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1/23/2017 G.R. No.

206020

TodayisMonday,January23,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
BaguioCity

ENBANC

G.R.No.206020April14,2015

1UNITEDTRANSPORTKOALISYON(1UTAK),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,Respondent.

DECISION

REYES,J.:

Therighttoparticipateinelectoralprocessesisabasicandfundamentalrightinanydemocracy.Itincludesnotonly
the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express ones
preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental
restrictionontherighttoconvinceotherstovoteforacandidatecarrieswithitaheavypresumptionofinvalidity.

This is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by 1United Transport
Koalisyon(petitioner),apartylistorganization,assailingSection7(g)items(5)and(6),inrelationtoSection7(f),of
ResolutionNo.96152oftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC).

TheFacts

On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act", was passed.
Section9thereofprovides:

Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. The COMELEC may authorize political parties and partylist groups to
erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets,
barangaycentersandthelike,whereincandidatescanpost,displayorexhibitelectionpropaganda:Providedthat
thesizeoftheposterareasshallnotexceedtwelve(12)bysixteen(16)feetoritsequivalent.

Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in not
morethanten(10)publicplaces,thesizeofwhichshallnotexceedfour(4)bysix(6)feetoritsequivalent.

Candidatesmaypostanylawfulpropagandamaterialinprivateplaceswiththeconsentoftheownerthereof,andin
publicplacesorpropertywhichshallbeallocatedequitablyandimpartiallyamongthecandidates.

OnJanuary15,2013,theCOMELECpromulgatedResolutionNo.9615,whichprovidedfortherulesimplementing
R.A.No.9006inconnectionwiththeMay13,2013nationalandlocalelectionsandsubsequentelections.Section7
thereof,whichenumeratestheprohibitedformsofelectionpropaganda,pertinentlyprovides:

SEC.7.ProhibitedFormsofElectionPropaganda.Duringthecampaignperiod,itisunlawful:

xxxx

(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common
posterareas,inpublicplaces,orinprivatepropertieswithouttheconsentoftheownerthereof.

(g)Publicplacesreferredtointheprevioussubsection(f)includeanyofthefollowing:

xxxx

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorizedornot

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6.Withinthepremisesofpublictransportterminals,suchasbusterminals,airports,seaports,docks,piers,
trainstations,andthelike.

The violation of items [5 and 6]under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchiseandwillmaketheownerand/oroperatorofthetransportationserviceand/orterminalliableforan
electionoffenseunderSection9ofRepublicActNo.9006asimplementedbySection18(n)oftheseRules.3

In its letter4 dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification
fromtheCOMELECasregardstheapplicationofResolutionNo.9615,particularlySection7(g)items(5)and(6),in
relationtoSection7(f),visvisprivatelyownedpublicutilityvehicles(PUVs)andtransportterminals.Thepetitioner
explainedthattheprohibitionstatedintheaforementionedprovisionsimpedestherighttofreespeechoftheprivate
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the
implementationoftheassailedprovisionsandallowprivateownersofPUVsandtransportterminalstopostelection
campaignmaterialsontheirvehiclesandtransportterminals.OnFebruary5,2013,theCOMELECenbancissued
MinuteResolutionNo.130214,5whichdeniedthepetitionersrequesttoreconsidertheimplementationofSection
7(g) items(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. The COMELEC en banc, adopting the
recommendationofCommissionerChristianRobertS.Lim,opinedthat:

From the foregoing, x x x the primary fact in consideration here is actually whether 1UTAK or any other [PUV]
ownersinthesamepositiondoinfactpossessafranchiseand/orcertificateofpublicconvenienceandoperateasa
public utility. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies squarely. If it does, then its operations, pursuant to
Section 4, Article IXC of the Constitution, will be placed directly under the supervision and regulation of the
Commissionforthedurationoftheelectionperiodsoastoensureequalityofopportunity,time,andspaceforall
candidatesintheplacementofpoliticaladvertisements.Havingplacedtheirpropertyforusebythegeneralpublic
and having secured a license or permit to do so, 1UTAK and other PUV owners, as well as transport terminal
owners, cannot now complain that their property is subject to regulation by the State. Securing a franchise or a
certificateofpublicconvenienceintheirfavordoesnotexemptthemfromtheburdensimposedbytheConstitution,
RepublicActNo.9006xxx,andotherrelatedstatutes.ItmustbestressedthattheConstitutionitself,underSection
6,ArticleXII,commandsthattheuseofpropertybearsasocialfunctionandalleconomicagentsshallcontributeto
thecommongoodandthereisnohighercommongoodthanthatasespousedinR.A.No.9006theequalization
of opportunities for all candidates for political office during elections a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely
implements.

As required in Adiong, and in compliance with the OBrien standards, the prohibition furthers two important and
substantialgovernmentalinterestsequalizingopportunity,time,andspaceforallcandidates,andputtingtoastop
excessivecampaignspending.TheregulationbearsaclearandreasonablenexuswiththeseConstitutionallyand
statutorilysanctioned objectives, and the infringement of freedom is merely incidental and limited as to time. The
CommissionhasnottakenawayallavenuesofexpressionavailabletoPUVandtransportterminalowners.They
mayexpresstheirpoliticalpreferenceselsewhere.

The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport terminals is exactly because it is
publicandcanbeseenbyallandalthoughitistruethatprivatevehiclesplythesamerouteaspublicvehicles,the
exposureofa[PUV]servicingthegeneral,ridingpublicismuchmorecomparedtoprivatevehicles.Categorizing
PUVsandtransportterminalsaspublicplacesunderSection7(f)ofReso.No.9615isthereforelogical.Thesame
reasoning for limiting political advertisements in print media, in radio, and in television therefore holds true for
politicaladvertisementsinPUVsandtransportterminals.6

Hence,theinstantpetition.

ArgumentsofthePetitioner

ThepetitionermaintainsthatSection7(g)items(5)and(6),inrelationtoSection7(f),ofResolutionNo.9615violate
therighttofreespeechoftheownersofPUVsandtransportterminalsthattheprohibitioncurtailstheirideasofwho
shouldbevotedbythepublic.Thepetitioneralsoclaimsthatthereisnosubstantialpublicinterestthreatenedbythe
posting of political advertisements on PUVs and transport terminals to warrant the prohibition imposed by the
COMELEC.Further,thepetitionerpositsthattheownershipofthePUVsperse,aswellasthetransportterminals,
remains private and, hence, the owners thereof could not be prohibited by the COMELEC from expressing their
politicalopinionlesttheirpropertyrightsbeundulyintrudedupon.

Further,assumingthatsubstantialpublicinterestexistsinthesaidprohibitionimposedunderResolutionNo.9615,
thepetitionerclaimsthatthecurtailmentoftherighttofreespeechoftheownersofPUVsandtransportterminalsis
muchgreaterthanisnecessarytoachievethedesiredgovernmentalpurpose,i.e.,ensuringequalityofopportunity
toallcandidatesinelectiveoffice.

ArgumentsofCOMELEC

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Ontheotherhand,theCOMELECpositsthatprivatelyownedPUVsandtransportterminalsarepublicspacesthat
are subject to its regulation. It explains that under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, including the power to regulate the
enjoymentorutilizationofallfranchisesandpermitsfortheoperationoftransportationutilities.

TheCOMELECpointsoutthatPUVsandprivatetransportterminalsholdacaptiveaudiencethecommuters,who
have no choice but be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. Thus, the COMELEC avers, it is within its
constitutionalauthoritytopreventprivatelyownedPUVsandtransportterminalsfromconcurrentlyservingcampaign
materialstothecaptiveaudiencethattheytransport.

The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a valid contentneutral regulation and, thus, does not
impinge on the constitutional right to freedom of speech. It avers that the assailed regulation is within the
constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IXC of the Constitution. The COMELEC
allegesthattheregulationsimplyaimstoensureequalcampaignopportunity,time,andspaceforallcandidates
animportantandsubstantialgovernmentalinterest,whichistotallyunrelatedtothesuppressionoffreeexpression
thatanyrestrictiononfreespeechismerelyincidentalandisnogreaterthanisessentialtothefurtheranceofthe
saidgovernmentalinterest.

TheIssue

ThepetitionerpresentsthefollowingissuesfortheCourtsresolution:

I.[WHETHER]RESOLUTIONNO.9615VIOLATESTHERIGHTTOFREESPEECHOFTHEOWNERSOF
[PUVs]ANDTRANSPORTTERMINALS.

II. [WHETHER] RESOLUTION NO. 9615 IS VOID AS A RESTRAINT TO FREE SPEECH AND
EXPRESSIONFORFAILURETOSATISFYTHEOBRIENTEST.

III. [WHETHER] THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE TO GIVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM


THE ELECTORATE IS NOT IMPAIRED BY POSTING POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS ON PUVs AND
TRANSPORTTERMINALS.

IV. [WHETHER] THE OWNERSHIP OF FACILITIES IS DIFFERENT AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE
FRANCHISEOROPERATIONOFTHEPUBLICUTILITY,THEFORMERBEINGBEYONDTHEPOWEROF
REGULATIONBYTHECOMELEC.7

Insum,theissuepresentedfortheCourtsresolutioniswhetherSection7(g)items(5)and(6),inrelationtoSection
7(f),ofResolutionNo.9615,whichprohibitsthepostingofanyelectioncampaignorpropagandamaterial,interalia,
inPUVsandpublictransportterminalsarevalidregulations.

RulingoftheCourt

Thepetitionismeritorious.

Resolution No. 9615, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 4, Article IXC of the Constitution and the
provisions of R.A. No. 9006, lays down the administrative rules relative to the COMELECs exercise of its
supervisory and regulatory powers over all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation and other
publicutilities,mediaofcommunicationorinformation,andallgrants,specialprivileges,orconcessionsgrantedby
theGovernment.

Like any other administrative regulations, Resolution No. 9615, or any part thereof, must not run counter to the
Constitution.ItisbasicthatifalaworanadministrativeruleviolatesanynormoftheConstitution,thatissuanceis
nullandvoidandhasnoeffect.TheConstitutionisthebasiclawtowhichalllawsmustconformnoactshallbe
validifitconflictswiththeConstitution.8Inthisregard,anadministrativeregulation,evenifitpurportstoadvancea
legitimate governmental interest, may not be permitted to run roughshod over the cherished rights of the people
enshrinedintheConstitution.

Section7(g)items(5)and(6),in
relationtoSection7(f),of
ResolutionNo.9615areprior
restraintsonspeech.

Freespeechmaybeidentifiedwiththelibertytodiscusspubliclyandtruthfullyanymatterofpublicconcernwithout
priorrestraintorcensorshipandsubsequentpunishment.9Priorrestraintreferstoofficialgovernmentalrestrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior
restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and
regardlessofwhetheritiswieldedbytheexecutive,legislativeorjudicialbranchofthegovernment.10Anysystemof
priorrestraintsofexpressioncomestothisCourtbearingaheavypresumptionagainstitsvalidity.11
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Section7(g)items(5)and(6),inrelationtoSection7(f),ofResolutionNo.9615undulyinfringeonthefundamental
rightofthepeopletofreedomofspeech.Centraltotheprohibitionisthefreedomofindividuals,i.e.,theownersof
PUVsandprivatetransportterminals,toexpresstheirpreference,throughthepostingofelectioncampaignmaterial
intheirproperty,andconvinceotherstoagreewiththem.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during an
electionperiodinPUVsandtransportterminalscarrieswithitthepenaltyofrevocationofthepublicutilityfranchise
andshallmaketheownerthereofliableforanelectionoffense.

TheprohibitionconstitutesaclearpriorrestraintontherighttofreeexpressionoftheownersofPUVsandtransport
terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively
inhibitedfromexpressingtheirpreferencesunderthepainofindictmentforanelectionoffenseandtherevocationof
theirfranchiseorpermittooperate.

Itisnowdeeplyembeddedinourjurisprudencethatfreedomofspeechandofthepressenjoysapreferredstatusin
our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect our
freedomofspeechandofthepress.12Ithasbeenourconstantholdingthatthispreferredfreedomcallsallthemore
for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equallyvitalrightofsuffrage.13

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,14 the Court struck down the COMELECs prohibition against the posting of decals
andstickerson"mobileplaces."TheCourtratiocinatedthat:

Significantly,thefreedomofexpressioncurtailedbythequestionedprohibitionisnotsomuchthatofthecandidate
or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displayingitonhiscar,toconvinceotherstoagreewithhim.Astickermaybefurnishedbyacandidatebutoncethe
car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out
restrictionsonreportingbynewspaperorradioandtelevisionstationsandcommentatorsorcolumnistsaslongas
these are not correctly paidfor advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the
prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who
pastesastickerordecalonhisprivateproperty.15(Emphasesours)

Theassailedprohibitiononposting
electioncampaignmaterialsisan
invalidcontentneutralregulation
repugnanttothefreespeechclause.

TheCOMELECclaimsthatwhileSection7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615mayincidentallyrestrictthe
righttofreespeechofownersofPUVsandtransportterminals,thesameisneverthelessconstitutionallypermissible
sinceitisavalidcontentneutralregulation.

TheCourtdoesnotagree.

A contentneutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under welldefined standards,16 is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is
within the constitutional power of the Government second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interestthird,thegovernmentalinterestisunrelatedtothesuppressionoffreeexpressionandfourth,theincidental
restrictiononfreedomofexpressionisnogreaterthanisessentialtothefurtheranceofthatinterest.17

Section7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615arecontentneutralregulationssincetheymerelycontrolthe
place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free
speechclauseasitfailstosatisfyalloftherequisitesforavalidcontentneutralregulation.

It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important and
substantialgovernmentalinterest,i.e.,ensuringequalopportunity,timeandspaceamongcandidatesaimedatthe
holdingoffree,orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.Itisfurtherconcededthatthegovernmentalinterest
inimposingthesaidprohibitionisunrelatedtothesuppressionoffreeexpression.However,Section7(g)items(5)
and(6),inrelationtoSection7(f),ofResolutionNo.9615,arenotwithintheconstitutionallydelegatedpowerofthe
COMELECunderSection4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitution.Also,thereisabsolutelynonecessitytorestricttheright
tofreespeechoftheownersofPUVsandtransportterminals.

TheCOMELECmayonlyregulate
thefranchiseorpermittooperate

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andnottheownershipperseof
PUVsandtransportterminals.

TheprohibitionunderSection7(g)items(5)and(6),inrelationtoSection7(f),ofResolutionNo.9615isnotwithin
theCOMELECsconstitutionallydelegatedpowerofsupervisionorregulation.ItisnotdisputedthattheCOMELEC
hasthepowertosuperviseorregulatetheenjoymentorutilizationofallfranchisesorpermitsfortheoperationof
transportationutilitiesduringanelectionperiod.Section4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitution,thusprovides:

Section4.TheCommissionmay,duringtheelectionperiod,superviseorregulatetheenjoymentorutilizationofall
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information,allgrants,specialprivileges,orconcessionsgrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agency,or
instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable,equalratestherefor,forpublicinformationcampaignsandforumsamongcandidatesinconnectionwith
theobjectiveofholdingfree,orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.Nevertheless,theconstitutionalgrant
ofsupervisoryandregulatorypowerstotheCOMELECoverfranchisesandpermitstooperate,thoughseemingly
unrestrained,hasitslimits.Notwithstandingtheostensiblybroadsupervisoryandregulatorypowersgrantedtothe
COMELECduringanelectionperiodunderSection4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitution,theCourthadpreviouslyset
outthelimitationsthereon.InAdiong,theCourt,whilerecognizingthattheCOMELEChassupervisorypowervis
vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IXC of the Constitution, nevertheless held that
such supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of an individual to express his preference of
candidatesinanelectionbyplacingelectioncampaignstickersonhisvehicle.

InNationalPressClubv.COMELEC,18whiletheCourtupheldtheconstitutionalityofaprohibitiononthesellingor
givingfreeofcharge,excepttotheCOMELEC,ofadvertisingspaceandcommercialtimeduringanelectionperiod,
itwasemphasizedthatthegrantofsupervisoryandregulatorypowerstotheCOMELECunderSection4,ArticleIX
CoftheConstitution,islimitedtoensuringequalopportunity,time,space,andtherighttoreplyamongcandidates.
Further, in Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC,19 the Court, notwithstanding the grant of supervisory and
regulatory powers to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IXC of the Constitution, declared unconstitutional a
regulationprohibitingthereleaseofelectionsurveyspriortotheelectionsinceit"actuallysuppressesawholeclass
of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists,radioand[television(TV)]commentators,armchairtheorists,andotheropinionmakers."20

Intheinstantcase,theCourtfurtherdelineatestheconstitutionalgrantofsupervisoryandregulatorypowerstothe
COMELECduringanelectionperiod.Asworded,Section4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitutiononlygrantsCOMELEC
supervisoryandregulatorypowersovertheenjoymentorutilization"ofallfranchisesorpermitsfortheoperation,"
inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELECs constitutionally delegated powers of
supervisionandregulationdonotextendtotheownershipperseofPUVsandtransportterminals,butonlytothe
franchiseorpermittooperatethesame. 1wphi1

Thereisamarkeddifferencebetweenthefranchiseorpermittooperatetransportationfortheuseofthepublicand
theownershipperseofthevehiclesusedforpublictransport.Thus,inTatadv.Garcia,Jr.,21theCourtexplained
that:

What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the
powerplant,notapublicutility.Whileafranchiseisneededtooperatethesefacilitiestoservethepublic,theydonot
bythemselvesconstituteapublicutility.Whatconstitutesapublicutilityisnottheirownershipbuttheirusetoserve
thepublicxxx.

TheConstitution,innouncertainterms,requiresafranchisefortheoperationofapublicutility.However,itdoesnot
requireafranchisebeforeonecanownthefacilitiesneededtooperateapublicutilitysolongasitdoesnotoperate
themtoservethepublic.

xxxx

Inlaw,thereisacleardistinctionbetweenthe"operation"ofapublicutilityandtheownershipofthefacilitiesand
equipmentusedtoservethepublic.

xxxx

The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities
thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a
publicutilitywithoutowningthefacilitiesusedtoservethepublic.Thedevotionofpropertytoservethepublicmay
bedonebytheownerorbythepersonincontrolthereofwhomaynotnecessarilybetheownerthereof.

Thisdichotomybetweentheoperationofapublicutilityandtheownershipofthefacilitiesusedtoservethepublic
can be very well appreciated when we consider the transportation industry. Enfranchised airline and shipping
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companiesmayleasetheiraircraftandvesselsinsteadofowningthemthemselves.22(Emphasesours)

Thefranchiseorpermittooperatetransportationutilitiesisaprivilegegrantedtocertainpersonstoengageinthe
businessoftransportingpeopleorgoodsitdoesnotrefertotheownershipofthevehicleperse.Ownershipisa
relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in
everythingnotprohibitedbypubliclawortheconcurrencewiththerightsofanother.23Thus,theownerofathing
hastherighttoenjoyanddisposeofathing,withoutotherlimitationsthanthoseestablishedbylaw.24

Onesuchlimitationestablishedbylaw,asregardsPUVs,isthefranchiseorpermittooperate.However,afranchise
or permit to operate a PUV is a limitation only on certain aspects of the ownership of the vehicle pertinent to the
franchiseorpermitgranted,butnotonthetotalityoftherightsoftheowneroverthevehicle.Otherwisestated,a
restrictiononthefranchiseorpermittooperatetransportationutilitiesisnecessarilyalimitationonownership,buta
limitation on the rights of ownership over the PUV is not necessarily a regulation on the franchise or permit to
operatethesame.

AfranchiseorpermittooperatetransportationutilitiespertainstoconsiderationsaffectingtheoperationofthePUV
as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable
fares,rates,andothercharges,or,incertaincases,nationality.25Thus,agovernmentissuance,whichpurportsto
regulateafranchiseorpermittooperatePUVs,mustpertaintotheconsiderationsaffectingitsoperationassuch.
Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very
ownershipofthevehicleusedforpublictransport.

TheexpressionofideasoropinionofanownerofaPUV,throughthepostingofelectioncampaignmaterialsonthe
vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing
support for a certain candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as such.
Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election campaign material
thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the
vehicle.

ThedichotomybetweentheregulationofthefranchiseorpermittooperateofaPUVandthatoftheveryownership
thereofisbetterexemplifiedinthecaseofcommercialadvertisementspostedonthevehicle.Aprohibitiononthe
postingofcommercialadvertisementsonaPUVisconsideredaregulationontheownershipofthevehicleperse
therestrictionontheenjoymentoftheownershipofthevehicledoesnothaveanyrelationtoitsoperationasaPUV.

On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because it
hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or
permittooperate.IthasadirectrelationtotheoperationofthevehicleasaPUV,i.e.,thesafetyofthepassengers.

Inthesamemanner,theCOMELECdoesnothavetheconstitutionalpowertoregulatepublictransportterminals
owned by private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public
commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be required by local
governmentstoobtainpermitsinordertooperate,thepermitonlypertainstocircumstancesaffectingtheoperation
of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to operate should similarly be limited to
circumstancesaffectingtheoperationofthetransportterminal.Aregulationofpublictransportterminalsbasedon
extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to
regulatingtheownershipofthetransportterminalandnotmerelythepermittooperatethesame.

Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated
power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The
posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a
form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to
operatethePUVortransportterminal.

TherulingsinNationalPressClub
andOsmeav.COMELEC26findno
applicationtothiscase.

The COMELEC pointed out that the issue presented in the instant case is akin to the Courts rulings in National
PressClubandOsmea.Itexplainedthatinbothcases,theCourtsustainedSection11(b)ofR.A.No.6646orthe
Electoral Reforms Law of1997, which prohibits newspapers, radio broadcasting or TV stations, and other mass
mediafromsellingorgivingprintspaceorairtimeforcampaignorotherpoliticalpurposes,excepttotheCOMELEC,
duringtheelectioncampaign.TheCOMELECaverredthatifthelegislaturecanempowerittoimposeanadvertising
banonmassmedia,itcouldlikewiseempowerittoimposeasimilarbanonPUVsandtransportterminals.

TheCourtdoesnotagree.

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TherestrictionimposedunderSection11(b)ofR.A.No.6646hasadirectrelationtotheenjoymentandutilizationof
thefranchiseorpermittooperateofnewspapers,radiobroadcastingandTVstations,andothermassmedia,which
theCOMELEChasthepowertoregulatepursuanttoSection4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitution.Theprintspaceor
airtime is an integral part of the franchise or permit to operate of mass media utilities. Thus, the restriction under
Section11(b)ofR.A.No.6646iswithintheconfinesoftheconstitutionallydelegatedpoweroftheCOMELECunder
Section4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitution.

Ontheotherhand,theprohibitiononthepostingofelectioncampaignmaterialsunderSection7(g)items(5)and(6)
of Resolution No. 9615, as already explained, does not have any relation to the franchise or permit of PUVs and
transportterminalstooperateassuchand,hence,isbeyondthepoweroftheCOMELECunderSection4,ArticleIX
CoftheConstitution.

Therestrictiononfreespeechof
ownersofPUVsandtransport
terminalsisnotnecessarytofurther
thestatedgovernmentalinterest.

Section7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615likewisefailedtosatisfythefourthrequisiteofavalidcontent
neutral regulation, i.e., the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtheranceofthatinterest.ThereisabsolutelynonecessitytorestricttherightoftheownersofPUVsandtransport
terminalstofreespeechtofurtherthegovernmentalinterest.Whileensuringequalityoftime,space,andopportunity
to candidates is an important and substantial governmental interest and is essential to the conduct of an orderly
election,thisloftyaimmaybeachievedsansanyintrusiononthefundamentalrightofexpression.

First,whileResolutionNo.9615waspromulgatedbytheCOMELECtoimplementtheprovisionsofR.A.No.9006,
the prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for
therein.

Second,therearemorethansufficientprovisionsinourpresentelectionlawsthatwouldensureequaltime,space,
and opportunity to candidates in elections. Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 mandates that "all registered parties and
bonafidecandidatesshallhaveequalaccesstomediatimeandspace"andoutlinestheguidelinestobeobserved
intheimplementationthereof,viz:Section6.EqualAccesstoMediaTimeandSpace.Allregisteredpartiesand
bonafidecandidatesshallhaveequalaccesstomediatimeandspace.Thefollowingguidelinesmaybeamplified
onbytheCOMELEC:

6.1Printadvertisementsshallnotexceedonefourth(1/4)pageinbroadsheetandonehalf(1/2)pageintabloids
thriceaweekpernewspaper,magazineorotherpublications,duringthecampaignperiod.

6.2 a. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not
morethanonehundredtwenty(120)minutesoftelevisionadvertisementandonehundredeighty(180)minutesof
radioadvertisementwhetherbypurchaseordonation.

b.Eachbonafidecandidateorregisteredpoliticalpartyforalocallyelectiveofficeshallbeentitledtonotmorethan
sixty(60)minutesoftelevisionadvertisementandninety(90)minutesofradioadvertisementwhetherbypurchaseor
donation.

Forthispurpose,theCOMELECshallrequireanybroadcaststationorentitytosubmittotheCOMELECacopyof
its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and
durationofadvertisementsbroadcastforanycandidateorpoliticalparty.

6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising, promoting or
opposinganypoliticalpartyorthecandidacyofanypersonforpublicofficewithinfive(5)daysafteritssigning.In
everycase,itshallbesignedbythedonor,thecandidateconcernedorbythedulyauthorizedrepresentativeofthe
politicalparty.

6.4Nofranchiseorpermittooperatearadioortelevisionstationshallbegrantedorissued,suspendedorcancelled
duringtheelectionperiod.Inallinstances,theCOMELECshallsupervisetheuseandemploymentofpress,radio
andtelevisionfacilitiesinsofarastheplacementofpoliticaladvertisementsisconcernedtoensurethatcandidates
are given equal opportunities under equal circumstances to make known their qualifications and their stand on
public issues within the limits set forth in the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7l66 on election
spending.

The COMELEC shall ensure that radio or television or cable television broadcasting entities shall not allow the
schedulingofanyprogramorpermitanysponsortomanifestlyfavororopposeanycandidateorpoliticalpartyby
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political party in such program respecting,
however, in all instances the right of said broadcast entities to air accounts of significant news or news worthy
eventsandviewsonmattersofpublicinterest.
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6.5Allmembersofmedia,television,radioorprint,shallscrupulouslyreportandinterpretthenews,takingcarenot
tosuppressessentialfactsnortodistortthetruthbyomissionorimproperemphasis.Theyshallrecognizetheduty
toairtheothersideandthedutytocorrectsubstantiveerrorspromptly.

6.6 Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, onair correspondent or personality who is a
candidateforanyelectivepublicofficeorisacampaignvolunteerfororemployedorretainedinanycapacitybyany
candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned, if so required by their employer, or shall take a leave of
absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period: Provided, That any media practitioner who is an
officialofapoliticalpartyoramemberofthecampaignstaffofacandidateorpoliticalpartyshallnotusehis/her
timeorspacetofavoranycandidateorpoliticalparty.

6.7 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be publicly
exhibitedinatheater,televisionstationoranypublicforumduringthecampaignperiod.

6.8Nomovie,cinematographordocumentaryportrayedbyanactorormediapersonalitywhoishimselfacandidate
shalllikewisebepubliclyexhibitedinatheateroranypublicforumduringthecampaignperiod.

Section 9 of R.A. No. 9006 authorizes political parties and partylist groups and independent candidates to erect
commonposterareasandcandidatestopostlawfulelectioncampaignmaterialsinprivateplaces,withtheconsent
oftheownerthereof,andinpublicplacesorproperty,whichareallocatedequitablyandimpartially.

Further, Section 1327 of R.A. No. 716628 provides for the authorized expenses of registered political parties and
candidates for every voter it affords candidates equal opportunity in their election campaign by regulating the
amountthatshouldbespentforeachvoter.

Likewise, Section 1429 of R.A. No. 7166 requires all candidates and treasurers of registered political parties to
submitastatementofallcontributionsandexpendituresinconnectionwiththeelection.Section14isapostaudit
measurethataimstoensurethatthecandidatesdidnotoverspendintheirelectioncampaign,therebyenforcingthe
grantofequalopportunitytocandidatesunderSection13.

A strict implementation of the foregoing provisions of law would suffice to achieve the governmental interest of
ensuringequaltime,space,andopportunityforcandidatesinelections.Thereisthusnonecessityofstillcurtailing
the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals by prohibiting them from posting election
campaignmaterialsontheirproperties.

Section7(g)items(5)and(6)of
ResolutionNo.9615arenot
justifiedunderthecaptiveaudience
doctrine.

The COMELEC further points out that PUVs and transport terminals hold a "captive audience" commuters who
have no choice but be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. The COMELEC further claims that while
ownersofprivatelyownedPUVsandtransportterminalshavearighttoexpresstheirviewstothosewhowishto
listen,theyhavenorighttoforcetheirmessageuponanaudienceincapableofdecliningtoreceiveit.

TheCOMELECsclaimisuntenable.

The captiveaudience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive
speech,thespeechcanberestricted.30The"captiveaudience"doctrinerecognizesthatalistenerhasarightnotto
beexposedtoanunwantedmessageincircumstancesinwhichthecommunicationcannotbeavoided.31

Aregulationbasedonthecaptiveaudiencedoctrineisintheguiseofcensorship,whichundertakesselectivelyto
shieldthepublicfromsomekindsofspeechonthegroundthattheyaremoreoffensivethanothers.Suchselective
restrictionshavebeenupheldonlywhenthespeakerintrudesontheprivacyofthehomeorthedegreeofcaptivity
makesiteitherimpossibleorimpracticalfortheunwillingviewerorauditortoavoidexposure.32

In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,33 the Supreme Court of the United States of America
(U.S.SupremeCourt)struckdowntheorderofNewYorkPublicServiceCommission,whichprohibitspublicutility
companiesfromincludinginsertsinmonthlybillsdiscussingcontroversialissuesofpublicpolicy.TheU.S.Supreme
Court held that "[t]he prohibition cannot be justified as being necessary to avoid forcing appellants views on a
captiveaudience,sincecustomersmayescapeexposuretoobjectionablematerialsimplybythrowingthebillinsert
intoawastebasket."34

Similarly,inErznoznikv.CityofJacksonville,35theU.S.SupremeCourtnullifiedacityordinance,whichmadeita
public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drivein movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity, when the
screenisvisiblefromapublicstreetorplace.TheU.S.SupremeCourtopinedthatthedegreeofcaptivityisnotso
greatastomakeitimpracticableforanunwillingviewertoavoidexposure,thus:

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TheJacksonvilleordinancediscriminatesamongmoviessolelyonthebasisofcontent.Itseffectistodeterdrivein
theaters from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or even educational. This discrimination
cannot be justified as a means of preventing significant intrusions on privacy. The ordinance seeks only to keep
thesefilmsfrombeingseenfrompublicstreetsandplaceswheretheoffendedviewerreadilycanaverthiseyes.In
short,thescreenofadriveintheaterisnot"soobtrusiveastomakeitimpossibleforanunwillingindividualtoavoid
exposure to it." x x x Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot
justifythiscensorshipofotherwiseprotectedspeechonthebasisofitscontent.36(Emphasisours)

Thus,agovernmentregulationbasedonthecaptiveaudiencedoctrinemaynotbejustifiedifthesupposed"captive
audience"mayavoidexposuretotheotherwiseintrusivespeech.TheprohibitionunderSection7(g)items(5)and
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captiveaudience doctrine the commuters are not forced or
compelledtoreadtheelectioncampaignmaterialspostedonPUVsandtransportterminals.Noraretheyincapable
of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply
averttheireyesiftheyfindthesameunbearablyintrusive.

TheCOMELEC,ininsistingthatithastherighttorestrictthepostingofelectioncampaignmaterialsonPUVsand
transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,37 a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In
Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements on governmentrun buses, was
upheldbytheU.S.SupremeCourt.TheU.S.SupremeCourtheldthattheadvertisingspaceonthebuseswasnota
publicforum,pointingoutthatadvertisementspaceongovernmentrunbuses,"althoughincidentaltotheprovision
ofpublictransportation,isapartofcommercialventure."38Inthesamewaythatothercommercialventuresneednot
accepteveryprofferofadvertisingfromthegeneralpublic,thecitystransitsystemhasthediscretiononthetypeof
advertisingthatmaybedisplayedonitsvehicles.

Concurringinthejudgment,JusticeDouglasopinedthatwhileLehman,acandidateforstateofficewhosoughtto
availhimselfofadvertisingspaceongovernmentrunbuses,"clearlyhasarighttoexpresshisviewstothosewho
wishtolisten,hehasnorighttoforcehismessageuponanaudienceincapableofdecliningtoreceiveit."39Justice
Douglasconcluded:"therightofthecommuterstobefreefromforcedintrusionsontheirprivacyprecludesthecity
from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive
audience."40

TheCOMELECsrelianceonLehmanisutterlymisplaced.

InLehman,thepoliticaladvertisementwasintendedforPUVsownedbythecitygovernmentthecitygovernment,
asownerofthebuses,hadtherighttodecidewhichtypeofadvertisementswouldbeplacedonitsbuses.TheU.S.
SupremeCourtgaveprimacytothecitygovernmentsexerciseofitsmanagerialdecision,viz:

Revenue earned from longterm commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a requirement that shortterm
candidacy or issueoriented advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be subjected to the blare of
politicalpropaganda.Therecouldbelurkingdoubtsaboutfavoritism,andstickyadministrativeproblemsmightarise
inparcelingoutlimitedspacetoeagerpoliticians.Inthesecircumstances,themanagerialdecisiontolimitcarcard
spacetoinnocuousandlesscontroversialcommercialandserviceorientedadvertisingdoesnotrisetothedignity
of First Amendment violation. Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office
buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every
wouldbepamphleteerandpolitician.ThistheConstitutiondoesnotrequire.41(Emphasisours)

Lehmanactuallyupholdsthefreedomoftheowneroftheutilityvehicles,i.e.,thecitygovernment,inchoosingthe
typesofadvertisementsthatwouldbeplacedonitsproperties.Instarkcontrast,Section7(g)items(5)and(6)of
Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements that
maybepostedontheirproperties.

Also,thecitygovernmentinLehmanhadtheright,naytheduty,torefusepoliticaladvertisementsontheirbuses.
Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance
thereof,wasanecessity.Intheinstantcase,theownershipofPUVsandtransportterminalsremainsprivatethere
existsnovalidreasontosuppresstheirpoliticalviewsbyproscribingthepostingofelectioncampaignmaterialson
theirproperties.

ProhibitingownersofPUVsand
transportterminalsfromposting
electioncampaignmaterialsviolates
theequalprotectionclause.

Section7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615donotonlyrunafoulofthefreespeechclause,butalsoofthe
equalprotectionclause.Oneofthebasicprinciplesonwhichthisgovernmentwasfoundedisthatoftheequalityof
right,whichisembodiedinSection1,ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution.42"Equalprotectionrequiresthatallpersons
orthingssimilarlysituatedshouldbetreatedalike,bothastorightsconferredandresponsibilitiesimposed.Similar

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subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminateagainstothers."43

"Theequalprotectionclauseisaimedatallofficialstateactions,notjustthoseofthelegislature.Itsinhibitionscover
allthedepartmentsofthegovernmentincludingthepoliticalandexecutivedepartments,andextendtoallactionsof
astatedenyingequalprotectionofthelaws,throughwhateveragencyorwhateverguiseistaken."44

Nevertheless,theguarantyofequalprotectionofthelawsisnotaguarantyofequalityintheapplicationofthelaws
toallcitizensofthestate.Equalityofoperationofstatutesdoesnotmeantheirindiscriminateoperationonpersons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different.45

Inorderthattherecanbevalidclassificationsothatadiscriminatorygovernmentalactmaypasstheconstitutional
normofequalprotection,itisnecessarythatthefourrequisitesofvalidclassificationbecompliedwith,namely:(1)it
mustbebaseduponsubstantialdistinctions(2)itmustbegermanetothepurposesofthelaw(3)itmustnotbe
limitedtoexistingconditionsonlyand(4)itmustapplyequallytoallmembersoftheclass.46

It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to
existingconditionsandappliesequallytothemembersofthepurportedclass.However,theclassificationremains
constitutionallyimpermissiblesinceitisnotbasedonsubstantialdistinctionandisnotgermanetothepurposeof
thelaw.

A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the
former,tobeconsideredassuch,needstosecurefromthegovernmenteitherafranchiseorapermittooperate.
Nevertheless,aspointedoutearlier,theprohibitionimposedunderSection7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.
9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals the prohibition does not in any manner
affectthefranchiseorpermittooperateofthePUVandtransportterminals.

As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport
terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other
propertiesareallowedtoexpresstheirpoliticalideasandopinionbypostingelectioncampaignmaterialsontheir
properties,thereisnocogentreasontodenythesamepreferredrighttoownersofPUVsandtransportterminals.In
termsofownership,thedistinctionbetweenownersofPUVsandtransportterminalsandownersofprivatevehicles
andpropertiesismerelysuperficial.Superficialdifferencesdonotmakeforavalidclassification.47

The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not substantial
justificationtosetthemapartfromprivatevehiclesandotherproperties.Admittedly,anyelectioncampaignmaterial
thatwouldbepostedonPUVsandtransportterminalswouldbeseenbymanypeople.However,electioncampaign
materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments,
wouldalsobeseenbymanypeople.Thus,thereisnoreasontosingleoutownersofPUVsandtransportterminals
intheprohibitionagainstpostingofelectioncampaignmaterials.

Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles and other
propertiesbearsnorelationtothestatedpurposeofSection7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615,i.e.,to
provideequaltime,spaceandopportunitytocandidatesinelections.Tostress,PUVsandtransportterminalsare
privateproperties.Indeed,thenexusbetweentherestrictiononthefreedomofexpressionofownersofPUVsand
transportterminalsandthegovernmentsinterestinensuringequaltime,space,andopportunityforcandidatesin
electionswasnotestablishedbytheCOMELEC.

In sum, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech
clause they are contentneutralregulations,whicharenotwithintheconstitutional power of the COMELEC issue
andarenotnecessarytofurthertheobjectiveofensuringequaltime,spaceandopportunitytothecandidates.They
arenotonlyrepugnanttothefreespeechclause,butarealsoviolativeoftheequalprotectionclause,asthereisno
substantialdistinctionbetweenownersofPUVsandtransportterminalsandownersofprivatevehiclesandother
properties.

Onafinalnote,itbearsstressingthatthefreedomtoadvertiseone'spoliticalcandidacyisclearlyasignificantpart
of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most
valuable feature of the democratic way of life.48 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
issuedbytheCommissiononElectionsareherebydeclaredNULLandVOIDforbeingrepugnanttoSections1and
4,ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution.

SOORDERED.
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BIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

(NoPart)
ANTONIOT.CARPIO
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.*
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

(OnOfficialLeave)
ARTUROD.BRION
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO**
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTA LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

(OnOfficialLeave)
MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.**
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ JOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE MARVICM.V.F.LEONEN
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

(NoPart)
FRANCISH.JARDELEZA*
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,IcertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeen
reachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*
NoPart.
**
OnOfficialLeave.
1
Rollo,pp.331.
2
Id.at3159.
3
Id.at3739.
4
Id.at9599.
5
Id.at103105.
6
Id.at104105.
7
Id.at1112.
8
SocialJusticeSociety(SJS)v.DangerousDrugsBoard,etal.,591Phil.393,405(2008).

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9
Reyes,etc.v.Bagatsing,etc.,210Phil.457,465466(1983).
10
Chavezv.Gonzalez,etal.,569Phil.155,203(2008).
11
SeeBantamBooksv.Sullivan,372US58(1963).
12
J.Puno,ConcurringOpinion,SocialWeatherStations,Inc.v.COMELEC,G.R.No.147571,May5,2001,
357SCRA496,512.
13
Mutucv.COMELEC,146Phil.798,805806(1970).
14
G.R.No.103956,March31,1992,207SCRA712.
15
Id.at719.
16
Chavezv.Gonzalez,etal.,supranote10,at204.
17
SocialWeatherStations,Inc.v.COMELEC,supranote12,at504,citingUnitedStatesv.OBrien,391U.S.
367,377.
18
G.R.No.102653,March5,1992,207SCRA1.
19
G.R.No.147571,May5,2001,357SCRA496.
20
Id.at505.
21
313Phil.296(1995).
22
Id.at321323.
23
Tolentino,CommentariesandJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,Vol.II,1992ed.,p.45.
24
CIVILCODEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Article428.
25
1987CONSTITUTION,ArticleXII,Section11.
26
351Phil.692(1998).
27
Section 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. The agreement amount that a
candidateorregisteredpoliticalpartymayspendforelectioncampaignshallbeasfollows:

Forcandidates.Tenpesos(P10.00)forPresidentandVicePresidentandforothercandidates

Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
certificateofcandidacy:Provided,Thatacandidatewithoutanypoliticalpartyandwithoutsupportfrom
anypoliticalpartymaybeallowedtospendFivePesos(P5.00)foreverysuchvoterand

For political parties. Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencieswhereithasofficialcandidates.

Anyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstandinganycontributionincashorinkindtoanycandidate
orpoliticalpartyorcoalitionofpartiesforcampaignpurposes,dulyreportedtotheCommissionshall
notbesubjecttothepaymentofanygifttax.
28
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
29
Section14.StatementofContributionsandExpendituresEffectofFailuretoFileStatement.Every
candidateandtreasurerofthepoliticalpartyshall,withinthirty(30)daysafterthedayoftheelection,
file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all
contributionsandexpendituresinconnectionwiththeelection.

No person elected to any public offices shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the
statementofcontributionsandexpenditureshereinrequired.

Thesameprohibitionshallapplyifthepoliticalpartywhichnominatedthewinningcandidatefailstofile
thestatementrequiredhereinwithintheperiodprescribedbythisAct.

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Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection
with electoral contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute an administrative
offenseforwhichtheoffendersshallbeliabletopayanadministrativefinerangingfromOnethousand
pesos(P1,000.00)toThirtythousandpesos(P30,000.00),inthediscretionoftheCommission.

Thefineshallbepaidwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofnoticeofsuchfailureotherwise,itshallbe
enforceablebyawritofexecutionissuedbytheCommissionagainstthepropertiesoftheoffender.

Itshallbethedutyofeverycityormunicipalelectionregistrartoadviseinwriting,bypersonaldelivery
orregisteredmail,withinfive(5)daysfromthedateofelectionallcandidatesresidinginhisjurisdiction
tocomplywiththeirobligationtofiletheirstatementsofcontributionsandexpenditures.

Forthecommissionofasecondorsubsequentoffenseunderthissection,theadministrativefineshall
befromTwothousandpesos(P2,000.00)toSixtythousandpesos(P60,000.00),inthediscretionofthe
Commission.Inaddition,theoffendershallbesubjecttoperpetualdisqualificationtoholdpublicoffice.
30
BlacksLawDictionary,8thEdition,p.224.
31
SeeProChoiceNetworkv.ProjectRescue,799F.Supp.1417(W.D.N.Y.1992).
32
SeeErznoznikv.CityofJacksonville,422U.S.205,209(1975).
33
447U.S.530(1980).
34
Id.at530531.
35
422U.S.205(1975).
36
Id.at212.
37
418U.S.298(1974).
38
Id.at303.
39
Id.at307.
40
Id.
41
Id.at304.
42
PhilippineJudgesAssociationv.Prado,G.R.No.105371,November11,1993,227SCRA703,711.
43
CityofManilav.Hon.Laguio,Jr.,495Phil.289,326(2005).
44
Biraogov.ThePhilippineTruthCommissionof2010,651Phil.374,459(2010).
45
SeeCentralBankEmployeesAssociation,Inc.v.BangkoSentralngPilipinas,G.R.No.148208,December
15,2004,446SCRA299.
46
Quinto,etal.v.COMELEC,621Phil.236,273(2009).
47
Cruz,ConstitutionalLaw,2003ed.,p.128.
48
J.Paras,DissentingOpinion,NationalPressClubv.COMELEC,supranote18,at43.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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