a government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming
around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had
aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-
appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without
first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled
upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor
was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the
absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor
General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit
or license to possess the subject firearm.[17]
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of
illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[18]
In People v. Tiozon,[19] this Court said:

"It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be invoked to support the
view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him
of a license to possess the firearm, but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged
lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if 'it is an essential
ingredient of the offense charged,' the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the
firearm used by appellant in commtting the offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now
G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no 'license or permit to possess' the .45 caliber pistol mentioned
therein. Thus is seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove
it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged
with 'having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a
voter. It was there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the
crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where
the accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for
certain diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he received monetary compensation, without having
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in
Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject of the negative averment alike, for
instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a
negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case from the
best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not
even a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief
Justice Moran upholds this view as follows:
'The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not
relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact
must be assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar
instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of
liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge of
that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can, with more facility, be
adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove
the allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or
knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the
onus upon him.' (6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8)."
Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law on this
question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling:[20]
"We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the prosecution to prove all the
ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in an information, which allegation must perforce include
any negative element provided by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the
fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the offense charged, then it must
prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus alleged."
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-appellant
admitted before Police Officer Nio at the time that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to
carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one.[21] In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-
appellant's admission to prove the second element.
Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the corresponding license? Corollary to the above question
is whether an admission by the accused-appellant can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing
beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading and which forms an essential ingredient
of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is the mere
acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the
speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt."[22] In other words, it is a "statement by defendant of fact
or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but
which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction."[23] From the above principles, this Court can infer that an
admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt thecommission of the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Court which states:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case
does not require proof."
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely
bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution was able to establish
the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being
able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not
lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to
establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification
from the government agency concerned."[24]
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the
establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then
the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative."[25]
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that
accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released unless there
are other legal grounds for his continued detention, with costs de oficio.

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State Prosecutors vs.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) costs of suit.

x = 2 (80-48) x [P41,160.00 P20,580.00]

The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:

The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.

A: I want this to proceed.[24]

Q: When were you born?

Q: You do not know your birthday?

A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.

ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.

Aguenza vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. 271 S 1

The petition has merit.

Philamgen vs. Sweet Lines, Inc. 212 S 195

Alano vs. CA 283 S 269

Hence, this petition.

People vs. Solayao 262 SCRA 255

In People v. Tiozon,[19] this Court said:

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