G.R. No.
195203 April 20, 2015 that he vacate the property because they did not
[Formerly UDK No. 14435]
ANTONIO PAGARIGAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELITA YAGUE and SHIRLEY
ASUNCION, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 we review
the February 11, 2010 decision2 and December 9,
2010 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110552. The CA affirmed the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board's (DARAB's) ruling in DARAB Case No.
13848 that likewise affirmed the Provincial
Adjudicator's decision to eject Antonio Pagarigan
(petitioner), including all other persons acting in his
behalf, from the subject rice land.
Factual Antecedents
Anastacio Yague (Anastacio), the previous owner of
a 21,459 square meter-parcel of rice land located at
Brgy. San Carlos, Paniqui, Tarlac, had initially
instituted his stepfather Macario Pagarigan
(Macario) as tenant of the land.4 Macario, with the
help of his son Alfonso Pagarigan (Alfonso),
cultivated the land and, as agreed upon, shared
equally the lands yearly harvest with Anastacio.5
Allegedly with Anastacios consent, Alfonso
became tenant of the land in place of his ailing
father sometime in 1957.6 Alfonso continued to
cultivate the land after Macarios death and
religiously delivered to Anastacio his share in the
harvest.7
In 1993, Anastacio transferred the title of the
subject rice land to his daughters, Angelita Yague
and Shirley Asuncion (respondents).8
In succeeding years, the respondents noticed a
decline in the number of cavans produced and
delivered to them each year. They claimed that, in
1999, they did not receive any share in the lands
harvest.9
Upon investigation, the respondents were surprised
to find that the petitioner was cultivating the land;10
they thought all along that Alfonso (petitioners
father) was still the lands tenant11 and that Antonio
was merely delivering to them their share in the
harvest upon Alfonsos instructions.12 The
respondents confronted the petitioner and demanded
consent to his institution as tenant of the land. They
also argued that the petitioners house and the two
fishponds on the property were constructed without
their knowledge and consent,13 and that the
petitioner even allowed his son to build a house on
the property without first seeking their
permission.14 The petitioner refused to heed the
respondents demand so the dispute was brought to
the barangay for conciliation.15
Failure of the parties to reach a settlement before
the barangay and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office resulted in the ejectment complaint the
respondents filed against the petitioner before the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, DARAB, Region III.16
In his answer to the ejectment complaint, the
petitioner contended that the respondents father
Anastacio consented to his institution as tenant of
the land and to the construction of his house on the
property.17 With respect to the house being
occupied by his son, the petitioner claimed that it
was built on the property in 1997 originally for use
as an animal shelter, and that his sons use was
temporary.18 Also, the petitioner claimed that the
fishponds were constructed in1995 supposedly to
serve as a catch basin for water to irrigate the rice
fields without any objection from the
respondents.19
In a decision20 dated November 28, 2003, the
Provincial Adjudicators office ruled in the
respondents favor after finding that the petitioners
cultivation and occupation of the subject rice land
was without the respondents consent. The
Provincial Adjudicator ordered the petitioner, and
all other persons acting in his behalf, to vacate the
property and peacefully return its possession and
occupation to the respondents.21
On appeal to the DARAB, the DARAB affirmed the
Provincial Adjudicators decision.22 The petitioner
moved to reconsider but the DARAB denied his
motion in a resolution dated January 16, 2009.23
The petitioner appealed to the CA.
In a decision dated February 11, 2010, the CA
affirmed the DARABs decision and held that the
petitioners status as de jure tenant to the subject
rice land was not properly established due to the
absence of the elements of consent and an agreed
sharing system of harvest between the parties. The
CA held that, other than his bare allegation, the
petitioner failed to prove that his institution as
tenant in 1979 was with the consent of the
respondents father;24 and that the "acquiescence by
the landowners of the petitioners cultivation of the
land does not create an implied tenancy if the
former, as in this case, never considered petitioner
Antonio Pagarigan as tenant of the land."25 Also, it
held that the petitioner failed to provide evidence,
such as receipts, that he had been delivering to the
respondents their corresponding share in the lands
harvest.26
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration
with the CA, the petitioner filed the present petition
for review on certiorari where he insists that his
institution as tenant of the land was with the consent
of the respondents father. Nevertheless, he argues
that an implied tenancy was already created
between him and the respondents because of the
latters acceptance of his deliveries of palay. He,
likewise, maintains that he did not fail to deliver to
the respondents their share in the harvest but could
not present receipts as evidence thereof because it
was never the respondents practice to issue receipts
for his deliveries considering the familial relations
between the parties.
Our Ruling
We DENY the present petition for lack of merit.
In his petition before this Court, the petitioner
mainly argues that the respondents continued
acceptance of his deliveries of palay constituted as
implied acquiescence of his occupation and
cultivation of the subject rice land, thus, he claims
that an implied tenancy has been created between
him and the respondents. But for an implied tenancy
to arise, it is necessary that all the essential
requisites of tenancy must first be present.27
The following are the essential elements of an
agricultural tenancy relationship: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.28 In our review of the
present case, we agree with the CA that the element
of consent from the landowner to the petitioners
tenancy is absent.
We have consistently held that occupancy and
cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how
long, will not ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant.29 Independent and concrete evidence is
necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of
harvest, or consent of the landowner.30 We
emphasize that the presence of a tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed;31 the elements for
its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done
away with by mere conjectures.32 Leasehold
relationship is not brought about by the mere
congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship,
the mutual will of the parties to that relationship
should be primordial.33
In the proceedings before the DARAB and the CA,
the petitioner consistently failed to provide
independent and concrete evidence to show that the
respondents and their father, Anastacio, gave their
consent (impliedly and expressly) to his institution
as tenant of the subject rice land. We note that proof
of consent by the landowner/s is largely a matter of
evidence, and not a proper subject of a Rule 45
petition. Well-settled is the rule that only questions
of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon
by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.34 In the absence of
exceptional circumstances, we shall rely and give
credence to the factual findings of the DARAB on
the question of whether the landowners gave their
consent to the petitioner's tenancy, especially when
its finding on the matter was affirmed on appeal to
the CA.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review
on certiorari for lack of merit. The decision dated
February 11, 2010 and the resolution dated
December 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 110552 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155580
ROMEO T. CALUZOR, Petitioners,
vs.
DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS
OF THE LATE LORENZO LLANILLO, and
MOLD EX REALTY CORPORTATION,
Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed. It is
established only by adducing evidence showing that
all the essential requisites of the tenancy
relationship concur, namely: (a) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (b)
the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (c) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (d) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
(e) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee.1
Antecedents
Lorenzo Llanillo (Lorenzo) owned the parcel of
land (land) wi.th an area of 90, 101 square meters,
more or less, known as Lot 4196 and situated in
Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan. The land was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25864
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
The petitioner averred that Lorenzo took him into
the land as a tenant in 1970, giving to him a sketch
that indicated the boundaries of the portion he
would be cultivating. To effectively till the land, the
petitioner and his family were allowed to build a
makeshift shanty thereon. Even after the death of
Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of
his produce to the family of Lorenzo through
Ricardo Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzos overseer. In
1990, respondent Deogracias Lanillo (Deogracias),
the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner
P17,000.00/hectare of the cultivated land in
exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias.
In the end, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner.
Instead, on August 5, 1994, Deogracias and persons
acting under his orders forcibly ejected the
petitioner and his family by levelling their shanty
and plantation with the use of a bulldozer. The
efforts of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council to
conciliate failed; hence, the authority to file a case
was issued to the petitioner.
On September 9, 1994, the petitioner instituted this
case against Deogracias in the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
in Malolos, Bulacan,2 demanding the payment of
disturbance compensation. He amended his
complaint to implead Moldex Realty Corporation
(Moldex) as an additional defendant upon
discovering that the latter had entered the land to
develop it into a residential subdivision. He prayed
for the restoration of his possession of the tilled
land, and the payment of disturbance compensation.
In his answer,3 Deogracias denied that any tenancy
relationship between him and the petitioner existed;
and that to show that the land in controversy had not
been tenanted, he presented several documents,
namely:
(1) the certification dated May 26, 1994 issued by
Municipal Agrarian Region Office (MARO)
Eleanor T. Tolentino;4 (2) the certification dated
September 13, 1978 issued by Team Leader I
Armando C. Canlas of Meycauayan, Bulacan;5 (3)
the Masterlist of Tenants and Landowners as of
March 1984;6 and (4) the Letter dated July 17, 1981
of Lorenzo Llanillo to the Provincial Assessors
Office requesting a change in the classification of
the land7
Meanwhile, on April 12, 1995, the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted the
application for the conversion of the land from
agricultural to residential and commercial uses filed
by Deogarcias, through Moldex as his attorney-in-
fact.
Ruling of the PARAD
On December 13, 1996, the PARAD dismissed the
complaint of the petitioner,8 pertinently ruling:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship x x
x are as follows:
1. [There] is consent given
2. The parties are landholder and tenants
3. There is personal cultivation;
4. The subject is agricultural land;
5. The purpose is agricultural production;
6. There is showing of harvest or payment of fixed
amount in money or produces.
xxxx
After a perusal of the records and evidence
presented by both parties, requisites No. 1 and 6 are
wanting. Complainant failed to submit any evidence
to prove that the landowners gave their consent for
him to work on the land except the sketch of the
land (Exh. "A") which he alleged that Lorenzo
Llanillo gave him. A careful scrutiny of the sketch,
however, show that it may be prepared by a
surveyor because even the technical description of
the land were indicated therein and the allegation of
Romeo Calusor that the landowner drew the sketch
before him is therefore untenable. Complainant
failed to submit any certification from the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer that he is listed
as tenants [sic] of the landowners. He also failed to
submit any evidence that he has a leasehold contract
with the landowners. Complainant also failed to
submit any receipt of payments of his alleged
leasehold rentals. The house of the complainant
which he alleged to have been destroyed by the
respondent is a makeshift shanty.
It is a well settled doctrine that mere cultivation
without proof of the conditions of tenancy does not
suffice to establish tenancy relationship. (Gepilan
vs. Lunico, CA-G.R. SP No. 06738, CAR June 5,
1978). In the case at bar, complainant Romeo
Calusor marked on the land without the express
consent of the landowners, represented by
Deogracias Llanillo and without the benefit of any
leasehold agreement between the landowners and
the complainant. Consequently, there is a complete
absence of landlord-tenant relationship. In the case
of Gonzales vs. Alvarez (G.R. No. 77401, February
1, 1990), the Supreme Court held that:
"The protective mantle of the law extending to
legitimate farmers is never meant to cover intruders
and squatters who later on claim to be tenant on the
land upon which they squat."
The mere fact that Romeo Calusor works on the
land does not make him ipso facto a tenant. It has
been ruled that tenancy cannot be created nor
depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the
land.
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful landholders through
lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation
(Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573).9
Decision of the DARAB
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB),10 which, on June
26, 2000, reversed the PARAD,11 opining and
holding thusly:
The vortex of the controversy is the issue of
whether or not tenancy relationship exists between
the parties.
We rule in the affirmative. Complainant-Appellant
Romeo Calusor is a de jure tenant of a portion of
the subject land with an area of three (3) hectares
thereof.
In the case at bar, Complainant-Appellant
maintained that he has been instituted as an
agricultural lessee of the subject land by the
landowner Deogracias Llanilo; that he has been
delivering the landowners share through an
overseer in the person of Ricardo Martin. A receipt
is presented to bolster Complainant-Appellants
claim (Annex "B", p. 127, rollo); that he has been in
peaceful possession of the subject parcel of land
until it was disturbed by herein Respondent-
Appellees by bulldozing and levelling the subject
land thereby destroying the fruitbearing trees
planted by herein Complainant-Appellant.
Justifying his position, RespondentAppellees
argued that Complainant-Appellant is a mere
squatter in the subject landholding; that there is no
sharing of the produce between the parties; that the
subject property is untenanted as certified by
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) for
Marilao, Bulacan.
After weighing the parties contrasting arguments
and after a close scrutiny of the pieces of evidence
adduced, we are constrained to rule in favor of
Complainant-Appellant.
In the case at bar, Complainant-Appellant is a
tenant\cultivator of the subject property, having
been verbally instituted as such by Deogracias
Llanillo. Sec. 166 (25) R.A. 3844, as amended
provides:
(25) shared tenancy exists whenever two persons
agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and
the other his labor, with either or both contributing
any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid
available from members of his immediate
household and the produce thereof to be divided
between the landholder and the tenant.
Clearly, the institution of Complainant-Appellant as
a tenant in the subject land by Deogracias Llanillo
and the sharing of the produce between the parties
sufficiently established tenancy relation between the
parties.
The subsequent conveyance or transfer of legal
possession of the property from Deogracias Llanillo
in favor of his children does not extinguish
Complainant-Appellants right over his tillage.
Section 10, R.A. 3844, as amended finds application
in this case, it provides:
Sec. 10 Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by the Expiration of Period, etc.- the
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall
not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term
or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor, sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof
shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to
the obligations of agricultural lessor.
Again, the Supreme Court in several cases has
sustained the preservation of an agricultural
leasehold relationship between landholder and
tenant despite the change of ownership or transfer
of legal possession from one person to another.
Verily, Complainant-Appellant cannot be validly
ejected from the subject premises. It may be worthy
to emphasize that Respondents-Appellants act in
bulldozing and levelling the subject property
without securing the prior approval/clearance from
the government agencies concerned (HLURB,
DENR, DAR) tantamounts to illegal conversion.
Hence, Respondent- Appellees are criminally liable
for such act. Since, there is no legal conversion in
the present case, it would be futile to dwell on the
issue of award of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing premises, the
appealed decision dated December 13, 1996 is
hereby REVERSED ad SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is rendered:
1. Ordering the reinstatement of Complainant-
Appellant to the subject premises; and
2. Ordering Respondents-Appellees to maintain
Complainant- Appellant in peaceful possession and
cultivation of tillage.
SO ORDERED.12
Decision of the CA
On appeal by Deogracias and Moldex, the CA
reversed the ruling of the DARAB and reinstated
the PARADs decision through the decision
promulgated on August 30, 2002,13 viz.:
Per Order of Conversion dated April 12, 1995, the
DAR, through then Undersecretary Jose Medina,
approved the application for conversion of the
subject landholding (ANNEX E" petition, Rollo,
pp. 56-58). The application was granted based on
the facts that 1.) the property is no longer suitable
for agricultural production as p tification dated 8
November 1994 issued by Mr. Renato N. Bulay,
Regional Director, Department of Agriculture, sa
Fernando, Pampanga; 2.) the area where the
property is located had already been classified as
residential/commercial as per Municipal Ordinance
No. 43, Series of 1988; and 3) the MARO, PARO,
RD and CLUPPI recommended its approval.
xxx
In fact the subject property is now a developed
subdivision (ANNEXES "G", - "G-1" & "H" "H-
1") with individual lots having been sold to different
buyers (ANNEXES ""I"-"I-1"). Under such
circumstances, there can be no agricultural tenant
on a residential land.
On the issue of whether or not respondent is entitled
to disturbance compensation under Section 36(1) of
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389,
he must be an agricultural lessee as defined under
Section 166 (2) of R.A. 3844. However, the records
are bereft of any evidence showing that he is a
tenant of petitioner Llanilo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
DARAB dated 26 June 2000 and its Resolution
dated 20 December 2001 are reversed and set aside.
Accordingly, the Decision of the PARAB dated
December 13, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (citations omitted)
Issues
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari
commenced by the petitioner on the ground that the
CA had gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction when: firstly, it
heavily relied on documents that had not been
presented in the PARAD proceedings; and,
secondly, it disregarded altogether the evidence on
record proving his tenancy and entitlement to
disturbance compensation.14 He points out that the
CA gravely abused its discretion in considering the
order of conversion as its basis for concluding that
there was no agricultural tenant on the land despite
the order being presented for the first time only on
appeal; and in denying his right to the disturbance
compensation despite abundant showing that he was
a tenant.
In its comment,15 Moldex insists that the petitioner
resorted to the wrong remedy, arguing that the
assailed decision of the CA, being one determining
the merits of the case, was subject to appeal by
petition for review on certiorari within 15 days from
notice of the decision; that the petition for certiorari
was an improper remedy; that after the lapse of the
15- day period, he could not substitute his lost
appeal with the special civil action for certiorari;
and that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction considering that he had not been a
tenant on the land.
On his part, Deogracias adopted the comment of
Moldex.16
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is bereft of merit.
First of all, we declare to be correct the respondents
position that the petitioner should have appealed in
due course by filing a petition for review on
certiorari instead of bringing the special civil action
for certiorari.
It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed
decision in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
to review and pass upon the DARABs adjudication
by of the petitioners appeal of the PARADs ruling.
As such, his only proper recourse from such
decision of the CA was to further appeal to the
Court by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.17 Despite his
allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the
CA, he could not come to the Court by special civil
action for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special
civil action for certiorari, being an extraordinary
remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.18 In certiorari, only errors
of jurisdiction are to be addressed by the higher
court, such that a review of the facts and evidence is
not done; but, in appeal, the superior court corrects
errors of judgment, and in so doing reviews issues
of fact and law to cure errors in the appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence.19 Based on such
distinctions, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal.
It is obvious that all that the petitioner wants the
Court to do is to revisit and review the facts and
records supposedly substantiating his claim of
tenancy and his demand for consequential
disturbance compensation. He has not thereby
raised any jurisdictional error by the CA, and has
not shown how the CA capriciously or whimsically
exercised its judgment as to be guilty of gravely
abusing its discretion. It is not amiss to point out
that the settled meaning of grave abuse of discretion
is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law.20 In that regard, the
abuse of discretion must be shown to be patent and
gross in order for the act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion.21
Yet, none of such categories characterized the act of
the CA.
Neither did the petitioners averment of the denial
of due process predicated on the CAs reliance on
the conversion order despite said order not being
among the documents presented during the trial22
justify the resort to certiorari. It appears that the CA
cited the conversion order not to deny his claim of
being the tenant but only to accent the land
conversion as a fact. Indeed, as the CA found, he
presented nothing to substantiate his claim of
having been the tenant of Leonardo. Under the
circumstances, the CA did not act either arbitrarily
or whimsically.
Secondly, the petitioners insistence on his being the
tenant of Leonardo and on his entitlement to
disturbance compensation required factual and legal
bases. The term tenant has a distinct meaning under
the law. Section 5 subparagraph (a) of R.A. No.
1199 provides:
A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by another, with the latters consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under
the leasehold tenancy system.
For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the
following elements must be shown to concur, to wit:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.23 The
presence of all these elements must be proved by
substantial evidence;24 this means that the absence
of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure
tenant.25 Unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure or to be covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.26
Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy
relationship, the petitioner carried the burden of
proving the allegation of his tenancy.27 According
to Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,28 to wit:
It is a matter of jurisprudence that tenancy is not
purely a factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land but more
importantly a legal relationship. (Tuazon v. Court of
Appeals, 118 SCRA 484) Under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, the term "agricultural
tenancy" is defined as
[T]he physical possession by a person of land
devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally
possessed by, another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and with the
members of his immediate farm household, in
consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain
or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in
both.
In establishing the tenancy relationship, therefore,
independent evidence, not self-serving statements,
should prove, among others, the consent of the
landowner to the relationship, and the sharing of
harvests.29
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy
were not shown to be presented in this case.
To prove the element of consent between the
parties, the petitioner testified that Lorenzo had
allowed him to cultivate the land by giving to him
the sketch30 of the lot31 in order to delineate the
portion for his tillage.
Yet, the sketch did not establish that Lorenzo had
categorically taken the petitioner in as his
agricultural tenant. This element demanded that the
landowner and the tenant should have agreed to the
relationship freely and voluntarily, with neither of
them unduly imposing his will on the other. The
petitioner did not make such a showing of consent.
The sixth element was not also established. Even
assuming that Lorenzo had verbally permitted the
petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy
relationship between them thereby set in because
they had not admittedly discussed any fruit sharing
scheme, with Lorenzo simply telling him simply
that he would just ask his share from him.32 The
petitioner disclosed that he did not see Lorenzo
again from the time he had received the sketch until
Lorenzos death.33 Although the petitioner asserted
that he had continued sharing the fruits of his
cultivation through Ricardo, Lorenzos caretaker,
even after Lorenzos death, producing the list of
produce to support his claim,34 the list did not
indicate Ricardos receiving the fruits listed therein.
The petitioner did not also contain Ricardos
authority to receive Leonardos share.
We underscore that harvest sharing is a vital
element of every tenancy. Common sense dictated,
indeed, that the petitioner, if he were the de jure
tenant that he represented himself to be, should
fully know his arrangement with the landowner. But
he did not sufficiently and persuasively show such
arrangement. His inability to specify the sharing
arrangement was inconceivable inasmuch as he had
depended on the arrangement for his own
sustenance and that of his own family. The absence
of the clear-cut sharing agreement between him and
Lorenzo could only signify that the latter had
merely tolerated his having tilled the land sans
tenancy. Such manner of tillage did not make him a
de jure tenant, because, as the Court observed in
Estate of Pastor M. Samson v. Susano:35
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and
cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto
make one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete
evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation,
sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner.
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact
of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible
evidence must be presented, because selfserving
statements are inadequate. Tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence
are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by
conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought
about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a
legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to
that relationship should be primordial. For implied
tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential
requisites of tenancy must be present.
Consequently, the CA rightly declared the DARAB
to have erred in its appreciation of the evidence on
the existence of the tenancy relationship.
With the restoration of his possession having
become physically impossible because of the
conversion of the land being already a fact, could
the petitioner be granted disturbance compensation?
If tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36
of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389, the dispossessed tenant is entitled to
the payment of disturbance compensation.36
Reflecting this statutory right, the conversion order
presented by Moldex included the condition for the
payment of disturbance compensation to any
farmerbeneficiary thereby affected.
Yet, the query has to be answered in the negative
because the petitioner was not entitled to
disturbance compensation because he was not the de
jure tenant of the landowner.
It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance
compensation to be validly made by a de jure tenant
must meet the procedural and substantive conditions
listed in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844, to
wit:
Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The
agricultural lessee shall have the right to be
indemnified for the cost and expenses incurred in
the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other
expenses incidental to the improvement of his crop
in case he surrenders or abandons his landholding
for just cause or is eje ition, he has the right to be
indemnified for one-half of the necessary and useful
improvements made by him on the landholding:
Provided, That these improvements are tangible and
have not yet lost their utility at the time of surrender
and/or abandonment of the landholding, at which
time their value shall be determined for the purpose
of the indemnity for improvements. (Emphasis
supplied)
In short, the de Jure tenant should allege and prove,
firstly, the cost and expenses incurred in the
cultivation, planting or harvesting and other
expenses incidental to the improvement of his crop;
and, secondly, the necessary and useful
improvements made in cultivating the land. Without
the allegation and proof, the demand for indemnity
may be denied.
In fine, the CA did not err in reversing and setting
aside the decision of the DARAB and reinstating
the decision of the PARAD.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192270 January 26, 2015
IRENE D. OFILADA, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES RUBEN ANDAL and MIRAFLOR
ANDAL, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the
July 13, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR. CV3 No. 101603 which: (1)
granted the Petition for Review4 filed therein; (2)
reversed and set aside the August 28, 2007
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Lucena City, Branch 56 in SPEC. CIV. ACTION
2007-01-A, affirming in toto the February 27, 2007
Decision6 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Antonio, Quezon in Civil Case No. 188 which,
in tum, ordered the ejectment of respondents
spouses Ruben Andal and Miraflor Andal (spouses
Andal) from the properties of petitioner Irene
Ofilada (Irene); and, (3) declared the said MTC
Decision null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Also questioned in this Petition isthe CAs May 6,
2010 Resolution7 denying Irenes Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.
Factual Antecedents
Irene, together with her husband Carlos Ofilada
(Carlos), bought from the heirs of Teresita Liwag
(Teresita) a 27,974-square meter parcel of land
principally planted with rambutan, a number of
coconut trees and other fruit-bearing plants located
in Barrio Puri, Tiaong, Quezon. The sale is
evidenced by a February 13, 1997 Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale8 wherein
respondent Miraflor Andal (Miraflor), who brokered
the sale of the property, signed as tenant.
Apparently, ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor
appeared before Anastacio Lajara (Anastacio), the
then Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC)
Chairman of Barangay Puri, San Antonio, and
executed a Pagpapatunay9 stating that:
Sa kinauukulan:
Ito ay pagpapatunay na si Miraflor
Andal ay kusang[-]loob na dumulog sa
aking tanggapan upang
ipagbigay[-]alam na ang lupa na pag-
 aari ni TERESITA LIWAG x x x ay
walang "tenant"o magtatrabaho at
hiniling niya na ang nasabing lupa ay
mapalipat sa pangalan ng mga bumili
na walang iba kundi sina Carlos at
Irene Ofilada.
Pinagtitibay nya na wala na siyang
paghahabol na ano man laban sa may-
ari o kahalili nito sa karapatan sapagkat
siya ay tumanggap na ng kaukulang
halaga hinggil sa naging pagtatrabaho
niya sa nasabing lupa at gayon din ang
kanyang mga magulang.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG
ITO ay ako ay nagbibigay ng
pahintulot na ang nasabing lupa ay
mapagbili na at mapatala sa bagong
may-ari na ligtas sa ano mang
pananagutan.10
Two weeks after the sale or on February 27, 1997,
Miraflor, with the consent of her husband,
respondent Ruben Andal (Ruben), executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay11 wherein she acknowledged
Irene and Carlos as the new owners of the property.
While it was stated therein that she will continue to
take care of the property, she nevertheless waived
any tenancy rights that she and her husband might
haveover the land, viz.:
1. NA AKO ang [n]agtatrabaho o "tenant" sa lupang
pag-aari ni TERESITA LIWAG at ang nasabing
lupa ay matatagpuan sa Brgy. Puri, San Antonio,
Quezon x x x
2. NA AKO ay kusang loob na nag-alok sa
tagapagmana ng may-ari ng lupa na
pinangatawanan ni Ginoong JOSE LIWAG na
ipagbili na ang nasabing lupa sa mag-asawang
CARLOS OFILADA at IRENE OFILADA sapagkat
magpapatuloy naman ang aking pangangalaga sa
nasabing lupa;
3. NA AKO at ang aking asawa ay kusang loob na
sumang[-]ayon na ang Titulo ng [na]sabing lupa ay
mapalipat sa mga bumili at simula sa araw na ito ay
matahimik kong isinusulit ang pamomosesyon
samga bagong mayari;
4. NA kami ay kusang[-]loob na tumatalikod na sa
karapatan ko bilang "tenant" na kahit kailan [ay]
hindi na maghahabol laban sa dating may-ari o sa
kaniyang mga tagapagmana sapagkat walasilang
ano mang pananagutan sa amin at gayon[din] ang
bagong may-ari na mag-asawang CARLOS
OFILADA at IRENE OFILADA;12
Eventually, the land was registered in the names of
Irene and Carlos.13
Eight years later or in October 2005, Irene filed
against the spouses Andal a Complaint14 for
Ejectment and Damages before the MTC of San
Antonio, Quezon. She averred that aside from the
aforementioned property, she and Carlos also
acquired an 8,640-square meter ricefield located in
Pulo, San Antonio, Quezon. For humanitarian
reasons, she acceded to the spouses Andals request
to take care of her two parcels of land, provided that
they would not be considered as tenants. To stress
the factthat neither she nor the spouses Andal
intended that the latter be deemed as tenants, Irene
pointed to the following: (1) the condition for her
purchase of the property in Tiaong that the same
should not have any tenants; and (2) Miraflors
execution of a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein she
waived any tenancy rights that she and her husband
might have over the said property.
In their Answer,15 the spouses Andal denied Irenes
allegations and claimed that they were tenants of
Irenes predecessor-in-interest and continued to be
such despite the transfer of ownership of the
properties to Irene. They likewise contended that
since the suit is an action to dispossess themas
tenants, it is not the MTC which has jurisdiction
over the complaint but the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Rejecting the tenancy claim, Irene averred in her
Memorandum16 that her real properties are not
covered by agrarian reform laws as they are within
the retention limit allowed by law. She again
stressed that the spouses Andal had already
voluntarily surrendered their rights as tenants way
back in 1997 as evidenced by the Pagpapatunay and
the Sinumpaang Salaysay. She added the said
spouses voluntarily waived their rights and received
P1.1 million as commission for brokering the sale
of the Tiaong property to her. This was after Irene
made clear that the sale would not materialize and,
consequently spouses Andal would not get the
commission, if the property has tenants. Irene
averred that the spouses Andals receipt of the said
amount of money, being advantageous to them, is a
valid ground for termination of tenancy relations.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
Prior to the preliminary conference, the MTC heard
the respective sides of the parties for a preliminary
determination of the existence of tenancy.
The spouses Andal, in support of their claim that the
controversy should be resolved by the DARAB
because of the issue of tenancy, submitted the
following evidence to prove their status as Irenes
tenants:(1) their December 19, 2005 Affidavit17
attesting that: a) they agreed to act as agents for the
sale of the lands on the condition that they would
remain as tenants; b) they personally cultivated
Irenes lands and; c) they have been receiving
shares of the proceeds of the sales of the coconut,
rambutan, and harvested palay; (2) the December
19, 2005 Affidavit18 of Anastacio corroborating the
spouses Andals statements in their affidavit of even
date; (3) a receipt19 dated July 27, 2005 showing
that Irene received from the spouses Andal
P9,694.00 as her share in the harvest equivalent to
30 sacks of palayand; 4) a February 27,1997
Affidavit of Landholding20 executed by Irene and
Carlos, the second paragraph of which provides:
2. That we hereby testify that said parcel of land
containing an area of 27,974 Square Meters is the
only parcel of agricultural land registered in our
names; and we hereby agree that the same tenant
Miraflor Andal, will continue as a tenant, over the
said parcel of land. (Emphasis supplied) On the
other hand, Irene insisted that the spouses Andal are
not tenants but mere caretakers of her lands. She
disputed the documentary evidence of the said
spouses as follows: (1) it is the Pagpapatunay issued
by Anastacio in 1997 and furnished the Registry of
Deeds of Lucena City and Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) which must be considered as more
credible evidence over his apparently fabricated
affidavit executed at a later time (2005); (2) the
share in the produce of the lands as reflected in the
receipt was the only share given to her by the
spouses Andal throughout the eight years that they
took care of her properties; and, (3) the copy of the
Affidavit of Landholding presented by the spouses
Andal contained in the second paragraph thereof an
insertion made through a manual typewriter. Irene
claimed that the said insertion which reads "and we
[Irene and Carlos] hereby agree, that the same
tenant Miraflor Andal, will continue as a tenant,
over the said parcel of land," was made without her
knowledge and consent. In fact, her copy21 of the
said document does not contain such inserted
portion.
In its August 14, 2006 Order,22 the MTC found no
prima facie showing of tenancy relations between
the parties and proceeded with the case.
On February 27, 2007, the MTC rendered its
Decision23 holding that spouses Andal failed to
adduce proof that they are tenants. It gave weight to
the Pagpapatunay issued by Anastacio in 1997 as
against the affidavit he executed in 2005 which it
found ambivalent as to whether spouses Andal are
working as tenants on the lands of Irene. The MTC
did not also accord any evidentiary weight to the
copy of the Affidavit of Landholding presented by
spouses Andal because of the doubtful insertion.
Hence, it concluded that the spouses Andal were in
possession of the properties by mere tolerance of
Irene. It ultimately ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing
findings, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering:
a) Defendants and all other persons living in said
premises without permission of the plaintiff, to
vacate and restore to the plaintiff the peaceful
possession and occupation of the landholdings in
question;
b) Defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P30,000.00 as attorneys and appearance fees[;]
c) Defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P80,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.24
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Resolving the appeal of the spouses Andal, the RTC
in its August 28, 2007 Decision25 affirmed in toto
the MTC ruling. The motion for reconsideration
thereto was also denied in the RTC Resolution26
dated November 22, 2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, on the other hand, took a different view of
the case. In its assailed Decision27 of July 13, 2009,
the CA ratiocinated that since the existence of
tenancy relations between the previous owners of
the properties and the spouses Andal is undisputed,
the question of whether the said spouses may be
dispossessed therefrom constitutes an agrarian
dispute despite the severance of such relations. This
is considering that severance of the tenurial
arrangement does not render the action beyond the
ambit of an agrarian dispute and, hence, jurisdiction
over the same remains with the DARAB. In support
of its conclusion, the CA cited the cases of Rivera v.
David28 and Spouses Amurao v. Spouses
Villalobos.29
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 56, in Special
Civil Case No. 2007-01-A, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 27 February
2007 of the Municipal Trial Court of San Antonio,
Quezon in Civil CaseNo. 188, is declared NULL
and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. SO
ORDERED.30
Irene filed a Motion for Reconsideration,31 which
was denied in the CA Resolution32 dated May 6,
2010.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issue
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and
the municipal circuit trial courts.33 On the other
hand, the DARis vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform.34 As DARs adjudicating arm,35 it is the
DARAB thathas exclusive and original jurisdiction
involving all agrarian disputes. Republic Act (RA)
No. 6657, Section 3(d) defines an agrarian dispute
as follows:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation
of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee.
The term also "refers to any controversy relating to,
among others, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture."36
Significantly, Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules of
Procedure reads:
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and
Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) under R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A.
No. 9700, E.O. Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, R.A. No.
3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Specifically,
such jurisdiction shall includebut not be limited to
cases involving the following:
a. The rights and obligations of persons, whether
natural or juridical, engaged in the management,
cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered
by R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), as
amended, and other related agrarian laws; x x x
xxxx
d. Those cases involving the ejectment and
dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders;
With the above points on jurisdictions having been
laid, the Court now resolves the crucial issue in the
case of whether tenancy relationship between Irene
and the spouses Andal exists as to strip off the MTC
of its jurisdiction over Irenes suit for unlawful
detainer.
Our Ruling
We grant the Petition.
The factual circumstances in Rivera and
Amurao clearly make out cases involving
agrarian dispute.
As the CA relied on Rivera and Amurao,it is wise to
revisit the factual milieu of the said cases.
In its assailed Decision, the CA quoted the
following pronouncement which was restated37 in
Rivera, viz:
Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed,
the action still involves an incident arising from the
landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case
involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a
former tenant of the land claimed to have been
given as compensation in consideration of the
renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly
exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court
has already ruled:
Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199,
provides that all cases involving the dispossession
of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or
the settlement and disposition of disputes arising
from the relationship of landlord and tenant shall
be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations. This jurisdiction
does not require the continuance of the relationship
of landlord and tenant at the time of the dispute.
The same may have arisen, and of ten times arises,
precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed immediately, or
shortly, before the controversy and the subject
matter thereof is whether or not said relationship
has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute
otherwise springs or originates from the relationship
of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then)
cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations38
In the said case, Agustin Rivera (Agustin) was in
possession of a 1.8-hectare portion of the 5-hectare
lot owned in common by the heirs of Cristino and
Consolacion David, and these heirs demanded that
hevacate the premises. Thus, Agustin filed a
Complaint to Maintain Peaceful Possession before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAB). He averred that his possession of the
property was, originally, as registered tenant of the
said heirs predecessor-ininterest, Cristino, as
evidenced by the certification issued by the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO).
Subsequently in 1957, he became the lot owner
because the spouses Cristino and Consolacion
David gave him the 1.8-hectare land as his
disturbance compensation, in exchange for the
renunciation of his tenurial rights. On the other
hand, Nemesio David (Nemesio), oneof the heirs,
argued that the DAR has no jurisdiction over the
case asthe same only involves the issue of
ownership of the land.
The DAR (thru the PARAB and the DARAB)
assumed jurisdiction over the case and went on to
render judgments in favor of Agustin. The CA,
however, ruled that the DAR no longer had any
jurisdiction on the ground that the alleged tenancy,
per Agustins own admission, had already ended in
1957. Thus, it set aside the respective decisions of
the PARAB and the DARAB. The Court, though,
did not agree with the CA on the issue of
jurisdiction. Although it denied Agustins appeal
because he was not able to sufficiently prove his
ownership of the land, DARs jurisdiction over the
case was nevertheless upheld. And it was at that
point that the above-quoted pronouncement was
restated.
Indeed in Rivera, the severance of the tenancy
relations when the suit was filed did not matter
because the prior agricultural tenancy served as the
juridical tie which compelled the characterization of
the controversy as an agrarian dispute. This is due
to the fact that the land from which Agustin was
being dispossessed was claimed to have beenowned
by him by way of disturbance compensation given
to him as a former tenant by his former landlord.
On the other hand, in Amurao, the spouses Amurao
bought in 1987 from a certain Ruperto Endozo a
parcel of land which was then tenanted by the
spouses Villalobos. The spouses Amurao allowed
the spouses Villalobos to continue working on the
land until such time that their need for the same
arises. In 1994, the therein parties executed a
Kasulatan in which the spouses Villalobos promised
to surrender the possession of the lot should the
spouses Amurao need it, while the latter, in return,
bound themselves to give the spouses Villalobos a
1,000-sqm. portion of the land. But because the
spouses Villalobos reneged on their promise in
accordance with the Kasulatan, the spouses Amurao
filed an ejectment case against them before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). On the
defense that the issue concerns an agrarian dispute,
the spouses Villalobos questioned the trial courts
jurisdiction. Both the MCTC and the RTC upheld
their jurisdiction over the case but the CA ruled
otherwise.
Before this Court, the spouses Amurao argued that
the tenancy relationship between them and the
spouses Villalobos was terminated upon the
execution of the Kasulatan. Hence, there can be no
agrarian dispute between them over which the DAR
can take cognizance of. The Court held: The instant
case undeniably involves a controversy involving
tenurial arrangements because the Kasulatan will
definitely modify, nay terminate the same. Even
assuming that the tenancy relationship between the
parties had ceased due to the Kasulatan, there still
exists an agrarian dispute because the action
involves an incident arising fromthe landlord and
tenant relationship. x x x x
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the tenancy
relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is
of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the
dispute is the legality of the termination of the
relationship, or if the dispute originates from such
relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR,
through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial
arrangement will not render the action beyond the
ambit of an agrarian dispute.39
To restate, what brought Rivera under the ambit of
an agrarian dispute is the fact that the land from
which Agustin was being dispossessed of by the
heirs of his former landlord is claimed to have been
given to him by the said former landlord as
consideration for the renunciation of his tenurial
rights. While in Amurao, it was the issue of whether
the Kasulatan entered into by the parties terminated
the landlord-tenant relationship between them.
Clearly, asthe action in both cases involved an
incident arising from landlord-tenant relationship,
the severance or alleged severance of such
relationship did not take them beyond the ambit of
an agrarian dispute and, consequently, it is DAR
which has jurisdiction over the said cases.
Rivera and Amurao are not on all fours
with the present case.
Here, Irene claims that there can be no agrarian
dispute since there exists no landlord-tenant
relationship between her and the spouses Andal. If
ever such a relationship existed, it was between the
former owner of the properties and the spouses
Andal and the same had already been renounced by
Miraflor prior to Irenes acquisition of the
properties. The CA, however, ruled that even if the
landlord-tenant relationship between the previous
owner and the spouses Andal had already ceased,
the action to dispossess the latter from the subject
properties still involves an agrarian dispute, as held
in Rivera and Amurao.
Suffice it to say, however, that the present case is
not on all fours with Rivera and Amurao.
As already discussed, in Rivera, the land involved is
claimed to have been given to the former tenant by
the former landlord by way of disturbance
compensation. Hence, even if the landlord-tenant
relationship was asserted to have been severed as
early as 1957, the Court considered the action as
arising from an agrarian dispute, the rightful
possession of the land being an incident of such
previous landlord-tenant relationship. In the present
case, there is no claim that the subject properties
were given to the spouses Andal by their former
landlord as a form of disturbance compensation.
While the spouses Andal in this case refuse to
surrender the properties to Irene on the ground that
they are tenants of the same just like in Amurao, it
cannot be gain said that in Amurao, the tenancy
relations between the former owners of the property
involved therein and the spouses Villalobos, had,
undisputedly, been continued by and between the
said spouses and the spouses Amurao when the
latter acquired the property. And it was on that
supposition that the Court held that even if the
Kasulatan executed by the spouses Amurao and the
spouses Villalobos terminated the tenancy
relationship between them, the action of the former
to dispossess the latter from the property tenanted
involved an agrariandispute. However, in this case,
unlike in Amurao the severance of the tenancy
relations between the former owners of the
properties and the spouses Andal, as well as the
non-existence of a similar relationship between the
said spouses and Irene as the new owner, were
sufficiently shown as will be discussed below.
Hence, the said pronouncement made in Amurao
finds no application in this case.
The tenancy relationship between the
former owners of the properties and the
spouses Andal was clearly severed prior
to Irenes purchase of the same; no such
relationship was subsequently created
between Irene and the spouses Andal.
Certainly telling are the Pagpapatunay and the
Sinumpaang Salaysay which were voluntarily
executed and never impugned by the spouses Andal.
Both contain express declarations that at the time
Irene and her husband bought the property, the
tenancy then existing between the heirs of Teresita
as former owners and the spouses Andal as tenants
had already ceased, and that no tenancy relations
would continue between the latter and the new
owner, Irene. Notably, the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
being a public document, is evidence of the facts in
the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and
has in its favor the presumption of regularity.40 The
spouses Andal are bound by their admissions
against their own interest.
Indeed, while a tenancy relationship cannot be
extinguished by the sale, alienation, or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding,41 the same
may nevertheless be terminated due to
circumstances more advantageous to the tenant and
his/her family.42 Here, records show that Miraflor,
who brokered the sale between the heirs of Teresita
and Irene, voluntarily executed, days prior to the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute
Sale, her Pagpapatunay before the BARC Chairman
stating that she and her parents have already
received a sufficient consideration for her to
release her former landlord and the purchaser of the
lot from liability. As later disclosed by Irene during
trial, such sufficient consideration amounted to
P1.1 million by way of disturbance compensation, a
factual allegation which was again never refuted by
the spouses Andal before the lower court and was
found to be an uncontroverted fact by the CA. To
the Court, the said amount is adequate enough for
the spouses Andal to relinquish their rights as
tenants. In fine, it can be reasonably concluded that
the tenancy relationship between the previous
ownersand the spouses Andal had already been
severed.
The next question now is whether a new tenancy
relationship between Irene and the spouses Andal
was subsequently formed. This becomes crucial
because for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over
the case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties.43 Evidence is necessary to
prove the allegation of tenancy."The principal factor
in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists
is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is alsoa legal relationship."44
An allegation of tenancy before the MTC does not
automatically deprive the court of its
jurisdiction.1wphi1 Basic is the rule that:
x x x the material averments in the complaint
determine the jurisdiction of a court. x x x a court
does not lose jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by
the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense
therein the alleged existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The court
continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate
the evidence, precisely to determine whether or not
it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is
shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.45
The Court agrees with the conclusion of both the
MTC and the RTC that for dearth of evidence,
tenurial relationship between the parties was not
sufficiently shown. Thus, the said courts correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
The fact alone of working on anothers landholding
does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. For tenancy to be proven, all
indispensable elements must be established, the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the
alleged tenant a de facto one. These are: 1)the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the
subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent by
the landowner; 4) the purpose is agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6)
there issharing of the harvests.46
The Pagpapatunay and the Sinumpaang Salaysay
both support Irenes claim that she purchased the
landholdings only on the condition that there will be
no tenants. Her refusal to give her consent to any
tenancy relationship is glaring. On the other hand,
the spouses Andal, in their attempt toprove tenancy,
submitted their copy of the February 27, 1997
Affidavit of Landholding, which contains an
inserted statement that Irene and Carlos agree "that
the same tenant Miraflor Andal, will continue
astenant, over the said parcel of land." However,
serious doubt is cast on the authenticity of said
inserted statement considering that it does not bear
the respective initials/signatures of Carlos and Irene
attesting their conformity thereto. More importantly,
Irenes copy of the said document does not contain
the same insertion.
Anent the proof of sharing of harvest, what the
spouses Andal merely presented was a single receipt
dated July 27, 2005 representing Irenes share in
the harvest. This even militates against the spouses
Andals claim of tenancy considering that they did
not present the receipts for the alleged sharing
system prior to 2005 or from 1997, the year when
Irene purchased the land. Notably, the receipt they
submitted is dated July 27, 2005 or just a few
months before the filing of the complaint. To the
Courts mind, such act of the spouses Andal to give
Irene a share is a mere afterthought, the same
having been done during the time that Irene was
already making serious demands for them to
account for the produce of the lands and vacate the
properties. Be that as it may, the Court stresses "that
it is not unusual for a landowner toreceive the
produce of the land from a caretaker who sows
thereon. The fact of receipt, without an agreed
system of sharing, does not ipso facto create a
tenancy."47
In sum, the Court holds that absent any tenurial
relationship between them, the spouses Andal 's
possession of Irene's properties was by mere
tolerance of the latter. The action to dispossess the
spouses Andal there from is therefore a clear case of
summary action for ejectment cognizable by the
regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
July 13, 2009 Decision and May 6, 2010 Resofotion
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 101603
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 28,
2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena
City, Branch 56 in SPEC Crv. ACTION 2007-01-A
affinning in toto the February 27, 2007 Decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of San Antonio, Quezon
in Civil Case No. 188, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988
YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and
BIENVENIDO ABAJON, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of an Order issued by the public
respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its
then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
herein petitioner and the private respondent and
certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief
filed by the petitioner against the private respondent
as not proper for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which
consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20 meters
x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner
herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes
This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which
has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated
at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No.
3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said
spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members
of the Millenes family, thus consolidating
ownership over the entire (500-square meter)
property in favor of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes
spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said
landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the
owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise
allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared
by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977,
Abajon planted corn and bananas on the
landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but
continued to plant bananas and camote. During
those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot
occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the
produce to Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was
sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes,
told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build
would be close to his house and pursuaded him to
transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern
portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay
the new owners rental on the land occupied by his
house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new
owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying
that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to
leave. The parties had a confrontation before the
Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but
failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted
by the landowners to oust Abajon from the
landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused
to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes,
executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after
she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and
jackfruit from the property without her knowledge,
the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the
banana plants on the property worth about P50.00.
A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed
against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting on the
property, including that of the banana plants, had
been done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982, upon
motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD
1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case
to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for
a preliminary determination of the relationship
between the parties. As a result, the Regional
Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a
certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating that
said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for
hearing on the bases of the following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land
owned by the complaining witness, which is
devoted to bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject
the tenant from his farmholding, which act is
prohibited by law; and
That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian
relations.
From the said certification, the petitioner appealed
to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR. Acting
on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its
then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the
previous certification in its Order 2 of February 3,
1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper
for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot
consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the
house of the accused is constructed and within the
industrial zone of the town as evinced from the
Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of
Talisay, Cebu."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon,
the respondent DAR, through its new Minister,
herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an
Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the
previous Order 3 dated February 3, 1986, and
certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial,
finding the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties, and that the case was designed
to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.
In the summary investigation conducted by the
DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes,
testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her
50% share of the produce of the land under his
cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes,
Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the
former, stating that he received said share from
Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the
present owners received in his presence a bunch of
bananas from the accused representing or 50% of
the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes
had acquired the property. 4
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded
that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the
former owner, who had testified that she shared the
produce of the land with Abajon as truer thereof. 5
Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended,
which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold
relation under this Code shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding";
and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof
shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to
the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR
ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to
respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that
the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting
merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20)
meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters."
6
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez
committed "grave abuse of power and discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that
private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant
even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x
20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the
petitioner.
II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that
Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial and
hearing by the court. 7
We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of
the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended. To
invest him with the status of a tenant is
preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among
those who live and work on the land as tillers,
owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size
farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a
consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture
to industrial development;
xxx xxx xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-
size farm as "an area of farm land that permits
efficient use of labor and capital resources of the
farm family and will produce an income sufficient
to provide a modest standard of living to meet a
farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and
education with possible allowance for payment of
yearly installments on the land, and reasonable
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule
portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter
lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas,
camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered as an economic family-
size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and
corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not
produce an income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet the farm family's basic
needs. The private respondent himself admitted that
he did not depend on the products of the land
because it was too small, and that he took on
carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the order sought
to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared
policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared
the produce of the land with the former owner,
Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public
respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship
existed between the petitioner and the private
respondent because, the public respondents
continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as
amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship
are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. 10
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient
to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is
not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the
produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable
provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way
of expressing gratitude for favor received. This,
however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled
is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located
in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only
if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production. The circumstances of this case indicate
that the private respondent's status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises
and to have a garden of some sort at its
southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said
portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose
being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the
private respondent was never a tenant of the former
owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of
RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply
stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the
herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner
argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural
tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief
filed against him should be declared as proper for
trial so that proceedings in the lower court can
resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private
respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold
that the remand of the case to the lower court for the
resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the
interest of justice. Remand to the Municipal Court
of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of justice
at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal
is in a position to resolve with finality the dispute
before it. This Court, in the public interest, and
towards the expeditious administration of justice,
has decided to act on the merits and dispose of the
case with finality. 11
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by
the petitioner against the private respondent for
allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly
P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention
of the municipal court to the prejudice of other more
pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore, the
private respondent will have to incur unnecessary
expenses to finance his legal battle against the
petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to
resume. Court litigants have decried the long and
unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases
and the consequent costs of such litigations. The
poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial
dawdle, Impoverished that they are they must deal
with unjust legal procrastination which they can
only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought
about by their poverty, deprivation, and despair. It
must be the mission of the Court to remove the
misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature
of the dispensation of justice. If justice can be
meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from
heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a
mere bagatelle the Court finds it proper and
compelling to decide it here and now, instead of
further deferring its final termination.
As found by the DAR, the case for malicious
mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit
stating that after she reprimanded private
respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and
jackfruit from the property without her knowledge,
the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the
property worth about P50.00.
This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a
friend of the petitioner, who likewise executed an
affidavit to the effect that she saw the private
respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana
trees. 12
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
"any person who shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within
the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be
guilty of malicious mischief." 13
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief
are:
1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the
property of another;
2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or
crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the
offender.
After a review of the facts and circumstances of this
case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal case against
the private respondent be dismissed.
The private respondent can not be held criminally
liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana
trees because, as an authorized occupant or
possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana
trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof
The private respondent's possession of the land is
not illegal or in bad faith because he was snowed by
the previous owners to enter and occupy the
premises. In other words, the private respondent
worked the land in dispute with the consent of the
previous and present owners. Consequently,
whatever the private respondent planted and
cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him
and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential element
of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of
another," is absent because the private respondent
merely cut down his own plantings.
WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents
dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal
Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.
Armando M. Laki for movant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26,
1963, of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court
by the Court of Appeals for the reason that the
jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court,
under date of April 29, 1972, Atty. Virgilio M.
Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan,
gave notice to this Court that said appellant died on
April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children,
who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador
Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan,
Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de Avante.
For the purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by his heirs
herein named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando
M. Laki filed a motion with this Court advising that
appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967,
and was survived by her heirs and successors-in-
interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, married to
Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O.
Gabriel, married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O.
Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and Pablo O. Gabriel,
and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be
substituted by her heirs herein named. By order of
this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for
substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the
case to this Court, the Court of Appeals made the
following findings, which We adopt:
On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of
a fishpond situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis,
Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square
meters; that sometime during the last war she
entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with
the defendant on a year to year basis, i.e., from
January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in
advance in the month of January; that desiring to
develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself, she
notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26,
1957 that she was terminating the contract as of
December 31, 1957; that upon request of the
defendant, she extended the lease for another year;
that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote the
defendant that he should surrender possession of the
fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he
however ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that
the defendant be ordered to restore the possession of
the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the
amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959,
attorney's fees and costs.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to
the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between
the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The defendant thereafter filed
his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia,
that the land in question was originally leased to
him, also verbally, by the plaintiff's father,
Potenciano Gabriel in 1923 for as long as the
defendant wanted subject to the condition that he
would convert the major portion into a fishpond and
the part which was already a fishpond be improved
at his expense which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of
the lease for whatever cause; that when the plaintiff
became the owner of the property through
inheritance, she told the defendant that she would
honor her father's contract with the defendant, and
likewise assured him that he could continue leasing
the property, whose original rental of P400.00 a
year had been progressively increased to P1,200.00,
for as long as he wanted since she was not in a
position to attend to it personally. As a special
defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of
the case.
On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order
herein below quoted in full:
The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the
fishpond described in the complaint which is under
lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses
to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction
of this Court contending that the action should have
been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as
their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.
After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis
of the allegations of the complaint, the parties were
ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining which Court shall take cognizance of
the case.
It appears that the fishpond is presently in the
possession of the defendant, who originally leased it
from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of
the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the
plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and
is registered in her name. It contains an area of
169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a yearly
basis.
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work
personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited
fishpond since 1956 he became ill and
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took
over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang,
Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names
of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned
as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the
dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the
defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived
separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar
Pangilinan. who is residing near the fishpond, the
other children of the defendant are all professions; a
lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in
Manila. None of these persons has been seen
working on the fishpond.
The above are the material and pertinent facts upon
which we enter this order.
After a study of the facts and in the light of the
provisions of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No.
1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended. it
seems clear that his case does not fall within the
purview of said Act. The lease contract is manifestly
a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code.
Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares,
more or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who
is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is
Personally cultivating the fishpond or through the
employment of mechanical farm implements, and
the further fact that the persons named above are not
members of the immediate farm household of the
defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that
this Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case. After this order has become final,
the plaintiff may request for the setting of the initial
trial.
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts
therein made by the trial court.
After the parties adduced their respective evidence
on the merits, decision was rendered wherein the
trial court Pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil
Code, fixed the period of the low up to June 30,
1964, the defendant on said date to surrender
possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and to pay
the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part,
was required upon surrender of on to her, to pay the
defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement
of the expenses he incurred in improving the
fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the
amount due the other, the same would bear interest
at the legal rate until full payment is made.
A reconsideration by the defendant having been
denied, he appealed to this Court and assigned the
following errors:
1. The lower court erred in considering the
relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a
civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code of the
Philippines and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep.
Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the
Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the
cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature
pursuant to Rep Act. NO. 1199 as amended.
3. The lower court erred in appreciating the
evidence of the appellant particularly the basis for
the expenditure for the development of the fishpond
in question.
4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in
favor of the appellant in them easily amount of one
thousand pesos for reimbursement and for seven
hundred pesos for the cost of the floodgate.
Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted
fact that plaintiff leased the fishpond to the
defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual
rental payable at the end of the year (Exhibit C,
Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3).
It is likewise undisputed that the work in the
fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae
(lumut) would grow or if algae would not grow,
getting some from the river and putting them in the
fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh water,
repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of
fingerlings and attending to them; that these were
done by defendant, with some help; that he
personally attended to the fishpond until 1956 when
he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo
Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the
work to be done in the fishpond and his daughter
Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management,
conveying his instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp.
4-8, Magat).
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that
the relationship between the parties is an
agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to
section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the
present case is therefore within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in
effect that since defendant has ceased to work the
fishpond personally or with the aid of the members
of his immediate farm household (Section 4,
Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship
between the parties has been extinguished (Section
9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the
trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the
case.
It does appear that the controversy on the issue of
jurisdiction calls for the interpretation of cultivating
or working the land by the tenant personally or with
the aid of the members of his immediate farm
household. 1
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts
made by the Court of Appeals which, as a general
rule, bind this Court. 2
1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this
appeal. First, was the relationship between the
appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil
law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold
tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of
leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land;
that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law
requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil
law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the
thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in
leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas
in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil
law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following
requisites must concur.
1. That the land worked by the tenant is an
agricultural land;
2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant
either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household;
4. That the land belongs to another; and
5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both. 4
Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant
case?
There is no doubt that the land in question is
agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds
and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof.
Thus Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the
consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds,
salt beds and of lands devoted to the raising of
livestock shall be governed by stipulation between
the parties". This Court has already ruled that "land
in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural
land." 5 The mere fact, however, that a person
works an agricultural land does not necessarily
make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be
a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as
above enumerated are complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that
the land in question has an area of 169,507 square
meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The
question of whether such a big parcel of land is
susceptible of being worked by the appellant's
family or not has not been raised, and We see no
need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the
third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself
personally or with the aid of his immediate family
worked the land.
Assuming that appellant had previously entered in
1923 into an agreement of leasehold tenancy with
Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to
work the fishpond personally because he became ill
and incapacitated. Not even did the members of
appellant's immediate farm household work the land
in question. Only the members of the family of the
tenant and such other persons, whether related to the
tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the
farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate
farm household" 6 The record shows who helped
work the land in question, and We quote:
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work
personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited
fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took
over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang,
Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names
of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned
as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the
dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the
defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived
separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar
Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond, the
other children of the defendant are all professionals:
a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in
Manila. None of these persons has been seen
working on the fishpond. 7
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5
(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a
"tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain in produce
or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation
of landholder and tenant to the person who
furnishes the land and to the person who actually
works the land himself with the aid of labor
available from within his immediate farm
household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act
requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that
the tenant and his immediate farm household work
the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists
when a person, who either personally or with the aid
of labor available from members of his immediate
farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of
agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally
possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must
himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land.
Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the
land cannot be considered tenants; 8 and he who
hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation
of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as
having abandoned the land as tenant within the
meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No.
1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the
court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Agrarian Relations. 9
2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We
accordingly rule that the Court of First Instance
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar,
this being a case of civil law lease.
3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and
fourth assigned errors as these are issues involving
findings of facts which have been settled by the
lower court, and unless there is grave abuse of
discretion, which we do not find in the record of the
case, We shall not venture to discuss the merits of
the factual findings of the court a quo.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil
Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with
costs against the appellants.
This decision should apply to the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the original parties, as
named in this decision. In consonance with the
decision of the lower court, the heirs and
successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the
fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-in-
interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs
and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan should pay the heirs and successors-in-
interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued
rentals. From January 1, 1960, at the rate of
P1,200.00 a year, until the actual delivery of the
possession of the fishpond as herein ordered, with
interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104774-75 October 8, 1997
ZACARIAS OARDE and PRESENTACION
MOLAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES WILFREDO
and LOURDES GUERRERO and SPOUSES
ROGELIO and VILMA MOLAR, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Trial and appellate courts determine the existence
(or nonexistence) of a tenancy relationship on the
basis of the evidence presented by the parties.
Certifications of administrative agencies and
officers declaring the existence of a tenancy relation
are merely provisional. They are persuasive but not
binding on courts, which must make their own
findings.
The Case
This principle is stressed by this Court as it rules on
the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February
26, 1992 Decision 1 of Respondent Court of
Appeals 2 in CA G.R. CV No. 29453-54, the
dispositive portion of which reads: 3
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is set
aside and another one entered as follows:
In Civil Case No. 7975:
(1) Plaintiff Zacarias Oarde is ordered reinstated as
lawful tenant-tiller of Lot 17 of the Agrarian
Reform Project for Barangay Gotob, Camalig,
Albay and restored immediately to the possession
thereof.
(2) Defendants Rogelio Molar and Vilma Molar are
ordered to pay damages to plaintiff Zacarias Oarde
in the sum of P5,850.00.
The decision of the court a quo dismissing the
complaint of Presentacion Molar in Civil Case No.
7960 is hereby affirmed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Although Oarde was reinstated as tenant by the
Court of Appeals, he is nonetheless dissatisfied and
claims a larger amount of damages. On the other
hand, Molar desires to be recognized as a tenant of
private respondents and to be granted damages for
her eviction. Hence, this recourse to this Court.
The Facts
The Court finds that the facts and allegations of the
contending parties are fairly recited in the trial
court's decision, viz.: 4
The plaintiffs [petitioners herein] seek to enjoin the
defendants [private respondents herein] from
removing the former as tenant-tillers of the land in
question and are likewise requesting for damages,
as a result of their dislocation from the land.
The following facts are admitted by the parties:
1. Their identity;
2. That the original tenant-tiller of the land was
Francisco Molar, father of the plaintiff Presentacion
Molar, and father-in-law of the other plaintiff
Zacarias Oarde;
3. That the eldest and only son of Francisco Molar
is Basilio Molar;
4. That defendant Rogelio Molar is the grandson of
Francisco Molar, the former being the son of Basilio
Molar;
5. That defendant spouses Wilfredo Guerrero and
Lourdes Guerrero sold the herein involved parcels
of land to the defendant spouses Rogelio Molar and
Vilma Molar sometime in October 1987.
The issue to be determined as per order of the Court
dated 15 September 1988 in Civil Case No. 7975,
and order dated 27 June 1988 in Civil Case No.
7960, is whether plaintiffs in both cases are tenants
of defendants in possession of the land and cannot
be ejected therefrom except for cause.
It is the claim of the plaintiffs that they are [tenant-
tillers] of the land in question.
Plaintiff Zacarias Oarde, testified that he began to
till the land in question on April 29, 1964 when he
got married to the daughter of Francisco Molar, and
to substantiate his claim, he presented as one of his
witnesses Gregorio Magnaye, an employee of the
Bureau of Lands. He was the Chief of a Survey
Team that conducted the survey in Gotob. The other
members were technicians from the DAR.
He testified on cross-examination that in preparing
the Summary Lists of the tenant-tillers in Gotob,
Camalig, Albay, they conducted a barrio assembly.
They arrived at the conclusion that certain persons
were tilling certain properties owned by other
persons because that was the listing of the DAR
technicians (p. 11, tsn, Nov. 16, 1988). Before the
survey was conducted, they gathered the tenants
together with the barangay officials and interviewed
them if they are the ones cultivating the property.
The ones listed in the Summary Lists were the ones
whose names were given by the barrio officials (p.
13, tsn. Nov. 16, 1988). Based on their survey,
Zacarias Oarde was tilling two lots, Lots 17 and 18.
These were the areas pointed to by Pedro Cervantes
(p. 15, tsn. Nov. 16, 1988). (Zacarias, however,
when he testified claims that he is tilling only one
lot, Lot 17) Witness Magnaye alleged that as far as
the property being tilled by Zacarias is concerned,
information was given by Pedro Cervantes (p. 19).
During the survey, Zacarias Oarde was not around.
Zacarias admitted that when the survey was made,
he was not present.
Another witness presented was Gregorio Medina.
He was the President of the Samahang Nayon of
Gotob in 1977. He knows the plaintiff Zacarias
Oarde because the latter is a member of the
Samahang Nayon. He alleged that he is not very
particular about the land that the farmer-members
till, but when they register for membership, he is
informed that they are leaseholders (p. 2, tsn. 8 Dec.
1988). He signed this Exhibit A, in 1977, when he
was called by the DAR personnel to their office.
The document was already prepared. He did not
read the contents. He really does not know if
Zacarias was doing the farming all by himself
because several people are tilling the land aside
from Zacarias. Zacarias likewise works on the field
of others. He had no hand in the preparation of the
lists and he was not present when the persons
included therein signed their names. He likewise did
not verify whether the persons in the list were really
farmers of the landholdings as mentioned therein.
He knows for a fact that the former farmer of these
lands in question was Francisco Molar.
Another witness presented was Gil Nabio. He
testified that he personally knows Zacarias Oarde
being a neighbor. Zacarias is tilling a land owned by
Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero and saw him working on
the field.
The wife, Melicia Oarde, likewise took the witness
stand and testified that as tenant-tillers, they gave
the owner's share to Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero.
On the claim of plaintiff Presentacion Molar in
Civil Case 7960, she alleged that she is a tenant-
lessee of the land in question previously owned by
Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero. She started tilling the land
in 1965. Before, she owned a carabao but sold it.
She caused the land to be worked on "Pakyaw"
basis, hiring different persons for different work.
She actually does not till the land (p. 16, tsn. July
11, 1989).
According to Zacarias Oarde who testified in behalf
of Presentaction (sic), the latter began tilling in
1968. She is not married and she only hires laborers
to till the land. It was Francisco Molar who
distributed to his children the land they are farming.
Presentacion hires laborers to prepare and plant the
land. She does not actually till the land (p. 18, tsn.
May 16, 1989).
Jose Neo, an employee of the DAR, testified that he
did not in any way participate in the preparation of
the document presented in evidence. He did not
know whether it is genuine or a tampered one.
On the other hand, defendants in both cases claim
that plaintiffs Presentacion Molar and Zacarias
Oarde are not tenant-tillers of the land in question.
Basilio Molar, a witness for the defendants testified
that Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero owns only one parcel
of land in Gotob and this was previously farmed by
his father Francisco Molar. After Francisco Molar's
death, the land was tilled by witness Basilio Molar.
Presentacion Molar and Zacarias Oarde are only
helpers. From the share of the tenant-tiller Francisco
Molar, Presentacion and Zacarias get their share.
Another witness was Ernesto Nares. He was one of
the buyers of the property together with Rogelio
Molar.
On cross-examination he stated that Zacarias Oarde
and Presentacion Molar are not tillers of any land,
whether coconut or riceland (p. 6, tsn, Nov. 3,
1989).
Rogelio Molar and defendant Wilfredo Guerrero
likewise took the witness stand but their testimony
centered on the denials that Presentacion Molar and
Zacarias Oarde are tenants of the land.
The trial court held that Petitioners Molar and
Oarde were not lawful tenants of private
respondents. As noted above, public respondent-
affirmed the trial court's ruling in regard to
Petitioner Molar, bur reversed it with respect to
Petitioner Oarde. It ordered the reinstatement of
Oarde as a tenant and awarded him damages in the
sum of P5,850.00.
Before us, Petitioner Molar prays that she be
declared as a lawful tenant, and Petitioner Oarde
asks that the damages awarded to him be increased
from P5,850.00 to P13,850.00. Private respondents
do not question the Decision of public respondent.
The Issues
Petitioners list the following assignment of errors in
their petition 5 and memorandum: 6
I. The appellate court erred in not giving credence
and probative value to the official and public
documents showing Presentacion Molar as the
registered tenant-tiller of the lot in question.
II. The appellate court erred in notconsidering (sic)
substantial facts, the testimonial evidence and
admissions that greatly affected the result of this
case.
III. The appellate court erred in not applying the
provsions (sic) of the New CARP 7 Law (RA 6657)
and other applicable laws and jurisprudence
favorable to tenant-tiller, Presentacion Molar.
IV. The appellate court erred in not computing
correctly the total share that Zacarias Oarde was
deprived of since October 1987 to the present.
V. The appellate court erred in not awarding actual
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral
and exemplary damages to plaintiffs.
To avoid needless repetition, the Court believes that
the issues may be condensed into three:
1. Is Petitioner Molar a lawful tenant?
2. Is the award to Petitioner Oarde of P5,850 as his
lawful share in the harvests of his tilled land from
October 1987 to May 1991 correct?
3. Are petitioners entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses?
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Is Petitioner Molar a
Lawful Tenant-Tiller?
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are
the following: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of harvests. All these must concur to
establish the juridical relationship of tenancy. 8
Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is
the element of "personal" cultivation. Both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals found that Molar
herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did
her immediate family or farm household. Instead,
she hired other people to do all phases of farm
work. 9 Even her co-petitioner testified that she did
not actually till the land and that she merely paid
laborers to perform such task. 10 Thus, public
respondent aptly held: 11
The trial court noted that Presentacion made
inconsistent answers when asked when she began
tilling the land, before she finally declared that she
started tilling the property way back in 1965 (tsn,
July 1, 1989). However, the element of personal
cultivation is essential for an agricultural leasehold;
that is, that there should be personal cultivation by
the tenant or by his immediate farm household or
members of the family of the lessee or other persons
who are dependent upon him for support or who
usually help him in his activities (Evangelista vs.
CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in requiring
the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the
lessee cannot hire many persons to help him
cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA
559).
In this case, Zacarias Oarde, testifying for
Presentacion Molar, (tsn, May 16, 1989) declared
that Presentacion "does not actually till the land but
she pays laborers to till the land" (p. 12); she is
single, owns no working animals, nor farm
implements (p. 9). Presentacion herself admitted
that she has "the property tenanted on pakyaw
basis' meaning that she hires different persons for
harrowing, for plowing, and for harvesting and that
she did not actually till the land, but merely says
others "because (I) am a woman"; she owns a small
store (tsn, July 11, 1989, pp. 16-19).
We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a
case where a landlord is divested of his landholding
and somebody else is installed to become a new
landlord. (Emphasis supplied.)
We stress that both the respondent appellate court
and the trial court found that Petitioner Molar was
not a tenant of Private Respondent Wilfredo
Guerrero. Petitioners are in effect asking this Court
to assess the evidentiary basis of the foregoing
factual conclusion. This we cannot do. In Fuentes
vs. Court of Appeal, 12 we explained that only
questions of law could be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court:
Jurisprudence teaches us that "(a)s a rule, the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from
the Court of Appeals . . . is limited to the review and
revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. This
rule, however, is not without exceptions." 13 The
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are
as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of
review by this Court: 14
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of
Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings,
goes beyond the issues of the case, and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly will considered,
will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but such findings are contradicted by the evidence
on record.
Whether Petitioner Molar was a tenant-tiller is a
question of fact. Molar has not shown that her case
falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the
ironclad rule that only questions of law may be
raised before this Court in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 15
In any event, Petitioner Molar submitted the
following documentary exhibits to support her
claim that she was a tenant:
Exhibit A Summary List of Rice and Corn Lands
A-1 Signature of defendant Rogelio Molar
A-2 Signature of the Barangay Captain
A-3 Signature of the President, Samahang Nayon
B Addendum Index Log Sheet
B-1 Lot 17 & 18
C Police Blotter re: complaint of plaintiffs-
appellants
C-1 Signature of Jose Segovia, Team Leader, I DAR
D Parcellary Map[p]ing Sheet
E Letter of Atty. Lladoc of DAR to the Station
Commander,
Camalig, Albay
G DAR letter to parties re: Mediation Conference.
She adds that she "has been a registered tenant-tiller
of Lot 1 since
16
1977" as evidenced by certifications from a team
leader of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). These documents, she argues, show that she
was a tenant of the land in question because "factual
findings of administrative agencies are entitled to
great respect and even accorded finality." 17
Petitioner Molar prays that we give credence to
these documents in her favor, in the same way that
the Respondent Court did in favor of Petitioner
Oarde. She also contends that Don Pepe Henson
Enterprises vs. Pangilinan 18 is "on all fours" with
the present controversy, specifically citing the
following pronouncement of the Court therein:
We also note that private respondents have already
been listed as farmer beneficiaries of the Land
Transfer program of the government, as certified by
the Team Office of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. This fact reaffirms the conclusion of
tenancy reached in this case, and strengthens our
view that these tillers of the soil are to be respected
in the cultivation of their landholdings.
We are not impressed by petitioner's reliance on
numerous certifications of administrative agencies
that she was a tenant of Lot 1. Assessing the
evidence in hand, both lower courts concluded that
Petitioner Molar was not a tenant. The certifications
issued by administrative agencies or officers that a
certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and
not conclusive on courts, as ruled by this Court in
Cuao vs. Court of Appeals. 19 citing Puertollano
vs. IAC: 20
Secondly, the certification issued by Mr. Eugenio
Bernardo of the MAR (Ministry of Agrarian
Reform) is very much like the certifications issued
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and other
officials of the Ministry and later the Department of
Agrarian Reform concerning the existence of
tenancy relationships in respect of agricultural lands
from which persons, who claim to be tenants, are
sought to be ejected. It is well-settled that the
findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties is merely
preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon
the courts. Thus, in Puertollano, et al. v. Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., this Court held
that:
From the foregoing provisions of the law [Section 2
P.D. No. 316 and Section 2 P.D. No. 1038], it is
clear that the trial court cannot take cognizance of
any ejectment case or any other case designed to
harass or remove a tenant in an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn without first
referring the same to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform or his authorized representative in the
locality for a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the contending parties. If said
officer finds that the case is proper for
determination by the court it shall so certify and
thence said court may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute or controversy. Such preliminary
determination of the relationship however, is not
binding upon the court. Said court may after due
hearing confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary
determination as the evidence and substantial merit
of the case may warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, these documents were based merely
on bare ex parte allegations of different persons. 21
Even worse, Molar's own witness, Jose Neo, "an
employee of DAR," testified that "he did not in any
way participate in the preparation of the document
presented in evidence." 22
In Don Pepe Henson Enterprises, cited by
petitioners, the conclusion of this Court on the
existence of a tenancy relationship was based on the
evidence presented before the trial court and not on
the certifications issued by the DAR; said
certifications merely "reaffirm[ed]" and
"strengthen[ed]" the conclusion of the court. In
other words, the cited case is inapplicable to the
present controversy because Petitioner Molar has
not convinced us that she was a tenant in the first
place.
Petitioner Molar further argues that Respondent
Court failed to apply the following laws:
1. Section 6, RA 6657 23
2. Section 106, PD 1529 24
3. Section 10, RA 3844 25
4. Section 9, RA 1199 as Amended by RA 2263 26
5. Section 4, PD 583 27
6. Section 12, RA 6389 28
The foregoing provisions enumerate the benefits
available to a tenant. Presentation Molar cannot
claim such benefits because, precisely, she failed to
prove that she was a tenant at all.
Second Issue: Share of Petitioner Oarde from
Harvests
Petitioner Oarde contends that Respondent Court
erred in computing the award due him. He claims it
should be P13,850.00, not P5,800.00, representing
"the loss of 70 cavans of palay for the period
October 1987 to May 1991 (filing of Brief) priced
at P195.00 [each] or a total of P13,850.00,
corresponding to seven (7) harvest seasons for three
and one-half years (3 1/2) counted from October
1987 to May 1991." 29
We are not convinced. A party is entitled to
adequate compensation only for duly proved
pecuniary loss actually suffered by him or her. Such
damages, to be recoverable, must not only be
capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Damages cannot be
presumed or premised on conjecture or even logic.
In making an award, courts must point out specific
facts which show a basis for the amount of
compensatory or actual damages. 30 The claim of
70 cavans of palay is based on the unsubstantiated
allegation that the subject riceland yielded two
harvests a year. We need only to quote the finding
of the appellate court to show the folly of Oarde's
peroration on this point: 31
In their brief, the plaintiff-appellant Oarde seeks
actual damages corresponding to the loss he
suffered for failing to get his share of the produce
since October 1987 alleging that his average
share is 10 cavanes. Melicia Oarde testified that
since October 1987, they were not able to get their
share of the produce, averaging 10 cavanes of palay
(after deducting the landowner's share) for the third
planting season (tsn, Dec. 9, 1988, p. 8). There is no
other credible evidence of record pertinent to the
claim of pecuniary loss of 70 cavanes based on the
alleged prevailing price of P184.00 to P197.00 per
cavan of palay. Accordingly, the award for actual
damages on the basis of the unlawful dispossession
by the vendee defendants Rogelio and Vilma Molar
is calculated at 30 cavanes at the average price of
P195.00 prevailing at that time (not disputed by
appellee) or P5,580.00.
Third Issue: Damages, Litigation Costs and
Attorney's Fees
Petitioners plead that they were "dispossessed of
their landholding" and "compelled to litigate and
incur expenses in the prosecution of this suit,"
which entitle them to attorney's fees under Article
2208 32 of the Civil Code. Further, they also pray
for an award of P6,000.00 as "actual expenses" and
the additional amount of P4,000.00 which they
incurred in this appeal. Petitioners claim P10,000.00
as moral damages for their "economic, physical and
emotional sufferings" which were the "inevitable
and proximate result of their being ousted from the
land without any justifiable cause." They leave to
the sound discretion of this Court their claim for
exemplary or corrective damages. 33
Respondent Court denied the claims for "moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees . . . for lack
of legal and/or factual basis." 34 We find no error in
such ruling.
The award of attorney's fees depends upon the
circumstances of each case and lies within the
discretion of the court. We scoured the records and,
like the Court of Appeals, found no legal, factual or
equitable justification for the award of attorney's
fees.
Likewise, we deny the claim for moral and
exemplary damages. Aside from the naked
allegations of physical and emotional sufferings,
petitioners failed to substantiate their claims.
Likewise, exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve
as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
socially deleterious actions. In this case, no harmful
act can be attributed to the private respondents
which warrants the award of exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed DECISION is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95318 June 11, 1991
LOURDES PEA QUA, assisted by her
husband, JAMES QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(SECOND DIVISION), CARMEN CARILLO,
EDUARDO CARILLO, JOSEPHINE
CARILLO, REBECCA CARILLO, MARIA
CEPRES, CECILIO CEPRES and SALVADOR
CARILLO, JR., respondents.
Brotamonte Law Office for petitioner.
Isabel E. Florin for private respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case deals with the issue of whether or not
private respondents possess the status of agricultural
tenants entitled to, among others, the use and
possession of a home lot.
Respondent Court of Appeals,1 in denying due
course to the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner, stated the antecedents of this case in the
lower courts as follows:
. . . [O]n July 17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Pea
Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages
against private respondents claiming that she is the
owner of a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 2099
of the Malinao Cadastre, situated at Poblacion,
Tinapi, Malinao, Albay, with an area of 346 square
meters, which is registered in her name under TCT
T-70368; that inside the land in question is an auto
repair shop and three houses, all owned by private
respondents; and that said respondents' stay in the
land was by mere tolerance and they are in fact
nothing but squatters who settled on the land
without any agreement between her (sic), paying no
rents to her nor realty taxes to the government.
In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo,
surviving spouse of the late Salvador Carillo (and
[respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the
other [private] respondents), alleged that the lot in
question is a farm lot [home lot] because she and
her late husband were tenants of the same including
the two other lots adjoining the lot in question, Lots
No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner;
that as tenants, they could not just be ejected
without cause; that it was not petitioner who
instituted them as tenants in the land in question but
the former owner, Leovigildo Pea who permitted
the construction of the auto repair shop, the house
of Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.
After trial, the Municipal Court [found private
respondents to be mere squatters and] rendered
judgment2 ordering . . . [them] to vacate and
remove their houses and [the] auto repair shop from
the lot in question and to pay the petitioner
attorney's fees and a monthly rental of P200.00.
On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the
judgment was modified by ordering the case
dismissed [insofar as] Carmen Carillo [was
concerned being qualified as an agricultural tenant
and] declaring that the home lot and her house
standing thereon should be respected.3
Believing that even private respondent Carmen
Carillo does not qualify as an agricultural tenant,
petitioner pursues her cause before this forum citing
only one ground for the entertainment of her
petition, to wit:
THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Court of Appeal]
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND ACTED CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED
FACTS AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,
FOR DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITIONER'S CRY FOR JUSTICE AND FOR
DISMISSING THE PETITION.4
The Court agrees and finds that respondent Court of
Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for review of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, the same being replete
with inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions.
Because of this jurisdictional issue raised by
petitioner, the Court hereby treats this petition as a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.5
The Regional Trial Court6 made the following
observations:
The land in question is a measly three hundred forty
six (346) square meters and adjoining another two
(2) lots which are separately titled having two
thousand four hundred thirteen (2,413) square
meters and eight thousand two hundred ninety eight
(8,298) square meters the three (3) lots having a
total area of eleven thousand fifty seven (11,057)
square meters, more or less, or over a hectare of
land owned by the plaintiff or by her predecessors-
in-interest.
In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4)
structures, [to wit]: an auto repair shop, a house of
[private respondent] Carmen Carillo and two (2)
other houses owned or occupied by the rest of the
[private respondents] . . .; in other words, the
[private respondents] almost converted the entire
area as their home lot for their personal
aggrandizement, believing that they are all tenants
of the [petitioner].
Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500)
coconut trees and only fifty (50) coconut trees
survived in the land in question and/or in the entire
area of the three lots. Such an evidence (sic) is very
untruthful, unless it is a seed bed for coconut trees
as the area is so limited. But found standing in the
area in question or in the entire three (3) lots are
only seven (7) coconut trees, the harvest of which is
[allegedly] 2/3 share for the [petitioner] and the
1/3 share for the [private respondents]. The share,
if ever there was/were, could not even suffice [to
pay] the amount of taxes of the land (sic) paid
religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.7 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that the source of
livelihood of private respondents is not derived
from the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This
conclusion is further supported by private
respondent Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto
repair shop was constructed with the consent of
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest for whom her
husband served as a driver-mechanic.8
From private respondents' manner of caring for the
lots, it is also apparent that making the same
agriculturally viable was not the main purpose of
their occupancy, or else they should have
immediately replanted coconut trees in place of
those that did not survive. Indeed, the location of
their auto repair shop being near the poblacion and
along the highway, private respondents chose to
neglect the cultivation and propagation of coconuts,
having earned, through the automobile repair shop,
more than enough not only for their livelihood but
also for the construction of two other dwelling
houses thereon. It is also intimated by the Regional
Trial Court that there is no direct evidence to
confirm that the parties herein observed the sharing
scheme allegedly set-up between private
respondents and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest.
Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a non-
agricultural tenancy relationship, however, the
Regional Trial Court decided in favor of private
respondent Carmen Carillo and ruled, thus:
In View of the Foregoing, and Premises considered,
the Court renders judgment:
1. Ordering defendants, namely: Eduardo Carillo,
Josephine P. Carillo, Rebecca Carillo, Maria Cepres,
Cecilio Cepres and Salvador Carillo, Jr., to vacate
and remove their two (2) houses and the auto repair
shop from the premises in question, and restoring
the area to the lawful owner, the herein plaintiff;
2. Ordering said six defendants to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses;
3. Ordering said six defendants to pay plaintiff the
sum of One Hundred Seventy One Pesos and Thirty
Six Centavos (P171.36) monthly, for the use of the
area in question, commencing July 17, 1986 the
date the plaintiff filed this action in Court, up to the
time the defendants vacate the area in question and
restore the same to the plaintiff peacefully.
4. And ordering said six (6) defendants to pay the
costs proportionately.
The case against defendant, Carmen Carillon is
hereby ordered DISMISSED. The home lot and
where her house stands is respected. And without
pronouncement as to its costs (sic).
IT IS SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Without explaining why, the Regional Trial Court
chose not to believe the findings of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court and instead, adopted the
recommendation of the Regional Director for
Region V, acting for the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, without making
separate findings and arriving at an independent
conclusion as to the nature of the relationship
between the parties in this case. This is evident in
the following excerpt of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court:
The dispositive part of the Resolution of this Civil
Case No. T-1317 for Ejectment with Damages,
Referral Case No. 880054 states and is quoted
verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are
constrained to issue the following resolutions:
1) Certifying this case as NOT PROPER FOR
TRIAL in as far as the home lot and house built
thereon by the spouses Carmen Carillo (sic);
2) Advising the plaintiff to institute proper cause of
action in as far as the auto repair shop and the two
(2) houses erected on her landholdings by the
children of tenant-farmer Salvador Carillo since
they appear as not the lawful tenants thereat.
SO RESOLVED.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing dispositive part of the resolution
penned down by the Regional Director, it defines
and explains the status of each of the defendants.10
Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards
relations between litigants in land cases, the
findings and conclusions of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, being preliminary in nature, are
not in any way binding on the trial courts11 which
must endeavor to arrive at their own independent
conclusions.
Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this
doctrine, proceeded to so conduct its own
investigation and examined the facts of this case, a
contrary conclusion would have been reached, and
the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
sustained, particularly when the circumstances
obtaining in this case are examined in the light of
the essential requisites set by law for the existence
of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural
production; and (4) there is consideration.12 It is
also understood that (5) there is consent to the
tenant to work on the land, that (6) there is personal
cultivation by him and that the consideration
consists of sharing the harvest.13
It is contended by petitioner that the parcel of land
occupied by private respondents, Lot No. 2099,
with an area of only 346 square meters is residential
in nature, being situated near the poblacion of
Malinao, Albay, and as evidenced by the tax
declaration obtained by petitioner to this
effect.1wphi1 Indeed, the municipal trial court
judge ordered the ejectment of the private
respondents on this basis. On the other hand, private
respondents aver that the lot is agricultural being
bounded by two other agricultural lands planted to
coconuts titled in the name of petitioner and all
three parcels being cultivated by them.
The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential
status of the land merely on the basis of the tax
declaration, in the absence of further showing that
all the requirements for conversion of the use of
land from agricultural to residential prevailing at the
start of the controversy in this case have been fully
satisfied.14
Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the
presence of private respondents on the property as
given by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, the
situation obtaining in this case still lacks, as
discussed earlier, three of the afore-enumerated
requisites, namely: agricultural production, personal
cultivation and sharing of harvests.
The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court
of Appeals,15 that
All these requisites are necessary in order to create
tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make
the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so
because unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.
Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen
Carillo is not entitled to be considered an
agricultural tenant. Therefore, she may be not
allowed the use of a home lot, a privilege granted by
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended,
in relation to Section 22 (3) of Republic Act No.
1199, as amended,16 only to persons satisfying the
qualifications of agricultural tenants of coconut
lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one is issued
REINSTATING the decision of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Malinao-Tiwi, Albay, Fifth
Judicial Region dated 19 August 1987. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108941 July 6, 2000
REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA
BEJASA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Special Sixteenth Division, ISABEL
CANDELARIA and JAMIE DINGLASAN,
respondents.
PARDO, J.:
This is a petition1 assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals2 reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro 3
and ordering petitioners Reynaldo and Erlinda
Bejasa (hereinafter referred to as "the Bejasas") to
surrender the possession of the disputed
landholdings to respondent Isabel Candelaria
("hereinafter referred to as Candelaria") and to pay
her annual rental from 1986, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.4
Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination
of a factual issue. Whether a person is a tenant is a
factual question.5 The factual conclusions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are
contradictory and we are constrained to review the
same.6
We state the undisputed incidents.
This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered
by TCT No. T-581917 and TCT No. T-59172,8
measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares more or less,
situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro. The parcels of land are indisputably
owned by Isabel Candelaria.
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a
three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio
Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan").
In the contract, Malabanan agreed among other
things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to
purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan
seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for whatever
plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary
harvest of fruits, etc."9
Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to
plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim
that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and
banana trees on the land and shouldered all
expenses of production.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-
year usufruct over the land, modifying their first
agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was
under no obligation to share the harvests with
Candelaria.10
Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted
respondent Jaime Dinglasan (hereinafter referred to
as "Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of
administration over the disputed land.11
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new
lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan,
Jaime's wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria").
The contract had a term of one year.12
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay
Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga"13 agreement,
with a term of one year. The agreement is below
quoted:14
"Ako si Victoria Dinglasan bilang
tagapamahala ni Isabel Candelaria ay
ipinaaryendo kay Reynaldo Bejasa ang
lupang dating aryendo ni Pio
Malabanan sa nasabing Ginang Buhat
sa ika-30 ng Disyembre 1984
hanggang Ika-30 ng Disyembre 1985.
Ako ay tumanggap sa kanya ng pitong
libong piso at ito ay daragdagan pa
niya ng walong libong piso (P8,000)
dito sa katapusan ng buwan ng
Disyembre 1984.
 (signed) (signed)
Reynaldo Bejasa Victoria Dinglasan
"Witness
"(unintelligible)
"(unintelligible)"
During the first week of December 1984, the
Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed. The
balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the
amount of P4,000.00 was paid on January 11,
1985.15
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's
demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to
stay on the land and did not give any consideration
for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared
harvest.16
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans
again entered into a three-year lease agreement over
the land.17 The special power of attorney in favor
of Jaime was also renewed by Candelaria on the
same date.18
On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before
the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro
seeking ejectment of the Bejasas.
On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the
complaint.
Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan Oriental,
Mindoro19 against the Bejasas for "Recovery of
possession with preliminary mandatory injunction
and damages." The case was referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").
On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the
case was not proper for trial before the civil
courts.20
The trial court dismissed Jaime's complaint,
including the Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold,
home lot and damages.1awphi1
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro
a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and
home lot with recovery of damages."21 against
Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan.22
On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court
ruled in favor of the Bejasas.23First, they reasoned
that a tenancy relationship was established. 24 This
relationship can be created by and between a
"person who furnishes the landholding as owner,
civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and
the person who personally cultivates the same." 25
Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have
security of tenure.26 The lower court ruled:27
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as
follows:
"(1) Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiffs
in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the
lands in question and to respect plaintiff's security
of tenure on the landholdings of Isabel Candelaria
and the home lot presently occupied by them;
"(2) Confirming the leasehold tenancy system
between the plaintiffs as the lawful tenant-tillers and
the landholder, Isabel Candelaria, with the same
lease rental of P20,000.00 per calendar year for the
use of the lands in question and thereafter, same
landholdings be placed under the operation land
transfer pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657;
"(3) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the amount of P115,500.00
representing the sale of calamansi which were
unlawfully gathered by Jaime Dinglasan and his
men for the period July to December, 1987 and
which were supported by receipts and duly proven,
with formal written accounting, plus the sum of
P346,500.00 representing the would-be harvests on
citrus, calamansi, rambutan and bananas for the
years 1988, 1989 and 1990, with legal rate of
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid;
"(4) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly
and severally the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorney's fee and expenses of litigation; and
"(5) Authorizing the plaintiffs as tenant-farmers to
litigate as pauper not only in this Court but up to the
appellate courts in accordance with Section 16 of P.
D. No. 946.
"SO ORDERED."
On February 20, 1991, respondents filed their notice
of appeal.28
On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's
ruling.29 Reasoning: First, not all requisites
necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were
met.30 There was no consent given by the
landowner. The consent of former civil law lessee,
Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy
relationship.31 Second, when Malabanan engaged
the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted them
as mere overseers and did not make them
"permanent tenants". Verily, even Malabanan knew
that his contract with Candelaria prohibited
sublease.32 Third, the contract ("aryenduhan")
between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms,
expired after one year. The contract did not provide
for sharing of harvests, means of production,
personal cultivation and the like. 33 Fourth, sharing
of harvest was not proven. The testimony of
Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is self-serving. Fifth,
the element of personal cultivation was not proven.
Reynaldo Bejasa himself admitted that he hired
laborers to clear and cultivate the land. 34 The Court
of Appeals disposed of the case, thus:35
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The interlocutory order issued on
September 5, 1988 is DISSOLVED and the
appellees are hereby ordered to surrender
possession of the disputed landholdings to appellant
Isabel Candelaria and pay her the amount of
P15,000.00 in annual rents commencing from 1986
plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P35,000.00 and costs.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, this appeal filed on March 3, 1993.36
The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy
relationship in favor of the Bejasas.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:37
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in
this case, we find that there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as
Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to
stay on and cultivate the land.1avvphi1
However, even if we assume that he had the
authority to give consent to the creation of a
tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for
the possession of the land, he agreed to deliver the
landowner's share (1/5 of the harvest) to
Malabanan.38 Only Reynaldo Bejasa's word was
presented to prove this. Even this is cast into
suspicion. At one time Reynaldo categorically
stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that 25%
was for Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner,
Candelaria.39 Later on he stated that the
landowner's share was merely one fifth.40
In Chico v. Court of Appeals,41 we faulted private
respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests
since "no receipt, or any other evidence was
presented."42 We added that "Self serving
statements ... are inadequate; proof must be
adduced."43
Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is
no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner
never gave her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no
contact with Candelaria.44 They acknowledge that
Candelaria could argue that she did not know of
Malabanan's arrangement with them. 45 True
enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that
the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the
land.46 However, the Bejasas claim that this defect
was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land
to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when
Malabanan died in 1983.47 We do not agree. In a
tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the
form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that
Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for
P20,000 per year,48 such agreement did not create a
tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the
Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of
the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is
no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest
sharing. The only agreement between them is the
"aryenduhan",49 which states in no uncertain terms
the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term
of the contract.
Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny
the petition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals of February 9, 1993, in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169691 July 23, 2008
PEDRITO SALMORIN, Petitioner,
vs.
DR. PEDRO ZALDIVAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Pedrito
Salmorin assails the January 31, 2005 decision 1 and
September 8, 2005 resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
On July 15, 1989, respondent Dr. Pedro Zaldivar, as
legal possessor3 of Lot No. 7481-H4 situated in
Mapatag, Hamtic, Antique, entered into an
agreement (Kasugtanan)5 with Salmorin
designating him as administrator of the lot with a
monthly salary of P150. Salmorin allegedly did not
comply with the terms of the Kasugtanan when he
failed to till the vacant areas. 6 This compelled
Zaldivar to terminate his services and eject him
from the lot. When Salmorin refused to vacate the
property, Zaldivar filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against him in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Tobias Fornier-Anini-y-Hamtic.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 229-
H.
In his answer, Salmorin alleged the existence of a
tenancy relationship between him and Zaldivar.
Thus, he claimed that the case was an agrarian
matter over which the MCTC had no jurisdiction.
After an examination of the position papers
submitted by the parties, the MCTC found that the
case was in the nature of an agrarian dispute and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Zaldivar appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Jose, Antique which ruled in his favor. The
RTC found that the consent of the landowner and
sharing of the harvest, which were requisites for the
existence of a tenancy relationship, 7 did not exist.
Thus, it ruled that the MCTC had jurisdiction over
the case and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case
No. 229-H.
Salmorin appealed the RTC decision to the CA but
the latter upheld the decision of the RTC. He now
seeks a reversal of the RTC and CA decisions.
Salmorin argues that the regular court had no
jurisdiction over the case and Zaldivar had no right
to possess the subject property.
We disagree.
On one hand, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over agrarian related cases, i.e., rights
and obligations of persons, whether natural or
juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation
and use of all agricultural lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and other
related agrarian laws, or those cases involving the
ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or
leaseholders.8 On the other, Section 33 (2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
7691, provides that exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is
lodged with the metropolitan trial courts, municipal
trial courts and MCTCs.
It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter of the action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.9
In his complaint, Zaldivar alleged the following:
(1) he possessed the subject lot;
(2) he instituted Salmorin as administrator thereof;
(3) Salmorin failed to administer the subject lot by
not having the vacant areas thereof planted;
(4) for Salmorins failure to administer the subject
lot, Salmorins service as administrator was
terminated;
(5) he adviced Salmorin through registered mail to
leave or vacate the subject lot and
(6) Salmorin refused to vacate the subject lot
without justification.
Thus, Zaldivars complaint concerned the unlawful
detainer by Salmorin of the subject lot. This matter
is properly within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The allegation of tenancy in Salmorins
answer did not automatically deprive the MCTC of
its jurisdiction. In Hilado et al. v. Chavez et al.,10
we ruled:
[T]hat the jurisdiction of the court over the
nature of the action and the subject matter
thereof cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss. Otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant. xxx
The [MTCC] does not lose its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party
raising as defense therein the alleged existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is
the duty of the court to receive evidence to
determine the allegations of tenancy. If after
hearing, tenancy had in fact been shown to be the
real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
Contrary to the findings of the MCTC, both the
RTC and the CA found that there was no tenancy
relationship between Salmorin and Zaldivar. A
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. 11 In Saul
v. Suarez, 12 we held:
There must be evidence to prove the tenancy
relations such that all its indispensable elements
must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the
landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites
are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant.
All these elements must concur. It is not enough that
they are alleged. To divest the MCTC of
jurisdiction, these elements must all be shown to be
present.13
Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the
existence of particular facts as required by law. In
this case, the RTC and CA correctly found that the
third and sixth elements, namely, consent of the
landowner and sharing of the harvests, respectively,
were absent. We find no compelling reason to
disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.
The fact alone of working on another's landholding
does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy.14 There must be substantial
evidence on record adequate to prove the element of
sharing. Moreover, in Rivera v. Santiago,15 we
stressed:
[T]hat it is not unusual for a landowner to receive
the produce of the land from a caretaker who sows
thereon. The fact of receipt, without an agreed
system of sharing, does not ipso facto create a
tenancy.
Salmorins attempt to persuade us by way of a
certification coming from the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee attesting that he was a bona fide
tenant of Zaldivar deserves scant consideration.
Certifications issued by municipal agrarian reform
officers are not binding on the courts. This rule was
articulated in Bautista v. Mag-isa vda. de Villena: 16
In a given locality, merely preliminary or
provisional are the certifications or findings of the
secretary of agrarian reform (or of an authorized
representative) concerning the presence or the
absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties; hence, such certifications do not
bind the judiciary.
We note that agricultural share tenancy was
declared contrary to public policy and, thus,
abolished by the passage of RA 3844, as amended.
Share tenancy exists:
[W]henever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one
party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
either or both contributing any one or several of the
items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant.17
In alleging that he is a tenant of Zaldivar, Salmorin
(in his affidavit dated April 26, 2000) 18 relates that
their arrangement was for him to do all the
cultivation and that the expenses therefore will be
deducted from the harvest. The rest of the harvest
will be divided equally between himself and
Zaldivar. If Salmorins version was to be believed,
their arrangement was clearly one of agricultural
share tenancy. For being contrary to law, Salmorins
assertion should not be given merit.
Since the MCTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 229-H, we will refrain from discussing the right
of Zaldivar to possess Lot No. 7481-H as it is more
correctly the subject of the appropriate action in the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The January 31, 2005 and September 8, 2005
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Civil Case No. 229-H is hereby REINSTATED.
The case is REMANDED to the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Tobias Fornier-Anini-y-Hamtic which
is directed to proceed with and finish the case as
expeditiously as possible.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166664 October 20, 2005
DOMINGO C. SUAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
LEO B. SAUL, ROGER S. BRILLO, EFRAIN S.
BRILLO, ELENO S. BRILLO and IGNACIO G.
PELAEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the August 31, 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71516
affirming in full the December 14, 2000 DARAB
Decision in DARAB Case No. 5468; as well as its
January 6, 2005 Resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Domingo C. Suarez owns a 23-hectare
agricultural land in Sitio Spring, Poblacion Tboli,
South Cotabato registered under OCT No. (P-
31540) P-11967.1 On August 8, 1995, a complaint
for reinstatement with preliminary mandatory
injunction, recovery of possession and damages 2
was filed against him and Tboli Agro-Industrial
Development, Inc. (TADI) before the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), by
respondents Leo B. Saul, Roger S. Brillo, Efrain S.
Brillo, Eleno S. Brillo and Ignacio G. Pelaez.
Respondents alleged that they were agricultural
tenants in petitioners land on a 25-75 sharing
agreement; that after two croppings, petitioner
voluntarily offered the land for sale to the
government under a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
dated February 20, 1993;3 that they signed the
documents for the transfer of the land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
as farmer-beneficiaries, and petitioner, as
landowner; and that the sale was approved by the
local Land Valuation Office of the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP).
Respondents claimed that while the VOS was being
processed, they were summarily ejected from the
property by TADI after the latter entered into a
Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy4 with
petitioner thereby depriving them of their
landholdings.
Petitioner filed an Answer contending that
respondents were installed as tenants, not by him,
but by Wennie5 Gonzaga of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) in Koronadal, South
Cotabato. He admitted that he voluntarily offered
his land for sale to the government under the CARP
but denied knowledge of the certification issued by
the LBP. He denied the existence of a growers
contract between him and TADI over the subject
land.6
For its part, TADI claimed that its growers contract
with petitioner covered parcels of land different
from those being claimed by respondents.7
In due course, the Regional Adjudicator issued an
Order8 dated July 18, 1996 dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. The adjudicator found
that respondents failed to prove their alleged
tenancy over petitioners land. While they were
identified as potential farmer-beneficiaries of the
land subject of the VOS, they only have an
"inchoate right" to the land since its coverage under
the CARP has yet to be completed.9
On appeal, the DARAB Central Office rendered a
Decision10 reversing the Regional Adjudicator. It
observed that petitioner admitted that respondents
were his tenants. It further held that:
... it is in fact immaterial whether the subject
landholding is covered by the alleged growers
contract or not. What is clear in the instant case is
the fact that herein appellants were illegally ejected
from their respective tenanted lands. If indeed the
subject land is not covered by the growers contract,
if theres any, the act of defendant-appellee TADI in
ejecting the tenants-appellants was beyond
authority, hence, illegal. Assuming arguendo that
the subject landholding is truly covered in the said
contract, the contracting parties are required under
the law to respect the tenurial rights of the tenants
therein.11
The DARAB thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is hereby SET
ASIDE and a NEW JUDGMENT is rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs-appellants as bona fide
tenants of the subject landholding;
2. Ordering the MARO and other concerned DAR
Officers to determine the disturbance compensation
from the time of actual ejectment of herein
plaintiffs-appellants until the time of actual
reinstatement, after the last harvest of pineapple, to
be awarded to herein plaintiffs-appellants; and
3. Ordering the reinstatement of herein plaintiff-
appellants in their respective original landholdings
after harvest.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals which, on August 31, 2004, rendered a
Decision affirming the DARAB.13 Upon denial of
the motion for reconsideration, 14 petitioner filed
the instant petition.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether
respondents are bona fide agricultural tenants under
the law; and (b) whether petitioner illegally ejected
respondents from their landholdings.
Petitioner contends that there is no basis in holding
that respondents were his tenants. He denies having
admitted that they were his tenants, and insists that
there is no proof to prove the existence of tenancy
relations. He asserts that he did not eject
respondents from their landholdings by entering
into a growers contract over the subject land with
TADI.
Indeed, there is nothing in the records to suggest
that respondents were petitioners bona fide tenants
prior to their designation by the DAR as potential
farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP. There is no
evidence to prove tenancy arrangement between
petitioner and respondents before the formers
voluntary offer to convey the land to the
government.
In holding that respondents were bona fide tenants
of petitioner, the DARAB and the appellate court
relied solely on the alleged admission in petitioners
answer to the complaint, to wit:
3. Defendant admits the averments in paragraph IV
of the complaint.15
The fourth paragraph of the complaint states:
4. That plaintiffs were instituted sometime in 1993
and were given three (3) hectares each respectively,
while for plaintiff Roger Brillo was given 2
hectares; the sharing of the parties involved was 25-
75 in favor of the tenants; after for two croppings
defendant D. Suarez approached and offered the
land by Voluntary Offer to Sale (VOS) last
November 1993 in our favor (plaintiffs-tenants) and
the papers for VOS was processed in the office of
Department [of] Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Koronadal, South Cotabato;16
We find that the above admission was taken out of
context. While petitioner admitted that respondents
were tenants in the land, he qualified in paragraph 2
of his answer that it was Wennie Gonzaga of the
DAR who installed them as such. Clearly, it was the
DAR who placed respondents in actual possession
of the land upon petitioners offer to transfer the
same to the government. Other than this supposed
admission, there is no evidence on record to prove
the tenancy relations. Respondents did not
substantiate their claim with evidence to show that
they were agricultural tenants in petitioners land.
They did not allege actual cultivation or specify the
crop produced thereby. Neither did they mention
how much of the produce was delivered to
petitioner or submit receipts to prove the purported
25-75 sharing of harvests. They did not state, much
less prove, the circumstances of their agreement
with petitioner as to the alleged tenancy
relationship. Thus, there is no basis to the claim that
they are agricultural tenants on the property.
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals,17 we held that a tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all
its indispensable elements must be established, to
wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests.
All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more
requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant.
The DARABs reliance on the ruling in Tizon v.
Cabagon, et al.18 that the landowners admission
of the fact of tenancy relationship is conclusive is
misplaced. In Tizon, there was actual proof of
tenancy relationship as the landowner therein
categorically admitted in the petition that
respondents were her tenants. She also testified in
open court that respondents were "managing" or "in
charge" of the lands. Respondents therein proved
actual cultivation and there was sharing of harvests.
On the contrary, there is no independent evidence in
this case to prove any of the requisites of a tenancy
relationship. The DARAB and the appellate court
merely relied on petitioners alleged admission
which we have disregarded.
Even assuming that a tenancy relationship exists
between petitioner and respondents, we find that the
latter has no cause of action against petitioner. It
should be noted that the complaint for ejectment
was brought against petitioner based on the
growers contract he had executed with TADI. 19
Respondents alleged that petitioner deprived them
of their landholdings by entering into a growers
contract, thereby allowing TADI to plant pineapples
in respondents lands. However, an examination of
the contract reveals that it pertains to other lands
and not the land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioners application for VOS covers the land that
respondents are claiming as their landholdings and
measures 13.9269 hectares, and is covered by OCT
No. (P-31540) P-11967.20 The tax declaration and
sketch plan describe the lot as Cadastral Lot No.
111-B, Pls-555, and bounded on the northeast by
Lot Nos. 108 and 105; on the southeast by Lot No.
114; on the southwest by Lot Nos. 112 and 113; and
on the northwest by Lot No. 111-A.21
On the other hand, the lands subject of the growers
contract between petitioner and TADI are Lot No.
117, Pls-55522 covered by TCT No. T-26810, Lot
No. 119-E, Psd-01748723 covered by TCT No. T-
4146024 and Lot No. 119-F, Psd-11-017487 25
covered by TCT No. T-41461.26
It is clear therefore that the subject matter of the
growers contract did not include the land subject of
the VOS. Thus, petitioner could not have caused
respondents ejectment from the subject property by
virtue of his transactions with TADI, since he never
authorized the latter to plant on the subject land.
Respondents ejectment from the land was not
pursuant to the contract petitioner had entered into
with TADI who appears to have entered the land
without petitioners consent.
Thus, it was error for the appellate court to affirm
DARABs conclusion that it is "immaterial whether
the subject landholding is covered by the alleged
growers contract or not." It is, in every sense,
material to the determination of the case because
petitioner is sought to be held liable for
respondents ejectment due allegedly to the contract.
If the disputed land is not the subject of the
contract, as in fact it is not, then respondents cannot
claim that petitioner illegally ejected them from the
land. Consequently, they have no cause of action
against petitioner, since the latter did not commit
any act that resulted in their dispossession.
Respondents cause of action is against TADI as it is
the latter who allegedly planted pineapples in the
land occupied by respondents, when it is clear that
its contract with petitioner covered different lots.
The DARAB itself observed that "(i)f indeed the
subject land is not covered by the growers
contract ..., the act of defendant-appellee TADI in
ejecting the tenants-appellants was beyond
authority, hence, illegal."27 Respondents should
have thus brought the action only against TADI who
alone caused their expulsion from the land in
question.
In this regard, respondents should have filed the
instant case before the regular courts and not the
DARAB considering that the only act complained
of by respondents is TADIs alleged intrusion into
the subject land. Thus, respondents cause of action
is actually one for forcible entry. The allegation that
they were deprived of their landholdings due to the
growers contract will not automatically make the
case an agrarian dispute that would call for the
application of tenancy laws and the assumption of
jurisdiction by the DARAB.28
In order for a dispute to fall under the jurisdiction of
the DARAB, the controversy must relate to
"tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements."29 There must be a
tenancy relationship between the party litigants for
the DARAB to validly take cognizance of a
controversy.30
In this case, there is no showing that there exists a
tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondents. Likewise, respondents have no tenancy
relationship with TADI, against whom they
principally have a cause of action. The controversy
is civil in nature since it involves the issue of
material possession, independent of any question
pertaining to agricultural tenancy. Hence, the case
falls outside the jurisdiction of DARAB; it is
cognizable by the regular courts.31
Though the parties do not challenge DARABs
jurisdiction, the Court may motu proprio consider
the issue of jurisdiction. The Court has discretion to
determine whether DARAB validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case since jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by law.32
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be
acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission
of the parties. Neither would the active participation
of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer
jurisdiction on the DARAB where the latter has
none over a cause of action.33
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The DARAB Decision dated December 14, 2000 in
DARAB Case No. 5468 and the Court of Appeals
Decision dated August 31, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
71516, as well as its Resolution dated January 6,
2005, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in DARAB Case No. XI-249-SC-95 is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169589 June 16, 2009
JOAQUIN SOLIMAN, LAZARO ALMARIO,
ISIDRO ALMARIO, BALDOMERO
ALMARIO, DEMETRIO SOLIMAN, ROMEO
ABARIN, ERNESTO TAPANG and
CRISOSTOMO ABARIN, Petitioners,
vs.
PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY (PASUDECO), INC. and GERRY
RODRIGUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition 1 for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated April 12, 2005
which reversed the Decision3
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) dated January 15, 2004 and
reinstated the Decision4 of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Fernando,
Pampanga dated August 16, 1995.
The Facts
The respondents recount the antecedents, as
follows:
The property subject of this case is situated at
Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga, with an area of ten
(10) hectares, more or less, previously covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 70829-R
(subject property) and formerly owned by one
Dalmacio Sicat (Dalmacio).
On December 2, 1969, Dalmacio offered to sell the
subject property to respondent Pampanga Sugar
Development Company (PASUDECO), a domestic
corporation engaged in sugar milling, to be used as
a housing complex for PASUDECO's laborers and
employees. The land was offered for sale at the
price of P8.00 per square meter.5 On January 26,
1970, Dalmacio reduced the price to P5.00 per
square meter.6 In a meeting held on April 15, 1970,
the Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board
Resolution No. 0577 authorizing the purchase of the
subject property at P4.00 per square meter.
On May 22, 1970, Dalmacio and his tenants 8 jointly
filed a Petition9 with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR), San Fernando, Pampanga, seeking
approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject
property with payment of disturbance
compensation. On the same date, the CAR rendered
a Decision,10 approving the voluntary surrender of
the subject property by the tenants to Dalmacio,
thus, terminating their tenancy relationship effective
May 21, 1970, the date when the parties entered into
the agreement.
On May 22, 1970, a Deed 11 of Sale with Mortgage
was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO.
Thereafter, the documents needed for the
conversion of the land to residential purposes were
prepared, such as the subdivision layout with
specifications as to the size of each lot; topographic
survey; monumenting of all corners of the
subdivision lots; and approval of the plan including
the technical description of the land. "No
trespassing" signs were also installed around the
premises. Thus, on May 31, 1974, TCT Nos.
110325-R,12 110326-R13 and 110327-R14 were
registered in favor of PASUDECO. However, due to
financial setbacks suffered after the imposition of
Martial Law in 1972, PASUDECO deferred the
construction of the housing project. PASUDECO
averred that no person was authorized to occupy
and/or cultivate the subject property.
On the other hand, the petitioners have a totally
different version.
Petitioners Joaquin Soliman, Lazaro Almario, Isidro
Almario, Baldomero Almario, Demetrio Soliman,
Romeo Abarin, Ernesto Tapang and Crisostomo
Abarin (petitioners) claimed that, sometime in
November 1970, they started working on the subject
property with a corresponding area of tillage, as
certified to by the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) on December 6, 1989, to wit:
(1) Lazaro Almario with an area of 1.65 hectares; 15
(2) Demetrio Soliman with an area of 1.70
hectares;16 (3) Crisostomo Abarin with an area of
1.10 hectares;17 (4) Baldomero Almario with an
area of 1.5 hectares; 18 (5) Isidro Almario with an
area of 1.5 hectares; 19 (6) Romeo Abarin with an
area of 0.400 hectare;20 and (7) Ernesto Tapang
with an area of .6500 hectare. 21 A Certification22
dated December 28, 1989 was also issued by the
Samahang Nayon in favor of petitioner Joaquin
Soliman with respect to the remaining area of 1.5
hectares. Likewise, on December 28, 1989, the
Barangay Chairperson of Macabacle, Bacolor,
Pampanga, certified that the eight (8) petitioners
had been the actual tenant-tillers of the subject
property from 1970 up to the present, 23 and that
petitioner Baldomero Almario (Baldomero) was
issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-
04346624 with an area of 3.2185 hectares on July
22, 1981.
The Ocular Inspection and the Investigation
Report25 issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) on March 13, 1990 showed that
since 1970, petitioners cultivated the subject
property, allegedly managed by the late respondent
Gerry Rodriguez (Gerry), manager of PASUDECO
from 1970-1991. Petitioners alleged that in 1970,
Gerry made one Ciriaco Almario (Ciriaco) his
overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals
from petitioners. In turn, Ciriaco remitted the rentals
to Gerry. On May 14, 1990, Ciriaco certified that
petitioners were the actual tenant-tillers of the
subject property.26 Moreover, petitioners deposited
their alleged rentals with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in San Fernando, Pampanga, as
land amortizations, in varying amounts, from 1989
to 1993, as shown by the official receipts issued by
LBP.27 Thus, petitioners averred that from 1970 up
to 1990 or for a period of almost twenty (20) years,
they had been in actual and peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property.
The real controversy arose when PASUDECO
decided to pursue the development of the property
into a housing project for its employees in the latter
part of April 1990. On May 14, 1990, petitioners
filed a Complaint28 for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession with a Prayer for the issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction against Gerry before the
PARAD to restrain him from harassing and
molesting petitioners in their respective
landholdings. Petitioners alleged that Gerry,
together with armed men, entered the property and
destroyed some of their crops. Traversing the
complaint, Gerry raised as one of his defenses the
fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject
property. Thus, on November 26, 1990, petitioners
filed their Amended Complaint29 impleading
PASUDECO as a party-defendant. Meanwhile,
PASUDECO asserted that petitioners were not
tenants but merely interlopers, usurpers and/or
intruders into the subject property.
Trial on the merits ensued. In the process, the
PARAD conducted an ocular inspection and found
that the subject property was planted with palay
measuring one (1) foot high. There were also
several dikes or pilapil dividing the subject
property. The PARAD also observed that there was
a big sign installed therein, reading "Future Site of
PASUDECO Employees Housing Project."30
The PARAD's Ruling
On August 16, 1995, the PARAD dismissed
petitioners' complaint and denied their application
for the writ of preliminary injunction. The PARAD
held that petitioners had not shown direct and
convincing proof that they were tenants of the
subject property. Petitioners could not show any
receipt proving payment of lease rentals either to
PASUDECO or Gerry. In addition to the absence of
sharing, the PARAD ruled that there was no consent
given by PASUDECO in order to create a tenancy
relationship in favor of the petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with
the DARAB on September 7, 1995 on the following
grounds: (a) that the PARAD abused its discretion
by ignoring or disregarding evidence which, if
considered, would result in a decision favorable to
the petitioners; and (b) that there were errors in the
findings of fact from which equally erroneous
conclusions were drawn, which, if not corrected on
appeal, would cause grave and irreparable damage
or injury to the petitioners.
While the case was pending resolution before the
DARAB, the subject property was devastated by
lahar due to the eruption of Mount Pinatubo
sometime in October 1995. As a result, the farming
activities on the subject property ceased. Shortly
thereafter, PASUDECO fenced the subject property
and placed additional signs thereon, indicating that
the same was private property.31 At present, the
subject property is unoccupied and uncultivated.32
The DARAB's Ruling
On January 15, 2004, the DARAB rendered its
Decision in favor of the petitioners, reversing the
findings and conclusions of the PARAD. The
DARAB held that, without the approval of the
conversion application filed by PASUDECO, it
could not be substantiated that the subject property
was indeed residential property intended for
housing purposes. Because of this, and the fact that
petitioners tilled the subject property for almost
twenty (20) years, the same remained agricultural in
character. Moreover, the DARAB held that,
contrary to the findings of the PARAD, the elements
of consent and sharing were present in this case.
The DARAB, citing Section 5 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844,33 ratiocinated that petitioners
entered the subject property in 1970 upon the
request of Ciriaco who, with the consent of Gerry as
manager of PASUDECO, was authorized to look for
people to cultivate the subject property. Petitioners
cultivated the same and shared their harvests with
PASUDECO, received by Gerry through Ciriaco.
Later on, when Gerry refused to accept their lease
rentals, petitioners deposited the money with LBP.
The DARAB opined that these pieces of evidence
established the fact of consent and sharing. While
express consent was not given, the fact that Gerry
accepted the lease rentals for a considerable number
of years signified an implied consent which, in turn,
bound PASUDECO.
PASUDECO filed a Motion for Reconsideration34
which was, however, denied by the DARAB in its
Resolution35 dated May 21, 2004. Thus,
PASUDECO went to the CA for recourse. 36
However, some of the records were found missing,
as certified by the DARAB on June 22, 2004.37
The CA's Ruling
On April 12, 2005, the CA reversed the DARAB's
ruling and reinstated the PARAD's decision. The
CA held that, while the subject property was
agricultural, there was no tenancy relationship
between the parties, express or implied. The CA
concurred in the findings of the PARAD and found
no credible evidence to support the contention that
petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the
elements of consent and sharing were absent. Citing
these Court's rulings in Hilario v. Intermediate
Appellate Court38 and Bernas v. Court of
Appeals,39 the CA reiterated that tenancy is not
merely a factual relationship but also a legal
relationship; hence, the fact that PASUDECO, being
the owner of the subject property, was uninvolved in
and oblivious to petitioners' cultivation thereof,
tenancy relations did not exist. Thus, the CA
concluded that in the absence of any tenancy
relationship between the parties, the case was
outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Petitioners filed their Motion for
40
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in
its Resolution41 dated August 3, 2005.
Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following
errors:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the facts of the case when it ruled that the
occupation of the petitioners of the subject lot was
without the consent of the respondents, express or
implied.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
applying the principles laid down in the cases of
Hilario v. [Intermediate Appellate Court]and Bernas
v. Court of Appeals and [in] consequently ruling
that there is no tenancy relation between the parties.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the provision[s] of Section 5[,] Republic
Act No. 3844 which provides for the establishment
of agricultural leasehold relation by mere operation
of law.
IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it
ruled that the instant case [does] not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication [Board].42
This submission boils down to the sole issue of
whether petitioners are de jure tenants of the subject
property.
Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
Tenants are defined as persons who in
themselves and with the aid available from within
their immediate farm households cultivate the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing
the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price
certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both
under the leasehold tenancy system.43
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant,
entrenched in jurisprudence are the following
essential elements of tenancy: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2)
the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the
harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee.44 The presence of all these
elements must be proved by substantial evidence.
Unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. 45
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims
that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure.46
Pertinent are Sections 4 and 5 of Republic Act No.
3844 as amended, which provide:
SEC. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy.
Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is
hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and
shall be abolished: Provided, That existing share
tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect
in any region or locality, to be governed in the
meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic
Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as
amended, until the end of the agricultural year when
the National Land Reform Council proclaims that
all the government machineries and agencies in that
region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in
this Code are operating, unless such contracts
provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner
exercises his option to elect the leasehold system:
Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize
international commitments, lands devoted to crops
covered by marketing allotments shall be made the
subject of a separate proclamation that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives,
marketing agreements, or other similar workable
arrangements, have been made to insure efficient
management on all matters requiring
synchronization of the agricultural with the
processing phases of such crops: Provided,
furthermore, That where the agricultural share
tenancy contract has ceased to be operative by
virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy
contract has been entered into in violation of the
provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null and
void, and the tenant continues in possession of the
land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist
a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this
Code, without prejudice to the right of the
landowner and the former tenant to enter into any
other lawful contract in relation to the land formerly
under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the
security of tenure of the former tenant under
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and
ninety-nine, as amended, and as provided in this
Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a
lawful leasehold tenancy contract was entered into
prior to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and
obligations arising therefrom shall continue to
subsist until modified by the parties in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.
SEC. 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold
Relation. The agricultural leasehold relation shall
be established by operation of law in accordance
with Section four of this Code and, in other cases,
either orally or in writing, expressly or
impliedly.lawph!1
The pronouncement of the DARAB that there is, in
this case, tenancy by operation of law under Section
5 of R.A. No. 3844 is not correct. In Reyes v.
Reyes,47 we held:
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the
establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation:
(1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4
of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement,
either express or implied.
By operation of law simply means the abolition of
the agricultural share tenancy system and the
conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold
relations. The other method is the agricultural
leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in
writing.
Rather, consistent with the parties' assertions, what
we have here is an alleged case of tenancy by
implied consent. As such, crucial for the creation of
tenancy relations would be the existence of two of
the essential elements, namely, consent and sharing
and/or payment of lease rentals.
After a meticulous review of the records, we find
that the elements of consent and sharing and/or
payment of lease rentals are absent in this case.
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful landholder who is
either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of the property, and not through the acts
of the supposed landholder who has no right to the
property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise
would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to
the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder.48
As duly found by the PARAD and the CA, Gerry
was not authorized to enter into a tenancy
relationship with the petitioners. In fact, there is no
proof that he, indeed, entered into one. Other than
their bare assertions, petitioners rely on the
certification of Ciriaco who, likewise, failed to
substantiate his claim that Gerry authorized him to
select individuals and install them as tenants of the
subject property. Absent substantial evidence
showing Ciriaco's authority from PASUDECO, or
even from Gerry, to give consent to the creation of a
tenancy relationship, his actions could not give rise
to an implied tenancy.491avvphi1
Likewise, the alleged sharing and/or payment of
lease rentals was not substantiated other than by the
deposit-payments with the LBP, which petitioners
characterized as amortizations. We cannot close our
eyes to the absence of any proof of payment prior to
the deposit-payments with LBP. Not a single receipt
was ever issued by Gerry, duly acknowledging
payment of these rentals from Ciriaco who,
allegedly, personally collected the same from the
petitioners. Notably, the fact of working on
another's landholding, standing alone, does not raise
a presumption of the existence of agricultural
tenancy. Substantial evidence necessary to establish
the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere
scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete
evidence on record adequate to prove the element of
sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt
or any other credible evidence must be presented,
because self-serving statements are inadequate. 50
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged
status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given
locality, the certification issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative,
like the MARO or the BARC, concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, is considered
merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such
certification does not bind the judiciary.51
The onus rests on the petitioners to prove their
affirmative allegation of tenancy, which they failed
to discharge with substantial evidence. Simply put,
he who makes an affirmative allegation of an issue
has the burden of proving the same, and in the case
of the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof
never parts. The same rule applies to administrative
cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests
the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which
he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.52
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to
cultivate the subject property without opposition,
does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly
recognized the existence of a leasehold relation.
Occupancy and continued possession of the land
will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant,
because the principal factor in determining whether
a tenancy relationship exists is intent. 53 This much
we said in VHJ Construction and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,54 where we held
that:
Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. As we ruled in Chico v. Court of
Appeals[347 SCRA 35 (2000)]:
"Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is
essential to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy
relationship between the parties. This de jure
relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security
of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The
leasehold relationship is not brought about by a
mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial."
Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and
are not contrary to law, are even more important.
Thus, we agree with the following findings of the
CA:
First, there is no credible evidence to show that the
alleged caretaker, Ciriaco Almario, was designated
by PASUDECO or its manager, Gerry Rodriguez, to
facilitate the cultivation of the property. There is
likewise no evidence to suggest that the respondents
ever dealt directly with and acted upon the
instruction of PASUDECO with respect to the
cultivation of the property.
Second, it is indeed inconceivable, as petitioner
claims, for the respondents to allow petitioners to
work on the property considering that before its
purchase, the prior owner, Dalmacio Sicat, sought
for the voluntary surrender of the landholding
agreement with the previous tenants of the property
so that the same can be sold to PASUDECO free
from tenancy. This proves to be true considering
that it is undisputed that the subject property was
offered for sale by Dalmacio Sicat to the petitioner
in order for the latter to build its low cost housing
project thereon.
Third, the certifications issued by Isidro S. Almario
as BARC Chairman of Agdiman, Bacolor,
Pampanga to the effect that respondents were
actually cultivating he subject property deserves
scant consideration. Said certifications can easily be
considered as self-serving since the issuing officer
is himself one of the respondents who claimed to be
tenants of the subject property and it is quite natural
for him not to declare anything which is adverse to
his interest. The same scant consideration can also
be accorded to the certification issued by the
Barangay Captain of Macabacle, Bacolor,
Pampanga, As it was held in Esquivel v. Reyes
[ G.R. No. 152957, September 8, 2003, 410 SCRA
404 ]. Obviously, the barangay captain or the
mayor whose attestation appears on the document
was not the proper authority to make such
determination. Even certifications issued by
administrative agencies and/or officials
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy
relationship are merely preliminary or provisional
and are not binding on the courts.
xxxx
Not a single piece of traceable evidence was shown
by respondents when and how much are the rental
payments that they supposedly paid before 1988. In
fact, they neither mentioned the terms and
conditions of their oral tenancy agreement, i.e. kind
of agricultural crops to be planted, if indeed it
existed; nor did they mention that such payments
were made in the form of harvest sharing equivalent
to a certain percentage agreed upon by the parties.
While there were indeed payments made with the
Land Bank of the Philippines in varying amounts
starting 1988 and thereafter, it cannot be ignored
that such payments were precipitated only by
PASUDECOs resistance of respondents presence
in the subject property. Thus, we concede to the
Adjudicator a quos finding that said payment was
made only as afterthought.55
Finally, the long period of petitioners' alleged
cultivation of the subject property cannot give rise
to equitable estoppel. It should be remembered that
estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel arises when
one, by his acts, representations or admissions or by
his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and the other rightfully
relies and acts on such beliefs so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the
existence of such facts. The real office of the
equitable norm of estoppel is limited to supplying
deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant
positive law. The elements for the existence of a
tenancy relationship are explicit in the law and these
elements cannot be done away with by
conjectures.56
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 84405 dated April 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.