EFFECT OF REPATRIATION
Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7,
2001
Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member
of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground
that he is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time
when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still
jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine
Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in
connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
and ran for and was elected as a representative.
When his nationality was questioned by
petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a
natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A.
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had
under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5)
political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance
to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship
BENGSON VS. HRET
G.R. No. 142840, May 7 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.
However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the United States. As
a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4),
a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country."
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic
Act No. 2630 entitled as An Act Providing For
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service
To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces
of the United States. He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of
26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipinocitizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost
his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service
in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship as provided under Section 1 of R.A.
No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath
of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth
as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to
be elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. The HRET did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion, thus the petition was
dismissed. Read full text
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is
at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of
the House of Representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to
or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost.
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting
commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of
service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country, and the taking of an oath
 of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a
defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains
armed forces on Philippine territory with
the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino
citizen concerned, at the time of rendering
said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service
to said foreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned
in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in,
the armed forces of said country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil
and politically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss
of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in
connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired
his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of
26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision5 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET
likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution
dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for
certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that
private respondent is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
that he had ceased being such in view of
the loss and renunciation of such
citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered
private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not
validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's
acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors
and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed
the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born
status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent
Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no
longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since
he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore
allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had
to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists
that Article citizens are those who are from birth
with out having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he
reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth"
in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are
Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1)
by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth
Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification13 provided by law to become a
Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2)
years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A.
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications17 and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had
under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes
[referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to
file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in
the place of his residence or where he had
last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in
the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality.26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance
to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father.27 It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no
longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in
its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was
first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is
a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be
considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to
perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there
were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an
act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the
1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an
act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider
those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who
re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos
are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of
a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceeding in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member
of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by
the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House.29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power and annul
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgement for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the
assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of
grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DUAL ALLEGIANCE VS. DUAL CITIZENSHIP
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No.
135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano
were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held
to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to
hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship"
in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20
must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by
naturalization takes an oath that he renounces
his loyalty to any other country or government
and solemnly declares that he owes his
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within
the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere
with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of
allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that
he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
MERCADO VS MANZANO
Posted by kaye lee on 5:15 PM
G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999 [Dual Citizenship;
Dual Allegiance]
FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu
Manzano to hold elective office on the ground
that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino
citizen, having been born in the United States of
Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition
and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen
pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160,
that those with dual citizenship are disqualified
from running any public position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for
disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship
per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The results of the election were as
follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second
Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second
Division said:
What is presented before the
Commission is a petition for
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office
of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the
May 11, 1998 elections. The
petition is based on the ground
that the respondent is an American
citizen based on the record of the
Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed
on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate
of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother.
He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California,
September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen
under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as
an American citizen, he did not lose
his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it
would appear that respondent
Manzano is born a Filipino and a US
citizen. In other words, he holds
dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether
under our laws, he is disqualified
from the position for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy. Is he
eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, those holding
dual citizenship are disqualified
from running for any elective local
position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission
hereby declares the respondent
Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion
remained pending even until after the election
held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No.
3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for
vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene
in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August
31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner
abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5The
pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo
Barrios Manzano was born in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. He
acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the
principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino
citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his
father and mother were Filipinos at
the time of his birth. At the age of
six (6), his parents brought him to
the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an
alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the
loss of his Philippine citizenship, as
he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath
of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when
respondent attained the age of
majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998, which
effectively renounced his US Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en
citizenship under American law. banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
Under Philippine law, he no longer August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent
had U.S. citizenship. as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside
elections, the resolution of the the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en
Second Division, adopted on May 7, banc and to declare private respondent
1998, was not yet final. disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of
Respondent Manzano obtained the Makati City. Petitioner contends that
highest number of votes among
the candidates for vice-mayor of [T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in
Makati City, garnering one hundred holding that:
three thousand eight hundred fifty
three (103,853) votes over his A. Under Philippine law, Manzano
closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, was no longer a U.S. citizen when
who obtained one hundred he:
thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two 1. He renounced his
thousand nine hundred fifty nine U.S. citizenship when
(2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III he attained the age
obtained third place with fifty four of majority when he
thousand two hundred seventy five was already 37 years
(54,275) votes. In applying election old; and,
laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be
2. He renounced his
embroiled in complex legal issues
U.S. citizenship when
involving private international law
he (merely)
which may well be settled before
registered himself as
the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
a voter and voted in
Commission on Elections, 257
the elections of
SCRA 727).
1992, 1995 and
1998.
WHEREFORE, the Commission en
banc hereby REVERSES the
B. Manzano is qualified to run for
resolution of the Second Division,
and or hold the elective office of
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998
candidacy.
elections, the resolution of the
Second Division adopted on 7 May
We declare respondent Eduardo
1998 was not yet final so that,
Luis Barrios Manzano to be
effectively, petitioner may not be
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the
declared the winner even assuming
position of vice-mayor of Makati
that Manzano is disqualified to run
City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
for and hold the elective office of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission
directs the Makati City Board of
We first consider the threshold procedural issue
Canvassers, upon proper notice to
raised by private respondent Manzano whether
the parties, to reconvene and
petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this
proclaim the respondent Eduardo
suit considering that he was not an original party
Luis Barrios Manzano as the
in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
winning candidate for vice-mayor
Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to
of Makati City.
intervene granted.
 I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS
SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions
of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner
has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his
motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may
be permitted to intervene. Any
person allowed to initiate an action
or proceeding may, before or
during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the
Commission, in its discretion to
intervene in such action or
proceeding, if he has legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or when
he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by such action or
proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission.
In allowing or disallowing a
motion for intervention, the
Commission or the Division, in the
exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a
separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner
has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect
because he is "a defeated candidate for
the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City
[who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by
final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at
the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had
already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation
at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still
has, an interest in ousting private respondent
from the race at the time he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in
several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to
the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner
filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of
the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified
"from running for [an] elective local position"
under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril
(who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City,
was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in
litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates
for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known
as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who his been
declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed
in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition
for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioner's motion for intervention but also with
the substantive issues respecting private
respondent's alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely,
whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice
mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent
Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which
declares as "disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner,
as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers
and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their father's'
country such children are citizens
of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter's country the
former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen
of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the
above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of
the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance
of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the
fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a
memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a
dual allegiance and I reiterate a
dual allegiance is larger and
more threatening than that of mere
double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of
the accident of mixed marriages or
of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do
not question double citizenship at
all.
What we would like the Committee
to consider is to take constitutional
cognizance of the problem of dual
allegiance. For example, we all
know what happens in the triennial
elections of the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce which consists of about
600 chapters all over the country.
There is a Peking ticket, as well as
a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is
the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of
China in Taiwan. And until recently,
sponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the People's Republic of
China, they have the Associated
Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast
Asia including some European and
Latin countries were represented,
which was dissolved after several
years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-
Chinese were also represented in
that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance,
therefore, I speak of this unsettled
kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of
citizens who are already Filipinos
but who, by their acts, may be said
to be bound by a second
allegiance, either to Peking or
Taiwan. I also took close note of the
concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta,
who were concerned about the lack
of guarantees of thorough
assimilation, and especially
Commissioner Concepcion who has
always been worried about
minority claims on our natural
resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon
scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and
this is already happening. Some of
the great commercial places in
downtown Taipei are Filipino-
owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese
it is of common knowledge in
Manila. It can mean a tragic capital
outflow when we have to endure a
capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask
that the Committee kindly
consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the
article on Citizenship which will
read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE
IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND
SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING
TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke
on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of
Commissioners expressed their
concern about dual citizenship in
the sense that it implies a double
allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who
spoke then in a freewheeling
debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which
pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a
uniqueness and which elsewhere in
the Constitution is defined in terms
of rights and obligations exclusive
to that citizenship including, of
course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course,
the concern for national security. In
the course of those debates, I think
some noted the fact that as a result
of the wave of naturalizations since
the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic
of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized
Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei
every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a
foreign government maybe just to
enter into the spirit of the occasion
when the anniversary of the Sun
Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have
detected a genuine and deep
concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double
 allegiance which is repugnant to
our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be
left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the
scale of the problem, the real
impact on the security of this
country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee
entertain a proposed amendment
at the proper time that will prohibit,
in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship,
the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of
the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
"[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is
considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators
Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I
would like to ask clarification of line
41, page 17: "Any person with dual
citizenship" is disqualified to run for
any elective local position. Under
the present Constitution, Mr.
President, someone whose mother
is a citizen of the Philippines but his
father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a
natural born citizen, upon reaching
the age of majority, must elect or
give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person
would carry two passports, one
belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind,
Mr. President, it only means that at
the moment when he would want
to run for public office, he has to
repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he
carries only a Philippine passport
but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that
person, nevertheless, as a citizen?
No one can renounce. There are
such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very
fact that he is running for public
office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be
considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely,
Mr. President, the Constitution does
not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the
citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we
are saying, Mr. President, is: Under
the Gentleman's example, if he
 does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening
himself to question. So, if he is
really interested to run, the first
thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am
a Filipino citizen, and I have only
one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are
talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and
that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution
of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true,
Mr. President. But if he exercises
acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships,
then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an
applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at
the time he is a subject or citizen before he can
be issued a certificate of naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for
citizenship by naturalization takes
an oath that he renounce, his
loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is
satisfied and compiled with. The
determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully
complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted
by the legislative department of
the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation
and application. If the requirement
of the Chinese Law of Nationality
were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to
require, but what a foreign
government has thought or
intended to exact. That, of course,
is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a
brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was
born in San Francisco, California on September 4,
1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli,
the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that,
by participating in Philippine elections in 1992,
1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively
renounced his U.S. citizenship under American
law," so that now he is solely a Philippine
national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that
merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in
any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years
old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections
private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind
349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who
is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality
by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory." To be sure this provision was
declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power
given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed
on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO
CITIZEN (STATE IF
"NATURAL-BORN" OR
"NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF
PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY
SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT
RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I
SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I
WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed
to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was
held: 17
It is not disputed that on January
20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify
him "from running for any elective
local position?" We answer this
question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at
the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988.
In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he "had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American
citizenship long before May 8,
1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim when he
abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the
assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the
United States,
petitioner Frivaldo
lost his American
citizenship when he
took his oath of
allegiance to the
Philippine
Government when
he ran for Governor
in 1988, in 1992, and
in 1995. Every
certificate of
candidacy contains
an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine
Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo
has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have
not been effectively rebutted by
Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission
are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's
contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is
insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age
of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority
age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private
respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the
United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of
candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be
considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis
mundatis to private respondent in the case at
bar:
. . . Considering the fact that
admittedly Osmea was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate
staring he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that
he is an American does not mean
that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider
that the renunciation needed to
lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express," it stands to reason that
there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is
no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of
allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that
he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that
he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9225 August 29,
2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine
Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or
affrim) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The
unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship
of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right
of surffrage must Meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office
shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where
they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their
profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or
appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are
occupying any public office in the
country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as
commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they
are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section
or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, any other section or provision not
affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws,
decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall
take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2)
newspaper of general circulation.
Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives
This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill
No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally
 passed by the the House of Representatives and United States of America, he lost his Filipino
Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
respectively. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day
4
OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate Secretary General an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention
House of Represenatives and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

Approved: August 29, 2003
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO will support and defend the Constitution of the
President of the Philippines Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
RA 9225; ELECTION LAWS
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship,
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, which states:
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear
ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
BALUA, Respondents. allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
DECISION myself of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of
America.
SERENO, CJ.:

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement

THE CASE
is true and correct to the best of my knowledge
and belief.7
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in
conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
review the Resolutions of the Commission on
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.
Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others,
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated
the following statements:
5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while
the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized
February 2011 is being questioned for finding Filipino citizen.
that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant
citizen qualified to run for public office despite his to, a foreign country.
continued use of a U.S. passport.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
FACTS
I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws,
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with
the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado
left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on
25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July
2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel
Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file
as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division)
issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum
within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua
moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado
filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of
Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all
neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado
is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and
that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his familys
ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay
of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is
a bona fide resident of his barangay and
that Arnado went to the United States in
1985 to work and returned to the
Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from
the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating
that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as
Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964
to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979
to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the
Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying
that Arnado has been a registered voter of
Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST
DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for
the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First
Division considered it as one for disqualification.
Baluas contention that Arnado is a resident of
the United States was dismissed upon the finding
that "Balua failed to present any evidence to
support his contention,"16 whereas the First
Division still could "not conclude that Arnado
failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government
Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however,
the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have
substantially complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of consistently using
his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated
his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a
strong indication that Arnado had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that
he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to
enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a
blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between
Arnados unexplained use of a US passport six
times and his claim that he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the
Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a
person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign
countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself
of US citizenship would not continue to avail of
privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered
by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is
hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados
proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is
hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution
before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the
Resolution and that the said Resolution is
contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino
citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and
the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent
to his renunciation of his American
citizenship is not tantamount to a
repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he
did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because
he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his
Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Divisions treatment of
the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice
as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning
candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his
citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of
votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a
Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the
First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum
with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed
by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not
stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the
COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of
the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En
Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further
to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would
not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as
it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment
by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was
filed well within the period prescribed by
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is
not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set
aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the
following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by
R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became
a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to
revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the
case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen
who, after taking his oath as a naturalized
Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who
acquire their citizenship by choice, thus
discarding their original citizenship. The
Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens.
In the present case, respondent is not a
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who
chose greener pastures by working abroad and
then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a
US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case
at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation
as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport
was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he
was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport so that he was actually able to get it
about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he
was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by
the respondents submission of a certified true
copy of his passport showing that he used the
same for his travels on the following dates:
January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010,
January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4,
2010. This then shows that the use of the US
passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for
his use. As probably pressing needs might be
undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC
Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds
provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship
may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle
of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person
becomes a citizen, either by birth or
naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen, and this assumption
stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained
a Filipino despite his use of his American passport
in the absence of clear, unequivocal and
competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of
citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly
and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latters continued use of
his US passport and enjoyment of all the
privileges of a US citizen despite his previous
renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship
runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to
retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondents submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose
of complying with the requirements for running
for the mayoralty post in connection with the May
10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as
citizenship, are continuing requirements; once
any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to
the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate
is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if
he lost his citizenship after his election to office,
he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does
the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of
votes for the mayoralty post cure the latters
failure to comply with the qualification
requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at
all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his
election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a
candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid.
His ouster from office does not violate the
principle of vox populi suprema est lex because
the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
sovereign will of the people who expressed it
when they ratified the Constitution and when
they elected their representatives who enacted
the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning
the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run
for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty
race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and
reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen
despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run
for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks
the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling
that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the
respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties
before this Court which will be addressed seriatim
as the subsequent questions hinge on the result
of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is
allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of
a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation
earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should
be whether or not the use of a foreign passport
after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on
succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at
the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division
Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the
candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has
an interest in the disqualification case filed
against Arnado, considering that in the event the
latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should
be considered stray and the second-placer should
be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original
petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and /
or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division
and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that
stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene
in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown
that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not
be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does
not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.

Arnados claim that the main case has attained

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated
finality as the original petitioner and respondents
in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
therein have not appealed the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it
candidate who has been declared by final
from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
petition that the disqualification case originally
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
The use of foreign passport after
number of votes in such election, the Court or
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a
Commission shall continue with the trial and
positive and voluntary act of representation
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
as to ones nationality and citizenship; it
upon motion of the complainant or any
does not divest Filipino citizenship regained
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
Renunciation required to qualify one to run
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
for an elective position.
strong.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-

Mercado v. Manzano28
acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
clarified the right of intervention in a
disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to
qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath
of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not
just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008
when he applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise
possessed American citizenship. Arnado had
therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado
renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was
deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of the effect of such renunciation under the laws
of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his
citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009. The pivotal question to determine is
whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino
citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run
for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced
his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to
the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he
is an American citizen, with all attendant rights
and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this
situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that
he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that
he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against anyone who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not
one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run
for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April
2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity
to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such
act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by
which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is
distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of
the certificate of candidacy already carries with it
an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on
the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy
on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
American citizenship. He was qualified to vote,
but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x
x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public
office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the
COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport effectively
negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This
does not mean, that he failed to comply with the
twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in
fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that
he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective
public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in
disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we
were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold
any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US
passport with the explanation that he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport
on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only
able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from
Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his
use of a US passport less of an act that violated
the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen
before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado,
stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of
his Philippine passport, the respondent already
used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC.
Three months from June is September. If indeed,
Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used
his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his
Philippine passport does not correct the fact that
after he renounced his foreign citizenship and
prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used
his US passport. In the same way that the use of
his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine
passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant
duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship
by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship
to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to
the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US
passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May
2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting
Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and
its soundness once again put to the test to
address the ever-recurring issue that a second-
placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot
be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in
the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the
office of municipal president. The petitioner,
Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo
Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad
contested the election upon the sole ground that
Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected
the second time to the office of the municipal
president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened. 46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o
on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking
a second re-election absent the four year
interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is
that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a
mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing
"the effect of a decision that a candidate is not
entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found
is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is
not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different
from that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office. In the former
case the court, after an examination of the ballots
may find that some other person than the
candidate declared to have received a plurality
by the board of canvassers actually received the
greater number of votes, in which case the court
issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers
to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find
that the manner of holding the election and the
returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that
it cannot be determined who received a plurality
of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
question as to the correctness of the returns or
the manner of casting and counting the ballots is
before the deciding power, and generally the only
result can be that the election fails entirely. In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of
the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal
manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the
latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality
of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character
and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found
starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier
statement, "In the former, we have a contest in
the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to
have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the
ruling therein is that since the Court of First
Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the
person who obtained the highest number of votes
in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when
he "declared that no one had been legally elected
president of the municipality of Imus at the
general election held in that town on 4 June
1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected
and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was
disqualified and that Abad as the second placer
cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court
therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion
and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded
his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings
that no one was elected municipal president of
the municipality of Imus at the last general
election; and that said order and all subsequent
proceedings based thereon are null and void and
of no effect; and, although this decision is
rendered on respondents' answer to the order to
show cause, unless respondents raised some new
and additional issues, let judgment be entered
accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a
host of decisions does not even have a legal basis
to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the
Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent
statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of
victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is
thereafter established, what stops the Court from
adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the
winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest
number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a
candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the
lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have
been passed upon prior to election date.
Consequently, he may have had the opportunity
to hold himself out to the electorate as a
legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number
of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect
of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law
requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before
one even becomes a candidate. When a person
who is not qualified is voted for and eventually
garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon
and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
We might as well write off our election laws if the
voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of
who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the
Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks
to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state.51(Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified
in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be
interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidates
victory in the election may be considered a
sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate
sought to be disqualified if the main issue
involves defects in the candidates certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating
to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in
terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give
effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper
time and opportunity to fine-tune our above
ruling. We say this with the realization that a
blanket and unqualified reading and application
of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of
our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified
reading may provide a way around the law that
effectively negates election requirements aimed
at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a
candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an
unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the
LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of
local government officials. Equally susceptive of
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC
that sets out what should be stated in a COC.
Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or
deny due course to a COC can render a Section
78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC
data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may
risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they
know that an election victory will cure any defect
that their COCs may have. Election victory then
becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual
from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to
delay any disqualification case filed against him
so he can submit himself to the electorate and
win, if winning the election will guarantee a
disregard of constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications
of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring
that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow
the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to
trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates
is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorates voice spoken through the ballot is
made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as
an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set
in.1wphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then
becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining
the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate
are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules
that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their
victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the
next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidates
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor
said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere
obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The
very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidates disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been
proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based
on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation
to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his
disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on
15 June 2010, long after the elections and after
he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding
Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It
does not involve the commission of election
offenses as provided for in the first sentence of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already
been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado
is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado
was both a Filipino and an American citizen when
he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The
following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position." The prohibition
serves as a bar against the individuals who fall
under any of the enumeration from participating
as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he
filed his answer to the petition when the elections
were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to
negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches
back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in
the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in
his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En
Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010
elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally
upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FOUNDLING ~ NATURAL BORN THEREFORE
QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT
Grace Poe vs COMELEC
(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700
March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016
elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from
24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the
Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for
good. Before that however, and even afterwards,
she has been going to and fro between US and
Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as
newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July
18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring
that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010,
before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirement . From then on, she stopped using
her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny
or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since
she cannot prove that her biological parents or
either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en
banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held
(9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to
vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to
rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution
provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or
lack thereof of a candidate is not one among
them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only
the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members,
whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for
the qualifications of candidates for such positions,
the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before elections.
Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a
mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate
grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of
procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case
for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a
natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a
natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of
the constitutional requirements that only natural-
born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes
parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a municipality where
the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be
more than 99% chance that a child born in such
province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents nationality. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based
are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise
is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced
that foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. This is based on the finding that
the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, the
SC felt the need to examine the intent of
the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred
with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of
international law. Although the Philippines is not
a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres
to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling
is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year
residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of
animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi
in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as
of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when
her application under RA 9225 was approved by
the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which
decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot
be counted unless she acquires a permanent
resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship
is without merit. Such cases are different from
the circumstances in this case, in which Grace
Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US. Coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her familys actual continuous
stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it
was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should
be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the
ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts
refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon.
Only when there is a prior authority finding that
a candidate is suffering from a disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court
Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there
cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C.
ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with extremely urgent application for
an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three
days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13
May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner's name be changed
from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on
petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second
half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the
OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of
her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's
mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the
OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a
new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in
1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was
issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998,
she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a
degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines8but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of
America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in
1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of
Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back
to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony
or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her
eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born
in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June
2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She
returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8
July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December
2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
upon learning of her father's deteriorating
medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a
coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to
take care of her father's funeral arrangements as
well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise
of her father was a severe blow to her entire
family. In her earnest desire to be with her
grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next
semester;20 coordination with property movers for
the relocation of their household goods, furniture
and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper
procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner
already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their
family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at
her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot
at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan
City in the second half of 2005.27 The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by
the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick
trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially
informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's
change and abandonment of their address in the
U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27
April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from
his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the
country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a
major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband
acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home34 and to this day, is where the couple and
their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can
be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI
acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and
declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the
Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's
name and in the names of her three (3)
children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter
of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a
new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino
III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a
notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites
stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The
following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner
submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took
her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using
her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before
the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the United States."49 On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the
U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had
taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21
October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the
same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that
she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in
the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued
to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May
13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on
16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained
Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for
the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner
attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the
upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the
subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No.
221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President,
Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to
deny due course or cancel said COC which was
docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to
the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced
that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is
that petitioner committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day
before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that
petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international
law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this
line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to
apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with.64 Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-
born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that
status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo
pointed out that petitioner was bound by the
sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for
Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and
six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship
under the said Act. Also on the assumption that
petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she
failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein
she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction
over Elamparo's petition as it was actually
a petition for quo warranto which could
only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the
Presidential elections, and that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006
Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of
action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement
in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;
(3) she did not make any material
misrepresentation in the COC regarding
her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional
Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered
citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under
international law to have been born
of citizens of the place where they
are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born
Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn
renunciation of her American
citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC for President in the May 9,
2016 Elections and that the same
is in full force and effect and has
not been withdrawn or recanted;
 e. the burden was on Elamparo in
proving that she did not possess
natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence
and that she reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early
as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence
even before she reacquired natural-
born citizenship under R.A. No.
9225;
h. statement regarding the period
of residence in her 2012 COC for
Senator was an honest mistake, not
binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an
action to usurp the sovereign right
of the Filipino people to decide a
purely political question, that is,
should she serve as the country's
next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted
for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running
for the President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections,
contained material representations which are
false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December
2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December
2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos.
221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate
petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D.
Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to
its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings,
cannot be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of
statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings
were not expressly included in the categories of
citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of
the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore,
the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is
a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under
international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a
nationality.76 According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory
and that local legislations are necessary in order
to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed
that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a
foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad
concluded that she did not comply with the ten
(10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined
that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon
City only from the time she renounced her
American citizenship which was sometime in
2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned
petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S.
domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband
stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or
cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No.
15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced
the view that former natural-born citizens who
are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only
their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to
their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission
in her COC for Senator that she had only been a
resident of the Philippines for at least six (6)
years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May
2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez
rejected petitioner's claim that she could have
validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that
petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against
petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA
No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015
COC for President should be cancelled on the
ground that she did not possess the ten-year
period of residency required for said candidacy
and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended
that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be
from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by
the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could
not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her
Philippine domicile since she was then living here
as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following
arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed
outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status
of petitioner which are not among the recognized
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to
an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are
basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus
on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a
presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where
they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen,
she has every right to be repatriated under R.A.
No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-
born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the
Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of
regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006
Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the
issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced
her position that she is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first
quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally
reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her
American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was
no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of
a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing
in the residency portion of her COC for Senator
was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December
2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that
petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she
failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the
Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections
on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's
Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC,
petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance
of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
restraining orders were issued by the Court
enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court.
The Court also ordered the consolidation of the
two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution
of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments
were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and
SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015
rendered through its Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015,
rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007
(DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of
the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of
the Commission En Banc, upholding the
11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which
the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016
National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not
the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground"
that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of
the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our
Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C,
Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the Commission on election
contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices
shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including
determination of the number and
location of polling places,
appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence
of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient
publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which,
in addition to other requirements,
must present their platform or
program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not
be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are
supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission,
in addition to other penalties that
may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint,
or on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress
effective measures to minimize
election spending, including
limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President
the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary
action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the
Congress a comprehensive report
on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers
approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law
stating that:
The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4
which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in
the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is
our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized
proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1,
the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any
candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility
of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A,
6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from
the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualifications based
on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art.
IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules
of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds
but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government
Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a
word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice versa. We have this sort of
dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications
provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to
grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in
its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the
absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and
is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined
lest he wins because of the very acts for which
his disqualification is being sought. That is why it
is provided that if the grounds for disqualification
are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will
not be counted; and if for some reason he has
been voted for and he has won, either he will not
be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set
aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a
candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as
in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to
make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in
the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A.
Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the
COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy.
That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidacy
that they are eligible for the position which they
seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and
only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made
in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition
against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members
of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of
Congress of the President and Vice President, as
the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September
2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993
version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or
protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking
grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an
acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is
concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of
one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction,
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of
a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding
before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a
prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or
her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which
the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions
against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final
pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under
the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be
citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is
a foundling, she said it all. This borders on
bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that
herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say
that "she now has the burden to present evidence
to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of
the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than
sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not
a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were
aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did
not shift the burden to her because such status
did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of
petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence
must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics
from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number
of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986
while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines
in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented
census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were
Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349
Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In
1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus
1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same
year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as
against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim
admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the
time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of
the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality
of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of
the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church
in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if
not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the
words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because
foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they
can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the
probability is such that every foundling would
have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50%
chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame
our questions properly. What are the chances that
the parents of anyone born in the Philippines
would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority,
from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in
the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that
sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This
means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the
Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means
that the statistical probability that any child born
in the Philippines on that decade would be a
natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social
anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but
I am confident that the statistical probability that
a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino will not be affected by whether or
not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood
that a foundling would have a Filipino parent
might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps,
shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning
their children here in the Philippines thinking
those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned
children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign
couple has ever considered their child excess
baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings
and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child
of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical
certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a
decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of
human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are
not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a
need to examine the intent of the framers.
In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after
subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the
proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown
parents." Current codes consider them Filipino,
that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish
territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in
the Philippines in that a child of unknown
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the
conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore,
there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children
of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in
the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this
[person] does not recognize the child, is not
unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or
not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the
amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize
the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I
think those of overseas Filipino mother and father
[whom the latter] does not recognize, should also
be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the
amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better
to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these
cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include a provision on the subject
exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried
out, it was not because there was any objection
to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision,
Delegate Rafols presented an amendment
to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father
of a mother who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily
because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution
to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law
were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and
that foundlings followed the nationality of
the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the
Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was
rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was
the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed
that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's
or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong.
They can even overturn existing rules. This is
basic. What matters here is that Montinola and
Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in
the convention that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully
explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is
to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos
under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over
into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is
appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently
vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that
the framers "worked to create a just and humane
society," that "they were reasonable patriots and
that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He
exhorts that, given the grave implications of the
argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an
express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use
the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really
intended to take this path to the dark side and
inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which
provides that the "State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children
to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship
upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most
basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with
status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis
and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by
aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a
proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15)
adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over
the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No.
8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine
that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which
make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having
to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance,
the determination of foundling status is done not
by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly,
the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there
is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her
favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May
1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by
Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario
Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a
foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under
international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws
of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law,
and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary rules
are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial
logic, based on principles which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"127 such as "general
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No.
111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation."128 These are the
same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof
states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following
obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far
as possible, the right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation
of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the
right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right, to such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor, on the part
of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately
after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a
nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and
ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by
the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet
unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first
is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country
of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall
have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality
shall be determined by the rules applicable in
cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved,
presumed to have been born on the territory of
the State in which it was found. (Underlining
supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting
State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality
of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean
that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this
Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or
ratified the "International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted
principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen
states and had not even come into force and
which needed the ratification of a minimum of
twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points
out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional
state practice in Latin America, and State Practice
in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying
countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either
ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when
the case was decided in 2005. The Court also
pointed out that that nine member countries of
the European Common Market had acceded to
the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited
U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of
foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there
was pronouncement that recognition of foreign
judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively
takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are
based not only on international custom, but also
on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in
Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic
to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion
that the right against enforced disappearances
and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted
principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty
countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the
sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the
1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six
(26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also,
the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are
recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries,
show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having
been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A.
No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of
them, foundlings are among the Filipino children
who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of
the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions
and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of
a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot
be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member
of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to
signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties
and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would
be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek
to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny
them political status or to accord them second-
class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned
that since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards
consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No.
9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v.
HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has
been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where
we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation
process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x
x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation
of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission
on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner
reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No.
9225), he will ... recover his natural-
born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth"
in the definition of natural citizens as implying
"that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth
and remain uninterrupted and continuous from
birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line
with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress
saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it had been once lost.
It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that
natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where
the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at
the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his
birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is
"repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court
pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third
category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of
a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member
of the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new
rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where
we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine,
we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines." This Court also
said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the
oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born
to" in her application for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and
this misled the BI to presume that she was a
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that
the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact -
petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects
of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the
biological parents and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was
also entitled to an amended birth certificate
"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child
of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not
bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the
adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development],
or any other agency or institution participating in
the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The law therefore allows
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were
her birth parents as that was what would be
stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given
the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose
that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the
qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make
in the same case for cancellation of COC, it
resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of
the issue of whether or not petitioner committed
false material representation when she stated in
her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016
been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is
true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates
to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since
the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May
2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years.
In answer to the requested information of "Period
of Residence in the Philippines up to the day
before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of
25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991,
she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire
a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence
showing that she and her family abandoned their
U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for
good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005
and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting
in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their
household items weighing about 28,000 pounds
to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine
Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship
their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July
2005; titles for condominium and parking slot
issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army
in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American
Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy
where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her
family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and
that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the
facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that
petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as
of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence
of the first two requisites, namely, physical
presence and animus manendi, but maintained
there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of
the position that the earliest date that petitioner
could have started residence in the Philippines
was in July 2006 when her application under R.A.
No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard,
COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero
v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the
private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these
cases decree that the stay of an alien former
Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship, a visa-free entry under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005
to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in
these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only
evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a
candidate who wanted to count residence prior to
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the
Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to
establish residence. In Caballero v.
COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his
place of work was abroad and that he only visited
during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an
American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a
seven-month stint as provincial officer. The
COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court,
said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence
on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold
that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and
taken together leads to no other conclusion that
she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children
from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight
company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right
after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine
schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after
all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and
her family's actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for
good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it
against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer
look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent
to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad
and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The
law institutes a balikbayan program "providing
the opportunity to avail of the necessary training
to enable the balikbayan to become economically
self-reliant members of society upon their return
to the country"164 in line with the government's
"reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not
ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the
return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh
conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow
him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself
into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner
did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former
Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been
decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial
precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication
in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended
to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the
evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC
ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016
in her 2015 COC was false because she put six
( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of
residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she
started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified
pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of
the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said
that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006
which was the period when the U.S. house was
sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in
2015 that residence could be counted from 25
May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood
the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the
change which the COMELEC itself introduced in
the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the
query if it did not acknowledge that the first
version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence
from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house
and the return of her husband is plausible given
the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her
passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC
to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could
be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after
all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven
(7) months as her period of residence where the
required period was a minimum of one year. We
said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May
2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded
the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC
took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it
does not take away the fact that in reality,
petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was
here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in
good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner
was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015.
The event from which the COMELEC pegged the
commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was
an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6)
years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up
in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have
not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point.
From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances
that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was
also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on
1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6)
years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood
the question and could have truthfully indicated a
longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a
matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on
15 October 2015, she could not be said to have
been attempting to hide her erroneous statement
in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do
not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her
side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run
for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole
ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in
his COC must not only refer to a material fact
(eligibility and qualifications for elective office),
but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of
infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus
manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying
home was as much as dismissed as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at
the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based
on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the
standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of
residence, not the statement of the person that
determines residence for purposes of compliance
with the constitutional requirement of residency
for election as President. It ignores the easily
researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the
candidate on the basis of facts of residence far
less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all
else, what we consider as a primary reason why
petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in
her COC for Senator which declaration was not
even considered by the SET as an issue against
her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made
the declaration in her COC for Senator that she
has been a resident for a period of six (6) years
and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May
2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference
the residency requirements for election as
Senator which was satisfied by her declared years
of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
arguments before us that at the time the
declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did
not have as yet any intention to vie for the
Presidency in 2016 and that the general public
was never made aware by petitioner, by word or
action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy.
There are facts of residence other than that which
was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such
other facts of residence have never been proven
to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May
2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in
the USA to finish pending projects and arrange
the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with
her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled
Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in
2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection
in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old
enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her
husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her
family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005,
[petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in
1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and
"Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to
the US in order to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband
informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April
2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned
from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for
a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband
acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where
they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the
COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case
fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than
that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for
Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship
and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned
Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave
abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the
COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is
hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through
the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio
P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized
Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division
is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a
candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
The Grace Poe Case Simplified
A further digest of another digest by Vena V.
Verga, presented in a way laymen would better
understand. It is for you to be informed of what
netizens are raging about.
GRACE POE vs. COMELEC
The Case
Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by
Edgardo Militar in 1968. Parental care and
custody over her was passed on by Edgardo to
his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife.
Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces
adopted Grace Poe.
 1991 Poe went to the US to be a
permanent resident therein
2001 She became a naturalized US citizen
First quarter of 2005 she came back to
the Philippines to permanently reside herein
February 14, 2006- she went back to the
US to dispose family belongings
July 18, 2006 she re-acquired Filipino
citizenship
According to Poe in her 2013 COC for
Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election, she
has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years
and 6 months (reckoned from year 2006 when
she re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225).
Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May
9, 2016 elections (hence, computing from May,
2013, she has been a resident in the Philippines
for 9 years and 6 months only)
However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is
a natural born and her residence in the Philippine
up to the day before election would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from May 24,
2005 (when she returned from the US to the
Philippines for good).
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in
the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born
citizen? Yes, based on:
a) Circumstantial evidence
b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of international
law
Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe
has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-
born Filipino. xxx. [T]here is a high probability
that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor
General offered official Statistics from the
Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975,
the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in
the country were more than 10 Million. On this
basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in
the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn,
would indicate more than ample probability that
Poes parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality
of Poes parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things
have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that
Poes parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise
is to accept the absurd.
Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.
The amendment to the Constitution proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as
natural born citizens was not carried out, not
because there was any objection to the notion
that persons of unknown parentage are not
citizens, but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. There was no
intent or language that would permit
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support
the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee
must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Recent legislation all expressly refer to Filipino
children and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
Generally accepted principles of
international law
The common thread of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the International
Convent on Civil and Political
Rights obligates the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and to ensure that no child
is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of
the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
(foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not
signatory to these conventions.
Poes evidence shows that at least 60 countries in
Asia, North and South America and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence,
there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having
been born and a national of the country in which
it is found.
2) After renouncing her American citizenship and
after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired
 her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes,
Poes repatriation resulted to reacquisition
of natural born citizenship.
A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine
nationality will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v.
HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).
3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency
requirement? Yes, she will have been a
resident for 10 years and 11 months on the
day of the election.
[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to
no to other conclusion that Poe decided to
permanently abandon her US residence and
reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that
she and her family abandoned their US domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include former US passport showing her
arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the
Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange
for the shipment of household items as well as
with the pet Bureau; school records of her
children showing enrolment in the Philippine to
the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.
xxx These evidence, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is
clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was
for good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her
2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As
explained by Grace Poe, she misunderstood the
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of
residence as of the day she submitted that COC
in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency
from April-May 2006 which was the period when
the U.S. house was sold and her husband
returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she
was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Such a mistake could be given in evidence
against her but it was by no means conclusive
considering the overwhelming evidence
submitted by Poe.
--------------------------------------
end-----------------------------------------------
NOTE: The Supreme Court is the highest court in
the Philippines. It is the court of last resort, which
means that it gives the final disposition to a case
which cannot be overturned by any other court
but itself. In short, it resolves controversies once
and for all. Whatever it says, forms part of the
law of the land; whatever it says, binds us all
Filipinos, even our children yet to be born unless
it has decided differently in another subsequent
case.
Classic display of power and personal interests,
well-executed but of course, highly doubted. This
is a shameless disregard of the most fundamental
law, a revolutionary turn-around from the rule of
law, slavery to the should-be infallible, thief to
lawyers and aspirants, the downfall of a highly
respected profession, an evidence of the evils of
corruption. What else could happen in this
country?
As a law student, I am deeply frustrated but this
is more reason for me to be one of the lawyers
who stand for and by the law, inviolable as it is,
sacred in its letters and spirit. Never shall I play
blind, never shall I be blinded.
As it ever was and should always be--dura lex
sed lex.
NATURALIZATION: 3 WAYS FOR ALIENS TO
BECOME PH CITIZENS
Consti II case digest: EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he
is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an
employee, he derives an average annual income
of around P100,000.00 with free board and
lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to
speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he
is exempt from the filing of Declaration of
Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30
a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which
all persons concerned were enjoined to show
cause, if any, why the petition should not be
granted. The entire petition and its annexes,
including the order, were ordered published once
a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise
ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
posted in public and conspicuous places in the
Manila City Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty.
Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and
adviser of the So familys business. He would
usually attend parties and other social functions
hosted by petitioners family. He knew petitioner
to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of
good moral character, including all the
qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo,
testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991.
He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took
up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some
school organizations and mingled well with
friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the decision to the CA on the following
grounds:
Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification
needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally
adopting a foreigner into the political body of a
nation by clothing him or her with the privileges
of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws,
there are three ways by which an alien may
become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A.
No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an
alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate
and distinct laws the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-
born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
their lives, who never saw any other country and
all along thought that they were Filipinos; who
have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
Philippines and affinity to the customs and
traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging
which is administrative rather than judicial in
nature. Thus, although the legislature believes
that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is
nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A.
No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed
by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in
mind was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only
implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of
the applicant to prove not only his own good
moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be
credible persons.56 Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only
an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police
character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not incredible. What must be
credible is not the declaration made but the
person making it. This implies that such person
must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that
he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and
that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the applicants worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioners argument that
respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the
petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a
judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata.
A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if
it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any
material fact. Law and jurisprudence even
authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If
the government can challenge a final grant of
citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the
decision of the RTC within the reglementary
period despite its failure to oppose the petition
before the lower court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-
102984. Likewise assailed is the appellate courts
Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed
before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization3 under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. He alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he
is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an
employee, he derives an average annual income
of around P100,000.00 with free board and
lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to
speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he
is exempt from the filing of Declaration of
Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born
in the Philippines, and studied in a school
recognized by the Government where Philippine
history, government and culture are taught; he is
a person of good moral character; he believes in
the principles underlying the Philippine
constitution; he has conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government as
well as with the community in which he is living;
he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people; he has all the qualifications provided
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he
is not opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments; he is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success
or predominance of mens ideas; he is not a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of
polygamy; he has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude; he is not
suffering from any incurable contagious diseases
or from mental alienation; the nation of which he
is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is
his intention in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to China; and he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of
the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission as citizen of the Philippines. The
petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No.
02-102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint
Affidavit4 of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B.
Salcedo; and petitioners Certificate of Live
Birth,5 Alien Certificate of Registration,6 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence.7
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30
a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which
all persons concerned were enjoined to show
cause, if any, why the petition should not be
granted. The entire petition and its annexes,
including the order, were ordered published once
a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise
ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
posted in public and conspicuous places in the
Manila City Hall Building.9
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the
above order, as well as the entire petition and its
annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20,
200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in Today, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing,
petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified
that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the
legal consultant and adviser of the So familys
business. He would usually attend parties and
other social functions hosted by petitioners
family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral
character, including all the qualifications
mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified
that petitioner was gainfully employed and
presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street,
Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been practicing
Philippine tradition and those embodied in the
Constitution; petitioner had been socially active,
mingled with some of his neighbors and had
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines;
and petitioner and his family observed Christmas
and New Year and some occasions such as
fiestas. According to the witness, petitioner was
not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a
Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to organized
government or believes in the use of force; he is
not a polygamist and has not been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude; neither is he
suffering from any mental alienation or any
incurable disease.12
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo,
testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991.
He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took
up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some
school organizations and mingled well with
friends.13Salcedo further testified that he saw
petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and
special occasions when he would go to
petitioners house. He has known petitioner to
have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is
intelligent, a person of good moral character, and
believes in the principles of the Philippine
Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful occupation,
has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner and has all the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove
that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a citizen of the
Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence,
petitioner offered in evidence the following
documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth;14 (2) Alien
Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant
Certificate of Residence;16 (4) Elementary
Pupils17 and High School Students18 Permanent
Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College; (5)
Transcript of Record issued by the University of
Santo Tomas;19 (6) Certification of Part-Time
Employment dated November 20, 2002;20 (7)
Income Tax Returns and Certificate of Withholding
Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from
Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor;22 (9)
Clearances that he has not been charged or
convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates and
Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine
General Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in
evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4,
2003.25 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the petition and declaring that
petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as
citizen of the Philippines, after taking the
necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this
decision becomes final, subject to payment of
cost of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.26
The trial court ruled that the witnesses for
petitioner had known him for the period required
by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had
all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had
satisfactorily supported his petition with
evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the decision to the CA on the following
grounds:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES,
NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK
SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER
WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED
AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.27
Respondent contended that based on the
evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that
he possesses all the qualifications under Section
2 and none of the disqualifications under Section
4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2)
character witnesses did not know him well
enough to vouch for his fitness to become a
Filipino citizen; they merely made general
statements without giving specific details about
his character and moral conduct.28The witnesses
did not even reside in the same place as
petitioner.29 Respondent likewise argued that
petitioner himself failed to prove that he is
qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he
did not give any explanation or specific answers
to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He
merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general
statements in answer to his counsels questions.
Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had
all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required by law to be a
naturalized Filipino citizen.30
On the other hand, petitioner averred that he
graduated cum laude from the UST with the
degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is
now on his second year as a medical student at
the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the
requirements for naturalization under C.A. No.
473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to
Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been
relaxed after the Philippine government entered
into diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China; the requirements were further
relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was
signed into law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the
petition, with all its annexes, was published in the
official gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation; notices were likewise sent to the
National Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the
OSG. But none from these offices came forward
to oppose the petition before the lower
court.32 Petitioner insisted that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become Filipino. This was clearly established by
his witnesses.
In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No.
9139 applies to administrative naturalization filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It
insisted that even in the absence of any
opposition, a petition for naturalization may be
dismissed.
In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set
aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the
petition for naturalization without
prejudice.34 According to the CA, petitioners two
(2) witnesses were not credible because they
failed to mention specific details of petitioners
life or character to show how well they knew him;
they merely "parroted" the provisions of the
Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their
applicability to petitioners case.35 The appellate
court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to
comply with the requirement of the law that the
applicant must not be less than 21 years of age
on the day of the hearing of the petition; during
the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9)
months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling
short of the requirement.36 The CA stated,
however, that it was not its intention to forever
close the door to any future application for
naturalization which petitioner would file, and
that it believes that he would make a good
Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this
country.37
Petitioners motion for reconsideration38 was
denied in a Resolution39 dated November 24,
2005; hence, the present petition grounded on
the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.40
In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the
arguments he set forth in the Brief filed before
the CA.
In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent
countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect
on August 8, 2001 and where the applicants age
requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years
old), refers only to administrative naturalization
filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial
naturalization before the court, as in the present
case.42 Respondent, through the OSG, avers that
its failure to oppose the petition before the court
a quo does not preclude it from appealing the
decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even
authorized to question an already final decision
by filing a petition for cancellation of
citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its
argument that petitioners character witnesses
are not qualified to prove the formers
qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for
naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino
citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following
issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies
to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and
(2) whether or not the witnesses presented by
petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the
jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines
set forth in C.A. No. 473.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally
adopting a foreigner into the political body of a
nation by clothing him or her with the privileges
of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws,
there are three ways by which an alien may
become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A.
No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an
alien.45
Petitioners contention that the qualifications an
applicant for naturalization should possess are
those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those
set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant
for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473. On the other
hand, Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139
provide for the qualifications and disqualifications
of an applicant for naturalization
by administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial
measure intended to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical and more encouraging.50 It likewise
addresses the concerns of degree holders who,
by reason of lack of citizenship requirement,
cannot practice their profession, thus promoting
"brain gain" for the Philippines.51 These however,
do not justify petitioners contention that the
qualifications set forth in said law apply even to
applications for naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate
and distinct laws the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-
born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
their lives, who never saw any other country and
all along thought that they were Filipinos; who
have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
Philippines and affinity to the customs and
traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging
which is administrative rather than judicial in
nature. Thus, although the legislature believes
that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is
nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A.
No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed
by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in
mind was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only
implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for
naturalization by judicial act, though at the time
of the filing of his petition, administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already
available. Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No.
9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would be
broadened since it would then apply even to
aliens who are not native born. It must be
stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens
who were born in the Philippines and have been
residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to
judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention
of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization
procedure in the country. One of the qualifications
set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant
was born in the Philippines and should have been
residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was
born here but left the country, though resided for
more than ten (10) years from the filing of the
application is also disqualified. On the other hand,
if we maintain the distinct qualifications under
each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified
under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized
under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly
amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the
qualifications and disqualifications set forth
therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the
witnesses he presented were competent to vouch
for his good moral character, and are themselves
possessed of good moral character. It must be
stressed that character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of
the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they
ought to testify on specific facts and events
justifying the inference that the applicant
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law.53
Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo,
did not testify on his specific acts; they did not
elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not
convince the Court that they personally know
petitioner well and are therefore in a position to
vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by
the CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted
mainly of general statements in answer to the
leading questions propounded by his counsel.
What they conveniently did was to enumerate the
qualifications as set forth in the law without
giving specific details. The pertinent portion of
Atty. Adasas testimony follows:
q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us how did you come to
know him?
a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,]
when I was the legal consultant and adviser of
their family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t
him during my visit to their place way back in
1991 to 1992.
q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your
relationship with the petitioner more or less
contin[u]ous?
a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual
professional visit that I did to their family some
social function was sponsored normally and I am
(sic) invited and I used to attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did
you usually attend petitioners birthday?
a On several occasions I attend the birthday.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner
resides at present?
a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528
Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.
q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides
in the Philippines?
a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is
that since birth.
q During all the times that you have know[n] the
petitioner, what is your impression of his
conduct?
a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be
obedient and hard working individual and ah (sic)
he has a good moral character and he has been
ah (sic) no adverse report concerning the
character of the petitioner.
q In your opinion does the petitioner has the
qualifications necessary to become [a] citizen of
the Philippines?
a Yes.
q Can you tell us why do you say so?
a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has
posses (sic) all the qualifications mandated by
law and presently he is more than 21 years old
and he has resided in the Philippines particularly
in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for more than
ten (10) years and that since his birth; and that
he has good moral character and I have observed
that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine
traditions and ah (sic) those embodied in the
Philippine constitution and he has been socially
active and meddle (sic) some of his neighbors
and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace
and learn the customs and ideas and traditions in
the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that
he conducted himself in proper and approachable
(sic) manner during his entire residence in our
country and he has a gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs
which the petitioner embraced?
a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with
his family they used to ah observed (sic) the
usual Filipino celebration during Christmas and
new year and some occasions such as fiestas.
q And do you know whether petitioner is not
disqualified under Commonwealth Act to become
Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?
a Ah there has been no incident or occasion
which I learned that would disqualify of coming
(sic) the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
I have noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under
Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he
is not opposed to ah (sic) organized government.
His family and himself does not believed (sic) in
the use of force in the success of his ideas and ah
(sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the
practice of illegal and he has not been convicted
in any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and
he is not suffering from any mental alienation or
any incurable contidious (sic) disease. as
provided for.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these
stage?
a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment
with his family we have continuously having ah
(sic) the usual contact with his family.54
It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to
petitioners family, but not specifically to
petitioner. Atty. Adasas statements refer to his
observations on the familys practices and not to
petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony
suggests that he was close to petitioner and
knew him well enough to vouch for his
qualifications.
Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:
q Now do you know the petitioner in this case
Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Are you personally acquainted with him?
a Yes, Sir.
q How long have you known the petitioner?
a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.
q Will you please inform the Honorable court
under what circumstances did you come to know
the petitioner?
a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.
q And from 1991 up to the present is your
relationship with the petitioner more or less
contin[u]ous?
a Yes, Sir.
q How often did you see the petitioner?
a I see him twice a week, Sir.
q And during this time that you met the
petitioner, what did you usually do?
a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero
(sic).
q Do you go to church together?
a Yes, Sir.
q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner
go?
a Yes, Sir.
q How about during fiestas in the place where the
petitioner reside[s], did you also go during
fiestas?
a Yes, Sir.
q During occasion in the house of the petitioner,
are you invited?
a Yes, Sir.
q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic)
residence of the petitioner?
a Twice a week, sir.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner
resides?
a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street,
Tondo, Manila, Sir.
q For how long does the petitioner reside in that
address?
a Since birth, Sir.
q During all the times that you have known the
petitioner, will you please tell us your impression
of his conduct?
a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he
believed in the principles of the Philippines (sic)
Constitution.
q Will you please cite one or two of these
principles underlined the principles (sic) of the
Philippines (sic) Constitution?
a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic)
state, sovereignty preside (sic) over the people
and the government authority emanate from
within; and the other one is the civilian
government is not supreme over the military.
q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all
the qualifications necessary to become a citizen
of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q What are these qualifications?
q So when you said he was the secretary he only
works as part time secretary?
a Yes, Sir.
q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with
the Filipinos?

a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of a Yes, Sir.

good moral and has been residing in the
Philippines since birth. q Will you please name at least one of those
Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) with?
q What else?
a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.
a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the
traditions and customs, Sir. q Who else?

q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted a Elmer Ramos, Sir.

himself in a proper and appraochable (sic)
manner during the period of his residence in the
Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful
occupation?
a Yes, Sir.
q What is the occupation of the petitioner?
a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in
Commonwealth, Sir.
q And aside from being the secretary, what else
did the petitioner do?
q Who else?
a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.
q You said the petitioner is of good moral
character?
a Yes, Sir.
q Why do you know that?
a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and
ah (sic) I can see that he has ah better
approached (sic) with other people and I can see
that he mixed very well with friends.
q So during school days you see him everyday?

a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir. a Yes, Sir.

q Is the petitioner still a student? q When there are no classes during the vacation
you see the petitioner twice a week?
a Yes, Sir.
a Yes, Sir.
q Where is he studying?
q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the
a In UST, Sir. petitioner is not disqualified to become the citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines?
q Is he your classmate?
a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.
a Yes, Sir.
q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?
q What was his course?
a Because he abide [by] any law in the
a Pharmacy, Sir. government, sir, ah (sic) he is not polygamus and
he is not convicted of any crime, Sir.
q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any
organized government?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use
of force in any such ideas?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the
practice of polygamy?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s]
from mental alienation or incurable disease
illnesses?
a No, Sir.
q Why do you know?
a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him
as my classmate, sir and ah (sic) he is a very
intelligent person, Sir.
q Is the petitioner a member also of any
organization or association in your school?
a Yes, Sir.
q What organization?
a He is a member of Wishten and a member of
starget, Sir.
q What does starget means?
a Starget is an organization of Chinese
community in UST, Sir.
q How about the other one which you mentioned?
a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the
ah the (sic) school intercollegiate, Sir.55
Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on
petitioners qualifications.
In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not
personally know him well enough; their
testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications prescribed by law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of
the applicant to prove not only his own good
moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be
credible persons.56 Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only
an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police
character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not incredible. What must be
credible is not the declaration made but the
person making it. This implies that such person
must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that
he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and
that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the applicants worthiness.57
The records likewise do not show that the
character witnesses of petitioner are persons of
good standing in the community; that they are
honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable. The most that was established was
the educational attainment of the witnesses;
however, this cannot be equated with their
credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on
presenting evidence tending to build his own
good moral character and neglected to establish
the credibility and good moral character of his
witnesses.58
We do not agree with petitioners argument that
respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the
petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a
judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata.
A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if
it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any
material fact. Law and jurisprudence even
authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If
the government can challenge a final grant of
citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the
decision of the RTC within the reglementary
period despite its failure to oppose the petition
before the lower court.
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of
naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the
decision of the CA denying the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
is one of the highest privileges that the Republic DENIED for lack of merit.
of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a
privilege that should not be conferred except SO ORDERED.
upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict
compliance with the law.60